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TÜRK TARİH KURUMU



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ÖNSÖZ

Bu cilt, *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk* dizisinin dördüncü cildidir.

Dizinin birinci cildi, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin ikinci yılında yayınlanmıştı ve Türk Kurtuluş Savaşının ilk yılını, Nisan 1919 - Mart 1920 dönemini, kapsıyordu. Bu ilk dönemde Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın, Türk Ulusal Kurtuluş hareketinin lideri olarak tarih sahnesine çıktığı görülür. İtilâf devletleri ise Türk ulusuna boyun eğdirmek için giriştikleri askeri baskıları sürdürürler. Silahlı baskılar, 16 Mart 1920'de başkent İstanbul'un resmen işgaliyle doruk noktasına varır. Birinci cilt orada sona eriyordu.

1975 yılında yayınlanan ikinci cilt, 1920 yılı Nisanından Aralık sonuna kadar geliyordu. Türk Kurtuluş Savaşının bu ikinci yılında Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın "Devlet Kurucusu" olarak ortaya çıktığı, Anadolu'da yeni Türk Devletinin doğduğu görülür. İngiltere'nin Türkiye politikası bakımından ise 1920 yılı, "Sèvres yılı"dır. İngiltere, bu dönemin ilk yarısında Sèvres antlaşmasını Türklere imzalatmak, ikinci yarısında da imzalanan antlaşmayı onaylatıp uygulatmak çabası içinde görülür. Askeri-diplomatik baskılarını aralıksız sürdürür; bu arada Yunanistan, İngiliz emperyalizminin bir aracı olarak kullanılır ve Anadolu içlerine doğru saldırtılır. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya gelince, o, Türk milletinin idam kararı olarak gördüğü Sèvres antlaşmasını yırtıp atmıştı. Tam bağımsızlık için yılmadan savaş veriyordu. Bu gelişmeler, ikinci ciltte adım adım izleniyordu.

Dizinin üçüncü cildi 1979 yılında çıktı. Türk Kurtuluş Savaşının üçüncü yılını, daha doğrusu 1921 yılının ilk dokuz aylık dönemini kapsıyordu. Bu aylar, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümetinin zorlu başarılarla doğru yürüdüğü aylardır. Birinci İnönü, İkinci İnönü ve Sakarya zaferleri bu aylar içinde yer alır. Askeri başarıları diplomatik başarılar izler. Ankara Hükümeti, Afganistan'la, Sovyetlerle antlaşmalar imzalar ve Londra konferansına çağırılır. Uluslararası alanda yavaş yavaş tanınmakta ve yabancı devletlerle ilişkiler kurmaktadır. Sakarya zaferi, Türk kurtuluş Savaşında bir dönüm noktası olur. Askeri bakımdan inisiyatif Türk ordularına geçer. O güne kadar savunma savaşı vermiş olan Türk orduları, bundan böyle taarruz savaşı vereceklerdi. İki yıldır Anadolu'da saldırıda olan Yunan orduları ise artık savunmaya geçeceklerdi. Sakarya zaferi üzerine İtilâf devletleri cephesinde de sarsıntılar ve çatlamalar baş gösterecekti. Kitabın üçüncü cildi Sakarya zaferinin ilk yankılarını da içine alıyor, 1921 yılı Eylül sonuna kadar geliyordu.

Beş yıllık bir aradan sonra yayınlanan bu dördüncü cilt, üçüncü cildin bittiği yerden başlıyor. Türk kurtuluş savaşının son yılını kapsıyor. Ekim 1921'den Ekim 1922'ye, yani Mudanya konferansının toplanmasına kadar uzanıyor.

Bu cildin de yayınlanmasıyla, üç buçuk yıl kadar sürmüş olan Türk Kurtuluş Savaşıyla ilgili İngiliz belgeleri dört ciltte toplanmış oluyor. Altı ay eksiğiyle, her yıla bir cilt ayrılmış demektir. Bu dört cilde, belki, Türk Kurtuluş Savaşının belgesel bir panoraması veya bir kronolojisi de denilebilir.

Dört cildi, üstüste, üç-dört yıl içinde gün yüzüne çıkarabilmeyi çok isterdim; ama olmadı. Türk Tarih Kurumunun yıllık yayın programları, Basimevinin iş durumu ve özellikle benim görevle sürekli yer değiştirmek durumunda oluşum gecikmelere neden oldu. Belgeleri, görevle bulunduğum Londra'da, 1970'lerde derlemiştim. Şimdi on yıl geriye bakıyorum: Birinci cildi Paris'te, ikinci cildi Ankara'da, üçüncü cildi Lâhey'de tamamlayabilmişim. Dördüncü cildi şimdi yine Ankara'da bitiriyorum. Dizinin bundan sonrasını, Atatürk'ün ölümüne kadar uzanacak diğer ciltlerini, nerde, ne zaman tamamlayabilirim, bilemiyorum.



Bu ciltte ilk göze çarpan, Sakarya zaferinden sonra bir bekleyiş döneminin başlamış olmasıdır. En iddialı Yunan saldırısı fiyaskoyla sonuçlanmıştı. Yunan ordusu, Sakarya'da büyük zayıat vererek önceki hatlarına çekilmek zorunda kalmış ve artık saldırı gücünü yitirmiş, siperlerde bekleyişe geçmişti. Türk ordusu, Sakarya'da ağır bir yenilgiye uğratmış düşmanı gerisi geriye kovalamış, ama denize dökmeğe kalkışmamıştı. Kısacası, cephe de silahlar susmuştu. Bu suskun bekleyiş bir yıla yakın sürecekti.

Askeri bakımdan olduğu gibi diplomatik bakımdan da bir bekleyiş dönemine girilmişti. Askeri zaferleri genellikle diplomatik zaferler izler. İnönü zaferlerinden sonra bu böyle olmuştu. Sakarya zaferinden sonra da Ankara Hükümetinin yeni diplomatik başarılar kazanması beklenirdi. Gerçi bu bekleyiş büsbütün boşa çıkmamıştı. Ekim 1921'de Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti ile Fransa arasında imzalanan anlaşma, Ankara için bir diplomatik başarıydı ve bu başarı, Sakarya zaferinin bir sonucuydu. Bu anlaşmanın imzalanmasıyla, Ankara Hükümeti, Birinci Dünya Savaşının Batılı galiplerinden birine kendisini tanıtmış ve İtilâf Devletleri cephesinde bir çatlak yaratmış oluyordu.

Ama asıl önemli olan İngiltere'nin tutumuydu. Türkiye'ye karşı yürütülen emperyalist politikanın elebaşılığını yapan ve Batılı düşman cepheyi ayakta tutan İngiltere idi. Sèvres antlaşmasının baş mimarı olan İngiltere, diplomatik alanda inisiyatif elinde tutuyordu. Türkiye'nin ulusal sınırlar içinde tam bağımsızlık istediğinin karşısında asıl İngiltere vardı. Sakarya zaferi üzerine İngiltere'nin Türkiye politikasında köklü bir değişiklik beklenebilir miydi ve Türkiye için onurlu bir barış yolu açılabilir miydi? Düğüm buradaydı. Sakarya'da Yunan yenilgisinin İngilizleri epeyce derinden etkilediği görülüyor. İngiltere Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Sakarya meydan muharebesinin ayrıntılı bir değerlendirmesini yapmıştı. Vardığı sonuç özetle şuydu: Yunan ordusu, herhangi bir kararı veya Sèvres antlaşmasını Türklere empoze edebilecek güçte değildi. Anadolu'ya barış

getiremezdi. Yunanistan, Türkiye'ye karşı savaşı sürdürmekle hiçbir şey kazanamazdı. Belki çok şey kaybedebilirdi. Yunanistan için çıkar yol, tezelden Mustafa Kemal ile görüşme masasına oturmak ve Anadolu macerasından sıyrılmaktı. İngiliz Genelkurmayının bu görüşü, Savunma Bakanlığınca da paylaşıyordu.

Koloniler Bakanlığı, hem Yunanistan'ı yaklaştıran bir felâketten kurtarmak, hem de Irak'a karşı muhtemel bir Türk tehdidini savuşturmak için, Türk-Yunan savaşına artık bir son verilmesi, Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile barış görüşmelerine gidilmesi gerektiği görüşündeydi. İngiltere'nin Irak Yüksek Komiseri Sir P. Cox, Londra'ya durmadan uyarıyordu. "Mustafa Kemal ile görüşme kapısı açılmalı" diyordu. Cox'un görüşüne göre, Sakarya zaferinden sonra Ankara'da başlayan Türk-Fransız görüşmelerine, İngiltere hesabına Irak Kralı Faysal da katılabilirdi. Böylece, İngiltere de dolaylı yoldan Mustafa Kemal ile görüşmeye başlamış olurdu. Görüşmeler ilerde, iki taraflı olmaktan çıkar, üç taraflı olur, Türk-Fransız-İngiliz görüşmelerine dönüşürdü. Koloniler Bakanlığı da Cox'un bu görüşünü paylaşıyor ve Irak'a karşı bir Türk harekâtını önlemek için tezelden Mustafa Kemal ile anlaşmak ve Türkiye ile yeniden dostluk kurmak gerektiği görüşünü benimsiyordu.

Sakarya zaferi üzerine Hindistan İşleri Bakanlığı da ciddi kaygıya kapılmıştı. Lloyd George Hükümetinin, Türkiye'nin kurtuluş ve bağımsızlık savaşına karşı güttüğü düşmanca politika, Hindistan'da, Afganistan'da ve Orta Asya içlerinde İngiltere'ye karşı kaynaşmalar yaratıyordu. Sakarya zaferinden sonra artık İngiltere'nin Anadolu ve Trakya üzerindeki Türk haklarını teslim etmesi isteniyordu. Hindistan Genel Valiliği, Türk istekleri kabul edilirse, Hindistan'da ve Afganistan'da gitükçe büyüyen kaynaşmaların yatışacağını umuyordu. "Majesteleri Hükümeti ileri bir adım atabilir ve özellikle Trakya ve İzmir ile ilgili barış şartlarının yumuşatılmasında Türkiye'ye yardımcı olabilirse bunun Hindistan'da hemen olumlu sonuçları görülecektir" diyordu. Hindistan İşleri Bakanlığı, Genel Valiliğin bu görüşlerini benimseyip destekliyordu.

Demek ki, Sakarya zaferi üzerine, Lloyd George Kabinesi içinde yeni sesler yükselmeye başlamıştı. Koloniler Bakanlığı, Hindistan İşleri Bakanlığı, Savunma Bakanlığı ve ayrıca Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Türk-Yunan savaşına artık son verilmesini, Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile görüşme masasına oturulmasını, Türkiye'nin haklı isteklerinin bir ölçüde kabul edilmesini ve Türk-İngiliz dostluğunun yeniden kurulmasını savunuyorlardı.

İngiltere Başbakanı Lloyd George ile Dışişleri Bakanı Lord Curzon'un Türkiye'ye karşı tutumları ise halâ çok olumsuz ve düşmancaydı. Curzon, Mustafa Kemal ile doğrudan ilişki kurulmasına kesinlikle karşıydı. Mustafa Kemal isterse, İstanbul Hükümeti aracılığıyla görüşlerini İngiltere'ye duyurabilir, diyordu. İngiltere, yalnız İstanbul Hükümetini tanıyordu. Ankara Hükümetiyle yarı resmi bile ilişki kurmak niyetinde değildi. Ankara ve Londra

Hükümetlerini birbirlerine yaklaştırmayı amaçlayan her girişimi Curzon sert biçimde reddediyordu. İngiltere, bütün Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı boyunca, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümetiyle asla doğrudan ilişki kurmayacaktı ve kurmadı.

Lord Curzon, Sakarya zaferinden sonra Anadolu'daki Türk-Yunan savaşına artık bir son verilmesi yolunda yükselen isteklere doğrudan cephe alamıyordu. Ama, barış girişimlerini ertelemek ve amaçlarından saptırmak taktiği izliyordu. Sakarya'da Yunan yenilgisinin Batıda yarattığı ilk şok atlatılmalı, Lloyd George Hükümetinin Türkiye politikasına karşı yükselen eleştiriler az-çok yatıştırılmalı, müttefik cephede beliren çatlaklar iyi-kötü onarılmalıydı. Barış önerileri Türklerin haklı ulusal isteklerine cevap vermekten ziyade, Yunanistan'ı kayırp korumayı amaçlamalıydı. Mustafa Kemal oyalanmalı, Türk ordusunun taarruza kalkması önlenmeli ve Yunanistan, Anadolu macerasından en az zararla çıkabilmeliydi.

Bu düşüncelerle Lord Curzon, epeyce ayak sürüdükten ve Sakarya zaferi üzerinden üç ay kadar bir zaman geçirdikten sonra, 1921 sonlarına doğru yeni bir barış girişimine kalkıştı. Fransa ve İtalya ile yazışmalara girişti. Hazırlanan İngiliz barış programı önce müttefiklere benimsetilecek, sonra Yunanistan'a ve Türkiye'ye iletilecekti. Müttefiklerarası tartışmalar ve yazışmalar da iki ay kadar sürdü. Sakarya zaferinden altı ay sonra, Mart 1922'de müttefiklerin önerileri ortaya çıktı.

İngiliz planına dayanan bu öneriler, Ankara, İstanbul ve Atina Hükümetlerine sunuldu. Bunlara göre, Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında mütareke yapılacak, Anadolu kansız boşaltılacak, azınlıklar korunacak, Ermeni sorunu Milletler Cemiyetine havale edilecek, doğu Trakya sınırı biraz geri alınarak Tekirdağ Türkiye'ye bırakılacak, buna karşılık Edirne, Babaeski, Kırklareli ve Gelibolu yarımadası Yunanistan'a verilecek, Sèvres antlaşmasının mali, iktisadi ve askeri hükümleri Türkiye lehine birazcık yumuşatılacak idi.

İtilâf devletlerinin bu barış planı, Türk ulusunun uğrunda savaştığı ulusal sınırlar içinde tam bağımsızlık isteklerine cevap vermekten çok uzaktı. Misak-ı Milli, 1913 sınırına kadar doğu Trakya'nın da kurtarılmasını öngörüyordu. İtilaf devletleri ise yalnız Tekirdağ'a kadar olan yerleri Türkiye'ye bırakmak, geri kalan doğu Trakya topraklarını ve bu arada Edirne'yi Yunanistan'a vermek istiyorlardı. Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında mütareke yapılması ve Anadolu'nun kan dökülmeden boşaltılması öngörülüyordu. Ama, Ankara Hükümeti, mütarekenin yapılmasıyla birlikte Yunan ordularının da Anadolu'yu boşaltmaya başlamalarını isteyince, karşı tarafın niyetleri daha iyi anlaşıldı. Birazcık yumuşatılmış bir Sèvres antlaşması Türkiye'ye tümüyle empoze edilmedikçe bir tek Yunan askerinin bile Anadolu'dan çekilmeyeceği belli oluyordu. İngiltere, Türklerle mütareke yaptırmak isterken Türk ordusunu yerinde mihlayıp taarruza kalkmaktan alıkoymayı amaçlıyordu. Anadolu'nun boşaltılması sorunu ise süruncemede bırakılacak ve "zaman aşımına" uğratılacaktı.

Bir de konferans toplanmasından, buna Ankara, İstanbul ve Atina Hükümetlerinin de çağırılmalarından söz edildiği görülüyordu. Barış konferansı-na hazırlık niteliğinde olacak bu toplantının Beykoz'da mı, İzmit'te mi yoksa bir Avrupa kentinde mi olacağı konusunda tartışmalar, kısır yazışmalar sürüp gidiyordu.

Bu arada İngilizler dikkatlerini Anadolu'nun içişlerine çevirmişlerdi. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın yıldızı parlamış, durumu güçlenmişti. Ama zamanla bu durumun değişebileceği, Mustafa Kemal'in çeşitli güçlüklerle karşılaşarak yıpranabileceği hesaplanıyordu. İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nda hazırlanan bazı notlarda, "Türk milliyetçilerine karşı en etkili baskı yönteminin Anadolu'daki çıkmaz durumun sürdürülmesi olacağı" belirtiliyordu. Hesapça, Türklerin ekonomik ve mali durumları kötüydü, Anadolu halkı savaştan bıkmıştı, çıkmaz durum sürüp giderse, sonunda Mustafa Kemal'in gücü çökebilirdi. Zaman, Mustafa Kemal'in aleyhine işliyordu.

Bu yöndeki İngiliz raporları birbirini izler. Ocak 1922'de Sir H. Rumbold, Ankara'da çözülme belirtileri var, diye rapor eder. Rauf Bey ve Refet Paşa, Mustafa Kemal'le anlaşmazlığa düşmüşler ve istifa etmişlerdi. T.B.M.M.'de Mustafa Kemal'e karşı güçlü bir karşıt grup bulunduğu anlaşılmıştı. Mustafa Kemal'in yetkileri daraltılmak isteniyordu. Şubat'ta Mustafa Kemal ile Meclis arasındaki gerginlik sürüyordu. Mart'ta, T.B.M.M. içindeki karşıt grupların ayrıntılı dökümü yapılıyordu. Mustafa Kemal'in Müdafaa-i Hukuk grubunun karşısında Din adamları grubu, "Doğu illeri grubu", sözde Komünist Partisi, İttihatçılar, "Küme Partisi", "Tevhit Grubu" gibi çeşitli karşıt gruplar oluşmuştu. İstanbul'da Padişah, Mustafa Kemal'e karşı bir koruyucu arıyor, gözlerini Londra'ya çeviriyor ve İngiltere ile gizlice anlaşmak istiyordu. Mayıs başında İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri Ankara'daki durumun yeniden değerlendirmesi-ni yapıyor, Mustafa Kemal'e karşıt grupları anlatıyor, Türklerle Yunanlılar arasındaki askeri dengenin Yunanlılardan yana döndüğünü, çarpışmalar yeniden başlarsa ne Türklerin ne de Yunanlıların başarı kazanabileceklerini rapor ediyordu. Yani Anadolu'daki "çıkmaz durum" sürüp gidiyordu ve sürüp gidecekti....

1922 Haziran, Temmuz aylarında, Yunanistan'ın İstanbul'u işgal etmek istediği, Yunan işgali altındaki batı Anadolu'da da ayrı bir Hükümet kurulacağı haberleri çıkarıldı. Kurulacak Batı Anadolu Hükümeti, Ankara Hükümetine karşı, Yunan kanadı altında olacaktı. Ankara Hükümeti, tüm Anadolu'yu ve doğu Trakya'yı kurtarmağa çalışırken Anadolu'nun bir bölümünün elden gittiğini görecekti. Yunan orduları Anadolu'dan çekilip gitseler bile arkalarında ayrı bir Hükümet kurup bırakacaklardı. Mustafa Kemal'in durumu daha da sarsılacaktı.

İngiliz raporlarına bakılırsa, T.B.M.M. içinde Mustafa Kemal'e muhalefet 1922 yaz aylarında durmadan artıyordu. Meclis, Temmuz başında, Hükümet

üyelerinin seçimiyle ilgili yasayı kabul etmiş, Mustafa Kemal'in yetkilerini kısmıştı. Mustafa Kemal artık hükümet üyeliklerine aday gösteremeyecekti. Ankara Hükümetinde değişiklikler olmuştu. Belki Rauf Bey, Mustafa Kemal'e rakip olarak sıvılabılırdi. Mustafa Kemal, sarsılan otoritesini güçlendirmeye çabalıyordu. Eski otoritesini kazanıp kazanamayacağı Rauf Beyin tutumuna da bağlıydı. Ankara'da Mustafa Kemal'in durumunu etkileyen herşey, uluslararası durumu da etkileyecekti. Milli hareket zayıflarsa, Ankara daha ılımlı bir tutum izlemeye başlayacak, yani İtilaf devletlerinin isteklerine boyun eğecekti. Ağustos başında İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri, İstanbul Hükümeti Hariciye Nazırı ile bir görüşmesini rapor ediyordu. İzzet Paşa'ya göre, Mustafa Kemal'in durumu sarsılmıştı. Ankara'da vekilleri artık Mustafa Kemal seçmiyordu. Bundan sonra yapılacak konferansta Ankara'yı Rauf Bey temsil etmeliydi.

Bu gibi kısır yazışmalar ve boşuna bekleyişlerle zaman yitirildi. Anadolu'daki çıkmaz durum sürdürüldükçe sürdürüldü. 1922 Ağustos ayı sonlarına gelirken görünen durum kısaca şuydu: Sakarya Meydan Savaşının üzerinden bir yıl geçmişti. Bir yıldır Anadolu fiilen savaşıyor, barış bekliyordu. Barışın ne zaman Türk ulusuna lütfen bahsedileceği, tâ uzaklardaki Lloyd George'ların, Lord Curzon'ların iradelerine kalmıştı. Gerçi Sakarya'dan altı ay sonra İtilaf Devletleri Dışişleri Bakanları bir barış plânı saptamışlardı. Ama bunun arkası gelmemişti. Arkasını Batı'ya dayamış olan Yunanistan Anadolu'yu boşaltmak niyetinde görünmüyordu. Hiç değilse Batı Anadolu'da ayrı bir "Rum Devleti" veya "İyonya Devleti" kurup bırakmadan çekilmeme kararındaydı. Lloyd George Hükümetinin de böyle bir iğreti "Devleti" tanımaktan geri kalmayacağı seziliyordu. Anadolu'nun boşaltılacağı yolundaki haberler sıklaştıkça, İstanbul Hükümetinin Ankara Hükümetine karşı düşmanlığı yeniden artmıştı. Anadolu boşaltılırsa, Ankara Hükümetine değil, İstanbul Hükümetine teslim edilmeliydi. Padişah bunu istiyordu ve bu uğurda İngiltere ile anlaşmağa hazırdı. Gerek İngiltere, gerek Padişah, Mustafa Kemal'i içten çökertme emellerinden kendilerini kurtaramamışlardı. Sakarya'dan beri yerinden kıpırdamayan Türk ordusunu hesaba katan pek kalmamış gibiydi. İngiliz askeri otoritelerinin son raporlarına bakılırsa, Türk ordusu taarruza kalkışamazdı, kalkışsa bile Yunan ordusunu Anadolu'dan söküp atamazdı.

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26 Ağustos 1922 sabahı başlayan Büyük Taarruz, İngilizler için tam bir sürpriz oldu. İngiliz haberalma örgütleri, Türk taarruzunu zamanında haber alamamışlardı. Haber aldıkları zaman ise artık Yunan ordusu Dumlupınar'da yenilmiş bulunuyordu. Lloyd George Hükümeti şaşkına döndü. Telâşlı yazışmalar birdenbire olağanüstü ölçüde arttı. Yalnız 1922 Eylülünde yapılan yazışmalar bu cildin yarısından çoğunu oluşturur. Bu bir ay içinde İngilizlerin

Türkiye ile ilgili yazışmaları, ondan önceki on aylık yazışmalarından daha fazla gibidir. Sanki yer yerinden oynamıştı. Telgraf makinaları geceli gündüzlü durmadan çalışıyordu.

Atina Hükümeti, cephedeki durumun vahametini 1 Eylül gecesi öğrenir. Ertesi sabah İngiltere'ye başvurur. Ateşkes yapılmasını ister. Anadolu'yu hemen boşaltmağa hazırdır. Ama, ateşkes için Türk Orduları Başkomutanına başvuracağı yerde Londra'nın kapısını çalar. İngiltere'nin Yunanistan için daha elverişli bir ateşkes anlaşması sağlayabileceğini umar. 3 Eylülde Atina ve Londra Hükümetleri biraz iyimser haberler alırlar. General Tricupis ordularının Anadolu'da biraz direnebilecekleri umuduna kapılırlar. Ama umutları boşa çıkar. 6 Eylülde General Tricupis'in Türklere tutsak düştüğü duyulur. İngilizler buna pek inanamazlar. Ertesi gün haber doğrulanır. İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri Rumbold, "General Tricupis Başkomutanlığa atandığını ilk önce Mustafa Kemal Paşa'dan öğrenmiş" diye rapor eder. 7 Eylülde, "durum vahim... Ateşkes için yitirilecek zaman yok" der. Ama İngilizlerin ciddi girişimlerine ve diplomatik baskılarına pek zaman kalmaz. 9 Eylülde Türk orduları İzmir'e ulaşırlar. Anadolu Yunan ordularından temizlenmiş demektir. Yunanistan'ın ateşkes isteği anlamını yitirir.

İngilizler kendi dertlerine düşerler. İzmir'den İngiliz kolonisini boşaltmak, Boğazlar bölgesindeki İngiliz birliklerini toparlamak ilk kayguları olur. Padişahın güvenliğini sağlamak sorunu da gündeme gelir. Bu arada Mustafa Kemal'in İngiltere'yle savaş halinde olduğu yolunda İzmir'deki İngiliz Başkonsolosundan çıkan bir telgraf Londra'da telaş yaratır. Gerçi bu haberin yanlış olduğu çabucak ortaya çıkar. Ama Lloyd George Hükümetinin Türkiye'ye karşı takındığı tutum, pek ciddi bir bunalım yaratır.

İzmir'i kurtardıktan sonra doğu Trakya'yı da kurtarmak amacıyla İstanbul'a ve Çanakkale'ye yönelen muzaffer Türk ordularının karşısına bu kez İngiltere dikildi. Lloyd George başkanlığındaki İngiliz kabinesi, 15 Eylül günü pek ciddi bir karar aldı: "Muzaffer Kemalist ordunun bir tehlike olduğunu" gözönünde tutarak, İngiliz kuvvetlerinin İstanbul'da ve Boğazlar bölgesinde silâh zoruyla tutunmasına ve General Harington'a takviye gönderilmesine karar verdi. Lloyd George, aynı gün, Kanada, Avustralya, Yeni Zelanda, Güney Afrika Birliği Başbakanları ile Newfoundland Başbakan Vekiline telgrafla başvurdu. Türklere karşı savaşmak üzere tezelden asker gönderilmesini istedi. Lord Curzon da Romanya ve Yugoslavya'ya başvurdu. Türk ordusunun "Boğazların geçiş serbestliği ve Balkanların dengesi için bir tehlike olduğunu" ileri sürerek, General Harington emrine birer tümen göndermelerini istedi. Lloyd George Hükümeti, Mustafa Kemal'in kurtarıcı ordularına karşı İngiliz dominyonlarını, Balkan Devletlerini ve Müttefikleri seferber etmeğe çalışıyor ve yeni bir genel savaş hazırlığına kalkışlıyordu. Çanakkale'ye hızla İngiliz birlikleri yığılmağa başlanıyordu.

Bu arada Türk orduları ileri yürüyüşlerini sürdürüyorlardı. Fransa ve İtalya, Türklere karşı savaşmayacaklarını açıklayarak, Boğazların Anadolu yakasından askerlerini çektiler. Ama İngiltere gerilemek niyetinde değildi. Yeni bir genel savaş çıkırtkanlığıyla durmadan Çanakkale'ye asker yığıyordu. Harington'a gönderilen buyrukta belirtildiğine göre, Çanakkale ve Boğazların serbestliği, İngiliz politikasının temeliydi. Askeri öneminin yanı sıra, Çanakkale, o sırada, Britanya İmparatorluğunun prestiji bakımından pek büyük anlam taşıyordu. Çanakkale'nin fiilen elde tutulması son derece önemliydi. Bu bakımdan General Harington, gerekli bütün önlemleri almağa yetkiliydi. Gerekirse, Boğazlara yaklaşmaması için Mustafa Kemal'i uyatabilirdi. 22 Eylülde Sir H. Rumbold, "bir yanardağ üzerinde oturuyoruz" diyordu. İngiliz kolonisi Türkiye'den boşaltılıyor, buna karşılık Çanakkale'ye İngiliz askeri dolduruluyordu.

Bu gergin hava içinde, 20 Eylülde, Paris'te İtilâf Devletleri Konferansı toplandı. Birinci oturum, İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanı Lord Curzon ile Fransa Başbakanı ve Dışişleri Bakanı Mösyö Poincaré arasında tartışmalarla geçti. Curzon, kuvvet politikasını savundu. Yoksa Mustafa Kemal, Gordion'un düğümünü kılıçla kesecek, yani Boğazları, İstanbul'u ve Trakya'yı kuvvet zoruyla alacaktı. Buna izin verilmemeliydi. Yunanistan'ı yenmiş olan Mustafa Kemal'in şimdi Müttefikleri de yenmesine göz yumulamazdı. M. Poincaré, Fransa'nın Türklere karşı kuvvet kullanamayacağını anlattı ve en kısa zamanda barış konferansının toplanmasını istedi. Türkleri barış masasına getirebilmek için de Mustafa Kemal'e elle tutulur vaadde bulunmak gerektiğini savundu.

Konferansın ikinci oturumunda Poincaré, Türk zaferinin kapsamını İngiltere'nin yeterince kavrayamadığını, bütün kolonilerin kaynaştığını, Müttefiklerin gerçekten "büyük bir tehlike" karşısında bulunduklarını, Mustafa Kemal'in istediği an Boğazları geçebileceğini, bunu önlemenin tek yolunun tezelden barış konferansını toplamak olduğunu anlattı. İtalya temsilcisi Kont Sforza da Poincaré'nin görüşlerine katıldı. Curzon, Fransızlarla İtalyanları "Kemalden fazla Kemalist" olmakla suçladı, ama sonunda o da bir konferans toplanmasını kabul etmek durumunda kaldı.

Ondan sonraki üç gün boyunca, üç Müttefik temsilci, toplanacak konferansın şartlarını tartıştılar. M. Poincaré, Edirne'nin ve Meriç nehrine kadar doğu Trakya'nın Türkiye'ye bırakılmasını, yoksa Türklerin konferansa gelmeyeceklerini ve Türk askerinin Boğazlardan geçip doğu Trakya'yı silâhla geri alacağını savundu. Curzon buna karşı çıktı: Konferansa gelsin diye Mustafa Kemal'e rüşvet mi verilecekti?! Trakya sorunu barış konferansında çözülmeliydi. Türkler istediklerini önceden alırlarsa barış konferansının anlamı kalır mıydı? İngiliz ve Fransız görüşleri yine uzun uzun çarpışıyordu ve üç gün boyunca çarpıştı. Bir ara tartışmalar kopacak gibi oldu. Lord Curzon, Fransız askerinin Mustafa Kemal'den yılıp sıvıştığını ima ediyordu. M. Poincaré, Fransa'nın 1915 Çanakkale felâketini unutmadığını, İngiltere'nin arkasına takılıp yeni bir

maceraya sürüklenemeyeceğini sezdirdiyordu. Sınırlar gerilmiş, ses tonları yükselmşti. Yarım saatlik bir çay molası verildi. Hava biraz yatıştı. Sonunda Lord Curzon, Müttefik cepheyi ayakta tutabilmek amacıyla, Meriç'e kadar doğu Trakya'nın Türkiye'ye geri verilmesine razı oldu. Ama "Misak-ı Milli" ağza alınmayacaktı. Yoksa Batı Trakya sorunu da değilebilirdi. İşler büsbütün sarpa sarardı.

En sonunda, güç belâ bir ortak nota hazırlanabildi. 23 Eylül tarihliydi. Sforza, Curzon, Poincaré imzalarını taşıyordu. Bununla Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti barış konferansına çağırıldı. Meriç'e kadar doğu Trakya'nın ve Edirne kentinin Türkiye'ye bırakılacağına da söz verildi.

Türkiye'ye yapılan bu barış çağrısından sonra gerginlik yatışmadı. İngiltere yine Çanakkale'de savaş hazırlıkları yapıyordu. Türk birlikleri de Çanakkale'ye yaklaşıyorlardı. Müttefikler, kendi kendilerine, Boğazların Anadolu kıyısında bir sözde "tarafsız bölge" ilân etmişlerdi. İngilizler, Türk askerinin buraya giremeyeceğini ileri sürüyorlardı. Türk askeri, 23 Eylülde bu sözde "tarafsız" bölge sınırını ilk kez aştı. Gelibolu'nun karşısına düşen Lapseki kasabasını kurtardı. Türk süvarisi Çanakkale'ye yöneldi. Erenköy'ü zaptetti. 26 Eylülde General Harington, Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya bir nota gönderdi. Türk süvarisinin "tarafsız bölge"den geri çekilmesini istedi. Mustafa Kemal Paşa, "aramızda bir tarafsız bölge kararlaştırıldığından haberim yok" dedi. Türk süvarisinin Yunan ordusunu kovaladığını belirtti. İngilizlerin Çanakkale'deki askeri önlemlerini anlayamadığını ekledi. Boğazların serbestliğinin Ankara Hükümetince zaten tanındığını bildirdi ve herhangi bir yanlış anlaşılmaya meydan verilmemesini istedi.

Başkomutan Mustafa Kemal Paşa gerilemiyordu. Fransız ve İtalyan birlikleri gibi İngiliz askerinin de Çanakkale'nin Anadolu kıyısından çekilmesini istiyordu. Yoğun yazışmalar ve Fransızların telâhî arabuluculuk çabaları sürüp giderken Türk askeri de durmadan ilerliyor ve Çanakkale bölgesindeki İngiliz kuvvetlerinin üzerine doğru yürüyordu. Dünya, ürpertici bir bekleyiş içindeydi.

28 Eylül akşamı Türk ve İngiliz askerleri burun buruna geldiler. Durum son derece nâzikti. Barışın veya savaşın kaderi Çanakkale'de belli olacaktı. Türkiye ile İngiltere, yeni bir savaşın eşiğine dayanmışlardı. Londra'da İngiliz Kabinesi, sınır gerginliği içinde, sürekli toplantı halindeydi. Harington'un Mustafa Kemal'e ultimatum vermesini, Türk askeri çekilmezse üzerine ateş edilmesini bekliyordu. Harington bocaladı. Ultimatum göndermeyi, ateş emri vermeyi göze alamadı. Türk askeri bir adım daha yürüdü ve İngiliz siperlerine dayandı. İngilizler tetüğe dokunamadılar.

Mustafa Kemal Paşa, General Harington'un bileğini sonuna kadar bükükten sonra, 29 Eylülde askeri harekâtı durdurdu. Aynı gün Ankara Hükümeti, askeri harekâtı durdurulduğunu, Mudanya konferansının kabul edildiğini, Konferansta Türkiye'yi İsmet Paşa'nın temsil edeceğini M. Poincaré'ye duyurdu. Müttefik Generallerin de 3 Ekimde Mudanya'ya gelmelerini istedi.

Bu gelişmelerin ayrıntıları ve daha birçok konu üzerinde kitapta bol sayıda belge vardır. Bunlar ilginç, aydınlatıcı ve düşündürücü belgelerdir. Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı tarihi, üzerinde uzun uzun düşünülmeğe değer bir alandır.

Bir rastlantıyla, bu satırları Çanakkale zaferinin yıldönümünde noktalıyorum. Düşüncelere dalıyorum. Ve öyle sanıyorum ki, bu kitap okuyucuyu düşündürebildiği ölçüde amacına ulaşmış olacaktır.

Ankara, Gaziosmanpaşa, 18 Mart 1984

BİLÂL N. ŞİMŞİR

Türk Tarih Kurumu Üyesi

BELGELERDE VE DİPNOTLARDA GEÇEN KISALTMALAR

A.C.	: Army Corps (Kolordu)
a.m.	: <i>ante meridiem</i> (öğleden önce)
B.M.A.	: British Military Attaché (İngiliz Askeri Ateşesi)
CAB.	: Cabinet (İngiliz Kabinesi Arşivi)
C.B.	: Companion of the Bath (İngiliz asalet ünvanı)
C.G.S.	: Chief of the General Staff (Genelkurmay Başkanı)
C-in-C.	: Commander-in-Chief (Başkomutan)
C.M.G.	: Companion of the order of St Michael and St George (İngiliz asalet ünvanı)
C.U.P.	: Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Komitesi)
D.B.F.P.	: <i>Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. First series.</i> (İngiliz Dış Politikası üzerine Belgeler, 1919-1939, Birinci dizi).
Div.	: Division (Tümen)
D.S.O.	: Distinguished Service Order (Üstün Hizmet Nişanı)
E...	: <i>Eastern</i> (İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Doğu Dairesinin arşiv rumuzu)
F.A.	: <i>Field Artillery</i> (Sahra topçusu)
F.O.	: <i>Foreign Office Archives</i> (İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivleri)
—/371	: İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivlerinin <i>General Correspondence</i> (Genel Yazışmalar) serisi...
—/406	: İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivlerinin <i>Confidential Print</i> (Gizli Yayınlar) serisi...
G.C.B.	: Grand Cross Bath (İngiliz asalet nişanı)
G.C.M.G.	: Grand Cross St. Michael and St. George (İngiliz asalet nişanı)
G.C.S.I	: Grand Commander Star of India (İngiliz asalet nişanı)
G.H.Q.	: General Headquarters (Genel karargâh)
G.O.C.	: General Officer Commanding (Ordu Komutanı)
G.O.C-in-C.	: General Officer Commander-in-Chief (Başkomutan)
H.A.	: Heavy Artillery (Ağır Topçu)
H.C.	: House of Commons (Avam Kamarası)
H.L.	: House of Lords (Lordlar Kamarası)
H.M.	: His Majesty (Zatı Şahane, Haşmetlü, İngiliz Kral(hğ)ı)

H.M.S.	: His Majesty's Ship (İngiliz Gemisi)
i.e.	: <i>id est</i> (yani, şöyle ki, demek ki.)
K.C.	: Knight Commander (İngiliz asalet ünvanı)
K.C.B.	: Knight Commander of the order of the Bath (İngiliz asalet ünvanı)
K.C.M.G.	: Knight Commander of St. Michael and St. George (İngiliz asalet ünvanı)
K.G.	: Knight of the order of the Garter (İngiliz asalat ünvanı)
L.T.	: Livre Turque (Türk lirası)
M.A.	: Military Attaché (Askeri ateşe)
M.	: Monsieur (Bay)
M.C.	: Military Cross (Askeri Haç nişanı)
M.I.	: Military Intelligence (Askeri istihbarat)
Misc.	: Miscellaneous (çeşitli)
M.P.	: Member of Parliament (Parlamento üyesi, milletvekili)
N.	: North (Kuzey)
N.N.W.	: North - North West (Kuzey-Kuzey Batı)
N.W.	: North - West (Kuzey Batı)
O.C.	: Officer Commanding (Kumandan Subay)
O.M.	: Order of Merit (Liyakat nişanı)
p.	: page (Sayfa)
p.m.	: <i>post meridiem</i> (öğleden sonra)
P.R.O.	: Public Record Office (İngiliz Devlet arşivleri)
P.W.	: Prisoners of War (Savaş tutsakları)
R.E.	: Royal Engineers
Regt.	: Regiment
Rt. Hon.	: Right Honorable (Sayın)
S.	: South (Güney)
S., Sd., Sgd.	: Signed (imza)
Se.	: Signé (İmza)
Sic.	: Aslında yanlış
S.N.O.	: Senior Naval Officer (Kıdemli Deniz Subayı)
SS.	: Steam Ship (vapur)
S.S.W.	: South - South West (Güney - Güney Batı)
S.W.	: South West (Güney Batı)
Vol.	: Volume (Cilt)
W.O.	: War Office (İngiltere Harbiye Bakanlığı)
W.T.	: Wireless Telegraph (Telsiz telgraf)

BELGELERİN LİSTESİ VE ÖZETLERİ

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
1	6 Ekim	HİNDİSTAN İŞLERİ BAKANI MONTAGU'DAN İNGİLİZ BAKANLAR KURULUNA, Hindistan'dan gelen telgrafi Kabinenin bilgisine sunuyorum.	1
Ek.	1 Ekim	HİNDİSTAN GENEL VALİLİĞİNDEN LONDRA'YA TEL. Barış şartları Türkiye yararına yumuşatılırsa, bunun, Hindistan'da, Afganistan'da ve Orta Asya'da olumlu etkileri görülecek. İngiltere'nin cömertçe bir jesti, Orta Asya'da İngiltere'ye karşı islam kaynaşmasını yatıştırarak. Bu telkinin İngiliz hükümetince dikkate alınması önemle rica olunur.	1
2	7 Ekim	DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İNGİLİZ BAKANLAR KURULUNA MUHTIRA, Sakarya Savaşı sonrasında siyasal durum: 1. Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında arabuluculuk konusu yine ortaya atıldı. Görünen şudur: Yunan ordusu Sakarya'da 23.000 zayıat verdikten sonra çekiliyor. Morali sarsılmış. 17.000 zayıat veren Türkler, Yunanlıları Eskişehir'den ve Afyon'dan atmağa kalkışmayacaklar gibi. Askeri durum, arabuluculuk girişimine elverişli görünüyor. 2. Siyasal bakımdan, Yunanistan'ın tutumu henüz belli değil. Yunan Başbakanı Gounaris yakında Londra'ya gelecek. Arabuluculuk isteyip istemediği o zaman anlaşılacak. İstanbul Hükümeti pek önemli değil. Sadrazam Tevfik Paşa, arabuluculuk için müttefiklere başvurmayı düşünüyor. Ankara'dan alınan raporlar pek umut verici değil. Kimi belirtilere göre Ankara Hükümeti arabuluculuk önerilerini kabul edebilecek, ama kendi şartlarını öne sürecektir. Mustafa Kemal'in durumu sağlam. 3. Sèvres anlaşmasında yapılacak değişiklikler konusunda müttefiklerin kendi aralarında ve Yunanistan ile anlaşmaları gerekir. İzmir yöresinde özerk bir vilayet kurulması, Trakya sınırında düzeltmeler yapılması üzerinde müttefikler uyumaktadırlar. 4. Sèvres'in mali hükümlerinde Türklere biraz ödün verilebilir. Mali Komisyon yerine Türk Hükümetine	1

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Avrupalı danışmanlar verilmesi gibi. Herde ekonomik, askeri ve adli hükümler de biraz yumuşatılabilir.	
		5. Değişiklikler Yunanistan tarafından kabul edildikten sonra müttefikler toplanıp kendi aralarında ortak bir görüşe varacaklar. En sonra Türkler ve Yunanlılar masa başına çağırılacaklar. Şimdilik zorlama düşünülmüyor.	
		6. Ankara ile ilişki kurma konusuna gelince, Mustafa Kemal isterse İzzet Paşa ya da Avrupa'daki temsilcileri aracılığıyla görüşlerini İngiltere'ye iletebilir. Fransızların ve İtalyanların Mustafa Kemal ile ilişkileri pek umut verici olmadı. Şimdi yapılacak iş, arabuluculuk ve Sèvres antlaşmasında değişikliklerdir ve bunları taraflara kabul ettirebilmektir. (Bkz. No. 58).	
3	7 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İRAK YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ COXTAN KOLONİLER BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 558 (İngiliz Kabinesine de sunulmuştur). Kral Faysal, Mustafa Kemal ile anlaşma düşüncesine pek yatkın. Böylece kendi durumunu güçlendireceğini umuyor. (Bkz. No. 4 ve 8).	13
4	11 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İRAK YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ COXTAN KOLONİLER BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 571 (İngiliz Kabinesine de sunulmuştur). Fransa, Mustafa Kemal ile anlaşmaya gidiyor. Mustafa Kemal, İngiltere'ye kızgın. Rusya, İngiltere ile Fransa'nın arasını açmağa çalışıyor. Ankara'daki gelişmeler Irak bakımından pek önemli. Ankara ile müzakere kapısını açmanın tam zamanıdır. Bunu Kral Faysal başlatabilir. Herde müzakereler uçlu da olabilir. Türk-Fransız-İngiliz (Irak) müzakereleri. (Bkz. No. 8).	14
5	12 Ekim	İNGİLİZ SAVUNMA BAKANINDAN BAKANLAR KURULUNA MUHTIRA: İRAK'TA DURUM Irak'ta askeri birlikler. Bunların konuşlandırılması. Irak'ta dıştan gelebilecek tehditlerin gözden geçirilip değerlendirilmesi. İncelemeden çıkan sonuç: Irak'a saldırı, olsa olsa Türkiye'den gelebilir. Böyle bir saldırı	15

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		felâket olabilir ve İngiltere'nin prestijini sarsar. Türk saldırısını önlemenin tek yolu, Türkiye ile tezelden dostluk kurmaktır.	
6	12 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 670.	21
		Haberlere bakılırsa, Ankara'da yapılan Türk - Fransız müzakereleri çıkmaza girmiş. Kesin birşey söyleyemiyorum. Ama görüşmelerin ciddi engellerle karşılaştığını sanıyorum.	
7	13 Ekim	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ YARDIMCISI SIR E. CROWE'UN VENİZELOS İLE YAPTIĞI GÖRÜŞME UZERİNE NOT	21
		Venizelos ziyaretime geldi. Anadolu konusuna değindi. Son Yunan askeri harekâtından dolayı kralı suçluyor. Yunanistan konusunda İngiltere ile Fransa'nın anlaşmasını diliyor. Briand, Fransızların Yunan Kralından nefret ettiklerini kendisine anlatmış. Venizelos, İngiltere'nin de Kral Konstantin'e karşı olduğunu açıklamasını istiyor. Kral çekilirse Yunanlılar müttefiklerin desteğini sağlayabilir ve Türklere barış yapabilir, düşüncesinde. İzmir konusunda Türklere hiçbir ödün verilemeyeceğini söylüyor..	
8	19 Ekim	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ GÖREVLİLERİNDEN FORBES ADAMS'IN ANKARA VE İRAK KONULU NOTU.	23
		(İlgi: No. 3 ve 4)	
		Irak Yüksek Komiseri Cox, Irak ile Ankara arasında müzakere yolunun açılmasını öneriyor. Müzakerelerin üçlü olabileceğini de söylüyor. Faysal, böyle müzakerelere girilemez. Irak'ın dış ilişkilerinden İngiltere sorumludur. Mustafa Kemal de bunu bilir ve görür. Üçlü müzakereler gerçekleştirilemez ve sakıncalıdır. İster ikili, ister üçlü olsun, Cox'un önerdiği müzakerelerin sağlayacağı yarardan fazla sakıncaları vardır. En uygunu, Curzon'un öngördüğü arabuluculuk ve konferans yoludur. (Bkz. No. 19).	
9	21 Ekim	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANINDAN BAKANLAR KURULUNA MUHTIRA.	27

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
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Anadolu'da son durum konusunda Genelkurmay'ın raporu.

1. Türk-Yunan askeri durumunu değerlendirme:
Son Yunan askeri harekâtının üç hedefi vardı. Yunan ordusu, Türk ordusunu yoketmek ve Ankara'yı ele geçirmek hedeflerine ulaşamadı. Afyon-Eskişehir demiryolunu ele geçirmek hedefine güç belâ ve kısmen ulaşabildi. Geri çekilmek zorunda kaldı. Yunan başarısızlığının nedenleri.
2. Türk ve Yunan ordularının güçleri ve son durumları:
Türk Yüksek kumandası başarılı ve etkin; Türk askeri iyi. Türkler toplam 30.000 kişilik zayıatı kapatabildiler. Malzeme sıkıntıları pek yok. Silah ve teçhizat bakımından artık Rusya'ya bağlı değiller. Batı Avrupa'dan da bunları sağlayabiliyorlar. Türk ordusunun morali yüksek. Mustafa Kemal'in durumu sağlam.
3. Yunan Yüksek komutası harekâtın ilk safhasında başarılıydı. Sakarya yenilgisi Yunan ordusunun moralini bozdu. Yunanlılar, 31.000 zayıat verdiler ve bunu giderdiler. Malzeme kıtlığı çekmiyorlar.
4. Türk ve Yunan orduları bundan sonra ne yapabilir?
Soruyu değerlendirince şu sonuçlar çıkıyor: Yunan ordusu Türklere boyun eğdiremez. Anadolu'da kesin bir zafer kazanamaz. Türk ordusunun etkinliği gittikçe artacaktır. Yunanlılar, Anadolu'da savaş sürdürmekle birşey kazanamazlar. İyisi mi halen işgal altında tuttukları toprakları pazarlık konusu yaparak Mustafa Kemal ile müzakereye girişmelidirler. İngiliz Genelkurmayının görüşü budur.

10 21 Ekim

İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 776

35

1. Yunan Başbakanı Gounaris Briand'la görüşmüş. Türklerle barış müzakerelerine girişmeyi ve arabuluculuk istemeyi düşünmediklerini, Anadolu'da Yunan sivil yönetimi kurmayı tasarladıklarını söylemiş. Briand, bu tutumun yanlış olduğunu ve Yunanlıları felâkete sürükleyebileceğini kendisine anlatmış.

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Ankara'nın da uzlaşmaya pek yanaşmadığını söyledim. Briand, Mustafa Kemal'in Fransa ile anlaşma yapmak istediğini ve anlaşmanın bugün ya da yarın Ankara'da imzalanacağını bildirdi.	
		3. İzmir'de bir özerk bölge kurulabileceğini, Trakya'da Yunanistan'dan ödün istenemeyeceğini söyledim. Briand, Trakya konusunun da müzakereye açık olacağı görüşünde. Yunan Kralı Konstantin konusuna da değindik.	
11	21 Ekim	İNGİLİTERE'NİN ATINA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 548..... Yunanlılar, özel konuşmalarında, Anadolu'dan vazgeçmek gerektiğini söylüyorlar. Böyle bir karar Hükümetin ve Kralın düşmesine yol açar. Yunanistan'da karışıklık yaratır. Mustafa Kemal'in isteklerini artırır. Yunan bozgunu da tehlikeli gelişmelere yol açar.	37
12	22 Ekim	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT BAŞKANINDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI, GİZLİ..... İstanbul'dan alınan istihbarat raporları ilâhikte sunuldu.	38
Ek.1	5 Ekim	ANADOLU'DA SİYASAL DURUM ÜZERİNE RAPOR. NO. 543..... 1. Sakarya zaferi Mustafa Kemal'i ve Meclisteki dımlı partisini güçlendirdi. Yusuf Kemal'in muhalefet partisi de halâ oldukça etkin. 2. Rafet Paşa güçlü duruma geldi. Mustafa Kemal'i destekliyor. Fevzi paşa biraz arka planda kalıyor. 3. Meclis'te Mustafa Kemal'in Müdafaa-i Hukuk grubunun 165-170 üyesi, Yusuf Kemal'in aşırı grubunun 45-50 üyesi, Enver Paşa taraflarının ise 15 kadar üyesi var.	38
Ek.2	4 Ekim	MİLLİYETÇİLERİN İSTİHBARAT ÖRGÜTÜ ÜZERİNE RAPOR. ÇOK GİZLİ NO. 543/1..... 1. Milliyetçilerin istihbarat merkezi Ankara'daki Matbuat ve İstihbarat müdüriyetidir. Kâzım Paşa tarafından kuruldu. Halen Genelkurmay Başkanına bağlıdır. Propaganda, casusluk ve karşı casusluk işlerini yürütüyor.	40

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		<p>2. Roma, Zürih, Berlin, Paris ve Moskova'da dış şubeleri var. Roma şubesi en önemlisidir.</p> <p>3. İstanbul şubesi bunlardan ayrıdır. Önce "Muharip" adını taşıyordu, bugün Felüh grubu olarak biliniyor. Fransız Karargâhı ile ilişkileri vardır. Askeri istahbarat toplar, ayrıca Anadolu'ya gönderilecek subayların geçmişini araştırır. Anadolu'ya telgrafçı, telsizci gibi uzmanlar gönderilmesini, silah ve malzeme kaçırılmasını yürütür. Ankara ile gizli haberleşmeyi sağlar.</p> <p>4. Anadolu'da karşı casusluk işleri "Ayn Pe" örgütüne yürütülür. Bunun da İstanbul'da, Kafkasya'da ve İran'da kolları var.</p>	
13.	22 Ekim	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 786.</p> <p>Ankara Anlaşması.</p> <p>"Temps" gazetesi, İzmir, Trakya, Edirne ve İstanbul konusunda Ankara'nın isteklerini Fransa'nın destekleyeceği yolunda haberleri yalanlıyor. Anlaşma konusunda bilgi veriyor. Öteki gazetelerde de haberler var.</p> <p>Briand, Ankara Meclisi, Suriye ve Kilikya konusunda bizimle anlaşmayı kabul etti. "Güçlüklerimiz hafifleyecek" dedi. (Bkz. N.: 22).</p>	42
14.	24 Ekim	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 983.</p> <p>1. İstanbul'daki Japon Yüksek Komiseri Uchida, arabuluculuk yapmağa çalışıyor. Ankara ajanı Hamid Beyle görüşmüş.</p> <p>2. Türk basını, Yunan Başbakanı Gounaris'in arabuluculuk istemek üzere, müttefik ülkelere gittiğini yazıyor. Bir gazete, Yunanistan'ın Anadolu'yu boşaltmağa karar verdiğini ileri sürüyor. (Bkz. No. 62).</p>	43
15.	25 Ekim	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 986.</p>	44

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tercümanım Hamid Beyle bir görüşme yaptı. Hamid Bey, Ankara anlaşması konusunda bilgi verdi. Keyifli görünüyor. Anlaşmada kapitülasyonlara değinilmiyormuş. 2. Hamid Bey'e göre, barış yapılıncaya Ankara Meclisi kendisini feshedecek; yeni seçime gidilecek, Padişah'a dokunulmayacak, Mustafa Kemal "Türkiye diktatörü" olmayacak. 3. VAKİT ve TEVHİDİ EFKÂR gazeteleri, Ankara anlaşmasına göre yeni sınırın bir haritasını yayınladılar. Anlaşmada gizli hükümler bulunduğu yolunda söylentiler dolaşıyor. 	
16	1 Kasım	<p>İNGİLİZ KABİNESİNİN 1 KASIM TARİHLİ TOPLANTISI TUTANAĞI</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dışişleri Bakanı, Yunan Başbakanı ve Dışişleri Bakanı ile yaptığı görüşme konusunda bilgi verdi: Yunan ordusunun iyi durumda olmadığını Gounaris de kabul ediyor. Müttefiklerin arabuluculuğuna razı. İzmir'e özerklik verilmesi, Trakya sınırının gözden geçirilmesini Hükümetine danışacak. Curzon'a göre, Ankara Hükümeti de anlaşmaya razı olabilir. İstanbul Hükümeti dünden razı. 2. Curzon, Türk - Fransız anlaşması konusunda da bilgi verdi ve anlaşmayı eleştirdi. Buna göre, anlaşma, müttefik devletlerin Türkiye ile ayrı barış yapmayacakları ilkesine aykırı. Üçlü anlaşmaya ters düşüyor. Daha kötüsü, Suriye sınırını Türkiye lehine değiştiriyor. Fransa'nın buna hakkı yoktur. Fransa, İngiliz çıkarları aleyhine tutum takınıyor. En kötüsü, Bağdad demiryolu konusudur. Fransa, Türklere Musul yolunu açıyor. İngiltere, Türkiye'nin tek düşmanı gibi görülecek. 3. Curzon'un Fransa'dan açıklama istemesi kararlaştırıldı. İngiltere'nin Ankara anlaşmasını hayret ve şaşkınlıkla karşıladığı vurgulanacak. 4. İngiltere'nin de Mustafa Kemal ile doğrudan ilişki kurması konusuna değinildi. İngiltere'nin durumunun Fransa'ninkinden farklı olduğu belirtildi. 	46

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
17	1 Kasım	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN HİNDİSTAN İŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI Hindistan'dan Mustafa Kemal'e para gönderilmesi. Bombay'dan Osmanlı Bankasına 10 bin sterlin gelmiş. Banka, bu paranın Mustafa Kemal'e gönderilip gönderilemeyeceğini soruyor. Curzon, İngiliz Hükümetinin bu işe karışmayacağını bankaya bildirmek niyetinde. Hindistan İşleri Bakanı Mr. Montagu'nun görüşü nedir? (Bkz. No 18 ve 23).	51
18	1 Kasım	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN MALİYE BAKANLIĞINA YAZI Hindistan'dan Mustafa Kemal'e para yardımı. Bombay'dan Mustafa Kemal'e gönderilen 10 bin sterlin konusunda Maliye Bakanlığının görüşü nedir? (Bkz. No. 23 ve 24).	51
19	1 Kasım	HİNDİSTAN İŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN KOLONİLER BAKANLIĞINA YAZI NO: 4438 (İlgi: No. 8) Irak Yüksek Komiseri Cox, Kral Faysal'ın Mustafa Kemal ile müzakereye girişmesini öneriyor. Hindistan işleri Bakanlığı bu öneriyi destekliyor.	52
20	1 Kasım	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜNÜN ÜÇ AYLIK DÖNEM RAPORU (15 Temmuz - 15 Ekim 1921). Gizli. Anadolu harekâtı. Barış için arabuluculuğu etkileyen faktörler. 1. Ankara ve İstanbul Hükümetlerinin tutumları: Dönem içinde Mustafa Kemal'in durumu güçlendi. Ankara hükümeti, Misak-ı Milli üzerinde direniyor. Meclis'te Müdafaa-i Hukuk grubu Mustafa Kemal'i destekliyor. Mustafa Kemal'in muhalifleri Yunanlılarla müzakereye girişmeyi savunuyorlar, ama önermiyorlar. 2. İstanbul Hükümeti, barış için müttefiklerin arabuluculuk yapmalarını istiyor. Bu amaçla ve Ankara ile İstanbulu yaklaştırmak niyetiyle Salih Paşa Avrupa'ya gönderildi. Roma'dan Mustafa Kemal ile yazışmalar yaptı. Mustafa Kemal, Salih Paşa'nın barış girişimlerinden şimdilik bir yarar umulmadığını Roma'ya bildirdi.	52

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
3.		Barış en çok Padişâh istiyor. İstanbul Hükümeti de Padişâhın arzusuna uydu. İzmir'in boşaltılması, Trakya'nın Yunanistan'a bırakılması esasına göre barış yapılması için müttefiklere resmen başvurmağa karar verdi. Yalnız İzzet Paşa bu karara karşı çıktı.	
4.	24 Eylül'de	Mustafa Kemal görüşünü açıkladı. Barış girişimlerinin henüz zamanı olmadığını, barış anlaşmasının yalnız Anadolu'nun değil, Trakya'nın da Yunanlılar tarafından boşaltılması ve müttefiklerin de İstanbul'u bırakıp girmeleri esaslarına dayanması gerektiğini İstanbul hükümetine bildirdi.	
5.		İstanbul Hükümeti, kendi başına diplomatik girişimlerini sürdürdü. Mustafa Kemal bu kez, arabuluculuk işinin İstanbul Hükümetinin diplomatik girişimleri ile değil, Büyük Millet Meclisinin silah gücüyle çözümleneceğini bildirdi.	
6.		İtalyanların Ankara'ya karşı soğuk davrandıkları ve İngiltere'ye yaklaşma eğilimi gösterdikleri gözlenmektedir. Bu da Kemalistleri kaygılandırıyor.	
7.	Ek. 4:	Roma'da Salih Paşa'dan Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya Tel. 20.8.21.	58
		En elverişli barış şartlarını elde edebilmek için Avrupa'ya gönderildim. İngiltere'ye karşı direnip durmak gereksiz ve tehlikelidir. Rusya'ya yaklaşmak ve Batıyı ihmal etmek ise felâket olabilir. Vakit geçirmeden barış arayalım. Bu amaçla Avrupa'dayım. Bir temsilcinizi bana gönderiniz, işbirliği yapalım.	
8.	Ek. 5:	Mustafa Kemal'den Roma'da Bekir Sami Bey'e Tel. 26.8.21.	59
		Görüşmek üzere Ankara'ya gelmenizi rica.	
9.	Ek. 6:	Yusuf Kemal Bey'den Roma'da Cami Bey'e Tel. 23.8.21.	59
		Bir İtalyan temsilcisini Ankara'ya kabul edeceğiz. Roma'da girişimde bulunmanızı rica.	
10.	Ek. 9:	İzzet Paşa'dan Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya Tel. 29.1921.	60
		Görüşlerinizi bize anlatmak üzere yetkili bir temsilcinizi İstanbul'a göndermenizi rica.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
11.		<i>Ek. 10: T.B.M.M.'den İstanbul Hükümetine Tel. 5.10.1921</i>	60
		Önemli ve ivedi sorunlar, T.B.M.M.'ince çözülünür, İstanbul Hükümetince değil. İvedi durumlarda görüşümüzü öğrenmek için güvenilir bir adamınızı Ankara'ya gönderebilirsiniz.	
21	3 Kasım	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANINDAN HÜKÜMETE MUHTIRA. ANADOLU'DA YUNANLILARIN VE TÜRKLERİN ASKERİ DURUMLARI	60
		1. Genelkurmayın 3 Kasım günlü notu: Yunanlıların Anadolu'da savaşı sürdürmekle bir şey kazanamayacakları, bir an önce Türklerle müzakerelere başlamaları gerektiği sonucuna varılmıştı. Ekli telgraf bu kanıyı perçinliyor.	
		2. Harington'un 2 Kasım tarihli, 1238 sayılı telgrafı: Yunan ordusunun morali bozuluyor. Birinci Ordu Komutanı Ali İhsan Paşa, Yunanlılara karşı kış herkâtına girişecek gibi görünüyor.	
		3. Anadolu'da Yunanlıların gücü 50.000 tüfek, Türk batı ordusunun gücü 60.000'e çıkarılabilecek. Türk askerinin morali yüksek, Türk Komutanları kararlı.	
22	3 Kasım	İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'E YAZI NO 2013	63
		(İlgi: No. 13) Ankara anlaşması. Fransız Büyükelçisi ile görüşme:	
		1. Ankara'ya giden Franklin-Bouillon'un resmi bir görevi yok, deniyordu. Ankara'da imzaladığı anlaşma İngiltere'yi şaşkına çevirdi.	
		2. Fransa, Türkiye ile ayrı barış yapmış ve Ankara Hükümetini tanımış oluyor. Anlaşmanın Fransız askerlerinin geri çekilmesiyle ilgili 3. maddesi, Üçlü anlaşmaya, azınlıklarla ilgili 6. maddesi de Seyres anlaşmasına aykırıdır.	
		3. Anlaşmanın 8. maddesiyle Suriye sınırında Türkiye'ye toprak veriliyor. Bu toprakları Fransızlar değil, İngilizler fethetmişti. Türkler, Bağdat demiryolunu kullanabileceklerdir. Yani Fransa, Türklerin Irak'a saldırmalarını kolaylaştırmış oluyor. Fransa'ya	

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		tanınması öngörülen ayrıcalıklar, Üçlü anlaymaya ters düşüyor. Fransa'dan açıklama istenecek başka noktalar da var. Muhtıra konusu yapılacak. Bunlar Fransız Büyükelçisine anlatıldı. (Bkz. No. 35).	
23	3 Kasım	İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN HİNDİSTAN İŞLERİ VE MALİYE BAKANLIKLARINA YAZI (İlg: No. 17 ve 18) Mustafa Kemal'e iletilmek üzere, Bombay'dan Osmanlı Bankasına 5 bin sterlin daha yollanmış. Maliye'nin ve Hindistan işlerinin görüşü nedir? (Bkz. No. 24).	68
24	4 Kasım	İNGİLTERE MALİYE BAKANLIĞINDAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI NO. F. 1896 (İlg: No. 18 ve 23) Hindistan'dan Mustafa Kemal'e gönderilen para konusunda Curzon'un görüşüne katlıyoruz. (Bkz. No. 26).	68
25	7 Kasım	YUNANISTAN'IN LONDRA İŞÇİLERİ R. RANGABEDEN İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A NOTA NO. 4399 Tevfik Ruştü, Moskova'dan bir milyon altın lira kadar borç sağlamış. Bu para savaş malzemesi için kullanılacak.	69
26	8 Kasım	İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN HİNDİSTAN İŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI QOK IVTDE (İlg: No. 17 ve 23) Hindistan'dan Mustafa Kemal'e gönderilen para konusunda Mr. Montagu'nun görüşü nedir? (Bkz. No. 27).	69
27	8 Kasım	HİNDİSTAN İŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI (İlg: No. 26) Hindistan'dan Mustafa Kemal'e gönderilen 15 bin sterlin konusunda Curzon'un görüşüne katlıyoruz. (Bkz. No. 28).	70
28	8 Kasım	HİNDİSTAN İŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN HİNDİSTAN KRAL NAİBLİĞİNE TEL NO. 1804 (İlg: No. 17, 23, 26)	70

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		Mustafa Kemal'e iletmek üzere, Hindistan'dan Osmanlı Bankasına 15.000 sterlin gönderilmiş. İngiltere Hükümeti bu işi karşımayacak. (Bkz. No. 29).	
29	9 Kasım	OSMANLI BANKASI LONDRA ŞUBESİNDEN İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI (İlg. No. 28) Mustafa Kemal'e iletmek üzere Hindistan'dan 15.000 sterlin gönderildi. Bu parayı Mustafa Kemal'e transfer etmemiz konusundaki görüşünüzü tezelden bekliyoruz. (Bkz. No. 33).	70
30	11 Kasım	İSTANBUL'DA GENERAL HARRINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL NO 1264 1. Anadolu'da Yunan subaylarının cesareti kırılmış. Yunan askerinin morali bozuk. Türkler onları rahatsız ediyorlar. 2. İstanbul Hükümeti aracılığıyla Mustafa Kemal'e yaklaşmak konusunda iyimser değilim. 3. Tek kaygım şu ki, Mustafa Kemal Yunanlıların Anadolu'yu boşaltmaları ve Misak-ı Milli esasları gibi ağır istekler ileri sürer. Rafet Paşa ile Şile'de ya da İstanbul'da görüşüp onun aracılığıyla Mustafa Kemal'i yumuşatmak aklıma geliyor. 4. Fransız askerleri çekilirse durumumuz güçleşebilir.	71
31	11 Kasım	KIRTCHEV ADLI BULGARDAN İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA MR. OSBORNE'A YAZI Bir dostum Mustafa Kemal adına İngiltere'yle görüşmek istiyor. Bu amaçla Paris'e geldi. Kendisini kabul edip edemeyeceğinizi bana bildirmenizi rica ederim. (Bkz. No. 38).	72
32	12 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO 724 Harrington, barış çalışmalarının hızlandırılmasını istiyor. Kemalistler uzlaşmaz bir tutum içinde. Ankara ile temasa geçmek için zaman pek elverişsiz. İzzet Paşa, İstanbul Hükümetinin Ankara'yı etkileyeemediğini söylüyor. Ankara'ya yaklaşmak işini yalnız Fransızlara ve İtalyanlara bırakmak da sakıncalıdır.	73

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		Resmî olmayan ajanlar kullanmak da öyle. En uygunu, Hamid Bey aracılığı ile Ankara'yla ilişkiye geçilebilir ve Kemalistlere şu yolda bir mesaj iletilebilir: "Herkes savaştan usandı. Herkes barış istiyor. Siz de gerçekten barış istiyorsanız, müttefik yüksek komiserleriyle görüşmek üzere tam yetkili bir temsilcinizi İstanbul'a gönderiniz...." Uygun görülüyorsa, Hamid Bey aracılığıyla Ankara'ya bu yolda bir telgraf çekebiliriz. (Bkz. No. 34).	
33	14 Kasım	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN OSMANLI BAKASINA, YAZI (İlgi: No. 29) Bombay'dan Mustafa Kemal'e havale edilen para konusunda İngiltere Hükümeti hiçbir işlem yapmayacak. (Bkz. No. 36).	76
34	15 Kasım	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI GÖREVLİLERİNDEN MR. EDMONDS'UN HAZIRLADIĞI NOT. (İlgi: No. 32). Ankara ile müzakereye girişmek konusu: müzakere arzumuz, Mustafa Kemal tarafından, bizim pek güç durumda olduğumuz biçiminde yorumlanacak. Oysa güç durumda olan Kemalistlerdir. O bakımdan görüşmek üzere Mustafa Kemal'in kendisini İstanbul'a çağıralım. Gelirse ne alâ. Gelmezse bize yöneltilen eleştirileri susturmuş oluruz. (Bkz. No. 40).	76
35	15 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO 875 (İlgi: No. 22). Ankara Anlaşması. 1. Anlaşmayı Fransa onayladı. Başbakan Briand bunu bir mektupla Yusuf Kemal Bey'e duyurdu. Fransa'nın 4 Kasım'da anlaşmayı uygulamaya başlayacağını bildirdi. Mektup metni "Eclair" gazetesinde çıktı. 2. Franklin-Bouillon da Mustafa Kemal'e bir telgraf çekti. Anlaşmanın onaylanmasından duyduğu sevinci bildirdi. (Bkz. No. 48).	77

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36	15 Kasım	İSTANBUL'DA GENERAL HARİNGTON'DAN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA, ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 1276 Padişah ile özel bir görüşme yaptım. 1. İstanbul ile Ankara'nın yaklaştırılmasını istiyor. İzmir ve Trakya boşaltılmadan anlaşmaya varılabileceğini söylüyor. 2. Padişah, Ankara'da aşırıların % 10 kadar olduğunu, adil bir barış yapılırca bunların silineceklerini ileri sürüyor.	78
37	15 Kasım	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ'NÜN RAFET PAŞA HAKKINDA NOTU' Rafet Paşa, tutsaklar içinde Mustafa Kemal ile İngilizler arasında aracı rolünü oynadı. Harington da onunla görüşmek istedi. Paşa ilimlidir. Geniş görüşlüdür. Milliyetçilerin en yetenekli liderlerinden biridir. Özel yaşamı kötü.	79
38	17 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI, No. 398 (İlg: No. 31) Davidoff adlı Bulgardan alınan mektup ilişiktir. Kemalister adına İngiltere ile görüşmeler yapmak istiyor. (Bkz. No. 42.)	80
Ek.	17 Kasım	DAVIDOFF'TAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA MEKTUP, TÜRK SORUNU ÜZERİNE BİR EXPOSE, Türk siyasi çevreleriyle yakın ilişki içindeyim. Eski sadrazam Talat Paşa'nın yakın dostuydum. Ankara Hükümetinin Roma temsilcisi Cami Bey ile de görüştim. Mustafa Kemal Paşa adına İngiltere ile görüşmem uygun görüldü. Bu amaçla Londra'ya gitmek istiyorum.	80
39	19 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. ÖZEL 1. Ankara ile temas işini erteleyelim. İrlanda sorunu çözümlendikten sonra daha güçlü duruma geliriz. 2. Kemalister, bizim yöntemimizi kabul etmeyeceklerdir. 3. Yine de temas aramam isteniyorsa yakında İstanbul'dan geçecek olan Bekir Sami'den yararlanabilirim.	84

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40	22 Kasım	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. No. 740.</p> <p>(İlgi: No. 34).</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dışişleri Bakanı, Ankara'nın bir telgrafını bana bildirdi. "Anadolu ve Trakya boşaltılırsa İngiltere'nin ve Yunanistan'ın gerçekten barış istediklerine inanırız. İngilizler Misak-ı Milli metnini değiştirmeyi tasarladıklarına göre, şu sırada müzakerelerden pratik sonuç alınamaz" diyor. 2. Böylece, dolaylı yoldan, Ankara'nın görüşünü öğrenmiş olduk. Hiç umut verici değil. Misak-ı Milliye esas almak, Anadolu'nun ve doğu Trakya'nın boşaltılmasını şart koşturuyorlar. Bu durumda Ankara ile temasa geçmenin yararı yok. <p><i>F.O. in notu:</i> Ankara'ya anlatmalı ki, yalnız İngiltere ve Yunanistan'la değil, bütün müttefiklerle karşı karşıyadırlar ve doğu Trakya'nın Türklere geri verilmesi söz konusu değildir. Müzakerelere başlamak için henüz erkendir. Ancak müttefiklerin birleşik cephesi Ankara'yı yola getirebilir. Fransa'nın işbirliğini isteyeceğiz. (Bkz. No. 41).</p>	85
41	25 Kasım	<p>İSTANBUL'DA GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. No. 1300.</p> <p>(İlgi: No. 40).</p> <p>Rumbold'un telgrafını gördüm. Ankara'nın uzlaşmaz olduğu görüşüne katılmıyorum. Karşılıklı kuşkuları gidermek gerek. Askeri bakımdan İstanbul'da güçlüklerimiz artıyor, müzakerelere tezelden girişilmelidir.</p>	87
42	25 Kasım	<p>BULGAR KYRITCHEF'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA MR. OSBORNE'A MEKTUP</p> <p>(İlgi: Nos. 31 ve 38)</p> <p>Dostum Davidoff'la görüşmeyi yararsız görüyorsunuz. İstanbul'daki Büyükelçiniz Mustafa Kemal'in bir temsilcisiyle görüşebilir. Bütün Trakya'dan Yunanlıları çıkarmak ve orada plebisit yapmak karşılığında Türkiye'nin dostluğunu kazanabilirsiniz. Ondan sonra Stambuliski de etkiniz altına girecek.</p>	88

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		<i>F.O.'in notu:</i> Bu Bulgar entrikasına şunu söyleyelim: Ankara, İstanbul'daki Yüksek komiserliğimiz aracılığıyla İngiltere'ye yanaşabilir, yanaşmalıdır.	
43	29 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI No. 1084.	89
		1. İstanbul gazeteleri, Doğu sorununun çözümü için Ankara Hükümetinin görüşünün sorulacağını yazıyorlar. "İleri" gazetesi haberi çarpıtıp Ankara'nın resmen fikri soruldu, diye yazdı. Bu yüzden bir gün kapatıldı.	
		2. Binbaşı Henry'nin İnebolu gezisi İngilizlerin Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderdikleri yolundaki söylentilere neden oldu. Fransa ile yapılan Ankara anlaşmasından sonra, İtalya ve İngiltere'nin de Ankara Hükümetiyle anlaşmalar yapacakları yolunda propaganda yapıyor.	
Ek.	28 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİNCE YAYINLANAN BİLDİRİ	90
		1. Ankara Hükümetinin resmen görüşünün sorulduğu yolunda "İleri" nin haberi asılsızdır. Bu yüzden gazete bir gün kapatıldı.	
		2. İngiltere, Anadolu'ya resmî ya da yarı resmi hiçbir heyet göndermedi.	
44	29 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI No. 1084.	91
		1. İstanbul Hükümeti, gittikçe Ankara'ya boyun eğme duruma düşüyor. Maliye Nazırı "Ben Ankara Hükümetinin bir kavasıyım" demiş. Yalnız sadrazam Kemalistleri "âsi" sayıyor.	
		2. Ankara Hükümetinin de büyük güçlükleri olsa gerek.	
45	29 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI No. 1085.	92
		1. Ankara Hükümetinden iki vekil çekildi. Yerlerine Rauf bey ile Vehbi Bey getirildi. Bu değişikliklerin Mustafa Kemal yandaşlarıyla Enver Paşa yandaşları arasındaki çekişme ile ilgili olduğu söylentileri var.	

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		2. Ama Mustafa Kemal'in durumu zayıflamış değil, Malta'dan dönenlerden bazılarının önemli makamlara getirilmeleri normaldir, Kabine'de ve kumandanlar arasındaki değişiklikler, Enver Paşa yandaşlarının bir başarısı sayılamaz.	
46	3/4 Aralık	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ İŞGAL KUVVETLERİ KOMUTANI GENERAL HARRINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 1413 Ankara ile yapılan sözde müzakerelere benim adım da karıştırılıyor. Oysa bu konuda herhangi bir faaliyette bulunmadım ve bulunmak niyetinde de değilim. Eski Binbaşı Henry izinsiz olarak benim adımı kullanmış olabilir. Onun Anadolu'ya gittiğinden ise son ana kadar haberin bile yoktu (Bkz. No. 47)	94
47	27 Kasım/ 5 Aralık	BİNBAŞI HENRY İLE RAFET PAŞA'NIN 27 KASIM-5 ARALIK TARİHLERİ ARASINDA İNEBOLU'DA YAPTIKLARI GÖRÜŞMELERİN İNGİLİZLERCE KALEME ALINMIŞ TUTANAĞI (İlgi: No. 46)	95
		1. Haziran'da yapılan görüşme başarısız kalmıştı. Rafet Paşa, bunun İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğinin entrikaları yüzünden başarıya ulaşamadığını söyledi ve şunları ekledi: İngiltere ile Türkiye'nin ortak çıkarları var. Devlet adamları bunu kavratlarsa anlaşma sağlanabilir. Şimdiye kadar anlaşma olmamışsa İngiltere'nin tutumu yüzündendir. İngiltere Türkiye'yi dün Almanya'nın kucağına atmıştı, bugün Fransa'nın kollarına itiyor. Türkiye halâ İngiltere'den bir işaret bekliyor.	
		2. Henry, bu çıkmazdan kurtulmak gerektiğini ve Rafet Paşa'nın General Harrington ile buluşmasının uygun olacağını belirtti.	
		3. Rafet Paşa, Harrington tam yetkili değilse böyle bir buluşmadan sonuç alınamayacağını, ama bu öneri üzerinde düşüneceğini söyledi.	
		4. Henry, iki general arasında dostça buluşma sağlamağa çalıştığını, aynı zamanda bazı ticaret işleri için Ankara'ya gitmek istediğini bildirdi ve Rafet Paşa'ya,	

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ilerde yapılacak Türk-İngiliz görüşmeleri için en iyi araç olarak gördüğünü söyledi.

5. Harington'a iletmek üzere, Rafet Paşa'nın görüşlerini sordu. Rafet Paşa, görüşlerini özetle şöyle açıkladı: İngiltere, Afrika'daki topraklarıyla Hindistan'ı bağlamak için eski Osmanlı topraklarında Filistin, Ürdün, Irak gibi devletler kurdu. Ama durum artık eskisi gibi değil. Mısır'da, Hindistan'da İngiliz prestiji sarsılıyor. Eskiden İngiltere slav yayılmasına karşı Türkiye'nin toprak bütünlüğünü savunuyordu ve iki ülke arasında geleneksel dostluk vardı. Alman tehlikesi artınca İngiltere, slav tehlikesini unuttu, Rusya ile dost olup Türkiye'ye ihanet etti. Türkiye, varlığını koruyabilmek için, Almanya'ya yaklaşmak zorunda kaldı. Bugün durum yine değişti. Artık Alman tehlikesi yok, ama slav tehlikesi yine var. Rusya ilerde daha da büyük tehlike olacak. Rusların İstanbul'a, Akdeniz'e, Hindistan'a inmelerini önlemek amacıyla geleneksel Türk-İngiliz dostluğuna dönmek gerek. Bu gerçek benimsenince öteki sorunlar kolayca çözülecektir. Yunanlıların Anadolu'yu ve Trakya'yı boşaltmaları gerekir. Slavlara karşı Boğazların savunması için Trakya'nın Türkiye'de kalması gerekir ve bu aynı zamanda İngiltere'nin çıkarıdır. İstanbul ve Boğazlar, Türk kontrolünde kalmalıdır.
6. Rafet Paşa şöyle devam etti: İngiltere, Mezopotamya'da güç durumdadır. Türkiye, İngiltere'nin bu güç durumunu istismar etmemiştir. Araplarla Türkleri birbirine düşman saymak yanlıştır. İngiltere, Türkiye'yi yok etmeğe çalışırsa, Türkler her tarafta İngilizlere pek çok güçlükler çıkarabilirler.
7. Rafet Paşa, Misak-ı Milli sınırları içinde kurulacak ulusal Türk devletinin güneyde kurulacak bağımsız Arap devleti ile bir çifte devlet (Dual State) oluşturabileceklerini söyledi ve bu plânın İngiliz çıkarlarına da uygun düşeceğini savundu. Türkiye'nin İngiliz sermayesine geniş ölçüde açılacağını belirtti.

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8.		Paşa, bu görüşlerinin General Harington'a sunulmasını istedi ve ısrar edilirse Harington'la görüşebileceğini ekledi.	
9.		Kendisine yöneltilen sorular üzerine Rafet Paşa şunları söyledi: Plan, Fransızların da yararına olacak. "Çifte Devlet" in başında Osmanlı Halife-Padişah bulunacak. Irak'ta Faysal tahttan indirilecek. Müttefiklerarası bir konferanstan önce Türkiye ile İngiltere aralarında anlaşacaklar.	
10.		Rafet Paşa, ayrıca şunları açıkladı: "Ermenistan" coğrafi bir terimdir, etnik anlama gelmez. Türkiye'de ermeni nüfusu % 2,5 kadardır. Ermeniler yalnız Sovyet Ermenistan'ında çoğunluktadır. Türkiye'de Ermeni muhtariyeti olamaz. "Kürdistan" Türkiye'nin bir parçasıdır. Azınlıkların korunması sorunu kolayca çözümlenecektir. İngiliz Baştercümamı entrikacı Mr. Ryan, Türkiye'de en çok nefret edilen kişidir. Onunla işbirliği yapan Rahip Frew da öyle. Birlikte bir entrika ağı kurdular. İki gazeteyi beslediler. Said Molla'yı, Refi Cevad'ı kullandılar, Damat Ferit Paşa'yı avuçlarının içine aldılar. Türkiye'yi kontrol altına almağa kalkıştılar. Yurtsever Türk aydınlarını tutuklatıp Malta'ya sürdüler. Bunları hep Ryan'ın çetesi tezgâhladı. Türkleri yıldırma için İstanbul işgal edildi. Anadolu'da gelişen milliyetçi hareket, Ryan'ın planlarını açığa çıkardı. Harington'a suikast yapılacağı söylentisini de Ryan çetesi uydurdu. Birileri öldürülecek ise, işe Ryan'dan başlardık. Ryan, General Harington'u İstanbul'da istemiyor ve suikast masalını uydurmakla bir taşla iki kuş vurmaya çalışıyor. Türkler Harington'a karşı saygı besliyor.	
11.		Rafet Paşa, İstanbul Hükümeti, Ankara anlaşması, Albay Rawlinson ve Bolşevikler konusundaki görüşlerini de anlatıyor.	
12.		Binbaşı Henry'nin notları: Rafet Paşa dürüst ve samimi. Türkiye'yi ezmek planı suya düştü. Anadolu'da yeni bir Devlet doğdu. İngiltere, politikasını değiştirip Türklerle anlaşmalıdır. (Bkz. No. 34)	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
48	6 Aralık	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO 910 [İlg. No. 35]	112
		1. Ankara anlaşması üzerine Fransız notası. Briand, bunun dostça kaleme alındığını söyledi. Gerçekten notanın ifadesi dostçadır. Briand, bu konuda İngiltere ile Fransa arasında alınıp verilen dört notanın yayınlanmasının ertelenmesini istedi. Sonra Franklin-Bouillon dosyasını gösterdi. Mustafa Kemal ve Yusuf Kemal ile Franklin-Bouillon arasında uzun yazışmalar var. Bunların örnekleri İngiltere'ye verilecek.	
		2. Briand, ayrıca konferans konusunu açtı. Ankara Hükümetinin şu sırada Yunanistan'la barış yapmağa yatkın olduğunu, İzmir konusunuda değilse bile, Trakya konusunda ödün verebileceğini söylüyor. Mustafa Kemal'in kendisinin konferansa katılmasını gerekli görüyor.	
49	6 Aralık	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 1112 [İlg. No. 36]	114
		1. Hükümetin yetki ve sorumlulukları hakkındaki bir yasa tasarısı dolayısıyla Mustafa Kemal, T.B.M.M.'de bir konuşma yapmış. Tasarı, Mustafa Kemal'in yetkilerini kısıtlamayı amaçlıyormuş.	
		2. Mustafa Kemal, Misak-ı Milli'yi kabul ettirmeğe çalışıyor. Fransızlar kabul etti sayılır. İtalyanlar da karşı çıkmıyor. Kemal, İngiltere'de Misak-ı Milli'yi kabul etmek eğiliminde olanlar bulunduğunu biliyor. Mustafa Kemal'in içteki durumu zor. Misak-ı Milli'yi kabul ettirirse kurtarıcı olarak yıldızı parlayacak ve ilderde de Türkiye'nin kaderinde rol oynayacak.	
		3. Mustafa Kemal ve Fevzi Paşaların son söylevleri birlikte okunmalı. Ankara liderleri, İzmir'i ve Edirne'yi geri almadan kılıçlarını kınlarına sokmak niyetinde görünmüyorlar.	
50	6 Aralık	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A ÖZEL MEKTUP [İlg. No. 37]	116

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		[İlgi: No. 19]. Cox'un telgrafi üzerine görüşlerimi özel olarak sunuyorum: 1. Ankara'yı yola getirmeden barışa ulaşamayız. Kemalistlerle savaşmadığımıza göre, barış onların lehine olacak. Ama kendi çıkarlarımız ve moral sorumluluklarımız var. 2. Çıkarlarımız açısından: Türkiye, İslâm propagandası merkezi olmamalı, Irak'ta bize saldırılamamalı, Boğazlar açık kalmalı ve vatandaşlarımız Türkiye'de yaşayabilmeli ve iş tutabilmeli. 3. Ankara'nın isteklerini kabul edersek dost bir Türkiye kazanmayız. Tam tersi olur. 4. Ankara yola getirilmeli. Ama İstanbul kenara itilmemeli. Padişahın nüfuzu artırılabilirse elimizde yararlı bir koz olur. 5. Mustafa Kemal'le anlaşalım diyenler var. Düşlerinde değil, ama öteki Bakanlıklarda bu görüş yayılıyor. Ben de görüşlerimi ekledim. Pek iyimser değilim. Mustafa Kemal'e teslim olmak zorunda kalabiliriz. Bolşevikler Enver Paşa'yı Ankara'ya oturtabilirler. Şimdilik sizin çizdiğiniz yolda yürüyalım ve Yunanlılarla Türkler arasında arabuluculuk için çalışalım. [Bkz. No. 55]	
Ek. 3	3 Aralık	İNGİLTERE'NİN BAĞDAD YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR P. COX'TAN KOLONİLER BAKANINA TEL. NO. 795 Biran önce barış yapıp dost bir Türkiye kazanmak bizim için hayati önem taşıyor. Hükümete ısrarla arz ederim.	118
51	7 Aralık	İNGİLTERE - SAVUNMA BAKANINDAN KABİNEYE MUHTİRA İngiltere ve Türk milliyetçileri. Harington'dan gelen iki telgrafi ilişikte sunuyorum.	119
Ek.1	3 Aralık	HARİNGTONTAN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. Bkz. No. 76, Güvenilir bilgilere göre: Ankara, İngiltere ile anlaşmayı arzuluyor. Misak-ı Milli üzerinde diremiyor. Yunanlılar Anadolu'dan kovulmadan önce	119
Ek.2	1 Aralık	HARİNGTON DAN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. Güvenilir bilgilere göre: Ankara, İngiltere ile anlaşmayı arzuluyor. Misak-ı Milli üzerinde diremiyor. Yunanlılar Anadolu'dan kovulmadan önce	120

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		İngiltere ile anlaşırsa Ankara Musul'dan vazgeçebilecektir. Anlaşma gecikirse Ankara sertleşecek. Lütfen görüşünüzü telleyiniz.	
52	7 Aralık	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATINA İŞGÜDERİ BENTINCK'TEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 597. ÇOK GİZLİ (İlgi: No. 48) Yunan Savunma Bakanı, Ankara anlaşmasında iki üç gizli madde bulunduğunu söylüyor. Biri Kilikya'daki Fransız silahlarının Mustafa Kemal'e teslimiyle ilgiliymiş.	121
53	10 Aralık	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 1122 1. İzzet Paşa, Ankara'nın İngiltere ile anlaşmak istediğini, Binbaşı Henry'yi çok iyi karşıladığını söyledi. Kendisine Henry'nin hiçbir resmi sıfatı bulunmadığını anlattım. İngiltere'nin Ankara Hükümetiyle ayrı barış yapmayacağını belirttim. 2. İzzet Paşa, Türkiye'nin bütün Anadolu'yu ve Meriç sınırını istediğini; Kemalistlere karşı saltanatın korunacağını söylüyor.	121
54	12 Aralık	İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN PARIS VE ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİLERİNE TEL NO. 709. (İlgi: No. 48). Binbaşı Henry adında biri İngiliz makamlarının bilgisi dışında Anadolu'ya gitmiştir. Hiçbir resmi sıfatı yoktur. Bunu, bulunduğunuz ülke Hükümetine bildiriniz. İngiltere, müttefikleriyle birlikte hareket etme politikasından saptırılmaz. (Bkz. No. 57).	123
55	13 Aralık	İNGİLTERE'NİN İRAK YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ COX'TAN KOLONİLER BAKANINA TEL (İlgi: No. 50) Faysal, Mustafa Kemal ile müzakereye girmiş değil. Halen Amman'da bulunan Naci Bey aracılığıyla Mustafa Kemal'in Irak konusundaki görüşlerini öğrenmek niyetindedir. Bu fırsatın kaçırılmaması yerinde olur.	124

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
56	13 Aralık	HİNDİSTAN'IN BOMBAY EYALETİ SİYASAL İŞLER DAİRESİNDEN DELHI SİYASAL İŞLER DAİRESİNE TEL. NO. 4050 (İlgi: No. 33) Bombay'dan Mustafa Kemal'e gönderilen para konusunda Hollanda Bankasına ne cevap verilecek? (Bkz. No. 60).	125
57	17 Aralık	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN SAVUNMA BAKANINA YAZI (İlgi: No. 54). İngiltere Hükümeti, General Harington'un Rafet Paşa ile görüşmesini ve Generalin adının diplomatik ve politik konulara karışmasını istemiyor. Binbaşı Henry'nin hizmetlerine de muhtaç değil. Bu konularda General Harington'un uyarılması dileği. Not. Rafet Paşa'nın Binbaşı Henry aracılığıyla İngiltere'ye yaptığı tekliflerin özeti.	125
58	19 Aralık	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İNGİLTERE BAKANLAR KURULUNA MUHTIRA. GİZLİ (İlgi: No. 2). Sèvres antlaşmasını gözden geçirme sorunu. Türkiye ile barış yapma girişimleri şimdiye dek başarısız kaldı. Şimdi yeni bir girişim söz konusudur. Bazı elverişli belirtiler var: müttefikler birbirlerine daha yakın görünüyorlar. Yunanlılar, Anadolu'daki ihtiraslarının gerçekleştiremeyeceğini kavradılar. Türkler de savaştan usanmış gibi. İki aşamalı bir plan hazırladım. Önce müttefikler kendi aralarında toplanacaklar. Sonra Yunanlılar ve Türkler çağırılacaklar. En güç iş, müttefiklerin kendi aralarında anlaşabilmeleridir. Yunanlılar ve Türkler, gerekirse baskıyla yola getirilebilirler. Henüz kestirilemeyen bazı noktalar var: Rusya'nın tutumu, İslâm dünyasının davranışı gibi. Sèvres antlaşmasını gözden geçirirken ele alınacak başlıca sorunlar: (1) İzmir, (2) Trakya, (3) Kilikya, (4) Boğazlar bölgesinin silâhsızlandırılması sorunlarıdır.	127

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
50	19 Aralık	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERLAMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNİN DURUM RAPORU. GİZLİ. CX/4861 Ankara-İstanbul ilişkileri, Türk-Fransız ilişkileri, Türk-İtalyan ilişkileri, Türk-Sovyet ilişkileri, Ankara Hükümeti ve Yemen, Anadolu'nun iç durumu, Kafkaslarda durum konularında istihbarat değerlendirmeleri.	130
60	21 Aralık	YENİ DELHİ HÜKÜMETİ DIŞİŞLERİ SEKRETERİNDEN SİYASİ İŞLER SEKRETERİNE. TEL. NO 2057 (İlg: No. 56). Bombay'dan Mustafa Kemal'e para gönderilmesi engellenmeyecektir.	134
61	22 Aralık	HİNDİSTAN İŞLERİ BAKANI MONTAGU'DAN İNGİLTERE BAKANLAR KURULU'NA MUHTİRA. GİZLİ. C.P. 3576 Türkiye ile barış sorunu. Türkiye ile dostluk kurulması İngiltere'nin yararına olacaktır. Savaşın sürdürülmesi Yunanistan'da kargaşa ve ihtilâl yaratabilir. Doğu Trakya'nın ve İstanbul'un Türklere bırakılacağına söz vermişsek, sözümüzü tutalım. Savaş öncesi sınırlarına kadar olan Trakya topraklarını Türkiye'ye bırakalım. Edirne'yi geri verelim. Fransa'nın daha fazlasını Türklere vadedebileceğinden kaygı duyarım.	134
62	24 Aralık	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN TOKYO BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR C. ELLIOT'A TEL. NO. 267. (İlg: No. 14). Japonya'nın İstanbul temsilcisi, Kemalistlerle İngiltere arasında arabulucuk yapmağa çalışıyor. Bundan rahatsız olduğumuzu Japon hükümetine gizlice duyurunuz.	136
63	29 Aralık	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA İŞGÜDÜSÜ BENTINCK'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 600. Yunan Genelkurmay Başkanı Yardımcısı General Stratigos'un, Temmuz-Eylül 1921 döneminde askeri durumla ilgili raporu ile bu konuda Elçilikçe hazırlanan iki not ilişikte sunulmuştur.	136
Ek.1	25 Eylül	GENERAL STRATIGOS'UN ANADOLU SAVAŞI VE ASKERİ HAREKATIN ÇÜNCÜ SAFHASI ÜZERİNE GENEL RAPORU. (22 TEMMUZ - 23 EYLÜL 1921) 137	137

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
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Yunan taarruzu ve Sakarya meydan muharebesi üzerine ayrıntılı rapor. 24 Temmuz muharebesinde Türk ordusu büyük kayıp vermişti. Ama Mustafa Kemal'in direnişi kırlanamıyordu. Bunun üzerine Ankara'ya doğru taarruza geçilmesi kararlaştırıldı. Kral da hareket planını onayladı. Sakarya, teknik bakımdan aşılmaz bir engeldi. Arazi dağlıktı. Yol yoktu. Türkler, beş aydır bölgeyi tahkim etmişlerdi. Buna karşılık gerekli hazırlıklar yapıldı, önlemler alındı ve Yunan ordusu 14 Ağustos günü Sakarya'ya doğru yürüyüşe geçti.

Türkler, büyük yığınaklar yapmışlar, yalnız bir savunma çizgisini değil, tüm bölgeyi tahkim etmişlerdi.

Bu durumda başlayan büyük Sakarya muharebeleri 15 gün sürdü. 26 Ağustos'ta Türkler ilk mevzilerinden atıldılar, biraz gerilediler, ama bu gerileme genel bir çekilmeye dönüşmedi. Püskürtülen Türkler, biraz çekilip yeni mevzilerine yerleşiyor ve yine direnişe geçiyorlardı. Yunan taarruzu durduruldu. Türk ordusunu toptan yöketmek mümkün değildi. Yunan ordusu, "büyük ve güç misyonunu tamamlamış olarak" 10 Eylül'de Sakarya nehrini gerisin geri geçmeğe ve çekilmeğe başladı. Çekilme 23 Eylül'de tamamlandı. Çekilirken 120 kilometre uzunluğundaki demiryolu tahrip edildi.

Ek.2 24 Aralık

STRATİGOS'UN RAPORU ÜZERİNE İNGİLTERE'NİN ATINA ELÇİLİĞİ ÜÇÜNCÜ KÂTİBİ MCLEWEN'İN NOTU. 159

Stratigos'un raporu daha çok yabancılarla dönük. Sakarya'nın doğusundaki Türk mevzileri iyi tahkim edilmiş. Yunanlılar taarruz hazırlıklarını yirmi günde tamamlamışlar, başlangıçta başarılı olmuşlar, ama Sakarya mevzilerini aşamamışlardır. Stratigos, taarruzdan vazgeçmelerini, kışın yaklaşmasına ve askerinin yorgunluğuna bağlıyor. Türk ordusunu yok etmeği değil, yıpratmayı amaçladıklarını söylüyor ve bunu başarıldıklarını ileri sürüyor.

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
	1922		
Ek.3	1 Ocak	STRATIGOS'UN RAPORU ÜZERİNE İNGİLTERE'NİN ATINA ATAŞEHİTLERİNİN NOTU Stratigos'un raporu ilginç ve değerli. Ama tarihler ve yer adları bakımından yanlışlarla dolu. Sakarya taarruzu öncesinin olayları: 1920 yılı Yunan başarısıyla geçti, sonra 1920-21 kışında durum değişmeğe başladı ve İkonu'de Yunanlılar durduruldular. Bunun üzerine daha büyük bir taarruzla Mustafa Kemal'i dize getirmeğe karar verdiler. Onlerinde birkaç aylık bir hazırlık süresi vardı ve 1921 temmuzunda genel taarruza geçtiler. Taarruzun ilk safhası başarılı geçti. Ankara'ya yürümek konusunda biraz kararsız idiler. General Papulas ve Kral bu yürüyüşe taraftar oldular. Ancak bir zaferle amaçlarına ulaşabiliyorlardı. Türkler buna fırsat vermediler. Yunanlılar, top ve makineli tüfek bakımından üstün, süvari bakımından ise zayıf durumda idiler. 25 Ağustos Yunan ordusu için nâzik bir gün oldu. Sonra Yunanlılar bazı fırsatları değerlendiremediler. General Stratigos, "Yunan ordusu görevini başardı" diyor. Bu, yanlıştır. İlk raporunda Türklere karşı kesin zafer kazanacaklarını söylemişti, şimdi sözünü değiştirmiştir. Muharebenin siyasal sonuçlarının ne olacağını söylemek için henüz erkendir.	163
64	2 Ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATINA İŞGÜDERİ BENTINCK'TEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 1. Aydın-Eskişehir demiryolu Yunanlıların elinde en büyük pazarlık kozudur. Demiryolunu terketmek, Mustafa Kemal'e üstünlük sağlar. Eskişehir'i boşaltmak ise M. Kemal'e İstanbul yolunu açar. Yunan askerinin moralinin çok bozuk olduğu bildiriliyor.	165
65	3 Ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLİF'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ CURZON'A YAZI NO. 7. Türkiye-Ukrayna anlaşması. Bu konudaki belgeler iliyikte sunuldu.	166

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek.1	3 Ocak	"İLERİ" GAZETESİNDE ÇIKAN BİR ANKARA TELGRAFI 167 T.B.M.M. Hükümetiyle Ukrayna arasındaki müzakereler başarıyla sonuçlandı. Bir dostluk anlaşması imzalandı. Anlaşmanın hükümleri.	
Ek.2		"JOURNAL D'ORIENT" GAZETESİ YAZISI 168 Türkiye-Ukrayna anlaşmasının imzalanması üzerine yapılan konuşmalar.	
66	7 Ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 13 Ankara'dan dönen Signor Tuozzi'nin verdiği bilgiler: Mustafa Kemal, her zamankinden daha güçlü durumda. Ankara Hükümeti, Türkiye'nin başkentini Anadolu'ya kaydırmak niyetinde. Mustafa Kemal'den sonra en önemli kişi Fethi Beydir. Enver Paşa yanlıları bir tehlike değil. Ankara Hükümeti, Müttefiklerin her biriyle ayrı anlaşmalar yapıp Yunanistan'ı yalnız bırakmak niyetindeydi. Ama bunu başaramadı; Tuozzi, anlaşma imzalamadan döndü. Ankara'nın Bolşeviklerle ilişkilerinde karşılıklı güvensizlik var. Ruslar yardımlarını azalttılar. Türkler, Afganistan yoluyla Hindistan'da propagan- daya kalkışıyorlar. Anadolu'da büyük hoşnutsuzluk ve silahlı çeteler var. Ankara'nın silâh, cephane ve para sıkıntıları var. Ekonomik durum hiç iyi değil. Anadolu'da azınlıkların durumu kötü. Türkler "Anadolu Türklerindir" düşüncesinde. Milliyetçiler, İngiltere'den nefret ediyorlar. İrlanda'daki gelişmeleri dikkatle izliyorlar. Geri dönen Malta sürgünleri İngiltere aleyhindeki propa- gandayı kamçılıyor. Tuozzi, müttefikler arasındaki dayanışmayı elzem görüyor. Sévres'in yerini alacak barış anlaşmasının çok dikkatle hazırlanması ve İstanbul hükümetine imzalatılması gerek. Kemalistlerle anlaşmaya varıla- maz. Çünkü Anadolu'nun tam bağımsızlığını istiyor- lar. Milliyetçiler, Fransa'ya bel bağlıyorlar. Signor Tuozzi, Yunan yanlı bir tutum içinde. (Bkz. No. 128).	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
67	13 Ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN VIYANA ATEŞEMİLİTERİNDEN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. NO. 5 GİZLİ.	173
		Yunan elçisinden alınan not ilişiktir.	
Ek.		VIYANA'DAKİ YUNAN ELÇİSİNDEN İNGİLİZ ATEŞEMİLİTERİNE NOT.	173
		Mustafa Kemal'in ordusundan İsmail Paşa, takma bir adla Viyana'ya geldi. Görevi, ısmarlanan 110.000 el bombasını teslim almaktır.	
68	15 Ocak	İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN CURZON'A TEL. NO. 27.	174
		Ankara yöneticileri, Misak-ı Milli üzerinde direniyorlar. Daha azını kabule yanaşmazlar. Öte yandan Ankara'da bazı çözümler, Mustafa Kemal'e muhalefet belirtileri var. Mali durum nâzik. Yeni barış önerilerini Mustafa Kemal reddedecektir. Bunlar Padişaha kabul ettirilebilir.	
69	16 Ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 34.	175
		Hükümetin yetkileri ve görevleri konusunda T.B.M.M.'de yapılan görüşmeler ve Mustafa Kemal'in söylevi. Meclis'te, Mustafa Kemal'in yetkilerini daraltmak eğilimi belirdi. 24 Kasım günü yapılan görüşmelerde Mustafa Kemal'e muhalif olanlar birleştiler. Bir konuşmacı, Mustafa Kemal'i Enver Paşa'ya benzetti. Bir başkası Halife'ye bağlılığını açıkladı. 1 Aralık günü Mustafa Kemal, dört saat süren bir konuşma yaptı. Önce Hükümetin yetkileriyle ilgili yasa tasarısını eleştirdi. Sonra, şimdiki Hükümet sistemini savundu. T.B.M.M. Hükümetinin ulusça ve dünyaca tanındığını söyledi ve bunun kendine özgü bir Hükümet olduğunu vurguladı. Daha sonra Saltanatın ve Halifelüğün yetkileri konusu üzerinde durdu. Halife'nin ulusun efendisi değil, hizmetkârı olduğunu ileri sürdü. Mustafa Kemal, şimdiki anayasayı eski anayasalarla karşılaştırdı ve bunun Kur'an kadar kusursuz olduğunu ileri sürdü. T.B.M.M.'nin, ulusal egemenlik	

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		ilkesinin son iladesi olduğunu söyledi. Kuvvetler birliği ilkesini savundu. Bu konuşma, Mustafa Kemal'in düşünce yapısını yansıtıyor ve Avrupa'nın baskılarına boyun eğmeyeceğini gösteriyor. (Bkz. No. 73)	
Ek.1	11 Ocak	"JOURNAL D'ORIENT" GAZETESİNİN YAZISI. Mustafa Kemal, rejiminin doğuşunu ve kendi düşüncelerini anlatıyor. Mütareke yapıldığı zaman Halep'te idim ve dönmek istedim. İstanbul'da siyasal partiler kuruluyordu. Halifelik üzerine düşünceler. Misak-ı Milli nedir?	180
Ek.2	11 Ocak	"JOURNAL D'ORIENT" GAZETESİNİN BİR BAŞKA YAZISI. Fevzi Paşa "Savaşa devam edeceğiz" diyor.	182
70	16 Ocak	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA SERVİSİ İSTANBUL KOLUNUN RAPORU. NO. 496 Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümetine karşı (Batı) Anadolu'da bir muhtar Osmanlı Hükümeti kurma emeli güden "Anadolu Cemiyeti" ile Yunanlılar arasında görüşmeler. 9-10 Aralık 1921 günü yapılan müzakerelerde bazı noktalar üzerinde anlaşmaya varıldı. Buna göre: Yunan işgal bölgesinde geçici bir Hükümet kurulacak, gizli seçimler yapılacak, bir Meclis toplanacak, Yunanistan'la barış ve sonra ittifak imzalanacak. Bu geçici Hükümetin askerini Yunanlılar eğitecek ve donatacak. Yunanistan 100.000 lira kredi verecek... Yunanistan Yüksek Komiserliği, bazı değişikliklerle, bu anlaşmayı onayladı ve anlaşma metni Atina Hükümetine iletildi.	183
71	17 Ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 61. "İleri" gazetesinin yazdığına göre, Mustafa Kemal, Buhara Elçisi Muhammed Nazari'yi kabul etmiş. Elçi, 5 milyon Buharalı adına Mustafa Kemal'i selamlayan bir konuşma yapmış. Türkiye'den "Büyük kardeş" diye söz etmiş. Mustafa Kemal'e bir eski	185

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		Kur'an armağan etmiş. İnönü ve Sakarya kahramanlarına sunulmak üzere bir kılıç getirmiştir. Mustafa Kemal, Türkiye ile Buhara arasında ilişki kurulmasından duyduğu gururu dile getirmiş. Buhara Cumhuriyetine teşekkür etmiş, getirilen armağanları, İzmir'i kurtaracak olan muzaffer orduya sunacağını belirtmiştir.	
72	20 Ocak	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL KOLU RAPORU. NO. 332 KISMEN.	186
		Rauf Bey'in istifası. Mustafa Kemal'in durumu. Rauf Bey, sağlık nedeni ile değil, Mustafa Kemal ile anlaşmazlık yüzünden istifa etti. Anlaşmazlık, Mustafa Kemal'in yetkilerinin sınırlandırılması konusunda çıktı. İstifa mektubunun metni.	
73	24 Ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 95.	187
		(İlgi: No. 69). Geçen Kasım sonunda T.B.M.M.'nde yapılan görüşmeler sırasında Mustafa Kemal'e karşı güçlü bir muhalefet bulunduğu anlaşıldı. Görüşmelerden sonra Ankara'da birçok istifalar oldu. Rauf Bey'in, Rafet Paşa'nın istifası gibi. İstifaların hemen ardından, "Vakit" gazetesinde Ahmet Emin, Rauf Beyi yücelten uzun bir yazı yayımladı. Ankara Hükümetinin yetkileriyle ilgili yasa tasarısı yine gündeme geldi. Ankara-Moskova ilişkilerinde yumuşama var. Mustafa Kemal yine Bolşeviklere yanaşiyor gibi. Bu da onun içindeki sıkıntılarından ileri gelse gerek. Mustafa Kemal'e en çok muhalif olanlar Enver Paşa ve yandaşlarıyla bazı İttihatçılarla "Dönme" lerdir, sanırım.	
74	29 Ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 35.	190
		Sadrazam, Paris'te yapılacak müttefikler toplantısı konusunu açtı. İzmir'in ve tüm Anadolu'nun yabancı askerlerden arındırılmasını önerdi. Meriç sınırı konusunu açmadı.	

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75	2 Şubat	<p>İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'E YAZI NO 344.</p> <p>Fransa Büyükelçisi ile Paris konferansı konusunu görüştim. Poincaré veya Türkler Anadolu'nun tamamen boşaltılması üzerinde direnirderse, Anadolu Rumlarının güvenliği için Fransızlar nasıl garanti verecekler diye sordum. Büyükelçi, boşaltmanın safha safha gerçekleşeceğini, güvenliğin, müttefik subaylar komutasında kurulacak jandarmalarca sağlanacağını söyledi.</p> <p>Türkler Müttefiklerin kararlarını toptan reddederlerse ne yapılacak? diye sordum. Büyükelçi, Fransa'nın Türklere karşı kuvvet kullanmayacağını yineledi. Başka yollarla baskı yapılabileceğini belirttim ve özellikle Fransa'nın Türklere silahlı sağlaması konusuna parmak bastım. Büyükelçi, Paris görüşmeleri için bir tarih vermemi istedi, ama kesin bir tarih vermedim.</p>	191
76	3 Şubat	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ HARDİNGE'DEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO 306.</p> <p>Paris toplantısı konusunda Poincaré'den alınan nota ilâikte sunulmuştur.</p>	194
Ek.1	2 Şubat	<p>FRANSA BAŞBAKANI VE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI POINCARÉ'DEN İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ HARDİNGE'E NOTA.</p> <p>Curzon'un mektubunu inceledim. Müttefik Dışişleri Bakanlarının Paris toplantısını biraz erteleme düşüncesi uygundur. Curzon ile birlikte Doğu'da barışın kurulması için çalışıyoruz. Yunanlıların ya da Türklerin avukatlığını yapıyor değiliz. İzmir, doğu Trakya, İstanbul ve Boğazlar komisyonu konularında Lord Curzon'la aramızda büyük görüş ayrılığı yok. Ermenistan konusunda Sévres hükümlerini muhafaza etmek zordur. Ermeni sorununa Kilikya'da da çözüm aranamaz, çünkü orada Ermeni kalmamıştır. Azınlıklara pratik güvenceler sağlanması konusunda da görüş birliği içindeyiz.</p> <p>Kararlarımızı kabul ettirmek için Türklere karşı silah kullanılmasını, hatta baskı yapılmasını Fransa kabul</p>	194

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		edemez. Türklerin baskıya boyun eğeceklerini de sanmıyorum. Mareşal Foch, Türklerin Yunanlılara karşı taarruza geçtikten sonra başka taraflara da yönelebileceklerinden kaygı duyuyor. Bu kaygıları ben de paylaşıyorum. Buna İngiltere Hükümetinin dikkatinin çekilmesini dilerim. Üç müttefik Dışişleri Bakanlarının toplanıp barış şartları üzerinde anlaşmaya varmalarını ben de hararetle arzu ediyorum.	
Ek.2	1 Şubat	MAREŞAL FOCH'UN NOTU Müttefiklerin barış kararlarını Türklere kabul ettirmek için ne gibi askeri tedbirler alınabileceği Mart 1920'de rapor edilmmişti. Bugün durum daha da değişmiştir ve müttefiklerin gücünü aşmaktadır. Müttefiklerin olanakları şunlardan ibarettir: 1) Boğazlar Bölgesindeki müttefik kuvvetler, 2) İzmir bölgesindeki Yunan ordusu, 3) Türk kıyılarının abluka altına alınması. Bu olanaklar yetersiz kalmaktadır. Ankara Hükümeti, zorlanınca Sovyetlerle daha sıkı ittifak yapabilir ve ayrıca Fransa ve İngiltere'ye karşı Panislamizm politikası izlemeğe yönelebilir. Yunanlılara karşı zafer kazandıktan sonra Türkler Suriye'de, Irak'ta, hatta Hindistan'da ağırlıklarını hissettirebilirler. Kısacası, müttefikler, Türklere karşı askeri bir harekâta girişemezler; abluka da başarılı olamaz. Başarısızlıkla sonuçlanacak hareketler, müttefiklerin daha zararına olur.	197
77	6 Şubat	TÜRKİYE'YE BASKI YAPILMASI KONUSUNDA İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ GÖREVLİLERİNDEN FORBES ADAM İLE EDMONDS'UN HAZIRLADIKLARI MUHTİRA. Türkiye'nin mali ve ekonomik abluka altına alınması, Yunanistan'a mali ve askeri yardım yapılması, yeni anlaşma hükümlerinin Türkiye'ye karşı daha da sertleştirilmesi, İstanbul Hükümetinin Ankara Hükümetinden ayrılması, Türk topraklarının müttefiklerce tek yanlı bir deklarasyonla kesin olarak ilhak edilmesi konularında görüşler.	202

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		Sonuç: Rusya ile Türkiye'nin araları açılmadıkça Ankara'ya karşı alınacak dolaylı baskı önlemleri palyatif kalır ve Ankara'nın direnişini kırmağa yetmez. Buna karşılık Türkiye'ye cömertçe ödün verilirse ve müttefikler birlikte hareket ederlerse Mustafa Kemal boyun eğebilir.	
Ek.		Yunanlılar İzmir'i boşalttırlarsa Rum halkına verilecek güvenceler, Geçici önlemler, Edirne ve İzmir'de alınacak önlemler.	
78	6 Şubat	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI GÖREVLİLERİNDEN OSBORNE'UN NOTU: Türk milliyetçilerine karşı en etkili baskı yöntemi, bugünkü çıkmaz durumun sürdürülmesi olur. Türklerin mali ve ekonomik durumları kötüdür. Anadolu halkı savaştan bıkmıştır. Bugünkü çıkmaz sürüp giderse, sonunda Mustafa Kemal'in gücü çökebilir. Zaman Mustafa Kemal'in aleyhine işliyor.	207
79	6 Şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 82: Yusuf Kemal'in Avrupa'ya hareketinden önce T.B.M.M., Ankara Hükümetinin dış politikasının Misak-ı Milli'ye dayandığını yeniden vurguladı. Mustafa Kemal ile T.B.M.M. arasındaki gerginliğin sürdüğü haber veriliyor.	208
80	15 Şubat	PARKER, GARRETT GEMİCİLİK ŞİRKETİNDEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI: Mustafa Kemal'e kömür ve petrol götürmekte olan "Berkshire" gemisi, Yunan savaş gemilerince yakalanıp Pire'ye götürülmüş. Bu konuda ek bilgi verilmesi ricası.	209
81	16 Şubat	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ORGUTU İSTANBUL KOLUNUN RAPORU NO 365 KISMEN: 1. Mustafa Kemal'in durumu, Hükümetin yetkileriyle ilgili yasa tasarısını incelemekle görevli komisyon başkanlığına Yunus Nadi getirildi. Mustafa Kemal'in "diktatörlüğü" üç ay daha uzatıldı. 2. Mustafa Kemal'e Hindistan'dan 26 bin sterlin gönderildiği, ayrıca 24 bin sterlin daha gönderileceği haber alındı.	210

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82	17 Şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİ BAŞ TERCÜMANI RYAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BA- KANLIĞINA MUHTIRA Türkiye'ye karşı izlenecek politika konusunda Londra'da dört değişik düşünce var: a) Yunanistan'ı desteklemek, b) Türklerle Yunanlıları kendi hallerine bırakmak, c) Rusya ile anlaşarak Ortadoğu sorununa çare aramak ve d) Türkiye'ye ödün vermek gibi düşünceler ileri sürülüyor. Bu düşünceler üzerinde yorumlar. Bir anlaşmaya varılamazsa önümüzdeki baharda Irak için tehlikeli bir durum ortaya çıkabilir, çünkü Mezopotamya'nın geri alınması Misak-ı Milli'nin bir parçasıdır.	211
83	21 Şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 194 Afgan Emiri Amanullah Han'ın Mustafa Kemal'e gönderdiği mektup "Vakit" gazetesinde yayınlandı. Mektup çevirisi. Bu mektup düzmece de olabilir.	215
84	4 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 134 Mustafa Kemal, yeniden T.B.M.M. Başkanlığına seçildi. Seçilmesi dolayısıyla yaptığı konuşmadan parçalar. (Bkz. No. 85)	216
85	5 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 139 (İlgi: No. 84) Son konuşmasından Mustafa Kemal'in uyuşmaz bir tutum içinde olduğu anlaşılıyor. (Bkz. No. 86)	217
86	6 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 225 (İlgi: No. 84 ve 85). Mustafa Kemal'in son söylevinin çevirisi ilâhikte sunuldu. Söylevin bazı bölümleri müttefiklerarası sansürce kesildi. Sèvres andlaşmasının uygulan-	217

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		mayacağını söylemesi ilginçtir. Mustafa Kemal, 1921 yılında Sovyetlerle ve Fransa ile yaptığı anlaşmalarla övünüyor. Söylevinin sonunda Padişah'ı tehdit ediyor.	
87	6 Mart	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL KOLUNUN RAPORU NO 390 KISMEN Kemalistlerle Ruslar arasında ilişkiler. Asyalılık kongresi konusu. Sovyet Büyükelçisi Aralov ile Mustafa Kemal, Anadolu'da bir Asyalılık Pan-Asiatic kongresi toplamak için görüşmeler yaptılar. Görüşmelere Afgan ve Azerbaycan temsilcileri de katıldılar. Aralov, Asya halklarının artık kapitalistlere ve emperyalistlere boyun eğmeyeceklerini söyledi. (Konuşmasının özeti). Aralov, ayrıca Anadolu ile Rusya arasında bir ekonomik anlaşma yapılması için çaba harcıyor.	218
88	7 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LODR CURZON'A YAZI NO. 735 Bazı haberler: 1. Avrupa'ya gönderilen Yusuf Kemal Bey'e 160.000 lira ödenek verilmiş. Bunun 110.000 lirası gizli amaçlar içinmiş. 2. Anadolu'ya geçmek isteyen şehzade Ömer Faruk Efendi, İnebolu'dan geri çevrilmiş ve bu vesileyle T.B.M.M.'de Padişahı aleyhinde konuşmalar yapılmış. 3. Franklin-Bouillon, Ankara-İstanbul ikiliğine son verilmesini söylemiş. Mustafa Kemal, bunun ancak Padişah'ın tahttan indirilmesiyle olabileceğini belirtmiş. 4. Yusuf Kemal Bey, Padişah tahtta kaldıkça Fransızların pek birşey yapamayacaklarını, barışın sağlanmasında İngilizlerin en önemli faktör olduklarını tellemiş. 5. Ruslar, Ankara Hükümetinden maden imtiyazı istiyorlarmış. 6. Mustafa Kemal'i yakından tanıyanlar ona büyük saygı duyuyorlarmış. Çevresi, Mustafa Kemal'in	219

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		hizmetinde olmanın Padişah'a hizmetten çok daha iyi olduğunu söylüyormuş.	
89	13 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 255.	220
		İzzet Paşa'nın Avrupa gezisi. Sadrazam, Paşa'dan henüz rapor alınmadığını söylüyor.	
		İstanbul Hükümeti, Yunanlıların Anadolu'yu boşaltmalarını istiyor, ama Misak-ı Milli'den yana değil, Ankara'nın isteklerini aşı buluyor. İzzet Paşa, Avrupa'da İstanbul'un talimatına göre davranacak. Sadrazam, Anadolu'nun boşaltılmasına karşı direnmek isteyen Venizelos'un Yunan subayları konusuna değindi. Ben, Mustafa Kemal'in Sovyetlere bel bağladığını söyledim. Sadrazam, "denize düşen yılanı sarılır" deyince, "yılan, Mustafa Kemal'i sokacak" diye karşılık verdim. Son haberler, Anadolu'da bolşevik nüfuzunun arttığını gösteriyor. Anadolu'nun ve Edirne ile Doğu Trakya'nın Türklere bırakılmasını isteyen Hindistan müslümanlarıyla ilgili telgrafi basına duyurmadım. Yalnız Hindistan İşleri Bakanı Montagu'nun istifası haberinin yayınlanması- na izin verdim.	
90	14 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 259.	223
		Ankara Hükümeti Hariciye Vekaleti Vekili Celâl Bey, Yusuf Kemal Beyin Avrupa gezisiyle ilgili olarak bir demec verdi. Müteffik sansürü, bunu basında yayımlatmadı. Demec metni. Celâl Bey, İzzet Paşa'nın tutumunu sert biçimde eleştiriyor. İstanbul politika- cılarının çevirdikleri çirkin manevraların, Ankara Hükümetini yolundan döndüremeyeceğini belirtiyor. Eninde sonunda amaçlarına ulaşacaklarını vurguluyor.	
91	16 Mart	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL KOLU'NUN RAPORU. NO. 621. (KİSMEN).	225
		1. Ankara Hükümeti ve Rumeli göçmenleri. Güvenilir bir kaynağa göre, Ankara Hükümeti, Rumeli	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		göçmenlerinden özel bir kuvvet oluşturmaya tasarlamış, bu amaçla Edirne Mebusu Şeref Bey Trakya'ya gönderilmiş, ama sonunda ayrı bir kuvvet kurulmasına karar verilememiş.	
2.		İskenderun'dan Ankara'ya bir heyet gönderilmiş. T.B.M.M.'ne 120 imzalı bir dilekçe sunulmuş. Mustafa Kemal, heyeti kabul etmiş. Heyet, İskenderun bölgesinin anavatandan ayrılmamasını, bir plebisit yapılmasını istemiş. Mustafa Kemal, heyete, sabırlı olmalarını öğütlemiş. Suriye ve Filistin halkı da Türkiye'ye katılma eğiliminde.	
92	24 Mart	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL KOLU RAPORU. NO. 620 (KISMEN). Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinde Partiler ve gruplar. Mecliste Müdafai-i Hukuk grubu çoğunlukta, ama ayrıca şu partiler de var: Din adamları partisi: 20-25 üyesi var. Bunların başında Konya mebusu Hacı Vehbi bulunuyor. Doğu İlleri Partisi: 45-50 üyesi var. Bunların başında da Erzurum mebusları Salih Efendi ile Hüseyin Avni Bey bulunuyor. Sözde Komünist Partisi: Bunun başında Mahmut Esat Bey var. İttihatçı grup: Yunus Nadi, Hacı Muhittin, Hüseyin Avni ve Hafız Mehmet bu grubu oluşturuyorlar. Yunus Nadi zaman zaman Mustafa Kemal'i destekliyor. Küme Partisi: Oluşma aşamasında. Din adamları partisiyle Doğu İlleri Partisini ve bazı hoşnutsuzları birleştirme çabasında. Tevhid Klübü Grubu: Bunlar Rauf ve Fethi Beylerin kişisel yandaşlarından oluşuyor.	226
93	26 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE ARACILIĞIYLA LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 12. Sadrazam, müttefiklere yazılı cevap verdi. Önerilerin Mustafa Kemal'e iletildiğini bildirdi. Trakya'nın ve Edirne'nin boşaltılmamasını tehlike olarak görüyor.	228
94	26 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 304. GİZLİ.	228

No.	Tarîhi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Sadrazam Tevfik Paşa, Padişahın İngiltere ile ayrı bir anlaşma yapmak istediğini bildirdi ve Padişah adına şu önerilerde bulundu: "Türkiye ile İngiltere arasında ayrı bir anlaşma yapılacak. Boğazların serbestisini sağlama işi İngiltere'ye bırakılacak. Doğu Trakya'nın ve Edirne'nin Türkiye'ye geri verilmesine karşı itirazlara neden kalmayacak. Böyle bir anlaşma, İngiltere'nin Halifelîğe düşman olduğu yolundaki düşüncelerini de yok edecek..." Sadrazam, bu konunun bütün nazırlardan ve İzzet Paşadan da gizlendiğini söyledi. İngiltere böyle bir anlaşmayı kabul ederse Padişahın bunu hemen onaylayacağını bildirdi. Sadrazamı dikkatle dinledim. Bunun müttefiklerde kıskançlık yaratacağını söyledim. Padişah, İngiltere ile sıkı ilişki kurmayı içtenlikle arzuluyor. Mustafa Kemal'e karşı bir koruyucu arıyor ve gözlerini İngiltere'ye çeviriyor. Padişaha verilecek cevabın, - red bile olsa- elden geldigince okuyucu olacağını umarım.	
95	3 Nisan	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL KOLUNUN RAPORU. NO. 630. (KİSMEN). Müttefiklerin mütareke teklifleri Anadolu halkında büyük hoşnutsuzluk yarattı. Ankara bu teklifi reddederse Konya ve Tokat'ta karışıklık çıkabilir. Ankara çevrelerinde ise teklif, Yunanlıları korumayı amaçlayan bir hile olarak görülüyor. Mustafa Kemal henüz görüşünü açıklamadı. T.B.M.M.'nin gizli oturumunda konu görüşüldü. Kâzım Paşa, Misak-ı Milli'nin ancak silahla sağlanabileceğini söyledi ve alkışlandı. Yalnız albay Ömer Lütfi Bey muhalif görüşü dile getirdi.	231
96	4 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 335. Paris konferansı ve Türk bannı. Türk gazeteleri mütareke fikrine karşı. İlgal altındaki topraklar boşaltılmadıkça silah bırakılmayacağını yazıyorlar. Misak-ı milli konusunda pazarlığa girilemeyeceğini belirtiyorlar.	232

No,	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		<p>"Vakit" gazetesinde Ahmet Emin, Edirne'den ve Gelibolu'dan vazgeçilemeyeceğini yazıyor, ama Boğazlardan geçiş konusunda Devletlerin güvence istemelerini de kabul ediyor.</p> <p>"İleri" gazetesi, Türk-Yunan savaşının sona erdirilmesiyle genel barış andlaşması yapılması konularını birbirinden ayrı tutuyor.</p> <p>Türk gazeteleri, Atina haberlerine geniş yer veriyorlar. Yunan Hükümetinin güçlüklerini sömürü konusu yapıyorlar. Kemalistlere karşı tek gazete olan "Peyam-ı Sabah" ayrı bir tutum izliyor. Türklerin başarılarını Kemalistlerin eseri değil, müttefik politikasının sonucu olarak görüyor. Dünyu umumiyenin ve kapitülasyonların devamını doğal sayıyor. Anadolu gazeteleri de mütareke teklifini bir İngiliz tuzağı gibi görüyorlar.</p>	
Ek.1		<p>ERMENİ VE RUM GAZETELERİNİN PARIS KONFERANSI KONUSUNDA TUTUMLARI 235</p> <p>Ermeni basını karamsar. Ermeni emellerinin ihmal edildiği görüşünde.</p> <p>Venizelos yanlıs Rum basını da karamsar. Gounaris Hükümetini suçluyor. İngiltere'ye umut bağlıyor. İzmir'in boşaltılamayacağını ileri sürüyor. Paris tekliflerinin Türklerin lehine olduğunu yazıyor.</p>	
Ek.2	31 Mart	<p>"VAKİT" TE AHMET EMİN'İN BAŞYAZISINDAN PARÇA. 237</p> <p>Teklif edilen esaslara barış yapılabileceğine kimse inanmıyor. Ama müzakere yolu açık. Bizim asgari isteklerimiz kalıcı barışın tek güvencesidir.</p>	
Ek.3	29 Mart	<p>"VAKİT" TE AHMET EMİN'İN BAŞYAZISINDAN PARÇA. 237</p> <p>Boğazlar konusunda müttefiklerin çıkarlarıyla bizimkiler farklı. İlgili devletler Boğazların açık kalmasını istiyorlar. Bunu anlamamız gerek. İstanbul'un güvenliğini de sağlamak gerek. Bunlar iyi niyetle müzakere edilebilir.</p>	
Ek.4.	2 Nisan	<p>"VAKİT" TE AHMET EMİN'İN BAŞYAZISINDAN PARÇA. 238</p> <p>Ankara, mütareke teklifine cevap vermeyecek, genel teklifler konusundaki görüşlerini açıklamakla yetinecek. Yunanistan, kurdugu düşlerin bedelini ödemeğe katlanmalıdır.</p>	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek. 5	2 Nisan	"İLERİ" GAZETESİ BAŞYAZISININ SON BÖLÜMÜ.	238
		Lloyd George, Versailles antlaşmasının yürüme- yediğini, Avrupa işlerinin yolunda gitmediğini gördü. Bunalıma çare aramak üzere Amerika'yı, Almanya'yı ve Rusya'yı da Cenova konferansına çağır- dı. Amerika katılmadı. Fransa, konferansın ertelenmesini istedi. Bu arada müttefikler Paris konferansı- yla ilgilendiler. Türk ve Yunan kamuoylarını hazırlama- ğa koyuldu- lar. Doğu sorununun çözümü geriye kalıyor, baharda Anadolu'da savaş yeniden başlayabilecek demektir. Türkler, Cenova konferansına çağırılmadılar. Bu haksızlık belki son anda giderilir. Sèvres antlaşmasının değiştirilmesi konusu Cenova'da da görüşülebilir ve Rusya, bu konuda görüşlerini açıklayabilir. Sèvres, sonunda daha da lehimize değiştirilecektir.	
97	15 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 208	240
		Türk ordusu savaşa isteksizmiş. Mütareke konusunda Ankara'nın cevabı, ıdmların bir zaferi gibi görülüyor.	
98	21 Nisan	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL KO- LUNUN RAPORU. NO. 634. KISMEN	241
		1. Ankara Hükümetinin mali durumu: T.B.M.M.'nin gizli oturumunda mali durum görüşüldü. Yalnız Hükümet değil, Mustafa Kemal'in kendisi de eleştirildi. Sonunda güven oyu verildi.	
		2. Türk-Rus ilişkileri.	
		5 Martta Rus Büyükelçisi Aralov, Mustafa Kemal onuruna bir yemek verdi. Karşılıklı ilginç konuşmalar yapıldı. Aralov, itilâf devletlerine karşı doğu halklarının sallarını sıklaştırmalarından sözetti. Mus- tafa Kemal, Türk ve Rus ordularının kuzeyden güneye aynı düşmana karşı, aynı hattı savunduklarını söyledi. Doğu halklarının tam dayanışma içinde olmaları gerektiğini vurguladı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		3. Ankara Hükümeti ve Afganistan: Kâbil Büyükelçiliğine atanan Fahrettin Paşa'ya verilecek talimat konusu görüşüldü. Büyükelçinin, Hint Hilafet komitesi aracılığıyla Gandi'ye bir mektup götürmesi kararlaştırıldı. Büyükelçi, Afganistan'daki İngiliz gizli haberalma örgütü konusunda araştırma yapmakla da görevlendirildi. Fahrettin Paşa, Hindistan Müslümanları derneğine de bir mektup gönderecek ve Ankara'nın teşekkürlerini bildirecek. Paşa'nın yakında Kâbil'e hareket edeceği sanılıyor. Ek. 1. Aralov'un 5 Mart günü yaptığı konuşma. Ek. 2. Mustafa Kemal'in aynı gün yaptığı konuşma metinleri.	
99	23 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 220 Ankara, Paris tekliflerini tartışmaya açık sayıyor. Milliyetçilerle Anadolu'da buluşmak olmaz. Hamid Bey, Konferans İzmit'te yapılırsa Mustafa Kemal de katılacak, diyor.	247
100	25 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 221 Ankara'ya verilecek cevap konusu müttefik Yüksek komiserlerince görüşüldü. Bazı noktalar üzerinde görüş birliğine vardık gibi. İzmit konferansı konusunda karara varamadık. Fransız Yüksek komiseri İzmit'e taraftar, İtalyan ortada görünüyor. Bense karşıyım. Ankara'nın cevabı hence taktik bir manevradır.	248
101	1 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 248 Poincaré, müttefiklerin İzmit konferansını kabul etmelerini savunuyor.	249
102	1 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 408 Ankara'da politik durum: Başlıca üç parti var: 1)	250

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Mustafa Kemal'i destekleyenler, 2) Enver Paşa'dan yana olanlar ve 3) Padişahla barışmak isteyenler. Mustafa Kemal, yine de duruma hakim görünüyör. Fethi Bey, "memleketin kapıları İttihatçılara açık" dedi. Ankara kabinesinden üç vekil istifa etti. Ama bunlar pek önemli kişiler değildi. Misak-i Milli'den gerileme görülüyor. Dış politika bakımından "Rusya eğilimli" ve "Batı eğilimli" olanlar var. Rusya eğilimli olanlar şimdilik ağır basıyor. Türklerle Yunanlılar arasındaki askeri denge Yunanlılardan yana değişti. Ama Kemalistlerin savaş makinası çözülmüş değil. Çarpışmalar yeniden başlarsa ne Türkler ne de Yunanlılar başarı kazanabilirler.	
103	2 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 411. 252 Türk basını, Ankara'nın notasını pek makul görüyor. "Tevhid-i Efkar", bu notaya "evet" veya "hayır" diye cevap vermek gerektiğini yazıyor, "Vakit", Mustafa Kemal'in İzmit konferansına katılmaya razı olmakla barışçı niyetini açıkladığını ileri sürüyor. Amerika'nın da İzmit'e "gözlemci" gönderebileceğini belirtiyor. Gazete, İstanbul'da konferans toplanmasının söz konusu olamayacağını da yazdı, ama bu cümle sansür edildi. "İleri" gazetesi ise, barışa savaşla varılabileceğini ileri sürüyor. Bu gazeteler, İstanbul Hükümetinin cevabı konusunda hiçbir yorum yapmıyorlar ve Ankara'yı Türkiye'nin tek Hükümeti olarak tanıma eğilimi gösteriyorlar. "Tevhid-i Efkar", bu konuda daha da ileri gidiyor. Bu gazete, Ermenilere karşı saldırgan Fransız sansürü gevşek davranıyor.	252
104	9 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 414. 254 Ankara haber ajansı, Kars antlaşması ile Ankara-Ukrayna antlaşmasını onayladıklarını duyurdu. Mustafa Kemal, Bolşevik dostlarıyla ilişkilerini güçlendiriyor. İçerde güçlükleri arttıkça Bolşeviklere daha çok bağlanıyor.	254

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105	10 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'E YAZI NO. 1405.	255
		Paris tekliflerine Atina, Ankara ve İstanbul Hükümetlerinin verdikleri cevapların özeti ve Ankara'nın cevabının eleştirisi. Ankara Hükümeti, konferansın İzmir'te toplanmasını istedi. İngiltere bunu sakıncalı gördü ve konferans yeri olarak Tarabya'yı öne sürdü. Fransa, Ankara'nın teklifinin kabul edilmesinden yana görünüyor. İngiltere, Fransa'nın tutumunu anlamakta güçlük çekmektedir. Zaman geçiyor. Paris kararları uygula- namıyor. Bu noktalara Fransa Hükümetinin önemle dikkatinin çekilmesi talimatı. Paris planından vazgeçilmesini İngiltere derin bir üzüntüyle karşılayacak. Müttefiklerin ortak hareketi sağlanamazsa, İngiltere kendi başına ve başka biçimde hareket edecektir. İlk iş olarak müttefiklerle Ankara, İstanbul ve Atina Hükümetleri arasında yapılmış olan yazışmaları açıklayıp yayınlayacaktır.	
106	15 Mayıs	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL KO- LUNUN RAPORU. NO. 678 (KİSMEN).	259
		Ruslarla Kemalistler arasında ilişkiler. Ankara'dan Babıâli'ye ulaşan bir duyuru, Bolşeviklerle Kemalist- ler arasında sıkı ilişkileri doğruluyor. (Duyuru metni). Anadolu'da Rus etkisinin arttığı söyleniyor.	
107	16 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 446.	260
		T.B.M.M.'de Mustafa Kemal'e karşı muhalefet var. Kabine'nin iki boşluğu güçlüklerle doldurulabildi. Mustafa Kemal, Meclise istediğini yaptırmakta gitgide artan güçlüklerle karşılaşılıyor ve Bolşeviklerle bağları koparmak niyetinde değil.	
108	18 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'A TEL. NO. 211.	262
		Ankara'ya verilecek cevap konusunda müttefikler arasında görüş ayrılığı var. Fransa, Mustafa Kemal ile İzmit'te görüşme yapılmasından yanadır, ben	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		(Curzon) buna karşıyım. Fransız planı konusundaki görüşleriniz nedir? Bir öneriniz var mı? (Bkz. No. 109)	
109	22 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 253 264 (İlgi: No. 108).	264
		1. Fransız Yüksek Komiseri, her ne pahasına olursa olsun, barış yapılmasından yana görünüyor. Fransa Hükümeti de müzakerelerde Kemalistlere boyun eğmekten yana olacak.	
		2. İtalyanlara uzun süre bel bağlanamaz. İtalyan Yüksek Komiseri İzmit konferansına karşı. Ankara ile yeniden nota değiş-tokuşunu yararsız görüyor.	
		3. Mustafa Kemal'in durumu sağlamdır. Genova konferansının başarısızlığı Ankara-Moskova ilişkilerini güçlendirir.	
		4. (Azınlıklara karşı) zulümler konusunda İngiltere'nin tutumu Kemalistlerin İngiliz düşmanlığını artırıyor.	
		5. İstanbul Hükümeti, Ankara'yı kışkırtıyor ve İzmit konferansı fikrine karşıdır.	
		6. Paris konferansı kararlarını Kemalistlere kabul ettirmek konusunda pek iyimser değilim.	
		7. Fransızlarla ilişkilerimizi koparmamak gerek.	
		8. İzmit'te konferansa karşıyım. (Bkz. No. 110)	
110	23 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 253 267 (İlgi: No. 109)	267
		1. İzmit'te Fransız gemisinde konferans toplanmasını belki Fransa'dan başka kabul eden olmayacak. Bunun İngiltere tarafından reddedilmesi herkesi rahatlatacak.	
		2. Konferans yapılacaksa "belli noktalar" gibi deyimlerin öncelikle halli gerekir.	
		3. Konferans, İstanbul yakınında, meselâ Beykoz'da yapılabilir.	
		4. İstanbul, Ankara ve Atina'nın konferansa katılmasını şart koşulmalıdır ve müttefikler, Paris teklifleri üzerinde direnmelidirler.	

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		5. Sonunda, belki yine İzmir'te, fakat Fransız gemisinde değil de İtalyan savaş gemisinde konferans toplanması kabul edilebilir.	
		6. İngiltere tek başına hareket etmek durumunda kalırsa, Ankara'ya karşı İstanbul Hükümetini kullanabilir.	
		7. İngiltere, Türklere karşı izlenecek yöntemi oluştururken, İzmir'deki direnişten ya da Yunanistan'daki politik değişikliklerden etkilenmemelidir.	
		<i>Not:</i> Lord Curzon'un 25 Mayıs günü yorumu.	
111	25 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI MÜSTEŞARI SIR E. CROWE'UN VENIZELOS İLE GÖRÜŞMESİNE DAİR TUTANAK Venizelos, artık politikaya dönmeyeceğini vurguladı. Gülümseyerek, belki yakında Yunanistan'ın kendisine ihtiyacı olacağını söyledim. Venizelos, Anadolu Rumlarının güvenliği üzerinde durdu. Yunan ordusunun İzmir'den çekileceğini, ondan sonra Mustafa Kemal'in müttefiklere meydan okuyacağını söyledi ve karanlık bir tablo çizdi. Buna çare olarak, Yunan ordusu çekilirken onun yerine batı Anadolu hristiyanlarının silahlandırılıp örgütlendirilebileceğini belirtti ve bu iş için müttefiklerin para yardımı yapmaları gerektiğini söyledi. Anadolu'ya, Türk ve Yunan bölgelerine müttefik soruşturma komisyonları gönderilmesi konusunda Venizelos, Yunan işgal bölgesinde soruşturma açılmasının haksızlık olacağını, sonra bu soruşturmalardan bir yarar çıkmayacağını söyledi. Yunan savaş bölgesiyle Türkiye'nin öteki bölgeleri arasında bir karşılaştırma yapmanın yanlış olacağı kanısında. Venizelos, "Yunan ordusu İzmir'den çekilirse Kral Konstantin yerinde kalamaz" dedi. <i>Dipnot</i> - Lord Curzon'un 25 Mayıs günü notları.	269
112	30 Mayıs	İNGİLİZ MİLLETVEKİLİ GENERAL SIR C. TOWNSHEND'İN AVAM KAMARASINDA YAPTIĞI KONUŞMA Türk-Yunan savaşına hemen son vermek hayati önem taşır. Yoksa Türkiye'yi Rusya'nın kucagina atmış	274

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		olacağız. Türkiye, Rus-Alman ittifakına katılırsa İngiliz İmparatorluğu için büyük tehlike doğar. Mondros'tan beri Türklere karşı acımasız davrandık. Türkiye'yi fazlasıyla cezalandırdık. Büyük hatalar işledik. Bu hatalarımız Mustafa Kemal'i ortaya çıkardı.	
		Üstün Yunan ordusu Sakarya'da yenildi. Yunanlılar savunmaya çekildiler ve şimdi "Mütareke istiyoruz, buradan gitmek istemiyoruz" diyorlar. Mustafa Kemal, İzmit'te bir konferans istedi. Fransa bunu kabul ediyor. Başbakan (Lloyd George) kalkıp niçin İzmit'e gitmez? Sanırım Haziran sonuna kadar Anadolu'da çarpışmalar yeniden başlayacak. Hükümetimiz politikasını değiştirmeli, Türklerle dostluğa yönelmelidir.	
		Milletvekili Kenworthy'nin konuşmasından parça: General Townshend'i destekliyor ve Hükümeti eleştiriyor.	
113	13 Haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 337.	278
		İzzet Paşa, barış müzakereleri konusunu sordu. Tekliflerimizin üç hükümetçe kesin olarak kabulünü ya da reddini beklediğimizi söyledim. Barış konusunun Ankara'da takılıp kaldığını, bu hükümetin İzmit'te konferans teklif ettiğini, bunun ise kabul edilemeyeceğini belirttim. Paşa, Ankara Hükümetinin, mütareke teklifini kabul etmemekle, büyük yanlışlık yaptığını söyledi. İzzet Paşa, son Avrupa gezisi dolayısıyla Ankara Hükümetince çok eleştirildiğini, bu eleştirilerin ise Mustafa Kemal'in durumunu zayıflatıldığını, bu yüzden şimdi Mustafa Kemal'in İttihatçılardan destek sağlamaya çalıştığını ileri sürdü.	
114	20 Haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 356.	279
		Mustafa Kemal'in Adapazarı'na ve İzmit'e gelişi. Adapazarı'nda "Vakit" gazetesine bir demeç veren	

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Mustafa Kemal, İzmit cephesini denetlemek için geldiğini, Pontus Rumlarının askeri nedenlerle sürüldüklerini, Yunan donanmasının Karadeniz kıyılarını bombalamasından bir sonuç çıkmayacağını, Rusya ile ilişkilerinin çok iyi olduğunu söyledi. Soru üzerine, Anayasa'nın değiştirilmeyeceğini, Hükümetin görev ve yetkileriyle ilgili yasa tasarısının ise yakında Meclise sunulacağını açıkladı.

Mustafa Kemal'in Adapazarı ve İzmit gezisi askeri amaçlıdır. Bolu yöresinde Kemalistlere karşı silahlı bir hareket var. Hareketin başında Albay Şevket Beyin bulunduğu söyleniyor. Batı Anadolu'da, Yunan kanadı altında, Ankara'ya karşı ayrı bir Hükümet kurulmak istendiği söylentileri de dolaşıyor. Ama bu isyan hareketini Kemalistler basturabilirler, sanırım. Claude Farrère, Mustafa Kemal ile buluşmak üzere İzmit'e gitti.

115 26 Haziran

İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL KOLUNUN RAPORU. NO. 742 GİZLİ. 281

Sovyetlerin Mustafa Kemal ve Enver Paşalarla entrikaları. Enver Paşa'nın Türkistan'daki faaliyetleri.

Sovyetlerin şaşırtıcı ikiyüzlü entrikalarıyla ilgili güvenilir bir rapor ilişktedir. Rapor, Mustafa Kemal ile Enver arasındaki kişisel düşmanlığın derin kökenlerini belirterek başlıyor. Sonra Sovyet Hükümetiyle Enver arasındaki ilişkileri anlatıyor. Sovyetler, önceleri Mustafa Kemal'i devirmek için Enver'i kullanmayı amaçlamışlar. Enver, bu amaçla Kafkaslarda çalışmalara koyulmuş. Tehlikeyi kavrayan Mustafa Kemal, Sovyetlere yanaşmış ve gizli bir anlaşma yapmış. Mustafa Kemal'e kızan Sovyetler, bu kez, Enver'i gizlice kösteklemeye koyulmuşlar ve ona karşı Bakü yöresinde ayaklanma çıkartmışlar. Sonra Enver'i görevli olarak Berlin'e, arkasından da Türkistan'a göndermişler. Türkistan'a gönderilmeyi sevinçle kabul eden Enver, Çiçerin'in sekreterinden Sovyet planının içyüzünü öğrenmiş ve onun üzerine Sovyetlere karşı dönmüş. Bolşeviklere karşı savaşmağa başlamış.

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		Raporun son bölümü Enver Paşa'nın Türkistan'daki faaliyetlerine ayrılmıştır. Rapor, Ruslarla Kemalistler arasındaki ilişkilerle ilgili çeşitli haberleri doğruluyor ve Enver'in Türkistan misyonuna ışık tutuyor.	
		Ek. Sovyet Hükümetinin Mustafa Kemal ve Enver Paşalarla ilgili entrikaları konusunda rapor metni.	
116	23 Haziran	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL KOLUNUN RAPORU. NO. 744 GİZLİ.	287
		T.B.M.M. ve Soruşturma Komisyonu.	
		Meclisin gizli oturumunda, soruşturma Komisyonu- nun Anadolu'ya girmesine izin verilmesi kararlaştırıldı. Ama Pontus bölgesine girmesi yasakla- nacak. Bu bölgede Ankara Hükümetinin aldığı sert tedbirleri haklı göstermek için bazı hazırlıklar yapılacak. Hristiyan azınlıkların ayaklanmış olduk- ları belgelenecek, kanıtlanacak. Şimdi azınlıkların huzur içinde oldukları gösterilecek. Ermenilerin ve Rumların Ankara Hükümetinden hoşnut oldukları yolunda dilekçeler vermeleri sağlanacak. Ayrıca, Yunan işgal bölgesinde işlenen zulümlerin de araştırılması istenecek.	
117	27 Haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 572.	289
		Mustafa Kemal'in 18 Haziran günü İzmir'te yaptığı konuşmasının çevirisi ilişiktedir.	
Ek.	18 Haziran	MUSTAFA KEMAL'IN İZMİR SÖYLEVİ.	289
		Dostumuz Claude Farrère'le burada buluşmaktan pek sevinçliyim. İzmir'ten Kars'a kadar her yerde kalplerimiz dostumuza karşı sevgiyle çarpıyor. Dostumuz, en karanlık günlerimizde bizi savunmak için sesini yükseltmiş büyük bir insandır. Özgürlük uğrunda bir ihtilâl yapmış soylu bir ulusun çocuğudur. İstanbul'dan buraya geldi ve orada yabancı süngülerin gölgesinde yaşayan bahtsız halkımızın çilesini gözleriyle gördü. Türkiye halkı, yüzyıllardır özgür ve bağımsız yaşamış soylu bir ulusun çocuklarıdır. Düşmanlarımız, yurdumuzu paylaşmağa, halkımızı tutsak etmeğe	

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		kalkışılar. Amaçlarına ulaşabilmek için her çareye başvurdular. Türklere kara çaldılar, çirkin iftiralarda bulundular. Bir de Anadolu'ya soruşturma komisyonları göndermeğe kalkışılar. Hiçbir bağımsız ülke kendi içişlerine yabancıların karışmalarına razı olamaz. Dünya bilmeli ki, bu ulus, ölüme değil, yaşamaya lâyıktır. T.B.M.M. tarihsel görevini başarıyla yapıyor.	
		Dostumuz Claude Farrère'in barış içinde bize gelmesini pek isterdik. Bugün barıştan yoksun isek suç bizim değildir. Acımasız batılı politikacılar, özgürlük için ölümlü göze alabilen bir ulusu yok edebileceklerini hayal etmekle yanıhıyorlar. Türkiye'ye karşı iftiralarla dünya kamuoyunu yanıltmağa çalışıyorlar. T.B.M.M., tarih önünde, uygarlık önünde yaptıklarının hesabını verecektir. Her bağımsız devlet gibi hakkımızı ve yetkimizi kullanıyoruz.	
118	28 Haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LINDLEY'DEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 234.	294
		Atina'ya çağrılan Stergiades ziyaretime geldi. Anadolu'daki Yunan ordusunun yeni hatta çekilmesi-ne karşı çıkıyor. Yunan Hükümeti mali nedenlerle tek başına savaşa devam edemeyeceğinden ve geri de çekilemediğinden bir çıkmaz içinde. Ama müttefiklerin desteği olursa Yunanistan dayanabilir ve sürekli barışı sağlayabilir.	
119	29 Haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ LORD BALFOUR'A TEL. NO. 286 ÇOK GİZLİ.....	295
		Mustafa Kemal'e karşı bir dernek üyesi eski bir Nazır, Yunan Yüksek Komiseriyle görüştü. Mustafa Kemal İstanbul'a gelirse sürülmekten veya idam edilmekten korktuklarını söyledi ve Padişah ile Yunanistan arasında barış yapılmasını telkin etti. Barış şu esaslara dayanacak: (a) Anadolu'da Sèvres sınırına göre, Padişah'ın vesayeti altında, muhtar bir devlet kurulacak ve bunun başında Hristiyan bir vali olacak. (b) Trakya sınırı Mart tekliflerine göre olacak.	

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		Padışah'ın Yunanistan'la anlaşacağını görünce Türk subaylarının birçoğunun Mustafa Kemal'i terkedecekleri umuluyor.	
		Yunan Yüksek Komiseri fikrimi sordu. Bu telkinlerin pek önemsenmemesi gerektiğini söyledim.	
120	29 Haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALFOUR'A TEL. NO. 291	296
		Yunan Yüksek Komiserine, Atina'ya çağırılıp çağırılmadığını sordum. Henüz telgraf almadığını, ama çağırılsa şaşırmayacağını söyledi. Anadolu Rumlarının durumunu vahim görüyor ve savaşa son vermek gerektiğini belirtiyor. Yunan ordusunun İzmir yakınında yeni bir batta çekilmesini sakıncalı buluyor. Böyle bir çekilme yeni bir durum yaratacak.	
121	3 Temmuz	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALFOUR'DAN SAVUNMA BAKANI WORTHINGTON-EVANS'A YAZI. E. 6293/5/44	297
		İstanbul'u boşaltmanın çeşitli güçlükleri ve sakıncaları vardır. İstanbul'daki garnizonumuzu orda tutmamız gerekir kanısındayım.	
		Not: General Harington'un İstanbul'un boşaltılmasını teklif eden 3 Haziran tarihli mektubundan parçalar.	
122	4 Temmuz	İNGİLİZ AKDENİZ BAŞKOMUTANLIĞI RAPORUNDAN PARÇALAR.	298
		Ankara Hükümetiyle ilgili haberler:	
		1. Kemalistlerin Karadeniz kıyılarına mayın döşedikleri yolundaki haberler doğrulanmadı. "Aydın Reis" ve "Preveze" gemi botları Batum'da görüldü. Yunanlıların "Averoff" zırhlısını batırana T.B.M.M.'nin 10.000 lira ödül vereceği rapor edildi.	
		2. T.B.M.M.'de Mustafa Kemal'e muhalefet artıyor.	
		3. Mustafa Kemal İzmit'te Claude Farrère'i kabul etti ve uzun bir konuşma yaptı. Farrère hararetle karşılık verdi. Mustafa Kemal ayrıca Türk gazetelerine demeçler verdi. Yusuf Kemal Bey, Atina Hükümetiyle doğrudan barış görüşmesi yaptıkları yolundaki söylentileri kesinlikle yalanladı.	

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		4. Yunan donanmasının Samsun'u bombalaması üzerine T.B.M.M. mütteliklere bir protesto notası gönderdi. Yunan donanmasının İstanbul'u üs olarak kullanmasını protesto etti.	
		5. Claude Farrère'in, Ankara ile İstanbul'u barıştırmaya çalıştığı, ama başarılı olamadığı haber veriliyor.	
		6. Çanakkale'de bir değişiklik yok. Aranan eşkiyalar yakalanamadı.	
123	9 Temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ LORD BALFOUR'A TEL. NO. 302.	300
		İtalyan Yüksek Komiseri, önceden herhangi bir şart ileri sürmeksizin, savaşan tarafları konferansa çağtırmaktan yana olduğunu söyledi. Bu konuda eski görüşünü değiştirmiş.	
124	11 Temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ LORD BALFOUR'A YAZI NO. 623. GİZLİ.	301
		"Peyam-ı Sabah", Enver Paşa'nın Orta Asya'daki faaliyetlerini öven bir yazı yayınladı. Gazeteyi çıkaran Ali Kemal, Mustafa Kemal'e karşı olan çeşitli unsurları bir partide toplamağa çalışıyor ve bu arada Enver Paşa'nın da avukatlığını yapıyor. Yazının İngilizlerce yazdırıldığı, Enver Paşa'nın İngilizlerle anlaşmış olduğu ileri sürülüyor.	
		Bir başka söylentiye göre, Bolşeviklerle bozuşmuş ve Mustafa Kemal'e karşı olan Enver Paşa şimdi Padişah'a yanaşıyor. Padişah'ın da Enver Paşa'yı Mustafa Kemal'e karşı kullanmak eğiliminde olduğunu gösteren bazı belirtiler var. Halen Anadolu'da Mustafa Kemal'e karşı en güçlü muhalif grup Enver Paşa yanlılarıdır.	
		Padişah ile Enver Paşa'nın işbirliği şimdilik bir teoriden başka bir şey değildir. Böyle bir işbirliğine gidilirse, hem Padişah hem Enver Paşa İngiltere'nin koruyuculuğunu isteyeceklerdir. Enver Paşa ile ilişki kurulması yolunda İngiltere Yüksek komiserliğine son bir yıl içinde iki kez telkin gelmiştir.	

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		Nuri ve Küçük Talat Paşaların gizlice İstanbul'a geldikleri söylentisi dolaşıyor. Doğru çıkarsa buradaki konumuz bakımından anlam taşıyacaktır. Enver Paşa ile öteki İttihatçı liderlerin Türk siyaset sahnesinde ileride yeniden görülmeleri halinde ne gibi gelişmeler olabileceği incelenmeğe değer. Bir süre önce Fethi Beyin, "kapılarımız İttihatçılara açıktır" yolundaki demeci epeyce dikkat çekti. <i>Foreign Office'in notu:</i> Padişah-Enver ve İttihatçı işbirliği ilginç bir tasarıdır. Padişah için, hatta Kemal'i defetmesine karşılık Enveri kabullenecek miyiz? Sanmam. Fethi Bey Avrupa'da, Cavit Bey Fransız maliyecilerle anlaşıyor. Bu da not edilmeğe değer.	
125	14 Temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALFOUR'A TEL NO. 305 Hükümet üyelerinin T.B.M.M.'nce seçimi usulüyle ilgili yasanın kabulü üzerine, Ankara Hükümeti istifa etti. Yeni yasa Mustafa Kemal'in yetkilerini kısıtlıyor. Son telgraflar, istifa eden başlıca Hükümet üyelerinin yeniden seçildiklerini haber veriyor.	303
126	16 Temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALFOUR'A TEL NO. 308 Ankara Hükümetinin Beykoz konferansına katılacağı yolunda bir belirti yok. Londra konferansına katılmayı arzu edebilir. Böyle bir arzu resmen bildirilirse tutumumuz ne olacak?	304
127	18 Temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALFOUR'A YAZI NO. 646 Ankara'da kabine değişikliği. Kasım ayındanberi komisyonlarda incelenmekte olan kabine üyelerinin seçimi ve Hükümet başkanı ile ilgili yasa tasarısı, 6 Temmuzda T.B.M.M. 'nce kabul edildi. Yasanın nasıl çıktığı henüz bilinmiyor. Yeni yasa, Mustafa Kemal'in boş hükümet üyeliklerine aday gösterme yetkisini elinden alıyor. Yeni usule göre yeni vekiller 13 Temmuzda seçildiler. Yeni	305

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		kabine eskisinden pek farklı değil. Yeniler şunlar: Başvekil Hüseyin Rauf, Adliye Vekili Celâlettin Arif Bey, İktisat Vekili Mahmut Esat Bey ve Dahiliye Vekili Ata Bey. Fevzi Paşa eskiden Başvekil ve Genelkurmay Başkanıydı, şimdi yalnız Genelkurmay Başkanı olarak kabinede kaldı. Eski vekillerden yalnız üçü kabine dışında kaldı: Hasan Bey, Refik Şevket Bey ve Adnan Bey. Ama Adnan Bey Meclis İkinci Başkanlığına getirildi. Müttefikler bakımından bu kabine değişikliğinin ne gibi etkileri olacağını söylemek için henüz erken. Rauf Bey, Mustafa Kemal'e rakip olarak sıvrılabilir. Mustafa Kemal'in otoritesi kısıtlanmıştır. Ama politik bir yenilgiye uğrayıp uğramadığı henüz belli değildir.	
128	18 Temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN ŞAM KONSOLOSU PALMER'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALFOUR'A YAZI NO. 216.. 307 (İlg: No. 66). Bir süre önce Ankara'da Mustafa Kemal'in konduğu olan Signor Tuozzi, İtalya'nın Şam Konsolosluğuna atandı. Şunları söyledi: Anadolu, yokluk ve sıkıntı içinde. Bolşevik yardım olmasa Mustafa Kemal'in askeri direnişi çöker. Pontus bölgesinde Hristiyanlara zulüm yapılmış.	
129	18 Temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN BEYRUT BAŞKONSOLOSU STOVE'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALFOUR'A YAZI NO. 109.. 308 General Townshend, 12 Temmuzda Beyrut'a geldi. General Gouraud ile görüştü ve Ankara'ya hareket edeceğini duydum. Kendisini bu geziden vazgeçirmek için gönderilen talimat bana 17 Temmuzda ulaştı. General Gouraud'yu gördüm ve Townshend'e bu yolculuğunda kolaylık göstermemesini istedim. Yalnız nezaket gösterdiğini ve Halep'e kadar kendisine bir refakatçi subay verdiğini söyledi. Bundan geri dönmedi. Beyrut'ta Townshend'i yol hazırlığı içinde buldum. Vazgeçmesini söyledim, ama vazgeçme t. Mustafa Kemal'i iyi tanıdığını, görüşmek istediği ü, İngiliz Parlamentosunda 100 kişinin bu görüşme y. onayladığını, yalnız Foreign Office'in buna karşı çıktığını söyledi. Türkiye'ye hiç gitmeyeceği yolunda	

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		söz vermemiş, pasaport alırken "şimdilik, yani birkaç hafta içinde gitmeyeceğim" demiş. Üç hafta içinde döneceğini söyledi. 17 Temmuzda Halep'e hareket etti. (Bkz. No. 136)	
130	23 Temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALFOUR'A TEL. NO. 314 Mustafa Kemal'in konferans yeri olarak Beykoz'u kabul etmesi ihtimali pek yok. Reddederse, İstanbul ve Atina Hükümetleriyle burada bir konferans yapılmasını teklif ederim. Uygun görülürse İstanbul Hükümetinin düşüncesi yoklanabilir. <i>Foreign Office'in notu:</i> Fransa bunu kabul etmez. Rumbold, İstanbul'a dönüşünde durumu gözden geçirecek, şimdilik konuyu İstanbul Hükümetine açmak doğru olmaz.	310
131	25 Temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALFOUR'A YAZI. NO. 653. GİZLİ. 20 Haziran'da Ankara'da imzalandığı haber verilen gizli Rus-Türk anlaşması altı maddelik. Birinci maddeyle Türkiye, Sovyetlerin rızası olmadan Yunanistan'la barış yapmamayı taahhüt ediyor. Sonra kendi topraklarının Sovyetlere karşı kullanıl-mamasını, Rusya'ya Balkanlardan ya da Kafkaslar-dan bir saldırı halinde müttefikine yardım etmeyi kabul ediyor. Sovyet Hükümeti Türkiye'ye gerekli askeri malzeme sağlamayı yükleniyor. Boyle bir anlaşma yapılıp yapılmadığına emin olamıyorum. Bana gösterilen metin düzmece de olabilir, gerçek de. Kesin birşey söyleyemiyorum.	311
132	25 Temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALFOUR'A YAZI. NO. 656 T.B.M.M.'i, Mustafa Kemal'in Başkomutanlık görevini süresiz olarak uzattı. Mustafa Kemal bir konuşma yaptı ve Meclise teşekkür etti. Ordunun moralinin yüksek olduğunu ve olağanüstü tedbirlere	313

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		başvurulmadan ulusal amacın gerçekleştirilebileceğini söyledi. Mustafa Kemal, sarsılan otoritesini güçlendirmeğe çalışıyor. Eski otoritesini kazanıp kazanamayacağı Rauf Bey'in tutumuna da bağlı olacaktır. Ankara'da Mustafa Kemal'in durumunu etkileyen herşey uluslararası durumu da etkiler. Ama müttefiklere karşı Ankara'nın daha ılımlı bir tutum izlemesi, Milli hareketin toptan zayıflamasıyla olur. Mustafa Kemal, kurtarılacak yerler arasında Musul'un adını anmadı. Misak-ı milliye uygun kesin sonuçlar alınmasından söz etti. Bunlar dikkate değer noktalardır. Duygusal bakımdan Türkler için Musul, belki İzmir, Bursa, İstanbul ve Trakya kadar önemli olmayabilir	
133	26 Temmuz	SİR M. HANKEY'DEN İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI MÜSTEŞARİ SİR E. CROWE'A MEKTUP İstanbul bölgesinde görev yapmış Yüzbaşı Armstrong'dan alınan memorandum ilişikte sunulmuştur. Armstrong, Ankara Türklerinin pek yorgun olduklarını ve eninde sonunda Rusya'nın kucağına düşeceklerini söyledi	316
Ek.		YÜZBAŞI ARMSTRONG'DAN SİR M. HANKEY'E MUHTİRA. KİŞİYE ÖZEL. Padişah, "İngiltere, Padişahı ve Halifeyi ayakta tutmak istiyorsa tezelden yardımına gelmeli" diyor. İngiltere'den neler beklendiğini ve beklediklerini elde ederse neler yapacağını birer birer sayıp döküyor. Yunanlılarca boşaltılacak Anadolu'nun milliyetçilere değil, kendisine teslim edilmesini istiyor. Milliyetçiler İngiltere'ye düşman, Padişah ise dosttur. Anadolu'nun boşaltılması, adım adım, "sancak sistemi" ne göre yapılmalı. Boşaltılan yerler adım adım Padişah'a devredilirse Mustafa Kemal'in gücü son bulur. Yunanlılar gidince Türk niçin savaşıacak? Zaten pek yorgun.	317
134	27 Temn.'üz	İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALFOUR'DAN PARİS İŞGÜDERİ CHEETHAM'A YAZI. NO. 2359 İlişikteki memorandumun Fransa Hükümetine sunulması talimatı.	320

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Ek.		YAKIN DOĞU BARİŞ GÖRÜŞMELERİYLE İLGİLİ MUHTIRA 321 Fransız muhtırası dikkatle incelendi. İngiltere Hükümeti milliyetçi topraklarında (İzmit'te) veya gemide konferans toplanmasına kesinlikle karşıdır. Beykoz'da veya Adalarda konferansa taraftardır. Türkiye'deki azınlıkların korunması için uygun tedbirler alınmasını istemektedir.	
135	28 Temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATINA İŞGÜDERİ BENTINCK'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALFOUR'A TEL NO. 267 .. 323 Yunanistan, Mustafa Kemal'e bir ultimatom vermek, Paris kararlarını kabul etmezse Yunanlıların İstanbul'u işgal edeceklerini bildirmek niyetinde	
136	1 Ağustos	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALFOUR'A YAZI NO. 678 323 (İlgi: No. 129) General Townshend'in Anadolu gezisi, Türkiye'de heyecan ve ilgi yarattı. Geziyle ilgili basın haberleri, önceleri İngiliz sansürünce kısıtlandı, sonra serbest bırakıldı. Telgraf haberlerine göre, General, Konya'da iki kez Mustafa Kemal ile görüşmüş. Ankara'da Rafet Paşa'nın konuğu olmuş, ileri gelen kişilerle görüşmüş. Mustafa Kemal ile ne konuştuğu bilinmiyor. Townshend, basına verdiği demeçte, Türkiye'yi savunmaktan kıvanç duyduğunu, Avam kamarasında Türk yanlısı olanların çoğaldığını, Yunan işgal bölgesinde işlenen zulümlerin de araştırılması gerektiğini v.s. söylüyor. Townshend ile "Evening News" gazetesi arasında yapılan yazışmalar da yayınlandı. Padişah, Townshend'in gezisini sordurdu. İngiltere Hükümetinin bu geziye karşı olduğu Padişah'a duyuruldu.	
Ek.	29 Temmuz	ANKARA'DA GENERAL TOWNSHEND'DEN İNGİLTERE AVAM KAMARASINDA YÜZBAŞI GEE'YE TEL. 325 Mustafa Kemal ile görüştüktan sonra şu kamıya vardım: Yunanlılar Anadolu'yu boşaltılırsa barış hemen yapılabilecek. Dönüşümde bunu Hükümete anlatmak istiyorum. Çok iyi karşılandım.	

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Türkiye'yi ziyaret etmeyeceğim yolunda verdiğim söz şarta bağlıydı. Meclis'te beni savunmanızı dilerim. Bu telgrafın örneğini ilgililere ve basına göndermenizi rica ederim. (Bkz. No. 140).

137	4 Ağustos	İNGİLTERE AVAM KAMARASINDA GÖRÜŞMELER VE LLOYD GEORGE'UN KONUŞMASI 326
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1 *Kenworthy'nin konuşması:*

Meclis tatile girmeden Anadolu sorununu görüşmemiz yerinde olur. Türkiye ile ticaretimizi canlandırmamız gerek. Başbakan'ın 1918 yılındaki vaadini kendisine hatırlatırım. O zaman "Anadolu ve Trakya topraklarını, başkent İstanbul'u Türklerin elinden almayacağız" demişti. Bu sözleri Hindistan'da yayılmıştı ve pek hoş karşılanmıştı. Sonra Yunan askeri İzmir'e çıkartıldı. Orada zulümler yaptı. Binlerce kişi Mustafa Kemal'in bayrağı altında toplandı. Başbakan, Türkiye'nin milli kahramanına "âsi general" dedi.

Ermenistan, Yunan emperyalizmince bir bahane olarak kullanılıyor. Ermeniler, bizim tarafımızı tuttular ve efendilerine karşı ayaklandılar. O yüzden öldürüldüler. Şimdi Erivan'da bir Ermeni Cumhuriyeti vardır ve bunu Türkler de tanımışlardır. Türkiye'deki Ermeni azınlığı için Türkler güvence veriyorlar. Rum azınlığı da 500 yıl Türklerle birlikte yaşamış, zenginleşmiş ve önemli yerlere de yükselmiştir.

Türkler, mütareke yapılması için Yunan askerinin çekilmesini istiyorlar. Haklıdırlar.

Ankara'da başka ülkelerin temsilcileri var, İngiliz yok.

Yunanlıların İstanbul'u işgal etme ve İzmir'de bir İyonya devleti kurma tehditlerine tepki gösterilmelidir. Denizci devletlerin desteği olmazsa İyonya devleti ayakta kalamaz. Başbakan kabul etmelidir ki, zulüm iddiaları, Anadolu'da savaşın devam ettirilmesi için yeterli değildir. Yunanlılar da zulüm yapmışlardır. Zulümleri durdurmak için savaş

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durdurmak gerekir. Yunanlıların Anadolu'daki haksız savaşına destek olmamalıyız. Kemalistlerin teklifleri yerindedir. Başbakanın politikasını değiştirmesini rica ediyorum.

2. *Binhazi Glyn'in konuşması:*

Hükümeti taşlamak biraz haksızlıktır. Çünkü Hükümet, uzun zamandır Anadolu'da barış sağlamak için çalışıyor. Yunan zaferi İngiltere için yenilgi olur, ama Türklerin zaferi de Hristiyanlığın zaferi olmaz. Bu sorunun çözümü için Milletler Cemiyeti de görev almalıdır. İstanbul'da Milletler Cemiyetinin bir şubesi açılmalı, Meriç'e kadar, Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında bir tampon devlet kurulmalıdır.

3. *General Surtees'in konuşması:*

Yakın Doğu'daki uzucu duruma son verilmeli, barış sağlamak için Hükümet çabalarını arttırmalıdır.

4. *Başbakan Lloyd George'un konuşması:*

Hükümet de barış istiyor, ama adil barış. Kenworthy yakın tarihi unuttmuş. Geçmişte Türkiye'yi korumak için savaştık. Ama 1914'de biz bir ölüm-kalım savaşına girince, Türkiye düşmanlarımızın safında yer aldı. Türkiye'nin savaşa girmesi, savaşı iki yıl uzattı. Boğazlar bize kapatılmasaydı belki Rusya çökmeycekti. Hep Türkiye yüzünden oldu.

Yunanlıların İzmir'e çıkmaları ve Sévres antlaşmasının hazırlanması, yalnız İngiltere'nin eseri değildir. İzmir bölgesinin Yunanistan'a verilmesi gerekiyordu ve verildi. Venizelos'un gidişi, Kral Konstantin'in dönüşü, durumda değişiklik yarattı ve Fransa kamuoyu Yunanistan'a karşı döndü.

Barış sağlamak için iki deneme yapıldı. Önce Londra konferansı toplandı. Sévres antlaşmasında değişiklikler yapıldı, ama Ankara bunları kabul etmedi. Sonra Paris'te karar alındı, bir mütareke yapılması ve arkasından bir konferans toplanması kararlaştırıldı. Yunanistan bunu kabul, Ankara ise reddetti. Mustafa Kemal büyük bir general ve büyük bir yurtsever olabilir, ama müslümanların başı İstanbul'dadır, halifedir. Mustafa Kemal, önce

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Yunanlıların Anadolu'yu boşaltmalarını istedi. Barış yolu bu değildir.

Kenworthy, tek tük Yunan zulümlerini eleştiriyor, ama Türklerin Pontus yöresinde Hristiyanlara yaptıkları zulümleri görmemezlikten geliyor. Yunanistan, çekilirken geride bırakacağı 500.000 soydaşı için güvence istemekte haklıdır.

Bugün Türkiye'nin başkentini Yunanistan'a karşı savunuyoruz, yoksa Yunanlılar birkaç saat içinde İstanbul'a girerler. Yunanlıların Anadolu'yu abluka altına almalarına da izin verilmiyor. Barış yapılması için Türkiye'deki hristiyanlara tam güvence istiyoruz. Son 30 yıldır Türkler, azınlıkları yok etme politikasını izliyorlar. Anadolu Rumları korunmaya layıktır ve korunacaklardır, inancındayım.

138 5 Ağustos

İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ
RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALFOUR'A
TEL. NO. 335 341

Türkiye'de genel hava.

Herkes konferanstan yana. Anlaşmazlık yer konusunda. İstanbul Hükümeti Beykoz'a razı. Ankara İzmit'i istedi, olmayınca Batı Avrupa'da bir yeri yeğliyor. Anadolu boşaltılırsa, asıl güçlük Trakya konusunda görülecek.

Mustafa Kemal'in durumu sarsılmış, kendisine muhalefet artmıştır; ama Ankara'da Misak-ı Milli'den gerileme yönünde bir belirti yoktur.

Mustafa Kemal'in yerini Enver Paşa yanlıları veya eski İttihatçılar alsalar bile onlar da bize Mustafa Kemal'in kendisi kadar güçlük çıkarırlar. Bizim için en iyisi Padişah'ın güçlenmesi olur, ama şimdilik pek umut yok.

Türkler, Yunanlıların Anadolu'dan ve Doğu Trakya'dan atılmasını istiyorlar. Trakya'da Yunanlıların durumunun güçlenmesi, Türklerle baskı için yararlı olacaktır. Kemalistlerin Bolşeviklerle sıkı ilişkileri Fransa'yı etkileyebilir.

139 5 Ağustos

İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ
RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALFOUR'A
YAZI. NO. 690. 342

F. VI

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		İzzet Paşayla görüştüm. Paşa, Çatalca yöresinden kaygı duyduklarına, ama şimdi kaygıların giderildiğini söyledi. İzzet Paşa'ya göre, Mustafa Kemal'in durumu sarılmıştır. Ankara'da Vekilleri artık Mustafa Kemal seçmiyor. İstanbul Hükümeti Beykoz konferansına razı, ama İzmir'e karşı. İzzet Paşa, Ankara Hükümetini konferansta Rauf bey'in temsil etmesini istiyor.	
140	10 Ağustos	İNGİLTERE'NİN BERUT BAŞKONSOLOSU SATOW'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD GURZON'A YAZI NO. 119. (Kahire'ye ve İstanbul'a örnek) (İlgi: No. 136) General Townshend, Mersin'e hareket etti. Pasaportunda "Türkiye için geçerli değildir" damgası ve Suriye için Fransız diplomatik vizesi var. Kendisiyle konuştum. 24 Temmuz'da Konya'da Mustafa Kemal ile görüşmüş. Sonra Ankara'ya gitmiş ve 31 Temmuz'da Türkiye'den ayrılmış. Townshend, Mustafa Kemal ile derhal barış yapılması gerektiğini söylüyor. Konferans için en uygun yer Mersin'dir, diyor. Yeni ve etkin bir Türkiye doğduğuna inanıyor. Bu görüşü Mougin de paylaşıyor. Suriye'de görüştuğu Fransız yetkilileri de derhal barış yapılmasını savunuyorlar. Townshend Ankara'ya gitmekle bir görev yaptığına içtenlikle inanıyor. (Bkz. No. 141).	343
141	12 Ağustos	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI P/10949/1 (M. 1. 2) (İlgi: No. 140) General Townshend'in Ankara gezisiyle ilgili telegraflar ilişikte sunulmuştur.	345
Ek.		GENERAL TOWNSHEND'İN ANKARA GEZİSİYLE İLGİLİ TELGRAFLAR. 1. "Evening News" den Townshend'e. Hükümet, sözünüzü tutmadığınızı açıkladı. 2. Townshend'den "Evening News" e tel. Birçok milletvekilinin isteği üzerine Mustafa Kemal'i ziyaret ettim. Hiç ziyaret etmeyeceğim diye söz vermiş değilim. Savaşa hemen son verilmezse, bütün	

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		Avrupa'yı ateş sarar. Barışa katkıda bulunabilirim, kanımdayım (General Townshend, Anadolu'da bir mucize ile karşılaştığını söylüyor.)	
		3. <i>Townshend'den Parlamento üyesi Gee'ye tel. 29.7.1922</i> Yunanlılar Anadolu'yu boşaltırlarsa barış yapılabilir. Yoksa vahim bir durum ortaya çıkacak. Anadolu'da çok iyi karşılandım. Türkiye'ye gitmeyeceğim yolunda verdiğim söz şarta bağlıydı. Barış için nüfuzumu kullanmayı görev biliyorum. Yokluğumda beni savunmanızı ve bu telgrafımı Hükümet yetkililerine ve basına vermenizi dilerim.	
		4. <i>Ankara muhabirinden "Akşam" gazetesine tel. 30.7.1922</i> Townshend Ankara'dan ayrıldı. "Türkiye'yi güçlü gördüm, ziyaretimin amacı barışa katkıda bulunmaktır" dedi.	
		5. <i>Ankara muhabirinden "İkdam" gazetesine tel. 30.7.1922</i> Townshend'i gördüm. "Türkleri çocukluğumdan beri severim... Büyük umutla ayrılıyorum" dedi.	
		6. <i>Anadolu Ajansından İstanbul'a tel. 31.7.1922</i> Townshend bir demeç verdi. "Türklerin kahramanlığını ve centilmenliğini gördüm... Türkiye ile İngiltere anlaşabilirler" diyor. (Bkz. No. 155)	
142	21 Ağustos	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 352 İtalyanlar, Türklere uçak veriyorlar ve Mustafa Kemal'in taarruza hazırlandığını söylüyorlar. Fransızlar da savaş malzemesi veriyorlar.	347
143	23 Ağustos	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜNCÜN NİSAN-AĞUSTOS 1922 DÖNEMİYLE İLGİLİ GENEL RAPORU. (KİSMEN) GİZLİ Aşağıdaki konularda ayrıntılı bilgiler ve gizli haberler: 1. Genel siyasal durum: Ankara Hükümetinin iç ve dış politikası,	348

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		2. Anadolu'nun iç durumu.	
		3. Milliyetçiler ve İttihatçılar,	
		4. Zulüm iddiaları ve soruşturma komisyonu konu- sunda Türklerin aldığı önlemler.	
		5. Türk-Rus ilişkileri,	
		6. Milliyetçiler ve Fransızlar,	
		7. İtalya ile ilişkiler,	
		8. Milliyetçiler ve Vatikan,	
		9. Anadolu'da Amerikan ticari faaliyetleri.	
144	28 Ağustos	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL KOLU RAPORU. NO. 866. (KISMEN)	364
		Mustafa Kemal başkanlığındaki bir komite bir İslâm kongresi toplanması konusunu görüştü. Afgan Elçisi, kongrenin Kâbil'de, İran Elçisi Tahran'da, Mustafa Kemal ise Ankara'da toplanmasını istediler. Konu- nun şimdilik ertelenmesi kararlaştırıldı.	
145	29 Ağustos	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 779	365
		Mustafa Kemal'in 19 Ağustos'ta yaptığı bildirilen konuşmasının çevirisi ilişikte sunulmuştur. Konuşma, gerçekten yapılmış ise, pek ilginç değildir. Mustafa Kemal'in meydan okuyan tonu bir yana, İngiltere'ye yaklaşmak istediği seziliyor. Ama konuşmanın gerçekliği konusunda kuşku var, bunun ihtiyatla karşılanması gerekir. Mustafa Kemal'in 21 Ağustos'ta Ankara'da verdiği bildirilen resepsiyon konusunda henüz yeterli bilgi alamadım.	
Ek.	19 Ağustos	MUSTAFA KEMAL'İN T.B.M.M.'DE YAPTIĞI KONUŞMASININ ÇEVİRİSİ	366
		Rusya ile ilişkilerimiz kötü görülüyor. Ama toprak- larımızda gözü olmayan Rusya bizim dostumuzdur. Barış tekliflerine barışçı düşüncelerle cevap verdik. İngiltere barışı geciktiriyor ve bir tarafı açıkça yüreklendiriyor. Katliam hikâyeleri düşmanlarımızca bir silah olarak kullanılıyor. Yunan zulümleri gözardı ediliyor. Yunanistan'ın İstanbul'u işgal tehdidi bizi etkilemez. İstanbul zaten işgal altında.	

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Anadolu'da Rum muhtariyetinin önemi yoktur. Biz yurdumuzun toprak bütünlüğünü ve tam bağımsızlığını istiyoruz. Gelecek için umutluyuz. Müttefiklerin Doğudaki çıkarlarını tartışmıyoruz. Ekonomik imtiyazlar konusunu görüşmeye hazırız. Ama ekonomik sömürüyü kabul edemeyiz. Bizim temsilcimiz Londra'da kabul edilmedikçe Anadolu'ya İngiliz temsilcisini kabul etmemiz askıdadır. (Not: Bu konuşmanın düzmece olduğu anlaşıyor. BNŞ)

146 29 Ağustos

İNGİLTERE'NİN ŞAM KONSOLOSU PALMER'DEN
DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 251
GİZLİ

369

Dört ay Anadolu'da kalmış olan Hamza El Gouth adlı ajan aşağıdaki bilgileri verdi: Mustafa Kemal bir dâhi değildir. Rus Elçisinin onun üzerinde nüfuzu vardır. Meclis Mustafa Kemal'e güvenini yitirmiştir. Barış yapılır yapılmaz Anadolu'da Mustafa Kemal'e karşı ayaklanma patlak verir; onun için barış yapmamak Mustafa Kemal'in işine geliyor. Asker savaştan bıkmış usanmıştır. Anadolu dağları ıfari erlerle doludur. Memurlar maaşlarını yedi ay gecikmeyle alabiliyorlar. Kabine'de değerli olan yalnız Yusuf Kemal Bey ile Rauf Bey vardır. Ali Fuat Paşa Moskova'dan geri dönmüş ve bir daha görevi başına gitmemiştir. Enver Paşa'nın öldürüldüğü söyleniyor. Cemal Paşa'nın vurulduğu kesin. Türk-Fransız anlaşması Mustafa Kemal'e biraz nefes aldırdı, yoksa bir ayaklanma patlak verecekti. Fransızlar Kemalistlere dokuz uçak satmışlar. Kemalistlerin kamyonu ihtiyaçları var. Sonuç: Türk milleti, her ne pahasına olursa olsun barış istiyor. Subaylar ve liderler savaşı sürdürmek istiyorlar. Kemalist düzen koftur, bir darbeyle çökebilir. Yeni bir Yunan taarruzu çabucak başarı kazanır.

147 2 Eylül

İNGİLTERE'NİN ATINA İŞGÜDERİ BENTINCK'TEN
DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 358 374
Mustafa Kemal, müstareke için Anadolu'nun ve Doğu Trakya'nın boşaltılmasını şart koşacaktır. Ateşkesi

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		kabul etmese güneydeki Yunan ordusu tehlikeye girecektir, ama belki Yunan askerinin bir bölümü Trakya'ya kaydırılabilir. Yunan desteği olmadan İstanbul'u savunmamız bir sorun olabilir.	
148	2 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATINA İŞGÜDERİ BENTINCK'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 359. ÇOK İVEDİ. GİZLİ 374 Yunan Hükümeti, İzmir'in korunması için devletlerin tezelden önlem almalarını istiyor ve Anadolu'yu boşaltmak şartıyla ateşkesi kabul edeceğini bildiriyor.	
149	2 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATINA İŞGÜDERİ BENTINCK'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 360. ÇOK İVEDİ 375 Yunan Hükümeti, ateşkes sağlaması için İngiltere'ye başvuruyor, Anadolu'yu boşaltmak şartıyla ateşkes razı olduğunu bildiriyor. Anadolu'nun boşaltılması hemen başlayacak.	
150	3 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATINA İŞGÜDERİ BENTINCK'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 362. ÇOK İVEDİ 376 İngiltere, Yunanistan için daha elverişli ateşkes hükümleri sağlayabilir.	
151	5 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATINA İŞGÜDERİ BENTINCK'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 380 376 Cephedeki durumla ilgili haberler alabilirsem min- nettar kalırım. Durumun vahameti Atina'da 1 Eylül gecesi anlaşıldı. 3 Eylül'den beri durum iyileşiyor ve General Tricoupis kuvvetlerinin savaşacakları umu- luyor. Yunanlılara fiili yardımda bulunabilirdik ve bu felâket gelmezdi. İzmir'e akın eden göçmenleri boşaltmak için zaman yitirmeyelim. İngiltere, Yu- nanlılar için daha iyi mütareke şartları sağlayabilir. İngiltere direnirse, Mustafa Kemal, Trakya'nın boşaltılması için Yunanistan'ı zorlayamaz. Ve İngiltere, Yunanlıların İstanbul'a girmelerine izin verirse Trakya'nın savunması kolaylaşır.	
152	5 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 381 378	

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		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Yüksek Komiserler, İzmir'de, Kemalist kuvvetlerle çatışmaktan sakınmak gerektiği kanısında, Yurttaşların korumak için birliklerimiz İzmir'in bazı noktalarını işgal edebilir ve sonra buraları Türklere teslim edebilirler. 2. Meslektaşların, ateşkes için müttefiklerin müdahale edebilecekleri görüşünde. 3. Venedik konferansı için çağrışı bir süre ertelemenin uygun olacağını düşünüyoruz. 	
153	6 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATINA İŞGÜDERİ BENTINCK'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 304 ÇOK İVTDİ	379
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ateşkes anlaşması yalnız Anadolu'nun boşaltılması şartına bağlanmalı ve Trakya bunun dışında bırakılmalı. 2. Anadolu'nun ve hele Trakya'nın artık savunulamayacağına çabuk hüküm vermemeli. 3. Yunan üçüncü ordusu Trakya'ya kaydırılırsa, Mustafa Kemal Anadolu'dan fazlasını isteyemez. 4. İngiltere tezelden Yunanistan'a maddi yardımda bulunabilir. 	
154	6-7 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 2195	380
		Haberler çelişkili. Ama durum vahim. Azınlıkları korumak için devletler hemen harekete geçmeli. Mustafa Kemal'in katliamları önlemesi gerektiğini söyledim. Ateşkes için kaybedilecek zaman yok. Yunanlı Anadolu'dan kaçıp gitmekten başka birşey düşünmüyor.	
155	7 Eylül	BİR İNGİLİZ PARLAMENTERİNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA SIR W. TYRRELL'E MEKTUP İlgi: No. 1411.	381
		Townshend'in raporu ilişikte. Barış görüşmelerinde bunun dikkate alınacağını kendisine söyledim.	
Ek.	27 Temmuz	GENERAL SIR CHARLES TOWNSHEND'İN RAPORU.	381
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. İzmir vilayeti boşaltılacak. Azınlıklar için Türkler güvence verecekler. 2. Trakya sınırı değiştirilecek. Edirne'yi içine alacak biçimde Meriç sınırı Türkleri tatmin edecek. 	

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		<p>3. Çanakkale Boğazı güvence altına alacak.</p> <p>4. Türk Silahlı kuvvetleri 45.000 yerine en az 300.000 kişilik olmalı.</p> <p>5. Mustafa Kemal, İslâm dünyasındaki büyük hareketi henüz İngiltere aleyhine kullanmamıştır, ama barış yapılmazsa bu silahı kullanabilir ve İngiltere'yi güç durumda bırakabilir.</p> <p>6. Türk milli ordusu güçlü ve etkindir. İngiltere Hükümeti bunu kavrayabilmiş değildir.</p> <p>7. Yepyeni bir Türkiye doğmuştur. Bu da İngiltere'de henüz anlaşılmış değildir.</p> <p>8. İngiltere'nin düşmanca tutumu yüzünden Türkiye ticaretini başka ülkeler ele geçirmişlerdir.</p> <p>9. İngiltere ve Fransa Yakın Doğu konusunda elele vermeli. Biri Türk sempatisini, öteki Yunan sempatisini olursa barış nasıl yapılır?</p> <p>10. İngiltere ve Fransa için ortak tehlike, İslâm tehdididir, Türk tehlikesidir. Barış için aklımızı başımıza toplayalım.</p> <p>11. Ordumuzu terhis ettik. Anadolu'da Yunanlılar için savaşabilecek durumda değiliz. Lloyd George 150.000 kişiyi askere almağa kalkışsa bu, onun sonu olur. Türk'ü Avrupa dışına, Anadolu'ya itmeğe çalışmak çılgınlıktır.</p> <p>12. İngiltere, konferans yeri olarak Beykoz'u ileri sürdü. Mustafa Kemal oraya gidemez. İzmit'e gidebilirdi, ama en iyi konferans yeri Mersin limanı olabilir.</p>	
156	9 Eylül	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 403</p> <p>Hamid Bey, Yunan Hükümetinin resmen mi ateşkes istediğini sordu. Fransız Yüksek Komiseri resmen istediğini ve amacın Anadolu'nun hemen boşaltılması şartıyla kan dökülmesine son verilmesi olduğunu bildirdi. Ankara Hükümeti işi geciktirmeğe çalışıyor.</p>	388
157	9 Eylül	<p>İTALYANIN LONDRA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ DE MARTINO'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A NOTA ÇEVİRİ</p> <p>İtalya Hükümeti, Doğu'da barışın sağlanması için çaba harcamasını her zaman gerekli görmüştür.</p>	389

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		Bugün Anadolu'daki savaş dolayısıyla müttefiklerin barış için ellerinden geleni yapmalarını, her zaman- dan daha fazla gerekli görmektedir. İtalya Hükümetine göre, İngiltere ile Fransa arasında mutareke konusundaki görüş ayrılıkları müttefik girişimlerini geciktirebilir. Müttefikler, savaşan tarafları Venedik konferansına çağırabilirler ve burada on barış imkânları görüşülebilir. Bu arada müttefikler, savaşan taraflara ateşkes çağrısında bulunabilirler. Çağrı taslağı ilişkiindedir. Bu taslak, İngiltere tarafından da uygun görülürse, Atina'ya, İstanbul'a ve Ankara'ya tellenebilir. (Bkz. No. 162).	
158	9 Eylül	BOYUK MİLLET MECLİSİ HÜKÜMETİ İSTANBUL TEMSİLCİSİ HAMİD BEYDEN İNGİLTERE YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'A NOTA Yunan zulümlerine karşı T.B.M.M.'nin protestosunu ilişikte sunuyorum.	390
EK.	7 Eylül	YUNAN ZULÜMLERİNE KARŞI TÜRKİYE BOYUK MİLLET MECLİSİNİN PROTESTOSU" Yunan ordusunu Anadolu'dan atmak ve yurdun bağımsızlığını sağlamak amacıyla kurulan T.B.M.M., düşmanı bozguna uğratmıştır. Çekilen düşman ordusu, köy ve kentleri yıkmakta, müslüman halkı diri diri yakmakta ve tarihi sanat anıtlarını yıkmaktadır. T.B.M.M., 7 Eylül günü toplanarak bu yakıp yıkmalardan duyduğu derin üzüntüyü dile getirmiş, Bursa ve İzmir gibi kentlerde benzer vandalizmi önlemek amacıyla uygar dünya önünde Yunan Hükümetinin bu davranışlarını protesto etmeğe karar vermiştir. Halkımız, bunları hiçbir zaman bağışlamayacaktır.	390
159	10 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'A TEL. NO. 371. İVEDİ Anadolu boşaltıldıktan sonra, çarpışan taraflar arasında temas kesilecektir ve Türklere, Trakya'nın bir bölümünün boşaltılması gibi bir ödün vermeğe	391

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		<p>gerek kalmayacaktır. Yunanlıların İstanbul'u işgal edebilecekleri korkusu Mustafa Kemal ile müzakerelerde önemli bir koz olabilir. Bu bakımdan Trakya'da Yunanlıların geri çekilmeleri önerilerine karşıyız.</p>	
160	10 Eylül	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ GRAHAM'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 271.</p> <p>İstanbul Hükümetinin Roma temsilcisi Osman Nizami Paşa, Fethi Beyin İngiltere Hükümetince kabul edilmemiş olması yüzünden Mustafa Kemal'in Anadolu'da taarruza giriştiğini ve şimdi durumun daha da güçleştiğini söyledi. Mustafa Kemal'in İstanbul ve Edirne'yi de silah zoruyla geri alacağını ileri sürdü. Paşanın kanaatine, Ankara Hükümeti konferans çağırısını kabul edecektir. Barış yapılabilmesi için İstanbul ve Edirne konusunda Türklerle umut vermek gerekir. Roma'da bulunan Fethi Bey adına konuştuğunu belirten Osman Nizami Paşa, henüz vakit varken, İngiltere'nin tutumunu değiştirmesini istedi. Dostça bir jestimiz durumu lehimize çevirebilir. (Bkz. No. 161)</p>	392
161	10 Eylül	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ GRAHAM'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 272.</p> <p>(No. 160'ın arkası)</p> <p>Yunanlıların Boğazlara bekçilik edemeyecekleri anlaşıldı. Bolşeviklere karşı bu bekçiliği Türkler üstlenebilirler. Mustafa Kemal, Rus yardımını kabul etmek zorunda kalmıştır ama gerçekte Türkler Bolşeviklerden nefret ederler.</p> <p>Osman Nizami Paşa'nın bu söylediklerini dinledim. Mustafa Kemal'in müttefiklerle çatışmasının pek tehlikeli olacağını söyledim. (Bkz. No. 175)</p>	393
162	11 Eylül	<p>İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İTALYA'NIN LONDRA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ DE MARTINO'YA NOTA.</p> <p>Venedik konferansı ile ilgili notanız incelendi. İngiltere, bir an önce barış yapılması arzusuna katılıyor ve İtalya'nın Venedik Konferansı teklifini takdirle karşılıyor. Ancak şu sırada Kemalistleri</p>	394

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		konferansa çağırmanın uygun olmayacağı kanısındadır. Anadolu'daki gelişmeleri ve mütareke yapılmasını beklemek gerekir. Eskiden tasarlandığı biçimde Venedik konferansını toplama zamanı geçmiştir. Paris ve Roma Büyükelçilerimiz bunları Fransa ve İtalya Hükümetlerine anlatacaklardır.	
163	11 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN AKDENİZ BAŞKOMUTANINDAN DENİZ BAKANLIĞINA TEL NO. 301 Nureddin Paşa, İngiliz birliklerinin neden Cebelitarık'dan İzmir'e gönderildiklerini sordu. Mustafa Kemal İzmir'e geldi.	395
164	11 Eylül	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINDAN İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ KUVVETLERİ BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'A TEL Çanakkale'yi boşaltabilirsiniz. Boşaltırken Türk topları yokedilecektir. İzmit yarımadasından da çekilebilirsiniz. Donanma, Anadolu'dan Trakya'ya Türk kuvvetleri geçirilmesini önleyecektir. Müttefiklerin işbirliği sağlanamazsa İngiltere bu işi tek başına yükleneyecektir. Çanakkale'deki birliklerimiz Gelibolu yarımadasına kaydırılacaktır. Ayrıca Malta'dan asker istiyor musunuz?	395
165	11 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN AKDENİZ BAŞKOMUTANINDAN DENİZ KUVVETLERİ BAKANLIĞINA TEL NO. 302. (İZMİR BAŞKONSOLOSUNDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA NO. 69) Mustafa Kemal 10 Eylül'de İzmir'e geldi, T.B.M.M. adına ülkeyi yönetecek. İngiltere bu Hükümeti ne ölçüde tanıyor?	396
166	12 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 799 General Harington'a gönderdiğim mektup ilişktedir.	396
Ek. 1	7 Eylül	GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN SİR H. RUMBOLD'A MEKTUP Savunma Bakanlığının yazısı ilişktedir. Padişah'ın korunması için alınacak önlemler konusuna dikkatini zi ederim. Sizce, Padişah için hangi geminin ayrılması uygun görülür?	397

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Ek 2	22 Ağustos	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINDAN İSTANBUL'DA GENERAL HARINGTON'A YAZI. GİZLİ. O.152/6134/ D.M.O. ve L.	397
		Talimat isteyen yazınız alındı. Gönderilen yazılarda gerekli tavsiyeleri bulacaksınız. Padişah'ın güvenliği için gereken önlemleri alınız. Kendisine bir İngiliz gemisi ayrılması için ön hazırlıkları donanmayla birlikte yapmanız uygun olur.	
Ek 3	11 Eylül	SİR H. RUMBOLD'DAN GENERAL HARINGTON'A YAZI. NO. 6012.	398
		Padişah'ın korunması konusunda ilgili mektubunuzu aldım. Padişah İstanbul'dan ayrılmak isterse sizinle ve buradaki Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanımızla göreceğim.	
167	12 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 801.	399
		Son gelişmeleri topluca sunuyorum: 2 Eylül'de, Yunanlıların askeri durumunun umutsuz olduğunu haber aldım. Bir ara Tricoupis'in tutunabi- leceği yolunda bir umut belirdi. Ama umut boşa çıktı. Bir iki gün Tricoupis'in kaderi anlaşılamadı. 6 Eylül'de Ankara, Tricoupis'in tutsak edildiğini açıkladı. Ertesi gün haber doğrulandı. Tricoupis, Başkomutanlık görevine atandığını ilk önce Mustafa Kemal'in kendisinden öğrenmiş deniyor. 8 Eylül'de Yunanlılar İzmir'i boşaltma hazırlıklarını tamamladılar. Ertesi gün Türk süvarisi İzmir'e girdi. Bizim ilk kaygımız İzmir'deki İngiliz toplumunu korumaktı. Amiral Brock, İzmir'e gitti. Birkaç destroyer de oraya yollandı. İstanbul'da günlerce gösteriler yapıldı. 10 Eylülde pek büyük bir halk kitlesi Galata'dan Hürriyet-i Ebediye tepesine yürüdü. Camlar kırıldı. Beyoğlundaki Yunan Askeri heyeti binası ve muhalefet partisi merkezi saldırıya uğradı. Ama genellikle gösteriler düzen içinde geçti. İstanbul'da Hükümet çevreleri de genel sevinci paylaşıyorlar. Ama sorumlu kişiler ve İzzet Paşa, Trakya konusunda kaygılı. Padişah'ın da tahtı bakımından kaygılı olduğunu sanıyorum.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
168	12 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 806.	401
		Nairobi İslâm derneğinden bir telgraf aldım. Türk zaferini kutladıklarını ve Mustafa Kemal'in kahra-man ordusunun yeni zaferleri için dua ettiklerini Padişah'a iletmemi istiyorlar. Bu, Hindistan, Mısır v.s. müslümanlarından Mustafa Kemal'e gönderilen benzer telgraflardan sadece biridir, sanırım. Türk zaferi, müslümanlık-hristiyanlık sorununu ortaya çıkaracak gibi görünüyor. Yunan ordusu, Anadolu'dan kendisini sıyırmak üzere olduğundan, mütareke yapmak şimdilik gereksizdir. Müttefikler, denize hükmettiklerinden Kemalist ordunun Trakya'ya geçemeyeceği anlaşılacak ve bu, gerek Türklerin, gerek islâm dünyasının coşkusu-yu yatıştıracaktır. Fransızların da Kemalist başarıdan kaygılanmağa ve güçlü bir Türkiye'nin tehlikesini kavramağa başladıklarını gösteren belirtiler var.	
169	13 Eylül	LORD PEEL'DEN İNGİLTERE BAKANLAR KURULUNA MUHTIRA.	402
		Hindistan'dan alınan telgrafi sunuyorum.	
Ek.	11 Eylül	HINDİSTAN KRAL NAİBİNDEN HINDİSTAN İŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA TEL.	402
		Türk zaferi, İslâm dünyasında şiddetli yankılar yapacak ve Hindistan'da güçlüklerimizi arttıracak. Majesteleri Hükümetince, Hindistan bakımından, eski Türk-İngiliz dostluğunu diriltmek esas olmalıdır. O zaman Hindistan müslümanları yatışacak; Afganistan sınırındaki güçlüğü-müz azalacak; Türkiye, Rusya'dan ayrılmış olacaktır. Türklerin zaferlerinin meyvalarını ellerinden almağa kalkışmak ise İslâm dünyasında fırtına koparacaktır.	
170	13 Eylül	İNGİLİZ AKDENİZ BAŞKOMUTANLIĞINDAN DENİZ BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 311. (İZMİR BAŞKONSOLOSUN-DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA, NO. 70).	403
		Mustafa Kemal, İngiltere ile savaş halinde olduğunu ve İngiliz Temsilcilerini tanımadığını söyledi. Tezel-den talimat bekliyorum. (Bkz. No. 171)	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
171	13 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 404 (İlgi: No. 170). İzmir'e şu yolda telgraf çekiyorum: Mustafa Kemal, İngiltere ile savaş halinde olduğunu yazıyla doğrularsa, İngiliz kolonisiyle birlikte İzmir'den uzaklaşınız. İngiltere'nin tarafsız olduğunu da kendisine hatırlatınız. Mustafa Kemal'in Fransızlara ve İtalyanlara karşı tutumu nedir? (Bkz. No. 173).	404
172	13 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'A TEL. NO. 385 İtalyanlar ve Fransızlar işbirliği yaparlarsa Çanakkale ve İzmit mevzilerinden geri çekilmemek gerekir. Bu mevziler müzakerelerde yararlı kozumuz olur.	404
173	13 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İZMİR BAŞKONSOLOSU SIR H. LAMB'E TEL. NO. 29. ... (İlgi: No. 171). Rumbold'un telgrafı uygundur. En kısa zamanda, koloniyle birlikte, İzmir'den uzaklaşınız. Mustafa Kemal, meslektaşlarınıza karşı nasıl davrandı? (Bkz. No. 174).	405
174	13 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN PARIS VE ROMA TEMSİLCİLERİNE TEL. NO. 301 ve 270. ... (İlgi: No. 173). Mustafa Kemal, İngiltere ile savaş halinde olduğunu söyledi. Amiral Brock, bunun yazıyla doğrulanmasını istedi. Doğrulanırsa, Başkonsolos Lamb, İngiliz vatandaşlarıyla birlikte İzmir'i terkedecek. Fransa (İtalya) Hükümetine duyurunuz. (Bkz. No. 176).	405
175	13 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ GRAHAM'A TEL. NO. 271. (İlgi: No. 160 ve 161) Fethi Beyin İngiliz Hükümetince kabul edilmediği ve Mustafa Kemal'in bunu kendisine saygısızlık saydığı	406

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		iddiası, son Türk hareketlerinin sorumluluğunu İngiltere'nin üzerine atmak çabasıdır. Fethi Bey, Dışişlerinde yardımcılarınıla görüştü. Misak-ı Milli'den başka birşey söylemediği için görüşmeleri uzatmağa gerek görülmedi.	
176	13 Eylül	İNGİLİZ AKDENİZ BAŞKOMUTANINDAN DENİZ BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 317. 407 (İlgi: No. 174). Mustafa Kemal'e bir mektup gönderiyorum ve bizimle savaş halinde olduğu yolundaki sözlerini yazıyla doğrulamasını istiyorum. (Bkz. No. 177).	
177	13 Eylül	İNGİLİZ AKDENİZ BAŞKOMUTANINDAN DENİZ BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 318. 407 (İlgi: No. 176). Mustafa Kemal'den gelen mektup tatmin edici. (Bkz. No. 178).	
178	14 Eylül	İNGİLİZ AKDENİZ KOMUTANINDAN DENİZ BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 315. 408 (İlgi: No. 177) Mustafa Kemal'e bir mektup gönderip bizimle savaş halinde olduğu yolundaki sözlerini yazıyla doğrulamasını istedim. (Mektup metni). Mustafa Kemal, yanlış anlama olduğunu ve yazılı cevabı bugün göndereceğini söylemiş. (Bkz. No. 179).	
179	14 Eylül	İNGİLİZ AKDENİZ BAŞKOMUTANI AMİRAL BROCK'TAN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'A YAZI. NO. 742. 408 (İlgi: No. 178) Mustafa Kemal'in mektubu ilişiktir. Mektup getirildiği zaman Fransız ve İtalyan amiralleri de yanımda idiler. Mektubu onlara da gösterdim. Mektup, benim Nureddin Paşa ile yaptığım görüşmeyi biraz serbestçe tekrarlıyor ve Nureddin Paşa'nın aramızda ilişki kurulması bazı formaliteleri gerektirir dediğini belirtiyor. (Bkz. No. 180).	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek.	13 Eylül	T.B.M.M. BAŞKANI VE BAŞKOMUTAN MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'DAN AMİRAL BROCK'E MEKTUP. ÖZEL.	409
		Sir H. Lamb'e, T.B.M.M. Hükümeti nezdinde görevli bir kimse olarak değil, özel bir görüşme yaptım. Nureddin Paşa sizinle yaptığı görüşmede, aramızda siyasi ilişkiler bulunmadığını ve bu ilişkilerin başlaması için bazı formaliteler gerektiğini bildirmiştir. Nureddin Paşa'nın bu görüşüne katılıyorum. Aşılmiş usullere uyularak iki Hükümet arasında siyasi ilişkiler kurulabilir.	
180	14 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİLİĞİNDEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA TEL NO. 464.	410
		[İlgi: No. 174 ve 179]. Mustafa Kemal'in Lamb'e sözlerini Poincaré'ye bildirdim. Fransız Başkonsolosunun bu konuda Mustafa Kemal ile temas edeceği yolunda bir cevap aldım. (Bkz. No. 188).	
181	14 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ R. MBOLD'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 415.	411
		Tezelden bir konferans toplanması önemlidir. Savaşan tarafların artık birbirleriyle temasları kalmadı. Konferans çağrısı için şimdi en uygun zamandır. Yoksa Mustafa Kemal rahat durmaz. Ordularına, "İlk hedefiniz Akdeniz'dir" diyen Mustafa Kemal'in, ikinci hedefi Trakya'dır. Konferans olmazsa Trakya'ya geçmeğe çalışacaktır. Gecikirse güç durumda kalırız. Konferansın amacı mütareke, Trakya, Boğazlar ve azınlıklar sorunları olmalı.	
182	14 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ ORDULARI GENEL KARAR-GAHINDAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL NO. 2267.	412
		Lord Plumer'in telgrafı: İstanbul'a gelip durumu gördüm. Harington'un aldığı tertipler yerindedir. Durum ciddidir. Köşeye sıkıştırılabiliriz. Müttefikler şartlarını açıklamalı ve bunların aşılmasının müttefiklerle savaş demek olacağı Mustafa Kemal'e duyurulmalı. Kararlı ve birleşik olduğumuzu göstermeliyiz.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
183	14 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 2270.	413
		Çanakkale ve Yarımcı cephelerinde elden geldiğince dayanmağa çalışacağım. Aynı zamanda İstanbul'da karışıklık çıkmasını önlemek zorundayız. Fransız kuvveti gönderilmezse ancak Bostancı- Çamlıca keşif hattını tutabiliriz ve Üsküdar'ı tutmadan İstanbul'u tutamayız. Mustafa Kemal'in hedefi Çatalca'dır. Donanma, Türk kuvvetlerinin Boğazı gecmelerini önleyemez. Müttefikler birlikte hareket ederlerse Mustafa Kemal saldıramaz ve istediklerinin çoğunu konferansta elde edemezse kuvvet yoluyla elde etmeğe kalkışacaktır. Müttefikler hazırlıklı olmalıdırlar.	
184	15 Eylül	İZMİR'DE KIDEMLİ İNGİLİZ DENİZ SUBAYINDAN DENİZ BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 496 (BAŞKONSOLOS LAMB'DEN DIŞİŞLERİNE TEL. NO. 71).	414
		Mustafa Kemal, Fransız ve İtalyan Konsoloslarına daha içten davranıyor. İzmir'in müslüman mahallesi dışında kalan hemen her taraf yok edildi. İngiliz kolonisi boşaltıldı. İngilizlerin haklarını koruma işini İspanyol konsolosuna bırakmak niyetindeyim. Arşivi İstanbul'a yolladım.	
185	15 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 418.	414
		Meslektaşlarımla durumu görüştük. Mustafa Kemal birkaç gün bekler; konferans yoluyla istediklerini alamayacağını anlarsa, İstanbul ve Boğazlar üzerine yürür, diyorlar. Fransız Yüksek Komiseri, Mustafa Kemal'in Boğazlardan kuvvet geçirmeden de Trakya'da karışıklık çıkarabileceği konusunda. Müttefikler, en kısa zamanda Boğazlarda ve İstanbul'da kuvvetlerini artırmalıdır. En kısa zamanda konferans çağırısı yapılması gerektiğini düşünüyoruz.	
186	15 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 417.	416

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Hariciye Nâzırı, Trakya konusunun biran önce ele alınmasını ve Venedik konferansının toplanmasını istedi. İzmir'de konferans toplanamayacağını söylüyor. İstanbul Hükümeti, Mustafa Kemal'in zaferinden hem seviniyor, hem huzursuz; Müttefiklerin İstanbul ile Mustafa Kemal arasında tampon rolü oynamasını arzuluyor. (Bkz. No. 195).	
187	15 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA İŞGÜDERİ BENTINCK'TEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 443 Bir Amerikan gazetecisinin verdiği bilgiler: Mustafa Kemal, sekiz günde İstanbul'da olacağını, Meriç'e kadar Trakya'yı geri alacağını söyledi. Musul vilayetini de geri alacağını ekledi. Suriye konusundaki soruyu karşılıksız bıraktı.	416
188	15 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİLİĞİNDEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI NO. 2157 (İlgi: No. 180). Mustafa Kemal'in Lamb'e söyledikleriyle ilgili olarak Poincaré'den alınan nota ilişiktir.	417
Ek.	14 Eylül	FRANSA BAŞBAKANI VE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI POINCARÉ'DEN İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'E NOTA Mustafa Kemal ile İzmir'deki İngiliz Başkonsolosu arasında geçen üzücü olay, Fransız Başkonsolosunca rapor edildi. Başkonsolosumuz bu konuda Mustafa Kemal nezdinde girişimde bulunacak. (Bkz. No. 190).	417
189	16 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'A TEL. GİZLİ DAĞITIMI YAPILAMAZ ÇOK İVEDİ Kabine, Mustafa Kemal'in Boğazlar ve İstanbul üzerine yürüyebileceğinden kaygılıdır ve oralarda yeterince kuvvet bulundurmağa karardır. Harington'a yeni kuvvet gönderiliyor. Dominyonlara da başvuruldu ve ben de Romanya ve Yugoslavya'ya başvuruyorum. Tezelden kuvvet göndermelerini istiyoruz. Önümüzdeki hafta Paris'te Poincaré ile görüşeceğim ve İngiliz-Fransız işbirliğini sağlamaya	418

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		çalınacağını. Konferansın biran önce toplanması ve buna Büyük Devletlerden başka Romanya, Yugoslavya, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın da katılmaları gerektiği kanısındayım. Bulgaristan da dinlenebilir. Yer olarak, İtalya, Venedik üzerinde duruyor. Biz, Londra üzerinde direnmiyoruz, ama Venedik'te İtalya'nın başkanlık etmesinden kaygı duyarız. İzmir'de Türklerin zulüm yaptıkları doğrulanırsa bu, işimize yarar. Harington'la size güveniyoruz.	
190	16 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN PARIS VE ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİLERİNE TEL. NO. 307 ve 274 419 (İlgi: No. 188). Mustafa Kemal, savaş halinde olmadığımızı, ancak aramızda siyasi ilişkiler kurulmasının bazı formaliteleri gerektirdiğini bildirdi. Fransa (İtalya) Hükumetine duyurunuz.	
191	16 Eylül	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINDAN İSTANBUL'DA GENERAL HARRINGTON'A TEL. NO. 91068. GİZLİ 420 Kabine, bir iki tümeni daha seferber edip Mustafa Kemal'e karşı koymak niyetindedir. İhtiyaçlarınızı bildiriniz. Yeni kuvvetlerin ne zaman size yetiştirilebileceği hesaplandı. (Ayrıntılı bilgiler). Mustafa Kemal, Müttefiklere saldırıyorsa, önce Çanakkale Boğazının Anadolu kıyılarını işgal edecektir, sanıyoruz. Fransa ile işbirliği yapmak istiyoruz. Yeni kuvvetler yetişmeden önce Mustafa Kemal Çanakkale mevzilerini ele geçirirse, sonra buraları geri alabilir miyiz? İçin savaşa kadar varmayacağını da umarız.	
192	16 Eylül	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜNÜN RAPORU NO. 874. GİZLİ 421 Kemalist taarruzu: Fethi Beyin Ankara'ya raporu. Fethi Bey, İngiltere'nin tutumu konusunda, 25 Ağustos'ta Ankara'ya pek karamsar bir rapor gönderdi. Lloyd George ile Lord Curzon'un Türkiye'yi yoketmeğe kararlı olduklarını bildirdi. Türkiye lehine bir barış İngiltere'nin engellediğini Fransa Dışişlerinin de doğruladığını ekledi.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Mustafa Kemal, Fethi Beyin İngiltere konusundaki görüşünü paylaşmadığını bildirdi. İngiltere'nin Türkiye'yi yok etmeyi değil, Fransız nüfusunu önlemeyi amaçladığını söyledi.	
193	16 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATINA İŞGÜDERİ BENTINCK'TEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 444 Mustafa Kemal, İngiltere ile savaş halinde olmadığını gazeteciye söylemiş.	422
194	16 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATINA İŞGÜDERİ BENTINCK'TEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 448 Türk-Bulgar işbirliği konusu. Dışişleri Genel Sekreteri, Trakya'da Türk-Bulgar çeteleri kurulduğunu, halen 10-20.000 dolayında çeteci toplandığını, bunlara İstanbul'dan silah ulaştırıldığını, 25 Eylül'de çetelerin saldırıya geçebileceklerini söyledi. Trakya'daki Yunan ordusunun morali konusunda haber alamıyorum.	423
195	16 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 822 (İlgi: No. 186). Padişah Hükümeti, müttefiklerin tezelden konferans toplamalarını arzuluyor; Mustafa Kemal'in İstanbul'a yaklaşmasından kaygılanıyor. İzzet Paşa, belki şimdiki Padişahın değiştirilebileceğini, ama Mustafa Kemal'in Osmanlı hanedanını deviremeyeceğini söylüyor. Padişahın geleceği karanlık. Padişah, zaferden dolayı Mustafa Kemal'i kutlamayı reddetti. Son şehitler için dua yapıldığı camiye gitti, ama basın bunu sessiz geçirdi. İzzet Paşa, Ankara ve İstanbul Hükümetlerinin kaynaştırılmaları için bir girişimde bulunmayacağını söyledi.	424
196	16 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN MİSİR YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ MAREŞAL ALLENBY'DEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 473 Türk zaferinin Mısır'da yankıları. İskenderiye'de açık gösteriler yapılmadı. Mustafa	425

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		Kemal'in zaferi kahvelerde ve evlerde coşku yarattı. Bazı kimseler Padişaha kutlama telgrafları gönderdi. Basın coşkulu yayın yaptı, ama genellikle ölçülü kaldı. Mısır Liberal Partisi lideri Mohammed Bey Wahid, Fransa'yı İslâmın dostu olarak övdü. Kral Fuad ve Tevfik Paşa ile Türk zaferi konusunu görüştüm. Tevfik Paşa, kendisini tanırsa İngiltere'nin Mustafa Kemal'in dostluğunu kazanabileceğini söylüyor.	
197	17 Eylül	İNGİLİZ KABİNESİ SEKRETER VEKİLİNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI XLVIII/22/1. GİZLİ Türkiye konusunda Kabine bu sabah şu kararları aldı: 1) Politikamız, Mart ayında Paris'te varılan anlaşmaya dayanacak. 2) Boğazlar, İngiliz çıkarları için pek önemlidir ve burada Kemalistlere kuvvetle karşı koyulacak. 3) Donanma, Kemalistlerin Gelibolu yarımadasına atlamalarını engelyecek. 4) Bazı İngiliz birlikleri bu yarımadaı işgal edecek ve bu bölgeye Malta'dan takviye yollanacak. 5) İzmit hatundan çekilebiliriz, ama Mustafa Kemal İstanbul Boğazını geçmeğe kalkarsa kendisine bütün kuvvetlerle karşı durulacak. 6) Kemalist tehdidi konusunda ortak bir rapor hazırlanacak. 7) Göçmenleri taşımak üzere İzmir'e ticaret gemileri yollanacak.	426
198	17 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN AKDENİZ BAŞKOMUTANINDAN DENİZ BAKANLIĞINA TEL NO 342 İzmir'de müttefik amirallerle konsoloslukların göçmenler konusunda aldıkları kararlar. 200.000 göçmeni kurtarmak üzere Yunan gemileri gönderilmesi istenecek, Mustafa Kemal nezdinde girişimde bulunulacak, müttefikler de yardımda bulunacaklar.	427
199	18 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ GENELKARARGÂHINDAN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL 2205 Uşak'ın zaptedilmesi üzerine Mustafa Kemal, Balıkanlarda karışıklık çıkarılmasını istemiş. Kemalistler,	428

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		Kavala'yı Bulgarlara vadedmişler, Stambuliyski'yi düşürmeğe çalışıyorlarmış. Fuat Beyin çeteleri Trakya'da faaliyetlerini arttırıyorlar. Edirne'de Yunanlılar arasında karışıklık çıktığı söyleniyor.	
200	18 Eylül	<p>İNGİLİZ KABİNE TOPLANTISI TUTANAĞI. GİZLİ 429</p> <p>1) Savunma Bakanı, Harington'un telgrafını okudu. Harington, Mustafa Kemal'in İstanbul üzerine yürüyebileceğini ve İngilizlerin uç-dört hafta dayanabileceklerini bildiriyor.</p> <p>Başbakan, Akdeniz Başkomutanlığının telgraflarını okudu. Deniz Bakanı, Boğazlardan Türk kuvveti geçirilmesini donanmanın önleyemeyeceğini bildirdi.</p> <p>2) İzmir'deki göçmenler konusu görüşüldü.</p> <p>3) Boğazlar bölgesinin savunması ve buraya yeni kuvvetler gönderilmesi konuları ele alındı. Savunma Bakanı, Genelkurmay Başkanı, Deniz Bakanı, Hava Kuvvetleri Bakanı, Koloniler Bakanı ve Başbakan açıklamalarda bulundular.</p> <p>Özetle aşağıdaki kararlar alındı:</p> <p>(a) Akdeniz orduları Başkomutanı, Mustafa Kemal'in Anadolu'dan Trakya'ya kuvvet geçirmesini önlemekle görevli olacaktır.</p> <p>(b) Savunma Bakanlığı, General Harington'a takviye yetiştirmek için gerekli önlemleri alacaktır.</p> <p>(c) Deniz Bakanlığı, bölgeye yeni deniz kuvvetleri yetiştirecektir.</p> <p>(d) Hava Kuvvetleri Bakanlığı, Harington'un emrine yeni bombardıman uçakları yetiştirme işini yürütecektir.</p> <p>(e) İlgili makamlar, Çanakkale Boğazından geçişlerin güvenliği ve bu bölgedeki kuvvetlerin arttırılması konularında ortak bir rapor hazırlayacaklardır.</p>	
201	18 Eylül	<p>İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'DAN ATINA ELÇİSİ LINDLEY'E TEL. NO. 298 436</p> <p>İzmir'deki göçmenler konusunda İngiltere'nin pasif davrandığı iddiası asılsızdır. Mustafa Kemal'in Yunan gemilerine izin vermesini ve ayrıca İngiliz gemileri sağlamağa çalışıyoruz.</p>	

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202	18 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATINA ELÇİSİ LINDLEY'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 455 Yunanistan'a müttefik gibi davranmazsak İngiliz planlarında Yunan ordusuna bel bağlanamaz. Bu durumda, (i) ya Mustafa Kemal ile Misak-ı Milli esaslarına göre anlaşmaya gitmeli, (ii) ya da Türklerin Avrupa'ya dönmelerine karşı koyacağımız Mustafa Kemal'e duyurulmalıdır. Yunan ordusu en ucuz silah olarak kullanılabilir.	436
203	18 Eylül	İNGİLİZ AKDENİZ BAŞKOMUTANINDAN DENİZ BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 353 GİZLİ Mustafa Kemal, İzmir'deki göçmenlerin 30 Eylül'e kadar Yunan gemileriyle taşınmalarını kabul etti. İzmir yandı.	437
204	18 Eylül	İNGİLİZ DENİZ BAKANLIĞINDAN AKDENİZ BAŞKOMUTANINA TEL. NO. 924 GİZLİ. Emrinize yeni gemiler yollanıyor. Donanma, Mustafa Kemal kuvvetlerinin Avrupa'ya geçmelerini önlemekle görevlendirildi.	437
205	18 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN BÜKREŞ İŞGÜDERİ MILLINGTON-DRAKE'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 115 Konferansa katılmak istiyorsa Romanya'nın (Boğazlar bölgesinde) İngiltere'nin sorumluluğunu paylaşması gerektiğini Dışişleri Bakanına söyledim. Romanya, ilke olarak, askeri harekâta katılmak niyetinde. Resmi cevap daha sonra bildirilecek.	438
206	18 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN BÜKREŞ ELÇİSİ DERİNG'TEN DIŞİŞLER BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 116 M. Diamandy, Mustafa Kemal'in de katılabilmesi için konferansın İstanbul yakınında yapılmasının uygun olacağı görüşünde.	438
207	18 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN BÜKREŞ ELÇİSİ DERİNG'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 493 GİZLİ Romanya'nın da İstanbul'daki müttefik Başkomutanının emrine bir tümen verip veremeyeceğini Duca ile görüştüm. Başbakan da Lloyd George'dan aynı yolda bir telgraf almış. Duca, ilke olarak, fikre karşı değil, meslektaşlarına danışacak.	439

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		Mustafa Kemal'in zorla Boğazlar meselesini halletmesine izin verilmemesi gerektiğini söylüyor. Konferansa katılırsa Romanya'nın İngiliz görüşünü desteklemesini istedim. Yugoslav Elçisi de Romanya'nın tutumunu sormaya gelmiş. Romanya'yı Boğazlar kadar yakından ilgilendirmeyen Trakya sınırı konusu açılmadı. Konferansta Romanya'yı belki Diamandy temsil edecek. Ona da rastladım. Konferansın İstanbul yakınında toplanmasının uygun olacağı görüşünde. (Bkz. No. 213).	
208	18 Eylül	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINDAN İSTANBUL'DA GENERAL HARRINGTON'A TEL. 91093 Çanakkaleye çok yaklaşmaması için Mustafa Kemal'e yapılacak özel bir uyarı var mı? Varsa Rumbold'a bildiriniz.	441
209	18 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARRINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA. TEL. NO. 2304 Kararlı bir tutumla, Mustafa Kemal Boğazları ve İstanbul'u ele geçirmekten caydırılabilir. Çanakkale mevzilerimizi durmadan güçlendiriyoruz. Cebelitarık'tan ve Malta'dan bana tezelden takviye yetiştirilmesine teşekkür ederim. Donanmanın topları da bana epeyce yardım edecek. Hava birliği için girişimlerde bulunuyorum. Howitzer toplarına ihtiyacım var. Sağlık personelim kat. Durumun üstesinden gelebileceğimize inanıyorum.	442
210	19 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. GİZLİ Amiral Brock, Mustafa Kemal kuvvetlerinin Trakya'ya geçmelerini önlemek görevi aldığını bildirdi ve Mustafa Kemal'e bir uyarı göndermemi istedi. Sizden kesin talimat almadan bunu yapamıyacağımı söyledim. Böyle bir uyarı, Mustafa Kemal'e savaş ilâmı demek olacak. <i>Status quo</i> 'nun muhafaza edilmesi, yani konferansa kadar Mustafa Kemal kuvvetlerinin Anadolu'da kalınmaları gerektiği yolun-	443

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		da bir açıklama yapmak daha yerinde olur. Amiral, Boğazlardan ve Marmara'dan her türlü geçişi ve şehrin feribot seferlerini de durdurmak niyetinde. Böyle bir tedbir ve uyarı, Mustafa Kemal'i büsbütün kaçışlar.	
211	19 Eylül	İZMİR'DE İNGİLİZ KİDEMİLİ DENİZ SUBAYINDAN DENİZ BAKANLIĞINA. TEL. NO. 306. (Başkonsolos'tan Dışişlerine tel. No. 74). İtalyan Konsolosu, görüştüğü Mustafa Kemal'in uzlaşmaz bir tutum içinde olduğunu söylüyor. Kuzeye büyük kuvvetler gönderiliyor. Yunan askeri halâ Çeşme'den gemiye dolduruluyor.	443
212	19 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ HARDİNGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 469. Fransa Başbakanına telgrafınızın örneğini verdim. Boğazların Anadolu kıyısından Fransız birliklerinin geri çekilmesi kararını hayretle karşıladığımı bildirdim. Bu kararın İstanbul'daki Yüksek Komiserlere zamanında duyurulduğunu söyledi. Askerlerini geri çekmekle Mustafa Kemal'i yüreklendirmiş ve dolayısıyla savaş kışkırtmış olduklarını belirttim. Başbakan, İngiltere'nin savaş politikası güttüğünü ileri sürdü. Bunun kesinlikle asılsız olduğunu vurguladım. Yatıştı. Çanakkale mevzilerinin tehlikede olduğunu, Mustafa Kemal'in tarafsız bölgeyi tanımadığını, kamu oyunun tek bir Fransız askerinin tehlikeye atılmasına izin vermeyeceğini anlattı. Mustafa Kemal'i bir iki gün içinde konferansa çağırmanın en doğru iş olacağını söyledim. Başbakan, toprak istekleri önceden karşılanmazsa Türklerin konferansa katılmayacakları görüşünde. Bu isteklerin, Edirne'yi de kapsayacak biçimde Meriç sınırı, Boğazlar üzerinde Türk egemenliği olduğunu söyledi. Gelibolu yarımadasında İngiliz askerlerinin mezarları bulunduğunu hatırlattım. Mezarlıkların Türk egemenliği dışında bırakılabileceğini belirtti. Sorum üzerine, Mustafa Kemal'in artık İzmir'de bulunmadığını bildirdi.	444

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203	19 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'SİN BÜKRİŞ ELÇİSİ DERİNGTEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 95 ÇOK GİZLİ 446 İlgi: No. 207]. Romanya'nın Boğazlar bölgesine bir tümen asker göndermesi için yapığımız çağrı ile ilgili olarak Dışişleri Bakanı bugün beni çağırdı. Romen Başbakanının Lloyd George'a gönderdiği cevabı okudu. Romanya, kendi sınırları için kaygılı. Konferansa katılmayı arzu ediyor. Boğazların savunmasına katılmak niyetinde. Duca, Fransa'nın tutumunu sordu. Trakya'da Türk-Bulgar ortak sınırına karşı. Türklerle Bulgarların ortak faaliyetlerde bulunduk- ları yolundaki haberleri söz konusu etti.	
214	20 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARRINGTONDAN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 2335- GİZLİ 447 Bana gönderilen takviye için minnettarım. Fransız- ların ne yapacakları çok önemlidir. Mustafa Kemal'e angaje olmuşlar. Tek başımıza karar vereceğiz sanırım. Amiral Brock, tarafsız bölgenin çiğnenmesine sert biçimde cevap vereceğimizi İstanbul Hükümetine bildirecek. Fransız birliğinin Çanakkale'den Gelibolu'ya çekile- ceğini şimdi duydum. Charpy, Mustafa Kemal'in Çanakkale'ye saldıracağını söylüyor. Çanakkale, İngiliz politikası için mihenktaşı olacak. Takviye gelinceye kadar zaman kazanmağa çalışıyoruz. Çanakkale'de ve İstanbul'da sağlam durmakla çıkabilecek dertleri önlemiş oluyoruz. Aileleri gemiye bindiriyorum. Şimdi İtalyanların da geri çekildiklerini duydum.	
215	20 Eylül	FRANSA BAŞBAKANI M. POINCARÉ İLE İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON ARASINDA PARİSTE, FRANSA DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA YAPILAN GÖRÜŞMENİN İNGİLİZ SEKRETERİNCE KA- LEME ALINAN TUTANAĞI 450 Lord Curzon: Mart ayındanberi Mustafa Kemal'i konferansa getirmek için harcanan çabalar boşa gitti.	

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Venedik konferansına katılacağı yerde Mustafa Kemal taarruza geçti. Yunan cephesi çoktu. Anadolu'da toprak sorunu çözümlenmiş oldu. Trakya, Boğazlar ve İstanbul sorunlarının çözümü ise Mustafa Kemal'e bırakılmaz. Bunlar, konferansa, Müttefiklerce çözüme bağlanacaktır. Tarafsız bölgeye uyması Ankara'ya duyuruldu. İngiltere, Çanakkale ve İstanbul mevzilerini güçlendirme kararı aldı. Bu arada Boğazların Anadolu kıyısından Fransız askerinin çekilmesi kararını hayretle öğrendim. Bu karar, Gordiom'un düğümünü kılıçla kesmesi için Mustafa Kemal'e bir çağrı demektir. Müttefikler arasındaki beraberliğin bozulması vahim sonuçlar doğurur.

M. Poincaré: Mart tekliflerini Mustafa Kemal'in kabul etmeyeceğini zamanında söylemiştim. Gelişmeler beni doğruladı. Konferans düşünülürken taarruza geçmemelerini de Türklerle söylemiştim. Sözlerim dikkate alınmadı. Şimdi muazzaf bir millet karşındayız. Genel barışı korumak durumundayız. İzmir'de Mustafa Kemal'le görüşen General Pellé'den bir telgraf aldım. Tarafsız bölgeyi çiğnememesini Mustafa Kemal'e hatırlatmış. Mustafa Kemal, kış basmadan önce Misak-ı Milli'de öngörülen toprakları geri almak zorunda olduğunu söylemiş. Fransa'nın Türkiye'ye gönderecek askeri yoktur. Ayrıca Fransa müslüman kolonilerindeki duyguları hesaba katmak zorundadır. Tunus'tan Mustafa Kemal'e kutlama telgrafları gönderiliyor... Bu durumda Mustafa Kemal'i konferansa çağırmak, çağırırken de kendisine Boğazlar ve Trakya konusunda vaadde bulunmak gerekir. Yoksa, Türklerin Trakya'ya atlamaları önlenemez. Türkler harekete geçince Bulgarlar Sırbistan'a, Ruslar da Polonya'ya ve Romanya'ya saldırabilirler. Türkleri konferans masasına getirebilmek için kendilerine açıkça vaadde bulunmalı. İngiltere kabul etmezse Fransa bunu tek başına yapacaktır.

Lord Curzon: Müttefikler arasında dayanışma umuyor-
-uk. Yunanlılar İstanbul'u tehdit ederken Çatalca'da

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höyle bir dayanışma örneği verilmişti. O zaman İngilizler yan çizmemişlerdi. Şimdi Mustafa Kemal'e her istediğinin önceden verilmesi isteniyor. Yunanlılar denize döküldü diye Mart kararlarını yırtıp atmak olur mu? İslâm kamuoyu sorunu elbette var. Tezelden konferansın toplanması elbette gerekli. Ama istediği Misak-ı Milli'yi Mustafa Kemal'e önceden verince konferansın anlamı kalır mı? İstanbul'un geri verileceği, Türklerle söylenebilir. Boğazlar ve Gelibolu yarımadası gibi konularda müttefikler serbest olmalı. *M. Poincaré*: Fransa, Anadolu'da bir zorlama hareketine katılamaz. Türkler zorla durdurulamazlar. Mart teklifleriyle Türkler konferansa getirilemezler. Hiç değilse bazı konularda Türklerle vaadde bulunmak gerekir.

Lord Curzon: Türkler tarafsız bölgeye girerse bir daha silahsızlandırılmış bölgeyi kabul etmezler. Fransa, kararını gözden geçirmelidir. Mart teklifleri değiştirilebilir. Ama konferansta değiştirilebilir. Müttefikler kararlı davranırlarsa Türkler duraklar. *M. Poincaré*: Yıneliyorum: Türkleri biran önce konferansa katılmaya ikna etmek hayati önem taşıyor. Tehlike büyüktür.

216 20 Eylül

İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA TEL 460

Lord Curzon'dan İngiliz Kabinesine tel:

M. Poincaré ile iki-buçuk saat konuştum. Sforza'nın da katılmasını istedi. Önce ikili görüşmeyi yeğledim. Sforza, sonra katılacak.

İngiliz görüşünü anlattım. M. Poincaré'den açıklama istedim. Mustafa Kemal'in Avrupa'ya yürümesine izin verilecek mi, diye sordum. Fransız desteğine güvenebileceğimizi miydik?

M. Poincaré, Pellé ile Mustafa Kemal arasındaki görüşmeyi anlattı. Mustafa Kemal, Milli Misak'ta öngörülen bütün toprakları işgal etmeden ordularını durduramayacağını söylemiş. Poincaré, isteklerini önceden kabul etmezsek Mustafa Kemal konferansa katılmaz, diyor. Fransa'nın Türklerle karşı durmayacağını, Türklerin durdurulamayacağını söylüyor.

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		Konferansa katılması için Mustafa Kemal'e rüşvet vermeyi kabul etmedim. İstanbul Türklerle geri verilir. Trakya sınırında değişiklik yapılabilir, ama Boğazlar konusunda İngiltere direnir, dedim. Fransa, Boğazların Anadolu kıyısında bizimle işbirliğinden yan çiziyor. Öğleden sonra tutumumuzu açıkça vurgulayacağım.	
217	20 Eylül	FRANSA BAŞBAKANI, İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI VE İTALYA'NIN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ ARASINDA FRANSA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA YAPILAN GÖRÜŞMENİN İNGİLİZ SEKRİTERİNCE KALEME ALINAN TUTANAĞI 462 (İkinci görüşme) <i>Lord Curzon:</i> Fransa ve İtalya'nın Çanakkale'den ve İzmir'den çekilmeleri üzerinde duracağım. Yunanistan Çatalca'yı tehdit ederken Harington oradaki Fransızlara yardım göndermişti. Şimdi neden İngiltere yalnız bırakılıyor? <i>M. Poincaré:</i> Çekilmenin sorumluluğunu üstleniyorum. Bugünkü durumda hiçbir asker Çanakkale'de durmak istemez. Mustafa Kemal isterse yarın Boğazdan atılabilir. <i>Lord Curzon:</i> Gelibolu yarımadasında 25.000 mezarımız ve hakkımız var. Anadolu kıyısında ittifakımız sona ermiştir. Bunu Hükümete anlatacağım. Bu pek ciddidir. <i>M. Poincaré:</i> İngiltere'ye de çekilmeyi tavsiye ederim. Orada tutunmak olanaksız. <i>Lord Curzon:</i> İttifakı güçlendirmek için Paris'e geldim. Fakat Fransa'nın Çanakkale'den çekilmesi, İngiltere'yi tek başına harekete itiyor. <i>M. Poincaré:</i> Fransa Türkiye ile savaşa giremez. Parlamento buna izin vermez. (Amiral Beatty ve Grasset açıklama için çağırıldılar) <i>Lord Beatty:</i> Donanma, Türklerin Çanakkale'den Trakya'ya atlamalarını önleyebilir. Türklerin büyük toplarını da etkisiz hale getirebilir. <i>Amiral Grasset:</i> Türkler Yunanlılardan ganimet aldıkları topları getirirlerse donanma Çanakkale önünde tutunamaz.	

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		<i>Lord Curzon:</i> Öyleyse Türkleri kıyıya yaklaştırmayalım.	
		<i>M. Poincaré:</i> Şimdilik Çanakkale'de asker tutamaya- cağımızı not edelim	
		<i>Lord Beatty:</i> Gelibolu'ya yerleştireceğimiz ağır toplarla Türk toplarını bir ölçüde susturabiliriz.	
		<i>Amiral Grassel:</i> Çanakkale Boğazı iki ateş altında kalır ve gemilerin geçişi yine tehlikeli olur.	
		<i>Kont Sforza:</i> Türkler, küçük gruplar halinde Trakya'ya atlayamazlar mı? Boğazların her iki yakası da ateş altında kalmaz mı?	
		<i>Lord Beatty:</i> Sızmalar olabilir. Ama büyük kuvvetlerin Trakya'ya geçirilmesi yıllar alır.	
		<i>Lord Curzon:</i> Önemli olan Boğazlar bölgesinde müttefiklerin birliğinin bozulmasıdır.	
		<i>M. Poincaré:</i> Mareşal Foch'a göre, Boğazları kontrol altında tutabilmek için ileri karakollar değil, ordular bulundurmak gerekir. Kıyılar upuzundur. Sonra Trakya'da da ayaklanma çıkabilir.	
		<i>Lord Curzon:</i> Fransa ve İtalya, Mustafa Kemal'den fazla Kemalist davranıyorlar.	
		<i>M. Poincaré:</i> Anadolu'ya Fransız askeri göndermek, Fransız-Türk savaşını başlatır. Konferans toplamak ve Türklere ödün vermek gerekir.	
		<i>Lord Curzon:</i> Boğazların savunması için görüş ayrılığı, konferans için ise görüş birliği var. Şimdi konferansın şekli ve yeri, konuları var. Romanya ve Sırbistan da konferansa çağırılmalı. Bulgaristan da görüşünü açıklamak ister. Hazırlık konferansına gerek yoktur, sanırım.	
		<i>Kont Sforza:</i> Nihai Konferansı toplamak yerinde olur. Konferans yeri olarak Venedik uygundur.	
		<i>M. Poincaré:</i> Tam bir barış konferansı toplanması görüşüne katılıyorum. Venedik'i belki Türkler kabul etmez.	
		<i>Lord Curzon:</i> Önemli konular üzerinde müttefikler önceden anlaşmaya varmalı. Gelibolu yarımadası, Boğazlar, Trakya, silahsız bölgeler gibi. Fransa, alelacele bir harekete kalkışmaması için Mustafa	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Kemal'i ikna etmelidir. Bunun için Franklin-Bouillon görevlendirilebilir. <i>M. Poincaré</i> : Pellé zaten İzmir'de. Franklin-Bouillon da gönderilebilir. Kanaatimce Yunanlılar da Meriç'in gerisine çekilmeli. <i>Lord Curzon</i> : Konferanstan önce Yunanlılardan bunu isteyemeyiz. <i>M. Poincaré</i> : Trakya'nın geri verileceğini Türklere bildirelim. <i>Kont Sforza</i> : Trakya, Yunan askerince değil, müttefiklerce işgal edilebilir. <i>Lord Curzon</i> : Trakya konusunda Hükümetimden talimat isteyeceğim.... Japonya da konferansa katılsın. Kabul edildi ve basın bildirisi hazırlandı.	
218	20 Eylül	LORD CURZON'DAN İNGİLTERE HÜKÜMETİNE TELEFON MESAJI: Bu sabah Sforza ile görüştüm ve kendisini de toplantıya çağırdım. Toplantıda, Fransa'nın Boğazların Anadolu kıyısındaki sorumluluğundan sıyrılmak mı istediğini sordum. Poincaré pek sinirlendi. Tek bir Fransız askerinin ölmesine razı olmayacaklarını söyledi. Tartıştık. Lord Beatty, İngiliz donanmasının, Türklerin Boğazlara yaklaşmalarını ve Trakya'ya geçmelerini önleyebilecek güçte olduğunu anlattı. Buna karşı Poincaré, Amiral Grasset'yi harekete geçirdi. Ama pek başarılı olmadılar. Grasset'nin argümanını ele alıp kullandım. Konferans konusuna geçtim. Büyük Devletlerden başka, Yunanistan, Türkiye, Sırbistan ve Romanya'nın da konferansa katılmalarını istedim. Poincaré ile Sforza kabul ettiler. Konferans esasları üzerinde de anlaşmamızı istediler. Talimat isteyeceğimi söyledim. M. Kemal'in frenlenmesini Poincaré'den rica ettim. Şu sırada savaşa neden olabilecek bir harekettten kaçınalım.	474
219	20 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'E TEL. NO. 437	476

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Lord Curzon'a: Fransız Yüksek Komiserinin İzmir'den dönüşü gecikti. Mustafa Kemal ile görüşmesinde güçlüklerle karşılaştı, sanırım.	
220	20 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'E TEL. NO. 439. ÇOK İVEDİ	476
		Lord Curzon'a: Fransız Yüksek Komiseri, Mustafa Kemal ile görüşmesi üzerine olumsuz raporlar gönderdi. Bu yüzden Fransız askeri alelacele geri çekildi.	
221	20 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'E TEL. NO. 440	477
		Lord Curzon'a: İtalyan Yüksek Komiseri, İtalyan askerinin geri çekildiğini bildirdi. Fransızlara söylediklerimi ona da tekrarladım. İtalya'nın Mustafa Kemal ile savaş istemediğini söyledi.	
222	20 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LINDLEY'DEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 463	477
		Yunan Trakya'sında yaklaşık 150.000 göçmen var. Adalardakilerin sayısı bilinmiyor. Mustafa Kemal'in iddiası asılsız. Yunanistan'daki Türkler zulüm görmüyor.	
223	21 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI MÜSTEŞARI CROWE'DAN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'E TEL. 312. İVEDİ. ÇOK GİZLİ	478
		Harington'a şunlar tellendi:Savaşa neden olabilecek hareketlerden kaçınmak gerek. Yollanacak takviye ayrıca bildiriliyor. Politikamızın temeli Gelibolu yarımadası ve Boğazların serbestliğidir. İmparatorluğun prestiji bakımından Çanakkale'nin tutulması pek önemlidir. Önem bakımından Çanakkale başta, İstanbul ikinci sırada, İzmit ise üçüncü sırada geliyor. Gerekirse askeri İzmit'ten, hatta İstanbul'dan Çanakkale'ye çekebilirsiniz. Çanakkale'yi iki-üç hafta tutabilecekseniz Yüksek Komiser aracılığıyla Mustafa	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
224	21 Eylül	<p>Kemal'e gerekli bildirimde bulunabilirsiniz. Örneğin, tarafsız bölgeye girmemesi, girerse ateş edileceği yolunda kendisini uyarabilirsiniz.</p> <p>İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA TELEFON MESAJI 479</p> <p>Paris'te bulunan Lord Curzon'dan İngiliz kabinesine: Yarın toplanıp konferans esasları üzerinde anlaşmağa çalışacağız. Güç olacak. Fransa ve İtalya tarafından desteklenen Kemalistler, Misak-i Milli'nin toptan kabulü için baskı yapıyorlar. Bu iddialara karşı argümanlarım var. Hükümetin onaylaması şartıyla şu önerilerde bulunacağım:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. İstanbul: Barış antlaşması onaylandıktan sonra Türklere geri verilecek. Güçlük, Boğazın Anadolu kıyıların silahsızlandırma konusunda çıkacak. 2. Trakya: Fransa, Yunanlıların çekilmesi ve Meriç sınırı için baskı yapacak. Mustafa Kemal İzmit yarımadasının tarafsızlığına saygı gösterirse Yunanlılar Enos-Stranca çizgisine çekilebilirler diyeceğim. Sforza, Trakya'nın müttefiklerce işgalini isteyebilir. Trakya üzerinde Türk egemenliğinin hemen tanınması isteklerine karşı bunun konferansta kararlaştırılacağını söyleyeceğim. Gelibolu yarımadasını elimizde tutarsak, Meriç sınırını kabul edebiliriz. Ama kesin sınırı çizmek bizim işimiz değildir, diyeceğim. 3. Çanakkale: Burayı işgal etmemizi önereceğim. Sırbistan'dan ve Romanya'dan da katkı isteyeceğim. Teknik olarak Türk egemenliği kabul edilebilir. Bu çerçevede hareket etme yetkisi istiyorum. Müttefiklerin yakında konferans toplayacakları açıklanırsa Mustafa Kemal'in harekete geçmesi zorlaşır. 	479
225	21 Eylül	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 143 GİZLİ 481</p> <p>Yugoslav Elçisi, kişisel düşüncesi olarak, Hükümetinin Çanakkale'ye bir-iki tümen gönderebileceğini söyledi. Fransızlarla İtalyanlar,</p>	481

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		Mustafa Kemal ordusunun gücünü abartıyor ve 150-300 bin gösteriyorlar.	
226	21 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 44 GİZLİ 482	482
		Yunan Yüksek Komiseri, Mustafa Kemal'in Avrupa yakasına asker taşımak için gemi aradığını söyledi.	
227	21 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 45 ÇOK İVEDİ 482	482
		Fransız Yüksek Komiseri, Mustafa Kemal ile yaptığı görüşmelerini anlattı. Fransız askerlerinin geri çekilmesi konusunda Paris'ten bir telgraf almadığını söyledi. Mustafa Kemal'i iki kez görmüş. Tarafsız bölgeyi çiğnememesini istemiş. Mustafa Kemal, İstanbul üzerine yürüyeceğini söylemiş. Belki Çanakkale'ye de yürüyecek. Meriç'e kadar Trakya'yı istiyormuş. Sorunu kış basmadan önce kuvvet kullanarak çözmek niyetindeymiş. Konferansa katılacakmış, ama yürüyüşünü de durdurmayacakmış. Konferans yeri olarak Üsküdar'ı önermiş. Fransız Yüksek Komiseri, Kemalistlerin yalnız toprak sorununa önem verdikleri izlenimi edinmiş ve aceleci bir hareketle konferansı suya düşürmemesini Mustafa Kemal'den istemiş.	
228	21 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN CENEVRE KONSOLOSU LONDON'A TEL. NO. 47 483	483
		Göçmenler İstanbul'a taşınamaz. En uygunu Yunanistan ve adalardır. Göçmen taşımak üzere Yunan gemilerinin İzmir'e gelişine izin vermesi Mustafa Kemal'den isteniyor. Olmazsa diye İngiliz gemileri sağlamağa çalışıyoruz. Nansen'in emrine 100 bin frank verilmesini destekliyoruz. Siz de 50 bin frank'a kadar yardımda bulunabilirsiniz.	
229	21 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN DENİZ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI E. 964 27. 44 ÇOK İVEDİ 484	484
		Kemalistlerin, askerlik çağındaki erkekler dışında kalan göçmenlerin taşınmasına izin verdiklerini gazeteler yazıyor. Gemi sağlamak bakımından, bu haberin doğruluğunun İzmir'den sorulmasını rica.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
230	21 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN AKDENİZ BAŞKOMUTANINDAN DENİZ BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 376 Mustafa Kemal halâ İzmir'de, Pellé ile görüştü. Göçmenlerin 30 Eylül'e kadar boşaltılması isteniyor.	485
231	21 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DENİZ BAKANLIĞINDAN İZMİR'DE İNGİLİZ TUĞAMİRALİNE TEL. NO. 436 Mustafa Kemal'in göçmenlerin boşaltılmasına izin verdiği doğrulandı.	485
232	21 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARİNGTON'DAN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. 2375 Mustafa Kemal, bölgeye girerse karşısında İngiltere'nin gücünü bulacağını artık biliyor. Savaşa neden olmaktan kaçınıyorum.	485
233	21 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN LAHEY TEMSİLCİSİ MARLING'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 443 Hollanda gazeteleri Lloyd George'un politikasını eleştiriyor. Sosyalist "Het Volk" gazetesi, sözde tarafsız bölgeyi Mustafa Kemal'e karşı savunmak için İngiltere'nin başka ülkelerden yardım isteğine geniş yer veriyor.	486
234	21 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN BÜKREŞ ELÇİSİ DERİNG'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 499 Ataşemiliter Vekilinin Romen Genelkurmay Başkanıyla görüşmesiyle ilgili muhtıra ilişikte sunulmuştur.	487
Ek.	21 Eylül	ROMANYA GENELKURMAY BAŞKANI GENERAL CRISTESCO İLE GÖRÜŞMEYE DAİR MUHTIRA General Cristesco, İngiltere'nin İstanbul'u gerçekten savunmaya kararlı olup olmadığını sordu. Kararlı olduğunu söyledim. İngiliz donanması kolayca Türklerin Boğazlardan geçişini önleyebilir, dedi. İngiltere'yi desteklemek bakımından Romanya'nın kararsız tutumuna değindim. Fransa'ya karşı gelmek istemediklerini, ayrıca malzeme ve cephane sıkıntıları bulunduğunu, bu yüzden Romanya dışına asker gönderemeyeceklerini bildirdi. Romanya, İngiltere'nin politikasını destekliyor, ama eli kolu bağı. İstanbul'a asker gönderemiyor.	487

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
235	22 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN PARIS, ROMA VE VAŞINGTON BÜYÜKELÇİLERİNE TEL. NO. 318, 280 VE 284 Mustafa Kemal, (İzmir'deki) göçmenleri ağıktan ölüme mahkûm ediyor. Bulduğunuz ülke Hükümetlerince protesto edilsin ve göçmenlerin taşınması için yeniden baskı yapılsın.	489
236	22 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN CENEVRE KONSOLosu LONDON'A TEL. NO. 52 Lord Balfour'a: Mustafa Kemal, 250.000 Rum göçmenini ağıktan ölüme mahkûm ediyor. Milletler Cemiyetinde yapılacak eleştiriler kendisini caydırabilir. Gereğini.	489
237	22 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 449 Harington, tarafsız çizgiyi savunmaya kararlı olduğunu, Mustafa Kemal'e bildirmesi için, Hamid Bey'e duyurdu.	490
238	22 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ KUVVETLERİ BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. 2374 Dört tehlikeli nokta var: Çanakkale, İstanbul, İzmit cephesi ve Trakya'da ihtilâl. Mustafa Kemal, tarafsız bölgeyi çiğneyip çiğnememe kararını bugün verecektir, sanırım. Çiğnerse karşısında İngiltere'yi ve Dominyonları bulacağını açıkça kendisine duyurdum. Donanma bana pek yardımcı oluyor. Yakında birkaç uçak gelecek. Gelibolu'da Howitzer toplarına pek ihtiyacım var. 48 saat dayanabilirsem yardım yetişebilir.	490
239	22 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 474 Lord Curzon'dan İngiliz Kabinesine. Rumbold şunları telliyor: Harington pek kaygılı. Bir yanardağı üstünde oturuyoruz. İstanbul'da silahlı 20.000 Rum, bir o kadar da silahlı Türk var. Kuvvetlerimiz yetersiz. Kenti terkedebiliriz. Fransa'nın ve İtalya'nın tutumlarının ne olacağını tezelden öğrenmemiz gerek.	491

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		Subay epleri ve çocuklarıyla İngiliz kolonisini yarın gemilere bindirip gönderiyoruz.	
240	22 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DENİZ BAKANLIĞINDAN AKDENİZ BAŞKOMUTANLIĞINA TEL NO. 961	492
		Donanma Kemalist kuvvetlerin Anadolu'dan Avrupa'ya geçişlerini önlemekle yükümlüdür. Boğazdaki tüm gemileri uzaklaştırmak veya yoketmek de dahil olmak üzere tüm önlemleri almağa yetkilisiniz.	
241	22 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 446	493
		Fransız Yüksek Komiseri, Meriç'e kadar Trakya'nın geri verileceği bildirilirse Mustafa Kemal'in harekete geçmesi önlenebilir, diyor. İzmir'de az sayıda göçmen görmüş. İzmir'in yanması Mustafa Kemal'i pek etkilemiş. Öteki Türkler ise bunu bir savaş kazası gibi görüyorlarmış. Fransız Yüksek Komiseri, İzmir yangnundan Türklerin sorumlu olmadıkları kanısında.	
242	22 Eylül	FRANSA BAŞBAKANI, İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI VE İTALYA'NIN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ ARASINDA, FRANSA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA YAPILAN GÖRÜŞMENİN İNGİLİZ SEKRETERİNCE KALEME ALINAN TUTANAĞI (ÜÇÜNCÜ OTURUM)	493
		<i>Lord Curzon:</i> Bu toplantıda konferansın ele alacağı bazı önemli noktalar üzerinde anlaşmaya varmağa çalışacağız. Sorunları tek tek ele alalım. İstanbul'dan başlayalım. Trakya, Edirne, Boğazlar ve Gelibolu yarımadası sorunlarına geçelim. İngiltere savaş istemiyor. 1918 zaferinin meyvelerini yitirmek de istemiyor.	
		<i>M. Poincaré:</i> Türkleri barış konferansına getirmenin çaresini arayalım. Pellé'nin telgrafına göre, Mustafa Kemal kuvvetleri ileri yürümek istiyor. Mustafa Kemal onları frenlemeğe çalışıyor. Çatışmayı önlemenin tek yolu Mudanya konferansını başlatmaktır. Meriç'e kadar Trakya'nın Türklerle geri verileceği hemen açıklanmalıdır. Ancak böyle savaş önlenebilir. İngiltere ve İtalya razı olmazlarsa, Fransa kendi tutumunu açıklayacak ve savaşın sorumluluğunu yüklenmeyecektir.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
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Kont Sforza: General Monbelli, askeri durumum umutsuz olduğunu bildiriyor. General Harington, İstanbul hristiyanlarını silahlandırmayı düşünüyor-muş. Bunun vahametine dikkatinizi çekerim.

Lord Curzon: Mustafa Kemal'in müttefikleri etkileme-ğe çalışması doğaldır. General Harington, savaşmak ve çekilmek zorunda kalırsa, sorumluluk yalnız onun olmayacak, onu bırakıp kaçanların Fransızlarla İtalyanların olacaktır. Evet, konferans gerekli ama, Mudanya'da yapılması anlamsız. Mustafa Kemal, savaş öncesi Trakya sınırları istiyor. Bu, müttefikler için intihar olur. Trakya için çeşitli tarihlerde, çeşitli sınırlar önerildi. Trakya, geniş bir topraktır. Mütarekeden beri Yunanlılar buradadır. Belki Yunan nüfusu artmış, çoğunluk olmuştur. Ayrıca orada 50.000 (32.000) Yunan askeri vardır. Bunlar, oradan nasıl atılacaklardır? Müttefiklerin Mustafa Kemal'e hemen vaadde bulunmaları olanaksızdır. M. Poincaré'nin kesin politikası buysa, hemen toplan-tının ertelenmesini istiyeceğim ve Sırplarla Romen-lerin görüşlerini alacağım. Trakya için geçici bir düzenleme düşünülemez mi?

M. Poincaré: Tam anlatamadım. General Pellé, durum pek vahimdir, diyor. Karşımızda, milli topraklarını kurtarmağa kararlı, morali yüksek büyük bir düşman var. Fransız Genelkurmayı, Mareşal Foch, General Charpy ve diğer generaller, hepsi, durumu pek tehlikeli görüyorlar. Fransa daha önce (1915'te) bir kez Çanakkale'de tehlikeye sürüklenmişti. Böyle bir riski tekrar göze alamaz. General Harington savaşmak ve çekilmek zorunda kalırsa Fransa'nın da sorumlu olacağı yoludaki sözler geri alınsın.

Kont Sforza: İngiltere, Fransa ve İtalya müslüman devletlerdir. Fransa, İmparatorluğundaki müslüman kamuoyunu da hesaba katarak askerini geri çekmiştir. İtalya'nın tutumunun da başlıca nedeni budur.

M. Poincaré: Sforza'ya katılıyorum. Askerin geri çekilmesi müttefiklerin çıkarları gereğidir. İngiltere gerçek durumu görmemezlikten geliyor. Türk zaferi

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üzerine islam dünyası baştan başa bayram ediyor. Fransa bunun tehlikeli sonuçlarına katlanamaz. Mustafa Kemal, Edirne'yi ve doğu Trakya'ya geri istiyor. Yoksa konferansa gelmeyecek. Oysa bugünkü tehlikeli duruma ancak konferansta çözüm bulunabilir.

Lord Curzon: Mustafa Kemal'e verilmesi istenen ödünleri soğukkanlılıkla ve daha derinlemesine inceleyelim.

M. Poincaré: İngiltere bilmeli ki, Fransa, Yunanistan'ın yanında savaşmaya hiçbir zaman razı olmayacaktır. Mustafa Kemal, bazı yatıştırıcı güvenceler almadıkça, Boğazlar ve İstanbul üzerine yürüyüşünü durdurmayacaktır. Meriç sınırı ve Edirne Türklere geri verilince bazı silahtan arındırılmış bölgeler kabul edilebilir. Bunu Türklere anlatabiliriz. Şimdilik, Trakya konusunda Türklere kesin bir şey söyleyebilmeliyiz. Müttefikler buna yanaşmazlarsa Fransa tek başına söyleyecektir.

Lord Curzon: Yani, müttefikler, Trakya sınırının Meriç'e çekileceğini, yalnız sınır boylarının silahsızlandırılacağını söyleyecekler. Bu pek ciddi bir adımdır. Şimdilik buna kalkışmayalım. Trakya işini barış konferansına bırakalım. Mustafa Kemal'e genel nitelikte bir güvence vermekle yetinelim. M. Poincaré'nin önerdiği kesin güvence verilmesini İngiltere kabul edemez.

M. Poincaré: Müttefikler, İstanbul, Gelibolu, Meriç gibi önemli konularda Mustafa Kemal'e kesin bir şey söylemelidirler. Uzun bir Türk-Bulgar sınırından Sırbistan ve Romanya hoşlanmayacaklardır. Ama sonunda onlar bunu kabul ederler. Sırbistan Kralı, Mustafa Kemal ile ilişkilerinin çok iyi olduğunu ve Türklerin Trakya'ya dönmelerinden korkmadıklarını bana söyledi.

Lord Curzon: Boğazlar konusunda Romanya'nın tutumu Sırbistan'inkinden daha önemlidir. Hazırladığım formülü okutuyorum. (M. Massigli metni okudu).

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		<i>M. Poincaré:</i> Bu helgede Meriç sınırıyla Edirne'nin Türklere geri verileceği atlanmış. Barış konferansı yeri Mudanya'da belirlensin.	
		<i>Kont Sforza:</i> Fethi Bey konferans yeri olarak Venedik'e razı.	
		<i>Lord Curzon:</i> Mustafa Kemal Anadolu dışında konferans istemezse, konferans hiç toplanamaz.	
		<i>M. Poincaré:</i> Meriç konusunda açık birşey söylenmeyecekse, Fransa Mustafa Kemal'e ayrı bir nota verecek.	
		<i>Kont Sforza:</i> Bu tasarı İngiltere'nin son sözü mü?	
		<i>Lord Curzon:</i> Hayır.	
		<i>M. Poincaré:</i> İngiltere Meriç sınırına karşı mı?	
		<i>Lord Curzon:</i> Bu konuda çok kesin olmayalım, konferansa hareket serbestliği bırakalım, diyorum.	
		<i>Kont Sforza:</i> Meriç sınırı konusunda Mustafa Kemal'e kesin güvence vermek gerek.	
		<i>M. Poincaré:</i> Amiral Dumesnil'den bir telgraf aldım. Mustafa Kemal'le görüşmesini anlatıyor. Mustafa Kemal, doğu Trakya konusunda istediklerini elde edince öteki sorunların konferansa bırakılabileceğini söylemiş. Yunanlıların doğu Trakya'dan çıkarılmaları gerektiğini vurgulamış.	
		<i>Lord Curzon:</i> Tasarım Fransız kabinesine sunulsun. Müttefiklerin ortak bir nota üzerinde anlaşmaları esastır.	
		<i>M. Poincaré:</i> Trakya konusunda Türkiye'ye odun verilmezse ortak nota olamaz.	
		Toplantı ertelendi, kısa bir basın bildirisi kabul edildi.	
Ek.		ANKARA HÜKÜMETİNE YAPILACAK ÇAĞRI TASARISI İNGİLİZ TASARISI	510
		Müttefikler, Venedik'e veya bir başka yere tam yetkili bir temsilcisini göndermesi için Mustafa Kemal'e çağrıda bulunurlar. Konferansın amacı kesin barış yapmak olacaktır.	
		Müttefikler, Ankara Hükümetinin Trakya konusundaki isteklerini hayırhahlıkla incelemeğe hazırdu- lar. Barış antlaşması yürürlüğe girince askerlerini	

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		İstanbul'dan çekeceklerdir. Doğu Trakya'daki Yunan askerinin, belirlenecek bir çizginin gerisine çekilmesi için nüfuzlarını kullanacaklardır. Konferans boyunca Ankara Hükümeti tarafsız bölgeye girmeyecek ve Marmara'yı geçmeyecektir. Generaller Mudanya'da veya İzmit'te toplanacaklardır.	
243	22 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ HARDİNGE'DEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA TEL NO. 472 512	
		Lord Curzon'dan: Benzeri görülmemiş bir toplantıdan dönüyorum. Trakya konusunda konuşmağa başlamıştım ki, Poincaré parladı. Meriç sınırının Mustafa Kemal'e derhal vadedilmesini istedi. Onbeş dakika bağırıp çağırdı. Sözlerimi ağzıma taktı. Salonu terkettim. Poincaré arkamdan gelip özür diledi. Yarın saat sonra salona döndüm. Poincaré, Mustafa Kemal'e boyun eğmemizi öngören teklifini yineledi. Savaş öncesi sınırların Türkiye'ye geri verilmesini istedi. Yeniden çıkmaza girmek üzeriydik ki, önceden hazırladığım bir formülü ortaya attım. Poincaré Hükümetine danışacağını bildirdi. Ortak bir konferans çağrısı sağlamak için elinden geleni yapıyorum. Zaman kazandık. Störza da konferans çağrımızda Meriç ve Edirne'den açıkça söz etmemizi istedi. Ödün vermiyorum. Hükümetin kararını bekliyorum.	
244	22 Eylül	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ RAPORU NO. 887. GİZLİ 514	
		Yakın Doğu bunalımı: Fransa'nın ve Rusya'nın tutumları. Mustafa Kemal, Boğazlar ve İstanbul üstüne yürümek istiyor. Rauf Bey ise diplomatik yolu yeğliyor ve konferansa Fransız desteğine güveniyor. Henüz kesin karar verilmemiş. Savaş çıkarsa Fransa'nın İngiltere'ye yardım etmeyeceği Ankara'ya duyurulmuş. Ruslar, Türkleri yüreklendiriyorlar. Türklerle yardım amacıyla Kafkas Rus ordusu güçlendirilmiş. Ankara, Romanya'ya karşı harekât konusunda Ukrayna ile temasa geçmiş. Henüz cevap alamamış ve o yüzden şimdilik Boğazlara karşı harekete geçilmemiş.	

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245	23 Eylül	<p>FRANSA BAŞBAKANI, İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI VE İTALYA'NIN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ ARASINDA, FRANSA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA YAPILAN TOPLANTININ İNGİLİZ SEKRETERİNCE KALEME ALINAN TUTANAĞI DÖRDÜNCÜ OTURUM 517</p> <p><i>M. Poincaré:</i> İstanbul'u savunmak için İngiltere'nin Sırbistan'dan ve Romanya'dan asker istemiş olması pek vahimdir. Önce konferans çağrısına Mustafa Kemal'in vereceği cevabı beklemek gerekirdi.</p> <p><i>Lord Curzon:</i> Amaç, müttefiklerin birliğini göstermektir. Bu birlik Mustafa Kemal'i etkileyecektir. Sırp ve Romen birlikleri henüz gönderilmiş değildir.</p> <p><i>Kon. Sforza:</i> Karar, Sırp ve Romen Hükümetlerindir.</p> <p><i>Lord Curzon:</i> Niyetimiz, Türkleri kışkırtmak değil, durdurmaktır. Müttefikler birlik içinde olurlarsa silaha başvurmağa gerek kalmaz.</p> <p><i>M. Poincaré:</i> Şimdi Mustafa Kemal'e yapılacak konferans çağrısı konusuna geçiyorum. Genellikle İngiliz tasarısına katılıyorum. Yalnız Trakya sınırını daha kesin belirtmek gerek.</p> <p><i>Lord Curzon:</i> Metin okunsun, hangi noktalarda değişiklik isteniyor, görelim. Yalnız üç müttefikin bir ortak nota göndermeleri önemlidir.</p> <p><i>M. Poincaré:</i> Trakya sınırından başka her konuda pazarlık yapabilirim. Meriç ve Edirne'den söz etmeyecekse ortak notanın yararı yoktur.</p> <p><i>Lord Curzon:</i> Bu ödün verilirse Türkler duracaklar ve konferansa katılacaklar mı? Poincaré güvence verebilir mi?</p> <p><i>M. Poincaré:</i> Böyle bir güvence veremem. Ama bu ödün kendisine verilmezse Mustafa Kemal konferansa katılmayacaktır.</p> <p><i>Lord Curzon:</i> Ortak bir nota gönderebilmemizi sağlamak için, ödün vermeğe, Meriç ve Edirne'den söz etmeğe razı oluyorum. Yalnız Misak-ı Milli'den söz etmeyelim. Çünkü bunda Meriç sınırından başka Batı Trakya'nın özerkliği de söz konusu ediliyor. Franklin-Bouillon da müttefik notasındakilerden fazlasını Türklerle vadetmesin.</p>	

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		<i>M. Poincaré:</i> Etmeyecek. Yazılı talimat verdim. Mustafa Kemal'i yatıştırmağa, konferansa katılmasını sağlamağa çalışacak. (Notanın fransızca metni kabul edildi. Lord Curzon'un önerisi üzerine notanın örneğinin Yunanistan'a, Sırbistan'a ve Romanya'ya da verilmesi kararlaştırıldı.)	
Ek.	23 Eylül	CURZON, POINCARE, SFORZA İMZASIYLA ANKARA HÜKÜMETİNE GÖNDERİLEN NOTA 525 Üç müttefik Hükümet, Venedik'te veya başka yerde toplanacak konferansa tam yetkili temsilci gönderip göndermeyeceğini bildirmesini Ankara Hükümetinden rica ederler. Konferansın amacı, kesin barış antlaşmasını yapmak olacaktır. Üç müttefik Hükümet, Türkiye'nin Meriç'e ve Edirne'ye kadar Trakya'yı geri almak arzusunu olumlu karşıladıklarını beyan ederler. Barış antlaşması yürürlüğe girer girmez askerlerini İstanbul'dan çekmeleri yolundaki güvencelerini yinelerler. Konferanstan önce Yunan askerinin saptanacak belli bir hattın gerisine çekilmesi için nüfuzlarını kullanacaklardır. Söz konusu çizgiyi saptamak üzere, Mustafa Kemal ile müttefik generaller arasında Mudanya'da veya İzmit'te bir konferans hemen toplanabilecektir.	
246	23 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'DEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 476 526 Üç müttefik temsilcinin bu gece Ankara Hükümetine gönderdikleri notanın İngilizcesi aşağıdadır. (Bkz. No. 245'e ek)	
247	23 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'DEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA TYRELL'E TEL. 527 Lord Curzon'dan İngiliz kabinesine: Toplantımız dört saat sürdü ve bir ortak notanın kabulüyle sonuçlandı. Meriç ile Bulgar sınırı arasındaki toprak dilimini Yunanistan'a kazandırdım. Yunan askerinin çekileceği çizgiyi kesin biçimde belirtmekten kaçındım, böylece müttefik komutanlar Mudanya'da hareket serbestliği kazanmış oldular. Kemalistlere empoze edilen şartlar ise	

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		açık biçimde belirtildi ve kendilerine kaçamak yapabilecekleri bir boşluk bırakılmadı. M. Poincaré rahatladı. Sforza hiç yardımcı olmadı ve Fransızların gölgesi gibi kaldı. Notanın Sırp ve Yugoslav hükümetlerine iletlenmesi de kabul edildi. Yarın dönüyorum ve kabineye bilgi vereceğim. Lord Hardinge bana değerli yardımında bulundu.	
248	23 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 430. ÇOK İVEDİ GİZLİ Amiral Brock, Kemalistlerin Avrupa kıyasına geçmelerini önlemek amacıyla bütün gemileri Boğazdan uzaklaştırmak için aldığı talimatı gösterdi. Bütün gemileri Boğazdan uzaklaştırmak güçtür ve bunun İstanbul'a etkisini gözönünde tutmamız gerekir. Harington, bunun şimdilik yapılmaması düşüncesindedir. Ben de bu talimatın tam uygulanmasının pek güç olacağını düşünüyorum. Haliç'te gemileri toptan yoketmek ise tehlikelidir. Burada durum saatbaş değıştiğinden gelişmelere göre bize tam hareket serbestliği verilmesini dilerim.	528
249	23 Eylül	KOLONİLER BAKANİ CHURCHILL'DEN İNGİLİZ KABİNESİNE. C.P. 4200. GİZLİ Türk-Yunan savaşı ve Dominyonlarla işbirliği. 1. <i>Koloniler Bakanından Kanada, Arasturalya, Yeni Zelanda ve Güney Afrika Birliği Genel Valilerine Tel. 15.9.1922</i> (Benzer bir tel, 17.9.1922 günü Newfoundland'a da çekilmiştir.) Gizli. Başbakandan Başbakanımıza. Kabine, Avrupa'ya yapılacak Türk saldırısına, Mustafa Kemal'in İstanbul'dan müttefikleri atmasına karşı koymağa ve Gelibolu yarımadasını elde tutmağa karar verdi. Fransa ve İtalya bizimle beraber. Boğazları savunmak için Yunan, Romen ve Sırp Hükümetlerinin de askeri yardımını sağlayabileceğimizi umuyoruz. Yenilgimiz Hindistan'da ve öteki müslümanlar arasında vahim sonuçlar yaratır. Hükümetinizin bir askeri birlik gönderip gönderemeyeceğini bilmek istiyorum.	530

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2.		<i>Yeni Zelanda Genel Valisinden Koloniler Bakanına Tel. 16.9.1922</i> 532 Yeni Zelanda bir askeri birlik gönderecektir.	
3.		<i>Yeni Zelanda Genel Valisinden Koloniler Bakanına Tel. 16.9.1922</i> 532 Küçük bir birlik gönderildikten sonra takviye de isteniyor mu?	
4.		<i>Yeni Zelanda Genel Valisinden Koloniler Bakanına Tel. 20.9.1922</i> 532 Temsilciler Meclisi asker gönderilmesini kabul etti. 5000'den fazla gönüllü yazıldı.	
5.		<i>Koloniler Bakanından Yeni Zelanda Genel Valisine Tel. 19.9.1922</i> 532 Telgrafınız Savunma Bakanlığına iletilti. Cömertçe cevabınıza kabinedeki arkadaşlarımla birlikte pek uygulandık.	
6.		<i>Newfoundland'dan Koloniler Bakanına Tel. 18.9.1922</i> 533 Newfoundland yardıma hazırdır.	
7.		<i>Koloniler Bakanından Newfoundland'e Tel. 19.9.1922</i> 533 Cevabınız bizi duygulandırdı.	
8.		<i>Güney Afrika Birliği Genel Valisinden Koloniler Bakanına Tel. 18.9.1922. Gizli</i> 533 General Smiths burada değil. Ayrıca cevap verilecek.	
9.		<i>Güney Afrika Birliği Genel Valisinden Koloniler Bakanına Tel. 19.9.1922</i> 533 Başbakanın burada bulunmaması yüzünden cevabımız gecikiyor.	
10.		<i>Koloniler Bakanından Avustralya ve Yeni Zelanda Genel Valilerine. Tel. 18.9.1922</i> 534 Cevabınız bizi duygulandırdı.	
11.		<i>Kanada Genel Valisinden Koloniler Bakanına Tel. 18.9.1922</i> <i>Gizli</i> 534 Başbakan'dan Başbakanınıza: Asker isteyen gizli telgrafınızın içeriği bize ulaşmadan önce basında yayınlandı. Pek güç durumda kaldık. Telgrafınızı açıklayabilir miyim? Parlamento resmi yazışmamızın örneklerini istiyecek. Verebilir miyim?	
12.		<i>Kanada Genel Valisinden Koloniler Bakanına Tel. 19.9.1922</i> <i>Gizli</i> 534	

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		Asker gönderme konusu hükümetçe inceleniyor. Kamuyu, Parlamentodan yetki alınmasını isteyecek.	
13.		<i>Kanada Genel Valisinden Koloniler Bakanına Tel.</i> 19.9.1922 535	
		Kabine hergün toplanıyor ve haber bekliyoruz.	
14.		<i>Koloniler Bakanından Kanada Genel Valisine Tel.</i> 18.9.1922 535	
		Başbakanın telgrafı aynen yayınlanamaz. Gerektiğinde Parlamente'ye sunmanız için Başbakan adına yeni bir telgraf gönderiyorum. Ciddi bir savaş ihtimali yok. Ama Kemalistlerin Boğazlardan geçmelerini önlemek gerek. İmparatorluk dayanışmasına katkınız pek makbule geçecek. Bir birlik göndermeniz yetecek.	
15.		<i>Koloniler Bakanından Kanada Genel Valisine Tel.</i> 18.9.1922 536	
		Başbakan'dan Başbakanınıza, yayınlanmak üzere gönderilen tel aşağıdadır: Mustafa Kemal'in Avrupa'ya saldırması ihtimali karşısında Hükümetimiz, İstanbul'u ve Boğazları savunmağa ve Gelibolu yarımadasını elde tutmağa karar verdi. Tarafsız bölgeyi ihlâl etmemesi Mustafa Kemal'e duyuruldu. General Harington'a takviye gönderiliyor. Majesteleri Hükümeti, Kanada'nın da bir birlik göndereceğini umuyor.	
16.		<i>Koloniler Bakanından Kanada Genel Valisine Tel.</i> 19.9.1922 536	
		Şu sırada Kanada'nın tutumu büyük önem taşıyor. Asker göndermek için belki parlamente'ye toplamanız gerekmez. Kanada'nın imparatorluğun yanında olduğu yolunda bir açıklama, barış korumağa yardımcı olacak.	
17.		<i>Australya Genel Valisinden Koloniler Bakanına Tel.</i> 20.9.1922 537	
		Başbakanınızdan Başbakanınıza tel. Telgrafınız, içeriği basında yayımlandıktan sonra bize ulaştı. Bu, pek vahim ve üzücü bir durumdur. Bizi bu durumda bırakmak doğru değildir. İmparatorluğun bir savaş eşiğinde bulunduğu bize hiç bildirilmemişti. İngiliz kabinesinin Kemalistlere karşı harekete geçme kararı bize bir yıldırım darbesi oldu. Kemalistlerin	

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hangi hareketinin buna neden olduğu şimdi bile bize söylenmiyor da bizden asker isteniyor ve Hükümetimiz, savaşla barış arasında karar vermek gibi pek güç bir durumla karşı karşıya bırakılıyor. Bir karar vermeden önce İngiltere'nin Dominyonlara danışması gerekir. İmparatorluk ya bölünmez bir bütündür, ya da bir hiçtir. İngiltere kendi başına karar verir ve ondan sonra bizden asker isterse, o zaman Dominyonların da İmparatorluk kararlarında payı bulunduğu sözleri havada kalır.

Avustralya halkı, savaştan bıkmış usanmıştır. Hayati ulusal çıkarlar tehlikeye girmedikçe savaşı bir cinayet saymaktadır. Boğazların önemini, Çanakkale'deki ANZAK mezarlarının kutsallığını biliyor, ama Kral Konstantinin açgözlü emellerine hiç sempati duymuyor ve müttefiklerin Yunanlıları neden zamanında frenlemediklerini anlayamıyor. Milletler Cemiyeti ne yapıyor diye kendi kendisine soruyor.

İmparatorluğun birliğine inandığı için, herşeye rağmen Avustralya, Boğazların korunması ve Gelibolu yarımadasının elde tutulması için İngiltere ile işbirliği yapacaktır. Ama önce İngiltere'nin ve müttefiklerin Türkiye politikalarını açık-seçik bilmek istiyoruz. Kral Konstantin'in emelleri için tek bir askerimizi tehlikeye atamayız. Uğrunda savaşacağımız dava haklı değilse savaşa fiilen katılmayacağız. Türkiye'ye karşı haksızlık edilmesine Avustralya taraf olmayacaktır. Türkiye'nin haklı isteklerine cevap için Sévres antlaşması ne ölçüde değiştirilecek? Değiştirilecekse hemen değiştirilmeli ve savaştan kaçınmak için herşey yapılmalıdır. İmparatorluk savaşa sürüklenmemeli. Dominyonlar haksız bir savaşa katılmağa çağırılmamalı. Haklı bir dava uğruna hepimiz can vermeğe hazırız, haksız bir dava için ise tek bir insan harcamayız. Nereye gittiğimizi bilmek zorundayız.

18. *Koloniler Bakanı Churchill'den Kanada, Avustralya, Yeni Zelanda, Güney Afrika Birliği Genel Valilerine, Newfoundland Hükümetine ve Irak Yüksek Komiserine Tel. 20.9.1922. 540*

No	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Durum şudur: Anadolu'nun Yunanlılarca boşaltılması tamamlandı. Geriye, Boğazlar, Avrupa Türkiye'si ve İstanbul sorunlarının çözümü kaldı. İngiltere Hükümeti şu görüştedir:	
		1. Gelibolu yarımadası ve Boğazlar güvence altına alınmalıdır.	
		2. Antlaşmalar konferansta değiştirilmelidir, kuvvet yoluyla değil.	
		3. Mustafa Kemal 1918 mütarekesine ve tarafsız bölgeye saygı göstermelidir. Göstermezse kendisine kuvvetle karşı koyulacaktır. Kendisinden henüz bir cevap alınmamıştır.	
		Çanakkale bölgesinde kuvvetlerimiz takviye ediliyor. Bize meydan okuyacak Türk kuvvetlerine karşı konacaktır. Bu bakımdan Dominyonların desteği ve gerektiğinde asker göndermeleri bizim için pek değerli olacaktır. Fransızların tutumu tatmin edici değil. Çanakkale'yi ikinci bir Cebelitarık yapacağımızdan korkuyorlar. Lord Curzon Fransız Hükümetiyle görüşmek üzere Paris'e gitti. Balkan müttefiklerimiz de Türklerin Avrupa'ya dönmelerine karşıdır. Türklerin tarafsız bölgeye saygı göstermelerini isterken, yeni istekler ileri sürmüyoruz ve barışı engellemiyoruz. Tersine, zayıf olursak müslümanlar arasında yaygın karışıklıklar çıkar. Mustafa Kemal ile başedebilecek durumdayız. Arzumuz, azimli davranışımızla savaşı önlemektir. Bu bakımdan Dominyonların asker gönderme vaatleri pek değerlidir.	
250	23 Eylül	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI NO. 6152/6137 (M. 1.2) GİZLİ Harington'un yazısı ve eki ilişiktir.	542
Ek. 1	19 Ağustos	TÜRKİYE'DE MÜTTEFİK İŞGAL ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARRINGTON'DAN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA YAZI KİŞİYE ÖZEL 142 Padişah'tan alınan yazıyı ilişikte sunuyorum. Yazı üzerine hiçbir işlem yapmadım.	542
Ek. 2	7 Ağustos	PRENS SAMİ BEYDEN ALBAY GRIBBON'A SÖZLÜ MESAJ Padişah şu mesajı General Harington'a iletmemi	543

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		emretti: "Ben, Padişah ve halifeyim. Padişah olarak Osmanlı ordusu Başkomutanıyım. Bir bunalım çıkarsa müttefik işgal kuvvetleri başkomutanı ile beraber olmam doğaldır ve böyle bir kriz anında Genel karargahımın nerede olacağını bildirmesini General Harington'dan rica ederim."	
251	23 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN VAŞİNGTON BÜYÜKELÇİSİ GEDDES' DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 372	543
		Amaçlarımızın açıklanması pek iyi etki yarattı ve kamuoyu bizden yana dönmektedir. Bizi en çok eleştiren "New York World" bile Mustafa Kemal'i durdurmanın önemini vurguluyor.	
252	23 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ GRAHAM'DAN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'E TEL. NO. 287	544
		İtalya Dışişleri Bakanı, Fransa ile birlikte Mustafa Kemal'e öğütlerde bulunduklarını, savaş çıkmayacağını umduklarını söyledi ve tehlikeli noktanın Trakya olduğunu ekledi. Bakan, İzmir göçmenleri için elinden geleni yapacağını, bunalımın barış yoluyla çözümü için İtalyan desteğine güvenebileceğimizi de söyledi.	
253	24 Eylül	SIR. H. HANKEY'DEN CENEVRE'DE LORD BALFOUR'A TEL. NO. 61	544
		Dominyon delegelerinin bilgisine: Bugünün en önemli haberi Mustafa Kemal'e yapılan çağrıdır. Üç devlet, bir formül üzerinde güçlkle anlaşabildi. Mustafa Kemal'in cevabının ne olacağı henüz kestirilemiyor. Çanakkale'de askeri durumumuz daha sağlam. Türk süvarisi Çanakkale yakınında. Fransız ve İtalyan askerleri geri çekildiler. İstanbul içindeki durum da kaygı verici. Fransa'nın tutumu yüzünden Romanya asker göndermeğe karar veremiyor. Sırbistan'ın tutumu da kaçamaklı. Yunanistan İngiltere'ye yardım vadetti. Barışçı çözüm arzuladığımız bildirildi.	
254	24 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 479	545

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Ankara'ya yapılan ortak çağırışı Fransız basını sevinçle karşıladı. Sizin (Curzon'un) uzlaşıcı tutumunuz övülüyor. Lloyd George'un ters demeci eleştiriliyor. "Temps" halâ güçlükler bulunduğunu belirtiyor, ama iyimser ve bize karşı dostça. "Journal des Débats" Türkiye'nin eskisinden daha güçlü olacağına üzüntüyle değiniyor.	
255	24 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA GENERAL HARRINGTON'DAN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. 2430 GİZLİ Mustafa Kemal'e gönderilen notayı gördüm. Mudanya'ya veya İzmit'e gideceğim. Hazırlıklarımızı da gizlemeyelim, çünkü Türkler yalnız kuvvet gösterisinden anlar.	546
256	25 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 461 2000 kişilik bir Türk süvari kuvveti Erenköy'de görüldü. Bunları tarafsız bölgeden geri çekmesini Mustafa Kemal'e duyuruyoruz. Yoksa Harrington bunları geri çevirecek.	546
257	25 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. İVEDİ. GİZLİ. KİŞİYE ÖZEL. Nihat Reşad'la görüşüldü. Konferans çağırısını Mustafa Kemal'in kabul edeceğini söyledi. Franklin-Bouillon'un İngiliz çıkarları için tehlikeli olduğunu belirtti ve güvenilir bir kişiyi İzmir'e göndermemizi telkin etti. Kendisi Londra'ya geçmek istiyor. Onunla görüşseniz iyi olur. (Bkz. No. 264)	547
258	25 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 480 Franklin-Bouillon'un, Mustafa Kemal ile görüşmek üzere İzmir'e hareket ettiğini duyuran bir bildiri "Temps" gazetesinde yayımlandı	548
259	25 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN VAŞİNGTON BÜYÜKELÇİSİ GEDDES'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 375 Mustafa Kemal'e gönderilen ortak notaya İngiltere'nin katılmış olması, Amerikan gazetelerince	548

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Fransa'nın diplomatik zaferi gibi görülüyor. Türklerin Avrupa'ya geri dönmeleri üzüntüyle karşılanıyor.	
260	25 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 840.	549
		İzzet Paşa'yla görüştüm. İstanbul'da sükûnun korunmasını, Rumlarla Ermenilerin tutuklanmamasını istedim. İlgilenmeye söz verdi. İstanbul'da 20.000 kadar silahlı Türk var sanıyoruz. Patrik de 20.000 silahlı Rumu emrimize verebileceğini yazıyla bildirdi. İzzet Paşa, İstanbul'da 300 polis ile 300 jandarma bulunduğunu söyledi.	
		İzzet Paşa'ya göre, Padişah nâzik bir durumdadır. Mustafa Kemal, Osmanlı hanedanını devirip yeni bir hanedan kurabilir.	
261	25 Eylül	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ RAPORU. NO. 892. GİZLİ.	550
		Yakın Doğu bunalımı: Sovyet Hükümeti, Ankara'yı desteklemek üzere askeri ve diplomatik önlemler düşünüyor. Troçki ve Buharin, doğu Avrupa'ya karşı askeri harekât istiyorlar; Çiçerin bu fikre karşı çıkıyor. Henüz kesin bir karar verilmiş değil. Ama askeri hazırlıklar sürüyor.	
		Kemalistler, motorlarla Zonguldak'tan Trakya'ya asker taşıyorlar.	
262	25 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN SARAYBOSNA KONSOLOSUNDAN BELGRAD ELÇİSİ YOUNG'A YAZI. NO. 14.	551
		Anadolu olaylarıyla ilgili gazete kesitlerini sunuyorum. Yerel basın Mustafa Kemal'in zaferini alkışlarken İngiltere'ye küfür savuruyor. "Hrvatska Sloga", "Mustafa Kemal'in zaferi gerçeğin kötülüğe, hukukun haksızlığa zaferidir" diyor. "Naša Pravda" ise Lloyd George'a "İslam dünyasının kanlı düşmanı" diyor.	
Ek. 1	15 Eylül	HÜKÜMETE MUHALİF HIRVAT KÖYLÜ PARTİSİ ORGANI "HIRVATSKA SLOGA" GAZETESİNİN YAZISI: "Mustafa Kemal'in Amaçları:"	552
		Türk sorunu, şimdi Yunanistan'dan ziyade İngiltere	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		için önem taşıyor. İngiltere Çanakkale'den çekilirse prestij kaybedecek, çekilmezse savaşa neden olacak, bu da Asya kolonilerini sarsacak.	
Ek. 2	15 Eylül	HÜKÜMET YANLISI "YUGOSLAVENSKİ LIST" GAZETESİNİN YAZISI "Avrupa diplomasisinin başarısızlığı" Türk zaferi, ulusların kaderinin masa başında kararlaştırılmayacağını gösterdi ve İngiliz diplomasisine bir darbe oldu. Mucize: hasta adam diriliyor. Türk sorunu hakça çözümlenecek. Haçlı savaşlarından beri Avrupa, Türkiye'yi hiçbir zaman rahat bırakmamıştır. Sonra Avrupa'nın amacı Türk'ü Asya'ya itmek oldu. Türk milli uyanışına karşı da İngiltere, Yunanlığı destekledi. Yeni bir Bizans'ın Rusya'ya ve Türkiye'ye karşı İngiliz çıkarlarını koruyacağını umdu.	552
Ek. 3	14 Eylül	HÜKÜMET YANLISI TÜRK PARTİSİ ORGANI "İRŞAD" GAZETESİNİN YAZISI: "Yunanlıların tam yenilgisi:" Türk ordusu, Anadolu'da İngiliz-Yunan saldırısını yenilgiye uğrattı. Bütün İslam ülkeleri Ankara'ya kutlama telgrafları çektiler. Bazıları kurtuluş çağrısında bulunuyor.	553
Ek. 4	16 Eylül	HÜKÜMET YANLISI MÜSLÜMAN PARTİSİ ORGANI "İRŞAD" GAZETESİ YAZISI Kibirli İngiliz için zor günler görünüyor. İngiltere, Türkleri yeryüzünden silmek için elinden geleni ardına koymuyordu. Lloyd George 1919'da Yunanlıları Anadolu'ya çıkardı. Türklere karşı saldırganlığını sürdürdü. Bunun sonucu Hindistan'da kanlı ayaklanmalar patlak verdi. Başka yerlerde de güçlükler başgösterdi. Yüzyıldır İngiltere Türkiye'nin kuyusunu kazıyordu, şimdi kazdığı kuyuya kendisi düşecek gibi.	554
Ek. 5	16 Eylül	HÜKÜMETE MUHALİF MÜSLÜMAN PARTİSİ ORGANI "NAŠA PRAVDA" NIN YAZISI "İslamın büyük zaferi". Kemal Paşa, Avrupa diplomatlarının çözemediği sorunu çözdü. Yunanistan ve İslamın kanlı düşmanı	555

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Ökû	Sayfa
		Lloyd George, şimdî Türkiye'nin büyük kurtarıcısı önünde dize geliyorlar.	
263	26 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DENİZ BAKANLIĞINDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI M. 01283 İVEDİ 556	556
		Mustafa Kemal ile yazışmalar konusunda Akdeniz Başkomutanlığından alınan yazı ile ekleri ilişiktir.	
Ek. 1	16 Eylül	AMİRAL DE BROCK'TAN DENİZ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI NO. 1901/742 556	556
		Mustafa Kemal ile yaptığım yazışma konusunda Yüksek Komisere gönderdiğim yazı ve ekleri ilişiktir.	
Ek. 2	14 Eylül	AMİRAL DE BROCK'TAN İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİNE YAZI NO. 742 557	557
		(Bkz. No. 179).	
Ek. 3	13 Eylül	MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'DAN AMİRAL BROCK'A MEKTUP ÖZEL 557	557
		(Bkz. No. 179'a ek)	
264	26 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'E TEL. NO. 326 İVEDİ 557	557
		(İlgi: No. 257).	
		Nihad Reşad'ın Londra'ya gelmesi uygun. Mustafa Kemal'e birisini göndermemiz ise uygun değil.	
265	26 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 481 557	557
		M. Poincaré, Pellé'ye ve Dumesnil'e talimat yolluyor. Askerini tarafsız bölgeden geri çekmesi için Mustafa Kemal nezdinde girişimde bulunacaklar. Poincaré ayrıca Anadolu kıyısında müttefik askeri bulunduranın sakıncalı olduğu görüşünü size iletmemi istedi. (Bkz. No. 266)	
266	26 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 482 558	558
		(İlgi: No. 265)	
		Poincaré'nin söyledikleri pek haksız değil. Harington ile Mustafa Kemal arasında her iki tarafın da tarafsız bölgede asker bulundurmayaacağı yolunda bir anlaşma yapılırsa tehlike savuşturulmuş olur.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
267	26 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 481 Pellé, Hamid Beyi görmüş. Tarafsız bölgeden askerini çekmesi için Mustafa Kemal'e mesaj iletilmiş. Quai d'Orsay'de Fethi Bey'e de aynı şeyler söylenmiş. Fethi Bey bölgeye İngiliz takviyesi gönderilmesinden yakınmış.	559
268	26 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARRINGTON'DAN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 2463. ÇOK GİZLİ Hamid Bey'den Mustafa Kemal'e tel: General Pellé, 2000 süvarimizin Erenköy'den geri çekilmesini rica etti.	559
269	26 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ ORDULARI KARARGÂHINDAN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 2464. ÇOK GİZLİ .. Aralov'dan Moskova'ya tel: Rıza Nur, tarafsız bölgenin işgaline gizlice karar verildiğini söyledi.	560
270	27 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI GÖREVLİLERİN-DEN HAROLD NICOLSON'UN KALEME ALDIĞI NOT ... Osmanlı Bankasının Fransız direktörleri Mustafa Kemal'e hemen kredi vermek istiyorlar. İngiliz direktörler henüz kendilerini bağlamadılar, ama banka imtiyazının 1925'te yenileneceğini gözönünde tutarak Türkleri kızdırmamak istiyorlar. Yakında bir karar vermek durumundadırlar. Maliye Bakanlığı barış antlaşmasına yeni mali hükümler koydurmak niyetinde. Karar vermeden önce Maliye Bakanlığıyla görüşmelerini Banka yetkilerine salık verelim. Uygundur.	560
271	27 Eylül	İNGİLİZ BAKANLARINDAN HAZILARININ KOLONİLER BAKANLIĞINDA YAPTIKLARI TOPLANTININ TUTA-NAĞI GİZLİ Yakın Doğuda askeri durum. Genelkurmay Başkanı: Harrington'un telgraflarını okuyorum: Çanakkale, büyük çıkarma yapmamıza elverişli değil. Mustafa Kemal saldıracak. İki-üç hafta dayanabiliriz. Mustafa Kemal, toplar getirip takviye	561

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
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kuvveti çıkartmamızı engelleyebilir. İngiliz ve Türk kuvvetlerinin tarafsız bölgeden çekilmeleri için anlaşmaya varılırsa lehimize olur.

Chamberlain: Çanakkale'den çekilmemiz Britanya imparatorluğunu küçük düşürür.

Churchill: Chamberlain'e katılıyorum.

Genelkurmay Başkanı: Halen Çanakkale'de 3.500 askerimiz var. Türklerin ise 23.000 kadar.

Deniz Bakanı: Hemen çekilmekten kaçınalım. Yoksa prestijimiz sarsılır. Donanma, takviye kuvvetleri çıkartmamıza destek sağlar. Çanakkale düşerse, donanma savaş gemilerine boğazı açık tutar, salimen çekilme sağlanır.

Churchill: Mustafa Kemal'in toptarını gözümüzde büyütmeylem. Evet sahra toptarı var, ama mermisi kıt. Gerekirse Bulayır'a çıkartma yaparız. Yani Çanakkale'ye takviye göndermek pek güç olmaz. Harington da İstanbul'dan Çanakkale'ye asker gönderebilir.

Genelkurmay Başkanı: 7-15 Ekim arasında takviye gönderilecek. 23 Ekim - 7 Kasım arasında yeniden gönderilebilecektir. Çanakkale'ye hakim iki tepeyi elde tutup tutamayacağı Harington'dan sorulacak.

272 27 Eylül

İNGİLİZ BAKANLAR KURULU TOPLANTISI TUTANAĞI.
GİZLİ 565

Yakın Doğuda durum:

Chamberlain: Bugün öğleden sonra küçük bir toplantı yaptık. Harington'un telgraflarını gözden geçirdik. Mustafa Kemal'le temasta olduğunu bildiriyor. Lord Curzon, Çanakkale'nin büyük çıkartmaya elverişli olmadığını bildirdi. Üç-dört hafta tutunabileceğiz. Donanma destek sağlayabilecek. Çanakkale'de bizim 3.500, Türklerin ise 23.000 askeri var. Tepeleri tutup tutamayacağımız Harington'dan soruldu.

Deniz Bakanı: Bölgeye hava takviyesi yetiştirildi.

Başbakan: Mustafa Kemal'in telgrafı, pek beklenmedik bir cevap değil. Daha çok Yunanlılardan yakınıyor.

Savunma Bakanı: Orada bol bol cephanemiz var.

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Kolomiler Bakanı: Bizim için en önemlisi Gelibolu yarımadasıdır. Sonra Çanakkale, daha sonra da İstanbul, sonuncu sırada da İzmit yarımadası gelir.	
273	26/27 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ KUVVETLERİ BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARRINGTON'DAN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 2468	568
		Süvarisini Lâpseki ve Erenköy'den çekmesini Mustafa Kemal'den istedim. Albay Shuttleworth da bir ultimatom verdi ve yarın sabah silah kullanmak zorunda kalacağım bildirdi. Mustafa Kemal'e 48 saatlik süre tanıyacığım.	
		Mustafa Kemal, Çanakkale'ye saldırmak için 23.000 asker getirebilir. Çetin bir direniş gösterebilirim. Ciddi olarak kapişmadan önce bana takviye gönderilip gönderilemeyeceğini bilmek istiyorum. Mustafa Kemal'in ciddi saldırıya geçmeyeceğini sanıyorum. İlk ateş etmeye beni zorlamağa çalışıyor. Bundan kaçınıyorum, ama bizi muhasara etmesine ve boğazlara toplar yerleştirmesine göz yumamam.	
274	27 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA GENERAL HARRINGTON'DAN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. 1221	569
		Dün Mustafa Kemal'e çektiğim telgraf: Kuvvetlerinizi zı tarafsız bölgeden çekmenizi rica ederim.	
275	27 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA GENERAL HARRINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. 1222	569
		Mustafa Kemal'den bugün şu telgrafi aldım: "Aramızda bir tarafsız bölge bulunduğundan haberim yoktu. Birliklerimiz Yunan ordusunu kovalıyor. Olay çıkartmaktan kaçınıyoruz. Yunan uçakları Ezine civarında uçtu. Yunan donanması İstanbul'da demirledi. Çanakkale'deki silah ve cephane depolarımız İngilizlerce imha ediliyor ve birliklerimizin yakınında top atışları yapıyor. Boğazların serbestliğini kabul ediyoruz. Yanlış anlaşılmaya meydan verilmemesini dilerim".	
276	27 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 466	570

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		Mustafa Kemal'in cevabı hiç tatmin edici değil. Harington onun argümanlarını çürütecek yolda bir karşılık verecek. İki general yüzyüze konuşalar iyi sonuç alınabilir, kanundayım.	
277	27 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 468, GİZLİ, ÇOK İVEDİ Pellé'ye göre, müttefiklerin telgrafı yumuşama yarattı. Mustafa Kemal, Franklin-Bouillon'u beklediği için cevabı geciktiriyor.	571
278	27 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 469 Mudanya'ya gidecek generallere ne gibi talimat verileceğini görüştük. Generaller, Meriç gerisine çekilmenin ve doğu Trakya'da Türk yönetimi kurulmasının en pratik çözüm olacağı görüşünde. Generallere verilecek yetkiyi Hükümetlerimizden soruyoruz.	571
279	27 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LINDLEY'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 496 İhtilâl hareketi Trakya cephesini güçlendirmeyi amaçlıyor. Konferans çağrısını Mustafa Kemal'in olduğu gibi kabul edeceği sanılmıyor.	572
280	28 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 480 Çanakkale'de durum: Türkler, tarafsız bölgeye aldırıyorlar. İngiliz askeri makamları kendilerini zor tutuyorlar. Pellé, Franklin-Bouillon'a telgraf çekiyor. Dumesnil, Mustafa Kemal'le görüşmüş. Kemal, İngiliz askeri tarafsız bölgeden çekilirse Türk askeri de çekilir demiş	573
281	28 Eylül	İNGİLTERE BAKANLAR KURULU TOPLANTISINDA ALINAN KARARLAR VE ORTAYA ATILAN GÖRÜŞLER 1. İzmir'deki göçmenlerin taşınmalarının sağlanması ve bunlara yardım için Milletler Cemiyetine çağrıda bulunulması.	574

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		2. Mudanya konferansına bir Yunan generalinin de çağrılması kararlaştırıldı.	
		3. Yakın Doğu bunalımı konusunda bir karar verilemedi, yalnız şu görüşler ortaya atıldı: a) İngiliz çıkarları şu noktalarda toplanmaktadır: i) barışın sağlanması, ii) Boğazların serbestliği ve iii) Fransa ve İtalya ile ittifakın ayakta tutulması. b) Bu politikanın yürütülebilmesi için, gerekirse seferberlik ilân edilmesi ve Çanakkale'ye tavkiye gönderilmesi, c) Türkler Trakya'ya asker çıkarmaya çalışırlarsa, Yunanistan'ın bunu önlemesine engel olunmaması, ve d) Mudanya konferansının başarılı olmasına yardım edilmesi.	
282	28 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'A TEL. NO. 441 Kabine General Harington'un teklifini inceledi ve şu kararlara vardı: i) Harington'un Mustafa Kemal ile ikili görüşme yapması, Paris'te varılan anlaşmaya uygun düşmez, ama Hükümet Mudanya konferansının tezelden toplanmasını desteklemektedir. ii) Yunan askerinin gerisine çekileceği hat, Mudanya'da generallerce saptandıktan sonra müttefik Hükümetlerin onayına sunulacaktır ve iii) Yunanlılar Mudanya kararlarını kabul etmez ve geri çekilmezlerse Türk askerinin Trakya'ya geçmesine izin verilmesi teklifi, Paris kararlarına uygun düşmez. Türklerin Marmara'yı geçmelerine izin verilirse, Yunan donanmasının da Marmara sularını kullanmasına izin vermek gerekir. Bu ise savaşı Avrupa'ya sıçratır.	577
283	28 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'A TEL. NO. 442 Mustafa Kemal tarafsız bölgeden çekilmezse Yunan donanmasının da Marmara'yı ve Çanakkale boğazını kullanmasına izin verilecektir. Bunu Ankara'ya duyurunuz.	578

No	Tarih	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
284	28 Eylül	SIR MAURICE HANKLYDEN CENEVRE'DE LORD RALFOUR A TEL. 579 Şunları Dominyonlar Delegeletine duyurunuz: Harington, Türk askerinin tarafsız bölgeden çekilme- sini sağlamak için yoğun çaba harcıyor. Yerel İngiliz komutanı Türklere verdiği ultimatomu geri aldı. Mustafa Kemal, askerini Çanakkale'den geri çekmesi istegimize tatmin edici olmayan bir cevap verdi. Tarafsız bölgeyi tanımıyor. Yunan ordularını kova- ladığını ileri sürüyor. Müttefiklerin notasına henüz cevap vermedi ve gecikmesi, Franklin-Bouillon'u İzmir'e bekleyişi yüzündenmiş. Yunan donanması İstanbul'u terketti.	
285	28 Eylül	TÜRKİYE'DE İNGİLİZ KUVVETLERİ BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. 1223 580 Dün Mustafa Kemal'e verdiğim cevap: Tarafsız bölge üzerinde bir anlaşmazlık bulunduğu imasile ilk kez karşılaşıyorum... Tehdit ettiğiniz bölgede Yunan kuvvetleri yoktur. Yunan donanması bugün İstanbul'dan çekildi. İngilizlere yönelttiğiniz suçlamaları soruşturuyorum. Benim emrim olmadıkça birliklerinize ateş edilmeyecek. Arzum çatışmaktan kaçınmaktır. Olay ihtimallerini savuşturmanızı ye- niden önemle rica ederim. Arzu ederseniz sizinle görüşmeye hazırım. Bana gönderilen takviye barışın yararınadır. Saldırı emeli beslemediğinizi sizden duymuş olmak beni son derece ferahlatır.	
286	28 Eylül	TÜRKİYE'DE İNGİLİZ KUVVETLERİ BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. 2485 581 Mustafa Kemal'in bize saldıracağını sanmıyorum. Zayıf vermeden konferansa ulaşabilmek istiyorum. Türklerin Trakya'ya asker geçirmeleri konusu en büyük sorundur. Hukuken hakları var sanırım. Marmara'nın Trakya kıyılarıyla Yarımca-Karabiga arası tarafsız bölge değildir. Geçişleri engellenmezse tarafsız sınırları çizilemezler. Yunan ihtilâlinin ne gibi etkisi olacağını bilmiyorum.	

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287	28 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'DEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 486	582
		Fransız Hükümeti, Yunanistan olaylarının, Fransa'nın müttefikleriyle birlikte aldığı ve Mustafa Kemal'e iletilen kararları etkilemeyeceği yolunda bir bildiri yayınladı.	
288	28 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN BELGRAD ELÇİSİ YOUNG'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 413	583
		Ankara Hükümetine verilen nota örneği, Yugoslav Hükümetine iletili. Basın, Meriç'e kadar Trakya'nın Türklere bırakılmasından pek hoşnut değil. Ninçic ile görüştüm. Boğazlar bölgesine asker göndermek istediklerini, fakat Fransa'nın bir süre önce açtığı 100 milyon franklık krediyi kesebileceğinden çekindiklerini söyledi. Askerin zaten Anadolu yakasına değil, Trakya'ya gönderilmesinin tasarlandığını anladım. İsrar etmedim. Ninçic, Macarlardan ve Bulgarlardan çekindiklerini de söyledi. Mustafa Kemal'in zaferinin Yugoslav müslümanları üzerindeki etkisini sordum. Makedonya müslümanlarının ayaklanabileceklerinden kaygılandığını, Boşnaklardan kaygı duymadığını söyledi. Moskova, Boğazlar işinin Rusya'sız çözümlenemeyeceğini Yugoslavya'ya duyurmuş.	
289	28 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN BELGRAD ELÇİSİ YOUNG'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 415	585
		Edirne'nin Türklere bırakılacağı kararı Belgrad basınında düş kırıklığı yarattı, ama bunu önlemek için Yugoslavya'nın fedakârlıkta bulunmasını isteyen yok. Gazete yazıları ilişkide sunulmuştur.	
Ek. 1	23 Eylül	"DEMOKRATİJA" GAZETESİNİN YAZISI. (ÇEVİRİ)	586
		Müttefikler ve Balkanlar. İngiliz hükümetinin geçen hafta yaptığı açıklama, Türkiye'ye savaş ilanı gibi. Öyle bir savaş ki biz de içinde olacağız ve bu bize hiç haber verilmeden alınmış bir karar. Asker göndermemiz gerektiğini, "Reuter" ajansından öğreniyoruz. Bu güç durumdan çıkış yolu, Paris'te yapılmakta olan	

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		görüşmelerde bulunabilir. Bu görüşmelerde müttelikler iki gruba bölünmüşlerdir. Fransa ve İtalya, Mustafa Kemal'e karşı kuvvet kullanmak istemiyorlar, onun sözüne güveniyorlar. Ama Mustafa Kemal sözünü tutmaz da 1914 öncesi Türkiye'yi diriltmeğe kalkarsa, onu Meriç ötesine kim itecektir? İngiltere, iyiniyet sözleri ile yetinmiyor, sağlam güvenceler istiyor. Mustafa Kemal Balkanlara dönerse, bu yarımadaanın durumu kökten değişir, Balkan devletleri savunma güçlerini arttırmak zorunda kalırlar. İngiltere bunu önlemeğe çalışırken bizim çıkarlarımızı da korumuş oluyor.	
Ek. 2	27 Eylül	"DEMOKRAT" GAZETESİNİN YAZISI (ÇEVİRİ) Anlaşmanın ardından. Müttefiklerin anlaşmasına göre Türkler, Trakya'yı alacaklar. Türklerin Edirne'ye dönmelerinde biz bir sakınca görmüyoruz. Gerçi on yıl önce bizim çocuklarımız da bu şehrin önünde can verdiler. Ama önemli olan Anadolu'yu Trakya'ya bağlayan Boğazlardır. Boğazlar sorununun çözümünü harış konferansına bırakılmıştır.	588
Ek. 3	27 Eylül	"BALKAN" GAZETESİNİN YAZISI Fransa, Türkleri Avrupa'ya geri getiriyor. Müttefiklerimiz, Türklerin Avrupa'ya dönmelerini kabul ettiler. Bu, Balkanlara ve Avrupa'ya indirilmiş bir darbedir.	589
Ek. 4	28 Eylül	"VREME" GAZETESİNİN YAZISI Doğu sorununda Hükümetin tutumu ve rolü. Hükümetimiz bir çıkmazda. Ya Türkiye'ye karşı askeri harekâta girişecek, ya da Türkiye'nin Avrupa'ya dönmesine razı olacak. Mustafa Kemal bize karşı düşmanca emeller beslemiyor. İngiltere diplomatik yenilgiye uğradı. İngiltere'ye katılsaydık Çanakkale'ye asker göndermemiz gerekcekti. Mustafa Kemal bize güvence verdi. Bize karşı düşmanca emeller beslemediğini bildirdi. Bu güvence, Hükümetimizin kararında etkili oldu. Savaşa sürüklenmektense Türklerin Trakya'ya dönmelerini yeğledik. Pek kaybımız olmadı.	589

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290	29 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'A YAZI No. 959 Bugün Dr. Nihat Reşad benimle görüştü. Paris anlaşması için beni kutladı. Hararetili bir dost olarak geldiğini söyledi. Kendisine Mustafa Kemal'in taktiklerini anlayamadığımı belirttim. Mustafa Ke- mal halâ notamıza cevap vermedi, bu arada tarafsız bölgeye girdi. Çekilmezse çıkarılacak. Birkaç saat içinde savaşın eşiğine gelebiliriz, dedim. Nihad Reşad telaşlandı. Derhal Mustafa Kemal'e telgraf çekeceğini söyledi. Yunanlılarla birlikte savaşa gireceğimizden, Trakya'da Türk yönetiminin kurul- masını engelleyeceğimizden korktuklarını söyledi. Yunanlıları teşvik etmiyoruz. Tarafsız davranıyoruz. Ama Çanakkale'de olaylar ve savaş çıkarsa tutumu- muz hemen değişir. Trakya'da sivil bir yönetim kurulmasını ve bunun daha çok Türk özellikli olmasını istiyoruz. Ama Mustafa Kemal bunu Mudanya'da halledeceği yerde, oyalanıyor, dedim.	591
291	29 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 484 Franklin-Bouillon Mustafa Kemal ile uzun bir görüşme yapmış. İş çetin, ama umutuyum, diyormuş	594
292	29 Eylül	İTALYA'NIN LONDRA BÜYÜKELÇİLİĞİNDEN İNGİLTE- RE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA DUYURU Yunan ihtilaleci subayları Trakya'da Yunan cephesi- nin hemen güçlendirilmesini istiyorlar. Bunun barış yapılmasına zarar verebileceği Atina'ya duyuruldu. İtalya, müttefiklerin Atina'yı uyarmaları gerektiği düşüncesindedir. Schanzer, Yunan askerinin Meriç gerisine çekilmesi, doğu Trakya'da Türk sivil yönetimi kurulması ve buraya müttefik askeri gönderilmemesi gerektiği kanısındadır.	
293	29 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ GENELKARARGÂHINDAN SA- VUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. 2516 Rauf Bey Yahudi yurdu aleyhindeki sözlerinin yalanlanması istemiş. Ankara'da bolşevik nüfuzu azalıyor.	595

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294	29 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ GRAHAM'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 295 İtalyan Dışişleri Bakanı, Yunanlıların Meriç gerisine çekilmeleri gerektiğini söyledi.	596
295	29 Eylül	İNGİLİZ BAKANLARININ LORD CURZON'UN EVİNDE YAPTIKLARI TOPLANTININ TUTANAĞI <i>Lord Curzon:</i> Kemalistlerin temsilcisi Nihat Reşat ile görüştüm. İngiltere'nin dostudur. Türkiye'nin Lon- dra Büyükelçisi olmak emelinde. Paris kararlarını övdü. Beni kutladı. Teşekkür ettim. Ama savaşın eşiğinde olduğumuzu şöyle anlattım: Mustafa Kemal konferans çağrımıza cevap vermedi. Bu arada yalnız Harington'a bir telgraf gönderdi. O da tartışma açan nitelikte. Çanakkale'de Türk askerleri bizimle burun buruna geldiler. Artık buna katlanamayız. Türklerin çekilmelerini isteyeceğiz, yoksa ateş açacağız. Nihat Reşat, Mustafa Kemal'e telgraf çekeceğim dedi. Mustafa Kemal neden Mudanya'da değil? Boyuna oyalanıyor. Nihat Reşat'ın dediğine göre Yunanlılar- la işbirliği yapıp Trakya konusundaki vaadimizi hiçe indirmek isteyeceğimizden korkuyorlarmış. Yunanlı- ları durdurmağa çalışıyoruz, ama gelişmeler bu tutumumuzu değiştirebilir, dedim, Mustafa Kemal Trakya işini çözümlemek için neden Mudanya'ya gitmiyor diye sordum. Acaba Harington'a gönderilen takviye durdurulamaz mı? Çekilmeleri için Türklere tanınan 24 saatlik süre uzatılamaz mı? <i>Chamberlain:</i> Süre uzatılırsa Türkler siper kazarlar, topları Çanakkale'ye getirirler. Mustafa Kemal'e halâ ultimatom verilmemiş olduğunu öğrenince pek şaşırdım. Ama bu bizim temel tutumumuzu değiştirmez. Zaaf göstermekle savaş savuşturulamaz. <i>Maliye Bakanı:</i> Paris notasında, tarafsız bölgenin çığnenmemesi şartı vardı. Mustafa Kemal bunu hiçe saydı. Kuvvetlerimizi kuşatıyor. Hareketimizi gecik- tirmemiz üzücü olur. <i>Genelkurmay Başkanı:</i> Mustafa Kemal'e ultimatom verilmesi emri saat 16'da Harington'a tellendi. Şimdi	596

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		ultimatom verilmemesi yolunda bir talimat gönderilmesi, askerin morali bakımından pek tehlikeli olur. Gecikmemiz düşmanın gittikçe güç kazanması demektir. <i>Lord Curzon:</i> Karş emir değil, ultimatomun 24 saat geciktirilmesini telkin ettim. <i>Chamberlain:</i> Genelkurmay Başkanının görüşü kesindir. <i>Koloniler Bakanı:</i> Kabine, ultimatom verilmesi yolundaki kararını değiştirmez. Mustafa Kemal'in bizimle savaş isteğine inanamıyorum. Ultimatom ille de savaş demek değildir. Lord Curzon barış çabalarını yine sürdürebilir. <i>Lord Curzon:</i> Teklifimin uygulanmayacağı anlaşılıyor. Hayırlısı dileğinde bulunmaktan başka bir şey kalmıyor.	
296	29 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA TYRRELL'İN FRANSA'NIN LONDRA BÜYÜKELÇİSİYLE YAPTIĞI GÖRÜŞME KONUSUNDA NOT 605 Hükümeti adına konuşan Büyükelçi, Trakya'da durumun çok nazik olduğunu söyledi. Mudanya'da Mustafa Kemal'le buluşacak müttefik generallere, müttefiklerin doğu Trakya'da sivil Türk yönetiminin kurulmasına razı olduklarını Kemalistlere bildirme yetkisi verilmesini istedi.	
297	29 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ GRAHAM'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO 882 606 İtalya'yı Paris görüşmeleri dışında tutmak istediğimiz yolundaki yayınların yalanlanması Dışişleri Bakanından istedim. Bunu yapamayacağını söyledi. İtalyan basınında İngiltere ve özellikle Lloyd George aleyhindeki yazılara Bakanın dikkatini çektim. Gazetecilerle konuşacağını bildirdi. Kendisinin İngiliz-İtalyan dostluğundan yana olduğunu, fakat İngiltere'nin bu dostluğa pek önem vermiyor görüldüğünü söyledi. Yakındoğu durumu üzerinde durduk. Politikamızı anlatım. Türklere karşı direnmekten İtalya'nın yan çizmesinden yakındım. Türklerle savaşa kalkacak bir İtalyan hükümetinin	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
298	30 Eylül	derhal devrileceğini söyledi. Barışın sağlanmasında bizim kendisinin desteğine güvenebileceğimizi vurguladı. İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN PARIS VE ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİLİKLERİNE TEL. NO. 330, 293	609
299	30 Eylül	Trakya'da Yunan çekilmesi, Mustafa Kemal'in barış çağrımızı kabulünden önce başlamayacak, görüşündeyiz. İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 487	609
300	30 Eylül	Harington'un Mustafa Kemal ile tek başına görüşmesinin doğru olmayacağı görüşüne katılıyorum. Boşaltılacak doğu Trakya'da yönetimin İstanbul Hükümetine bırakılmasını Mustafa Kemal kabul etmez. Mustafa Kemal kuvvetleri İstanbul Boğazından Trakya'ya geçmek isterler ve Yunanlılar bunu engellemeğe kalkıştırlarsa İstanbul savaş meydanı olur. Bunu önlemeliyiz. Paris kararlarını ne Yunanlılar ne Mustafa Kemal kolay kabul edecek gibi görünüyorlar. Çabalarımızı öncelikle Mudanya konferansı üzerinde yoğunlaştıralım. İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 489	611
301	30 Eylül	Ankara temsilcisine gereken bildirimde bulundum. Mudanya konferansının biran önce toplanması gerektiğini, Mustafa Kemal'in sabrımızı taşırdığını bildirdim. Mudanya konferansının bir-iki gün içinde toplanacağını söyledi. Yunanlıların Trakya'da yaptıklarını protesto etti. İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 490	612
		Ultimatö konusunda Harington'a gönderilen talimatı gördüm. Çanakkale'de iyileşme var. Mudanya konferansının toplanma umudu belirdi. Harington talimatı uygularsa durumu tehlikeye sokarız. İki üç gün gecikmeyle birşey kaybetmeyiz.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
302	30 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 492 M. Poincaré, Mustafa Kemal ile görüşen Franklin-Bouillon'dan aldığı telgrafi gösterdi. Görüşme ılımlı ve umut verici. M. Poincaré, Harington'un Mustafa Kemal'e ultimatom vereceği yolundaki haberlerden pek kaygılı. Bunun İngiltere ile Türkiye arasında savaşa varabileceğinden korkuyor. Böyle bir kararın Fransa ve İtalya'dan habersiz alınmış olmasına üzgün. Bundan doğacak sonuçların sorumluluğuna Fransa'nın katılmayacağını söyledi.	612
303	30 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN BÜKREŞ ELÇİSİ DERİNG'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 118 Rusya ve Türk barış konferansı. Romen Dışişleri Bakanı Sovyetlerin Romanya'yı tehditlerine dikkatimi çekti. Kaygılı. Kendisini yatıştırdım.	613
304	30 Eylül	FRANSA'NIN LONDRA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ KONT DE SAINT-AULAIRE'DEN LORD CURZON'A NOTA Franklin-Bouillon'un Mustafa Kemal ile yaptığı görüşmenin raporu ilişikte sunulmuştur.	614
Ek.	29 Eylül	İZMİR'DE BULUNAN FRANKLİN-BOUILLON'DAN FRANSA BAŞBAKANI POİNGARÉ'YE TEL. Mustafa Kemal'le dört saat süren bir görüşme yaptım. Durumu güç. Askerini zor zaptediyor. Trakya'nın müttefiklerce geçici işgalini teklif ettim. Türk askeri barıştan sonra girecek. Türkler Çanakkale'de şimdiki mevzilerinde kalacaklar. Bunlar Mudanya'da kararlaştırılır. Mustafa Kemal'in kişisel tutumuna güveniyorum. Ama önce Trakya'yı kurtarmak gerek.	614
305	30 Eylül	FRANSA'NIN LONDRA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ KONT DE ST. AULAIRE'DEN LORD CURZON'A NOTA Mustafa Kemal, Türk ve İngiliz kuvvetlerinin aynı anda Çanakkale'ye bitişik tarafsız bölgeden çekilmelerini önerdi. Fransa, bu teklifi kuvvetle destekler ve Majesteleri Hükümetince de bunun ciddiyetle inceleneceğini umar.	616

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
306	30 Eylül	FRANSA BAŞBAKANI VE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI POINCARÉ'DEN İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'E NOTA.....	617
		Mustafa Kemal'in 18-36 yaşlarındaki Rum göçmenlerinin İzmir'i terketmelerine izin vermemesi savaş kanunlarına uygundur. Göçmenleri boşaltma sürecinin uzatılması için Amiral Dumesnil girişimde bulundu	
307	1 Ekim	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ H. RUMBOLD'A TEL. NO. 435.....	617
		Toplanacak Mudanya Konferansı konusunda yönerge: i) Konferans sadece askeri konularla uğraşacak, Trakya'da Yunan askerinin hangi hattın gerisine çekileceğini belirleyecek, ii) Mustafa Kemal Paris görüşmelerinde kararlaştırılmış olan esaslara uyacak, iii) Müttefik generaller siyasal konularda karar veremeyecekler ve bu gibi konular ortaya atılınca Yüksek Komiserlere danışacaklardır. Doğu Trakya'nın geçici yönetimi Müttefik Hükümetlerce kararlaştırılacaktır. Konferansta Mustafa Kemal çeşitli konular ortaya atabilir. Buna karşı Harington'a talimat gönderilmiştir. İngiltere'nin Çanakkale'ye takviye göndermesinin durdurulmaması arzu ediliyor.	
308	1 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ HARDİNGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CURZON'A TEL. NO. 494.....	621
		Poincaré, Franklin-Bouillon'dan gelen yeni bir telgrafı bana bildirdi. Telgrafta, kuvvetlerini şimdi bulundukları yerde durdurması için Mustafa Kemal'i ikna ettiğini bildiriyor. Buna karşılık İngilizlerin de (Çanakkale'ye) asker çıkartmalarının ve orda tahkimat yapmalarının durdurulması şart koşuluyor. Mustafa Kemal, 3 Ekim'de Mudanya'da konferans toplanmasını kabul etmiş. Müttefiklerin de bunu kabul etmeleri isteniyor. M. Kemal, Barış Konferansının da 15 Ekim'de İzmir'de toplanmasını teklif edecekmış.	
		(Bkz. No. 309 ve 313)	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
309	1 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. Poincaré, M. Kemal'den Türk askerinin Çanakkale'ye yaklaşmamasını isteyecek. 3 Ekimde Mudanya konferansının İngiltere tarafından kabul edilmesini istiyor.	621
310	1 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'DEN AKDENİZ BAŞKOMUTANLIĞINDAN DENİZ KUVVETLERİ BAKANLIĞINA TEL. NO. 436 Franklin-Bouillon'dan mesaj: (a) Türk askerinin durdurulmasını sağladım. (b) İki tarafın kuvvetleri 30 Ekim'de bulundukları yerlerde kalacaklar, (c) Trakya'nın derhal Müttefiklerce işgal edilmesi isteniyor, (d) 3 Ekimde Mudanya konferansının toplanması kararlaştırıldı.	622
311	1 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CURZON'A TEL. NO. 494 Türk askerinin Avrupa'ya geçişi önlemek için Fransız ve İtalyan gemilerinin Amiral Brock'la işbirliği yapıp yapmayacaklarını sordum. Fransız meslektaşım, hiç bir harekette bulunmayacaklarını bildirdi. İtalya yüksek komiseri de bu konuda talimatı olmadığını söyledi.	623
312	1 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 498 ve 499 İVEDİ. Harington, Mustafa Kemal'in 50.000 kişilik bir kuvvetle İzmit yarımadasında tarafsız bölgeye saldırma hazırlığı içinde olduğunu söyledi. Ryan'ı Hamid Bey'e gönderdim. Kemalistlerin susmaları ve tarafsız bölgeye girmeleri karşısında sabrımızın tıttığını söyledi. General Harington'un 3 Ekim'de Mudanya'ya gideceğini, Milliyetçi Komutan gelip kendisiyle görüşmeye oturmazsa bundan bir anlam çıkaracağını bildirdi. Hamid Bey, İsmet Paşa'nın 3 Ekim'de Mudanya'da olacağını ve Türk ordularının ileri yürüyüşlerinin durdurulacağını söyledi.	623

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
313	1 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ HARDİNGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 2291 ...	624
		Mudanya Konferansı ile ilgili olarak Poincaré'den alınan notanın ve ekinin örneği ilişiktir.	
Ek. 1	1 Ekim	FRANSA BAŞBAKANI VE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI POINCARÉ'DEN LORD HARDİNGE'NE NOTA	625
		Franklin-Bouillon'un yeni bir telgrafını sunuyorum. Türk birliklerinin Çanakkale'ye yaklaşmamasını istedim. Mudanya toplantısı için 3 Ekim tarihinin İngiltere tarafından da kabul edileceğini umarım.	
Ek. 2	29 Eylül	İZMİR'DE BULUNAN FRANKLIN-BOUILLON'DAN POINCARÉ'YE TEL	625
		İngilizlerin kuvvet çıkartmayı durdurmaları şartıyla Türk kuvvetlerinin de bulundukları yerde durdurul- malarını Mustafa Kemal'e kabul ettirdim. Mudanya konferansı için Mustafa Kemal 3 Ekim tarihini kabul etti. Müttefiklerin de bunu kabul etmeleri gerek, yoksa barış umudu söner. Yarın cevabınızı bekliyorum.	
314	1 Ekim	İNGİLTERE BAŞBAKANI LLOYD GEORGE İLE ROMAN- YA OLAĞANÜSTÜ ELÇİSİ DIAMANDY ARASINDA YAPI- LAN GÖRÜŞME TUTANAĞI	626
		<i>Diamandy:</i> Romanya'nın görüşüne göre, Kemalist ileri harekâtı, Doğu Avrupa'nın toprak <i>status quo</i> 'sunu etkileyecek pek ciddi bir tehlike yaratmaktadır. Romanya, bundan kaygı duymaktadır; Mustafa Kemal'e gönderilen nota konusunda fikrinin sorul- mamış olmasını sürprizle karşılamıştır. Romanya'nın görüşleri iki noktada toplanmaktadır: i) Türkiye'nin Bulgaristan ile ortak bir sınırı olmamalı, hiç değilse bu sınır Müttefiklerce garanti edilmelidir, ii) Boğazların iki yakası askerden arındırılmalı ve Müttefik kontrolü altında Boğazlardan geçiş özgürlüğü sağlanmalıdır. <i>Lloyd George:</i> Bunalım ivedi kararı gerektiriyordu. Romanya, barış konferansının dışında bırakılmaya- caktır. M. Kemal, pek tehlikeli bir davranış içindedir, ne yapacaktır, kestirilemiyor. Mudanya'da generale- rin toplanacaklarını haber aldık. Meriç'e kadar doğu Trakya'yı Türklere vadetmiş bulunuyoruz.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Romanya'nın güç durumunda olduğunu anlıyoruz. Ama Rusya'nın Romanya'ya saldırmasının önüne geçebiliriz. Romanya'ya malzeme yardımı yapabiliriz. Bu arada Boğazlar bölgesine Romen birlikleri gönderilmesi pek makbule geçecektir.	
315	2 Ekim	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN FRANSA'NIN LONDRA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SAINT-AULAIRE'E NOTA	629
		İtalya, Yunan askerinin Doğu Trakya'dan hemen çekilmesi için Atina'ya baskı yapılmasını ve Doğu Trakya'da hemen Türk yönetimi kurulmasını istedi. İngiltere'nin görüşüne göre, Yunan ordusunun Doğu Trakya'da hangi hattın gerisine çekileceği Mudanya konferansında kararlaştırılmalıdır. Ama önce M. Kemal, Müttefiklerin 23 Eylül tarihli notasını kabul etmeli. Mudanya'da Meriç sınırı kararlaştırılırsa İngiltere bunu kabul edecektir. Trakya'da geçici Türk yönetimi konusunda İngiltere'nin Paris Büyükelçisine talimat gönderilmiştir.	
316	2 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 499.	630
		Poincaré, Mudanya'da Yunan generalinin de bulunması gereğini kabul ediyor; Türkler Yunanlıyla görüşmezlerse, Müttefik generaller iki ayrı toplantı yaparlar, Türkler ve Yunanlılar ile ayrı ayrı görüşürler, diyor.	
317	2 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 503.	631
		İstanbul'a dönen Franklin-Bouillon İzmir'deki görüşmelerini anlattı. Söylediklerine göre, İstanbul'a ve Çanakkale'ye yürümeğe hazır 150.000 Türk askeri İzmir'de bekliyormuş. Türkler, İngilizlerin tutumunu anlayamıyorlarmış. Tehlikeli olmakla beraber yürümek niyetindeymişler. Franklin-Bouillon, son dakikada Türkleri ileri yürümekten caydırmış. İngilizlerin de aynı biçimde davranmaları ve Yunanlıların Trakya'yı boşaltmaları şartıyla Türk	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		askeri ileri yürüyüşünü durdurmuş. Franklin-Bouillon, Mudanya konferansına katılacak generallerle verilecek talimat taslağını da okudu. Türklerin tarafsız bölgeden çekilmeleri için ısrar edilmemesini söylüyor.	
318	2 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. 504. ÇOK İVEDİ	632
		Fransız Yüksek Komiseri, Türkler Mudanya konferansını kabul ettiklerine göre, Yunan askerinin doğu Trakya'yı hemen boşaltması ve burada geçici yönetim kurulması gerektiğini ileri sürdü. Böyle bir yorumu kabul etmedim. Mustafa Kemal'in önce barış konferansına katılmayı kabul etmesi gerektiğini bildirdim. Harington da önceden ellerimizi bağlamayalım diyor. Fransız Yüksek Komiseri, Trakya sınırının demiryolunu izlemesi ve Meriç'in hatasına taşması gerektiğini savundu. Meriç sınırını değiştirmeyi de kabul edemeyeceğimi bildirdim. İtalyan yüksek komiseri, bu güçlüğe başka bir çözüm bulunabileceği görüşünde.	
319	2 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATINA ELÇİSİ LINDLEY'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 535.	634
		Albay Plasteras, Trakya'daki Yunan ordusunu düzenlemek için oraya gideceğini söyledi ve Trakya'nın geleceğinin ne olacağını sordu. M. Kemal konferansı kabul eder ve Yunanistan kabul etmezse, bunun bir çılgınlık olacağını, Yunanistan'ın yalnız başına bir şey yapamayacağını anlattım. Politikacı olmadığını, Venizelos'un öğütlerine uyacağını söyledi. Yunanlıların Trakya'da zulüm yapmasının kendisine zarar vereceğini belirttim. Plasteras, ilk işinin bu gibi hareketleri önlemek olacağını söyledi.	
320	2 Ekim	FRANSA'NIN LONDRA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SAINT-AULAIRE'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A NOTA.	635
		23 Eylül tarihli Müttefik notasına Ankara Hükümetinin cevabını ilişikte sunuyorum. Mudanya konferansının 3 Ekimde toplanabilmesi için İngiltere'nin resmi cevabını tezelden bekliyoruz.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
Ek	29 Eylül	MÜTTEFİKLERİN 23 EYLÜL 1922 TARİHLİ NOTASINA ANKARA HÜKÜMETİNİN CEVABI Müttefik notasına T.B.M.M. Hükümetinin cevabı yakında bildirilecektir. Askerî harekâtımızı durdurduk. Meriç'e kadar Trakya'nın hemen boşaltılması ve Türkiye B.M.M. Hükümetine devredilmesi gerekir. İsmet Paşa, 3 Ekimde Mudanya'ya gidecektir. Bu tarih uygun görülürse Mudanya konferansına katılacak Müttefik generallerin adlarının bildirilmesini rica	635

BELGELER

No. 1

Mr. E.S. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, to the British Cabinet

Secret

I circulate for the information of my colleagues the following telegram which has been received from the Government of India.

E.S.M.

6th October 1921.

*From Viceroy, Foreign and Political Department,
1st October 1921*

Priority A.

2298 S. Turkey. So convinced are Muslim India, Afghanistan and Central Asia generally that Great Britain is the dominant world (? Power omitted), that nothing we say to the contrary can disabuse them of the idea that Turkey's plight lies at our doors, and that her future lies in our hands. If His Majesty's Government could now come forward and assist Turkey in mitigation of peace terms, especially over Thrace and Smyrna, the result within India itself would be immediate, while externally, and especially in Afghanistan, Bolshevism would receive its most effective counter blow. If (? His Majesty's Government) feel unable at present moment to intervene effectively, even a generous gesture to Turkey would go far to ease general Islamic ferment in Central Asia against Great Britain. And in view of difficulties that now confront us in India, Afghanistan and on the frontier, we earnestly beg that His Majesty's Government will favourably consider these suggestions.

C. P. 3383

F. O. 371/6532

No. 2

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs respecting Intervention between Greece and Turkey

TWO of my colleagues have written notes urging an immediate or early intervention in the struggle, which appears to have reached a position of stalemate between the Greeks and the Turks. They may be sure that the idea of such intervention at the first moment consistent with a reasonable chance of success has

F. 1

never been absent from my mind since the rejection by the Greeks of the last offer made by the Allies after my visit to Paris in June. But the problem is not to be solved by the mere expression of an *a priori* desire; and I will here endeavour to state, for the assistance of the Cabinet in arriving at a decision, the main conditions of the problem, as it now presents itself. The story will necessarily be rather a long one.

The first point to be determined is the military situation. Since the Greeks early in September failed to break through to Angora and retired west of the Sakharra, the Greek objective has apparently been to occupy a line about 20 miles east of Eskishehr, extending in front of Afion Karahissar, and some 16 miles south-eastwards along the Anatolian Railway, and to hold on to this territory as territory conquered in war, organising its administration on the lines of the zone round Smyrna. It is difficult, however, from the information reaching us, and while the situation changes from day to day, to form a clear opinion of the state of either belligerent's army.

As regards the Greeks, Sir H. Rumbold telegraphed on the 18th September that, although the Greeks had fought remarkably well, the *moral* of their staff appeared to be shaken and the Turks seemed to be working round both flanks. It remained to be seen whether retirement could be carried out in good order. General Harington also telegraphed on the 22nd September that he had received General Papoulas's appreciation of the situation, "which was that of a beaten man seeing the enemy threatening him everywhere." He added that the Greeks might succeed in stopping on the Eskishehr line if the weather broke there as it had at Constantinople. Again Lord Granville telegraphed on the 26th September that his Italian colleague had good information that the Turks had completely cut the communications between Afion Karahissar and Ushak; that they were encircling the right wing of the Greek army, whose *moral* was low but discipline not lost. On the 23rd September Lord Granville telegraphed that the Greek Minister of Finance had informed his French colleague that the Greeks would defend Eskishehr, but if the Turks succeeded in driving them thence, the Greeks might consider themselves defeated and the campaign might be abandoned.

On the other hand, Major Johnston, General Harington's liaison officer with the Greeks reported on the 20th September that the Greeks were "destroying the railway west of the Sakharra by blowing up each rail," and were laying waste the country. The Greeks, although their losses were said to have been 23,000 against Turkish 17,000, "were not in danger, and the retreat will be carried out safely." General Harington also telegraphed on the 23rd September that "the Greek army appears to be holding its own and retiring in good order on positions previously decided upon, despite the fact that the Turks are showing great energy and ability in carrying out cavalry raids."

As regards the Turks our information is more meagre. Secret messages indicated, however, that, just before the Greek retreat, the Turks were very short of ammunition and guns and equally short of motor lorries and petrol. We know, however, that they are receiving ammunition in coasting boats from Batum, and General Harington admits a leakage from Constantinople, apparently from stores under French control, which the Greek warships can only partially stop in the Black Sea. General Papoulas even admitted to General Harington that the Turkish troops opposed to him were stronger and better equipped than his own troops. It is also clear from secret sources that the French are negotiating for the direct supply of ammunition to the Kemalists, although actual delivery seems to depend on the outcome of the Franklin-Bouillon negotiations at Angora. Meanwhile both parties are officially celebrating the tremendous victory that they have won. *Te Deums* have been sung at Athens, and public rejoicings have taken place at Angora. We are reminded of the Battle of Jutland, which we simultaneously celebrated as a triumph in London and Berlin.

On the whole, however, it seems unlikely that the Kemalists can for some time sufficiently remunition themselves or become sufficiently mobile, with winter and the rainy weather setting in, to drive the Greeks from the two junctions of Eskişehir and Afion Karahissar. Though their lines of communication are long the Greeks have all the railways, other than the short stretch of the Anatolian and Baghdad beyond Tchai to Cilicia, and, if they can enforce it against the French and Italians, the command of the sea communications, other than those between Trebizond and Batum. A stalemate with both sides exhausted has been General Harington's forecast up to now, and this seems probable but not certain. On the other hand time seems to be on the side of the Turks since if the Greek troops cannot be demobilised, their *moral* is likely to suffer during the winter months in the trenches, subject to continuous raids and in the middle of a hostile country. If the situation changes at all it seems likely to be against the Greeks. From the military point of view the moment for intervention by the Allies would appear therefore to be propitious.

I now turn to the political attitude of the Greeks.

After the meeting of the Supreme Council in Paris in August and before the Greek retreat, Lord Granville sounded the Greek Prime Minister regarding his peace aims. They appeared to be a "strategic" frontier for the Smyrna zone, apparently pushed north to the Sea of Marmara to include Brusa, and some form of autonomous international State for the Straits and Constantinople, in the administration of which Greece would participate with the principal Allies. About the same time there were indications that the Greek Government believed that His Majesty's Government would support a Greek entry into Constantinople. The idea seems to have been reluctantly dropped after strong representations by Lord Granville and a Reuter statement, and in an interview at Brusa just before the

Greek retirement King Constantine was reported to have admitted that he realised that the Allies would not allow the Greeks to go to Constantinople, at any rate "for the present." Since the Greek retirement there has been no clear indication from Athens whether mediation would be acceptable or what terms Greece would now accept. On the one hand Lord Granville reported on the 19th September that all the papers seemed to agree that the time had come when the Government must at last make a great diplomatic effort in order to secure the acquiescence of Powers in suitable terms of peace, and that the general tone of the press indicated that mediation would be welcome. On the other hand he telegraphed on the 21st September that M. Gounaris, "who was not at all cheerful," had said "no" to an enquiry whether the Greeks meant to take the first step towards negotiation with Kemal. They would hold the line decided upon and see what happened. "Gounaris made no allusion to mediation." In a more recent statement to the press (26th September), M. Gounaris announced that "the Greeks must organise the occupied territory so as to defend it with the least possible sacrifices and expense, and we shall proceed to that organisation making it as complete as possible."

In August, before Parliament rose, M. Gounaris suggested a visit to London to see the Prime Minister and myself. The moment was, for any reasons, inopportune, and the reply was sent that the middle of October would be a better season. M. Gounaris has now revived the proposal, but has not yet been given a definite date. Until he comes he is not very likely to indicate with any precision how the Greeks view the situation or what terms they will accept. Meanwhile his own position seems to be somewhat insecure. Rival politicians are believed to have obtained the ear of the King, and, although M. Gounaris may survive the expected crisis, his Ministry does not seem likely to be long-lived.

Such information as we have regarding the internal situation in Greece (necessity of floating an internal loan, drachma at 78, calling up of the 1922 class, an admitted shortage of reserves) points to the Greeks (even if they believe that they can hold the Eskishehr line, which is uncertain) being ready to accept Allied mediation if the Allies are at all insistent and if sufficiently "face-saving" terms can be offered. Indeed, we hear of a spirit of depression prevailing at Athens when the real nature of the retirement came to be understood. This feeling will grow as winter draws on.

The attitude of the Constantinople Government is a less important factor, but it is perhaps significant that on the 23rd September Sir H. Rumbold reported that Tewfik Pasha, the Grand Vizier, had at a recent Cabinet reviewed the situation in Asia Minor as a stalemate, and stated that he had advocated in recent conversations with diplomatists at Constantinople the retention of Thrace by Greece, together with certain concessions in Smyrna, conditional on the immediate evacuation of Anatolia. He added that the time had come to approach

the Allies officially. The more Nationalist members of the Cabinet had protested on the ground that Angora must make the first move. Tewfik's move was believed to be inspired by the Sultan, and possibly to herald changes in the Cabinet in a direction unfavourable to the Kemalists. This however, has not followed. Meanwhile we know the Constantinople Government to be in close touch with Angora through the Constantinople Minister for Foreign Affairs, Izzet Pasha.

As regards the situation at Angora, our reports do not encourage any very sanguine hopes as to Angora's readiness for peace. One thing seems clear, however, namely that, in spite of some hostile symptoms, the nationalist movement, with Mustapha Kemal either as dictator or figurehead, has a real hold in Asia Minor. It also seems probable that there is really not much difference of opinion in principle between the various parties at Angora, beyond personal jealousies, and that the pre-war C.U.P. elements have created a fairly strong centralised and comparatively efficient Government, of a military kind. These points were emphasised at the Foreign Office the other day by Dr. White, an American missionary of long experience, who has seen much of Kemalist Turkey and only recently left it.

On the other hand, the material resources of the Kemalists cannot be strong. The shortage of ammunition, motors and petrol has already been noted. The recent forcible requisition of 40 per cent. of all stocks in Asia Minor was also significant. If intelligence reports may be trusted, a recent decision first to ask the Bolsheviks for labour and later for cavalry, and the removal of all troops from the Caucasus and Cilicia fronts show exhausted man-power. The same reports, confirmed by Dr. White, go to show that although the Russians have undoubtedly helped with arms and ammunition and offered but not delivered warships, the Kemalists regard Bolshevik agents and Bolshevik designs with no small suspicion, while the Bolsheviks hardly conceal their intention of recovering Kars and Sarykamish at the earliest opportunity. The "marriage de convenance" with the Bolsheviks, in short, seems unlikely to weigh strongly with the Kemalists at the moment if they thought that they could obtain acceptable terms from the Allies. Unfortunately it is very hard even to guess what their terms would be to-day.

Before the Greek offensive of last July there was very little indication that the Kemalists would modify appreciably in negotiations the terms of the National Pact of February 1921, which, as it is so often referred to, I am printing at the close of this Memorandum. These terms, though admittedly susceptible of modification in detail in the course of negotiation, differ very materially from the Treaty of Sévres even as afterwards proposed to be modified in London and Paris.

On the other hand, the indication of Kemalist terms communicated to us at the end of July by Mr. Toynbee, the correspondent of the "Manchester Guardian," who has transferred his sympathies from the Greeks to the Turks, showed a certain willingness to interpret the Pact more reasonably, especially in the matter of the Capitulations and finance, and possibly in the case of the Straits.

That was, however, before the Greek retreat, and there was no sign of any abandonment of the Pact's territorial provisions—retention of Smyrna and Thrace.

Since the Greek retreat, however, there has been some indication that Angora might be willing to accept intervention, though probably on her own terms. First, a telegram from Angora to Constantinople of the 12th September showed an inclination to turn negotiations about prisoners into negotiations for peace, and the Japanese High Commissioner, who had offered to intervene, was informed that the object of the National Assembly was to secure a peace guaranteeing the liberty and independence of the Turkish nation within its frontiers, and if the British Government would admit and concede these legitimate aims, they would be ready to start negotiations at once.

On the other hand, there can be little doubt what the legitimate frontiers of Turkey, as interpreted by the Kemalists, are. On the 21st September Sir H. Rumbold reported that the Kemalist Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yousouf Kemal, in a long and not unreasonable reply to the High Commissioner's protest as to Greek and Armenian deportations in Asia Minor, had concluded that the Near East could only be pacified if Smyrna were restored to Turkey. No palliatives would be of any avail. A complete end must be put to the invasion of Asia Minor by the Greeks, and, he added, in Sir H. Rumbold's words—"almost as an afterthought," as similar course must be adopted in respect of the Greek occupation of Thrace.

Thirdly, in a very recent speech reported by the "Morning Post" Constantinople correspondent on the 26th September, Mustapha Kemal said "... we want peace and we are ready to make peace. My own opinion is that there is not any obstacle to such aim." All he demanded was recognition of their existence and national independence. "Mr. Lloyd George on the 16th August in the British House of Commons indicated intervention in favour of the winner of the war, and I am hopeful that Mr. Lloyd George will not go back on his word."

These are of course only vague indications of a readiness to treat, but they are perhaps significant coming after the Greek retirement. They seem to justify the general appreciation of the situation given in Sir H. Rumbold's despatch of the 20th September. "I find that my colleagues share my impression that the Nationalists would be glad to make peace as they realise their exhausted state. I personally do not believe, however, that they would be satisfied with less than the solution contemplated at Paris in June last with regard to Smyrna" (i.e., an autonomous province under Turkish sovereignty, a mixed gendarmerie under a proportion of Allied officers and gradual retirement of Greek troops). "Looking at the situation from here it would seem that we must await further development of military situation and see whether the Greeks will be able to carry out their

programme of destroying the railway between Eskişehir and Angora, and creating a desert without hindrance from the Nationalists. A few weeks should be sufficient to judge of the effect on the internal situation in Greece of the serious check they have received. We therefore think that towards the end of October the Allies may find the moment favourable for action."

In short, the Kemalists would probably not refuse Allied intervention in the shape of an invitation to a conference by the Supreme Council. Whether terms could be agreed upon and offered on a basis acceptable to them is a very different matter, which I will discuss presently.

One condition, however, it will not be disputed, is an essential preliminary to any such conference, supposing the two combatants to be willing to attend it.

The Allies must agree in advance, preferably with Greece, but certainly among themselves, on the main modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres which will be reasonably likely to satisfy the Kemalists.

The terms of such a settlement can, for the purposes of convenient consideration, be divided into two main categories:

- I. Those which mainly concern Greece and Turkey.
- II. Those which mainly concern the Principal Allies and Turkey.

I. The crux is undoubtedly, as it has been all along, the Smyrna zone. At the June Conference in Paris there was agreement among the Principal Allies in proposing an autonomous province under Turkish sovereignty administered by a Christian Governor (incidentally Greece would be more likely to accept and Turkey might well offer a Turkish subject of Greek race as Governor) with the assistance of a mixed gendarmerie under European officers; Greek troops to be withdrawn as soon as the gendarmerie could ensure security in the province.

It may I think be taken as axiomatic that the Kemalists will never make a peace with Greece on less favourable terms than these, unless the Allies are prepared to unite in support of Greece and in hostility to Turkey (by which I mean the formal supply of arms and financial assistance to Greece and the blockade of the Mediterranean and Black Sea Kemalist ports at the least). But it seems equally axiomatic that France, with King Constantine on the throne of Greece, anxious to recuperate herself economically in Turkey, and probably committing herself to some support of Turkish aspirations in her negotiations in Angora, will not agree so to support Greece. It is hardly more likely that the Italians will support Greece with regard to Smyrna. It is true that the Italian Government has recently sat rather carefully on the fence as between Greeks and Turks and as between ourselves and the French, but we know from secret sources that they are now sending Signor Tuozzi to Angora and that they are really as anxious as ever to secure economic concessions from Turkey in southern Asia Minor.

In these circumstances it would probably be impossible for Great Britain alone to enable Greece to defeat the Kemalists and to hold Smyrna in the face of a benevolent French attitude towards the Kemalists, quite apart from the outweighing disadvantages of risking a split in the *Entente*.

If these considerations are sound, it follows that if a profitable mediation is to be offered Great Britain must press upon the Greeks something like the Paris proposals of June with regard to Smyrna. These proposals might conceivably be made more palatable to Greece by abolishing any customs barrier between the Smyrna province and Greece, and possibly by admitting Greece, so far as the Smyrna province is concerned to the Tripartite Agreement or to the "understanding between gentlemen" which, it was proposed at Paris in June, should take the place of the Tripartite Agreement.

In addition His Majesty's Government might offer recognition of King Constantine and possibly facilities for raising a loan here, though I doubt very much whether the French Government would join in any such proceeding. It is also a matter for consideration whether the islands in the Sea of Marmara left to Turkey by the Treaty of Sévres but ethnologically Greek might not be given to Greece. They could not be garrisoned, as they are in the demilitarised area.

Lastly, we shall have to insist on the Italians returning the Dodecanese even if it is too much to hope that they will throw in the concession of Rhodes.

If, however, the Greeks are to be brought to accept such a solution as the above of the Smyrna area, it seems politically impracticable to change the settlement of Thrace provided for in the Treaty of Sévres in the direction apparently desired by both the French and the Italians at the Paris Conference in June (the creation of an international zone under an international gendarmerie). Both on ethnological grounds and more especially in order to secure that the Dardanelles shall remain open, it seems essential that the Dardanelles peninsula and the northern shore of the Marmara, at any rate as far as Rodosto, should remain in Greek hands. This would rule out the return of Northern Thrace to Turkey or acceptance of the Enos-Midia line (which is no natural frontier) as the Græco-Turkish boundary. The Kemalists, and the French supporting them, ask for the return of Thrace or for its internationalisation in order the better to defend Constantinople. There are other ways of meeting this: (a) The Treaty of Sévres frontier can be brought across from its present point south of Midia to a point on the northern shore of the Sea of Marmara nearer Rodosto (b) Greek troops in Eastern Thrace (as opposed to gendarmerie) might be stationed only in certain places and in fixed numbers. Correspondingly the number of Turkish troops in European Turkey would have to be fixed. (c) There would remain, to safeguard both Turkey and Greece, the existence of an international commission of the Straits and of an Allied force, however small, at the Dardanelles end of the Straits.

Greek troops might participate in his garrison on the European shore and Turkish troops in the Allied garrison on the Asiatic shore.

In addition, it must be remembered that we have promised our support for the strengthening of article 15 of the Greek Minority Treaty in such a way as to give the Moslem majority of Adrianople the predominant share in the executive functions and in the ministerial council, and some stronger provision regarding non-interference by the Greek Government with the management of Moslem sacred shrines or places of Moslem worship, the immunities of the latter to be guaranteed.

II. I pass to the considerations that more directly affect the Allies in relation to Turkey. While we have no clear indication of what precise modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres, apart from Thrace and Smyrna, would satisfy the Kemalists, it seems certain that in order to obtain a settlement now, the Allies may have to go further than the concessions offered in London in March last (see Annex I to this memorandum) in the direction of saving the face of the Turks so far as the financial provisions of the treaty are concerned.

At Paris in June M. Briand told me that with regard to finance, in which French interests were paramount, he would be willing to seek a method of securing essential control that would not offend Nationalist susceptibilities. He probably meant abolishing the Financial Commission and falling back on the pre-war Debt Council. Our objection to this has always been that although the machinery of the Public Debt is very efficient, and although we and the Italians are represented equally with the French on the Council, the French Government, owing to the preponderant number of French bondholders in the pre-war Debt, would inevitably cause French claims on Turkey to be given precedence over other Allied claims. Under the Treaty of Sèvres the policy was to pool Turkish resources (revenues assigned to the Debt and other sources of revenue) for the payment not only of the pre-war Debt, but also of the cost of Allied occupation and the payment of Allied war claims for damages, &c. For us therefore it would be preferable to maintain the financial provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres and in some form or other the substitution of the Financial Commission for the pre-war Debt Council. Having regard, however, to the facts (a) that French financial interests in Turkey are greater than British, while British economic interests in Turkey (share of imports and exports) are greater than French, and (b) that the Kemalists object to a body like the Financial Commission under the Treaty of Sèvres, which is responsible to the Allies and has practically executive powers, as an infringement of their independence, a "way out" might be found by going back more or less to the pre-war system of Allied advisers to Turkish Ministries. The French might appoint an adviser to the Ministry of Finance who would be a servant of the Turkish Government; we might appoint an adviser to the Ministry of Customs;

and the Italians an adviser to the Ministries concerned with concessions. The financial and economic obligations of Turkey under the Treaty of Sévres would remain, and these three advisers might form a council for advising the Turkish Government as to how best to meet their obligations. This plan would, of course, mean that we should recognise and make permanent the French preponderant control of Turkish finance. It would also mean that we should rely on the personality and influence of the Allied representatives to ensure Turkey meeting all her obligations. To safeguard ourselves against French pre-war claims against Turkey being met before our own, owing to the preponderant French influence at the Ministry of Finance, we might have to make a separate agreement with the French Government regarding priority of payments, &c. These are very tentative suggestions, and the Treasury might have objections to offer, but in the case of Turkey, finance and politics are so mixed up that it is inevitable that in finding treaty terms acceptable to Turkey and France political considerations must carry great weight.

I shall be prepared, if the situation arises, to make suggestions with regard to other possible concessions, military, economic and judicial, which might render our proposals more palatable to the Kemalists. But it would perhaps be premature to dilate upon them now.

My general conclusion, however, is that if something like the terms I have sketched could be agreed upon by the three Principal Allies and offered jointly and firmly to the Greeks and Kemalists in the near future, a settlement should not be found impossible.

As regards procedure, apart from M. Gounaris' proposal to come to London in the middle of this month, a preliminary informal discussion with the Greeks seems essential, if only because we do not know their present attitude, and more especially because it seems absolutely necessary that His Majesty's Government should do their utmost to persuade them to take the line advocated above regarding Smyrna. The present position of the Greeks in Asia Minor is, after all, largely due to the mandate originally given them by the Supreme Council; and His Majesty's Government's obligations towards Greece, however slight they may be legally and on paper, render it desirable that we should treat their susceptibilities as far as possible with consideration, at any rate until we see whether friendly but strong persuasion fails to succeed. If the objection be raised that such a discussion would make it appear that we intended to back the Greeks strongly in the approaching conference, we could meet it by explaining to the French in advance what line we intend to take with the Greeks, and possibly by even suggesting that they should take steps to sound Angora in the same way as we are sounding the Greeks as to their attitude towards the conference and terms of peace. The French may be in a better position to do this than we.

The next step after discussion with the Greeks would appear to be to call an Allied Conference and to try to obtain an Allied agreement as to the main terms to be offered to both Greece and Turkey. The partial agreement reached at Paris in June would form the natural basis for such a resumption of Allied discussion, but the Allies should then be in a better position to know the Greek, and possibly the Kemalist, attitude, and it seems essential to remove the deadlock regarding Thrace which existed in June at Paris.

After the Supreme Council have reached agreement on the main modifications of the Treaty of Sévres to be proposed to both sides the Greeks and Turks might then be invited to attend, the invitation to Angora again being made through the Turkish Government at Constantinople. The latter point might perhaps be waived if necessary to ensure Kemalist acceptance of the invitation.

Mr. Churchill in his recent memorandum to the Cabinet has proposed that the Allied terms when agreed upon should, if necessary, be enforced by the Allied Powers by blockade or by assistance to one side or the other, in order to assure that the unreasonable party be brought to heel. It seems impossible to come to a decision on this point until there has been another Allied discussion and friendly mediation has again been tried. Even then it can hardly be contemplated, unless the Greeks are intolerably unreasonable, that we should assist Kemalist Turkey against Greece. It is difficult to overlook the fact that the Kemalists are the actual, if not the legal, successors of the Turkish Government which waged a five years' war against us, that the Greeks were our Allies until recently, and that they fought for, and the Kemalists against, the Treaty which was signed by all the Allies a year ago, and lastly, that the Kemalists have shown continual and bitter hostility to us ever since the London Conference. The Kemalists may generally wish, or at any rate circumstances may now make them ready, to change this attitude if more favourable terms are offered them, but time alone can show their good faith. Only a hopelessly intractable attitude on the part of the Greeks would, therefore, seem to justify our forcing our terms on the latter by help to the Kemalists. There are stronger grounds, already indicated, for enforcing our terms on the Kemalists, if they are unreasonable, but such a policy would require a change of French and Italian opinion, for which it is difficult to hope. In the circumstances it would seem better not to consider at this stage any form of forcible mediation.

It will be seen, therefore, that I endorse the plea for an early handling of the case, and this plea is undoubtedly strengthened by the fears so naturally expressed by Mr. Churchill that a failure to come to terms with the Turks may gravely prejudice the situation in Mesopotamia, the burden of which he has undertaken with so much courage, but where the balance may easily be deflected to his detriment.

On the other hand, Mr. Montagu's complaint that by the attitude of the Foreign Office we are prevented from exercising any influence at Angora, that we

can conceive of nothing but official representation there, and that the consequences of our apathy are disastrous, seems to me quite unfounded.

We have lost no opportunity presented to us of getting into touch with Mustapha Kemal and of ascertaining his views. We received Bekir Sami Bey when he came as the official representative of the Kemalist Government to London last year, and we made proposals and concluded agreements with him which were ignominiously and, in the case of our prisoners, most dishonourably thrown over by Mustapha Kemal when his delegation returned to Angora. As regards our prisoners, Mustapha Kemal not merely broke this engagement, but has treated our prisoners, including officers of high distinction, with great indignity, ultimately forcing us, in order to extricate them before the forthcoming winter, to conclude a bargain against which the Commander-in-chief at Malta has just protested as deplorable and humiliating.

Nevertheless, when Mustapha Kemal showed an inclination to be brought personally into touch with us last July through General Harington, we at once gave authority to the latter to proceed. Nothing came of it because Mustapha Kemal sought to attach the acceptance of his extreme political claims as a condition to discussion.

Mustapha Kemal can let us know his views any day that he pleases through his personal friend and former colleague, Izzet Pasha, now Foreign Minister at Constantinople, or through his liaison officer there, Hamid Bey, with both of whom our High Commissioner is in constant contact. He has other emissaries in Europe: Dr. Nihad Rechad, Jami Bey and Bekir Sami, who can approach us whenever they please.

No private person has been stopped or dissuaded from going to Angora except General Townshend, whose qualifications were not considered suitable. As regards the unofficial representatives of our Allies, I cannot think that their reception and experience there have been particularly encouraging. Count Sforza gained nothing whatever by his prolonged flirtation with Mustapha Kemal except the final refusal of the latter to receive the Italian representative, Signor Tuozi, at all. The French first tried to come to terms with Mustapha Kemal through M. du Caix, their representative in Syria, who negotiated the armistice preparatory to a treaty. They next made a separate agreement with Bekir Sami about Cilicia and their prisoners, which was at once thrown over by Mustapha Kemal and the National Assembly. Since then they have spent the best part of a year in trying to negotiate a substitute, first, in Paris, with Bekir Sami Bey (who was once again thrown over by Mustapha Kemal), and secondly, at Angora, through the instrumentality of M. Franklin-Bouillon, who has paid two, if not three, visits to Angora, and is believed, though officially disavowed by the French Government, to have made or to be making some arrangement confined to French prisoners and the Cilician frontier.

These examples are not particularly encouraging. Nor can I see the slightest reason to suppose that had any Englishman, official or unofficial, been at Angora during the last six months the results would have been very different. More probably he would have experienced the fate of Colonel Rawlinson. The time may come—I hope it may not be long delayed—when we can again attempt to enter into relations with Angora, while not I hope forgetting that there is still such a thing as a Government at Constantinople, to which our High Commissioner is accredited, and without whose concurrence we cannot negotiate any settlement at all. But isolated action will not help us to solve the larger problem any more than it has already helped the Italians and the French. The problem remains an international problem, and the steps now to be taken for its settlement are in my judgment these:—

- (a) A very early effort to ascertain what are the bases on which mediation can now take place with a reasonable prospect of success—such effort involving an urgent conference with the Greeks, upon whom we alone can exercise a friendly pressure, to be accompanied or followed by a similar attempt to resume discussion with the Turks.
- (b) As soon as the bases have been provisionally determined, a meeting of the Supreme Council to draw up the proposed revision of the Treaty of Sévres.
- (c) A summons to Greeks and Turks to attend and receive the revised conditions.

Foreign Office, October 7, 1921

C. OF K.

F.O. 406/48, pp. 8-15, No. 7

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 421-433, No. 405

No. 3

Paraphrase of Telegram from the High Commissioner of Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated 7th October, 1921

(Received Colonial Office 2. 0 p.m. 9th October, 1921).

(Circulated to the British Cabinet by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on October 11th)
Secret.

No. 558.

With reference to my telegram No. 534 of September 28th following is for your information. At my last meeting with him Feisal drew my attention to recent Reuter telegram report that Mustapha Kemal was bent on making things hot for him in Mesopotamia. He emphasised danger of situation especially now that

apparently Greeks had suffered a severe defeat and peace overtures were on foot. He asked if I had any recent information as to policy of His Majesty's Government.

I took opportunity of sounding Feisal as to how he would regard it if Iraq were permitted to exchange views with Mustapha Kemal with a view to friendly understanding. I found that he was extraordinarily in favour of the idea on the grounds that fact of his having sort of neighbourly understanding as between one Islamic Government and another would strengthen his position greatly in Mahometan world generally and would do much to sterilise activities of pro-Turkish elements in Iraq. The urgency for Iraq of knowing where she stands in relation to French and Turks is emphasised by information supplied in telegram from Consul at Beyrout of October 5th to Foreign Office repeated to me.

COX

C.P. 3390

F.O. 371/6532

No. 4

Paraphrase Telegram from the High Commissioner of Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated October 11, 1921

(Received Colonial Office 1.55 a.m. 12th October, 1921)

(Circulated to the British Cabinet with reference to C.P. 3378 & C.P. 3390 on October 13)
Secret.

No. 571.

Your attention is invited to my telegrams ending with number 500 of October 5th regarding French attitude to Great Britain; to my telegrams ending with number? 558 of October 7th regarding my proposals for Feisal's (?mission) to Mustapha Kemal and to General Baghdad's telegram of September 15th, X 2915 of October 9th., X2920 and X2921 of October 10th regarding position of Mustapha Kemal in Angora and telegram No. 1193 of October 5th to Foreign Office from Satow, Beyrout.

2. Reviewing the position from this end salient points of situation to-day seem to be (1) Irritated no doubt by a misconception of our policy in Syria and Iraq, French have endeavoured to conclude an agreement with Mustapha Kemal so far without complete success. It is their hope to aggrandise their own influence and interests in Near East at the expense of those of the British. (2) It is still Mustapha's belief that Great Britain is mainstay of Greeks and in consequence he is extremely resentful. (3) Disappointed at recent success of Mustapha and Enver Pasha's consequent loss of prestige Bolshevik Russia is fearful lest Franco-Turkish solidarity should defeat her ends in Turkey. She is therefore scheming (a) to widen

differences between England and France. (The subtle exaggerations (? display) ed in Satow's telegram October 5th 1909 if not from Bolshevik sources at least favour Bolshevik interests) (b) to (? group omitted) Franco-Turkish negotiations there by increasing prestige at Mustapha's expense.

3. Outcome of developments at Angora during next few days will have such vital consequences for Iraq that I venture to urge upon His Majesty's Government my most strong conviction not only that now is the psychological moment for immediate action but what any delay may prove most prejudicial to our interests.

4. In order to counteract factors and forces working against us our desiderata clearly are (1) a policy of co-operation with French and (2) the opening of a door for negotiations with Angora Government. May I be permitted to suggest as regards France the secret information in possession of His Majesty's Government may perhaps be capable of exploration and France induced to continue her negotiations at Angora but on basis that will be acceptable both to His Majesty's Government and to Mustapha. Perhaps it could be suggested to French that main reason for Angora Government's disinclination to accept French proposals is that they are alarmed at exclusive privileges which French Government are endeavouring to secure and this being so it would be in their own interest as well as that of Europe in general to modify their ambitions. The ideal result would be that ultimately negotiations should become tripartite. I have already intimated that as regards latter best method I can suggest is that Feisal should open negotiations and it is for consideration whether in view of extreme urgency of situation communication might not be attempted by wireless. I realise that any such communication would have so to be worded that French might know of it and had position at Angora seemed less critical I would not have suggested it. Bolshevik menace would probably cease to cause anxiety and Iraq could hope for that peace on her borders which is essential to her salvation were these two policies viz. reconciliation with France and (? acceleration of) negotiation with Mustapha to succeed.

C O X.

C.P. 3402

F.O. 371 6532

No. 5

Memorandum by the British Secretary of State for War to the Cabinet

THE SITUATION IN IRAQ

Secret

With reference to C.P. 3328, circulated by the Colonial Secretary, I think the Cabinet may like to see the following appreciation of the military position in Iraq.

L.W.-E.

THE WAR OFFICE.

12th October, 1921.

1. In accordance with the decision taken by the Cabinet in August, 1921, the administrative and financial control of Iraq has now been taken over by the Colonial Office, as from 1st October. It seems, therefore, that this is a suitable occasion for a review of the present military situation in that country, and of possible future eventualities which may affect military policy.

2. *Regular Garrison.* The present military garrison of Iraq consists of:—

- 1 Regiment British Cavalry,
- 1 Regiment Indian Cavalry,
- 1 Battery, R.H.A.,
- 1 Brigade, R.F.A.,
- 1 Brigade Pack Artillery,
- 4 Battalions British Infantry,
- 4 Battalions Indian Infantry,
- 3 Armoured Car Companies,
- 4 Companies, Sappers and Miners,
- 6 Squadrons, R.A.F.,

with the necessary complement of administrative services.

3. *Local Forces.*—In addition to the above regular troops, there are the following local forces available for the maintenance of internal order:—

- (a.) Arab levies, strength about 4,500, under British officers. This force is administered by the High Commissioner of Iraq and is maintained from Colonial Office funds.
- (b.) The Arab Army, strength about 1,000 (in training). This force is at present in course of formation, and has not yet assumed any of its military functions. It is entirely Arab, and is administered and maintained by the Arab Government of Iraq.

4. *Distribution.*—The British garrison, mentioned in paragraph 2, is at present distributed roughly as follows:

- 1 Infantry Brigade with attached troops in the Mosul area.
- 2 Infantry Brigades with attached troops in the Baghdad area.

The remainder of the Infantry is disposed at the Base and at various points on the Tigris Lines of Communication, the Euphrates line, north of Nasiriyeh, being in charge of the Arab levies, with a small British detachments at the Hindiyeh barrage.

5. *Future reductions.*—During the course of this winter the British garrison will undergo further steady reductions until, by the end of March, 1922, it will consist of only

- 2 British Infantry Battalions.

- 6 or 7 Indian Infantry Battalions.
- 2 Batteries, R.F.A.
- 1 Indian Pack Battery.
- 1 Armoured Car Company.
- 1 Sappers and Miners Company.
- 6 Squadrons, R.A.F.

These reductions are, however, dependent on the ability of the Arab Army to assume control of the whole of the Mosul Vilayet. Until this can be effected, the opinion of the General Officer Commanding is that it is not possible to reduce the Infantry portion of the garrison below 11 Battalions. He anticipates, however, that the Arab Army will be in a position to relieve his troops in the Mosul area during March, 1922, and that the garrison regular will therefore be reduced to the figures stated before the hot weather commences in May.

6. *Communications*.—The British forces at Baghdad and beyond are at present connected with their Base, Basrah, by two main lines of communication—

- (a) By the Euphrates Valley Railway to Baghdad.
- (b) By the River Tigris to Kut, and thence either by river on to Baghdad or by the Kut—Baghdad Railway. This railway, however, is to be closed and pulled up on 1st November, and consequently need not be considered.

A few remarks on these two main arteries will not be out of place here.

- (a) *The Euphrates Valley Railway*.—This line runs from Basrah, *via* Nasiriyeh, Samawa and the Hillah branch of the Middle Euphrates to Baghdad. Beyond Samawa, for some 120 miles, it traverses a country which is closely interested by a maze of irrigation canals, streams and nullahs, entailing a very large number of culverts and bridges. It is therefore very much exposed to the risk of interruption by evilly disposed persons, and when once interrupted, it can only be repaired from either end, since the nature of the country prevents repair material being carried by road to the point of damage. Moreover, this railway runs through the region which, out of the whole of Iraq, is perhaps the most open to disorder, owing to its being the great centre of religious fanaticism.
- (b) *The Tigris*.—This river is navigable up to Baghdad throughout the year. Navigation, however, is frequently difficult and always slow. In the high-water season, *i.e.*, from about January or February until June or July, the current is so strong as to reduce the rate of progress of a steamer with barges to some 3 or 4 miles an hour. And in the low-water season the depth of water in the channels and the numerous (and constantly shifting) sandbanks cause frequent groundings, with their attendant delays. Below Kut, except for a stretch of about 20 miles in length, known as "The Narrows," there are, however, no very serious obstacles to navigation. The chief difficulties arise above Kut, where the river takes an

exceptionally tortuous course, so much so, indeed, that, while the distance from Kut to Baghdad in a straight line is 98 miles, that by river is 250 miles. The average time taken by a loaded steamer between Basrah and Baghdad is 6 days, of which the journey to Kut (exactly half-way) usually takes 48 hours.

7. *The rôle of the Armed Forces.*—We see from the above that as from April, 1922, the forces responsible for the maintenance of order in Iraq, and their distribution, will be approximately as follows:

- (a.) A small regular British force of some eight or nine Battalions, of which the bulk will be stationed at Baghdad, with detachments guarding Basrah and the Tigris Lines of Communication.
- (b.) An irregular force of Arab levies, which will be responsible for the safety of the Euphrates Railway and for policing outlying districts in the Baghdad and Basrah Vilayets.
- (c.) A small Arab army, which will be responsible for keeping order in the Mosul Vilayet.

This organization and distribution is based on the essential condition that the armed forces are maintained *solely* for the preservation of internal order, and that they are not intended to defend Iraq against attack from without its borders. In the present temper of the country, which has accepted the accession of King Feisal with acclamation, there is good reason to hope that we may obtain temporary immunity from an insurrection on a scale similar to that of last year, but that this state of things will last is very doubtful unless our relations with Turkey improve. In any case, it is tolerably certain that internal disorders will accompany, and very probably precede, any organized attack from without, and such rising would have a very great effect on our method of dealing with such attacks.

8. *Possibility of external attack.*—The possible external enemies and the directions from which their attacks might develop are—

- (a.) From the east.—Persia.
- (b.) From the north and north-east.—Bolshevik Russia, either alone or in combination with Persia, or with independent Kurdish chiefs.
- (c.) From west and south-west.—The Arabs of Central Arabia.
- (d.) From north and north-west.—Turkey, either alone or in combination with Bolshevik Russia.

Taking these into consideration *seriatim*—

- (a.) Persia, by herself, cannot at present be regarded as a serious menace. Her army is a mere rabble of individuals, ill-armed, ill-clothed, unfed and badly paid. Her finances are in a state of chaos; and her Government is so honey-combed with personal intrigues as to be practically incapable of formulating a policy, and certainly incapable of carrying it out.

- b.) We are, of course, aware that hostility to Great Britain is the chief tenet of the Bolshevik faith, and we must therefore expect to be attacked by Russia wherever and whenever she considers that she can inflict damage upon us. The question is, therefore, whether an attack upon us in Iraq would, if successful, be of such value to Russia as to counterbalance the loss in the event of its non-success. We may take it that Persia, in her present condition, even if not in active co-operation with Russia, would place no obstacles in the way of a military advance on Iraq from the Caspian, and that certain of the Kurdish tribes would assist the Bolsheviks in the hope of loot.

Assuming then that a Bolshevik attack in force on Baghdad developed and that for any reason we were unable to maintain our position there but retired to a line covering Basrah and the Ahwaz oil-fields would the Bolsheviks be any better off than before? The answer surely is "No." To make a further attack and drive us from the country would be a military operation of great magnitude, and we could reinforce our position by sea more rapidly than the enemy could bring down troops *via* the Caspian and through Persia. True, we might lose some prestige in such a case, but it is doubtful whether this would create much effect in countries outside Iraq. The Bolsheviks, therefore, would only have succeeded, at a vast expenditure of money, in compelling us to a course of action which we have already contemplated taking without such compulsion. For these reasons a serious attack by the Bolsheviks is considered unlikely.

- c.) A deliberate attack by the Arabs from the Arabian deserts may also be classed as unlikely. In order to have any chance of success, a combination of the Tribes would be essential, and this, in the practically permanent condition of enmity between the two great sections, is almost unthinkable. The establishment of Feisal as King of Iraq has made such a combination even more improbable than before.
- d.) There remains, then, the menace of Nationalist Turkey from the north and north-west, and this is probably the great danger that we have to face. The hostility of Angora to Great Britain is well known, as is also its leaning towards friendship with France. Equally well known is France's objection to Feisal as a ruler. It may well seem good to the Kemalists, therefore, to endeavour, by one action, to destroy our power in the Middle East, to please the French by overthrowing the ruler whom we have set up, and at the same time to recover for Turkey a part at least of the territories which were wrested from her in the Great War. Consequently, when her operations against the Greeks are concluded, either by a stalemate or by conclusion of peace, she will very probably turn her eyes to the Mosul Vilayet which, as we have seen, will soon be garrisoned only by a weak and untried Arab Army.

9. *The British position.*—It now remains to consider what action is to be taken by us in the event of attack from without.

First of all we must regard it as an axiom that a complete military withdrawal from Iraq is inadmissible since we cannot afford to leave the Ahwaz oil-fields at the mercy of any enemy—Turk, Bolshevik, or Persian. Consequently our footing at Basrah, at least, must be maintained at all costs.

The force in the country, as stated above, is not designed to resist external attack. But, at the same time, we have established Feisal as King and are, therefore, morally bound to assist him against aggression.

It follows, therefore, that in the event of organized attack from without we shall have to bring troops into the country in order to meet it, and this question is already under discussion with India. But, even under the best circumstances, there is but small chance of (say) even one division of all arms being concentrated at Basrah in less than about six weeks. And what is going to happen during that time? Most probably the small Arab Army will be defeated. It will certainly have to retire from Mosul. The enemy will occupy the Mosul Vilayet and will probably advance towards Baghdad. At the same time he will arouse the tribes of the Euphrates, with the result that the Basrah—Baghdad railway will be cut, and, in view of a threat to Baghdad, no troops will be available for protecting repair parties. Hence the force at Baghdad will be in a thoroughly unsound military position, some 500 miles from its base, with an organized enemy in front and rebellious tribesmen behind. It will, in fact, be in the position of an advanced guard which has pushed ahead too far of its main body, and is open to defeat before support can arrive. Its communication by river with Basrah will be precarious, should the Tigris tribes rise in concert with those of the Euphrates.

It appears, therefore, that the only course to pursue will be to withdraw the troops and the Government from Baghdad at the first sign of hostile action and to retire, probably as far as Amara, until reinforcements arrive.

That such a course would be distasteful, and that the Arab Government would completely (and probably for ever) lose all its prestige, must be accepted.

The only alternative, however, is to remain in Baghdad and there sustain a siege. The troops necessary to relieve a force there would certainly be not less than two divisions, and the despatch of a force of this size would be intensely unpopular, both in this country and in India, even assuming that requirements elsewhere did not preclude it altogether. And, in any case, its assembly would be so slow, and the reformation, *ad motu*, of the river fleet necessary to transport and maintain it would be such a lengthy process, that there would be a grave risk of a disaster to the force in Baghdad before a relieving force could arrive.

10. *Conclusion.*—What, then, is the conclusion to be drawn from these considerations?

It has been seen that, of the possible enemies, Nationalist Turkey is the most probable one. It has been shown that, by allowing her to attack, we risk a *possible* disaster and a *certain* loss of prestige, not to mention the waste of all the efforts we have spent on the country. The only solution, therefore, appears to be to prevent Angora from attacking Iraq, and the only means to that end is to effect a speedy friendship with Turkey as a whole.

C. P. 3395

F. O. 371/6532

No. 6

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 12 th October, 1921, 8.30 p.m.

(Received 13th October, 1921, 3.30 p.m.)

No. 670, amended by telegram No. 673.

It would appear from information acquired from various sources that Franco-Kemalist negotiations at Angora except in so far as prisoners are concerned have reached dead-lock.

Nationalists are said to have refused to admit French special claims under Tripartite Agreement and General Gouraud to have refused to agree to Payas frontier on account of its strategical importance for Alexandretta.

There is also reason to believe that Soviet Government is opposing agreement. Attitude of Mustapha Kemal seems to be undecided but Government is divided and Youssouf Kemal and two other Ministers recently resigned—though resignation was not accepted—owing to failure to come to a satisfactory arrangement with French delegates.

Although I can assert nothing definitely I am inclined to believe that there is at any rate serious hitch in negotiations.

F. O. 371/6475

No. 7

Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with M. Venizelos

(E 11473/143/44)

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 13, 1921

M. Venizelos called upon me to-day. He said he came to say good-bye before going on a trip of several months to America. In the course of a friendly conversation he naturally alluded to the situation in Asia Minor. He reminded me

that he had always regretted the Greek military operations which had been undertaken, and which he thought had really been unnecessary, but no doubt they were due to the belief of King Constantine that without an anti-Turkish campaign he would not be secure on his throne. He said on looking at the whole situation, as it now presented itself, he saw that the greatest danger to Greece consisted in the ability of the Turks to enlist the sympathy of one or other of the Allies, and even to play off one against the other; in fact, so long as there was no definite agreement between England and France as regards their policy towards Greece, his country had not a chance of arriving at any satisfactory settlement. He therefore looked upon the establishment of an Anglo-French understanding respecting Greece as the first desideratum.

He had recently been to Paris and had a very frank conversation with M. Briand, who had assured him that, whatever might be his own personal affection for Greece, it was impossible for the French Government to conduct their policy on lines not approved by public sentiment in France. French opinion was absolutely opposed to King Constantine; M. Briand went so far as to say that Constantine was hated more than the Emperor William; as long as Constantine was on the throne, friendship with Greece was out of the question. On the other hand, he definitely assured M. Veniselos that, once Constantine was got rid of, French policy would undergo a radical and rapid change, which would be entirely to M. Veniselos's satisfaction.

This being so, M. Veniselos has come to the conclusion that in order that England might give effect to her well-known friendly feelings towards Greece, she must come to an understanding with France on the subject of King Constantine; that is to say, she must consent to make the sacrifice to French *amour-propre* of siding with her in declaring definitely against Constantine. He thought that an opportunity might shortly present itself for taking this step; M. Gounaris was coming to England in the near future, and M. Veniselos knew that he was also going to Paris; it would suffice for the British Government to make it clear to M. Gounaris that he must fully take into account French requirements, and advise him to come to a definite understanding with France. Possibly the British Government might previously concert with M. Briand that the latter should quite explicitly demand the abdication of Constantine as a *conditio sine qua non* of French support and goodwill; it was to be expected that, if England then made it clear that she could not separate herself from her French ally, the hint would be taken, and M. Veniselos seemed to think that, with the disappearance of Constantine, the Greeks would be able, with the then friendly assistance of the Allies, to arrive at a satisfactory settlement with the Turks.

I asked him whether he still contemplated that Greece would be able to maintain intact all her demands upon Smyrna in accordance with the Treaty of Sévres. To this he replied that no compromise was possible on the point. He even

suggested that he would be able to convince the French that any weakening of the Greek position in Smyrna would react disastrously on the French position in Syria.

I warned him, in a friendly way, that the solution of the difficulty in which Greece found herself did not lie entirely in the hands of England and France, even if they wished her well. There was the Turk. Was it quite certain that the influence which the Allies could still exercise would induce Angora to recognise Greek claims on Smyrna? He must realise that not only in France, but even in England, there was a movement of considerable strength in favour of seeking some accommodation with Angora, in order to put an end to Turkish and Moslem hostility to the Western Powers, and so far we had not received any indication that Mustapha Kemal considered himself compelled to give up his designs on the recovery of Smyrna.

M. Veniselos said he was well aware both of the actual dangers of the situation and of the sentiments entertained here, and in Paris, favourable to a compromise, rather than to a definite enforcement of the stipulations of the Treaty of Sévres. He still hoped, however, that reflection would bring greater wisdom. He was convinced that the enmity of the Turk towards the Western Powers would be in no way abated by any concessions that they made as regards Greece, whereas, on the contrary, to yield and make any concessions to Mustapha Kemal would only tend to increase Turkish contempt of the Christian Powers.

M. Veniselos finally told me that he was going to see the Prime Minister tomorrow afternoon, and intended to express his views to him with the frankness which he had always shown in former conversations with him.

E.A.C.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 434-435, No. 407

No. 8

Memorandum by Mr. Forbes Adams

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 19, 1921

ANGORA AND IRAQ

1. In his telegrams 534 of September 28th and 558 of October 9th (see No. 3), Sir P. Cox suggested that informal negotiations should be opened by some emissary of Feisal at Angora with Kemal in order to secure a "neighbourly understanding" and some recognition by Kemal of Feisal and his kingdom. This suggestion was somewhat expanded by Sir P. Cox in his telegram No. 571 of October 12th (See No. 4). With a view to obtain "(1) a policy of co-operation with France and (2) the opening of a door for negotiations with the Angora Government", His Majesty's Government were to suggest to the French Government to "continue their negotiations at Angora on a basis acceptable to

His Majesty's Government and Mustapha" and Feisal was to open negotiations with Angora, the negotiations eventually to become tripartite (French, Feisal and Mustapha) and presumably to cover the whole field of peace with Turkey.

2. Before considering Sir P. Cox's two proposals ((1) General negotiations for peace with Kemal through Feisal and the French, and (2) separate negotiations for some local arrangement about Iraq with Kemal through Feisal), it may be observed that Feisal cannot really open negotiations, under either head, without involving British responsibility (a) because we are the mandatory for Iraq and responsible for Iraq's foreign relations; (b) because any provisional arrangement regarding Iraq (frontier, customs etc.) would have to be embodied in the treaty of peace with Turkey and considered in the light of that treaty as a whole. Even if we were prepared (as it is assumed we are not) to regard Iraq as practically a fully independent state, free to conduct her own foreign policy and to be admitted as a separate signatory to the treaty of Sèvres, is it possible to believe that Mustapha would be prepared to consider Feisal's interests independently of ours and to enter into—or conclude—any separate negotiation with him about Iraq regardless of the British attitude towards the settlement with Turkey as a whole and particularly towards the Greeks? It seems almost certain that he will regard Feisal's overtures as camouflaged British overtures, initiated from Iraq because of our special interests and special vulnerability in that quarter.

3. The objections to Sir P. Cox's proposal for initiating general negotiations through Feisal at Angora, aiming at making them tripartite by bringing in the French, seem obvious and may be summarised as follows:

- (a) The French would certainly not agree at present so to collaborate with Feisal.
- (b) The proposal ignores the Italians, quite apart from the Greeks. The whole problem is international and must be treated as such.
- (c) Kemal, or at any rate his followers, would become impossible if it were thought that the Allies had found it necessary to transfer negotiations as a whole from Europe to Angora.
- (d) The issues, of which Iraq is only one and perhaps not the most important, are too complicated to be treated by Feisal or his emissary and by the cumbersome machinery of instructions from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, from the Colonial Office to Sir P. Cox, from Sir P. Cox to Feisal and from Feisal to his emissary!
- (e) It cannot be excluded that Kemal, regarding Feisal's emissary, as a British emissary, would treat him as British officials have hitherto been treated, i.e. merely another hostage (our prisoners are not yet released).

4. The objections to Sir P. Cox's earlier proposal (negotiations limited to Iraq matters, presumably something in the nature of armistice negotiations about the frontier etc.) are not so strong but have already been indicated. Three principal

ones may be noted. (a) The risk that it will only be regarded by Kemal as a sign of weakness; (b) it runs counter to our consistent policy hitherto of objecting to separate negotiations by the Allies even if the latter have limited scope; (c) it seems unwise even for one Ally to treat the settlement with Turkey piecemeal and negotiate about one area apart from her interests in the rest. (Incidentally, as already pointed out, the Kemalists are most unlikely to let us so negotiate and if they allow us to open, they will not conclude such a negotiation).

5. On the other hand, against these objections to both of Sir P. Cox's proposals must be set the real advantage from the point of view of internal politics in Iraq which would be gained by it becoming known that Feisal had opened any kind of relations with Angora. However unlikely to attain concrete results and however undesirable that any kind of general peace negotiations should be opened through such a channel, it is clear that the move would give confidence to Feisal and his Government, and would take the wind out of the sails of the pro-Turkish party in Iraq. It would also make it more difficult for Kemal to use what in Iraq is probably his most dangerous weapon-propaganda. Possibly the move might be used by the Viceroy in India for his apparently much needed counter propaganda to Moslem agitation, though Arab seems hardly to count as Moslem in India and the Kaliphate agitators want of course some concrete success for the Turk!

6. These considerations and counter considerations lead to the following general conclusions:

I. Sir P. Cox's proposals cannot be considered or decided upon separately from a decision on the question of Allied intervention as a whole in the Asia Minor conflict and if early intervention, as already suggested by the Secretary of State, is decided upon, the only proper and businesslike course from the British and Allied point of view seems that recommended in the Secretary of State's memorandum to the Cabinet of October 7th (Annex IV). Incidentally, this may involve an immediate and temporary widening of the basis of the French negotiations at Angora, which is one of Sir P. Cox's desiderata.

II. If the course proposed in that memorandum is adopted, and negotiations opened eventually in Paris or London, to which Turks and Greeks are invited, it would be confusing (and unnecessary) to have separate negotiations conducted at Angora by Feisal about Iraq.

III. If Allied intervention is postponed indefinitely and we continue our attitude of neutrality towards the Greeks and Turks through the winter, it is possible but not certain that Kemal may give trouble on the Iraq front. In that case there seems much to be said, primarily from the Iraq point of view, for allowing Feisal to send an emissary to Angora, not to open any general negotiations about peace, but to open negotiations for some provisional arrangement regarding the Iraq frontier. Kemal is unlikely, for the reasons already given, to allow such

negotiations to come to any conclusion, successful to Feisal and us, but it may serve to keep Angora in play and prevent any strong movement against us in Iraq during the winter. Feisal or rather his emissary, if well chosen, might as Moslems be better qualified for this purpose than an emissary sent by Sir H. Rumbold from Constantinople.

IV. Of course, if it be decided either to help the Greeks against Kemal or vice versa, it will be in the former case useless and in the latter case unnecessary to send any one to Angora.

7. Lastly one may be permitted to doubt whether Sir P. Cox's apprehensions regarding French aims and policy at Angora, on which he really builds up his case for immediate negotiation by Feisal at Angora, are quite justified. His information that the French in their negotiations at Angora are really encouraging Mustapha to attack Iraq are admittedly based on rumours reaching our consuls in Syria and more especially on Bolshevik telegrams. The latter are so obviously couched in terms likely to split the Allies that it seems not improbable that they are concocted and meant to be intercepted. The stories in them as to the terms France is seeking bear little or no relation to (in some cases they are an obvious exaggeration of) the information we have as to Franklin Bouillon's negotiations. From the latter it appears that while Bouillon is making the Turks vague promises as to French support of Islam in general and of Kemal's demands in Thrace and Smyrna (and these apparently in a way which will make it possible for the Quai d'Orsay to disavow him) his main negotiations seem to be confined to prisoners' exchange, the Cilician and Syrian frontier, and the gendarmerie and concessions in the zone of French interests under the Tripartite agreement. It is true that the proposed change of frontier puts back into Turkey the stretch of the Bagdad railway from the Euphrates to Nisibin, but this will not give the Kemalists unimpeded railway access from Cilicia to the Iraq frontier, though it may be enough to account for the rumour that the French are offering Kemal railway facilities to attack Iraq.

8. Sir P. Cox naturally does not know what we know to be the real and natural cause of the French anxiety to reach an agreement about Cilicia—namely, the opposition in Senate and Chamber to further expenditure on the 80,000 troops maintained in that part of the world with the possibility of a renewal of the already quite severe fighting which has taken place between the Kemalists and French on that front since the armistice. The French may be looking after their interests in a selfish way and may not mind that their policy, if successful, should free Kemalist troops for adventures further east, but it seems too much to believe that M. Briand has instructed M. Franklin Bouillon to encourage the Turks to attack France's ally or that the latter (who seems to do nothing without instructions from Paris) should independently have proposed so dastardly a course.

9. No doubt if and when similar reasons prompt us to allow Sir P. Cox to open some separate negotiation at Angora to save the Iraq front, the French will suspect our motives in much the same way that we are inclined to suspect theirs.

10. With regard to the "conclusion" in para. 10 of the War Office memorandum to the Cabinet of October 12th it need only be said that a practical method of reaching a settlement with Angora has already been put forward in the Secretary of State's memorandum to the Cabinet of October 7th. Whether a settlement with Angora can mean "friendship" with Angora, "speedy" or otherwise, may be doubted.

E. G. FORBES ADAM

Oct. 19th.

F. O. 371/6969/E. 12341

No. 9

Memorandum by the British Secretary of State for War to the Cabinet

THE SITUATION IN ANATOLIA, 1st OCTOBER, 1921

Secret.

I circulate herewith a memorandum by the General Staff on the position in Anatolia following upon the recent retirement of the Greek Army.

L.W.-E.

THE WAR OFFICE,

21st October, 1921.

1. Occasion for this paper.

The withdrawal of the Greek Army, at the end of September, 1921, to their old lines east of Eskişehir, marks the completion of a definite phase in the Turco-Greek operations. The occasion thus arises for a fresh appreciation of the situation in Anatolia.

2. Course of recent operations.

The map attached to this paper indicates—

- (a.) The Greek positions at the commencement of the operations in July;
- (b.) The furthest point reached in the Greek advance on Angora;
- (c.) The position on 1st October.

3. Greek objectives in recent operations.

In these operations, which began on 9th July, 1921, the Greek objectives were as follows:—

1st Objective.—To compel the Turkish Nationalist Army to fight, and to destroy it.

2nd Objective.—To occupy the Nationalist Capital, Angora.

- a.) With the political object of bringing the Turks to terms.
- b.) With the military object of gaining possession of the Nationalist workshops and depôts at Angora, and of denying to the Turks the use of the Angora—Eskishehr railway, the main line of approach to Smyrna, from the heart of Anatolia.

3rd Objective.—To obtain the power of rapidly concentrating their army, either on the Brusa or Ushak front, by gaining possession of the Anatolian railway, through Eskishehr and Afium Kara Hissar.

4. Results of the operations.

The extent to which the Greeks obtained their objectives is as follows:—

1st Objective.

In the early stages, the Greeks failed to bring about a decisive battle, although they succeeded in surprising the Turks and turning the Kutaya position. At Eskishehr, on 21st July, the Turks seized the initiative and carried out a very strong counter-attack to hold up the Greek advance. It is to be noted that this counter-attack synchronized with the refusal of the Angora Government to accept the offered assistance of the Bolshevik Army of the Caucasus. This counter-attack was defeated by the Greeks who, however, were unable to reap the fruits of victory owing to the fatigue of the troops and the necessity for reorganizing the Greek supply and transport arrangements after their long and rapid advance over difficult country. Following this battle the Turks withdrew a further 70 miles east, refusing battle west of the Sakaria river. They thus compelled the Greeks to follow them through an inhospitable country, and to extend their lines of communication to such a degree that supply became a matter of the greatest difficulty. This difficulty was intensified by the successful raiding activities of small Turkish forces which hovered on the flanks of the Greek advance. The Turks accepted battle at the Sakaria and won a signal victory; and the Greeks have therefore failed in their primary objective.

2nd Objective.

The Greeks have failed to gain their second objective, but they report that they have done much damage to the Angora—Eskishehr railway.

3rd Objective.

The Greeks have attained this objective at a cost greatly exceeding their estimates. It, however, remains to be seen whether they will be able to hold what they have gained. Their front from Afium Kara Hissar through Alpi Hevi (sic) to Bilejik measures 140 miles, without making any allowances for covering the open flank at each end of this line. It is supplied by two lines of communication situated in the rear of the extreme flanks, and neither of them adequately protected by the

position of the field army. Furthermore, the northern line of communication through Brusa, which was 20 miles in length prior to these operations, now measures 125 miles to Eskişehir, whilst the southern line, which formerly measured 185 miles to Tonlu Pınar, now measures 225 miles to Afium Kara Hissar. These extended lines of communication are very vulnerable and invite attack.

The Greeks have thus gained only the least important of their three objectives; but it is probable that even this partial success is more than counter-balanced by the moral effect produced, both in the opposing armies, and also among the inhabitants of Anatolia, by the Turkish victory at the Sakaria.

5. Causes of Greek failure.

The causes which appear to have led to the failure of the Greek Army may be summarized as follows:—

- (a.) The over-weening confidence of the Higher Command in the power of their army.
- (b.) An indifferent intelligence service, which appears to have given very incomplete information concerning the enemy.
- (c.) The plan of operations for the battle of the Sakaria was exceedingly complicated, thus leading to many unforeseen situations with which the Greek organization was not sufficiently good to deal.
- (d.) Faulty means of inter-communication.
- (e.) Inadequate means of transport and faulty supply arrangements.
- (f.) Faulty ammunition supply.
- (g.) Bad subordinate Staff work generally.
- (h.) Their failure to cripple the Turkish Army in the early stages of the operations. This compelled them to employ at the Sakaria forces larger than they were able to maintain there.

6. Distribution of opposing armies, 23rd September, 1921.

From the latest information at our disposal, the distribution of the opposing armies appears to have been as follows:—

Greek Army						Rifle and sabre strength.
Bilejik area						
1 Division	3,700
1 Regiment	1,500
Eskishehr area, General Headquarters—						
10 Divisions	37,000
Cavalry Brigade	500
Afium Kara Hissar area—						
1 Division	3,700
2 Regiments	3,000
Reserve—6 Regiments	7,500
Total						56,900
Nationalist Army—						
Bilejik area—2 Divisions	3,500
Eskishehr area—12 ¹ / ₃ Divisions	30,500
Afium Kara Hissar area—10 ¹ / ₃ Divisions	15,750
Reserve—6 Divisions	14,000
Total						63,750

7. Present condition of the Turkish Nationalist Army.

- (a.) *The Higher Command.*—Doubt no longer exists as to the efficiency of Nationalist General Headquarters, and of the Commanders of formations. Their conduct of the retirement, over 100 miles in length, in the face of a resolute enemy, and without any serious mishap, confirms the skill of commanders and higher staffs, while their handling of the difficult tactical situation in the battle of the Sakaria appears to have been efficient.
- (b.) *The troops.*—All the information at our disposal indicates that the Turkish soldier is good. The cavalry have shown enterprise and dash. The infantry have fought stubbornly and well, and their marching has been in no way inferior to that of the Greeks. The artillery, though numerically weaker than that of the Greeks, has been skilfully handled.
- (c.) *Casualties.*—It is reported that the Turkish casualties from the commencement of operations have amounted to about 30,000, and that in addition there have been some 10,000 deserters. It is also reported that 31,000 reinforcements had been sent to the Army before the end of the operations. It may, therefore, be assumed that the Army will soon be up to its original strength.

- (d.) *War matériel.*—There is no evidence to show that the Turks are dangerously deficient in guns, rifles, ammunition, or other war matériel; but it is known that their reserves are small. As, however, from secret information at our disposal, it is believed that they are now arranging for large supplies of this nature from France and other European countries, it seems probable that by next spring they will be better armed and equipped than they have hitherto been. We have no definite information as yet that contracts are complete, although arrangements are far advanced. When these arrangements are complete, the Turks will no longer be dependent upon Bolshevik Russia alone for the supply of such matériel.
- (e.) *Moral.*—The *moral* of the Turkish Nationalist Army must be considered high. The effect of the victory at the Sakaria, and the subsequent 60 miles advance, will have spread, not only to the Army, but throughout the length and breadth of Anatolia. It will assuredly have kindled Nationalist enthusiasm among those who were wavering in their allegiance to Mustapha Kemal, and is likely to redouble the difficulties of the Greeks in the occupied area.
- (f.) *Position of Mustapha Kemal.*—There is no doubt that the prestige of Mustapha Kemal himself has been greatly enhanced as a result of these operations. Formerly in the position of a Prime Minister answerable to a Government, he now appears to be almost in the position of a Dictator. We may, therefore, assume that the Moderate Party in the Angora Government is, for the time being, firmly in power, and this assumption, if correct, would seem to remove any immediate danger of the return of Enver Pasha, or of a military alliance between the Nationalists and Bolshevik Russia, especially as the Nationalists will shortly be no longer wholly dependent upon Russia for the supply of war matériel. At the same time, Mustapha Kemal is in such a strong military position, that there appears to be no reason why he should moderate his political demands, in the event of peace negotiations being re-opened.

8. Present condition of the Greek Army.

- (a.) *The Higher Command.* Full credit must be given to the Greek Higher Command for their excellent conduct of the earlier phases of these operations. With the exception of one miscarriage of orders, while the Greeks were advancing through Eskişehir, by which an opportunity was lost of intercepting a considerable Turkish force, the operations were carried through according to plan. Even in the battle of the Sakaria the Greeks appeared at one time to be within reach of victory, but at the crisis of the battle they allowed themselves to be outgeneralled by the Turks, and thus they failed.

- (b.) *The troops*.—All evidence in our possession goes to prove that the Greek troops marched and fought admirably, in spite of great privations. Their defeat at the Sakaria, and subsequent retirement to Eskişehir, must inevitably have adversely affected their *moral*, which, previous to those events, was very high. They must also, to some extent, have lost confidence in their leaders, and this will no doubt lead to the usual political bickering, so prevalent in the Greek Army even in better times, which reacts so unfortunately upon its efficiency.
- (c.) *Casualties*.—It is reported that the Greek casualties have amounted to about 31,000. Most of these casualties have no doubt been replaced already, and the balance can be replaced in the near future.
- (d.) *War matériel*.—It was evident that at the Sakaria there was a shortage of ammunition, but this is accounted for by the failure of transportation arrangements, and did not represent an actual shortage in the country. As the Greeks are now at liberty to purchase their requirements from civilian firms of any nationality, there appears to be no reason why they should not in future obtain all their needs, up to the limit of their financial resources.

9. Courses open to the Turkish Nationalists.

It is evident from recent information that the Greeks do not intend to resume the offensive before next spring. The initiative in the campaign may therefore be considered as having definitely passed to the Turks. The course open to Mustapha Kemal are as follows:—

- (a.) To continue operations on a large scale and engage the Greek Army with a view to defeating it, and driving it out of Anatolia.

Such operations would be difficult at any time, owing to the lack of railway facilities and accommodation for troops, but the difficulties in winter will be multiplied many times. This course is therefore very improbable, if similar results can be obtained by other means.

- (b.) To avoid a general engagement, but to harass the Greeks by guerilla operations, directed against their lines of communications, with a view to compelling them to withdraw from their present line.

Such operations present comparatively little difficulty. Mustapha Kemal would be able to count on receiving assistance from the Turkish elements of the population in the occupied area. Climatic conditions, and the difficult nature of the country, would render such operations even more difficult to cope with than the similar tactics adopted by the Boers in the later stages of the South African War. If the Turks successfully develop guerilla tactics they would stand a good chance of compelling the Greeks to abandon Eskişehir.

- (c.) To avoid all active operations against the Greeks and devote the winter to training and re-organization, hoping that political and financial troubles will force the Greek Government to demobilize the bulk of their army during the winter.

Time is undoubtedly in favour of the Turks in this connection, as the Greeks cannot afford to maintain a large army in the field for an indefinite period. From a military point of view, however, the complete cessation of offensive operations is unsound.

- (d.) Concurrently with (a), (b) or (c) the Angora Government may develop operations against either Constantinople or Mesopotamia, with a view to bringing pressure on the Allies to induce them to modify the terms of the Treaty of Sévres.

An early advance on Constantinople, with the Greek Army situated on the flank as it is at present, would be a very dangerous military operation. It would also bring the Nationalists into direct conflict with France and Italy, as well as with Great Britain, thus creating a situation which would appear to be at present out of harmony with the political programme of the Angora Government.

An operation of any magnitude against Mesopotamia appears to be equally improbable unless the French Government conclude a separate peace in Cilicia. It is considered that Mustapha Kemal will be disinclined to reduce his forces on the western front by sending any considerable detachments to the Tigris front so long as the Greek Army remains in Asia Minor. Even if political considerations demanded such a course the difficulties of transportation would probably prevent its adoption. The central section of the Baghdad Railway is in French hands, so that the Turks would have the assistance of the railway for only a portion of the distance.

An operation undertaken by a small detachment against the Mosul vilayet is however, always possible, until such time as peace is restored in Anatolia. It is no doubt realized at Angora that even a small operation in this area would suffice to cause much disappointment and anxiety in Great Britain, and we must therefore be prepared for the possibility. The enemy forces, to be expected, would consist of local tribesmen supported by such Turkish regulars as still remain in the Diarbekr area. The numbers of Turkish regulars in this area are believed to be small, but there are enough to cause us trouble. On the other hand, if the French conclude a separate peace in Cilicia, ample Turkish forces would become available to cause us serious anxiety.

10. Courses open to the Greek Army.

The arrival of winter precludes the possibility of offensive operations on a large scale. Any minor offensive operations, which might be undertaken, would merely tend to increase the supply and transport difficulties, which are already

considerable. The courses open to the Greek Army would therefore appear to be as follows:—

- (a.) To maintain their present positions, with a view to resuming the offensive in the Spring.

It seems probable that, by the Spring, they may find the Turkish Army a more formidable and efficient machine than it has been hitherto. There would therefore seem to be no better prospect of gaining a definite decision next year than in 1921.

- (b.) To select a suitable frontier line and make preparations for the permanent occupation of the territory they propose to annex.

With an unbeaten Turkish Army still in the field, the Greeks will be compelled, if they adopt this course, to maintain an army in Anatolia of sufficient size to deal with the Nationalist Army. Financial and political considerations would appear to forbid this course.

- (c.) To retire to the boundary of the Smyrna and Brusa enclaves, or possibly to that of Smyrna only, with a view to reducing the size of their army.

By this means they would be able to make great reductions in the size of the army, but such a retirement would be regarded as an admission of defeat, an admission to which the Greek Government would probably be unwilling to subscribe. Even if such a course were adopted, there is no guarantee that it would bring peace to Anatolia. Mustapha Kemal has repeatedly declared that he will continue the war so long as the Greeks remain in Smyrna, and there is little doubt that he intends to carry out his word.

11. Conclusions.

In view of the factors enumerated above, it is the opinion of the General Staff that the Greek Army is not capable of enforcing a decision upon the Turkish Nationalists.

In a former paper they gave as their considered opinion that although it appeared possible that the Greek Army, fighting alone and unsupported, might obtain some initial success in the operations which were then about to commence, they saw no prospect of any decisive victory being gained which would bring peace to Anatolia.

The course of recent events has confirmed this opinion. Furthermore, recent decisions of the Supreme Council with regard to neutrality have tended to make the future still darker for the Greeks. The Turks will no longer be restricted to Russian Bolshevik sources and the contraband traffic for the supply of their needs in war matériel, as they are known to be in negotiation for large supplies of war matériel from European countries. The General Staff are of opinion that, as time goes on, the relative efficiency of the Turks as compared with that of the Greeks is likely to increase.

The General Staff are, therefore, of opinion that the Greeks have nothing to gain by continuing military operations, and that the best course open to them is to commence peace negotiations with Mustapha Kemal immediately, using such territory as they hold to bargain with, before its loss is risked.

C. P. 3434

F. O. 371/6533/E 11764

No. 10

Lord Hardinge (Paris) the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 776 *Telegraphic*

En clair by bag.

PARIS, October 21, 1921.

(Received October 21)

When I called this morning upon the President of the Council, he told me that he had just seen the Greek Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and had had a long conversation with them. Their attitude, he said, was intractable. To his surprise, instead of opening with him discussions for mediation on the conditions of peace with Turkey, they had informed him that the Greek Government propose to establish Greek Civil administration in the occupied areas of Anatolia and that for the time being there was no question of mediation or of peace with Turkey.

Monsieur Briand appears to have spoken very strongly to the Greeks pointing out their mistaken attitude. To establish Civil administration in the occupied areas would, he said, imply annexation, would not meet with the approval of the Powers, and must inevitably become a source of weakness to the Greek Government and of exasperation to the Turks. He pointed out to them that they had made a great mistake in not accepting the overtures for mediation proposed by Your Lordship in July last and that if they continue in their present course it will only lead to their eventual disaster. He added that if they wish to have a future, they should consolidate their position and concentrate their power nearer home, since it was not unlikely that as time went on the Jugo-Slavs might have aspirations in the direction of Salonica and the Bulgarians towards Cavalla. He strongly impressed upon them the necessity of modifying their policy and of coming to terms with Turkey either directly or through the mediation of the Powers, since it was essential, not merely for Greece but for the whole of Europe and the East, that peace should be restored in the nearest possible future.

The Greek Delegates replied that they would consider what he had said to them and they asked for a further interview. Monsieur Briand believes that they have not told him their full scheme of policy which he expects to hear at the next meeting and of which he has promised to tell me the result.

On my observing that, as far as His Majesty's Government are aware, the Angora Government are not in a very conciliatory mood and it was possible that they also would not listen at the present moment to any proposals of mediation, Monsieur Briand replied by recalling to me the fact that the Angora Parliament had rejected almost contemptuously the first proposals of the French Government for an agreement respecting the Cilician frontier and the surrender of French prisoners of war. Later advices had however shown an improved spirit on the part of Mustapha Kemal but that the latter was even then doubtful as to the attitude of the Assembly. Information received within the last week through Franklin Bouillon had been to the effect that Mustapha Kemal was anxious to conclude the agreement with France and had decided to force the hand of the Assembly by making it a question of confidence. The latest information received by the French Government was to the effect that the Angora Assembly had accepted the Agreement, which is to be signed at Angora today or tomorrow.

I thereupon told Monsieur Briand that I had a long conversation with Your Lordship before I left London, on the question of the Near East and that although it might be possible for England and France to agree upon the policy to be pursued as regards the future of Anatolia by the constitution of an autonomous province of Smyrna under certain guarantees, the chief difficulty likely to arise between the two countries was as to the future of Thrace. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government it was impossible to ask the Greeks, our Allies in the later stages of the war and who had been of considerable assistance to us in our campaign against Turkey, to make further sacrifices in Thrace in addition to those that we might demand in Asia Minor. Although the Turkish and Greek armies in Anatolia occupy a position of stale mate, it could not be said that the Greek had suffered defeat and consequently they have to be regarded as a military power who had successfully secured a considerable amount of territory for the time being, even though the necessities of the situation might in the end compel them to evacuate a portion of it. The French view therefore that the Greeks should also evacuate Thrace would not be accepted by the Greek Government nor could it be pressed upon them by His Majesty's Government.

Monsieur Briand replied that the French view as regards the Greek occupation of Thrace was open to modification. The French Government were of opinion that the Government of Turkey should be concentrated at Constantinople, and that it was impossible to consider that Government free so long as the Greek Army was within a few miles and in striking distance of the capital. The French Government would be quite ready to agree to any modification of the situation in Thrace which would safeguard the position of the Turkish capital and which by being acceptable to the Turks would insure peace in the Near East.

I further observed that the French attitude towards King Constantine was yet another obstacle to the conclusion of peace, since whatever the objections to him

might be, and I was ready to admit there was a foundation for them, the fact remains that he is the ruler of Greece and the Greek Government could hardly be asked to displace him.

Monsieur Briand agreed saying that he could not approve of the idea of Monsieur Venizelos that the Powers should declare that the first step towards peace must be the abdication of the King, but that hostile as public opinion in France was against King Constantine on account of his German relationship and Germanophil sentiments, he had no doubt that the attitude of the French public opinion would be readjusted as soon as peace had been concluded, and as proof pointed to the fact that he had received the King's Ministers this morning.

HARDINGE

F.O. 371/6533/E 11620

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 444-446, No. 417

No. 11

Lord Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, October 21, 1921, 3.15 p.m.

No. 548 Telegraphic

(Received October 22, 11.45 a.m.)

Although officially and in all newspapers it is invariably and strongly stated that there can be no question of relinquishment of Asia Minor, many Greeks now say in private conversation that that will be the only solution.

Such a decision would almost certainly mean the fall of the present Government and possibly, though I think probably (? not yet) at least, the fall of the King... * It might very possibly lead to serious trouble and (? attack)-s on Veniselists and even perhaps on allied subjects but courage of 'Political Clubs' might be cooled by universal belief that great majority of the army are against them and would wreak vengeance on their return.

On the other hand, before pressing or encouraging this solution Allies should consider results.

Kemal might very likely pretend to accept it but his pretensions would certainly be enormously increased and he would set to work at once either openly or secretly to make himself master of Constantinople, to recover Thrace and even the Straits and he would become a very unpleasant neighbour at least to Mesopotamia and Syria. Neither we nor French and still less Italians are prepared to send strong enough forces to keep him in order and with Greeks beaten and gone I do not see who or what is to stop him.

* *The text is here uncertain.*

There would be also probable danger, in case of Greek collapse, of Serbian (? action) independently or combined with Bulgaria.

Repeated to Constantinople.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, p. 443, No. 416

No. 12

The Director of the British Military Intelligence to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Secret

M 1.2

22nd October 1921

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to transmit copies of the following reports received from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Constantinople; No. C.R.A.F. 543, dated 5th October 1921, on the subject of the Political Situation in Anatolia, and No. C.R.A.F. 543/1, dated 4th October 1921, on the subject of Nationalist Intelligence Organisations; No. C.R.A.F. 774 dated 4th October 1921, on the subject of Kurdish Affairs.

Copies of these reports have been sent to the India Office and Colonial Office.

F. O. 371/6533/E 11670

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 12

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ANATOLIA

Secret

No. C.R.A.F. 543

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 5, 1921

1. Political opinion in Anatolia on both internal affairs and foreign relations has varied greatly during the different phases of the recent operations between the Nationalists and the Greeks. The recent victory of the former has greatly strengthened MUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA and the Moderate Party in the Great National Assembly of which he is the leader. The reading at the end of August in the Great National Assembly of a report on the situation in India from Mr. MONTAGU has made a most favourable impression. Mr. MONTAGU's recommendations for the employment of a gradually increasing number of Indians, both in the civil service and in the army, have weakened the position of the Pan-Islamists and have further strengthened the position of the Moderate

PARTY. YUSUF KEMAL BEY¹, Minister for Foreign Affairs and head of the Opposition in the Great National Assembly, still wields much influence, although he represents a policy of accepting Russian assistance, which owing to the Nationalist victory is no longer so essential. YUSUF KEMAL is still at ANGORA and has not proceeded again to MOSCOW as had been rumoured.

2. RAFET PASHA² was appointed Vekil for National Defence in July which greatly increased his power, which he uses to support MUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA. RAFET PASHA acts as MUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA's mouthpiece in all military matters and combines the function of War Minister with that of Chief of the General Staff. FEVZI PASHA³, though still nominally holder of the latter appointment, is merely a cipher, all the power now being in RAFET PASHA's hands. FEVZI PASHA, who since the Nationalist retreat from ESKİŞEHİR is no longer admitted to the war councils, feels very slighted and his relations with RAFET PASHA are strained.

3. The Great National Assembly now comprises some 230 members, exclusive of a few honorary delegates who represent the ex-Turkish provinces of Syria, Arabia and the Caucasus. There are three main political parties in the Assembly which may be analysed as follows:—

- (a) The Moderate ("Mu'tedil") Party, headed by MUSTAFA KEMAL, which enjoys a very considerable majority, numbers between 165 and 170 adherents. This Party is stronger than ever since the recent retreat of the Greek Army, and is now known as the National Defence ("Mudafaa-i-Millie") Group. This party holds that Turkey's future depends on cultivating good relations with the Western Powers, and dreads all contact with Russia. It looks forward to making peace with the Allies, more or less on the basis of the National Pact, after having immobilised the Greek Army. This Party comprises nearly all the level-headed members of the Assembly.
- (b) The Extremist ("Mufrit") Party, headed by YUSUF KEMAL, which comprises some 45 to 50 members, aims at establishing the complete independence of Turkey. This Party will be satisfied with nothing less

¹ YUSUF KEMAL BEY was appointed Minister for Economics on the formation of the National Cabinet at ANGORA. He was a member of the Mission to MOSCOW. On his return, 15.5.21, he succeeded BEKİR SAMİ BEY as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

² RAFET PASHA commanded the Southern Army on the Western Front till the end of June 1921, when he resigned on grounds of ill health. In July he was appointed Vekil for National Defence at MUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA's instance, owing to the latter's confidence in RAFET PASHA's implicit obedience to his instructions.

³ MUSTAFA FEVZİ PASHA was Minister for War in Constantinople till resignation of Cabinet on 31. 3. 20, when he proceeded to Anatolia where he was appointed Minister for National Defence. He was unfavourable to the attempt by DAMAD FERİD in May 1920 to negotiate with MUSTAFA KEMAL. He is anti-British.

than the full letter of the National Pact; it aims at expansion to the East as opposed to relations with the West; and, as a corollary, regards Great Britain, which dominates the East, as Turkey's inveterate enemy. England's alleged Hellenic sympathies are only incidental in this enmity: even after the complete defeat of the Greeks, England will still be Turkey's strongest opponent in the way of eastward expansion. The aid of Russia, which outflanks England's eastern empire, must therefore be invoked at all costs.

YUSUF KEMAL is the strong man of this Party, other prominent members being ATIF (member for BAYAZID), NEJATİ SÜRİ (İSMİD) and YUNUS NADI⁴. NAZIM, who was also a member, has been condemned to imprisonment for Communism.

- (c) The Enverist Group forms the third and smallest Party in the National Assembly. It preserves the worst traditions of the C.U.P., and is the most extreme in its aims, though numerically very much in a minority. It only comprises some 15 members, such as EYUB SABRI⁵ and SHUKRİ. It aims at raising the standard of Pan-Islamic revolt throughout Central Asia, and its policy includes whole-hearted co-operation with Soviet Russia, in order to destroy the domination of the Western Powers, Great Britain in particular.

F. O. 371/6533/E 11670

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 12

NATIONALIST INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATIONS

Very Secret

C.R.A.F. 543/1

General Headquarters.

Allied Forces of Occupation.

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 4, 1921

1. The Headquarters of the Nationalist Intelligence is the MATBOUAT VE İSTIKHBARAT MOUDİARETİE (the Directorate of Propaganda and Information) and is at the Army Headquarters ANGORA. This Directorate was formed in the original instance by Brig. General KİAZIM Pasha and was later placed first under the direction of HAMDULLAH SUBHI Bey and then under AHMED MUKHTAR

⁴ YUNUS NADI is the editor of the "YENİ GÜN". He has attempted by the aid of his paper to prove the compatibility of the tenets of Islam with the principles of Bolshevism. He recently quarrelled with MUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA.

⁵ EYUB SABRI, a member of the C.U.P. and a notorious Pan-Islamist, is representative for ESKİ SHEHİR in the Great National Assembly. He is one of the leading advocates of Bolshevism in Anatolia.

Bev. It is now being run personally by the Chief of the General Staff. The Directorate controls propaganda, espionage and counterespionage, both in and outside Anatolia.

2. There are five foreign sections, which are established in ROME, ZÜRICH, BERLIN, PARIS and MOSCOW. Their function is the obtaining and transmission of European intelligence to Anatolia and the passing of Nationalist propaganda from the Directorate to Europe.

3. The ROME organisation can be considered the most important. It acts as a centre for communication with Anatolia (through RHODES and ADALIA). In the former place the Italians give the Nationalists all possible assistance. A courier system is arranged between MOSCOW, BERLIN and ROME. The ROME organisation is also associated with Moslem committees in TRIPOLI and was in communication with the Indian Khalifat Delegation.

That the Directorate takes a very intimate interest in the affairs of Europe and its views on Anatolia is shown by the fact that the ROME section regularly passes copies of newspapers published in England, France and Italy to ANGORA for translation.

4. The organisation at CONSTANTINOPLE for the supply of information is separate from these foreign organisations, and is run under the cloak of the Ottoman War Office. This organisation has a direct channel of communication with the Nationalist Headquarters at ANGORA. The organisation, which is now known as the FELIAH Group, was formerly called the MUHARIB Group. Its name was changed in August 1921, as certain correspondence incriminating the latter name had been captured by the British in a motor-boat plying between STAMBOUL and ISMİD. The Group is divided into three sections:

- (a) An Intelligence Department. This is in close touch with the 2nd Bureau of the French General Headquarters in Constantinople and was formerly facilitated enormously by them in the obtaining of military information with regard to the state and location of the Greek troops by their directly supplying it with all data that they obtained from British Headquarters.

The Intelligence Department, besides supplying military information, also investigates the antecedents of all officers whom the Group sends to Anatolia, and is responsible for the dissemination of Nationalist propaganda in Constantinople and, to a certain extent, in Europe through such Turcophile representatives as M. FRANKLIN BOUILLON.

- (b) An Adjutant General's Department, which forwards officers desirous of joining the Nationalist forces to Anatolia, and also similarly arranges for the transfer of specialists (telegraphists, wireless operators, etc.).
- (c) A quartermaster General's Branch, which arranges the purchase of arms and munitions etc. and organises the smuggling of arms, munitions, maps,

military text-books, etc. from Constantinople to the Nationalist forces in Anatolia.

5. The Group is also used as a channel for secret communications between HAMID Bey, Vice-President of the Turkish Red Crescent Society and Nationalist representative in Constantinople, and the Vekil for Foreign Affairs at ANGORA, and as an intermediary for, putting into force Nationalist intrigues for fomenting trouble in THRACE and BULGARIA.

6. The contre-espionage organisation in Anatolia is run by the Directorate through the AIN PE TESHLIKATI. This is a military police organisation with agencies located in the more important inland and seaboard towns. Its functions are:-

- (a) Rigid passport control of all persons entering or leaving Anatolia.
- (b) The surveillance of all foreigners in the more important towns.
- (c) The selection of couriers to such places as Constantinople, etc.

The organisation has a branch in Constantinople which issues passes to people wishing to proceed to Anatolia. There are also branches in the CAUCASUS and PERSIA. All persons arrested by the AIN PE organisation are brought in front of the ISTIKLAL Courte, which were formed to deal with all offences against the security of the realm.

7. The AIN PE organisation is, to a certain extent, a duplication of the Department for Public Security, but the former is a military organisation while the latter is under the Vekil for the Interior. In those towns where there are officials of both the AIN PE organisation and the Department for Public Security, those of the former take control in cases of doubt. The AIN PE officials are in direct communication with ANGORA and invariably refer cases to Headquarters before giving permits to proceed to the interior to persons without a proper visa.

F.O. 371/6533/E. 11670

No. 13

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, October 22nd 1921

(Received October 24)

Telegraphic

No. 780 By Post

My telegram No. 776 of October 21st.

Leading article in last night's "Temps" refers to article in Manchester "Guardian" which apparently stated that under Angora Agreement France had

promised to assist Turks to recover Smyrna, Thrace and Adrianople, and conceded complete sovereignty to Turkey over Constantinople and the Straits.

"Temps" points out that such rumours are completely untrue, and will not trouble Anglo-French relations. The negotiations undertaken by Monsieur Franklin-Bouillon were primarily intended to secure the liberation of prisoners. This end had already been obtained.

It remained to fix the Turkish Syrian frontier and arrange the evacuation of Cilicia. This frontier, the "Temps" adds, will be very similar to that adopted in London. As to the evacuation of Cilicia, arrangements would be made for the protection of minorities in accordance with the usual international treaties on this subject. There was nothing in the proposed agreement which would affect the political and economic problems to be decided upon in accord with the Allies of France.

This forecast is confirmed by an article in to-day's "Echo de Paris" which adds that the only new arrangements proposed are those connected with economic questions. Measures will be taken to ensure free exchange between the countries on either side of the frontier.

"Echo" warns Monsieur Gounaris that the first step towards a 'rapprochement' between Paris and Athens will be the acceptance of conditions making it possible to establish peace in Near East.

During last night's debate Monsieur Briand stated: "I have the satisfaction of informing you that in future our uneasiness on that score (i.e. relations with Syria and Cilicia) will be allayed, and that the Angora Assembly has agreed to settle with us the question of the frontier of Syria and Cilicia. This will open to us an interesting Near Eastern policy and will release a number of French troops".

F.O. 371/6533/E. 11872

No. 14

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 24th 1921.

No. 983.

My Lord,

The Japanese High Commissioner, who is very active, informs me that he has had several conversations with Hamid Bey, the Kemalist agent at Constantinople. On one occasion, Monsieur Uchida asked Hamid Bey why he did not discuss politics with me and indicate the terms on which the Nationalists would be prepared to make peace. Hamid Bey replied that he was not authorised to enter into such discussions with me and that even if he did, he could only discuss terms of

peace on the basis of the National Pact. He then admitted that he himself had drafted that instrument and that he now regretted that he had drafted it in such a way as to preclude a liberal interpretation of its terms.

2. The Turkish press professes to believe that Monsieur Gounaris, realising the difficult position of Greece, has gone to the allied capitals to ask for mediation. As a corollary to this view, the Turkish press states that the Nationalists will not abate a jot in their terms. The "Yeni Shark", a somewhat sensational paper edited by one of the Turks recently imprisoned at Malta, professed to give a few days ago the terms on which the Greek Government would be ready to evacuate Asia Minor. M. Gounaris was reported to have declared that all Anatolia, including Smyrna, would be evacuated and restored to Turkish sovereignty. In the territory of Smyrna, as delimited by the treaty of Sévres, there would be a Greek High Commissioner, and the protection of Greek interests would be entrusted to a Mixed Commission. The boundaries of Thrace and its form of administration would be fixed by the Supreme Council. Neither of the parties would demand an indemnity of any kind. If these preliminaries of peace were accepted, the two parties would give orders to their Commanders in Chief to enter into pourparlers for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of an armistice.

3. To a third party these terms would seem very moderate but the Turkish press will have none of them. No doubt a good deal of what is written is in the nature of bluff.

I have, etc.

(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F. O. 371/6534

No. 45

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 25, 1921
(Received October 31)

No. 386

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit the following account of an interview which the acting first dragoman had on the 23rd instant with Hamid Bey, vice-president of the Ottoman Red Crescent Society and local Kemalist agent. Mr. Matthews had called on Hamid Bey to obtain from him a document relating to the exchange of the British prisoners in Anatolia, and, while waiting for the document to be prepared, had asked if it was a fact that an agreement had been signed with M. Franklin-Bouillon by the Government of Angora. Hamid Bey replied in the

affirmative, and stated with evident pleasure that the new frontier line between Turkey and Syria would start from a point a little to the south of Payas on the Gulf of Alexandretta and about 9 kilom. to the north of Alexandretta. It would then pass north of Aleppo and cross the Euphrates at Kalat Jaber about half-way between Meskench and Rakka and some 100 kilom. south of the Bagdad Railway line. It would continue east to Nisibin and thence to the frontier of Mesopotamia. To prevent Aleppo losing its importance as a commercial centre, it had been decided to remove all customs barriers on the frontier between Syria and Turkish territory. The main Bagdad Railway line would be everywhere within Turkish territory, but was to be worked by the French. Mersina was to remain Turkish and Alexandretta was to be made a free port. The French would evacuate Cilicia a few weeks after the agreement had been approved by the French Government. No mention had been made of the Capitulations, as other Powers besides France and Turkey were interested in that question. M. Franklin-Bouillon had accomplished the journey from Angora to Constantinople by car and destroyer in thirty hours. He arrived here on the 22nd October and left the same day for Paris, where he would see M. Briand before the latter left France for Washington. Hamid Bey had had a conversation of an hour with M. Franklin-Bouillon.

2. Referring to the conclusion of peace between Greece and Turkey, Hamid Bey said that he did not anticipate this before the spring of 1922. He foresaw that the Grand National Assembly would dissolve itself after arranging for elections for a Constituent Assembly, the members of which would be chosen from all parts of the country, including CONSTANTINOPLE. This body would ratify the treaty of peace and take the necessary measures for carrying its provisions into effect. He was most emphatic that no action would be taken against the present Sultan, with whom the Nationalists had no quarrel. He was equally emphatic that Mustapha Kemal Pasha would not endeavour to promote himself from Dictator of Anatolia to be Dictator of the whole of Turkey. As proof of this he said that it had taken Mustapha Kemal two days to induce the Grand National Assembly to approve of the agreement with France, which had been signed at 4 o'clock in the morning (of the 20th October presumably).

3. Hamid Bey concluded by saying that no privileges had been granted to France, to which other States, such as the United Kingdom or the United States, could take exception.

4. The 'Wakt' and the 'Tevhid-i Efkiar' of the 24th instant publish a sketch-map on which Payas, Jerablus, Killis, Birejik, Ras-ul-Ain, Mardin and Nisibin are placed on the Turkish side of the new frontier, and comment favourably on the agreement in leading articles. The 'Wakt' says that it is necessary to await the publication of the official text of the agreement to learn how certain points in dispute have been arranged. Nevertheless it is clear, it continues, that a complete

accord has been reached by the two parties with regard to the evacuation of Cilicia, the rectification of the Syrian frontier, the fixing of the Eastern frontier, and with regard to minorities in the territory under French occupation being placed under an international guarantee.

5. With such information as is available locally, it is difficult to decide whether the agreement runs counter to the letter of the Treaty of Sévres and the Tripartite Agreement. The modification of the frontier in favour of Turkey in 'the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates' would certainly appear to do so (articles 62-64 of the Treaty of Sévres). Article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement was no doubt designed to give France a monopoly of railway interests in her zone.

6. I would add that rumours are current as to special privileges having been granted with regard to the position of French schools in Anatolia and as to the existence of secret clauses in the agreement for the supply of material of war, both naval and military, to the Kemalists.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 449-451, No. 422

No. 16

Conclusions of a Meeting of the British Cabinet held in Mr. Chamberlain's Room, House of Commons, S.W., on Tuesday, 1st November, 1921 at 5 p.m.

PRESENT

The Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Rt. Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Rt. Hon. Viscount Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.

The Most Hon. The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.T., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Rt. Hon. E.S. Montagu, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

The Rt. Hon. S. Baldwin, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.

The Rt. Hon. H.A.L. Fisher, M.P., President of the Board of Education.

The Rt. Hon. A.J. Balfour, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Rt. Hon. E. Shortt, K.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Home Affairs.

The Rt. Hon. W.S. Churchill, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Rt. Hon. Sir L. Worthington-Evans, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Rt. Hon. Sir A. Mond, Bart., M.P., Minister of Health.

The Rt. Hon. Sir Hamar Greenwood, Bart., K.C., M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT

Lieut.-General Sir C.H. Harington, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces of Occupation at Constantinople. (For Conclusion 2).

Lt.-Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B., Secretary.

Col. S.H. Wilson, C.B., C.M.G., Principal Assistant Secretary, C.I.D.

THE NEAR EAST

Greece and Turkey.

2) With reference to Cabinet 81 (21), the Cabinet had before them the following documents relating to the situation in the Near East:

Memo. by the Secretary of State for India, C.P. 3248

Memo. by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, C.P. 3328.

Telegram from the Viceroy of India, C.P. 3383.

Telegram from the Viceroy of India, C.P. 3412.

Telegram from the Governor of Bombay, C.P. 3423.

Memo. by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, C.P. 3328.

Memo. by the Secretary of State for War C.P. 3434.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave the Cabinet an account of his recent conversations with M. Gounaris and M. Baltazzi, the Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Minister respectively, who had come to London from Paris, where they had received a somewhat chilly reception, and were going on to Rome. The Greek Ministers had not denied that the military position of the Greek Army was as unfavourable as stated in the Memorandum by the General Staff (C.P. 3434). In fact, as Lord Curzon informed the Cabinet, there was evidence, which he had not mentioned to M. Gounaris, that the situation was if anything worse, e.g. the bad moral of the Greek Army, many desertions, and the precarious political position of the Greek Government.

After M. Gounaris had been reminded of the rejection, or at least non acceptance, by the Greek Government of the terms suggested by the Allies on no less than three occasions, Lord Curzon had urged that the Greek Government should entrust their interests to the Allied Powers. M. Gounaris had stated his willingness to place Greek interests in the hands of Great Britain, but Lord Curzon had pointed out that, while Great Britain might be more favourable to Greece than France or Italy, it was impossible for him to dissassociate herself from the

Allies. Lord Curzon had then asked whether M. Gounaris would place himself in the hands of the Powers on the understanding that they would work for a solution on the basis proposed in June 1921, namely, in its broad outline; Smyrna to be made an autonomous province with a Christian Governor and an international gendarmerie, and Thrace to be provided for as in the Treaty of Sévres with a rectification of the frontier in favour of Turkey. After consulting his colleagues, M. Gounaris had stated their willingness to accept mediation on this basis, subject to the approval of the Greek Government, to whom they must refer. Lord Curzon anticipated that, on the following morning, M. Gounaris would be in a position to communicate a definite acceptance.

The next step, Lord Curzon continued, would have been to approach France and Italy with a view to a communication to the Turkish Government. The forces of the Angora Government were wasted and exhausted and there was some reason to believe that they might be prepared to come to terms. The Constantinople Government was notoriously anxious for peace.

The whole situation, however, had been transformed within the last few hours by the receipt from the French Government of the Treaty concluded by M. Franklin Bouillon with Mustapha Kemal, which contained provisions which were a breach of honour and good faith and were most detrimental to British interests. Lord Curzon explained that the French Government had repeatedly stated—twice in writing—that M. Franklin Bouillon was not an emissary of the Government but a private individual, engaged in a concession hunting mission, who had been authorised to carry out conversations with a view to paving the way to an agreement. This could hardly be objected in view of the fact that France had no less than 80,000 men under arms in Cilicia, and was deeply interested in the question of the release of prisoners and the evacuation of her troops. On an analysis of the new Treaty, however, it was clear that this well-known politician had concluded an agreement of a very different order.

Lord Curzon then proceeded to give the Cabinet an analysis of the agreement, which he undertook to circulate together with his observations.

Article 1 provided for the conclusion of a separate peace with Turkey. This might be regarded as a breach of the Treaty of September 4th, 1914, by which Great Britain and France agreed not to make a separate peace. The Cabinet, however, felt that in view of the uncertain status of Mustapha Kemal as a technical rebel against the Constantinople Government, this would not be a point to emphasise too strongly in any representations to the French Government.

Article 3 and Article 5 were both violations of the Tripartite Agreement; the latter Article in particular made no adequate provision for the protection of minorities, which was definitely imposed by the Tripartite Agreement as to France and Italy within their respective spheres of interest.

Article 7 contained the most objectionable features. It traced a frontier between Turkey and the mandated territory of Syria, which was much more favourable to Turkey than the Treaty of Sèvres. The French had no right whatsoever in this way to dispose of territory which had been handed over to the Allies, and their action was the more reprehensible owing to the fact that the territory had been conquered for the Allies by the British forces. By the agreement in question fertile territories would be handed over to the Turk. Furthermore, the stipulations in the Treaty of Sèvres in regard to the Baghdad Railway had been ignored, and, under the new Agreement the Turks would be at liberty to use the railway for purposes of military transport. The railway could even be utilised for the transport of troops to attack Mosul.

In addition to the agreement, Lord Curzon reported that there was a letter from Yusuf Kemal which contained some ambiguous and disquieting proposals. Moreover, information from secret sources tended to confirm the most disquieting features of these proceedings.

In view of the French action, Lord Curzon felt that the steps he had contemplated to follow up the conversations with M. Gounaris must be postponed until he had cleared up the situation with the French Government, in regard to which he made definite suggestions — although he pointed out that the difficulty of making representations was materially increased by the departure of M. Briand and all the principal officials of the Quai D'Orsay for Washington.

In the subsequent prolonged discussion, emphasis was laid on certain disquieting features of the situation. France appeared to be adopting an attitude definitely hostile to British interests in the Near East. The growth of friction with France was the more disagreeable insofar that France was still heavily armed particularly from the point of view of aerial armaments. The most sinister feature in the Agreement received from the French Government was that part dealing with the Baghdad Railway and it appeared to lay Mosul open to the Turks while the French would look on with satisfaction if Mustapha Kemal were to carry his activities in that direction. The situation in the Near East had been steadily and remorselessly developing and had seriously affected our relations with France without our gaining anything in return. The situation in Mesopotamia was precarious, and would become even more so with the French helping Mustapha Kemal. A suggestion was made to the effect that there was a tendency to regard Mustapha Kemal as much more powerful than he really was and further that information received in the past as regards the in-efficiency and shortcomings of the Greek Army had not always been correct, and that the same might prove to be the case now. Emphasis was laid on the effect the Turkish situation was having in India, and the diplomatic triumph which the French Government would win in coming to an agreement with Mustapha Kemal. Italy did not count and with an

agreement concluded between the French Government and Mustapha Kemal, Great Britain, and Great Britain alone, would be regarded as the enemy of the Turks.

Lieutenant-General Sir C.H. Harington gave to the Cabinet his views regarding the military situation in Asia Minor and the efficiency of the Greek Army, and undertook to obtain by telegraph the latest information available concerning the state of that Army.

As regards the action to be taken to deal with the situation as modified by the communication which had been received from the French Government, it was generally agreed that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs must ask that Government for an explanation of the action taken and for information as to their future intentions, but some difference of opinion was expressed as to how this should be done. On the one hand, it was suggested that the French Ambassador should be informed that His Majesty's Government had received the terms of the proposed Agreement with astonishment and dismay and could not believe that the French Government seriously contemplated approving its terms, and, on the other hand, it was strongly urged that there were serious objections to taking any action which would tend to cause friction between the two Governments, and, that while merely taking note of the proposed agreement the attention of the French Government should be called to the regrettable fact that although we had tried to work hand in hand with them in directing our Near Eastern policy, they proposed now entering into an agreement behind our backs which was thoroughly hostile to British interests. It was also suggested that if any protest were made, it should be accompanied by some action, and that the British Government should pose neither as the friend of the Turk or the friend of the Greek, nor as a seeker after mines or other concessions, but as a peace-maker.

Some difference of opinion was also evident regarding the desirability of entering into direct communication with Mustapha Kemal. On the one hand it was argued that direct negotiations should be commenced without delay with a view to coming to some agreement, even if it meant sacrificing certain interests in Asia Minor, and on the other hand it was strongly argued that Great Britain was in a very different position to France who had a large force of troops in Cilicia and frontiers marching with those of the Angora Government, and it was asked what excuse there would be for the British Government entering on such negotiations, as there was really nothing to make peace over. At the same time it would be quite another matter to enter into communication with Mustapha Kemal with a view to mediating between Greece and Turkey; and the trend of opinion was in favour of this being done provided a favourable reply was received from M. Gounaris.

CABINET 84 (21)

F.O. 371/6535/E 12380

No. 17

*Foreign Office to the India Office**Immediate and secret*

FOREIGN OFFICE, 1st November, 1921

Sir,

With reference to your letter P 4520 of October 13th and previous correspondence regarding the raising by Indians of funds for the Kemalists, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to state for the information of Mr. Secretary Montagu that he has received an enquiry from the Imperial Ottoman Bank here whether His Majesty's Government would object to the remittance of ten thousand pounds to Mustafa Kemal at Angora. The bank explains that it has received this sum from the Netherlands Trading Company who in turn have received it from their Bombay office, with the request that it should be telegraphed to Mustafa Kemal. The bank has received no indication as to what the remittance represents.

2. Lord Curzon considers that this remittance may not be unconnected with proposals for raising a loan in India to help the Kemalists. Subject, however, to any observations which Mr. Montagu may desire to make, Lord Curzon proposes, in view of the Allied attitude of neutrality, to inform the bank that His Majesty's Government do not intend to take any action in this matter.

3. A similar letter has been addressed to the Treasury.

I am, etc.

(Signed) LANCELOT OLIPHANT

F.O. 371/6534/E. 12027

No. 18

Foreign Office to the British Treasury

FOREIGN OFFICE, 1st November, 1921

Immediate and secret

Sir,

I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to state for the information of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury that he has received an enquiry from the Imperial Ottoman Bank here whether His Majesty's Government would object to the remittance of ten thousand pounds to Mustafa Kemal at Angora. The bank explains that it has received this sum from the Netherlands Trading Company, who in turn have received it from their Bombay Office, with the request that it should be telegraphed to Mustafa Kemal. The bank has received no indication as to what the remittance represents.

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any observations which Mr. Montagu may desire to make. Lord Curzon proposes, in view of the Allied attitude of neutrality, to inform the bank that His Majesty's Government do not intend to take any action in this matter.

3. A similar letter has been addressed to the India Office.

I am, etc.

Signed LANCELOT OLIPHANT

F.O. 371/6534/E. 12027

No. 19

India Office to the Colonial Office

INDIA OFFICE, 1st November 1921

P. 4438.

Sir,

With reference to your letter No. 48729, dated the 30th September, transmitting a copy of a telegram from the High Commissioner, Iraq, suggesting that he should convey to King Feisal an assurance that His Majesty's Government would welcome his taking steps to initiate negotiations with Mustapha Kemal with a view to the formulation of an agreement, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to state for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies that, while he does not of course wish to intervene in any way in regard to the local aspects of the question, he feels that from the wider point of view the course of action suggested by Sir P. Cox might assist to bring about a general improvement in the position of His Majesty's Government in regard to Turkey and the Middle East, and in the view taken by Indian Moslem opinion of the situation. Mr. Montagu desires therefore to support Sir P. Cox's suggestion.

I have, etc.

(SD) L.D. WAKELY

F.O. 371/6369/E. 12341

No. 20

Extracts from a review by the British Secret Intelligence Service of the more important informations obtained during the period July 15th-October 15th 1921

Misc. 12/V

Secret

November 1, 1921

THE ANATOLIAN CAMPAIGN: FACTORS AFFECTING MEDIATION

Foreword. S.I.S. has been able to obtain from various authoritative and reliable sources in Anatolia, Constantinople, Rome and elsewhere, information of

a detailed nature from which it has been able to form a substantial estimate of the attitude of the various Governments and Parties interested in the question of mediation in the Anatolian campaign. This information is, to a large extent, based on communications which have passed between Angora and Constantinople, and between those places and Turkish representatives in Europe, the texts of which it has been possible, in many cases, to obtain, also upon accounts, containing verbatim statements, of Cabinet meetings which have taken place in Constantinople. In almost every case dates have been obtainable, which facilitate the narration of facts in chronological sequence. The salient features of these communications are given in the body of this memorandum. The full texts, to which marginal reference is made, are given in an Appendix, as Commun. No. 1, etc.

I.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE ANGORA AND CONSTANTINOPLE GOVERNMENTS: GENERAL

The most marked features, as regards the attitude in Angora towards mediation, have been the wave of Nationalism which has swept over Anatolia, and the consolidation of the power of Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

The strong Nationalist tendency in Anatolia has been primarily manifested by rigid adherence, throughout the vicissitudes of the past few months, to the so-called National Pact. It was reported by S.I.S., how in a declaration on Nationalist foreign policy on the 25th. June, Fevzi Pasha stated that the Government then held to the National Pact in its entirety; and reports which have since been received, indicate no modification in the attitude of the Great National Assembly, in this respect. For example, Mustapha Kemal, in a memorandum dated the 23rd. July, to Nationalist representatives abroad, on the subject of the Anatolian Government's foreign relations, laid stress on the fact that the agreement originally proposed by Bekir Sami had been repudiated on the ground that it was incompatible with the National Pact, and that a commercial agreement proposed by the Italians had proved unacceptable for similar reasons. Moreover, Bekir Sami, at a later date, referring to his subsequent negotiations with M. Briand, informed Yusuf Kemal that he considered the terms proposed by the French Prime Minister to be acceptable, in that they were in conformity with the National Pact. As apart from these instances quoted from S.I.S. reports, it has also been made abundantly evident in the Anatolian Press, that the National Pact has for some time constituted, and continues to constitute, the basis of Nationalist foreign policy.

There is no doubt that the position acquired by Mustapha Kemal is also an important factor in this connection. Mustapha Kemal's support in the Great

National Assembly is derived mainly from the National Defence Party, of which he is President. In an S.I.S. report of the middle of August, it was shown that the policy of this Party was strongly Nationalistic. Its programme included the exclusion of Enver and other Unionist leaders from the country; the adoption of comprehensive measures for the suppression of Russian Bolshevik propaganda; and opposition to the acceptance from the Bolsheviks of help, other than supplies of war material and money. The Party was, at first, in a somewhat precarious position, owing to the Unionists having succeeded in suborning a number of undecided delegates. It was finally, however, placed in an almost unassailable position by the adherence of Kiazim Kara Bekir, and his supporters from the Eastern provinces.

Opposition to Mustapha Kemal has come principally from the Enverists and an opposition group under the direction of Tahir Bey, which has been in favour of the opening of peace negotiations with the Greeks through the medium of the Allies. Strong measures were, however, taken to counteract the activities of these elements. Members of the National Defence Party were appointed as inspectors and members of Extraordinary Judicial Tribunals, which were set up in various districts with the object of preventing agitation against the Government. Enverist agents have been arrested, and according to reports of recent date, the Angora Government has refused permission for Enver and Jemal to attend a Mohammedan Congress, which is to be held at Ardahan during October. The differences between Mustapha Kemal and the exiled Unionist leaders appear, however, to be rather of a personal nature, than of principle.

Evidence of the increasing prestige of Mustapha Kemal was also found in the conferring on him, about the middle of September, of the titles of "Mushir" and "Ghazi". There is no doubt, moreover, that the pride and arrogance of Mustapha Kemal and his followers have been increased by the Nationalist Government having on various occasions been alluded to as the champion of Pan-Islamism. For instance, at the end of August, the Afghan Envoy at Angora, on the occasion of the recital of special prayers for the victory of Turkish arms, referred in eulogistic and flattering terms to the lead given by Anatolia to the Pan-Islamic movement.

The uncompromising attitude on the part of the Anatolian Turks towards the question of mediation in the war with the Greeks, which reports from S.I.S. unanimously demonstrate, appears to be due primarily to the factors outlined above.

As far as it has been possible to ascertain from S.I.S. sources, the first important step towards obtaining Allied mediation was taken by the Constantinople Cabinet, when early in August, Salih Pasha was despatched to Rome. It was established that Salih Pasha was sent with the definite object of meeting Nationalist deputies in Rome, and of arranging negotiations between Constantinople and Angora, on the one hand, and with the Allies on the other. This was

confirmed by a despatch, dated the 20th. August, from Salih Pasha to Mustapha Kemal. Salih Pasha, after stating that the Constantinople Government desired "the most honourable and most lavish peace terms possible" for Turkey, added that he had been instructed by his Government to communicate with Mustapha Kemal, through Jami Bey. He urged that it was, above all, necessary for the Turkish Nationalists to come to an understanding with Great Britain, pointing out that "Opposition to Great Britain for an unlimited period of time is disastrous and full of gravest dangers". He also pointed out that Turkish interests lay in the West rather than in the East, stating that "while there is still time let us not even lose a moment idly, but try and reach peace with Europe".

The Nationalist element in Rome, however, represented at that time by Bekir Sami, Jami Bey and Jellaleddin Arif Bey, whilst sharing Salih Pasha's views as to the necessity of arriving at an understanding with the Western Powers, favoured an agreement with France and Italy in preference to one with Great Britain. Jami Bey in a letter to Angora, dated the 12th. August, stated "it must be borne in mind that once we detach France and Italy from England, the latter will come to an understanding with us."

It appeared at first that the Nationalists were prepared to take advantage of Salih Pasha's presence in Rome to initiate negotiations on the subject of mediation; for it was ascertained from Angora at the beginning of September, that it had been agreed to send a mission to Rome, and that this mission was about to proceed via Rhodes. Hopes in Constantinople of the Nationalists adopting a conciliatory attitude were, however, short-lived; for on the 17th. September, a despatch was received from Salih Pasha, in which the latter stated that he despaired of persuading the Nationalists to approach the Allied Powers with a request for mediation. A few days later Jami Bey transmitted the following reply from Mustapha Kemal to Salih Pasha to the latter's despatch of the 20th. August, quoted above:

"At present our Government does not see any use in any peace move as offered by Salih Pasha: Please inform his Excellency of our attitude."

The Angora Government, although it had given this definite proof of its unwillingness to enter into formal negotiations for peace with the Allies generally; evidently thought it desirable to feel the way towards a separate understanding with France and Italy. Information on this subject is dealt with in greater detail below; but it can be said here that while negotiations with France proceeded very favourably from the Nationalist point of view, the latter made very slow progress with Italy, a perceptible coolness in fact arising between Rome and Angora.

In the meanwhile, reports were received such as to strengthen the impression that the Constantinople Cabinet, and in particular the Sultan, were desirous that peace overtures should be opened. On the 1st. September, the Sultan informed

Tewfik Pasha that he considered that the time had come to approach the Allies with a definite request for mediation. The Grand Vizier explained the Sultan's view to the Cabinet on the 3rd September, and it was decided, in the first place, that it was essential that the Cabinet should obtain definite information regarding the situation in Anatolia. Izzet Pasha, who was at first opposed to any action being taken by the Constantinople Cabinet, finally gave way. A confidential communication was thereupon sent to Mustapha Kemal, informing him of the Central Government's opinion that an opportune moment had arrived for peace overtures, requesting a statement of the Angora Government's attitude in this connection and regarding the situation in Anatolia.

The Sultan's views in this connection were obviously considerably in advance of those of the Cabinet. There were indications, in fact, that he was desirous of replacing the existing Cabinet with members of the Opposition Party, who would have no scruples as to approaching the Allies, regardless of the wishes of the Angora Government. On the 10th September, the Sultan said as much to the delegation of anti-Nationalists Turks, from the Samsun area; but he had to admit to them that his hands were tied for the moment.

It was quite evident, however, that the Cabinet had no intention of acting independently of Angora; for, on the 13th. September, it was unanimously decided that, in accordance with the wishes of the Angora Government, expressed through the medium of the Nationalist Committee at Constantinople, neither the resignation of the Cabinet as a whole, nor any individual member, was to be considered at that juncture.

On the 19th. September an important Cabinet Meeting was held at Constantinople, as the result of which the attitude of Central Government was defined more clearly. Tewfik Pasha, in the course of a statement on the subject of mediation, expressed the opinion that a stalemate had been reached in Anatolia, and that he was convinced that "the time has now come for us to approach the Allies officially in the matter". After stating that he had been sounding Allied representatives in Constantinople on the question of peace, he continued; "My theme has always been that the Greeks should retain Thrace; they should also be granted certain concessions in the Smyrna vilayet, on the condition that Anatolia be evacuated at once". Izzet Pasha, Ali Riza Pasha and Zia Pasha protested; but the Grand Vizier adopted a surprisingly firm attitude. It appeared that his action had been inspired by the Sultan. It was also reported at this time that the majority of the Ministers, including Ali Riza and Zia Pashas, were being brought round to the Grand Vizier's point of view regarding peace overtures, and were evincing moderate tendencies regarding the Turkish peace desiderata. Izzet Pasha alone appeared to be intransigent (*etc.*).

Mustapha Kemal's reply to the Central Government's communication regarding the opening of overtures and requesting a statement of the Angora Government's attitude was received in Constantinople on the 24th. September and discussed at a fully attended Cabinet Meeting. The reply was a (sic) follows:—

"This is no time for peace pourparlers. The heroic Nationalist army is as over triumphant, and we are now in a position to enforce our own terms upon the Greeks and the Allies. These terms will include the complete evacuation by the Greeks of Thrace and Smyrna and the evacuation by the Allied forces of Constantinople and Anatolia."

Mustapha Kemal's message was approved by Izzet Pasha alone. The Cabinet, however, decided that, if events justified such a course, the Central Government would, on its own responsibility, open negotiations for peace with the Allies and the Greeks.

At the end of September, the Grand Vizier gave some effect to this decision by ordering instructions to be sent to Turkish representatives in Europe to report at once regarding the attitude of the Allies and the intentions of the Greek Government. Izzet Pasha, on the other hand, apparently acting under directions from Angora, sent instructions to Salih Pasha to make no overtures for the present; but the Grand Vizier cancelled these instructions, and notified Salih Pasha to continue as heretofore.

The Angora Government, however, about this time, received what appeared to be an unsolicited report from Jami Bey, dated the 23rd September, on the question of mediation. Jami Bey expressed the opinion that the Greeks would probably seek mediation soon. He urged a policy of moderation, saying that the Nationalists aim should be Smyrna, and not the Capital. "We must", he said, "do all in our power to avoid another complication at the Straits".

At the beginning of October, the Central Government gave further effect to its desire to initiate negotiations by making preparations for a peace conference and by appointing sub-commissions to collect statistics with regard to the populations of Thrace, Smyrna and the Greek occupied zone. Izzet Pasha, moreover, was prevailed upon to despatch a telegram to Mustapha Kemal on the 2nd. October, requesting that a mission or plenipotentiary be sent from Angora to Constantinople to collaborate with the Central Government over the question of mediation.

On October 3rd. the Constantinople Cabinet discussed the reply of the Turkish representatives in London, Rome and Paris, regarding the attitude of the Allies. These replies were not encouraging. It was shown that none of the Allied Governments had as yet considered the question of intervention seriously, and that the Italian Government considered that the most moderate terms acceptable to

the Greeks would be unacceptable to the Nationalists. It was decided, however, that İzzet Pasha should again instruct the Turkish representatives to approach the Allied Governments with the request that Greece should be asked to cease hostilities, and also to evacuate Anatolia.

Mustapha Kemal's reply to İzzet Pasha's telegram of the 2nd. October, was received on the 5th of that month, and amounted to a pointblank refusal. This reply stated that urgent questions such as mediation were not to be settled by the Constantinople Government, but by the Great National Assembly; that the Turkish ends were to be attained by force of arms, and not through the diplomacy of a Constantinople Cabinet; and that the latter would be kept informed of the decisions of the Great National Assembly. This reply created considerable dismay in the Cabinet and was taken as constituting conclusive proof of the uncompromising attitude adopted by the Great National Assembly.

II.

THE NATIONALISTS AND THE ITALIANS (Extract)

A report received during July indicated that, as the result of recent developments, the Italian Government was adopting an attitude of decided coolness towards the Turkish Nationalists. The undesirability of allowing this state of affairs to continue was evidently realised at Angora, where apprehension was also felt as to the possibility of a rapprochement between the British and Italian Governments, reacting to the detriment of the Nationalists. On the 29th July, Yusuf Kemal sent a communication to Jami Bey, instructing him to report on this subject. Jami Bey replied on the 7th August, to the effect that the Italians were certainly leaning towards Great Britain, but that it was not yet too late to win back the friendship of Italy.

Appendix No. 4

From Salih Pasha (Rome) to Mustapha Kemal Pasha (Angora), dated 20.8.21.

"As your Excellency is undoubtedly aware of the fact that the principles of the Government of Constantinople correspond to those of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in the sense of obtaining for our country the most honourable and most lavish peace terms possible, I have been instructed by our Government to communicate with you through your Rome representative.

"Once again, as Your Excellency is undoubtedly aware, our present situation with the advance of the Greek troops to the interior of Anatolia has rendered our political successes gained at the last London Conference, useless. The same advance has given a chance to our enemies to open their anti-Turkish campaign once again. This is all the more evident in England, which country is at present the

chief Entente power with whom we must in the long run come to an understanding, by recognising her right and prestige in her Eastern colonies. With a view to exposing no further our already worn out and devastated country and nation to graver dangers and risks, I have been sent to Europe and shall visit the Entente capitals of London, Paris and Rome, where I shall sound the various Entente Governments as to peace terms best obtainable.

"It must be a fact known to Your Excellency that the opposition to Great Britain for an unlimited period of time is disastrous and full of gravest dangers for us, and, at the same time, useless. We have neither the means nor the energy to pull down England from her very powerful world situation. On the contrary this will weaken Turkey so that we shall be utterly knocked down. The British may to-day employ Greeks against Turkey, but should the Greeks fail, she may find other means and nations to fight against us.

"Another quite important fact is that Turkey cannot hope to gain overmuch by leaning on the East, i.e. the Russian Bolsheviks, and, on the other hand, indefinitely neglecting the West may prove disastrous.

"My point of view, as well as that of my Government, is that before the danger is graver, and while there is still time, let us not even lose a moment idly but try and reach peace with Europe.

"With this object in view I have come to Europe, and if Your Excellency accepts and shares the same point of view all you have to do is to appoint or send a delegate well versed in politics and informed as to our present state to co-operate with me.

"As I have put before Your Excellency our views, may I be permitted to state that your Excellency may hear some disagreeable news, undoubtedly circulated by our enemies, as to my mission being one of asking mediation from Europe in the Turco-Greek war. Far from it, we are conscious of the grave consequences of such a step. As we are denying such rumours from this end Your Excellency can do the same from our end".

Appendix No. 5

From Mustapha Kemal Pasha to Bekir Sami Bey (Rome), dated 26.8.21

"In view of the conciliatory attitude adopted by the French, and the necessity of your personally explaining in detail the arrangements made by you with France, your presence here (Angora) is necessary. M. Franklin Bouillon, we are informed, will be here shortly. We can consult with you both on this very important question".

Appendix No. 6

From Yusuf Kemal to Jami Bey (Rome), dated 23.8.21 (Extract)

"Fethi Bey, who has reached Angora, has verbally conveyed your advice to Mustapha Kemal Pasha, who has been favourably impressed by your ideas of an

early understanding with Italy. Fethi Bey also saw Colonel Caprini and other prominent Italians at Constantinople, who also advocated your ideas. It has been, therefore, decided to ask for an Italian representative at Angora; and such a step has already been taken by asking the High Commissioner in Constantinople to let his Government know of our decision. Will you also repeat this offer to the Consulta, at the same time explaining as best you can our reasons for refusing Totzi”.

Appendix No. 9

From İzzet Pasha to Mustapha Kemal, dated 2.10.21

“Owing to the fact that we experience considerable delays and difficulties through having to refer various important subjects to you by telegram, it is requested that you will send, as soon as possible, to Constantinople, either a mission or some person invested with plenary powers by you who will be in a position to give us immediately your view on the questions which will be shortly arising”.

Appendix No. 10

From the Great National Assembly to the Central Government, received 5.10.21.

“All urgent and important affairs are to be settled not by the Constantinople Government but by the Great National Assembly, which is chosen by the people. We wish to obtain our ends by force of arms, and not through the diplomacy of a Constantinople Cabinet. We will communicate as heretofore, and I will keep you informed of the decisions and wishes of the Great National Assembly. Should, however, a case of urgency arise, you may send me a confidential messenger to whom I will give my views”.

F.O. 371/6476

No. 21

Memorandum by the British Secretary of State for War to the Cabinet.

THE MILITARY SITUATION OF THE GREEKS AND TURKS

Secret.

C.P. 3463

I circulate a note by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff with copy of the 121/3/2193 telegram from General Headquarters, Constantinople.

L.W.-E.

THE WAR OFFICE,

3rd November, 1921.

1. In our paper of the 31st October, 1921 (C.P. 3434), we came to the conclusion that the Greek Army was not capable of forcing a decision upon the

Turkish Nationalists, that the Greeks have nothing to gain by continuing operations, and that the best course open to them is to commence peace negotiations immediately, using such territory as they hold to bargain with before its loss is risked.

2. This opinion was based on the assumption that the arrival of winter precluded the possibility of offensive operations on a large scale, which would necessarily be deferred until the spring. The attached telegram from Constantinople indicates that such operations are not altogether out of the question. The Greek Army, for various reasons, is not in a position to take the offensive, and is compelled to adopt an attitude of passive defence strung out on a long front parallel to its communications. Strategically this is a bad position, since a serious reverse might compromise its line of retreat. In general the telegram reinforces the view of the General Staff mentioned above, namely, that the best course open to the Greeks is to commence peace negotiations immediately, before they have suffered a further set back with accompanying loss of bargaining counters.

H.W.,

Chief of the Imperial General Staff

3rd November, 1921.

No. 1238, cipher.

2nd November, 1921

Following for General Harington. Your No. 90014, 1st November:—

1. (a.) Although report of 50,000 deserters is without foundation all reports show Greek troops now discontented with *régime* and discouraged by result of operations. Moral of army in Thrace in particular is deteriorating rapidly and may be taken as indicative of what may later be expected in Anatolia.
- (b.) Unless ordered away or subjected to serious Turkish menace, supported by actual pressure, accompanied by attack on communications, Greek Army will stand.
- (c.) In spite of weather conditions, serious operations can be carried out. Ali Ishan (Ihsan), who escaped from Malta, is a brilliant and experienced commander and is considered by Turks to be a better man than Ismet. In view of his experience against Russians and Generals Maude and Marshal on Persian frontier and in Jebel-Hamrin districts, he is particularly qualified for severe winter operations.

Since his escape, he has been given command of Turkish 1st Army, composed of 11 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions, which are being grouped against Afium Karahissar. Operations in this locality are expected by Greeks and according to our best proved agents, attack there by Ali Ishan is imminent.

- (d.) Yes, guerilla warfare will be organized by Turks, but will be subsidiary to organized operations based on Konia—Afium Karahissar railway.

- (c.) Unless forced to do so by attack, or for political reasons, Greeks will not retire further east (*sic*), as present line ensures a united front, which one further back would not.

2. *Fighting strengths, Greek.*—Johnson on 30th October reported 69,000 as front line rifle strength for 12 divisions in Anatolia. This estimate we consider high. Johnson has to take what Greeks tell him. We have other sources of information and place Greek rifle strength for front line purposes as being about 50,000.

Turkish.—Present rifle strength of Turkish Western Army stated by our best informant (s) to be 56,000, but this will be increased by 29,000 by advent of three strong divisions now *en route* from Eastern front and Kemalist Anatolia, and that by 1st January another 15,000 will be added by drafts from depôts, bringing total up to 100,000 rifles. This estimate we consider high, and estimate present rifle strength at 48,000.

This number will be raised to well over 60,000 by such of above reinforcements as are at present accepted as likely to materialize. What is probably a more important factor than any slight numerical superiority is the determination and experience of Turkish commanders, combined with ascending Turkish *morale*.

3. At meeting of Generals on 25th October, General Charpy was asked whether French military assistance could still be relied on against Nationalists, if necessary.

He was obviously embarrassed by question and replied by saying an agreement only had been signed by Franklin Bouillon and that its ratification by French Parliament was still required.

Concrete information is lacking, but effect of agreement is immediate French withdrawal from Cilicia and Codom (? *ini*) um along Baghdad Railway, military use of which is to be accorded to Turks. This military policy is hardly compatible with military opposition to Nationalists elsewhere.

Question must be influenced by French military budget for Syria about which it is believed War Office have information. Any operations against Nationalists would also render impossible French monopoly of (?) Aleppo.

C. P. 3463

F. O. 371/6535/E. 12381

No. 22

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 3, 1921

No. 2863.

My Lord,

I asked the French Ambassador to call upon me this afternoon, in order to make certain enquiries about the draft of the agreement concluded by M. Franklin-Bouillon, apparently on behalf of the French Government, with the Turkish Government at Angora, a copy of which, with an accompanying letter by Yussouf Kemal Bey, the Foreign Minister of that Government, had been forwarded to us by the French Foreign Office.

I reminded the French Ambassador that in the earlier part of the present year I had more than once asked M. Briand personally whether M. Franklin-Bouillon had any official mission, and had been definitely assured by him that he was a private person—rather a busybody, in fact—who was going to Angora for purposes of his own. Further, in July of the present year, when M. Briand was conducting negotiations with Bekir Sami Bey on behalf of the Angora Government, M. Briand had in an official note assured us that no general engagement had been or would be entered into by France on the general question of peace between the Allies and Turkey without a close agreement with the Allies, and especially with the British Government. Finally, when M. Franklin-Bouillon went a second time to Angora in September, and we had again enquired as to the capacity in which he was acting, the French Government had admitted that he had some sort of official mission, but M. Briand had added that he had been forbidden to discuss with the Angora Government the larger questions of peace, and had been only empowered to negotiate, on behalf of the French Government, with regard to French prisoners, the protection of minorities in Cilicia, and other points involved in the evacuation of Cilicia by French troops.

Relying upon these categorical assurances I had taken no further steps in the matter, but, on the contrary, had pursued here the policy of close and unwavering co-operation with the French in every aspect of our Middle Eastern policy. Only during the last week I had been conducting negotiations with the Greek Ministers, and in spite of their pressure I had insisted upon the duty incumbent upon me of acting only with our Allies, and had only yesterday successfully persuaded the Greeks to place themselves unreservedly in the hands of the latter. Fresh from this successful effort in the interests of the Alliance, which I thought boded so well for the future, it was with feelings of astonishment and almost of dismay that I had read the provisions of M. Franklin-Bouillon's Agreement, as to which I could not avoid asking a number of serious questions, and which I could hardly believe that the French Government would be prepared to accept in its present form.

I said that I would hand to the Ambassador a memorandum* which he could transmit to his Government containing the enquiries which I felt bound to make, but the principal of them I would indicate in my present remarks.

Whilst, I said, it was a matter of common knowledge that the Allies had agreed among themselves in the earlier stages of the war not to conclude peace with any enemy Power except by common agreement** it appeared from the wording of article of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement that a peace had now been concluded between France and Angora, and, further, in as much as the agreement was one with the Grand National Assembly of Angora, that it amounted to a recognition by the French of that Government as the Government of Turkey. No mention was made of the Government at Constantinople, and undoubtedly, if the agreement were ratified in its present form, Mustapha Kemal's Government could claim that they had received recognition from one of the most powerful of the European Allies.

Article 3 of the agreement, which provided for the withdrawal of French troops, appeared to run directly counter to article 8 of the Tripartite Agreement of the 10th August, 1920, in which the French had pledged themselves to maintain their troops in the zone of special French interests until the Allies were satisfied that the Treaty of Peace with Turkey was being executed, and that the measures accepted by Turkey for the protection of Christian minorities had been put into force and their execution effectively guaranteed.

Article 6, in which the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey declared that the rights of minorities solemnly recognised in the National Pact will be confirmed by them on the same basis as that established by the conversations on this subject between the *Entente* Powers and other Allies—such as Poland—or other European enemies—such as Hungary—called for a serious explanation. In the first place it did not appear to apply to Cilicia (*etc.*) only, but to be of general application to all Turkey. It was in direct opposition to the provisions of the Treaty of Sévres for the protection of minorities, by which the French Government had assumed the responsibility for the protection of minorities in their zone of special interest under the Tripartite Agreement. If this article were accepted, it would appear that France had not only not recognised her responsibility under that Agreement, but had pledged herself to new minority provisions on the lines of the treaties made in Europe. The provisions of these treaties were quite inapplicable to Turkey, and it would appear that this point had

* This memorandum, dated November 5, the French reply of November 17, and Lord Curzon's Note of November 25, are published in Cmd. 1576 of 1922—Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the French Government respecting the Angora Agreement of October 20, 1921.

** The Franco-British Agreement of September 5, 1914, and the London Pact of November 30, 1915.

been conceded by the French Government independently and to the detriment of any general negotiations for peace that might remain to be concluded between Turkey and the whole of the Allies.

Article 8 provided for a wholesale revision of the northern frontier of Syria, under which a large tract of territory was apparently to be handed over by France to the Angora Government without any reference to, or consent on the part of, the rest of the Allies. I reminded the Ambassador that the whole of this territory had been conquered from Turkey in the war, not by French troops, or even by Allied troops, but by British troops alone. In our loyalty to our engagements with the French we had handed over the whole of Syria to them, and when the Treaty of Sévres was drawn up we had without protest, on the assumption that they would receive the mandate for Syria—which, in passing, I remarked they had not yet done—been willing to settle a frontier entirely in accordance with their views. And yet a large slice of territory within the mandated area, which did not belong to them, which they had no right to distribute, and which was still, in the absence of peace, vested in the hands of the Allies, had now been handed over to Angora as a part of the price of the Franklin-Bouillon agreement. When we were discussing the Mesopotamia frontiers with the French last year a good deal had been said about Nisibin and Jezireh-bin-Omar, which we had eventually agreed to include in the mandated area of Syria, and yet these places, which were of great strategic importance to Mesopotamia, were now about to be handed back by France on her own account to Turkey. Nor was this all. It appeared from the provisions of the same agreement that Turkey was to receive the track of the Bagdad Railway between Chobenbey and Nisibin, and, still worse that the Turks were to have the right to use that part of the Bagdad line which might lie in the French sphere for the military transport of their troops. In other words, France was about to authorise the transport of Turkish troops from Konia to Nisibin with a view—it might very well be—to an attack by Mustapha Kemal upon the British mandated territory in Mesopotamia.

Supposing that we had made an arrangement of this sort, involving a serious possible risk to the French area in Syria, would not the French Ambassador have come down in a great hurry to Downing Street, and would he not be addressing me in language of even greater surprise than that which I was now employing to him?

There were further provision in the agreement which seemed equally to call for explanation, but a detailed enumeration of these would appear in the memorandum which I promised to send to the Ambassador. I must, however—I went on to say—ask him some serious questions about the letter from Yussouf Kemal Bey addressed to M. Franklin-Bouillon which accompanied the agreement. Was this a letter which, though detached, was to be regarded as forming a part of the agreement? What did its very ominous phraseology mean? What was the nature of the reply which the French Government had sent or contemplated

sending to it? I noted that in the first paragraph the Angora Foreign Minister expressed a hope that the French Government would undertake to settle in a spirit of cordial friendship all the questions relating to the independence and the sovereignty of Turkey. What did this mean? What relation had this to the evacuation of soldiers or prisoners from Cilicia? The language seemed to indicate that the Angora Government at least expected in return for their favours some large measure of support from the French Government in matters of a very much wider than local concern.

In the second paragraph of the letter the Grand National Assembly declared its willingness to grant concessions to the French for the iron, chrome and silver mines in the Harchite Valley, and announced its readiness to consider with the utmost good-will any other requests for concessions for mines, railways, ports or river which might be put before them by French groups. I could not help asking what all this meant. Even if the localities concerned were inside the French zone of special interest, the suggested concessions appeared to me to travel far beyond the spirit of the Tripartite Agreement. If they were outside, surely the concessions were in direct conflict with it.

The letter went on to invite the collaboration of French professors and teachers in the schools not of Cilicia alone, but apparently of every part of Turkey, and ended by inviting French capitalists to enter into economic and financial relations with the Angora Government—again without any geographical limitation. I did not know, of course, what view would be taken of these proposals by the French Government, or how far M. Franklin-Bouillon had committed them on the matter; but that a local arrangement of a relatively minor character for the evacuation of French troops, or the release of French prisoners, should have been expanded in this elastic fashion to include this vast motley of interests and concessions seemed to me one of the most unusual diplomatic achievements of which I had ever heard.

Before concluding, I alluded to a further report which, although it was not supported by anything that appeared in the agreement or in the letter, had yet reached me from more than one quarter, that the French had tried to procure or had procured, the monopoly of the provision of French officers and instructors in the gendarmerie—again not in Cilicia alone, but in Anatolia, without limitation. I could hardly believe that such was the case, since any such provision would be entirely contrary to the arrangement already concluded between the Powers, by which the future gendarmerie was to be international in character.

I said that the Ambassador must pardon me if I sought insistently for further information upon all these points. I could not, I said, conceal from him that the sum total of them had left upon the minds of myself and my colleagues a very painful impression, and I hoped very earnestly that the majority of the

apprehensions, to which I had given expression, would turn out to be unfounded, and would be dispelled by the explanation which it would be in his power to give.

The Ambassador interrupted me at various points of my narrative to inform me that whatever might be the answers returned by his Government on the points which I had raised, he was certain that they regarded the agreement as one of a purely local character; so much so, that they did not even propose to submit it for ratification to the French Chamber. It was merely a restricted arrangement between Angora and themselves with regard to Cilicia, and he felt convinced that the provisions, as to which I had expressed alarm, could only be applicable to the zone in which, under the Tripartite Agreement, it had been agreed that French interests should be recognised as predominant. He took great credit for the fact that there had been no attempt to discuss such wider issues as Smyrna and Thrace, and the conclusion of a general peace with Turkey, and he seemed to anticipate that, in reply to my charge that the French Government had been dealing with Angora as though it were the Government of Turkey, they would say that the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, if accepted by the French, would be submitted to the Constantinople authorities. He did not contest that the questions which I had put were of a very important and serious nature, and that on the face of it the language both of the agreement and of the letter appeared to suggest a wider field of action and consequence than he had himself predicted. It might be that M. Franklin-Bouillon, who was a person of very ebullient nature and not used to official negotiations, had done rather more than was expected of him, and had placed matters in a light which was open to criticism. All this would be elucidated in the enquiry which I had asked him to make.

I represented to the Ambassador in taking leave of him that the question was one to which we attached great importance, and that if we were shortly to reopen Allied negotiations for the settlement of the entire Eastern question it was indispensable that there should be removed from our minds the suspicion that one of our Allies had taken independent action, or sought to secure special advantages behind the backs—and, as it would appear in some cases, to the distinct detriment—of the others.

The Ambassador did not express any surprise at the manner in which I had spoken to him, and his defence of the procedure of his Government—such as it was—would not, I think, have secured him a favourable verdict, even from a tribunal of his own countrymen.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 461-466, No. 432.

No. 23

Foreign Office to the India Office and to the Treasury

FOREIGN OFFICE, 3rd November 1921

Immediate

Sir,

With reference to the letter from this Department of the 1st. inst. relative to a remittance of £ 10,000 received by the London Office of the Imperial Ottoman Bank from Bombay for transmission to Mustapha Kemal at Angora, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to state for the information of the Lords Commissioners of H.M. Treasury/Mr. Secretary Montagu, that the Ottoman Bank has now received a further and similar remittance of £ 5000.

2. Lord Curzon will be glad to receive the observations of the Lords Commissioners of H.M. Treasury/Mr. Secretary Montagu as soon as possible.

3. A similar letter has been addressed to the India Office/H.M. Treasury.

(Signed) LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

F.O. 371/6534/E. 12027

No. 24

The Treasury to the Foreign Office

LONDON, 4th November, 1921

(Received November 5)

F. 3836

Urgent

Sir,

I have laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Mr. Oliphant's letters of the 1st and 3rd instant (E. 12027/143/44), relative to an enquiry received from the Imperial Ottoman Bank, London, as to whether His Majesty's Government would object to the remittance of £ 10,000 and £ 5,000 to Mustafa Kemal at Angora.

In reply I am to request you to inform the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston that Their Lordships concur, so far as They are concerned, in his proposal to inform the Bank that His Majesty's Government do not intend to take any action in the matter.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the India Office.

I am, etc.

(Signed) B.B. BARKER

F.O. 371/6534/E. 12181

No. 25

Mr Rizo Rangabe, Charge d'Affaires of Greece, to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

No. 4289

Légation de Grèce,

LONDON, 7th November, 1921

My Lord Marquess,

I have the honour to submit, for Your Lordship's information, the following telegram received from my Government:—

"Athens, November 6.

"We send you the following information furnished by the Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople. Dr. Tewfik Rouchdi, sent to Moscow as a member of a Nationalist Delegation, returned a few days ago to Angora bringing with him a sum of over One million Turkish Pounds in gold, a fresh advance of the Soviet Government, upon a loan which is in process of negotiation between Moscow and Angora under the direction of Mustapha Kemal. This sum will be devoted exclusively to the purchase of war material and to expenses incurred by the general mobilisation in Anatolia."

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) A. RIZO-RANGABE

F.O. 371/6534/E. 12293

No. 26

Foreign Office to the India Office

Immediate

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 8th, 1921

Sir,

With reference to the letters from this Department of 1st and 3rd instant, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to enquire whether you are yet able to furnish him with Mr. Secretary Montagu's views as to the remittances of ten thousand pounds and five thousand pounds telegraphed from Bombay for Mustafa Kemal at Angora. The Imperial Ottoman Bank are pressing this Department for an answer and point out that owing to the depreciation of the piastre the value of the remittance has already diminished.

I am, etc.

(Signed) LANCELOT OLIPHANT

F.O. 371/6534/E. 12181

No. 27

India Office to the Foreign Office

INDIA OFFICE, 8th November, 1921

Sir,

In reply to your letters No. E. 12027/143/44 dated 1st and 3rd November relative to the proposed remittance of £ 15,000 to Mustafa Kemal at Angora, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to say that he concurs in the course of action which the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston proposes to follow.

I am to forward copy of a telegram which has been despatched to the Government of India on the subject.

I have, etc.

Signature

F.O. 371/6535/E. 12342

No. 28

India Office to Viceroy, Home Department, India

P. 4894

Telegraphic

8th November, 1921

5712. Imperial Ottoman Bank have received from the Netherlands Trading Company who in turn received it from their Bombay branch, £ 15,000 for remittance to Mustafa Kemal at Angora, and have enquired whether His Majesty's Government would object to the remittance. Foreign Office, with my concurrence, are replying that His Majesty's Government do not intend to take any action.

F.O. 371/6535

No. 29

*Secretary of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, London Agency, to the Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office*

LONDON, 9th November, 1921

Dear Sir,

On the 27th October we received advice from the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, Amsterdam that they had placed £10,000 at our disposal with a London Bank, which amount were requested by their Bombay Office to instruct us to transfer by telegram to Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Angora.

We advised the Foreign Office of this by telephone, asking whether we should be in order in cabling this sum to our Constantinople Office with instructions to transmit it to Angora if possible.

We were informed by the Foreign Office that a reply would be given to as soon as possible, but up to the present this has not reached us.

We have since received further letters from the Bank in Amsterdam, requesting us to transmit two further sums of £5,000 each, and, as non-compliance with their request places us in an embarrassing position both towards them and towards Mustafa Kemal Pasha, we beg to press for an immediate reply to our enquiry.

I am, etc.

(Signed) Secretary

F.O. 371/6535/E. 12363

No. 30

General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office

Received 1000 12/11/21.

Despatched 2030 11/11/21.

Secret

Paraphrase

1264 cipher 11/11.

First of 4 parts

Following is situation as I see it. Operations at a standstill. Reports I gave in London are confirmed by reports I have received from officers with Greeks. Officers are discouraged and morale is weakening, though army is in no immediate military danger. Turks will continue to worry. Offensive against Afium Karahissar has been prepared by them but, if Greeks weaken, they may decide not to launch.

Angora Government appear truculent. They have notified High Commissioner here that Sub-Commissions of Control, Special Elements and Gendarmerie, which I have established and which are now functioning, must be cancelled as they are in accordance with Treaty of Sèvres which is not recognized by them. No notice will be taken. I have information that French, as represented by Sarrau, have urged Turks to refuse recognition of these Sub-Commissions. Angora assert these Sub-Commissions will be recognized by no Turks.

Part 2.

This is absurd as proved by fact that on my return journey every station and bridge in Turkey in Europe and streets of Constantinople were lined by Turkish Gendarmerie and Police as a mark of respect for my having fought for their status and pay.

As instructed by Marquis Curzon, I have discussed with Sir Horace Rumbold best practical way in which Angora Government and Mustapha Kemal can be approached and Constantinople Government taken along at same time. Sir Horace thinks best way is to work through Izzet and Hamid with a view to get Mustapha Kemal to talk on a reasonable basis. I agree that this is correct channel but, knowing contempt and strained relations existing between Angora and Constantinople, am not sanguine of success. Furthermore our neutrality is also distrusted by Mustapha Kemal.

Part 3.

My only fear is refusal of Mustapha Kemal to talk except on an impossible basis, such as all Greeks out of Anatolia or on basis of National pact which will mean another dead lock. As an alternative the only thing I can suggest is for me to get Rafet to come and meet me at Shile or Constantinople and try to get him to create with Mustapha Kemal favourable atmosphere for future negotiations by Sir Horace Rumbold. As it is not my concern, I have no wish whatever to do this. There is no doubt that Rafet has influence with Mustapha Kemal and it was by Rafet that first definite agreement over prisoners was obtained.

Last part.

Procedure proposed by Sir Horace is right one but it is just a question under difficult circumstances whether it would be advisable to try to have channel that would avoid risk of failure, though I have no wish to be employed in this capacity.

Military situation is normal but our position may become insecure if French withdraw their troops or refuse support against Turks. I hope that information as to what the French attitude really is may be sent me before long.

F.O. 371/6535

No 31

Mr Kyrtechef to Mr D.G. Osborne, Foreign Office, London

*Hotel Moderne
Pl. de la République
PARIS, 11 November 1921*

Dear Sir,

I beg to confirm my letter of the 29th last and am glad (*sic*) to inform you that my friends consider the present moment as very opportune to realise the arrangement which I suggested you last July. If your Office is still disposed to accept the principal terms, exposed in my conversation with you, an official delegate will proceed to the place appointed by you to meet your representative and sign the preliminary arrangement.

Your Government has now the best opportunity to regain all that you have lost during the last two years and become again the most influential member of the allies in the Near East.

Your prompt answer will oblige me very much, as a special courier is waiting for it to take it to the person authorised to see your Authorities.

I am, etc.

Your faithfully

(Signed) KYRTCHEFF

N.B. My friend D. who is in most friendly terms with many important political men in Turkey, has just arrived here from Switzerland. He has been in Rome twice and has seen there the most intimate and official representative of Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Italy. He is authorised by this Gentleman to make you some very important communications in connection (*sic*) with the new events in the Near East and in favor of the special arrangement directly with Mustafa Kemal and Your Government. My friend possesses from the said official person a special letter which he will hand you. My friend assures me that the informations he is going to give you are of such a great interest to your Government and may have such grave consequences for your interests in the East, that he thinks it necessary to go to London and explain them to you personally, as their specially confidential character do not allow him to communicate them by letter.

As my friend pretends to know all details in connection with the new arrangements in Angora, I beg you to let me know if you care to see him in London, and, if so, to give the necessary instructions to your authorities in Paris to give us all the facilities to go to London without any delay.

F.O. 371/6477/E. 12588

No. 32

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 12th November 1921, 4.0. a.m.

(Received 14th November 1921., 8.31 a.m.)

No. 724. *Telegraphic*

My immediately preceding telegram.

General Harington, with whom I have been in constant touch since his return, has impressed on me anxiety of Your Lordship and His Majesty's Government to accelerate Turkish settlement as much as possible. We are agreed that for this purpose it is essential to get into touch with Angora Government in order to ascertain whether that Government are prepared to place themselves in the hands of the Allies with a view to discussion, firstly mediation in Turko-Greek conflict, and secondly of basis of general settlement.

Question of approaching Angora is surrounded with difficulty. Everything points to Nationalists being once more in most intractable frame of mind. Result of recent fighting with Greeks has given them renewed confidence. Conclusion of French agreement has shown them how little real union there is amongst the Allies. They interpret the numerous utterances in the English press as proving that they have strong sympathies in Great Britain. They are of course watching phases of Irish question with closest interest. Agreement recently concluded at Kars with (?Caucasian) States has secured their North Eastern frontier for the time being. They have renewed hope of building up strong central position in Islamic world.

In these circumstances I fear that there could hardly be worse moment for approaching Angora Government with confidence, although they have numerous internal difficulties which should incline them towards peace, and Kurdish revolt is understood to cause them grave preoccupation.

I have carefully considered the best means of establishing that contact with Angora which seems so necessary in spite of the above considerations. I have kept in view the desirability:

- (A). Of not exposing His Majesty's Government to rebuff which might diminish their prestige and, even worse, might close the door at the outset to the discussion which we wish to bring about;
- (B). Of continued co-operation of Allies notwithstanding their tendency to break away from us; and
- (C). Of not disregarding Constantinople Government, eventual reinstatement of which in its proper position should be one of our aims.

As preliminary measure I have carefully sounded Constantinople Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have (?let) him understand confidentially that there is now (?more) prospect of Greeks placing themselves in hands of Allies and I have sought his views as to the prospect of Angora Government doing likewise and as to best means of broaching question of mediating with them. I have impressed on him that sole desire of His Majesty's Government is to bring about peace that they themselves have nothing to seek from Angora and that they are not espousing the cause of either party to immediate conflict. Izzet Pasha says plainly that Constantinople Government as such is as powerless as ever to influence Angora, but he has promised to get to work himself through leading Nationalists here. He says that Hamid Bey who handled the negotiations for exchange of prisoners carries no real weight with Angora. This if true is disappointing as Hamid appeared to be useful instrument if carefully handled.

Conversation with Izzet do not encourage me to count much on the efficacy of his assistance especially in view of the urgency of the matter. I think we should keep Central Government informed of all we do but that we must seek more direct means of contact with Angora.

Alternatives would appear to be:

(1). To get French to sound Angora as foreshadowed in Your Lordship's memorandum of October 7th or possibly Italians.

(2). To sound Angora ourselves officially either jointly with Allies or in their name.

(3). To sound Angora ourselves unofficially with the knowledge of the Allies.

(4). Would have the advantage of letting the French or Italians take any (group undec.) I presume that Your Lordship would hesitate very much to place the matter in the hands of the French after their recent conduct. I doubt whether Italians would carry any real weight with Angora though they now seem anxious to collaborate loyally. For (3) it would be necessary to (? employ) either military or wholly unofficial agents empowered to converse with (? Nationalist) representatives in the (? first) instance without committing His Majesty's Government. This course presents some (? advantages) but choice of agents would be most difficult. There are also other objections. It would be very hard to tie Angora down and despatch of agents would rapidly become known even if not publicly announced. They would be credited with having definite "mission" and any rebuff would be almost more damaging to our prestige than if we failed in direct approach. If a high military personage e.g. General Harington were empowered to talk to Kemalists these objections would be aggravated proportionally, in addition to which Allies would make out that our military command was being utilized for political purposes.

(? Disadvantage of) (2) is that if Kemalists were approached officially they might make progress (? impossible) by attaching impossible preliminary conditions to participation in discussing e.g. complete renunciation of Treaty of Sèvres as basis, acceptance of National Pact, or immediate evacuation of Asia Minor by Greeks. Nevertheless this seems to me to be least disadvantageous (? course). Risk of complete rebuff at outset might be diminished by saying to Angora as from allied Governments something like this:—

"Everyone is tired of war and unsettlement. You have tried (? conclusion)s with Greeks and neither side has had decisive success. Military operations are no more likely to produce definite result in the future than in the past. You profess your desire for peace. So do Greeks. We have been able to converse with absolute authoritative exponents of their point of view. In your case however we never know what powers your representatives have and it is often difficult to know who they are. If you seriously desire peace will you not designate some fully authorized person to confer with allied High Commissioners in Constantinople (? not) with view to formal discussion of peace terms in the first instance but to explore best means of initiating such discussion. You can enter into conversation of this nature without in any way compromising your point of view beforehand. You must not

expect us either to tie ourselves down to anything. We shall all bring our views into preliminary conversations and if nothing else is gained we shall know after hearing your accredited spokesman whether formal discussion of general settlement with Greeks and ourselves can usefully be initiated".

After fullest reflections I can offer no better suggestion at present. Any procedure will take some little time to produce result. This may at least help us to take first step with least possible delay.

If Your Lordship approves of foregoing method of approaching Angora Government I would get my colleagues into line and ask Hamid Bey (? to) telegraph message in question (? to) Angora.

F.O. 371/6535/E. 12550

D.B.F.P. 1st. series, Vol. XVII, pp. 475-478, No. 442

No. 33

Foreign Office to the Secretary of the Imperial Ottoman Bank (Copies to Constantinople, Treasury and India Office)

FOREIGN OFFICE, 14 November, 1921

Sir,

In reply to your letter of the 9th instant, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to inform you that after consultation between the Treasury, India Office and this department, His Majesty's Government have decided that they will take no action in respect of the telegraphic remittances, amounting to £ 20,000 which you have received from Bombay for Mustapha Kemal Pasha at Angora.

F.O. 371/6535/E. 12363

No. 34

Memorandum by Mr. W.S. Edmonds, Foreign Office

POSSIBILITY OF DISCUSSION WITH ANGORA

In his telegram No. 724 Sir H. Rumbold emphasises very justly the great disadvantages which must attend anything in the nature of a request to Mustafa Kemal to discuss terms. Mustafa Kemal would at once think we were in a much worse position than we are and he would raise his terms accordingly.

It is permissible to think that Sir H. Rumbold has been unduly impressed by Angora bluff. The Turks have so far utterly failed to get the Greeks out of Anatolia, and their military position is not very grand. But what we may be sure is really

making them anxious is the fear that Russia will come to terms with Western Europe. The Kemalists know that in that event they are finished.

I venture to think that Angora is perhaps as anxious to reach a settlement as Athens. Marquis Gattori's enquiry (Constantinople telegram 723 last para. but one) whether we could not now send a messenger to Angora, was very possibly prompted by Mustafa Kemal himself.

In any case I submit that Mustafa Kemal's protest against the treaty of Sévres (Constantinople telegram 724) provides us with a chance of inviting Mustafa Kemal to come to Constantinople himself to discuss modifications of it, and yet ourselves avoiding the disadvantages emphasised by Sir H. Rumbold.

Mustafa Kemal would not be sure enough of his position in Anatolia to come as far as Paris or London, but we might reasonably expect him to come to Constantinople, and this seems the only way of preventing Angora from again disavowing their representative. Discussions might proceed there between him, the three High Commissioners, and representatives of the Greek and Constantinople governments. This would avoid waiting for the Washington conference, and Mustafa Kemal's presence in Constantinople might pave the way for a reunion between Constantinople and Anatolia.

If Mustafa Kemal accepted, well and good. If he refused, the India Office and other critics would be answered. If discussions were started but came to nothing, Turkish pressure on Mesopotamia would at any rate be less probable during their continuance.

W. S. EDMONDS

15.11.21

F.O. 371, 6536 E. 12840

No. 35

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, November, 15, 1921
(Received November 16, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 875, *Telegraphic*

By Bag.

My telegram No. 860 of November 9th.

This morning's "Eclair" publishes following under heading, "L'accord Franco-Turc est ratifié":

A l'occasion de la signature de l'accord franco-turc, le président du Conseil des Ministres, Monsieur Briand, a adressé à Youssouf Kemal bey, ministre des affaires étrangères nationaliste, la dépêche suivante:

"J'ai le plaisir de vous annoncer que le Gouvernement de la République française a pris connaissance de l'accord signé par Votre Excellence et M. Franklin-Bouillon, le 28 Octobre, 1921, et l'a ratifié.

En conséquence, le gouvernement de la République française commencera, à partir du 4 Novembre, à exécuter, dans le délai fixé les stipulations du traité qui le concernent.

Je prie Votre Excellence de bien vouloir donner les ordres nécessaires pour assurer également l'application des articles de l'accord concernant le gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale. Je partage les convictions exprimées par Votre Excellence en ce qui concerne l'heureuse influence que l'accord conclu entre nos deux pays aura sur le prompt rétablissement d'une paix permanente en Orient et la reprise des relations étroites qui avaient été créées par les longues traditions du passé."

M. Franklin-Bouillon vient de télégraphier de son côté à Mustapha Kemal pacha:

"L'accord que j'ai eu l'honneur de négocier avec les délégués de Votre Excellence a été ratifié par le gouvernement de la République française. Votre Excellence me permettra de lui dire une fois de plus à quel point je suis heureux d'avoir collaboré avec vos délégués en vue de rétablir des rapports d'amitié entre nos deux pays. Je suis parfaitement conscient des efforts qui sont nécessaires pour rétablir l'ordre et la tranquillité en Orient, mais je suis convaincu avec Votre Excellence que les personnalités qui auront à s'occuper de ces questions ont les qualités nécessaires pour conduire cette oeuvre à bien."

F.O. 371/6477

No. 36

General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office

Desp. 1400 15.11.21

Recd. 1000 16.11.21

Paraphrase. Secret.

1270 cipher November 15th

1st of 2 parts.

Yesterday I had a private audience with Sultan, whom I have never seen before, in order to thank him for house he has let me take for winter. He emphasized necessity of bringing together Constantinople and Angora Governments, to which end, he said, present Grand Vizier and Ministers were working. Stated he had always regarded entry of Turkey into war as suicidal. In very strong terms he expressed view that without evacuation of Smyrna and Thrace no understanding

could be hoped for. Turkey, after being great empire, had been reduced to size of moderate kingdom. Right to live within her ethnical frontiers and be mistress of own affairs was all she asked for.

Last part.

Extremist element at Angora, he said, did not number ten percent of whole and would disappear on conclusion of a just settlement.

He was emphatic that Turkey in its opposition to Greek occupation of their area was quite united and that on any other basis any influence of himself and his Ministers with Angora would be of no avail.

After thanking me for my impartial attitude, and for preserving peace in city, he said British troops had always been careful not to offend feelings of Turks of Constantinople when wounded by defeat and paid warm tribute to their attitude.

F.O. 371/6535/E. 12767

No. 37

Notes by British Military Intelligence on Rafet Pasha

LONDON, 15.11.1921

M.I. 2.b

Rafet Pasha was the chief intermediary between the British and Mustapa (sic) Kemal in the negotiations which resulted in the release of the British Prisoners of War. When a meeting between General Harington and Mustapa (sic) Kemal was mooted in July 1921 the latter suggested that Rafet Pasha should represent him. On the 7th November Press reports said that a Turkish Military Mission under Rafet had landed in France and was proceeding to Paris. The French Government however deny any knowledge of such a mission.

On the 12th November 1921 General Harington suggested using Rafet to prepare the way for negotiations with Mustapa (sic) Kemal.

Rafet is reported to be an honest man and broad minded, to have moderate views and to have broken with the C.U.P. extremists. In November 1920 he remarked to a British Officer that he considered Turkey required the help of British men of science and business for edu(ca)tional purposes although not as Government officials. In Nationalist circles he is considered to be one of their most able leaders, though his ability is more political than military. His moral character and private life are said to be bad.*

F.O. 371/6478/E. 12775

* Bu not, İngiliz Savaş Bakanlığı'nın 21.11.1921 günkü 15023 M.J.2. sayılı yazısıyla İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığına iletilmiştir. B.N.Ş.

No. 38

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, November 17, 1921

No. 3198.

(P. 1834)

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a letter, which you will observe is addressed to the Foreign Office, and which was left here by a Monsieur DAVIDOFF a Bulgarian Subject who apparently desires to enter into negotiations with His Majesty's Government on behalf of the Nationalist Turks.

I have informed Monsieur DAVIDOFF that this letter has been transmitted to Your Lordship.

I have &c.

Signed) HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

F.O. 371 6580/E. 12737

INCLOSURE IN No. 38

Mr. Davidoff to the British Foreign Office, London

AN EXPOSE CONCERNING THE TURKISH QUESTION

Confidential

The undersigned for 30 years now is a businessman and has been a partisan and one of the very intimate and trusted friends of the well known Bulgarian statesman the late Mr. Stamboloff, after whose assassination I transferred my residence to Constantinople. And because of my social position and influence in Constantinople as well as in Bulgaria I was entrusted on several occasions with delicate missions concerning the Balkan problem.

After Bulgaria's entrance in the world's war on the side of Germany, and being convinced that Bulgaria will end in a catastrophe and that she can be saved only from the outside in coming to an understanding with the Allies, I came to Switzerland during the month of January 1917, to work in that direction. For that purpose in the month of August 1917 I had a meeting with representatives of the allies, in Thonou-les-Bains (France). Also on 6th. of July 1918 I gave a memorandum to the Allies through the American Legation in Berne, and a copy was given to Mr. W.G. Middleton-Edwards, at that time in Geneva, and since then through him, I was in relations with the Allies concerning this question.

After the armistice and at the demand of Mr. W.G. Middleton Edwards I gave him an 'exposé' on the Balkan Problem and till the signing of the Treaty of Versailles I edited a Republican Bulletin in Lausanne. Also an article of mine, entitled 'Peace in the Balkans' was printed on Sept. 20th. 1918, in the 'Journal de Genève' No. 261.

In December 1920 I was in Berlin, where I had several meetings with the late ex-Grand Vizier Talaat Pacha, with whom I was acquainted from Constantinople. In my conversations with him I attracted his attention to the fact that Turkey had not appreciated the counsels and the traditional friendship of Great Britain since the Crimean War and the Treaty of Paris 1856, and that England had always been a powerful protector to the Ottoman Empire. I also pointed out to him that Turkey's only refuge is to gain anew the trust and the benevolence of Great Britain, with whose help can Turkey only attain her peaceful, cultural development and her economical progress.

Our conversations were in this line of thoughts and knowing my political convictions his Excellency Talaat Pacha entreated me to be the interpreter of his opinions before the British Government for an agreement between the two countries. For that purpose he gave me the following letter, the original of which will be shown at demand.

le 27 Decembre 1920

Porteur de cette lettre Monsieur Davidoff est mon ami intime. Il est au courant de mes opinions et de mes convictions sur la politique que la Turquie doit suivre envers l'Angleterre. Il est autorisé d'en parler.

ex-Grand Vizir

Mehmed Talaat

On my way to London I met Mr. Middleton Edwards in Switzerland and he gave me two letters of recommendation; one addressed to Mr. J. Randall in the Foreign Office and the other to Lt. Colonel Aubrey Herbert, M.P. But in Paris I made the acquaintance of Mr. Kirtcheff-Varnay, who recommended himself to me as an acquaintance of His Exc. Lord Hardinge, the British Ambassador in Paris; but as that took place on the eve of the Conference that was convoked in Paris for the 24th. of January 1921, I confided my mission to him with the request to be my interpreter, as I do not speak English and to come with me to the British Ambassador, to whom I was to report about my mission. On the following day, instead of going together Mr. Kirtcheff-Varnay informed me that he had already spoken to His Exc. Lord Hardinge about my mission and that his Exc. was going to impart it to the British Delegation as soon as it arrived in Paris. On the 25th. of January Mr. Kirtcheff-Varnay told me that one of the Secretaries of the British Delegation desired to see me, that I may tell him about my mission, but instead of

me he had done that already. With that I concluded that my mission was communicated to the proper party.

After the assassination of Talaat Pacha, I had in Switzerland meetings with Djevat Bey, the Turkish Minister Plenipotentiary in Berne, Nedjmedine Molla, ex-minister of Justice, Djavid Bey, ex-minister of Finances and Ahmed Djevlet Bey, the proprietor and editor of the Turkish newspaper 'İkdam' and we spoke of the situation of Turkey and the intervention of the late Talaat Pacha with my mission. All approved this idea of Talaat Pacha and begged me to report all that to Djami Bey in Rome, the representative of Mustafa Kemal Pacha, who after the murder of Talaat Pacha, was the only person that could realise such an understanding, all the more so, as a meeting had recently been held in Rome by some eminent Turkish political persons and the idea for an agreement with Great Britain had been recommended to Mustafa Kemal Pacha.

After these meetings, on the 16th. and the 20th. of last April, I wrote very important things to Mr. Kirtchoff-Varnay to inform you in connection with my mission.

At my encounter with Djami Bey, I saw in him an ardent anglophile and a devoted partisan to the idea for an agreement with Great Britain. He told me that Mustafa Kemal Pacha also was a partisan to the same idea and explained to me in what way the understanding could be realised. He begged me to continue my relations in that direction and to entreat the British Foreign Office to fix a meeting with him.

On my way to London, and at the arrival of Bekir Sami Bey in Paris, last June, I received from Jami Bey the following letter:

Délégation de Turquie (Angora)
Rome

Rome, le 28 Juin, 1921.

Mon cher Monsier Davidoff,

J'ai eu le plaisir de recevoir votre dernière lettre et je l'ai expédié à son Excellence Bekir Samy Bey, ex-ministre des affaires étrangères et le chef de la délégation du gouvernement d'Angora, qui se trouve actuellement à Paris.

Son Excellence Bekir Samy Bey causera avec vous après avoir pris note de votre lettre. Vous pouvez causer avec lui librement sur toutes les questions son Excellence Bekir Samy Bey a pleins pouvoir pour régler toutes les affaires en question.

Veuillez agréer, Mon cher Monsieur Davidoff, l'expression de mes meilleurs sentiments.

Djami

At my meeting with Bekir Sami Bey and Dr. Nihad Rechad Bey in Paris, they informed me that they are aware of my activity and they entreated me also to continue it and so facilitate their own mission too.

At that time I told Mr. Kirtcheff-Varnay only the fact that the Turks desire to have a meeting with the British Foreign Office, and he knowing English went to London, from where on 22nd of July he sent a telegramme saying that it is approved and when he came back, told me that the British Foreign Office had been assigned the person, who is to meet the Turks, without telling me his name.

On the base of this reply I went again to Rome to see Djami Bey. He confirmed again that Mustafa Kemal approves completely the continuation of my mission and Djami Bey particularly obliged me to impart to the British Foreign Office, that it will be especially satisfied with the meeting and begs that the person to meet him should know French as he himself does not speak English. After this conversation on the 1st of September I wrote to Mr. Kirtcheff-Varnay an important letter, whose contents to be communicated to you.

Consequently my present has for aim to set forth in its big lines the course of my mission and to impart to you directly and personally my intimate conversations with Djami Bey, concerning the mission that was entrusted to me by Mustafa Kemal Pacha, through him as his representative and also another details in connection with the recently created situation.

I have also to impart to you the wishes expressed by Mr. Stamboliyski, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, in a conversation that I had recently with him in Switzerland. These declarations are of very great interest to Great Britain.

Turkey on account of her geographical situation and religious ties with the Moslem World is an important factor for the peace in the East. The establishment of peace at the present conditions in Turkey and in all the orient is a difficult problem. The State that is the most interested in the peace of the orient is England and for that reason Turkey's attitude towards her must be clearly defined. The vital interests of Great Britain and Turkey impose a special agreement, between the two countries and based on friendship and confidence and such an understanding will exert a certain influence on the Moslem world for the establishment of peace in the Near East.

This delicate mission of mine is due to my political convictions, my social position in Constantinople, the confidence that I inspire and the influence that I have among Turkish political circles. After its accomplishment I will continue my activity by founding an organisation the aim of which will be to gain anew the

traditional friendship of Great Britain, and cultivating it among the Turkish nation, for which a political-commercial newspaper will be edited in Turkish.*

Most respectfully yours,

A. DAVIDOFF,
Hôtel Continental
rue du Mont Thabor, No. 30
Paris I

Paris, 17.11.1921

F. O. 371 6580/E. 12737

No. 39

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 19th November, 1921, 3.25 p.m.
(Received 20th November, 1921, 8.30 a.m.)

Private.

No distribution

My telegram No. 724.

I would like to emphasize two points.

1. Unless matter is very urgent it would be desirable to defer approaching Nationalists until a settlement with Ireland has been reached. This will place us in an infinitely stronger position in the eyes of the Nationalists.

2. In my view there is no chance whatever of Nationalists accepting a procedure which would entail their placing themselves in our hands in order to receive a treaty from us. I think the utmost we can expect is that they may agree to come to a conference at which main lines of a treaty in substitution for treaty of Sèvres would be laid down.

* This "exposé" was minuted at the Foreign Office as follows:

"It appears that this is the influential emissary that M. Kyrtschiff (another Bulgarian intriguer whom I saw in the summer) just recently suggested should be received at the F.O. Kyrtschiff's suggestion having been refused Davidoff writes to propose himself. His connection with Kemal appears to be very slender.

Qy. Instruct Lord Hardinge that if Davidoff calls again he should be told his letter reached the F.O. but there is no reply.

D.G. Osborne

22.11.1921

L. Oliphant"

Should you nevertheless decide to approach Nationalists now somewhat on lines of the proposal contained in my above mentioned telegram or on other lines, I might utilize as a messenger, Bekir Samy, who is reported to be arriving here immediately en route for Angora.

F. O. 371/6535

D.B.F.P. 1st series, Vol. XVII, p. 482, No. 448

No. 40

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 22nd, 1921, 7.00 p.m.

(Received November 23rd, 1921, 11.10 a.m.)

Telegraphic

No. 740.

My telegram No. 724.

Minister for Foreign Affairs communicated to me yesterday evening translation of a telegram from Angora government. Though he stated that this telegram had reached him through an intermediary, I suspect that it was addressed to himself.

Telegram is as follows:

"Invitation addressed to us last March had no other result than to gain time for Greek army. If once again we go to a conference without any conditions it will probably lead to the same result. If, therefore, England and Greece are really animated as we are by a sincere desire to bring about peace, the evacuation of Anatolia and of Thrace can alone constitute evident and convincing proof of this for Grand National Assembly and for Turkish public opinion.

Statement of British high commission to the effect that negotiations would take place on the basis of National Pact shows that it is intended to make modifications in that instrument.

We are convinced that there will be no practical utility in entering on negotiations before being assured in some manner with regard to intentions of British Government.

If serious and firm proposals are made to you, please communicate them to us."

I at once took exception to the statement alleged to have been made by British high commission, with regard to National Pact as a basis for negotiations, and pointed out that neither Mr. Ryan nor I had ever said anything of the sort. Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted that he had probably conveyed an incorrect impression to Angora Government and asked me to delete this paragraph from the telegram.

I repeated the substance of conversations which Mr. Ryan and I had had with him, as reported in my telegram under reference, and reminded him that he had himself volunteered to sound Angora government as to the likelihood of their being willing to embark on a fresh exchange of views. He replied that he had sounded them on the basis of our conversations. He considered that their telegram was evasive but not unconciliatory. He did not interpret the telegram as indicating that evacuation of Anatolia and Thrace must be a preliminary condition to holding of a conference.

I told Minister for Foreign Affairs that I did not consider telegram from Angora offered much prospect of a settlement as it did not seem to take into account realities of the situation. A deadlock had been reached in Greco-Turk conflict and if a settlement was to be reached there would have to be give and take. Angora government show ? some * sign that they appreciate this necessity.

In the course of conversation which ensued, I reminded Minister for Foreign Affairs that he had told me some time ago that Nationalists would not expect to stand strictly by national pact as regards Thrace. He answered that he had meant that Nationalists would not expect to recover western Thrace but that they must have eastern Thrace including Adrianople. He thought that Maritza would be best frontier on the west.

We have now obtained a preliminary expression of opinion from Angora government without in any way approaching them officially or directly. Their telegram is anything but encouraging. I read it to mean that they will take their stand on national pact and that they will make evacuation of Anatolia and eastern Thrace a condition of entering into any conference or of accepting intervention. Telegram from Angora practically answers (? question) suggested in my telegram under reference, and I now see no useful purpose in approaching Angora government in manner and sense indicated.**

F. O. 371/6536/E. 12878

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 489-490, No. 453

* İngilizce Dışişleri Bakanlığında, dolma kalemle, some yerine ? ne sözcüğü telkin edilmiştir.

** Bu telgraf üzerine İngilizce Dışişleri Bakanlığında şu yanıtla yapılmıştır:

"Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 740, just received, explains the French enquiry at 4

The misinterpretation of his words may have been an intentional one with the object of somehow committing us to the National Pact.

We can perhaps take İzzet's word for it that preliminary evacuation is not a condition of negotiation.

It seems that we have to make 2 things clear to Angora.

1. That they are to treat with the united Allies, not with England and Greece.
2. That our intentions, previous knowledge of which they demand, preclude all possibility of the return of Thrace. It is for them to decide if they will give up Adrianople to get Smyrna; at present we hold them both. On the rest of the National Pact we could meet them.

These 2 points will have to be emphasized when, and if, an invitation is addressed to them.

D.G. Osborne

29/11/19

No. 41

*General Harrington, Constantinople, to War Office**Despatched 17³⁰ 25/11/21.**Received 1000 26/11/21.**Secret.*

1300 cipher 25/11.

I have been shown by High Commissioner his wire to Foreign Office recommending taking of no action to approach Angora as, according to his information from Constantinople Government, Angora is intractable. On present evidence I do not agree with this as I think ground could be explored further; but it is for High Commissioner to advise and not for me.

Reference Marquis Curzon's speech of November 24th, I entirely endorse that the stamping out of attitude of mutual suspicion is what is required here. I am preparing summary of intelligence in my possession regarding attitude of Turks towards settlement, which will be sent by bag. From a military point of view, I pray that a settlement may be early attempted as surroundings for troops in this city are getting steadily worse and, until trade begins and there is some money in

"I read the Angora message in the same way as Sir H. Rumbold, as meaning that Angora's conditions for entering a conference are the evacuation of Smyrna and E. Thrace. This makes all talk of a Conference at Constantinople premature and the draft note suggesting it is therefore not now submitted.

On the other hand the Sec. of State's private tel. to Sir H. Rumbold has been despatched.

If any proof were desired of the disastrous effect on the Angora mind of the Bouillon agreement this incident furnishes it. Angora is completely beyond itself with arrogance. Nothing will bring it to reason except a strongly united front by the Three Powers. The note now being drafted aims at achieving this, but the situation is perhaps more difficult than we had imagined – or at any rate its difficulties have become more clear.

We are about to ask the French to assure us of loyal cooperation towards mediation. Now however we shall have to ask them to go further and give some signal proof of their cooperation which will be evident to Angora too. I think they should be pressed to make some amicable gesture towards the Greeks.

R.C.L.

Nov. 21.

"We had better hold our hand until we have Sir H. Rumbold's further advice in reply to Lord Curzon's private telegram now being despatched.

E.C.

Nov. 23.

Curzon.

F. O. 371 6336 E. 12078

the Turkish exchequer, I can see no hope of improvement. Even for essential services of city, medical and sanitary, there is no money and for nearly four months scavengers have had no pay.

F. O. 371/6478

No. 42

M. Cyrille Kyritcheff to Mr D.G. Osborne, Foreign Office, London

Hotel Moderne
Place de la République
PARIS, the 26th Nov. 1921

Dear Sir,

I am very much obliged to you for your answer of the 17th inst., from which I understand that you consider an interview with my friend D. is of no practical use.

I admit, however, that your Ambassador in Constantinople would not decline to see the delegate of Mustafa Kemal, if the latter decides to send him in Constantinople with the object to try and find a basis for an arrangement of sincere friendship between Gr. Britain and Angora.

I am authorised to inform you that such arrangement could be arrived at on the terms you know already, with the only derogation that whole of Thrace, Eastern as well as Western, should be evacuated by the Greeks and a plebiscite should be instituted in these provinces on the same basis as the last plebiscite in High Silesia. If your Government do not agree to this, you should then accept for a period of 10 to 15 years, a Mandate on the whole of Thrace. This is the only way for your Government to secure the true and devoted friendship of Turkey, as well as of Bulgaria.

You may know that owing to the preference you give to Greece, Bulgaria is quite isolated and obliged to seek the friendship of Yugoslavia, which is to help her to recover her lost territories in Thrace in exchange of a political and military alliance, in which later on Russia and Turkey are to participate also. This scheme is to be realised soon under the protection (patronage) of one of your great allies, who seems to understand better her interests in the Balkans than your philhellenists.

Instead of allowing the realisation of such a plan, which is surely not quite in harmony with your interests, I think your Govern. should encourage Turkey and Bulgaria to prefer an alliance between themselves and Roumania under your own protection.

If your Government comes to an arrangement with Angora, I am in a position to bring under your influence Mr. Stamboliski, who is ready to accept any reasonable terms in exchange of your friendship.

I am authorised to say that the new Turkish Government, which is to be formed by M.K.P., after the preliminary arrangement with you, will be prepared to satisfy all your terms of peace, as far as your interests in Asia Minor and on the Dardanelles are concerned, if you prove them that you are prepared also to give your preference to the true friendship of a new democratic Turkey, instead of to an opportunistic and *shaky Greece*.

A short but categoric answer from your part will oblige me very much, as the courier from Angora is still waiting for such.*

I am, dear Sir,

Your very truly,

(Signed) C. KYRTCHEFF

F. O. 371/6478

No. 43

Sir Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 29th 1921.

No. 1083

My Lord,

The local press published on November the 25th a telegram of the "Agence Télégraphique Italienne", purporting to have been despatched from London on the 23rd instant, to the effect that the Kemalist Government *was about to be* requested to state officially its point of view regarding the solution of the Eastern question. No authority for this statement was given, nor was it said by whom the request was to be addressed to the Angora Government. As however, the telegram was dated from London, it was evidently intended to convey the impression that it referred to a decision taken by His Majesty's Government.

2. The Nationalist Turkish newspaper "HURİ" in publishing the telegram in question distorted the text and made it read to the effect that the Angora Government *had been* requested to state officially its point of view regarding to

* Bu mektubun altına İngilizce Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nda şunlar not edilmiştir:

"This is the Bulgarian intriguer who wanted us to see his friend Davidoff; when we refused, the latter proposed himself to come and see us but Lord Hardinge has been instructed to tell him if he asks that there is no answer to his letter to the F. O.

"I think it might be worth repeating to this man that Angora can and should approach H.M.G. directly through H.M. High Commissioner at Constantinople.

"Qz. Do so.

D.G. Osborne

28.11.1921 "

settlement of the Eastern question. This falsification escaped the notice of the Censorship. On my attention being called to it, I arranged that a penalty of one day's suspension should be inflicted on the "ILERI". This was done in agreement with the Allied Delegates on the Censorship Commission.

3. My main reason for attaching importance to this incident was that the version given by the "ILERI" was calculated to support a rumour which has been widely circulated here, but has been kept out of the Press, to the effect that a British Mission consisting of 4 Military Officers had been despatched to Angora. The origin of this rumour lies in the fact that Major HENRY, a demobilized officer who played a rôle in connection with the projected interview between General HARRINGTON and MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha early in the summer, left Constantinople for Ineboli some days ago accompanied, I understand, by other ex-officers in the British army. I am not aware of the precise object of Major HENRY's journey. I presume it has to do with commercial enterprises in which he is interested. He certainly has no authority to speak to the Kemalists on my behalf or on behalf of General HARRINGTON.

4. As however the journey of Major HENRY and his companions is calculated to create a false impression, especially when taken in conjunction with statements such as that published in the "ILERI", I decided to publish a communiqué, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith. I felt that the present moment was the more timely for a statement tending to dispel the idea that His Majesty's Government are engaged in separate negotiations with the Kemalists, as my Italian Colleague had just authorized the publication of the Franco-Kemalist agreement. Nationalist propaganda has proceeded on the lines of suggesting that the Italian Government were on the point of concluding a similar agreement with the Angora Government and that His Majesty's Government might be expected to follow suit. My own efforts have been directed to make it clear that while His Majesty's Government are most anxious to accelerate a general settlement in the East, and recognise that the point of view of Angora must be taken into account, they have no intention of being drawn into separate negotiations with the Kemalist Government.

I have etc.

Signed HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner.

F.O. 371 6536 E. 13326

ENCLOSURE IN No. 43

Communiqué.

Constantinople, le 28 Novembre.

Le Journal ILERI a été suspendu pendant 24 heures pour avoir publié dans son numéro du 25 courant une version inexacte et tendancieuse d'un télégramme

de l'Agence Télégraphique Italienne daté de Londres le 23. Ce télégramme tel qu'il a été publié par l'Agence disait que le Gouvernement Kémaliste serait invité à faire connaître d'une façon officielle son point de vue dans la solution de la question orientale. Même sous cette forme il ne pouvait constituer qu'une appréciation du correspondant de l'Agence. Le fait est que le Gouvernement de Londres est en train d'examiner soigneusement les meilleurs moyens de rétablir la paix en Orient, par une action commune des Puissances Alliées, mais qu'aucune décision définitive à ce sujet n'a été prise encore.

La version du télégramme en question publiée par l'ILERI fut conçue dans ces termes:—

"Le Gouvernement d'Angora a été officiellement invité à faire connaître son point de vue quant à la solution de la question d'Orient."

Ceci est dénué de tout fondement. La publication de l'ILERI est d'autant plus tendancieuse, que l'on a fait circuler dernièrement à Constantinople des bruits du prétendu envoi d'une mission britannique à Angora. Aucune mission britannique, ni officielle, ni officieuse, n'a été envoyée en Anatolie. Les Autorités Britanniques n'empêchent certainement pas les ressortissants anglais de se rendre en Asie Mineure. Le commerce avec les belligérants étant libre en vertu d'une décision commune des Gouvernements Alliés, il est naturel que des Anglais puissent se rendre en Anatolie pour leurs affaires commerciales et privées. Il faut bien se garder de supposer que des personnes voyageant pour de pareilles affaires sont chargées d'une mission quelconque de la part du Gouvernement Britannique.

F.O. 371/6536/E. 13326

No. 44

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 29, 1921.

No. 1084.

My Lord,

THE political situation here has not improved in any respect during the last fortnight. Indications are not wanting to show that the Ministers at Constantinople are increasingly subservient to the Angora Government. The following story, which is authentic, bears out this view:

2. A member of the Provisional Financial Commission of Control asked the Finance Minister whether he would not do well to look ahead and endeavour to devise means for balancing the budget. The Minister replied that he was only the "kavass" of the Angora Government, which, when it eventually came to Constantinople, could get rid of him if it wished to do so.

3. The Grand Vizier alone of the members of the Constantinople Government declares that he will have no dealings with the Kemalists. In conversation with Sir Adam Block, he characterised the latter as rebels.

4. The difficulties of the Kemalists must, however, be considerable. Reliable reports state that they have given up any idea of suppressing the Kurdish rising by force, because they cannot spare the troops necessary for that purpose. They hope to effect a settlement by conciliatory methods. Then, again, there are persistent rumours that Enver Pasha is proving a thorn in the side of Mustapha Kemal. Had it not been for the direct encouragement afforded them by the conclusion of their agreement with France, the above mentioned anxieties of the Nationalists would have led to a much more chastened frame of mind on the part of the latter.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F. O. 406/48, p. 91, No. 38

No. 45

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 29, 1921
(Received December 5.)

No. 1009.

My Lord,

THERE have recently been indications of uneasiness in the internal political situation at Angora. Attention has been directed more particularly to the resignation of two Ministers, Omer Lutfi Bey, Commissioner for Public Works, and Hamdullah Subhi Bey, Commissioner for Public Instruction. The former has been replaced by Reouf Bey, formerly Minister of Marine, who proceeded to Angora on his release from Malta; the latter by one Yenbi Vehbi Bey, deputy for Karassi. These changes took place about the middle of the present month. About the same time it was announced that Nureddin Pasha, who was in charge of the operations against the Kurds, and Mihad Pasha, commanding the Mesopotamian front, had been relieved of their commands and had been replaced by Kutcbuk Jemal and Jevad Pashas, who are also among the deportees recently returned from Malta.

2. The general tendency is to connect these changes with the struggle which has been proceeding for some time between the pure Nationalists, who stand by Mustapha Kemal, and the supporters of Enver Pasha. Too little is known here of the details of this contest and of the present opinions of the persons named above to enable me to form a confident opinion. All that can be affirmed is that Enver is making a strong effort to re-enter Turkish politics, and has supporters in Angora

and doubtless in the army, especially among those who favour a more whole-hearted co-operation with the Bolsheviks. There would also appear to be a party, not necessarily identical with the Enverists, who view with misgiving and jealousy the dictatorship of Mustapha Kemal.

3. There is, however, no reason to suppose that Mustapha Kemal's position has been sensibly weakened, nor is there any ground for thinking that he and his supporters stand for a "moderate" tendency in regard to the questions at issue between Turkey and the Allies. All my information up to date tends to show that Mustapha Kemal is still in a strong position at Angora, and that he is as resolved as ever to secure the main objects of the national movement, *i.e.*, the complete expulsion of the Greeks and the acceptance by Europe of the National Pact. If assured of these objects, he would doubtless welcome a composition with the Western Powers generally, but it is only in this sense that he can be regarded as a "moderate." His attitude towards the Central Government is still one of defiance. He may possibly have in view a time when it will be necessary to recognise again the authority of the Sultan or at least of the Throne, but in the meantime he continues to treat that authority as being in abeyance, and maintains the claim of Angora to be the sole Government of Turkey. How completely impotent and how largely subservient the Constantinople Government is in face of these pretensions I have described in my despatch No. 1084 of to-day's date.

4. It was natural that on the return of the Malta deportees posts should be found for some of the more capable men among them. The three mentioned above all played leading parts in the national movement in its earlier stages. Reouf Bey played a part second only to that of Mustapha Kemal in organising it. He is usually considered an honest patriot, and may be an element for good in the long run if his experiences as a deportee have not embittered him. Kutchuk Jemal Pasha essayed to play at Konia a rôle similar to that of Mustapha Kemal in Northern Asia Minor, but was less successful. At a later stage, as Minister for War here he promoted the Nationalist movement to the utmost of his power, and Jevad Pasha, as Chief of Staff, also supported it from Constantinople with even greater energy and ability. It will be remembered that the activities of these two pashas in this direction led to their dismissal at the instance of the Allied High Commissioners early in 1920. In these circumstances, Reouf Bey, Jemal Pasha and Jevad Pasha may be expected to be whole-hearted supporters of Mustapha Kemal as long as he continues to direct the national movement on the present lines. There is no reason to suppose that the changes which have brought them into prominence in Anatolia represent in any way a success for the Enverist faction.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

No. 46

*General Harrington, Constantinople, to War office**Desp. 1030 4.12.21.**Recd. 1800 4.12.21.**Paraphrase.**1313 cipher December 3rd.**First of 3 parts.*

Some very active propaganda is being put about here, in an attempt to embroil me in some supposed negotiations with Angora which I think I ought to report for, your information.

Fact that while in England I attended Cabinet meetings, my private visit to Sultan to thank him for his house, and fact that ex-Major Henry and some other business men have gone to Ineboli on business to meet Rafet, have been construed into deep laid British plot, in which I am depicted as principal villian, (*sic.*) to negotiate with Turks.

Truth is as follows. No action of any kind has been taken by me; nor have I any wish or intention to dabble in work which is not mine.

Part 2.

Both in London and since my return here I consistently refused to see ex-Major Henry, and I was totally unaware that he was going to Ineboli as, very day before, he asked permission to bid me good-bye prior to his departure for London, for which he has obtained his berth and passport. It is reported that he cancelled his passage that night on receipt of letter from Rafet. It is possible that my name is being made use of by him and his friends to further their business interets, but entirely without my authority. Stories of a so-called British Mission are pure fabrication.

Sometime back my office received application from ex-Major Henry for facilities to go to Anatolia and informed him that he should obtain letter from Foreign Office.

Last part.

His passport for London was only facility afforded him.

He stated that he had five times unsuccessfully attempted to see British High Commissioner to obtain business facilities, since which he had joined French company.

An Italian steamer, which was for three days weather bound in Bosphorus conveyed party.

So far from being official mission, I was totally unaware until last moment of anyone's going to Anatolia and, as soon as fact that London plans were cancelled

and that party were going to Ineboli became known, information was given to High Commissioner.

F.O. 371 6537

No. 47

British Verbatim Report of Interviews between Major J. Douglas Henry and General Raffet Pasha, Minister of National Defence, Angora Nationalist Government, at Ineboli, which took place from November 27 to December 5, 1921

Confidential

NOVEMBER 27.

Explanation by Major Henry of unfortunate ending to original meeting in June. The general quite realised that this was brought about by Embassy intrigue, and jealousy of General Harington. He was satisfied that Major Henry's loyalty to him had been absolute, and no blame could be attached to him for what occurred. He regretted, however, that more support had not been afforded to him.

2. The general then said that an explanation was due from him. When Major Henry and he met in June he was simply an army commander on leave at Ineboli, who had never mixed himself up in politics or diplomacy of any kind. On meeting Major Henry, and hearing his views as to the best way to settle matters between the two countries, he became convinced that it was his duty to give Henry every possible support to carry through to a successful conclusion a programme, which, in principle, meant nothing but ultimate good to both nations. He had, therefore, relinquished his army command, and had, by dint of explanation, argument, pressure and the expenditure of a vast amount of energy, gathered into his own hands the most important Cabinet positions possible, namely, President of the Cabinet, Minister of the Interior and Minister of National Defence. In view of Major Henry's failure to bring British support to the plan agreed upon, his position in Angora had become one requiring some force to maintain. He was still convinced that our two countries have so many really vital interests in common, that once their statesmen realised this fact an accord between them should be easy as it was obvious and inevitable. This understanding would not consist in a mere group of paragraphs set out on paper and signed. It would be something more vital and deep than that. The policy of a separate and real understanding between the Angora Government (which was the real Turkey) and England was not very popular at the moment among his countrymen and British policy was certainly to blame for this; on the other hand, traditional feelings of friendship and esteem for the British had not died out in Turkey, we had not yet committed so many grave errors of policy *vis-à-vis* the Turks that a show of our former friendship would not quickly make us as popular as before if not more so. It was a proof of his earnest desire to bring about this

understanding that he had delayed the Bouillon Agreement for four months, waiting news from Major Henry. We alone were to blame for this agreement. We alone had forced them into the German alliance before the war and by our treatment of them subsequently we had forced them into French and other temporary alliances. But they were still waiting, as they had waited for years, for some sign from the British.

3. *Major Henry* then said that the present *impasse* had to be broken, a first step had to be made, and he proposed that the general should return again and go direct to General Harington, who would welcome any such friendly visit. There would be no official meeting, merely a friendly discussion across the table for the purpose of discovering some common ground of agreement to serve as a base for an official conference. It was pointed out also that such a visit would have a great and very favourable effect, apart from showing a real desire on the part of Angora to reach an understanding with us, it would strengthen General Harington's position in bringing about such an understanding.

4. *General Reffet* replied that he was certainly of the opinion that something of this kind was essential, but he was afraid that such a visit would lead to nothing unless we could assure him that General Harington was really authorised to speak. It was a question which we must ourselves help him to decide. We must remember that another failure to bring things to a head would mean he would have to give up the political position and influence which he had obtained with so much trouble, and which from both British and Turkish points of view it was so vital for him to retain, and return to the command of the army. Major Henry replied that he could not give this assurance. His task, self-assumed, was to bring about a friendly meeting, which, he felt sure, could only end in the success we all hoped for.

5. General Reffet now said that he would think the proposal over, but he would have to obtain the formal consent of the Angora Government and to obtain this he would have to give a satisfactory explanation of our visit. Major Henry was expected in Angora and it was hardly likely that the Cabinet would believe that the sole object of Major Hery's visit as to ask him (General Reffet) to pay a friendly visit to General Harington. It was obvious that such a proposal could easily have been made by letter. Major Henry replied that this was not the sole object of his visit, he had intended proceeding to Angora to discuss certain commercial matters and also a question of a private loan. General Reffet thought this would be a satisfactory explanation to give them.

6. At this point we left General Reffet, and on returning to our quarters the whole question was discussed. Major Henry decided that in view of what General Reffet had disclosed as to the part he had played subsequent to his first visit, he could not press the general to make the voyage suggested. It was obvious that in General Reffet we had the best possible medium for future Anglo-Turk negotiations at Angora, and that therefore it would be folly to take the slightest risk

that would jeopardise his position. It was decided that General Reflet should be told this decision at the beginning of the next day's interview.

NOVEMBER 28.

7. *Major Henry* began at once by giving the above decision to the general, who was obviously gratified and relieved; he said he agreed with the conclusions arrived at. Major Henry said he proposed to arrange a real reason for General Reflet's visit to Constantinople, and proposed that the general should set forth his views for the purpose of giving them direct to General Harington. If General Harington, on transmitting these views to London, felt he could issue, as a result of the permission given by the British Cabinet, an invitation to General Reflet to meet him privately, General Reflet would, he hoped, unhesitatingly accept the invitation. General Reflet agreed.

8. *The general*, in giving his views, wanted to impress upon us that he was going to speak very very frankly. In the first place he would go back to traditional British foreign policy, which was in Southern Asia Minor to create a series of dependencies along the northern shores of the Indian Ocean, in order to link up our African and Indian possessions. We had begun to realise this plan before the war by dividing with Russia zones of influence in Persia. The late war had brought the opportunity for completing the remaining links in the chain by the formation of several States in Southern Asia Minor, which formerly formed a part of the Ottoman Empire. We had created Palestine, ostensibly for the Jews; but as they represented a proportion of only 6 per cent. of the population of less than millions, we had merely succeeded in creating a strong national feeling among the Arabs which was directed against the Jews with whom, before the war, they had lived in peace. In order to protect Palestine from the desert Arabs we had created the State of Transjordan, under the kingship of a scion of Mecca—trusting to the power of a gold subsidy to make this buffer State effective. Lastly, we had created an independent Irak under Feisal as King. This was the completing link in our Cape to Colombo chain. But things are not as they were before the war. Our position in Egypt was changed—our prestige in India was weaker. Whereas in our self-governing dominions, British national strength was greater, in our dependencies our strength was far less. Our policy for many decades up to 1910 had become out of fashion. We no longer had the money, the possibility, or even a real reason for attempting the realisation of a plan no longer compatible with modern, very much altered conditions.

9. Here he should now turn to an aspect of our former policy which was closely allied and in sympathy with what he had already set forth. Up to the period of Turkish history beginning with the Solonica revolution of 1908, the relations between our two countries had been that of firmest friendship based upon vital interests shared in common. The one outstanding point upon which no doubts existed on either side was the necessity of preserving Turkey within such frontiers

as would prove a firm limit to the pan-Slavic expansions towards the south. The almost fanatic feeling of the Slavs to reach the birthplace of their Orthodox religion has existed for centuries, since the marriage of a Russian prince to a Byzantine princess. There is no logic to account for the instinct which spurs masses of living things, men, beasts and insects, to move in definite directions. Natural and human history is full of examples. The fear of the Slavic expansion south was no nightmare, it was a real factor to be reckoned with, and British statesmen had reckoned with it effectively up to 1908 by protecting Turkey against successive Slavic invasions. In addition to our assistance during the Crimean war, our fleet had always co-operated in later campaigns, and our diplomats had made better terms over the conference table than Turkey on the battlefield.

10. Owing to the fast growing menace of Germany, however, we had deemed it advisable to change our policy *vis-à-vis* Turkey. We reckoned the Russians to be a better ally in the war which was regarded as inevitable. To assure England and France of Russia's help against Germany and Austria, England had betrayed Turkey and had given away Constantinople and the Straits to a country who was by its very nature the permanent enemy of both. Turkey had been obliged to throw in her lot with Germany in the sheer necessity of preserving her existence. Russia's chief point was not so much Constantinople as Alexandretta. It was this knowledge which led England to occupy Cyprus. If Russia were to be at Constantinople and at the same time in control of territory reaching up to the Mediterranean, what was to become of Turkey?

Possibly our appreciation of the necessities of the situation were right, and we were just as unwilling to have Russia as an ally as the Turks to have the Germans.

To-day the situation has again changed. Germany could never again be the same menace to England, but the pan-Slavic menace still existed. Russia was ill, but not dead, and a definite reaction towards health had been universally recognised. The mass instinct of Russia was not altered, and, moreover, the new Russia would be a greater danger than before, more callous, more unscrupulous.

11. It was to our vital interest to prevent Russia or the Slavs reaching either Constantinople, the Mediterranean or India; and the best and cheapest way for us to do this was to revert to our former policy of an inviolate Turkey. We had perhaps twenty to thirty years of peace before us, and we could do a lot with the Turks during that time, make them more fitted to meet the Russians, for instance, when the time came. He realised that Turkey's history was doomed to be bloody. For centuries the country had been almost continually at war. But they wanted to live like the rest of us, and they realised that only with England marching by her side, tied by bonds of common interest, could Turkey hope to reach an old age.

12. It was only necessary for us to realise this fundamental truth for every remaining outstanding question of the moment to be settled automatically. Based on the acceptance of this, it followed logically that the Greeks must leave Asia

Minor and Thrace. Thrace was a sore point, for him personally; if he could have his way he would give up the whole of European Turkey and have the Straits as their northwest frontier. Constantinople and Thrace constituted the great and awful weakness of Turkey. That Thrace should remain with Turkey as a breastwork for the defence of the Straits was more in our interest than the Turks. England had tried to replace Turkey by the Greeks; our policy of stemming the southward march of the Slavs had not perhaps changed in principle, but only in the method of its application. But did we really think that we could keep the Western Slavic Empires from Salonica? Was it not inevitable that for the sake of this port Bulgaria would join in with Yugoslavia and make common cause against Greece? And if Salonica fell to the Slavs, could Greece possibly hold Thrace and protect the Straits, now to be without forts or garrison? We must look facts squarely in the face. If our political future in the East was such as he imagines it, then Turkey was fatally bound to us, and it was Turkey alone who could do our work for us. There is no Greek majority nor anything approaching it in either East or West Thrace. The Slav frontier is but 30 miles from Salonica and the intervening country is mixed Slav and Bulgar. Take the population of Salonica, a town dying for lack of its natural hinterland. There are 60,000 Jews, 30,000 Turks, 25,000 Greeks, and 10,000 Slavs, or 100,000 outside opulation against 25,000 Greeks. Is this city at all likely to do anything but welcome, even assist in, a Slav occupation, even the Greek portion of it, who are mostly merchants?

Could we consider even the prospect of Turkey renouncing all territory in Europe? These points should answer the question of Thrace, and the Straits question is closely bound up with it. There must be, *in our interests*, sole control by Turkey of the Straits. Neither of us really wants international occupation or control. The British want it and they would have it through Turkey. To achieve this, England would have to be the first to move in declaring its intention to leave the Straits in Turkish hands; the other Allies would follow. This would be subsequent to the realisation on both sides of our *common interests*. One thing he would say: that if the Straits should be under the control of a mixed Allied occupation, they would remove the capital and the Khalif from Constantinople. Turkey has no mercantile fleet and aspires to no control of waterways. It is against Turkey's interests in every respect to retain Constantinople and the Straits, which have nearly ruined her. But realising that our fates are linked together, they also realise that at our bidding Turkey must undertake the future defence of Constantinople and the Straits against pan-Slavic expansion.

13. At this point he thought he should make it quite clear that they are quite aware of the whole political plan which aimed at the political extermination of Turkey. This plan was almost wholly British and possibly the weakest and most inept of any having its inception in the brain of British diplomats. He knew the Greeks did not want the Smyrna war, and that on three separate occasions the

Greeks were forced to continue by British and French pressure, chiefly British. He was perfectly familiar with the whole business, and thought that we should have realised ere now what a blunder had been made. He mentioned this, not with any desire to reproach, but to show that in urging, almost imploring, the British Government to their side, they knew they were addressing the root and fount of their present troubles.

14. So far he had given a survey of the situation, having in view British interests solely, interests which were common to both in the northern sphere of Asia Minor. He would not deal with the southern sphere.

As he had already pointed out, we had created certain States in this sphere in order to link up our African and Indian interests, forming a barrier, again, against any northern interferences with our commercial routes. Let us take Mesopotamia. How did we propose to hold on to this? We could not do it with Indian troops, they were too easily "infected" with enemy propaganda. It could not be done with British troops, public opinion and questions of finance would not permit; and even so, it would be a crime to keep pure whites in that country, especially in those parts of it where they would be most needed. What other troops were there: Colonial, Egyptian? Impossible. We were now endeavouring to form mixed units on the Indian plan, but in India there were Hindus and Mahommedans to deal with and antagonise—in Mesopotamia all were Mahommedans. There were no traditional fighting semi-pagan tribes to employ like the Gurkhas. The only alternative was gold, and we would very soon learn that the use of this was making us more enemies than friends.

15. Angora had done nothing to encourage any action against the British in Mesopotamia, and he wished to emphasise the point that, having in view the only possible understanding that could be of any assistance to Turkey, they were not likely to be such fools as to imperil their prospects in this direction by pulling the lion's tail.

On the other hand, it was a great mistake to imagine for one moment that Turks and Arabs were enemies. It would be the easiest possible thing for them to create such trouble in Mesopotamia as to render it necessary for us to send an army there or evacuate the country. As a matter of solemn fact, they were actually preventing Bolshevik agents from fomenting disaffection, and it was unfortunate that they had no control in Persia to stop similar work being carried out from that side.

16. But if Turkey was to be executed now, they would not scruple to use any means to prevent or delay it, by creating difficulties for us wherever possible, and we should know how many points of attack were at their disposal. This was no bombastic threat—the time was long past for such things—but a legitimate warning of the fact that the Turks were prepared to fight to the last man with every available weapon. In such an event, who would suffer? Only the Turks, and the

British. No one else. The Mussulmans of Afghanistan, India and Russia were in accord that the critical moment of their history was at hand. In India they were outnumbered four to one, and they wanted to continue to live, as other. The troubles that would follow an attempt at the extermination of Turkey would inevitably mean a critical situation arising immediately in India and on the north-west frontier, and this time the Russians would assist.

Could we afford this? And, after all, was not the remedy simple? Simply to let Turkey live, as she used to, our friend and ally.

17. Before this divergence from the question of our position in Mesopotamia, he had asked how we were going to maintain it without an understanding with Turkey? Before outlining this plan, he presumed he was right in thinking that we wanted control in Mesopotamia chiefly for commercial reasons. If this was the case, our present policy would make anything produced in Mesopotamia somewhat expensive. Isolated oil properties, for instance, were vulnerable points and easily destroyed. Did we propose to garrison them all? If so, the British taxpayer would have to pay the oil company's profits.

But supposing that, based upon the understanding between the two nations that he regarded as vital to both, a perfectly feasible plan could be discovered whereby we could enjoy all the facilities for commerce and enterprise that we wanted without it costing us a penny? Would it not be to our advantage to accept it?

18. The plan was simple enough, but he wanted to say at the outset that it was not Turkey's interest to accept it, for reasons which he would give later, except as helping out two countries towards an understanding.

In the first place, the Turks had decided to centralise as much as possible. Their former Empire had cost them countless lives, brought them nothing but disaster and misery. They had had enough of it. They wanted a Turkish population, and none other. For this reason they had themselves drawn a line, already known, from a point somewhat north of Alexandretta on the Mediterranean, eastward to a point on the Tigris, south of which were Arabs and others, and north, Turks. They had declared that they desire to have nothing to do with any States or peoples south of this line. The Arabs must decide their own future.

It has this southern area that the British and French had cut up into unwieldy, unworkable States, costing large sums to both nations to maintain.

His plan was that the whole of this southern Arab country should be invited to form itself into an independent State, with its own National Assembly, and that this Arab State should form a dual State, with the independent Turkey on the north. There could be ample assurances for the protection of minorities, and in this respect it would be Turkey's undertaking to us to guarantee order and maintain it by force if necessary.

In accepting this plan and its responsibilities, responsibilities which actually are contrary to the Turkish National Pact, Turkey, to put it plainly, makes the sincerest possible bid for England's friendship and support.

19. At first glance the scheme looks perhaps too ambitious, but a persistent study of the number of very real advantages it offers should convince any unprejudiced critic that it is the only one to adopt.

It is clear that a British mandate in Mesopotamia is unpopular in America; it coincides with the conviction held all over the world that the British are landgrabbers; British occupation of Mesopotamia is unpopular in Great Britain; British public opinion is definitely against sinking any further sums in this adventure, and, on the whole, it cannot but be considered a very dangerous adventure indeed.

America has already protested against a mandatory Power showing favour to its own nationals in regard to the division of commercial opportunities. The adoption of the plan outlined in principle would assure greater opportunities to British enterprise than could be expected under the present British policy in Mesopotamia.

In fact, all concessions and opportunities desired by Great Britain in this Arab State could be guaranteed by Turkey in a separate pact beforehand. In this way there would be no expense occasioned to Great Britain in maintaining her influence in Mesopotamia and the Gulf, as it is clear that the whole economic development of that country would be in British hands.

In conclusion, it must always be remembered that policies alter in sympathy with economic pressure, and should Turkey at any time not act up to the letter of the understanding, so much desired, the remedy would always be in Great Britain's hands—and Great Britain's hands after some years of peace and retrenchment, would be very much stronger than they are now.

20. The creation of this duality, and the recognition of the fact that England is with Turkey, would have an immediate effect among all Mahomedan peoples, and States; more especially those on the north-west frontiers of India. Peace could be assured there and once again a bulwark would be erected against the future Slavic movement towards the south.

It cannot be expected that this plan, if adopted, would solve for always the Slavic question. It cannot be doubted that Slavic mass instinct will always press south, and the time will come when the issue must be fought out. In the meantime, we want years of peaceful preparation, and by a complete understanding between Great Britain and Turkey, at a time when Russia is temporarily demoralised, we can be assured of this peaceful interval.

21. Nothing was necessary to assure this understanding between the two countries but a realisation of the vital nature of the interests common to both.

confirmed by a new confidence of each one in the other. Turkey could not hope to betray England, in whom rests her only chance of an independent and prosperous future.

The original plan of substituting the Greeks for the Turks in the northern sphere had broken down, and England must adopt another policy quickly. Why not therefore realise that there is only one sound policy left—take Turkey again by the hand.

22. In addition to a political understanding, Turkey wanted economic development, and would give every attraction possible for British capital. Turkey had never had a real chance to improve her economic life nor to develop the natural riches of her country. There were roads and railways to build; mines and forests to exploit; harbours for shipping were few and bad; fresh blood was wanted to improve good native breeds of horses, cattle and sheep—the list was endless. In comparison with all other nations, Turkey was rich in that her National Debt was only £T. 150,000,000. As a field, therefore, for British capital, was not Anatolia as enticing as any other?

In speaking of these economic questions, the general wished to point out that Turkey and the proposed Arab State were closely bound to one another already in the exchange of natural products. With the expansion of roads and railways, the improvement of conditions and the growth of production in both States, these ties would become even closer. For economic reasons alone, it was impracticable for Great Britain to maintain in the south separate States formed largely with the idea of creating enemy populations to the Turk. No political programme could be successful which ignored the economic interests of a continent.

23. This concluded the general's proposals, which he asked Major Henry to lay before General Harington as coming direct from him. Had we insisted upon his voyage to Constantinople, he would have come. He was ready to accept any personal risk in a cause which, he was profoundly convinced, was the only salvation to Turkey and the only means whereby Great Britain could assure its hold and prestige in the Near East, in India and in Egypt.

If General Harington were to furnish him with an assurance, privately, of course, that in principle the British Government was prepared to discuss the matter along the lines suggested, he, General Reffet, would come personally to General Harington.

24. *Major Henry* then put several questions to the general:—

Q. Would Turkey assure our influence in the proposed Arab State by agreeing to the appointment of British advisers, by the Arab National Assembly, of course?—A. Most decidedly; though Turkey herself would expect to have the pick of the available advisers.

Q. How would this plan affect the French in Syria?—*A.* To their advantage, in the same way as it would be to ours in Mesopotamia. The French were looking to commercial interests, and it would pay them better not to have to maintain an army in Syria. There could be French advisers for the Syrian Province. He would like to explain that the system of government in Turkey was to give to each province its own self-government. In this way the local interests of the population would be preserved. The new Arab State could follow the same plan, thus giving autonomy to Mesopotamia, Syria, Arabia, Mecca and so on, each providing their representatives to the Grand National Assembly. European commercial interests in all these provinces would not be prejudiced at all by the new arrangement.

Q. Who was to be the titular head of this duality?—*A.* The Sultan and Khalif, who would be, by a new law, in the same constitutional position as King George, who was the titular head of many independent States.

Q. Would the Arabs accept the Sultan as Khalif?—*A.* The best answer was to ask if we thought it possible to have any other. Certainly it would be impossible to appoint a Khalif having the undivided support of all the Arabs. He thought the Arabs would be indifferent on this point, and besides, in view of the profound jealousies existing between old Arab families, it would be bad policy to make any choice among them of a Khalif. The support given to the Hussein family by the British was a bitter disappointment to almost all Arabs. The elevated positions into which we had placed them had still further embittered their enemies. Without British gold they would not last three months.

Q. You don't think, then, that Feisal is popular? Therefore what would happen to him under this scheme?—*A.* Nobody, least of all the British Government and Feisal, believes that he is popular. The vote of the merchants of Bagdad deceives nobody. Feisal alone is a sufficient reason for disaffection in Mesopotamia without any help from outside. The most powerful and intelligent sheikh of Mesopotamia and Arabia was Ajemi Pasha, no friend of Feisal. There would be no difficulty in getting rid of Feisal, and this was the best thing that could happen for everybody's sake.

Q. In any event the plan would take time to achieve. Suppose that, while accepting it in principle, the British Government would not undertake to answer for any Arabs except Mesopotamia, would the Turks take on the duality with Mesopotamia and undertake the same responsibilities there?—*A.* Yes; though it must be remembered that Turkey did not want to assume any liabilities outside Turkey; they were perfectly content to let the Arabs do what they liked, and we could do what we liked with the Arabs. His plan for the southern sphere was not to be considered a *sine qua non* of an understanding; it was merely a proposal on the part of Turkey to relieve Great Britain from a very uncomfortable and costly position.

Q. What guarantees could Turkey give that she would be loyal in such an arrangement?—A. I cannot understand what possible guarantees we could give. We could sign guarantees on paper, but the only possible guarantee is the realisation on our part that our future is entirely in the hands of Great Britain. We already realise that our futures are inevitably bound up together, that England can destroy us at any time, and that is the only guarantee worth anything. Should we not carry out the letter of an understanding, England would be in a stronger position after a few years' rest and recuperation than she is to-day. If we wanted to make trouble for Great Britain the present time would be the most favourable; time will give added strength to Great Britain. We want our independence as a nation. Great Britain wants a frontier against the southern movement of the Slavs, and a friendly Mahommedan Power capable of influencing outside Mahommedans to support England. If you give us the one, you should have no doubt that we shall give you the other. You must realise that the war has made a different nation of us, as we have proved in Anatolia. We have shown something of a new Turkey in our resistance to a plan destined to reduce us to a mob of natives with a past but no future, except as instruments in the hands of foreign capitalists. We are determined not to submit to this, and we fully believe that England will very soon realise the mistake of policy she has made, a mistake which is easily remedied, provided British statesmen realise the facts of the situation. The Turks have waited patiently for some sign, and will continue to wait until every hope is exhausted. If we are to understand that British policy was to continue as at present, it could only be expected that the Turks will adopt every possible means to preserve their existence. The general felt sure that it would never come to this. He wanted to stress the fact that before any Allied conference took place, a definite understanding should have been arrived at in the first place between England and Turkey.

NOVEMBER 29, AND SUBSEQUENT DAYS UP TO DECEMBER 5

A series of interviews took place during these days in which various questions were discussed. The following are General Reffet's views and statements:—
Armenia.

There was no such thing as Armenia ethnologically, it was a geographical name for a large area in which were found scattered Armenian communities, which before the war provided about 6 per cent. of the population. This proportion was now 24 per cent. The only area where Armenians were in a majority was the present Armenian Soviet Republic. It is due in a great measure to the Angora Government that this State had been inaugurated, which includes Alexandropol and Erivan, in which latter town it might be interesting to note only 100 Turks were now living of a former population of 25,000 Turks, the remainder having been massacred. Armenians living in Turkish territory had the right to emigrate to this new State, and Turks living there could, if desired, emigrate to

Turkey. Towns such as Erzerum and Bitlis had large Armenian populations, but separate autonomies would hardly be given to towns.

Kurdistan.

This was, of course, a part of Turkey. Under the new laws, each separate province in Turkey was allowed to choose its own form of local government, this provides that those provinces having a majority population of Kurds will manage their own affairs. The sentiment among the Kurds was definitely in favour of this plan. He much regretted our anti-Turk propaganda in this country, but he felt he should warn us that we could place no reliance on the promises made by the Kurds. They were very much excited and pleased at the prospect of getting military training and equipment at British expense, which might be useful to them at a later date in a way not altogether expected by the British. We should realise that the Kurds could be satisfactorily dealt with only by the Turks.

Minorities.

The question of protection of Christian and other religious minorities could be very easily settled in a satisfactory way.

Mr. Ryan.

In referring to Mr. Ryan of the British Embassy, the general showed some feeling for the first time. He said that Mr. Ryan was the best hated man in Turkey, who saw in him an enemy to their hopes, and the expression of the policy of the Turkish nation. Nothing that came from him would inspire confidence in the Turks, who regarded him as an intriguer of a kind who did not scruple to employ traitors and blackguards for his purposes. The Turks had very good reason for feeling in this way, as the following story of Mr. Ryan's activities will prove.

After the armistice, in which a definite promise was given by Admiral Calthorpe that Constantinople should not be occupied by Allied troops, Ryan and other diplomatic agents came to Constantinople accompanied by large detachments of arms of all kinds. On his arrival, Mr. Ryan saw the Reverend Mr. Frew, an English priest. Not without reason, the Turks had always been suspicious of Mr. Frew; he lived too luxuriously for a real missionary and he was accustomed to entertain Turkish ladies in his home, and it is further stated that British officers were invited to meet these ladies. Other stories, not altogether in keeping with a pious character, had been related of Mr. Frew. His activities after the armistice in co-operation with Mr. Ryan would seem to show him to be a paid British agent.

Soon after arrival in Constantinople, Mr. Ryan interviewed the Sultan, whom he thoroughly scared, and it is not difficult to scare the Sultan. His Majesty was induced to nominate Damad Ferid Pasha, a weak idiot and a ready instrument in Ryan's hands, as Grand Vizier. These two gentlemen gathered round them as accomplices such people as the notorious Said Mollah, known to us as a very base Moslem indeed. Two newspapers were subsidised, called the

"Allemdar" and the "Yeni Stamboul." Refi Djevad, a man of like character with Said Mollah, was one of the editors, and his second in command was another well-known scallywag, Kadri Pelvan, an absolute illiterate. Functionaries of the palace were also subsidised and a complete British ring was formed round the Sultan and the Turkish Government. Agents, of which a large number were Mullahs, were sent to various districts for propaganda purposes. At the beginning everything went well, and the first steps in the plan to obtain complete political control of Turkey were accomplished.

All this went on, but not without the knowledge of a large number of patriotic Turks, who saw quite clearly what this intrigue meant. Hasty meetings were called and plans roughly decided upon for the creation of a nucleus of a national resistance in Anatolia, and very soon numbers of Turks fled to Anatolia. When Mr. Ryan discovered what going on he decided to arrest on any pretext whatever as many of those educated and patriotic Turks as possible who might prove an obstacle to his plans. The famous arrests then took place, and numbers of Turkish gentlemen were exiled to Malta, where they were obliged to submit to the association of a number of Turkish criminals. This plan was a great blunder on the part of Ryan, and it was due to these arrests more than to anything else that the Nationalist feeling in Anatolia owes its strength and inspiration. You can imagine our feelings when we realised the base part played by certain Turks like Damad Ferid.

A further step in the plan to dishearten and cow the Turk was the comedy of the occupation of Constantinople. In effect, Constantinople was already occupied, and a definite challenge can be issued to prove that the Turks in the city were anything but completely docile. Even the intrigues of Ryan's gang could not excite trouble. However, further troops marched into Constantinople and some perfectly innocent Turkish soldiers were shot.

With the rise of the Turkish Nationalist movement, the Reverend Mr. Frew's activities became more intense. The number of agents presumably under his control were increased, and large numbers were sent to Anatolia "in the name of the Sultan" to preach a kind of Jihad against the Nationalists. This gentleman also embarked on a scheme of written instructions to Said Mollah and others. His correspondence is in Angora, and a part of it has been printed, together with other interesting documents of a like nature. Another Englishman who helped in this intrigue was an officer named Captain Bennett.

At this point the growth of the Nationalist movement foiled all Mr. Ryan's plans, and it was then decided that other steps must be taken than mere intrigue at Constantinople to put an end to this movement in Anatolia. It was then that England came to the decision to force Greece to send troops to Smyrna. The Treaty of Sévres provided that Smyrna should be handed over by the Allies to

Greece, but the Greeks were now told that she had to occupy Smyrna with an armed force, and although the Greeks demurred very energetically at this, they, however, were obliged to agree. Troops were sent, and the first part of this new adventure ended with the battle of Inonou, where the Greeks suffered badly. Subsequently, Veniseelos, in deference to strong Greek public opinion, was obliged to resign, and King Constantine was recalled by the Greek nation, not to go on with the war but to put an end to it. Admiral Kerr was then sent post haste to Athens and Constantine was told plainly that he would only be left to enjoy his return to kingship provided he continued the Smyrna campaign. Again the Greeks were forced to agree. The campaign which followed is already known, but I should like to assure you that the Greeks were very lucky to have got off so lightly. We have no great feeling of animosity against the Greeks, and we fully realise that the British are more to blame than they. The present situation can only be resolved by Great Britain.

In the meantime, the Damad Ferid-Ryan Cabinet had been obliged to resign and the present Cabinet was then formed. This Cabinet is honest and will not accept the Treaty of Sévres, it also dislikes and distrusts Mr. Ryan. It will therefore be seen that all Mr. Ryan's plans had failed up to the time that the battle of Sakaria finally ended all prospects of Greece crushing the Anatolian Nationalists. One would have thought that this would be the time for a change of policy on the part of Mr. Ryan, but this was not his opinion. He therefore attempted the downfall of the Tewfik Cabinet, with the object of bringing back his favourite Damad Ferid. His gang, Said Mollah and others, then prepared the comedy of the assassination of General Harington. Information was given through the British Intelligence that a plot existed to murder General Harington, and the informer of this plot was a Turk named Mouzaffer, a spy in the service of the British, known to the whole of Turkey as one of the apaches of Constantinople. He has been many times imprisoned for various crimes and formerly used to be employed by the Turkish police as a spy upon his criminal associates. Every nation has its base element, and Turkey is no exception; Mouzaffer and many others of a like nature and history are at present in the paid service of Mr. Ryan as spies upon their own countrymen, and, to crown all, these Turkish criminals are controlled by an Armenian, named Pantikian. We have been given to understand in Angora that the British Military Intelligence has realised that this whole plot was a fake, but we have yet to read that the British authorities acknowledge this. I may say further, and quite frankly, that we are provided with copies of every document having its inception with members of this gang. It is astounding that any credence could ever be given to information given by such persons. We do not for a moment suppose that General Harington for one moment imagined that there was any truth in this supposed plot. Why should we assassinate the general, whose every dealing with the Turk has been straight forward. If we wanted to remove anybody we should

start with Mr. Ryan. I would like to give you my most solemn assurance that we have never for a moment entertained or thought of any such fundamentally stupid ideas. We hold the view that Mr. Ryan does not want General Harington in Constantinople, and this faked assassination plot very nearly succeeded in killing two birds with one stone. We state definitely that Mr. Ryan has misled General Harington all along. In the first place, although the general, with my assistance, is to thank for the exchange of prisoners, Mr. Ryan gave advice to his superior which made considerable delays and rendered both General Harington's and my position extremely uncomfortable, and at the last moment obtained for himself all the credit for the exchange which finally took place. He misleads the general by not telling him frankly about his plans and intrigues, he has duped him over the assassination plot and so on. As a further instance, why was Damad Ferid's son appointed to form one of the party accompanying General Harington on his recent visit to the Sultan? All Turkey knows that Prince Sami was there, and it is quite natural that all Turks should look upon this as a definite mark of favour on General Harington's part in regard to Damad Ferid himself. We associate, but you can tell General Harington from me that we have nothing but honour and respect for him, and we would rather have his private assurances than Mr. Ryan's undertakings.

Constantinople Government.

The Grand National Assembly at Angora have passed a law wherein it is stated that they are free to accept or not as they may decide any Act promulgated by the Constantinople Government, which is not recognised by Angora at sight. We believed the present Cabinet to be absolutely honest, but we do not recognise them.

French Agreement.

The general stated that he had delayed this agreement for four months, awaiting news from Major Henry. In addition to the agreement as already published, there was a private letter in which it was agreed to give the French the exploitation of the Bagdad railway from a point near Konia to the present Southern Boundary of Turkey. There was nothing in these arrangements inimical to British interests. They had refused to give the French the exploitation of the Arghiana copper-mine, though this was persistently asked for. The general believed that the real motive of this agreement was to show the Arabs of Syria that they could not hope for any Turkish support in any resistance they might wish to show to French occupation. In other words, it was intended to dishearten the Arabs and allow the French an opportunity to consolidate their position. The general, however, was quite sure that the French would have lots of trouble.

Colonel Rawlinson.

The general had never heard of and could not believe that Colonel Rawlinson had been starved. They quite realised that Colonel Rawlinson was a previous

prisoner, and, in view of this, the principal medical officer of the Turkish army had been under instructions to deliver to the Cabinet a weekly report on the state of Colonel Rawlinson's health. They had not realised, it seems, that the climate, and possibly the fact that he was a prisoner, was acting very deleteriously on Colonel Rawlinson, and it had been decided, had not the exchange of prisoners taken place, to send him south during the present winter, in accordance with the doctor's advice. Strict enquiries will be made as to the treatment of the prisoners, and, if our allegations were right, very severe punishment would follow. Colonel Rawlinson, it was true, had been confined for a period owing to the capture of letters secretly sent to him by General Harington.

Bolsheviks.

The Turks had availed themselves of every offer of assistance from the Bolsheviks, and they were quite right in doing so. They had worked out, in conjunction with the Bolsheviks, a definite plan of concerted action, should Turkey find herself obliged further to fight for her existence. The Bolsheviks had given them quantities of ammunition and had prepared suitable propaganda for Afghanistan and India. In spite of this, however, it was perfectly true that the water of Bolshevism could never mix with the oil of Turkey; Bolshevism was mentally and morally impossible for Muslims in general and the Turks in particular, quite apart from the antipathy to each other which was ineradicable in both nations. An understanding with England would mean putting an effective stop to Near Eastern Bolshevik propaganda, which was of far greater importance than the British seem to believe.

Remarks by Major Henry.

There can be no question as to the earnestness of General Reffet's statements. I am perfectly convinced that he was sincere and honest in everything he said; that we have the firmest friend for an Anglo-Turk understanding in General Reffet that we could possibly want. In general, his declarations throw a clear light upon the near past and make quite plain happenings that hitherto have appeared inexplicable.

The plan to smash Turkey, to capture the Khalif and his Constantinople Government, to divide up Turkey into Allied spheres of influence, the pressure brought to bear on the Greeks to make them play their part in this general plan, have all failed. The Turks know the situation and realise as well as we do that we have reached a definite turning of the road.

It is now for the British Government to decide without delay which turning they are going to take. On the facts, it would appear clearly impossible that any doubt on this point should exist, and in this respect nothing could be added to the remarks already made by General Reffet. It is further perfectly clear that the Anatolian movement has given birth to a new Turkey, determined to resist to the last man any attempt to turn them into a dependent State.

With regard to the Arabi State scheme, it requires but little thought to appreciate its very obvious advantages. By its acceptance we have everything to gain and nothing to lose. The British taxpayer would be pleased, and the Minister who proposed this arrangement in the House of Commons would probably be acclaimed with the utmost enthusiasm.

I would like to make further mention of my conversation with General Reffet with regard to the British commercial opportunities. I discussed several matters with him, and, while he was careful to insist upon the strict observance of law and justice, he assured me that every possible facility would be given to British capital, which would be far more welcome than any other under a political understanding with Turkey. He was particular in pointing out that in future Turkey would undertake no commercial arrangements where there was a suspicion that these arrangements entailed any suggestion whatever of zones of political influence. It would be possible, should a favourable decision in principle be taken by the British Government, to precede a political *entente* by a private commercial arrangement.

With regard to the Greeks, they had made overtures for direct negotiations with Angora, but the Turks realised that they had not to deal with the Greeks but with the British.

As far as I can see—and it seems perfectly clear to me—there is only one possible course to adopt. The British Government must put an end to its former policy, which, in fact, is already dead, and adopt in a straightforward and earnest fashion the only policy compatible with British interests. We must get together with the Turks and decide between us exactly what we and they want and do not want, and, having decided this, the Allied Conference can take place, and there can be no doubt that a little will brought to bear on the question could ensure the Acceptance by our Allies of the understanding already previously agreed upon by the Turks and ourselves.

General Reffet expressed a keen desire that in any negotiations resulting from either this interview or any future talk, the Angora Government would much prefer to negotiate through General Harington and not through the British Embassy.

F. O. 371 6480

No. 48

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquis Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, December 6, 1921

(Received December 7)

No. 930 Telegraphic: by bag

My telegram No. 928.

Monsieur Briand asked me to call upon him yesterday evening and he showed me the text of a note¹ which he proposed to send in reply to your last note² to the French Chargé d'Affaires in London on the Angora Agreement.

He explained that although he had promised the other day to close the controversy by abstaining from sending any further reply, he found this document had been prepared during his absence and had received the approval of the Council of Ministers. He asked me to read it pointing out that it was couched in the most friendly and uncontroversial tone and he asked my opinion whether it could do any harm to send it as he felt bound to do so since it had been approved by the Council of Ministers. I read the note in his presence somewhat hastily as it is of considerable length and the tone was certainly friendly. I pointed out a paragraph which in my opinion was controversial and Monsieur Briand at once struck it out. Finally I told him that I thought his note could do no harm if sent. I then said that I presumed that he would now have no objection to the publication of all four notes. In reply he begged that publication might be delayed since he feared that it would only provide the wherewithal to create difficulties for him and the Government in the Chamber of Deputies. I think that is very true.

¹ This Note of December 6, not printed, was transmitted to the Foreign Office by the French Chargé d'Affaires. It is published in Cmd. 1570 of 1922. This published version omitted, by agreement with the French Government, the last paragraph and the first part of the penultimate paragraph. As Sir E. Crowe explained in a Minute of December 8 'I spoke to the French Chargé d'Affaires this morning about the difficulty standing in the way of laying before parliament his note of the 6th, if it included the last 2 paragraphs which contained references to the Greeks having placed themselves in hands of the allied governments.'

I suggested to M. de Monville that he should relegate the last 2 paragraphs to a separate note. He however thought by far the simplest thing would be if we omitted the 2 paragraphs from the printed version. He said he would telegraph at once to Paris to obtain definite authority and consent to this arrangement.

The original version ran as follows: 'Aussi, le Gouvernement de la République a-t-il été heureux d'apprendre, en recevant la note du 22 Novembre - not printed - de l'Ambassadeur britannique à Paris, que les Ministres grecs étaient revenus sur les prétentions inacceptables relatives dans la note de Lord Hardinge, en date du 21 du mois dernier - not printed. Il attend avec intérêt les propositions annoncées à la fin de la lettre de Votre Seigneurie, estimant toutefois nécessaire que l'intervention des Alliés ait lieu dans des conditions qui permettent d'aboutir à un résultat pratique.'

Je ne puis à ce propos que rappeler les indications que M. Bonnevay donnait à Lord Hardinge dans sa lettre du 26 Novembre, par laquelle il exprimait le desir que les précautions nécessaires fussent prises pour éviter un échec qui reculerait encore la date du rétablissement de la paix en Orient.

² Of November 25.

Monsieur Briand then produced the Franklin-Bouillon dossier of the existence of which he said he had been quite unaware, and he proceeded to summarise to me the contents of a considerable number of letters which had passed between Franklin-Bouillon and Mustapha or Yusouf Kemal. According to his summary which was of a very cursory nature, the correspondence related to a mine in the Adana district which had been exploited by a French Company in the past, the continuance of French schools in Cilicia, arrangements for the water supply of Aleppo and regulations for the town and port of Alexandretta. There was one letter in which the appointment of French instructors in the Turkish Gendarmerie was suggested. I at once took exception to this as being a question which interested all the Allies and Monsieur Briand gave me a positive assurance that nothing would be done on this question without full agreement on the part of the Allies. The remainder of the correspondence was innocuous as far as I was able to judge from the summary which he gave me, but I insisted upon having copies in order that you should know exactly how far Franklin-Bouillon had gone with the Angora Government. He promised that he would send me copies of this correspondence in a day or two¹.

He then raised the question of a conference on the subject of the Near East and having shown me a telegram to the Ambassador in London accepting your proposal, he said that he was very anxious that when you came to Paris you should discuss every sort of question with him so as to arrive at a general agreement on all questions at issue. He stated that according to his information, the Angora Government are now well disposed towards peace with Greece. They feel that they are not a properly constituted Government and that they are in the air. He said that they are irreconcilable on the subject of Smyrna but quite tractable on the question of Thrace, and that if and when the Supreme Council meets, it will be essential that Mustapha Kemal should attend in person and that the Turks should be a delegation representing not only Mustapha Kemal but the Constantinople Government.

As regards other questions affecting Western and Central Europe, he would very much like to be able to bring in the German Government into any agreement that was arrived at, for he felt that it was essential to do all in our power to support the German Republic against the reactionaries, and that the consolidation of a democratic Government in Germany was the surest and easiest means of securing peace in Europe. He stated his intention of making more reductions in the French army since the military burden of France was greater than the country could bear, while the people were clamouring and protesting against the calling up of the

¹ This correspondence was transmitted to the Foreign Office by the French *Chargé d'Affaires* in a Note of December 10, communicated on December 12; not here printed, which requested that the documents in question should not be published without the prior agreement of the French Government.

various classes and in particular against their employment in distant countries which he admitted was contrary to French law. From the information in his possession obtained through French Labour syndicates, he was convinced that there is considerable agitation amongst the labouring classes in Germany from fear of possible reaction and that everything should be done to encourage them and present German Government in resisting the Junkers and monarchists.

Monsieur Briand's admission of the advantage of Germany participating in Anglo-French agreements is decidedly a step in advance but I am not at all sure that such a suggestion would be well received in the Chamber at the present time.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 508-510, No. 471

No. 49

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 6, 1921.

(Received December 12.)

No. 1112.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a condensed translation of an account given in the "Wakt" of the 3rd December of a speech by Mustapha Kemal Pasha in the Grand National Assembly on the 30th November.

2 The speech was delivered in the course of a debate on a Bill relative to the powers and responsibilities of the Cabinet. Authentic information is lacking as to the nature of the Bill in question. So far I can gather it aimed at doing away with the system by which the executive power is vested in the Grand National Assembly, which merely deposes its powers to individual Ministers or commissioners elected by it. This system is obviously calculated to embarrass the executive at the present time, when an active, if not numerous, party in Angora, drawing their inspiration from Enver Pasha and the Bolsheviks, to undermine Mustapha Kemal Pasha's position. On the face of it the Bill suggests an attempt on the part of the latter to consolidate his position without taking the extreme measures of dissolving the Assembly. The latest information in the press here is that the Bill has been thrown out by the Grand National Assembly.

3. The portion of Mustapha Kemal's speech which has been telegraphed here does not, however, dwell on internal issues. Its significance lies in the fact that he went out of his way to disclaim intention on the part of his Government to follow an extreme pan-Islamic policy. His pronouncement would appear to have a double aspect. In the first instance, it is probably a move in the contest between Mustapha Kemal and the Enverists. In the second place, it is doubtless designed to disarm the misgivings of European Governments, and especially Great Britain, as

to the ultimate trend of Turkish Nationalist policy. As a statement of ultimate intention it must be received with scepticism. As a tactical move it is of great significance at the present time.

4. From various utterances of Mustapha Kemal and other leaders, it is evident that they are particularly anxious to emphasise their concern for the proletariat. The object of this would appear to be to discredit partisans of Enver working on Communist lines.

5. I conceive Mustapha Kemal's position at present to be somewhat as follows: He is, in my opinion, as determined as ever to secure the acceptance of the National Pact in all its essentials. He has arrived at a point at which he can regard this as being well in sight. The French have practically subscribed to the Pact. The Italians, though unwilling at the moment to separate themselves from His Majesty's Government, and though anxious to secure their own economic position, have no objection to the Pact as a basis for the General political settlement. Mustapha Kemal must know that there is a strong movement in Great Britain itself in favour of giving him a measure of satisfaction which would be tantamount to acceptance of the Pact. He may well feel therefore that he has all but achieved his ambition of wearing down the Allies to complete acquiescence in his point of view. On the other hand, his position at home is difficult. He is menaced by the Enverist movement, by discontent in Anatolia and by continuous, though incoherent, insurrection in Kurdistan. He sees the increasing difficulty of maintaining the Bolshevik alliance without coming under the ascendancy of Moscow. In these circumstances, he is not improbably seeking a way out for Angora and for himself personally on the lines of securing the National Pact, but relegating to the future any idea of extending Turkish sovereignty or even influence to regions outside the territories definitely claimed under the Pact, namely, Anatolia, Thrace, Kurdistan, Turkish Armenia and a portion of the three Caucasian sanjaks of Kars, Ardahan and Batoum. If he can carry on long enough to secure this it will enable him to emerge from the whole adventure with undiminished credit as the saviour of his country and to play a further rôle in a reunited Turkey. He would incur the open hostility of the Bolsheviks, but he would be compensated for this by the moral and perhaps material support which he might hope to expect from the Allies if the Bolsheviks felt strong enough to join issue with him.

6. I do not offer this as more than an attempt to rationalise the very obscure situation at present existing in Anatolia. It may, however, serve as a working theory on which to base further consideration of the best means of bringing about peace. I would suggest that the present despatch be read in connection with my despatch No. 1110 of to-day regarding rumoured new developments in the Caucasus.

7. Returning to the public utterances of Angora statesmen, I would direct your Lordship's attention to a speech by Fevzi Pasha on the 28th November,

reproduced in the Turkish press here from the "Reveil." Fevzi Pasha acclaims the partial realisation of the National Pact and the conclusion of peace "with our old friend" France, expresses complete confidence in the ability of the Nationalist army to obtain a favourable settlement by arms should the enemy prefer a renewal of hostilities to a peace based on the National Pact, and emphasises the determination of the Angora leaders not to lay down the sword until both Smyrna and Adrianople have been retrieved.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

High Commissioner

F.O. 306 48, pp. 103-104, No. 49

No. 50

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

Private

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 6th, 1921

Dear Lord Curzon,

I received a couple of days ago a repetition of Sir Percy Cox's telegram No. 795 to the Colonial Office, a copy of which I enclose for your convenience. I have refrained from offering any official comments on this telegram, as I wish to avoid any appearance of controversy with representatives elsewhere at a time when we are all agreed that nothing must be left untried to accelerate a settlement in the East. At the same time there are certain considerations which I feel I ought to bring to your personal notice.

General Harington's telegram of December 1st to which Sir Percy Cox refers is based on information received direct from Angora. This information may be regarded as an unofficial and wholly non-committal message from the Angora Government. If so, it is not singular that it should correspond with indications through other channels of the attitude of Angora towards His Majesty's Government, but to regard it as a definite offer would be most unwise. It is a mixture of temptations and threats designed to induce His Majesty's Government to follow the French example, make a separate composition with Angora, and give the Kemalists a free hand in regard to the Greeks.

I have long realised that a settlement cannot be effected without bringing Angora into line, and that as none of the Allies will or can fight the Kemalists, the settlement must be almost wholly favourable to the latter. If Greece were alone to suffer by this, it would not matter so much. She is incapable of holding extended territories in Asia Minor except on a war footing. We have however our own interests to consider, and we have moral obligations other than those to the Kurds

and Christians of the Mosul vilayet. I think we should still do what little we can to redeem our moral obligations, which are indeed obligations of honour, to the subject populations in the whole of the territory to be eventually left to Turkey.

As to our own interests, they require: 1. that Turkey should not be a centre of pro-Islamic propaganda, and there by a perpetual instigator of trouble in our Moslem dependencies, in Egypt, and in Arabia; 2. that Turkey should not be able easily to attack us in Mesopotamia; 3. that the Straits should be left open; and 4. that Turkey should be a tolerable place for our nationals to live in and do business in. There is too great a tendency at present in certain British circles to imagine that to secure these objects it is only necessary to throw over the Greeks, to recognise Angora as the sole effective authority in Turkey and to come to a fair and friendly understanding with the Kemalists leaders. Many of the exponents of this view are perfectly honest; but many of them are persons anxious to get trade openings; and many others, including a number of soldiers, are persons for whom the Turk is an honest Anglophil gentleman, now legitimately disgruntled, and the Greek a despicable cad.

I am not concerned with the details of the Mesopotamian frontier. They must depend on strategic and to some extent economic considerations. I am perfectly certain, however, that a belated and complete surrender on all other points to Angora as such will not secure a really friendly Turkey, scotch political Panislamism, or safeguard our permanent trade interests here. A Turkey which has triumphed over all the Allies will be run by xenophobes, will seek to make Islam a homogeneous political force and will be as arrogant in its dealings with foreign residents as its poverty will allow it to be.

Angora must be brought into line; but Constantinople should not be left out in the cold. Angora is revolutionary, Constantinople is conservative. The political opponents of the Kemalists here are worthless. Damad Ferid Pasha, the only decent man of first-class standing among them, is too discredited to play a useful part now, and probably too old and broken in health ever to do so again. The Sultan, however, is worth a great deal. His influence is for the moment completely in abeyance, but the Sultanate is too venerable an institution to lose its hold permanently on the mass of the people. If its influence revived, the present Sultan could be made a useful asset to us. The Crown Prince is a creature of wild impulses, but the throne might stabilise even him. The Prince next in succession is a son of Abdul Hamid's of whom little is known, but he probably resembles the present Sultan.

It must not be forgotten that Mustapha Kemal, for all his success, is, himself in a difficult position. I have attempted to define it (I admit on very inadequate information) in my despatch No. 1112 of today. I would beg you to read that despatch, for what it is worth, in conjunction with another despatch, No. 1110, dealing with the situation in the Caucasus, which appears to be entering into a new phase.

My object in writing this letter is not to propose a mode of settlement, but to add my voice to the voices of those who deprecate the theory that the only way out for His Majesty's Government is to treat direct with Mustapha Kemal more or less on his own terms. I know that this theory is not held in the Foreign Office, but it appears to be gaining a hold on the other departments and their advisers. I am not myself very hopeful about the future here. It may be that we shall have to capitulate to the Kemalists. It may be that the Bolsheviks will install Enver as their viceroy at Angora. For the moment I think we should continue to work on your own present lines of promoting mediation between Greeks and Turks, of seeking to get Constantinople and Angora into double harness, and of harmonising all that has happened up to date in a general settlement to which the two Turkish Governments and all the Allies shall be parties. It is for that reason that I welcomed, though without optimism as to the future, the Cabinet's proposal to endeavour to bring about a conference here.

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

[Signed] HORACE RUMBOLD

F. O. 371/6480/E. 13810

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 510-513, No. 472

(Mektubun eki olan Cox'un aşağıdaki telgrafi D.B.F.P. cildine alınmamış.- B.N.Ş.)

ENCLOSURE IN No. 30

Copy of telegram From Sir Percy Cox, Bagdad, to Secretary of State for the Colonies

3rd December 1921

No. 795

Please see Allfor, Constantinople, telegram No. 1309 of December 1st to G.O.C. Bagdad, and General Bagdad telegram No. X. 4014 dated November 5th to the War Office. The two telegrams from totally different sources so strikingly corroborate one another that we seem justified in accepting the information as true.

It is impossible for me to urge upon you too strongly the vital importance of the success of our policy generally and especially at the present juncture, of an early peace that will secure a friendly Turkey and I trust that H.M.G. will at once exploit to the full the proffered opportunity.

As regards the frontier from Jezireh towards the East, the Kemalist proposal as reported, which is well to the North of Amadia would enable us to fulfil our moral obligations to the Kurds and the Christians of the Mosul vilayet, and affords a satisfactory basis for acceptance.

I am sending by air mail a considered despatch dealing with the detailed alignment of the northern frontier and defining possible alternatives acceptable to Irak having regard to her political and military problems. The necessity for immediate action is more pressing because of the known presence of Frunze at Angora and the forthcoming visit of Tchicherin (as reported by Reuter) to attend the Congress assembling in furtherance of pan-Islamic, anti..... 4 groups mutilated) programme of oriental extremists.

F.O. 371/6480/E. 13810

No. 51

Memorandum by the British Secretary of State for War to the Cabinet.

Secret.

BRITAIN AND THE TURKISH NATIONALISTS

With reference to C.P. 3474, I circulate two telegrams which have recently been received from General Harington.

L.W.-E.

THE WAR OFFICE, 7th December, 1921.

3rd December, 1921.

Some very active propaganda is being put about here, in an attempt to embroil me in some supposed negotiations with Angora which I think I ought to report for your information.

Fact that while in England I attended Cabinet meetings, my private visit to Sultan to thank him for his house, and fact that ex-Major Henry and some other business men have gone to Ineboli on business to meet Rafet, have been construed into deep laid British plot, in which I am depicted as principal villain, to negotiate with Turks.

Truth is as follows: no action of any kind has been taken by me; nor have I any wish or intention to dabble in work which is not mine.

Both in London and since my return here I consistently refused to see ex-Major Henry, and I was totally unaware that he was going to Ineboli as, very day before, he asked permission to bid me good-bye prior to his departure for London, for which he obtained his berth and passport. It is reported that my name is being made use of by him and his friends to further their business interests, but entirely without my authority. Stories of a so-called ? British Mission are pure fabrication.

Sometime back, my office received application from ex-Major Henry for facilities to go to Anatolia, and informed him that he should obtain letter from Foreign Office.

His passport for London was only facility afforded him.

He stated that he had five times unsuccessfully attempted to see British High Commissioner to obtain business facilities, since which he had joined French company.

An Italian steamer, which was for three days weather bound in Bosphorus, conveyed party.

So far from being official mission, I was totally unaware until last moment of anyone's going to Anatolia, and, as soon as fact that London plans were cancelled and that party were going to Ineboli became known, information was given to High Commissioner.

1st December, 1921.

Well informed agent, recently returned from Angora, reports as follows:—

Angora, being in process of a settlement with Italy and having concluded separate peace with France, is desirous to come to terms with Great Britain. They have been convinced of Britain's good faith by recent exchange of prisoners. Flushed with victory and strengthened by settlement with Persia and Caucasus States, however, Angora stands on basis of National Pact. On conclusion of peace with three Allies, feels itself able to settle with Greeks. Angora is willing to meet Great Britain, and if agreement is reached with England before Greeks are expelled from Asia Minor, will renounce claim to Mosul Vilayet and accept frontier seven groups omitted telegraphically) Ibn Omar. If, however, England delays agreement, frontier as far south as the lesser Zab river, including Kirkuk and Suleimanieh, will be demanded by Angora.

Under former circumstances, Angora will in spite of hostility to Emir Feisul, refrain from propaganda in Mesopotamia and will assure her peace in Egypt, Mesopotamia and India. But Angora will carry out violent anti-British propaganda through British Moslem territories if England refuses.

Insurrection of Pontus Greeks was result of Greek propaganda during Turkish retreat. Plot was discovered in time by Nationalists who have deported all Greeks, between ages of 15 and 55, from Black Sea coast to frontiers of Syria and Mesopotamia and to neighbourhood of Diarbekr. 12,000 are in mountain area between Amassia and Baiburt.

Please wire your comments. Military and political information received in past from Agent in question has always been very reliable, although latter information may possibly be coloured with propaganda on certain points. It is probably safe to accept unless anything stated is known to be inaccurate.

F.O. 371 6537

C. P. 3533

No. 52

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, 7th December 1921, 5.45 p.m.

(Received December 8, 12.50, p.m.)

No. 597. *Telegraphic**Very Confidential*

Your despatch No. 554

Minister of war tells me in strictest confidence for your information that he has good reason to believe that Franco-Kemalist treaty contains two or three secret clauses.

One stipulates for delivery of all French arms in Cilicia to Kemal though French legation and military mission have denied this. Another refers to Mediterranean. A third, he thinks, but is not yet sure grants to France all rights which had formally been conceded to Germany in Asia Minor.

He has informed Monsieur Gounaris.

F.O. 371/6479/E. 13510

No. 53

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 10, 1921

(Received December 10)

No. 1122

My Lord,

Izzet Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, called on me yesterday evening to speak about the prospects of peace.

2. He stated that he knew that the Nationalists are anxious to come to some preliminary understanding with Great Britain. As a proof of this, he quoted the enthusiastic manner in which ex-Major Henry¹ and his party had recently been received at Samsoun. I reported in my despatch No. 1062² the departure of four

¹ See No 47

² Of November 22, not printed. In this, Sir H. Rumbold, reporting a conversation with Izzet Pasha on November 21, had stated: 'Izzet Pasha then said he had heard a report that an unofficial British mission was going to Angora to enter into discussions with the Nationalist Turks. I replied that there was no truth in this report. It probably owed its origin to the fact that a Major Henry, who as your Lordship may remember, was the intermediary employed in the summer to endeavour to arrange a meeting at a Black Sea port between General Harington and Mustafa Kemal Pasha had just gone to Ineboli to meet Rafet Pasha. I said that I did not know whether Major Henry had gone on private business, but in any event, he had no authority to discuss political question and only represented himself.'

Englishmen for Ineboli ostensibly in connection with commercial affairs. The party in question were unable to land at Ineboli and had therefore to proceed to Samsoun, where Rafet Pasha was awaiting them. They were received with a guard of honour because it was supposed that the party constituted a semi-official mission from His Majesty's Government to the Nationalist Government. Major Henry's party has now returned to Constantinople and, although I have not seen any of its members, I have just learnt that Major Henry has brought back a document containing a record of his conversation with Rafet Pasha. It was stipulated that this document should not be shewn to the British High Commissioner.

3. I pointed out again to Izzet Pasha that there was no truth whatever in the story that Major Henry and his party had been sent on a mission to the Nationalists, and I think that His Highness is now persuaded of the truth of my assurance.

4. Izzet Pasha was evidently very anxious to know whether any reply could be expected to the telegram which I had the honour to transmit in my telegram No. 740³. He said that it seemed to him desirable to ascertain the basis on which peace negotiations might be embarked upon. I replied that the telegram in question did not seem to me to be a very hopeful sign of the state of mind of the Angora Government, and, in any event, we were not going to make a separate agreement with that Government. There was no reason why we should do so. We wished to bring about peace in co-operation with our Allies.

5. Izzet Pasha replied that the Nationalists did not expect to make a separate agreement with us. He did not think that the telegram in question was unhelpful and he compared the preliminaries to peace negotiations to a transaction which might take place in the bazaars. The purchaser would not at the outset of a bargain get the last price from the merchant. The original price asked by that merchant would be lowered in the course of bargaining. I enquired whether this meant that the Nationalists would be prepared to modify the National Pact. He said that the whole of Anatolia was necessary to the existence of Turkey. I told Izzet Pasha that I had long thought that the question of the European frontier of Turkey would prove the most difficult to solve. In June last it was certain that English public opinion would not have acquiesced in a considerable extension of Turkish territory in Thrace.

6. Izzet Pasha said he had read allusions to the Enos-Midia line as a possible frontier for Turkey in Europe. This frontier was a purely artificial one. What the Turkish Government feared most in the future was the incursion of Greek bands. For that reason it was necessary for them to have a frontier such as that of the Maritza which they could defend against those bands. The Allied Powers should be under no illusions in this matter of the formation of bands. It was absurd to

³ See No. 40

imagine that if the Turkish frontier were continuous with that of Bulgaria the rest of the Balkan States would be in danger. Turkey could not go to war in conjunction with Bulgaria. Her alliance with Bulgaria during the War had anyhow been an unnatural one.

7. I then asked Izzet Pasha what he thought would be the attitude of the Nationalists towards the Sultan. He replied that he had no cause for devotion to the Sultan who, he knew, detested him personally and had behaved very badly. Nevertheless, he, Izzet Pasha, was a Monarchist, and would, with the rest of the Constantinople Government, rally to the support of the dynasty should the Nationalists attempt to interfere with it.

8. Finally, I enquired whether the existence of the large body of Turkish Officers who found employment whilst hostilities lasted would not prove an obstacle to the re-establishment of peace. He said he did not believe this and maintained that there were many Turkish Generals who ardently wished for the end of the war. This led him on to say that the military capacity of Mustapha Kemal Pasha was over-rated. The man who had done most for the Nationalist Army was Ismet Pasha. It was owing to his dispositions that the Turks had forced the Greeks to retire from the Sakaria River. Just before the Greek retreat Mustapha Kemal Pasha had been appointed to the supreme command of the Nationalist Forces and had consequently been given all the credit for what was really due to Ismet Pasha.

I have &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 518-520, No. 479

No. 54

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 12, 1921

No. 709¹

Telegraphic: by bag

(*To Paris only: 'My despatch No. 3232 of December 7th.'*)²

A certain Major Henry, an ex-army officer now engaged in business in Constantinople, recently went to Ineboli without the knowledge of the British authorities to meet Refet Pasha in order to obtain concessions. So far as we can

¹ No 709 to Paris, No. 506 to Rome.

² In this despatch Lord Curzon referred to Constantinople telegram No. 767 of December 2 and transmitted a paraphrase of General Harington's telegram No. 1313 of December 4 to the War Office reporting the visit of Messrs. Henry and Stourton to Ineboli.

ascertain, he went in an Italian ship, ostensibly on behalf of a French business concern, after facilities for the journey to Angora had been refused by British commander-in-chief. His journey to Angora was hailed in Constantinople as a British mission to the Nationalists and His Majesty's high commissioner found it necessary to issue a formal *démenti*. Major Henry has since returned to Constantinople and has left for London, alleging that he is the bearer of proposals from Mustapha Kemal for negotiating. Please inform government to which you are accredited of the above facts, which are all that is known at present to His Majesty's Government and tell them that we will keep them fully informed. It would appear that Mustapha Kemal having concluded an agreement with the French and failed to make one with the Italians is now trying what he can do with us. We shall not of course allow any such movement to deflect us from the policy of united action which we hope presently to discuss at Paris.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 648.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, p. 523, No. 482

No. 55

Paraphrase of Telegram from British High Commissioner of Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated 13th December 1921

Secret.

C.P. 3565.

(Circulated to the British Cabinet by the Secretary of State for the Colonies).

Feisal states that no negotiations are being carried on by him with Kemalists and he fully realises that His Majesty's Government is averse from his entering into relations with them. A letter has, however, recently been sent to him by his cousin Sherif Jamil at Amman suggesting that a certain Naji Bey who has a high position with Mustafa Kemal should be approached. Naji Bey who is related to Feisal's mother by marriage is, Feisal says, a trusty Hedjaz friend of his own and a soldier of some repute. If there is no objection he would like to write to him and ascertain privately what are Mustafa Kemal's intentions regarding Iraq. I would be glad if you would inform me by telegram whether His Majesty's Government has objection to Feisal's proposal. In my opinion this opportunity of obtaining reliable information should not be missed. This refers to my telegram No. 766 of December 6th.

Sd/ COX

C.P. 3565

F.O. 371 (6369) E. 13819

No. 56

The Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi
Telegraphic.

No. S. D. 4050.

Dated & Recd. the 13th December 1921.

Please telegraph what answer should be given to Manager of Dutch Bank with reference to the following:-

He has been asked by his Home House to assure himself that international complication will not result from transmission of funds by them to Ottoman Bank at Angora. These funds are being remitted from Bombay by Chotani. Chotani has given certificate that remittances are for relief of sufferers in Asia Minor; but see Bombay Chronicle of 18th October regarding declaration in helping Angora.

F.O. 371/7873

F.O. 371/7881

No. 57

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Secretary of State for War

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 17, 1921

Sir,

I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to state that he has examined the so-called proposals¹ submitted to ex-Major Henry by Refet Pasha

¹ These proposals were in the form of a verbatim report by Major Henry of his interviews with Refet Pasha at Ineboli from November 27 to December 3. A copy of this report and a record of Major Henry's conversation of December 13 with the Secretary of State for War (Major Henry had arrived in London the previous night) were communicated by the War Office to the Foreign Office on December 14. This record ran as follows: "The principal statements made by ex-Major Henry to the Secretary of State were to the following effect

"1. Refet Refet Pasha is the most powerful personality in Mustapha Kemal's government and has complete control over Mustapha Kemal himself.

"2. All the principal persons in the present Constantinople government, including Tewfik Pasha, are practically nominees of Kemal's.

"3. Great Britain has made a mistake in backing the Greeks and in supporting their claims to Smyrna and Thrace.

"4. The Greeks are willing to evacuate Smyrna and if they do not do so, they will probably be driven from it by the Turks.

"5. A further offensive by the Turks will be undertaken this winter. Ex-Major Henry alleged that he had been informed of this by Refet Pasha personally.

"6. The Greeks have three times approached the Turks with a view to concluding peace, but the Turks replied that it was no use negotiating with the Greeks till they had first negotiated with the British.

as the basis of a proposed discussion between the latter and General Harington. They constitute a demand for the restoration to Turkey of her pre-war frontiers, and practically amount to the proposal of a separate alliance with this country.

2. His Lordship would be glad if General Harington could be informed by telegram that H.M.G. are averse to his meeting Refet Pasha since the last thing they desire is to be committed to any Nationalist conditions of settlement, particularly of so excessive a nature as those put forward in the present case.

3. He would also appreciate any action the Army Council may be able to take to restrain Major Henry from any further interference. He should in any case be informed that His Majesty's Government do not desire to avail themselves of his services and that the proper and only channel for communication between them and the Angora Government is the British High Commissioner at Constantinople.

4. Lord Curzon notes from telegram No. 1349 from G.O.C. in Chief, Constantinople to War Office²—paragraph (4)—that a reliable agent from Angora stated that the Nationalist would prefer dealing with some more serious representative than Major Henry. It would perhaps be well were General Harington to inform the individual in question that Major Henry is in no sense whatever a representative of His Majesty's Government.

"7. Rafet expressed to ex-Major Henry the wish to meet General Harington with a view to opening negotiations with the British and asked whether General Harington would have authority to negotiate. When informed by ex-Major Henry that General Harington would not have this authority, Rafet said that he would nevertheless still like to meet General Harington.

"8. Rafet is willing to give up Constantinople, but public sentiment will not permit him to do so. Therefore, since Constantinople cannot be held without the hinterland, Rafet declares that Thrace must remain Turkish.

"9. Ex-Major Henry went on to say that he was acting on behalf of a British syndicate interested in the copper mines at Adana which Monsieur Franklin-Bouillon had tried and failed to get. The Turks were, however, willing to form an Anglo-Turkish company to work the mines in question.

"10. Ex-Major Henry further stated that British financial control of Turkey could be secured by the formation of a British syndicate to take over the Turkish national debt of £150,000,000 and that Rafet Pasha would be prepared to endorse this proposal.

"The Secretary of State for War listened to all ex-Major Henry had to say, and pointed out that:— (i) Hitherto the Greeks had shown no inclination to evacuate Smyrna. (ii) The British Government had not backed the Greeks. (iii) It was a tall order to believe that Rafet was willing to evacuate Constantinople. (iv) It was also doubtful whether any syndicate could be formed willing to buy the Turkish national debt.

"At the conclusion of the interview ex-Major Henry asked whether he might wire to Rafet Pasha and say that the schemes to which he had referred had been placed before British Cabinet Ministers and were being considered by them.

"The Secretary of State replied emphatically that Ex-Major Henry could not send such a telegram and that he must not on any account make any communication to Rafet at least for several days, since the matter was one of foreign policy which concerned Lord Curzon."

² Of December 14, not printed.

5. While it is clear that the British military authorities at Constantinople were in no way responsible for Major Henry's interference, which unfortunately may prove a grave embarrassment to His Majesty's Government with (sic) Reflet, Lord Curzon deprecates their readiness to accept political information such as that supplied by the reliable agent above referred to. Such indirect methods of communication are liable to encourage the Angora Government in their hopes of reaching a separate arrangement with His Majesty's Government and so complicate, if not compromise, the task of the Allied Governments in securing a general settlement. It is, indeed, hard to resist the information in question is specially prepared for British consumption, as, for example, the assurance that the Nationalists are postponing an attack on the Greeks out of deference to the supposed wishes of His Majesty's Government.

6. Further Lord Curzon feels very serious anxiety as to the situation in which, while General Harington himself appears to have acted, as might be expected, with perfect propriety, his name and personality (vide Major Henry's Report) are made the centre of a network of intrigue, in which he is treated as a political agent, actual or potential not merely to the detriment, but to the openly avowed disparagement of His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople. Lord Curzon would be glad if a warning could be addressed to General Harington, pointing out the extreme undesirability of his name being associated, however involuntarily, with any movement or proposals of a political or diplomatic character at a time when the utmost circumspection is required and when the Allies are about to embark on a common policy which can only be jeopardised by suggestions or attempts at individual action just as it has already been gravely imperilled by the proceedings of the French at Angora³.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 528-529, No. 488

No. 58

Memorandum from the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the British Cabinet

December 19th, 1921

Confidential

PROPOSED MEETING AT PARIS FOR REVISION OF TREATY OF SEVRES

THERE have been three main phases of the hitherto unsuccessful effort made by the Allies to conclude peace with Turkey, viz.: (1) the Treaty of Sèvres, signed in August 1920, but never ratified, and now virtually dead; (2) the proposals made

³ A copy of this communication was sent by Lord Curzon in a private communication of December 19 to Sir H. Rumbold, who replied in an unnumbered telegram of December 26: 'I have had the whole matter out with General Harington who has given most stringent orders that his officers are in future to refrain from mixing themselves up in political matters.'

at the London Conference of March 1921, but not accepted either by the Greeks or the Turks (or if accepted by one party in any particular, then declined by the other); (3) the bases of a resumed discussion suggested by me in Paris in June 1921, but rendered abortive by the refusal of the Greeks to accept Allied intervention. We are now about to make a fourth attempt. The Allies cannot afford another failure; and although the position has been rendered more difficult by the Angora escapade of the French, and by the increasing intractability of the Angora Turks, the following symptoms are not unfavourable: the complete (though never too dependable) rally of the Italians to our side; the disgust created in France, quite as much as here, by the Franklin-Bouillon trick; the consequent re-established unity of the Allies; the consciousness of the Greeks that their Asia Minor ambitions are no longer realisable and that their resources do not admit of protracted warfare; and, finally, some indications that the Turks also are tired of war and want peace. In these circumstances a new programme is required, adjusted to the new conditions and more liberal in its terms to the Turks—but, at the same time, a programme that the Greeks can accept and which the Allies will be prepared to enforce. I have prepared a draft of such proposals; and, in order that they may be compared with their predecessors, I have had them printed in parallel columns.

If the Cabinet give their general assent to the revised terms, I would then propose to send copies of the paper as printed below to the Foreign Ministers of France and Italy, in order that they may study them before we meet in Paris early in January. I had offered to go over after Christmas; but the Italian Minister cannot be there before the second week in the new year.

My plan of action contemplates two stages: (a) the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers at Paris, in order to arrive at an Allied agreement as to the terms, and as to the method of applying them; (b) a subsequent meeting of the Supreme Council in order to place them before the Turks and Greeks. I have suggested Constantinople as the place of final meeting, because I think it would be desirable to get away from the press atmosphere of Paris, and in a less degree London; and because at Constantinople we ought to get Mustapha Kemal himself. The Turks would, of course, constitute their own delegation, for it is with the Sultan's Government that we have to conclude peace. But it should be easy to make clear that Angora must be represented by its chief.

The most difficult stage will be the decision of the Allies, which must be reached in Paris in advance, as to the steps to be taken by them in the event of a breakdown at Constantinople, whether due to the Greeks or the Turks.

Such a breakdown may occur in one of three ways: the Greeks alone, the Turks alone, or both together, may refuse our terms; or the refusal of one or both of them may take the form of acceptance with impossible reservations.

In the first case, Greece herself, and Greek army in Asia Minor especially, would be, in the long run, so much at the mercy of a peaceful blockade and other

indirect pressure, that any threat from the Allies should suffice to bring Greece to reason, quite apart from any offer of help to the Turks. In the last resort this threat might have to be used.

If the Turks refuse, a more difficult situation arises. It must be remembered, however, that never since August 1920 has there been a really united Allied attempt to coerce Turkey, and even then no formal blockade of the Black Sea and Mediterranean ports was attempted. If such a sea control was attempted by the three Allies, and Allied control at Constantinople were tightened, if at the same time the three Allies gave active help to Greece at least with money and munitions of all kinds and perhaps with some staff officers, it should not be impossible to bring Kemal to reason next spring.

There will, however, be certain unknown quantities, *e.g.*, the attitude of Russia and the extent to which she can still help Kemal, the comparative strength of Greeks and Turks in men and material at that date, the ability or willingness of our Allies to join in any prolonged coercion of the Turks, and lastly, the possible reactions in Irak and the Moslem world of an active support of Greece against Turkey, however arrogant and unreasonable the attitude of the latter might have been.

On the other hand, even if the Greeks with Allied help were able to beat Kemal, and the Angora Government were to dissolve, the difficulty of any permanent settlement would remain both at Smyrna, which a victorious Greece could hardly in those circumstances be asked to leave, and in the interior of Anatolia, which would probably become a prey to chaos.

All these considerations point to the desirability of the Allies going to the utmost limit of reasonable concession in order to reach a settlement with the Turks.

Lastly, I come to the third contingency, *viz.*, that both Greeks and Turks may prove intractable and may refuse in such a way that neither side deserves any favours from the Allies. In that case here seems nothing to be done except to hold the ring (neutrality as usually understood towards both parties) for another campaigning season, when a decision in Asia Minor one way or the other may be reached. This third situation seems the least probable, if only in view of the power of the Allies to put effectual pressure upon the Greeks.

Hypothetical as such a discussion must be, I should like to reach in advance a measure of agreement in Paris as to common action in each case on the above lines.

With the accompanying summary of proposals, I circulate four maps which I have had prepared of the areas that will have to be dealt with, *viz.*, (1) Smyrna; (2) Eastern and Western Thrace; (3) Cilicia; (4) the demilitarised zones on the Straits.

C. OF K.

December 19, 1921.

F. O. 371/6480/E. 13991

F. 9

No. 59

Situation Report No. IV issued by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch, for the Period of 6th December-19th December 1921

C.A. 9607

Secret

I. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC.

i) *The Angora Government and the Imperial Authority.*

No further steps appear to have been taken by the Angora Government to induce the Sultan to renounce his temporal authority or to ? reorganise the supremacy of the Great National Assembly. Bekir Sami, who recently passed through Constantinople on his way to Angora on return from his European tour, is reported to have interviewed Izzet Pasha in the same connection, but without obtaining any result. It may, however, be regarded as significant that the Anatolian press announces that the Great National Assembly is at present occupied with a project to reform the Constitutional Law with the object of rendering it more compatible with the "Sovereign Rights of the People". There can be no question that such revision of the Constitutional Law by the Great National Assembly connotes the abolition of the Imperial prerogatives, which in any case are not acknowledged by Angora, and it therefore seems probable that Mustapha Kemal has recognised that the Sultan will never yield on the point and has finally abandoned diplomacy in favour of direct methods.

It is reported that a Parliamentary Commission has been formed to draft the amended law for submission to the Great National Assembly. One source, which at present lacks confirmation, goes so far as to say that the draft Law has already been the subject of debate and was passed by the Great National Assembly three days ago. We have further information that on December 14th a Deputy named Bessim Bey moved that the Sultan's deposition be proclaimed and that the motion was not debated but was, at Mustapha Kemal's instance, suspended, though not rejected.

ii) *The Cabinet.*

The situation of the Cabinet remains unchanged.

iii) *Foreign Affairs.*(a) *Turco-French Relations.*

As a result of the Franklin Bouillon agreement, subterranean intrigue between the French and the Nationalists has developed apace. There can be no question of the Treaty confining itself to the exigencies of the Turco-French situation in Cilicia, or of the French Government maintaining an honourable line with the Allies with regard to the Near Eastern settlement. If we can believe the reports of Ferid Bey, the Angora Representative in Paris, of his interviews with M.

Briand as made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Angora, (and there is no reason to doubt them) M. Briand will approach his forth coming visit to London and the projected Near East Conference more in the spirit of a fellow conspirator of the Turks than in that of the Premier of one of the Allied Powers; his only stipulation in yielding to practically all Nationalist demands being that France should be able to maintain the appearance of abiding by her official commitments. The deplorable effect of these events upon British prestige is traceable in the scathing and defiant tone of secret communications between Angora, Nationalist officials, and even officials of the Central Government in Constantinople and elsewhere; in view of which it is impossible to believe that the Angora Government is anxious for peace, except upon its own unconditional terms.

The Turks have now entered Adana, Aintab, etc., and trade is being resumed through Mersina. Underground arrangements for a French loan and the supply of arms are proceeding, and our previous information regarding gendarmerie arrangements has been confirmed.

Finally, the French seem to have gone the length of keeping the Nationalist authorities au courant with the Greek military dispositions, and their neutrality is therefore only a cloak behind which they can assist the Turks with greater efficiency.

A somewhat interesting point is one contained in official reports from Egypt, which show that French officials in Syria are disgusted at the conclusion of the Treaty, in that it has merely served to lower French prestige in the eyes of the Syrians. The whole distasteful little plot may thus possibly end in damaging the position of the French in the Near East, which they have sacrificed so many honourable principles of diplomacy to better at Allied expense.

(b) *Turco-Italian Relations.*

The Tuozi negotiations (see Situation Report No. III, part II, para (b),) have not developed favourably and Signor Tuozi left Angora on December 11th without attaining results. It is evident that the Italians are not prepared to emulate the French and, while, confining the conversations to the economic domain, showed that they were not prepared to forego their zone of influence as laid down by the Tripartite Agreement. It seems that some conciliatory proposals, the nature of which is unknown, were made by the Kemalist at the eleventh hour before Signor Tuozi's departure, as a result of which the latter, while unable to delay his own return to Rome, left Captain Nacaratto (?) in Angora to maintain contact. Captain Nacaratto has no authority to continue negotiations, but his presence in Angora is construed as a sign that the negotiations are still pending.

(c) *Turkish Relations with Russia.*

After the sensational rumours and press reports of a short while ago regarding the exacerbation of feeling between Mustapha Kemal and the Soviets on account

of the Turco-French Treaty and an attempted coup by Enver Pasha there has been a marked absence of news on the subject.

The rumour to the effect that Enver Pasha has carried out a coup in Ajaristan has not only been proved to be without foundation but no such coup appears to have been attempted. There is, however, evidence pointing to a recrudescence of Enverist activity in the form of agitation, and Enver Pasha himself, who seems really to have paid a recent visit to Batum, is reported to have addressed telegrams both to Mustapha Kemal and the Great National Assembly saying that he could not be kept out of Anatolia, when he felt the Turkish people needed him. Mustapha Kemal is reported as replying, somewhat dramatically, that "when Enver Pasha entered Anatolia the mothers, fathers and orphans of those killed at Sarikamish during the General War and the mutilated soldiers would stand beside the sentinels of Kiazim Karabekir on the frontier to receive the murderer of their fathers, sons and husbands".

Whatever the nature of this Enverist movement may have been, there seems no doubt that it has now come to an end, temporarily at least, and Enver is understood to have gone to Moscow.

In spite of denials in the Kemalist press, indications are not wanting that the relations between the Soviet authorities and the Angora Government have become strained, so much so, even, that the Bolsheviks are stated to have reinforced their troops in the region of the Turkish frontier. For the moment, however, the possibility of a rupture between Mustapha Kemal and the Bolsheviks appears to have passed and in the absence of definite news one is tempted to suppose that Moscow and Angora have once more managed to smooth over their difficulties and avert a conflict between themselves.

In connection with the subject of Turco-Soviet relations much importance is attached to the arrival of General Frunze as representative of Soviet Ukraine on the 13th December in Angora with a following of over 40 officers and soldier servants. Though the "Vakit" reports that Frunze, on arrival at Trebizond, declared that his special mission was to bring about an Entente and the exchange of ambassadors, it seems clear that the Mission is essentially a military one. In view of Frunze's position as Commander-in-Chief of the Western Russian front and the importance which the Kemalists attach to Bolshevik action against Rumania, it has been suggested that Frunze's visit to Angora is to concert plans for an offensive against Bessarabia in the spring in conjunction with a Nationalist offensive in Anatolia.

(d) *The Angora Government and the Yemen*

Relations between the Great National Assembly and the Yemen are reported as being maintained by couriers, while Mahmud Nedim, ex-Wali of the Yemen, (whom, we recently proved to have transferred his loyalty from the Sultan to

Mustapha Kemal is still in the Yermen striving to maintain Turkish authority. It should be remembered that the "National Pact", upon which the Kemalists are now taking so firm a stand, stipulates that the destiny of the old Turkish provinces, removed from the Turkish Empire by Allied victory and the Treaty of Sevres, should be settled by plebiscite. It is therefore perfectly in keeping with Kemalist policy to keep agitation in favour of Angora alive in Arabia, just as they have done in Mesopotamia and elsewhere.

ix. *Interior Situation in Anatolia.*

The interior situation remains unchanged, but rigorous winter conditions have prevented any further development of the rebel movements in the Kurdistan and Sivas areas. Snow has fallen in Angora and there is every indication that the winter may be unusually severe. Raufbey, former Minister of Marine and recently released from Malta, has been elected Vice-President of Mustapha Kemal's National Defence Party, while *Jevad Paşa*, formerly Minister of War, has been appointed Commander of the Adana area. Mustapha Kemal's policy just now appears to be to win over Enver's most influential supporters by giving them appointments under his own eye or in parts far removed from Anatolia, where they cannot undermine his influence.

x. *Situation in the Caucasus.*

With the increased tension existing between the Bolsheviks and Kemalists, the Armenians have come to be regarded with special favour by the Bolsheviks, who naturally look upon the Armenians as the most reliable fighting element in case of hostilities with the Turks. It is said that the Soviet authorities have ceased to persecute the Dashnak Party and even endeavoured to attract Dashnak officers into Soviet units serving on the frontier.

Regarding the much discussed Federation and union to Russia of the Trans-Caucasian states, nothing further has come to light. The Bolsheviks for some reason or other prefer to say little about it, and beyond a comparatively brief "*Resolution of the Kachbureau*" published in the local press, no definite official statement appears to have been made. The measure is not one which the Bolsheviks apparently are anxious to draw special attention.

F.O. 371/7881

No. 60

*The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi,
to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department*

Dated 21st December 1921.

No. 2857-S, Telegraphic

Imperial Ottoman Bank, London, have been informed by His Majesty's Government that in respect of money already sent from Bombay through Netherlands Trading Company for Mustapha Kemal at Angora they have decided to take no action.

Papers follow by post. Action of Dutch Bank appears to be unobjectionable. This refers to your telegram of December 13th No. S. D. 4050.

F.O. 371/7873

F.O. 371/7881

No. 61

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India to the British Cabinet

Secret

C.P. 3576.

TURKISH PEACE

I did not consume the valuable time of Conference of Ministers yesterday by re-argument of the case of Thrace. But in view of the decisions taken yesterday, which I most earnestly trust will lead to peace, I take this opportunity of putting on record the views that I hold.

1. I believe it to be in the interest of the British Empire that our friendly relations with the Turks, now more than justly punished for their share in the war, should be restored. I do not say this because I am a pro-Turk. It is true that most of those who have come in contact with the Turk — I never have — find him a likeable fellow, and he is probably a better fellow than the Greek; but it is true that owing to the unfortunate escape of the "Goeben" and the "Breslau" whose presence at Constantinople made it impossible for the Turk to make a separate peace, and owing to the admitted blunders of our pre-war diplomacy, the Turks were compelled to fight against us and to prolong the war, and must pay the penalty. My motive is what I conceive to be the interests of the British Empire.

2. I do not think that it is any act of friendship to the Greeks to permit them to acquire more territory than they are capable of administering, and to remain in territory where their presence would be unwelcome. On the contrary, I believe

that any outcome of the war if it were of this kind would lead not only to the arrest of Greek development, but possibly to revolution and chaos in Greece.

3. I think almost the most important consideration governing the distribution of Eastern Thrace is that the Prime Minister is honestly believed to have pledged himself, when he spoke on behalf of the British Empire in January 1918, so far as the British Empire was concerned, to leaving Thrace to Turkey, and I think it is most important that if such a pledge were made that pledge should be kept.

4. In 1919 the Prime Minister in the House of Commons stated that the pledge about Constantinople and Thrace *was a pledge*.

5. I admit that there is no religious question involved in the fate of Thrace as there is in the case of Constantinople, and the evacuation of Constantinople by the Allies, its freedom from allied control over its independence, and the security which is being given by the proposed readjustment of the Chatalja frontier, are entirely satisfactory, and together with the proposals for municipal autonomy for Adrianople and the minority clauses about the population of Thrace, would go far to solve the whole question, were it not for the bothersome pledge.

6. From the point of view of the pledge, therefore, and the real restoration of friendship with Turkey, I should of course prefer the restoration of the whole of pre-war Thrace to Turkey.

7. Failing that, and as a second best alternative, it would seem to me to be much the fairest solution to appoint a commission of enquiry into the wishes of the inhabitants and the arrangement of a frontier in conformity with the wishes of the inhabitants as nearly as such a commission could devise. This seems to me the equitable solution.

8. Failing either of these, I would favour the suggestion which was rejected by the Conference of Ministers yesterday: to take a frontier which at its southern end came to the sea at the point on the map just east of Rhodosto, suggested by Lord Curzon, joined the Maritza River and joined the Bulgarian frontier after passing just south of Adrianople. This compromise would have the advantages of excluding the Turk from the Gallipoli peninsula, and including in Turkey the most ancient Turkish settlement in Europe—Adrianople—a town which is predominantly Moslem in population and containing places of veneration to Moslems generally. So far as I can see, it would roughly halve Eastern Thrace. We want both the Greeks and Turks to live at peace. Both the Greeks and the Turks claim Thrace, and the Turks are supported by the Prime Minister's pledge; The compromise suggested is to split the difference!

What I fear most of all is this, that the French will advocate, inside or outside the Conference, the restoration of at least far more of Thrace to the Turk than Lord Curzon suggests; that the Italians will support them, and that the British will have the responsibility, as it was put yesterday, of doing their best to save Thrace. This is

the aspect of the case most prejudicial to the interests of the British Empire, the commission of enquiry, whatever be its results, would avoid this disaster.

E. S. M.

22nd December 1921.

F.O. 371/7853/E. 150

C.P. 3576

No. 62

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir C. Eliot (Tokio)

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 24th. 1921, 6 p.m.

No. 267. *Telegraphic*

No Distribution

Very Confidential.

Please inform Japanese Government confidentially that we are decidedly uneasy about the activities of their Representative at Constantinople. We learn from Angora that he is in constant communication with the Kemalist authorities whom he appears to be urging to accept him as an intermediary between themselves and Great Britain.

These proceedings are calculated to cause serious embarrassment to His Majesty's Government and it is therefore earnestly hoped that the Japanese Government may find a way of intimating to their Representative that he ought not behind the back of His Majesty's Government to act in a way gravely compromising the British position.

F.O. 371/6481

No. 63

Mr. C.H. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, December 29th, 1921

(Received January 9, 1922)

My Lord,

With reference to Lord Granville's Despatch No. 411 of September 7th last, I have the honour to transmit herewith four copies of a General Survey of the Military situation at the front during the period from July 22nd to September 23rd 1921 which has been forwarded to me by the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

This Report has again been drawn up by General Stratigos, Deputy Chief of the General Staff and approved by the Ministry of War. For convenience I enclose

an interesting précis prepared by Mr. J. H. F. McEwen, Third Secretary of His Majesty's Legation, as well as some observations on the subject with which the Military Attaché has supplied me.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch and of its enclosures to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, etc.

(Signed) C. H. BENTINCK

F.O. 371 7881/E. 322

ENCLOSURE : TO No. 63

La Campagne d'Asie-Mineure

Exposé Général

de la Troisième Phase des Opérations

du 9/22 Juillet au 10/23 Septembre 1921

L'issue victorieuse de la bataille du 8/21 juillet, succédant aux défaites répétées des Turcs dans la région de Kutahia, rendit vains les derniers efforts de Monistapha Kemal pour obtenir un succès au moment où les Grecs fatigués suspendaient la poursuite. L'insuccès de cette tentative lui prouvait, à tous égards, la supériorité militaire des Grecs et l'improbabilité qu'il obtint jamais la victoire.

Cependant, il était évident que, résolu de jouer en dictateur le sort de la Turquie, Kemal irait jusqu'au bout. Ne comptant plus sur la victoire, il pensait éviter la destruction dans l'immensité du territoire qu'il avait derrière lui.

Voici d'autre part, la question qui se posait clairement à la Grèce. L'armée grecque avait incontestablement remporté une grande victoire et l'armée turque, subi une grande défaite. L'ennemi, dans une retraite telle que celle qui suivit la bataille du 8/21 juillet, avait sans doute perdu une grande partie de ses forces en hommes et en matériel. Cependant Kemal subsistait, il conservait toujours son caractère de rebelle et de révolutionnaire. On ne pouvait donc pas exclure la possibilité que, renforcé, il revint à la charge pour récupérer ce qu'il avait perdu.

Par conséquent, la nécessité de priver définitivement l'ennemi de certains avantages militaires et territoriaux qu'elle-même acquerrait, s'imposait à la Grèce pour lui permettre de consolider la situation en Asie-Mineure avec toute la sécurité souhaitable sans que, pour cela, elle soit contrainte de maintenir son armée sur pied de guerre.

Les dispositions des populations turques des territoires occupés qui partout saluaient franchement l'armée grecque en libératrice, prouvaient la nécessité et la possibilité de consolider la paix et la sécurité dans ces territoires. Cet étonnant phénomène, incroyable à première vue est dû à la garantie d'ordre et d'égalité

donnée par l'armée grecque partout où elle passait, garantie respectée par l'administration civile qui suivait. La marche en avant de l'armée hellénique qui s'efforçait de rendre aussi légères que possible aux populations les charges inévitables de la guerre, signifiait pour les populations turques la délivrance d'une odieuse tyrannie, la sécurité de la vie et des biens. Voilà pourquoi l'armée grecque était accueillie et saluée avec gratitude.

La continuation de la campagne s'imposait donc impérieusement à la Grèce. Certes, personne ne s'est imaginé qu'il serait possible d'obtenir militairement la soumission de Kémal. La nature et l'étendue de la région lui procuraient la possibilité de reculer en manœuvrant de façon à éviter la destruction totale de son armée.

Du moins, en lui portant un nouveau coup plus fort, pouvait-on l'affaiblir davantage et, qui plus est, le priver des facilités de communication et de ravitaillement par la destruction d'un tronçon considérable de la voie ferrée d'Angora. On comptait que la nouvelle avance amènerait entre les forces kémalistes et notre ligue définitive la formation d'une vaste zone vide difficilement utilisable pour une action offensive par de grandes masses. D'autre part, notre armée s'établirait sur ligne desservie par un bon réseau ferré et facile à défendre avec des effectifs réduits. Enfin l'ennemi serait placé en état d'infériorité sous le rapport des communications.

C'est ainsi qu'à Kutahia, était décidée en plain accord entre le Roi, le Gouvernement et le Commandement, l'avance dans la direction d'Angora. La décision fut prise en pleine connaissance des nouveaux sacrifices qu'elle exigerait, des grandes difficultés du terrain et de la distance. Par contre, la valeur, l'abnégation et le patriotisme de l'armée inspiraient une confiance absolue. L'armée savait et comprenait qu'on ne la menait pas par plaisir à cette nouvelle lutte qu'imposait l'inéluctable nécessité nationale de servir des intérêts helléniques de la plus haute importance.

Le plan général des opérations fut soumis à Sa Majesté qui l'approuva. L'Etat-Major de l'armée en élaborait ensuite les détails qui furent, à leur tour, approuvés par le Roi.

L'ennemi occupait, par des avant-gardes de cavalerie, la ligne Kismet Tépé, Tchal Tépé jusqu'à Mandra, et plus au sud, une ligne en face du II^{me} corps d'armée. Ce n'était là qu'une ligne de couverture et non une position de défense.

L'ennemi aurait pu avoir établi une ligne de défense dans la région de Sivri-Hissar et plus précisément sur la ligne immédiatement à l'est de cette ville, partant de Bozak près du Poursak et arrivant au Sangarios à travers les monts Doumour Téké et Gounzoughiou. Cette position, fortifiée naturellement et assez éloignée des lignes grecques, présentait le grand désavantage que le Sangarios se trouverait sur

les derrières d'une armée dont le moral était ébranlé. Une retraite éventuelle de l'armée turque, avec poursuite immédiate aurait pu entraîner sa destruction totale.

Une hypothèse plus probable qu'envisagea dès l'abord le Haut-Commandement était celle qui devait se réaliser, à savoir que l'ennemi se défendrait à l'est du Sangarios. Cette position offrait en effet à l'ennemi les plus grands avantages. Elle lui donnait du temps pour réorganiser et renforcer son armée; elle éloignait l'armée grecque de ses bases; elle plaçait devant les lignes de défense le Sangarios, obstacle tactiquement infranchissable; ce même obstacle, dont les passages étaient faciles à garder, barrait la route aux déserteurs très nombreux surtout après la bataille du 8/21 juillet; de fait, les transfuges turcs cessèrent de se présenter aux avant-postes grecs dès que l'ennemi eut mis le Sangarios entre lui et nous; enfin en plaçant sa ligne de défense au-delà du fleuve, l'ennemi s'assurait la liberté sur les routes de la retraite et rapprochait considérablement ses troupes de leur base d'Angora.

Dans cette hypothèse, l'armée devait, avant d'attaquer les forces ennemies, tenter de passer le Sangarios loin de leur atteinte. Car l'ennemi, rangé sur la rive orientale avec un front de défense fortement organisé et qui tenait le fleuve sous le tir de son infanterie et de son artillerie, non seulement aurait infligé de lourdes pertes à l'armée hellénique, mais lui aurait encore rendu le passage impossible étant donné que les forces grecques n'étaient pas très supérieures en nombre. Cependant, malgré la précision des renseignements sur les concentrations de l'ennemi et ses ouvrages de défense renseignements confirmés par les reconnaissances quotidiennes d'avions, le G.Q.G. devait aussi tenir compte de l'hypothèse que l'ennemi pourrait se défendre à l'ouest du Sangarios, dans la région de Sivri-Hissar. La marche en avant devait donc être ordonnée en tenant compte des deux hypothèses pour y faire face le cas échéant.

Ainsi, tant que l'armée n'avait pas dépassé la ligne probable de défense ennemie à l'est de Sivri-Hissar et n'avait pas acquis la conviction absolue que l'ennemi s'était complètement retiré à l'est du fleuve, le gros des troupes grecques devait marcher dans la zone limitée au Nord par le Poursak, au Sud par le Sangarios. Cette masse principale était constituée par le I^{er} et le III^{es} Corps d'Armée.

Le II^{es} Corps qui se trouvait dans la région de Scidi-Gazi, au sud des sources du Sangarios devait suivre ce mouvement sur le flanc droit du dispositif afin de renforcer l'attaque au besoin, ou de déborder par le Sud les positions ennemies.

Mais s'il était constaté que l'ennemi avait entièrement abandonné, comme ce fut le cas, la région comprise entre les fleuves, l'armée devait se porter avec la presque totalité de ses forces en dehors de la zone arrosée par les fleuves afin de pouvoir attaquer en masse.

La répartition des troupes en dedans et au dehors de la dite zone devait être exclue car l'ennemi était assez en forces pour écraser les éléments qui se seraient

présentés isolés dans son voisinage en dehors de la zone des fleuves. Le passage du Sangarios pour une avance de l'ensemble des troupes helléniques en dehors de la zone des fleuves, pouvait être assuré en faisant simplement surveiller le bras oriental du Sangarios par de faibles détachements car il était tout à fait improbable que l'ennemi négligeât le gros des troupes qui marchaient contre lui et qu'il voulût passer lui-même le fleuve pour gêner le passage ou couper les communications de l'armée grecque. La sortie de la zone des fleuves était donc indiquée et même imposée par la force des choses. Il faut examiner maintenant dans quelle direction il était avantageux et possible d'effectuer cette sortie et la concentration pour l'attaque.

Le Sangarios prend sa source dans la région de Seidi-Gazi et coule d'abord vers l'Est, s'infléchit ensuite vers le Nord-Ouest formant ainsi un cul-de-sac dont le fond est constitué par la partie du fleuve qui coule du Sud au Nord. Sur la longueur de ce sac et presque sur le milieu coule, de l'Ouest à l'Est le Poursak, parallèle au bras sud du Sangarios. Le Poursak divise donc le terrain compris dans la grande boucle du Sangarios en deux zones ou bandes allongées dont celle au N. est faite de terrains montagneux, presque entièrement dépourvus de routes carrossables. Quant à la contrée au-delà du cours du Sangarios, au Nord-Ouest, elle est encore plus montagneuse et moins praticable. La zone Sud entre le Poursak et le Sangarios, est couverte de collines, coupées en tous sens par des routes naturelles, bonnes pendant la belle saison. Quant à la contrée au Sud du Sangarios, ondulée et sablonneuse, stérile et aride, sans vie et sans ressources, elle offre sur de vastes étendues l'aspect d'un désert.

Etant donné que les forces principales helléniques devaient d'abord marcher entre le Poursak et le Sangarios, le changement de direction pour l'attaque de l'ennemi concentré sur la rive est du Sangarios devait s'opérer sur un des flancs, ou Nord, ou Sud.

La concentration par le Nord offrait sans doute des avantages. D'abord l'offensive lancée du N-O en direction du S-E aurait immédiatement menacé la retraite de l'ennemi sur Angora, puis nos lignes de ravitaillement se trouveraient plus près de la voie ferrée dont un tronçon important, de Dorylée à Akhor était graduellement réparé et mis en service. Par contre cette manoeuvre présentait aussi des désavantages considérables. D'abord la nature montagneuse du terrain. Le manque de routes carrossables réduisant à rien l'avantage de la proximité de la voie ferrée. La concentration et l'action de grandes masses desservies par des camions sur des routes pareilles eussent été impossibles. L'offensive par le Nord présentait encore un autre désavantage considérable. C'est qu'il eut fallu passer le Sangarios de front et sous les feux de l'ennemi, ce que l'Armée voulait éviter. Le passage eut dû s'effectuer en effet par le bras nord-est du fleuve. Sans aucun doute, l'ennemi eut eu vent de la manoeuvre et aurait présenté aussi derrière ce bras un autre front défensif puissant, ce qu'il aurait pu faire facilement car il n'aurait pas

été éloigné de ses bases et de la voie ferrée. Il n'y avait, par contre, aucune probabilité, comme l'événement l'a prouvé, que les Turcs se concentrent au sud du Sangarios, du côté du désert, pour empêcher le passage des Grecs par le bras Sud.

Cette vue était tellement juste que les Turcs, qui connaissaient à fond le terrain, étaient certains que la manœuvre par le nord était pour nous impossible et que nous tenterions ou de forcer le passage par le bras est du fleuve ou de le franchir par le Sud. C'est pourquoi ils établirent d'avance un crochet défensif, face au Sud, transformé plus tard en front principal. Par des prisonniers nous avons obtenu le renseignement que les Turcs avaient commencé depuis cinq mois, c'est-à-dire depuis avril, à construire les fortifications le long du fleuve Ghreouk.

La manœuvre par le Sud du Sangarios n'allait pas non plus, sans doute, sans de grandes difficultés dont les principales étaient un extrême allongement des lignes de communication et la nécessité de longues marches pénibles sur un sol aride et desséché. Cependant, les difficultés exactement évaluées, le Commandement hellénique avait la certitude de les surmonter en comptant sur les moyens de ravitaillement dont il disposait et sur l'endurance éprouvée de la troupe. Il ne s'est pas trompé.

La manoeuvre par le Sud fut donc décidée et le passage des forces principales devait s'effectuer dès que l'on aurait acquis la certitude absolue que l'ennemi avait évacué le sac formé par les fleuves et s'était concentré sur la rive est du fleuve.

D'après le plan des opérations, l'ordre de marche était le suivant:

Le III^{me} Corps marcherait le long du Poursak, sa gauche appuyée sur le fleuve. Une de ses divisions, la 3^{me}, renforcée par un régiment de la 2^{me} division devait marcher au nord du Poursak en direction de Mihalitzi où avaient été repérées des forces ennemies et des tranchées.

Le I^{er} Corps marcherait à droite du III^{me}, avec sa propre droite appuyée sur le bras Sud du Sangarios.

Le II^{me} Corps marcherait au Sud du Sangarios, sa gauche longeant la rive droite du fleuve.

La Brigade de cavalerie, était disposée à la droite de toute l'Armée et mise sous les ordres du II^{me} Corps.

La 9^{me} Division qui se trouvait dans la région d'Indje-Karahissar recevant l'ordre de marcher par Azizié et Amorion à la rencontre de la droite du III^{me} Corps auquel elle appartenait. Cette division avait été réduite de 4 bataillons qui se trouvaient dans la région de Bouladan et qui recevaient l'ordre de suivre leur division.

La 3^{me} division, à l'extrême gauche, recevant l'ordre de poursuivre l'ennemi après avoir occupé Mihalitzi et de nettoyer la région comprise entre le Poursak et le Sangarios à l'est de Mihalitzi, puis de franchir le Poursak et de se diriger vers le Sud en laissant dans la région de Mihalitzi, un détachement mixte de la force d'un

régiment d'infanterie. Quant aux forces qui devaient rester sur la rive gauche du bras est du Sangarios, cela dépendrait de la situation militaire de l'ennemi sur la rive droite.

Ce plan d'opérations tracé d'avance répondait à toute action éventuelle de l'ennemi, soit en-deçà soit au-delà du bras est du Sangarios.

Il va de soi qu'il aurait été avantageux de remettre, après une courte halte, l'armée en marche pour suivre l'ennemi en retraite. Mais, pour qu'une opération soit exécutée, il ne suffit pas qu'elle soit avantageuse, il faut surtout qu'elle soit possible. Or, une pareille idée était irréalisable pour de multiples raisons de ravitaillement. Avant d'entreprendre des opérations qui seraient poussées à une profondeur de 300 kilomètres en pays ennemi, il fallait constituer de nouvelles bases de ravitaillement et y amener le matériel, les approvisionnements et les moyens de communication nécessaires.

Les divers services s'adonnèrent donc avec une activité admirable au rétablissement des communications, de Moudania et de Brousse à Dorylée et de là vers l'Est. Les gros stocks de la base de Smyrne furent transportés, par mer, à Moudania, d'où le transport jusqu'à Brousse se faisait par chemin de fer à voie étroite. De Brousse à Karakeuy (gare sur la voie du Bagdad) ce transport se faisait par camions; de Karakeuy à Dorylée, le nouveau centre de ravitaillement, par chemin de fer. A Dorylée, les fours de la ville furent immédiatement utilisés par des fours militaires qui y furent amenés, ils parvinrent bientôt à produire toutes les rations quotidiennes nécessaires à l'armée. On trouvait sur place des grains en abondance, et les moulins détériorés par l'ennemi en partant, furent vite remis en état. Pour faciliter le ravitaillement, il fallait remettre aussi en état le tronçon en notre possession de la voie ferrée Dorylée à Angora. En partant l'ennemi avait systématiquement détruit tous les ponts dont quelques uns ont plus de 30 mètres de longueur, et en général tous les travaux d'art. Il avait aussi rendu inutilisables la grande usine de la gare de Dorylée, les wagons et les locomotives qu'il n'avait pu emporter. Au bout de dix jours de travail fébrile, l'usine fonctionnait en grande partie, des wagons et des locomotives abandonnées étaient remis en mouvement, plusieurs petits ponts et le premier grand pont de 30 mètres remis en état, 30 kilomètres de voie ferrée de Dorylée à Alpikuey étaient mis à la disposition de l'Armée. Peu de jours après, s'achevait la réparation d'un autre grand pont et la ligne qui suivait la marche de l'armée était doublée arrivant jusqu'à la gare d'Akhor qui devint plus tard la gare terminus où l'armée puisa les provisions nécessaires pendant toute la durée de sa longue et pénible marche au Sud du Sangarios.

Il a en outre fallu renouveler les chaussures et l'habillement de la troupe usés aux cours des longues marches précédentes, trouver les animaux de trait qui manquaient, relaire l'approvisionnement en munitions et en matériel de tout genre.

Tout cela fut fait en 20 jours environ.

Le 29 Juillet / 11 Août l'Armée était prête pour le départ.

Pendant ce temps l'ennemi s'éloignait le plus possible en se couvrant par des arrière-gardes de cavalerie. Les renseignements des avions montraient qu'il se retirait à l'est du Sangarios et qu'il se fortifiait sur la rive droite face à l'Ouest et au Sud. D'après la déposition d'un officier prisonnier, les Turcs pensèrent d'abord établir leur première ligne de défense dans la région de Sivri-Hissar, mais informés que l'armée hellénique disposait de camions en grand nombre, ils craignirent d'être débordés par le Sud et résolurent de se défendre à l'Est du Sangarios.

Le 29 / 11 Août, l'Armée d'Asie-Mineure était disposée comme suit:

Le II^{me} Corps dans la région de Sèdi-Gazi, le III^{me} Corps, à l'Est de Dorylée avec les avant-postes à 35 kilomètres de la ville; le I^{er} Corps et la Brigade de cavalerie, dans la région de Dorylée; la 4^{me} et la 9^{me} Division dans la région d'Alion Karahissar, Indjé-Karahissar; la 2^{me} Division à l'est de Brousse.

Le départ pour la marche vers l'Est était fixé au 1 / 14 Août. Dans les journées du 30 / 13 Août, les diverses unités allaient occuper leurs positions de départ: le II^{me} Corps dans la région de Sèdi-Gazi, la 9^{me} Division recevait l'ordre de se diriger sur Azizie, le I^{er} Corps sur la gauche du II^{me}, le III^{me} Corps avec deux de ses divisions sur la gauche du I^{er} jusqu'au Poursak, et la 3^{me} Division au Nord de ce fleuve.

Le 1 / 14 Août, l'armée s'élançait de ses positions dans la direction générale de l'Est. Le soir du 3 / 16 Août, son front s'étendait des hauteurs Essefl au Sud du Sangarios par le pont de Fethioglou, les monts Gounzoughiou, les hauteurs est de Sivri-Hissar, les monts Doumour Téké jusqu'au village de Bozan sur le Poursak. La 3^{me} Division marchait contre les forces ennemies des environs de Mihalitzi. Pendant ce trajet l'armée ne rencontra nulle part de résistance sérieuse. Ainsi elle atteignait rapidement l'extrême limite d'où elle devait se défilier vers le sud du Sangarios pour s'y déployer et opérer sa conversion face au Nord.

Le passage au sud du fleuve devait s'effectuer graduellement avec la circonspection et les précautions voulues car la manœuvre était assez difficile et délicate. Le II^{me} Corps qui avait, dès le début, marché au sud du fleuve, devait, poussé opportunément en élargissant le mouvement de son aile droite, couvrir le passage des divisions du I^{er} et du III^{me} Corps sur le Sangarios. Les II^{me} Corps eut à lutter dans sa marche à travers le désert contre des difficultés considérables qu'il surmonta en fournissant même des étapes de 35 à 40 kilomètres par jour.

Mais il était nécessaire, avant d'effectuer la concentration vers le Sud, de nettoyer les environs de Mihalitzi et la zone du confluent du Poursak et du Sangarios. Cette mission fut confiée à la 3^{me} Division.

Le 4 / 17 Août, le II^{me} Corps s'avancait jusqu'à la ligne Tcheltik-Polat-Hissar, couvert au Sud près de Piribekli par la 9^{me} division contre de forts détachements ennemis qui se dirigeaient du Sud vers le Nord-Est par le lac d'Ak. Ces

détachements étaient formés par deux divisions turques, la 5^{me} et la 9^{me} rappelées en toute hâte de Cilicie. Le I^{er} et le III^{me} Corps effectuaient seulement des déplacements préparatoires. En outre, le I^{er} et le II^{me} Corps réparaient les ponts détruits sur le bras sud du Sangarios et rétablissaient les communications entre les deux rives. La 3^{me} division occupait Mihalitzi après une faible résistance, elle nettoyait le terrain en refoulant l'ennemi en retraite au delà du bras nord-est du Sangarios par les fronts de Hamam et Kiopribassi.

Le lendemain, 5/18, le II^{me} Corps d'armée occupait la ligne Youzouk-Bassi, Tsakir-Ian et la 9^{me} division occupait Tcheltik laissant à Piribekli un détachement mixte pour couvrir les communications. L'artillerie lourde était concentrée au N. de Tcheltik. Le II^{me} Corps d'Armée approchait ses divisions du fleuve. Le III^{me} Corps établissait la 7^{me} division sur la ligne de crête entre le Sangarios et Sivri-Hissar, et déplaçait la 10^{me} et la 3^{me} division vers le Sud, en arrière de la 7^{me}.

Le 6/19, le II^{me} Corps s'avancait jusque dans la région de Sakoushali, Youzoukbassi et Ouzoubey, laissant sur sa gauche le terrain nécessaire au déploiement du I^{er} et du II^{me} Corps. Le I^{er} Corps faisait passer sur la rive sud du Sangarios la 1^{re} et la 2^{me} division, couvertes par la 2^{me} et s'avancait jusqu'à la ligne Yokpounar, Tchakmak. Le III^{me} Corps continuait à pousser ses deux divisions vers le fleuve.

Le 7/20, le II^{me} Corps s'avancait vers l'Est, dans la région Cheik-Ahmetli (en plein désert) poussant sa droite (5^{me} division) jusqu'à Hadji-Moussa-Oglou. Le I^{er} Corps passait tout entier au Sud du fleuve et s'avancait jusqu'à la ligne Youzouk-Bassi-Ouzoubey, Kiosselar. Le III^{me} Corps faisait traverser le fleuve à la 10^{me} division vers Yokpounar et concentrait la 3^{me} division dans la région Mouzlouk-Bogaz.

Le lendemain 8/21, avec le passage de la 3^{me} division, l'armée toute entière se trouvait déployée au Sud du Sangarios, sauf la 7^{me} division, restée sur la rive gauche du bras Est du Sangarios. Les divisions étaient disposées sur une ligne à peu près identique à celle de la veille, avec la gauche à Zerma. Ainsi, après des marches pénibles et le passage du fleuve, l'armée occupait ce jour là un front à peu près parallèle à la ligne des défenses ennemies qui s'étendait le long des fleuves Ghéouk et Katrandji et qu'elle allait attaquer.

Le 9/22 Août, l'armée avançait encore légèrement et occupait une ligne à 15 kilomètres environ des fleuves Ghéouk et Katrandji, l'extrême droite formant un crochet vers l'arrière jusqu'au N.E. de Hadji-Moussa-Oglou.

Le 10/23, elle s'élance à l'attaque, et occupait les positions ennemies immédiatement au sud des fleuves, sans combat au Sud du Ghéouk et après un combat acharné au Sud du Katrandji près de Kerez-Oglou. Le centre et la droite se trouvaient ainsi immédiatement devant les positions principales de l'ennemi. L'attaque générale était fixée pour le lendemain 15 Août. L'aile droite (II^{me}

Corps : était fortement échelonnée un peu en retrait car, d'une part l'aviation avait signalé de grandes concentrations et des mouvements de colonnes vers l'Est, soit sur la gauche du dispositif de l'ennemi, d'autre part pour attendre l'offensive du centre et de la gauche helléniques qui bousculerait le front ennemi dans ces secteurs ou du moins y attirerait d'autres forces, ce qui aurait rendu plus facile et plus sûre l'action de notre aile droite, par ailleurs très allongée.

En outre, d'après les renseignements obtenus le 11 / 24 Août, l'ennemi avait abandonné ses tranchées à l'est de l'Etrekeuy sur le Sangarios; sur notre gauche, la 3^{me} division avait occupé après une faible résistance les hauteurs au Nord du Ghéouk, la 10^{me} division avait avancé de 2 kilomètres au Nord de l'Ilitza après une faible résistance de l'ennemi. Il est à remarquer que, d'après les cartes au 1 / 250000 en usage, les hauteurs mentionnées devaient former la ligne de défense principale de l'ennemi en face du Ghéouk. L'avance qui était annoncée signifiait donc que les Turcs renonçaient à l'idée d'opposer une résistance sérieuse sur ce point de leur ligne défensive. Mais les cartes n'avaient aucune ressemblance ou relation avec la conformation réelle du terrain et la principale ligne de défense ennemie se trouvait plus au Nord sur des positions qui n'étaient pas indiquées sur les cartes. Au centre, le 1^{er} Corps d'armée, après l'occupation des hauteurs au Sud de Kerez-Oglou et des environs de Yaridam, se heurtait à une forte résistance de l'ennemi installé sur sa ligne principale. L'aile droite annonçait que l'ennemi occupait, en face de la 13^{me} division, des positions qu'il organisait fortement.

La 7^{me} division, qui avait été laissée à l'Ouest du Sangarios, avait réussi à passer le fleuve de nuit et à refouler, le matin du 11 Août, avec peu de pertes, vers le Nord-Est, un bataillon d'infanterie ennemi avec deux canons qui se trouvaient devant elle.

Elle annonçait le matin du même jour qu'elle se proposait de concentrer, le lendemain, toutes ses forces pour attaquer dans la direction de Polatli.

Le développement de l'offensive pendant cette première journée, les renseignements de l'aviation donnaient l'impression, à laquelle contribuèrent aussi des cartes entièrement fausses, que l'ennemi craignant d'être débordé sur sa gauche, s'éloignait du Sangarios en direction générale Est, en d'autres termes qu'il cherchait à s'échapper vers Angora et au Sud de cette ville. Il fallait donc que l'armée grecque suivit ce mouvement en prenant une direction générale vers le N.E. après avoir occupé les tranchées ennemies face à son centre pour éviter que sa gauche donnât dans le vide et ne perdît le contact avec l'ennemi. Si l'armée réussissait à prendre une telle direction après seulement le premier jour de l'offensive, elle en tirerait des avantages considérables, en particulier l'abandon des lignes de communication longues et peu sûres par le désert et l'ouverture de nouvelles lignes de communication plus courtes et plus sûres par le bras est du Sangarios. Et cela sans courir aucun risque, car il va de soi que l'inflexion en direction du N.E. et l'avance dans ce sens, auraient été précédées par le nettoyage du terrain devant notre aile gauche et en partie devant le centre.

D'après les données de cette situation, telle qu'elle se présentait au soir du 11 Août le Commandement donnait l'ordre que, après la première phase de l'offensive de l'aile gauche et du centre, (ce qui signifiait que le premier ordre général d'attaque avec les directions qui lui avaient d'abord été fixées continuait à subsister tant que l'ennemi n'avait pas été refoulé) la droite, fortement échelonnée, se replie sur Kirk Pınar, que le centre marche vers Kiouzildjé-Kalé-Keuy et la gauche vers Kizil-Keuy.

Telle était la situation au soir du premier jour d'offensive. Mais le développement des durs combats qui suivirent au cours de cette grande bataille prouva que les Turcs avaient bien tout d'abord concentré sur leur gauche des forces considérables, évaluées par notre aviation à 35 ou 40.000 hommes pour éviter d'être débordés par notre droite qui les menaçait, et qu'ils ne songèrent pas toutefois à abandonner sans combats leurs positions successives puissantes naturellement et artificiellement au nord du Ghéouk et du Katrandji positions qu'avec beaucoup d'art, ils avaient depuis longtemps préparées. La réduction de leurs forces sur l'aile droite ne signifiait autre chose que leur conviction inébranlable que ces positions étaient inexpugnables.

Dès lors, commencent pour l'armée les combats gigantesques qu'elle eut à soutenir pendant 15 jours pour s'emparer de l'effrayant labyrinthe que formait cette zone fortifiée où les Turcs pensaient briser l'élan de l'armée hellénique, la repousser et la détruire inévitablement.

Mais les événements se déroulèrent tout autrement. L'élan, la capacité et la bravoure de l'armée hellénique surmontèrent la terrible résistance et dressèrent sur les hauteurs du Ghéouk, du Katrandji et du Sangarios, d'immortels trophées de gloire.

Quelles étaient donc les positions, les forces défensives des Turcs pour que le coup terrible porté par l'armée grecque à l'ennemi dans une bataille de cette envergure et de cette durée n'ait pas suffi à paralyser ses forces et à le contraindre à s'avouer vaincu.

Au demeurant, il ne s'agissait pas de positions fortifiées dans la région du Sangarios, du Ghéouk et du Katrandji, mais de toute une zone fortifiée, considérable en longueur et en profondeur. Les principales routes de Dorylée à Angora, passent presque toutes, d'une part, par la zone comprise entre le Poursak et le Sangarios et d'autre part, par celle entre le Sangarios et le Désert Salé. Les premières routes et la voie ferrée traversent le bras Est du Sangarios entre Gordion et Tourk Takazir; les secondes, s'infléchissent vers le Nord-Est, traversent le Ghéouk et le Katrandji et convergent vers Angora. Quant au petit nombre de routes qui sont dans la zone au nord du Poursak, elles traversent sur divers points le cours N.O. du Sangarios et mènent vers Angora par des lacets, à travers un pays montagneux. L'impossibilité d'utiliser ces routes pour des opérations de vaste envergure a été exposée plus haut.

Pour endiguer l'avance grecque sur Angora, les Turcs avaient donc à organiser défensivement et à garder surtout les passages du bras Est du Sangarios et le front du Ghéouk-Katrandji. Il leur suffisait de surveiller simplement le cours N.O. du Sangarios car la défense, sur ce terrain montagneux aurait pu plus facilement être improvisée sur place si les Grecs avaient lancé de ce côté leur offensive. C'est pourquoi le front principal de la défense turque commençait près de l'ancien Gordion, suivait la rive orientale du Sangarios jusqu'à son confluent avec le Poursak, de là s'infléchissait vers l'Est et suivait la rive nord des fleuves Ghéouk et Katrandji pour aboutir aux hauteurs abruptes de Kiouzildjé-Kalé-Keuy. Le front se développait sur une longueur de 95 kilomètres. Ce front défensif n'était pas fait d'une ligne fortifiée, avec des ouvrages successifs sur la profondeur habituelle jusqu'ici. C'était un enchevêtrement de défenses de plus de 20 kilomètres de profondeur, sur toute la longueur du front; dans cette zone, pas un repli de terrain, pas une colline, pas une crête qui ne fût creusé et transformé en ouvrage fortifié. La section occidentale 40 kilomètres environ du front défensif était protégée par l'infranchissable Sangarios, par une ligne ininterrompue de tranchées, de nombreuses batteries et des redoutes entourées de fils de fer barbelés; vers le fleuve, par des talus étendus sous un bon champ de tir. Les ouvrages fortifiés s'étendaient depuis les hauteurs nord de Polatli environ jusqu'à Sivri. La gauche de ce front était appuyée sur le Yildiz, haute montagne abrupte puissamment fortifiée. La section sud du front défensif (35 kilomètres) appuyait sa droite également sur le Yildiz qui, avec le Sapandja et trois autres barrages intermédiaires constituaient des groupes puissants garnis presque partout de fils de fer barbelés.

Les hauteurs derrière les barrages, le terrain devant les barrages et les espaces intermédiaires étaient sillonnés de tranchées qui se soutenaient par des feux croisés. Le reste du front jusqu'à Kiouzildjé-Kalé-Keuy ne le cédait en rien aux autres parties pour le nombre, la puissance et la disposition des tranchées. Il était en outre dominé par le groupe du Tambour-Oglou et les hauteurs fortifiées d'Alandjik et de Kerez-Oglou organisées pour les rendre imprenables selon toutes les règles de l'art des fortifications. La nature abrupte des crêtes de Kiouzildjé Kalé-Keuy, sur lesquelles s'appuyait l'extrême gauche turque, suppléait en partie les défenses artificielles.

Les monts Tchali et Ardiz, et plus à l'Est, les hauteurs de Temkeui et Karahodja constituaient sur ce secteur, une seconde ligne de défense. Les Turcs avaient aussi établi plus tard, après avoir été délogés de la première zone fortifiée décrite plus haut, plusieurs autres lignes de défenses successives sur les hauteurs de Tchatiarli, de Tchouluk, de Selametli. Les lignes se multipliaient au Nord-Est en direction de l'Elma Dag et d'Angora. Mais les Turcs n'eurent pas l'occasion d'utiliser ces lignes parce que l'armée hellénique ayant considéré qu'elle avait atteint son but, interrompit sa marche sur Angora, comme désormais inutile.

Telles étaient les fortifications que les Turcs opposèrent aux Grecs sur le Sangarios, avec des forces à peu près égales à celles des Grecs.

L'armée turque, qui, après sa défaite du 8/21 Juillet, s'était retirée à la hâte derrière le Sangarios et n'avait gardé le contact avec les Grecs que par 5 divisions de cavalerie, s'est appliquée avec une activité admirable à se reconstituer et à se renforcer. Par un recrutement intensif, sans distinction d'âge ou de situation militaire, par la concentration rapide de ses effectifs dispersés, l'armée turque parvint à combler les vides faits dans ses rangs au cours des opérations de Kutahia et de Dorylée. Par ces moyens, elle reconstitua la force combattive de ses divisions qu'elle porta même, selon certaines indications, de 14 à 18 en y ajoutant la 5^{me} et la 9^{me} rappelées de Cilicie et les 17^{me} et 18^{me} nouvellement formées.

Le moral de l'armée turque n'était certes pas à la hauteur désirable, mais les sauvages mesures draconiennes prises par le commandement contenaient les hommes qui savaient que les mitrailleuses turques les guettaient à l'arrière pour les contraindre à revenir dans leurs tranchées, si jamais ils pensaient s'en échapper pour éviter les balles et les obus helléniques. Les officiers turcs pour qui se battre était une condition d'existence étaient retenus et fanatisés par l'intérêt qui les unissait à Kemal. De plus tout officier qui aurait ordonné la retraite sans avoir un *ordre écrit* était fusillé sur le champ, sans jugement.

C'est dans ces conditions que commença, le 11/24 Août l'attaque principale des Grecs contre les Turcs. Le seul fait d'avoir surmonté de telles difficultés, d'avoir enlevé de telles positions et d'avoir refoulé un ennemi qui se défendait avec tant d'acharnement, suffit pour exalter l'œuvre de l'armée hellénique et pour montrer de quel feu sacré son âme était embrasée.

Nous avons déjà dit l'impression générale produite par les renseignements reçus jusqu'au soir du 21/4 Août. Mais cette impression était effacée le matin du 12 et il était au contraire avéré que l'ennemi était disposé à défendre avec acharnement ses positions fortifiées devant notre gauche et notre centre. Cette opiniâtreté de l'ennemi nous imposait la plus grande circonspection quant à l'avance de notre aile droite étant donné surtout que, même sur ce point, l'ennemi ne cédait pas facilement. Ainsi, l'ennemi mettant à profit sa position centrale par rapport au front, concentrait pendant la nuit, sur notre extrême aile gauche, quatre divisions : 41^{me}, 5^{me}, 57^{me} et 2^{me}, suivant les renseignements des prisonniers, et attaquait pendant toute la nuit, avec rage, mais sans succès notre 7^{me} division qui avait traversé le Sangarios. Le combat était repris avec plus de vigueur dans la matinée et la 7^{me} division passait à la contre-attaque pour élargir sa tête de pont.

D'après les renseignements de l'aviation, l'ennemi occupait toutes ses tranchées face à notre gauche, au nord du Ghéouk; ses effectifs n'étaient pas très nombreux quoique cependant assez puissants. Face à notre centre, au nord du Katrandji, les avions signalaient des concentrations dans le région de Yamak, évaluées à 20,000 hommes, en plus des Turcs tenant les tranchées.

L'aile droite de la 3^{me} division qui constituait notre gauche, recevait vers deux heures du matin une forte contre-attaque ennemie qu'elle repoussait. La 10^{me} division qui était plus à droite était engagée depuis le matin dans un violent combat au N.E. d'Hitza, elle occupait, après midi, la première ligne de tranchées ennemies et parvenait dans la soirée à 300 mètres des secondes lignes.

Au centre, le 1^{er} Corps d'armée passait à l'attaque, à minuit du 11 au 12. La 1^{re} division qui se battit jusqu'à 10 heures du matin, occupait les tranchées ennemies qu'elle avait attaquées, elle repoussait plusieurs contre-attaques et s'installait sur les hauteurs N. et N.E. de Bakchédjik. Elle avait en face d'elle 4 divisions ennemies. Elle infligea, avec l'aide d'éléments de la 12^{me} division, des pertes graves à l'ennemi. La 2^{me} division atteignait aussi depuis minuit le groupe du Tambour-Oglou. Le combat suspendu un moment reprenait à 5 heures du matin contre 3 divisions ennemies 15^{me} du Caucase, 9^{me} et probablement 5^{me} de Cilicie. Les attaques répétées de notre division étaient repoussées et suivies des violentes contre-attaques. Finalement elle occupait le secteur E. du groupe. L'ennemi renforcé par 5 autres divisions attaquait de nouveau à 19 heures et réoccupait la hauteur d'où il fut cependant une fois encore délogé. Cette division dut être renforcée par des éléments de la 12^{me} division tenus en réserve.

Sur la droite, des éléments du 2^{me} Corps s'étendaient jusqu'à Sinanlı, Boumsouf, Terelli, et occupait des tranchées ennemies.

Les combats de cette journée furent rudes, mais aussi l'avance de nos divisions, opiniâtre et ferme. Déjà, dès le matin, nos avions avaient signalé des mouvements d'éléments ennemis depuis les positions fortifiées du centre vers le N. ce qui signifiait ou une retraite ou du moins des mesures pour occuper d'autres positions vers l'arrière. Le matin du 12/25, on remarquait aussi des mouvements et des concentrations de forces devant notre droite dans la région de Karahodja-Kizil Kouyounlou. On avait donc l'impression générale que l'ennemi fléchissait sous la pression de notre gauche et de notre centre et qu'il renforçait sa gauche pour éviter d'être débordé. Le fait que l'ennemi creusait de nouvelles tranchées à l'Est de l'Eski-Kisla jusqu'à Kalataklı et qu'il les faisait occuper par de puissants contingents, en était un indice.

Tenant compte des résultats de la journée et de ces renseignements, le Commandement ordonnait de poursuivre l'attaque le lendemain 13/26, dans les directions générales suivantes:

La 7^{me} Division, Yıapan Hamam Derekeuy par Polatlı.

Le III^{me} Corps, sur Eski-Tsalis.

Le 1^{er} Corps, sur Kizil-Kouyounlou.

Le II^{me} Corps Kiouzdjé-Kalé-Keuy avec mouvement tournant vers Kizil-Kouyounlou.

L'ennemi, délogé de ses positions depuis le Nord du Ghéouk et de l'Ilitja jusqu'à Kereç-Oglou, occupait, en arrière d'autres puissantes positions retranchées et, après avoir concentré de nouvelles forces, tentait un retour offensif de plus large envergure contre notre centre dans le dessein évident de le percer.

Aussi, le 1^{er} Corps connut-il le 12 et le 13 jusqu'à une heure avancée de la nuit, une des phases les plus critiques de sa longue série de combats. La 1^{re} Division qui était engagée dans la bataille depuis le soir du 10/23, subissait le 13/26 depuis le matin jusque dans l'après-midi, tantôt sur sa gauche et tantôt au centre de fortes attaques de l'ennemi qui tentait visiblement de l'enfoncer. Cette division dut être renforcée par 5 bataillons de la 12^{me} division : 1^{er} R. d'infanterie et 2 bataillons du 41^{me} d'infanterie, et parvint ainsi, après des combats surhumains, non seulement à repousser toutes les attaques ennemies, mais à passer elle-même, à 15 heures, à une contre-offensive qui se développa avec succès jusqu'au soir.

A gauche de la 1^{re} division et en face de la 2^{me}, l'ennemi était parvenu à réoccuper après de nombreuses tentatives, dans la nuit du 12 au 13, le sommet conique qui dominait le groupe du Tambour-Oglou.

La 2^{me} division qui s'était avancée à 300 mètres de la ligne principale ennemie attendait pour donner l'assaut, l'avance de la 10^{me} division qui se trouvait à sa gauche. La 2^{me} division s'élance à l'attaque à 17 heures à travers le glacis qui la séparait des tranchées ennemies. Des tirs de barrage protégeaient notre attaque. Il faisait déjà nuit quand nos troupes pénétraient dans les tranchées ennemies où s'engageait un terrible combat corps à corps à la grenade et à l'arme blanche. Enfin, les nôtres restent définitivement maîtres du terrain, occupent le groupe entier du Tambour Oglou que l'ennemi ne parvint plus à reprendre malgré ses nombreuses contre-attaques.

La 2^{me} division avait été renforcée de la 12^{me}. Elle fit une cinquantaine de prisonniers dont 3 officiers. Le 14/7 à 5 heures, l'ennemi commença à battre en retraite vers le Nord Est, poursuivi par la 2^{me} division.

Sur la gauche, la 3^{me} division, couverte par un détachement mixte contre les fortifications du Yildiz attaquait à 5 kilomètres O. de la Sapandja, les groupes ennemis, qu'elle enleva tous sauf un, protégé par des fils de fer barbelés et qui fut enlevé par surprise le surlendemain dans la nuit. La 10^{me} division marchait dès le matin à l'attaque au Nord de l'Ilitza, bousculait l'ennemi et le poursuivait vers Sogoundjali.

Sur la droite, le II^{me} Corps attaquait et gagnait du terrain sur l'ennemi qui se défendait pied à pied, avec opiniâtreté. En raison des distances, les communications de ce corps avec le commandement étaient très difficiles, car il n'a pas été possible pendant toute la durée de la bataille d'établir des communications téléphoniques et la T.S.F. ne fonctionnait qu'imparfaitement et par intervalles. Les ordres, transmis par des officiers de liaison arrivaient souvent à destination avec des retards.

Cette difficulté des communications entre le commandement et les unités de l'armée, due à l'insuffisance du matériel et du personnel téléphoniques et télégraphiques, comme aussi à la nature et à l'étendue du théâtre des opérations, forçait le commandement à suivre de près les unités; ce qui l'exposait continuellement au danger d'attaques par surprise, surtout une fois la grande bataille engagée. L'ennemi organisait, à l'aide de sa nombreuse cavalerie légère, des incursions systématiques sur nos lignes de communication qu'il parvint à gêner grandement.

Le 14-27 Août, à 6 heures du matin, au moment où le G.Q.G. se préparait à quitter Ouzoubey, village en plein désert où il était installé depuis l'engagement de la bataille, une fusillade nourrie se fit entendre sur les collines environnantes tenues par deux compagnies de couverture. En même temps, on apprenait que le village où étaient établies aussi deux ambulances remplies de blessés était attaqué par une force de 500 hommes, fantassins et cavaliers. Bientôt des obus ennemis tombaient dans le village ce qui donnait à l'attaque une certaine gravité. Le G.Q.G. suspendit son départ et mit en ligne de combat le bataillon affecté à sa garde, tous les secrétaires et plantons, et le personnel des ambulances et attendit l'issue du combat. Vers 10 heures, l'ennemi était repoussé et le G.Q.G. se transférait à Inlar-Katrandji, où il campa jusqu'au 25/7 Septembre. Depuis lors, les incursions contre Ouzoubey et nos lignes de communication furent souvent répétées. Mais nos renforts parvinrent, à les rendre inefficaces et même à les disperser.

Nous avons dit précédemment que l'ennemi, délogé le 13/26 de ses premières positions fortifiées; reculait poussé par les nôtres. Mais cette retraite et cette poursuite n'eurent pas le caractère général auquel on s'attendait parce que l'ennemi en retraite s'établissait en d'autres positions préparées d'avance à peu de distance des premières. De plus, la poursuite était enrayée par les feux d'artillerie lourde ennemie. Derrière des nouvelles positions, l'ennemi se reconstituait, se renforçait, se défendait de nouveau opiniâtrement et contre-attaquait en concentrant des forces qu'il transportait nuit et jour d'un secteur à l'autre. La surmenage des troupes ennemies en mouvement continué soit pour se battre soit pour creuser le terrain, avait atteint selon les dépositions des prisonniers, les dernières limites de l'endurance. Aussi des mutineries éclatèrent, noyées immédiatement dans le sang. Les coups de bâton et au besoin les mitrailleuses servaient de tonique contre la fatigue.

Les journées du 14 et du 15/28 août, sont caractérisées par des séries d'attaques des nôtres, suivies de contre-attaques ennemies.

Les fortifications de la Sapandja et celle des hauteurs ouest de Polatli, furent plusieurs fois prises et reprises, en des combats de jour et de nuit, tant que l'opiniâtreté de l'ennemi fléchit et que la volonté des nôtres lui fut imposée. Ces positions restèrent définitivement en notre possession.

Le 16/29, la pression exercée par nos troupes devient plus sensible à l'ennemi qui effectue sur le front un recul assez important. A l'extrême droite, le II^{me} Corps, enlève, après un violent et épuisant combat, le crête escarpée du groupe de Ghouzeldje-Kalé-Keuy ou Kalégroto, par l'action combinée des 13^{me}, 5^{me} et 9^{me} divisions. Cependant, bien que délogé de ses positions avec de graves pertes, l'ennemi se retire seulement à 8 kilomètres du II^{me} Corps et organise sa défense. Il est à noter que sur cette partie du front, l'ennemi conservait toujours des forces considérables.

Au centre, l'ennemi évacue Kizil-Keuy sous la pression de la 1^{re} division et recule en désordre vers le Nord. Plus à gauche, notre ligne est poussée jusqu'à Sayildja. A l'extrême gauche, la résistance de l'ennemi à notre 7^{me} division est plus opiniâtre que jamais; la division ne gagne du terrain que pied à pied.

Le 17/30 août, notre gauche avance plus sensiblement et l'ennemi semble renoncer à toute résistance ultérieure sur ce point. A l'extrême gauche, la 7^{me} division s'empare de lignes successives de tranchées et occupe la ligne Indjélar-cote 913—ouest de Korsakli par Ahlat. La 3^{me} division avance, en combattant contre l'ennemi en retraite, jusqu'à 3 km. nord-ouest de Sari Halil. La 10^{me} division, lancée dès 5 heures du matin poursuit l'ennemi en retraite jusqu'aux hauteurs nord de Sivri. Au centre, l'ennemi semble avoir battu en retraite vers la ligne des montagnes Tchäl et Ardiz. Une avance des nôtres est signalée vers le Nord. La progression des nôtres vers le N.E. a pour résultat l'abandon sans combat par l'ennemi du groupe de Yildiz qu'il tenait fortement et dont la prise eut été très difficile.

Les reconnaissances aériennes du 18 signalent d'importantes concentrations ennemies dans la région Yapan Hamam, Kizil-Keuy, Kizil Kouyounlou, Plato. Notre gauche et notre centre poussent des éléments vers le N.E. et vers le N. jusqu'au pied du Ardiz et du Tchäl.

Ainsi, les Turcs bien que constamment refoulés, poursuivaient leur résistance, et le centre grec avait de nouveau devant lui une puissante ligne de défenses, celle des monts Tchäl et Ardiz, puissamment retranchée, comme toutes les autres lignes de défense turque.

Dans la soirée du 18/31, sur notre gauche, le II^{me} Corps et principalement la 10^{me} division, s'avance et occupa la première crête du Tchäl. Le I^{er} Corps était un peu en arrière; le matin du 18, il attaquait les positions ennemies depuis le milieu du mont Tchäl à l'Est, jusqu'au versant E. du mont Ardiz. Sur la droite, la première division culbute l'ennemi par une violente attaque et occupe la moitié Est du mont Ardiz et les hauteurs au S.O. de Temkeuy. L'ennemi est emporté par l'élan de cette attaque impétueuse que sa défense opiniâtre est incapable d'arrêter.

A gauche de la 1^{re} division, la 12^{me} attaquait avec un élan égal et occupait après une journée de combat, la moitié ouest de l'Ardiz jusqu'à son sommet. Elle fait prisonnier un bataillon de 400 hommes, avec officiers et mitrailleuses. Ce qui

donne une idée de l'importance des pertes turques, c'est l'aveu du commandant de ce bataillon que ses effectifs, au commencement de la bataille du Sangarios, étaient de 430 hommes, dont 260 fusils et que cet effectif était tombé à 120 fusils avec une perte totale de 60 de sa force combattive. Mais il avait été complété la veille de sa capture par des hommes enrôlés de force, sans distinction d'âge.

La 2^{me} division qui formait la gauche du I^{er} Corps, s'avancant par Eski-Tsalis, attaque aussi avec élan sur un terrain extrêmement abrupt et difficile, enlève plusieurs lignes successives de tranchées et établit solidement sa ligne sur la crête sud du versant Est du mont Tchal et le col entre le Tchal et le mont Ardiz. Le contact et la continuité sont ainsi établis avec la droite du III^{me} Corps.

Le III^{me} Corps resta immobile au cours de cette journée pour ne pas avancer isolément au-delà de la ligne du I^{er} Corps et parce qu'il était engagé sans arrêt dans un violent combat pendant toute la journée précédente et toute la nuit jusqu'au matin du 19.

Sur la droite, le II^{me} Corps resta sur ses positions.

La 7^{me} division, sur l'extrême gauche, occupait après un violent combat les hauteurs à l'ouest de Polatli.

Le 20 2 Septembre, l'attaque continue avec progression générale de la gauche et du centre.

A l'extrême gauche, l'ennemi, sous la pression de la 7^{me} division, évacue le matériel de la gare de Polatli, limite sa défense sur les hauteurs ouest et nord-ouest de Polatli, déplace son artillerie au N.E., et concentre ses réserves à Eski-Polatli. La 7^{me} division est à peine à 2 kilomètres de Polatli.

Mais près de Baïbourt, l'ennemi, qui y tient concentrés jusqu'au soir 3.000 à 3.500 hommes, conserve ses positions en face de la 3^{me} division.

La 10^{me} division avance jusqu'à Sivri, occupe toutes les hauteurs de la ligne des crêtes du versant Ouest du Tchal et établit sa première ligne au nord de ces hauteurs vers Kamidjik.

Le I^{er} Corps occupe également tout le reste de la ligne des crêtes à l'est du Tchal et du Ardiz et avance bien au-delà.

La 1^{re} division, fortement poussée déjà vers Temkeuy reste immobile ainsi que le II^{me} Corps, sur la droite. La volonté opiniâtre de l'ennemi pour tenir les positions en face de notre gauche, la nécessité de substituer rapidement à nos lignes de communication par le désert, des lignes plus courtes et plus sûres par le bras est du Sangarios, nous imposaient non seulement de ne pas pousser l'aile droite avant d'avoir pleinement assuré notre situation sur la gauche, mais encore de renforcer notre gauche par des prélèvements sur le II^{me} Corps.

Le soir donc du 19 / 1 Septembre, le II^{me} Corps recevait l'ordre de diriger par une marche de nuit afin de cacher ce mouvement aux avions ennemis : une de ses divisions dans la direction de Inlar Katrandji à la disposition du Haut

Commandement. La 9^{me} division qui fut chargée de cette mission se trouvait, le matin du 21 août, après deux marches de nuit, à Sogoundjali, était mise sous les ordres du III^{me} Corps et prenait part, dès le lendemain, aux opérations de l'aile gauche.

L'ennemi, délogé de ses positions fortifiées du Tchali et de l'Ardiz; rassembla le reste de ses forces pour former un nouveau front au N.E. dans la région de Yapan Hamam; Kadikouy Tchoulouk, Salametli où il concentra des contingents importants et se mit énergiquement à construire de nouvelles fortifications et de nombreuses lignes de tranchées. Il conservait cependant des forces assez importantes près de Polatli et de Babourt jusqu'à Korsakli.

Telle était la situation jusqu'au soir du 20 août, mais le matin du 21/3 septembre, est annoncée la retraite subite des détachements ennemis de la région de Korsakli et un mouvement de fortes colonnes ennemies devant le I^{er} Corps en direction Est. C'était un moment critique où l'ennemi, harassé par 12 jours de résistance à la pression des attaques helléniques qu'il ne parvenait pas à endiguer malgré les pertes auxquelles il consentait, hésitait entre une retraite générale définitive et la décision de faire un effort suprême pour continuer la résistance. Certes, ni les événements, ni les forces qui ont influé en ce moment critique sur les Turcs pour les arrêter sur la pente de l'abandon définitif du combat ne nous sont connues. Peut-être la grande énergie reconnue du Haut-Commandement kémaliste trouve-t-elle encore la force et les moyens de s'imposer à l'armée, peut-être les officiers turcs furent-ils influencés par l'idée qu'ils se battaient pour leur propre subsistance, peut-être que prévalut la pensée que l'abandon de la lutte et l'aveu non déguisé de la défaite auraient provoqué l'écroulement sans retour du régime kémaliste, tandis que ce régime n'avait plus rien à perdre en continuant une lutte désespérée. Le fait est que le mouvement de retraite fut enrayé et que les Turcs s'établirent dans de nouvelles tranchées sur de nouvelles positions.

Et qu'on se demande maintenant: est-ce qu'une armée qui, pendant tant de jours, était systématiquement délogée de positions puissantes par la nature et par l'art, malgré une résistance opiniâtre et héroïque; est-ce qu'une armée qui, malgré ses efforts obstinés, s'est vue dans la nécessité de céder continuellement à la pression de son adversaire et de subir sa volonté; est-ce qu'une telle armée aurait été en mesure de tenir ses nouvelles positions et d'endiguer définitivement le torrent offensif déchainé contre elle? Indubitablement non! car le sentiment de son infériorité et de sa défaite s'était enraciné dans son âme. Cependant, tandis que les faits attestaient cette importante diminution des forces physiques et morales de l'armée turque, de nouveaux facteurs hostiles aux Grecs, invisibles alliés des Turcs, s'approchaient, pour arrêter l'élan des Grecs et dissimuler déceimment la défaite des Turcs. Ces facteurs étaient: l'inévitable fatigue de l'armée grecque après tant de combats, les énormes distances, le manque de routes, l'approche de la saison des pluies et du rigoureux hiver sur ces hauts-plateaux inhospitaliers. Sous l'influence

des conditions climatiques, ces facteurs devenaient en effet pour l'armée grecque un ennemi beaucoup plus dangereux que les armées kémalistes, car ni la volonté, ni l'élan de l'armée grecque n'auraient pu les vaincre.

La fatigue, en effet, était passagère et on aurait pu facilement y remédier en suspendant l'offensive pour donner à l'armée quelques jours d'un repos relatif, car il n'y avait aucun danger que l'armée Kéaliste en profitât pour reprendre sérieusement l'initiative des opérations. Mais cet arrêt n'eut été possible que si l'armée grecque avait eu devant elle un mois au moins de bonne saison. Mais à l'époque où l'on se trouvait, la reprise des opérations eut coïncidé avec la saison des pluies et l'hiver. Alors les interminables pistes fussent devenues complètement impraticables aux camions et comme les distances n'auraient pas permis d'autre moyen de communication, les opérations seraient devenues impossibles. Comme, d'autre part, l'armée ne pouvait hiverner au-delà du Sangarios si loin de ses bases, elle aurait quand même été obligée de revenir sur ses positions mais alors dans des conditions extrêmement défavorables et périlleuses.

Devant cet état de choses, le Haut Commandement hellénique se demanda s'il convenait de poursuivre encore l'offensive pour occuper d'autres positions ennemies ou même pour prendre Angora, où si l'œuvre militaire jusque là accomplie desservait suffisamment la politique d'où était née la guerre. En d'autres termes, les avantages militaires d'une avance jusqu'à Angora compenseraient-ils les nouveaux sacrifices et les dangers qui seraient imposés à l'armée, puisque, dans tous les cas, cette armée retournerait sur ses premières positions.

Une autre question se posait encore: la destruction complète et définitive des forces Kémalistes est-elle possible ou même probable pour qu'on se lance même au prix de n'importe quel sacrifice à la poursuite de ce but dernier qui aurait radicalement résolu tous les problèmes?

Il a déjà été dit plus haut que la campagne contre Angora n'avait pas pour but la destruction complète des forces kémalistes, car ce but était irréalisable, mais leur affaiblissement partiel, surtout en leur supprimant les moyens de gêner sérieusement les principales forces helléniques, dans la zone où elles se seraient installées en permanence. Dans ces conditions, si l'armée grecque réussissait, comme elle a réussi en effet, à porter à l'armée kémaliste un coup si redoutable qui la paralysât pour longtemps, de façon à lui enlever toute possibilité d'une offensive sérieuse, elle serait libre de choisir à sa convenance, le moment de l'arrêt de l'offensive et de revenir sur ses bases fixées d'avance.

L'œuvre militaire accomplie jusqu'au 20 août fut donc jugée suffisante étant donné le but qu'on s'était fixé, et il fut décidé, en plein accord du Gouvernement et du Commandement, que l'Armée se désisterait des avantages militaires complémentaires que lui donnerait l'avance jusqu'à Angora, car ces avantages ne compenseraient pas les nouveaux sacrifices et les nouveaux dangers. Il était

probable que Kemal chercherait à exploiter l'arrêt de notre offensive et l'annoncerait à grand fracas comme une victoire de son armée. La décision fut maintenue malgré cet inconvénient parce qu'on était sûr que les événements qui suivraient prouveraient le mal fondé de ces assertions. Cette décision de la Grèce de ne pas se laisser entraîner dans l'opération très engageante d'occuper Angora à tout prix et le choix du moment absolument opportun et avantageux pour interrompre l'offensive est un acte militaire vraiment digne de tout éloge.

Le 21/3 et le 22/4 septembre, la droite et le centre restent immobiles sur les positions occupées qu'ils tenaient fortement; la gauche, renforcée par la 9^{me} division, reprend l'attaque, non dans le but d'une avance prononcée mais pour améliorer ses positions, en élargissant la grande tête de pont à l'est du Sangarios qui n'avait désormais d'autre raison d'être que celle de faciliter et d'assurer le passage de l'armée sur rive Ouest et d'empêcher l'ennemi de se rendre compte, plus tôt qu'il ne l'aurait fallu des intentions du Commandement grec. L'aile gauche est donc poussée plus avant par cette attaque, et la 7^{me} division occupe Polatli, si opiniâtrement disputé et s'établit sur les hauteurs est de la ville.

Le 23/5 septembre, toutes les unités reçoivent l'ordre de s'arrêter sur leurs positions et de se regrouper.

Le 26/6, à midi, le III^{me} Corps signale des concentrations ennemies sur son front. L'inaction, de la droite et du centre, pendant trois jours, enhardit, semble-t-il, les Turcs et leur fait concevoir l'idée, juste en vérité, de tenter un dernier effort pour essayer de refouler, par une sérieuse attaque, l'aile gauche hellénique. Le plan n'était pas mauvais, car, s'il avait réussi, il mettait en danger les communications grecques à travers le Sangarios, à peine rétablies depuis quelques jours et après de nombreux combats. Pour faire donc face à une telle éventualité, toutes les unités reçurent l'ordre de constituer de fortes réserves.

Le 26/7, les intentions des Turcs se manifestent plus clairement car leurs concentrations en face du III^{me} Corps devenaient si importantes qu'elles ne pouvaient plus passer pour une simple mesure de précaution défensive. Cela créait une situation que le Commandement grec ne pouvait négliger et qu'il devait liquider avant de transporter ses effectifs ou de commencer à repasser la Sangarios. Le III^{me} Corps recevait donc l'ordre d'opposer jusqu'au bout une défense active et les I^{er} et II^{es} Corps d'attaquer sans autre ordre, dès que l'ennemi aurait déclenché l'attaque contre notre gauche.

Le 26 et le 27/8 septembre, calme relatif; l'ennemi ne fit aucune tentative. Le 28/9 septembre, dès le matin, une violente attaque ennemie se déclanche sur tout le front du III^{me} Corps, depuis le mont Tchal jusqu'au nord de Polatli. L'attaque est engagée, mais la résistance du III^{me} Corps est opiniâtre et ferme. L'attaque ennemie, alimentée par toutes les forces disponibles, fut poursuivie le lendemain 29, manifestant un effort désespéré (*sic*) de l'ennemi pour jeter notre gauche dans le fleuve. Les masses successives jetées à l'assaut étaient décimées mais l'ennemi

persistait jusqu'au soir du 29 quand, après avoir pris et perdu à diverses reprises des positions secondaires, la contre offensive grecque le repoussait définitivement et brisait son dernier effort pour prendre l'initiative. Du reste, au cours de cette guerre, l'ennemi ne parvint pas un seul instant à prendre l'initiative ou à la conserver quand il le tenta.

Cette attaque coûte à l'ennemi tant de pertes et l'ébranla tellement que le Commandement grec eut la conviction qu'il pouvait, sans être gêné, effectuer le resserrement du front et le passage du fleuve, déjà décidé. Le temps pressait; août tirait sur sa fin, et septembre, avec ses pluies, approchait. Il n'y avait plus de temps à perdre. Dans la nuit du 29/10, dès que fut annoncé le refoulement complet de l'ennemi, ordre était donné pour le passage du Sangarios, dans la nuit du 30 au 31, par 7 ponts dont 4 pour camions lourds.

Déjà, dans la nuit du 28 au 29, les Corps d'armée avaient reçu ordre de diriger sur le pont de Kavoundji le superflu de leurs moyens de transport. Ainsi commença le mouvement difficile et délicat du passage du fleuve par une armée de 9 divisions sur un front large seulement de 30 kilomètres et en contact étroit avec l'ennemi.

Le II^{me} Corps détaché de ses positions à l'extrême droite était déjà acheminé, par marches de nuit et se trouvait concentré, dans la soirée du 29, dans la région de Karakhamzali-Tchanakdji.

Le I^{er} Corps se détachait du contact avec l'ennemi et marchait sur la route de Sarihalil, Hidja. Le III^{me} Corps repliait un peu sa droite; la gauche conservait ses positions. Le 30 au matin, l'ennemi attaque de nouveau la 7^{me} division sur l'extrême gauche mais il est de nouveau repoussé. Tel était l'état de l'ennemi refoulé que la 7^{me} division put avant de repasser le Sangarios, détruire, sous ses yeux, sans être gênée, 8 kilomètres de voies ferrées à l'est du fleuve. Dans la nuit du 30 au 31, s'effectuait sans aucune gêne le passage de toute l'armée. Les ponts étaient rompus après le passage du dernier soldat. Le 31/13 septembre, l'armée s'établit sur ses nouvelles positions à l'Ouest du fleuve. Le passage du Sangarios fut effectué avec un ordre et une précision dignes de toute admiration et témoignent de l'excellent moral des troupes qui passaient le fleuve en chantant, parce qu'elles avaient la conscience qu'elles ne battaient pas en retraite sous la pression de l'ennemi, mais qu'elles s'en allaient après avoir accompli à souhait la mission difficile qui leur avait été confiée.

Le I^{er} Corps fut placé à droite, le II^{me} au centre, le III^{me} à gauche, au nord du Poursak. L'armée resta dans cet ordre à l'ouest du Sangarios et proche de la rive gauche jusqu'au 4 septembre, soit pendant 5 jours; afin de pouvoir en toute tranquillité évacuer ses blessés, retirer le nombreux matériel qui s'était concentré sur le Sangarios et détruire un 1^{er} tronçon de 30 kilomètres de voie ferrée.

L'ennemi, incapable désormais d'une action vigoureuse mais désirant produire l'impression qu'il poursuivait l'armée grecque en retraite, monta des

incursions d'éléments sur nos communications. Le 1/14 septembre, un fort détachement d'infanterie et de cavalerie passant le Sangarios par le Sud, à l'ouest de Phetioglou, fit incursion dans Sivri-Hissar, où se trouvaient établies deux ambulances remplies de blessés. Faute de résistance, il entra dans la ville sans combat, s'empara des ambulances, détruisit tout le matériel qu'il ne put emporter, emmena un petit nombre d'hommes légèrement blessés et une partie du personnel sanitaire. Contrairement à ce qui fit un officier turc qui, dans une autre incursion contre un convoi d'ambulances automobiles, massacra des blessés, il faut ici noter à la louange de l'officier qui commandait le détachement, qu'il se montra compatissant envers les grands blessés auxquels il prodigua même des soins.

Non contents de ces incursions, les Turcs voulurent aussi exercer une pression sur le front. Le 3/16 septembre, un détachement de 3.000 hommes, traversa le fleuve au nord de Gordion sur des troncs de peupliers et passa sur la rive gauche. La 5^{me} division qui se trouvait en face, laissa l'ennemi effectuer sa manœuvre. Puis, elle détruisit par l'artillerie les ponts improvisés et lança l'infanterie à l'attaque de l'ennemi qui fut refoulé jusqu'au fleuve. Ceux qui ne furent pas faits prisonniers tombèrent à l'eau.

L'incursion contre Sivri-Hissar, qui ne pouvait avoir du reste aucun résultat sérieux puisque le voisinage des divisions grecques empêcha l'ennemi d'y rester, ne fut pas la seule. Les Turcs tentèrent une incursion de plus large envergure. Le 3/16 septembre, l'aviation hellénique signalait deux colonnes ennemies, l'une de 8.000 hommes et l'autre de 4.000 en marche de Tchiftélar, au sud du Sangarios, vers le N.O. c'est-à-dire Dorylée.

Une autre colonne de 1.500 à 2.000 cavaliers était signalée, partant du même point vers le Nord, en direction de la gare d'Alpi-Keuy. D'après les dépositions de prisonniers ces effectifs étaient formés avec une division détachée du front du Sangarios et qui passait par des marches forcées au sud du fleuve, division à effectifs réduits (Mouharédep) venue du Sud et 3 divisions de cavalerie. Les Turcs comptaient que l'armée grecque devait encore se trouver loin de ses bases et près du bras Est du Sangarios. Ils pensèrent donc la prévenir par une marche rapide et occuper Dorylée qu'ils supposaient faiblement gardée. Ils auraient détruit cette base de l'armée grecque, coupé ses communications et l'auraient mise en mauvaise posture. Ils auraient surtout pu proclamer par le monde qu'ils avaient repris Dorylée et que l'armée hellénique était encerclée. Ils ignoraient que les divisions grecques derrière le Sangarios auraient pu se passer de communications pendant plusieurs jours, parce qu'elles étaient suffisamment approvisionnées et qu'elles étaient assez fortes pour contenir l'ennemi qui aurait fait pression par l'Est et en même temps pour battre et disperser des incursions éventuelles sur Dorylée. En d'autres termes, l'armée se sentait assez forte pour soutenir avec succès une bataille sur deux fronts. Mais ce qu'ignoraient surtout les Turcs c'est que, dans la région de Dorylée se trouvait une division complète de troupes fraîches qui venaient d'y arriver.

Dès que le mouvement des colonnes ennemies sur Dorylée fut signalé, un détachement mixte d'infanterie et d'artillerie fut envoyé sur Alpi-Keuy et la division fraîche sur Derventikeuy et Hamidié, en même temps deux autres divisions du front du Sangarios qui étaient déjà en mouvement vers l'Ouest étaient acheminées dans la même direction. Le détachement dirigé sur Alpikeuy rencontre l'ennemi au sud de la gare et le met en fuite vers le Sud. Dans sa fuite il tombe sous les feux de la 2^{re} division, il est terriblement décimé et dispersé. Les autres colonnes ennemies qui se dirigeaient sur Dorylée, se rendant compte que l'incursion n'est pas aussi facile qu'elles se l'imaginaient et qu'elles auraient à affronter des forces importantes, rebroussement donc chemin, poursuivies par le feu des nôtres.

Ainsi finit la dernière tentative quelque peu sérieuse de Kémal. Quant à l'armée grecque, ayant achevé la grande et difficile mission qui lui avait été confiée elle revenait sur les positions qu'elle avait choisies d'avance pour s'y installer définitivement.

Ce mouvement, ordonné le soir du 3/16, était achevé dans la soirée du 10/23 sans que l'ennemi l'eut gêné en quoi que ce soit et se bornant à maintenir le contact par sa cavalerie. Le moment du retour de l'armée sur ses positions avait été opportunément choisi car, depuis le 8/21 septembre, un froid vif avait commencé à se faire sentir, accompagné de pluies qui rendaient les routes impraticables aux automobiles.

En revenant sur ses positions, l'armée détruisit à fond 120 kilomètres de la voie ferrée d'Angora, depuis le Sangarios jusqu'aux avant-postes de ses nouvelles positions, enleva du territoire entouré au S. à l'Est et au N. par le Sangarios, tout ce qui pouvait être utile à l'ennemi et le rendit pour longtemps impropre aux opérations par grandes masses.

L'armée grecque s'établit maintenant dans ses quartiers d'hiver, prête à repousser toute tentative d'incursion ennemie dans les territoires occupés.

Brousse, le 13-25 septembre 1921.

X. STRATIGOS

F. O. 371/7881/E. 322

ENCLOSURE 2 TO No. 63

Préface.

The Survey is an admirably clear and succinct account both of the operations which led up to the fighting, and the actual fighting, before Angora. The introductory remark show that it is intended chiefly for foreign consumption. The maps, though excellent as far as they go, do not make sufficiently clear the geographical reasons which necessitated the Greeks making their turning

movement from the South rather than from the North, the first one being uncontroverted, for that it was only necessity which forced them to do so is plainly evident. The Turkish position on the East side of the river Sangarios was one of great strength. Their front was defended by the river itself which, as the Report says, was "tactically impassible". Their right flank, North of the Pursak river which cut their position at right angles, lay in a particularly mountainous country and one without roads. The left flank, by which the Greeks actually made their turning movement, was bent back conformably to the line of the river, and being in desert country without natural features advantageous for defence, was carefully strengthened by entrenchments. Although a turning, had it been possible, by the Greeks from the North would have been (in the event of success) the more fertile in result, cutting as it would have done, the main Turkish lines of communication with Angora in a shorter time, yet the attack which was, in effect, carried out, was at least calculated to display the astonishing powers of endurance of the Greek soldier, who possesses the peculiar power of being able to march for days through a desert on a whiff of garlic and a raisin occasionally. The whole arrangements for the offensive, which included a change of base from Smyrna to Mudania, the repairing of the greater part of the railway both as far as Dorylaeon and between that town and the front, and the creation of an advanced base, were completed in about twenty days. On the 29th July/11th August the Greek Army was ready to advance. The concentration to the South appears from the Report to have been very ably conducted, some of the units of the II Corps marching under an August sun, from 35 to 40 kilometres a day.

After the development of the main engagement the Greeks seem to have made steady progress at considerable cost. When it is considered that the position which they were attacking was one of remarkable strength (it was 20 kilometres in depth), and had been prepared beforehand with every means at the 'Turks' disposal it is scarcely surprising that their progress was also slow. In addition the use made by the Turks of their cavalry to harass the attackers' lines of communication was, it is here officially admitted, admirable. As an example of this it is only necessary to cite the attack made on General Headquarters on August 14/27th. The 21 August/3rd September was the critical day. The Turks appear, for a moment, to have entertained the possibility of withdrawing generally and abandoning the whole line of the Sangarios. However they seem to have thought better of it at the last moment and occupied their next line of defence.

The reason given by General Stratigos for abandoning the offensive at this moment when, to all intents, one further effort might have brought success, is chiefly the climatic one. Namely that the approach of the wet weather and winter, as it was out of the question to maintain for any length of time such protracted communications as then existed, made it essential for them to disengage and retire nearer their base. He also mentions the fatigue of the army after almost a

fortnight's continuous fighting; but adds that there would have been no danger in giving the army a rest and in stopping the offensive altogether for a few days for that purpose. It is to be noticed also that he states that there never had been any question of the possibility of the Greeks destroying Kemal's Army; the most they ever hoped to do was to impair its striking qualities as a force and that, he avers, had now been accomplished. The best proof of the truth of this is to be found in the comparative ease with which the Greeks managed to effect their withdrawal in the very face of the enemy, a withdrawal which included the passage of the Sangarios, and the destruction of eight kilometres of railway to the East of that river.

Athens, December 24th, 1921.

(Signed) J.H.F. MCEWEN

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ENCLOSURE 3 TO No. 63

La Campagne d'Asie Mineure.

*Exposé Général de la troisième phase des opérations,
du 9/22 Juillet au 10/23 Septembre, 1921.*

In this general survey, dated 25th July, General Stratigos recorded the operations up to and including the battle of ESKISHEHR on the 21st July. In the paper now under review he carries the narrative, through the advance to the River SAKARIA, the battles on the left bank and the Greek withdrawal, up to the establishment of the Greek Army on the 23rd September in lines covering the AFIUN KARAHISSAR - ESKISHEHR - KARAKEUY railway.

A less experienced writer might have risked wearying his readers by an attempt to reconcile the closing paragraph of his first survey with the events he has now recorded, or even to make his later narrative fit his earlier statements. General Stratigos has wisely ignored past indiscretions and has given an honest description of the operations as they appeared to him. He has therefore succeeded in presenting not only an interesting story but a very valuable record of the Greek Army's operations and of the plans and views of the Commanders and Staff who directed them.

Unfortunately General Stratigos second survey, like his first, suffers from having been badly edited. Many of the dates are wrongly given in the text, particularly on pages 7, 16 and 17 where they confuse the narrative, and there are wide discrepancies between the spelling of topographical names in the text and in the maps.

The events which preceded and led up to last summer's campaign are still too near to be seen in proper perspective; but even now an endeavour to trace the connecting links may help us towards a truer understanding of the campaign.

The autumn of 1920 saw Greek arms triumphant both in Asia Minor and in Thrace. Except in a few minor incidents the Greeks had gained an unbroken series of victories; and both the Army and the nation belived themselves to be the masters of the Turks wherever they should meet them. During the winter of 1920-21 the Greeks, immersed in politics, failed to appreciate the unremitting efforts which Mustapha Kemal was making to organize and strengthen his forces; and Kemal himself was apparently careful not to enlighten them, for he opposed only a feeble resistance to the Greek Reconnaissance in force towards ESKISHEHR in the latter part of January 1921. This operation was designed to impress the conference which was to meet in London in February to try to effect peace in the Near East. The programme laid down by the Greek High Command, which excluded any entry into ESKISHEHR, was carried out in every detail and with very slight losses; but the Turkish, French and Italian presses translated the refusal to occupy ESKISHEHR as failure, and the Greeks had the mortification of seeing themselves debited with defeat instead of credited with victory.

The Greeks, labouring under a sense of unjust humiliation and still despising the Turks, were burning for revenge and found an excuse in the irreconcilable attitude of the Turkish Delegates in London. Kemal, who now probably wished to precipitate matters, managed by wireless messages of dummy cipher interspersed with a few pregnant words in clear, to make the Greek Command believe that he intended to forestall them by himself making an attack. Urged by Kemal's ruse and by their own over confidence, the Greeks launched a hastily conceived and ill prepared attack from both their wings. The first Corps from USHAK met little opposition and easily captured AFIUN KARAHISSAR. The 3rd Corps advancing from BRUSA on ESKISHEHR encountered important enemy forces entrenched in strong positions. After some days of severe fighting its centre gave way before the Turkish counter-attacks, the Corps extricated itself with difficulty, after suffering severe casualties, and retreated to BRUSA.

Kemal did not wait to pursue the retreating 3rd Corps. He turned instantly and with every available man Southwards with the object of throwing himself across the Greek 1st Corps line of retreat. Luckily for the Greeks limitations of the ESKISHEHR-KUTAHYA railway obliged the Turks to reach the Southern line piece-meal.

When the Greek 1st Corps had marched Eastwards from USHAK, the 34th Infantry Regiment was left at TONLU PUNAR; and it was on this, where the low hills afford an excellent position to block the passage from AFIUN KARAHISSAR to USHAK, that Kemal's troops were directed. The Turks attacked at dawn with two Divisions; and throughout the day this single Greek Regiment withstood the

pressure of ever increasing enemy forces. The Greek 1st Corps, marching day and night from AFIUN KARAHISSAR and beyond, arrived just in time and in a few hours 3 Turkish Divisions were in retreat.

The Greeks realized that good luck and the tenacity of the 34th Regiment only had saved the situation. Their illusions were dispelled, and they realized that they had in front of them a strong, bold and skilful enemy. They also believed that nothing but military defeat would bring that enemy to terms and that the longer he was left unmolested, the stronger he would become. They at once set to work to strengthen and reorganise their Army, and to try to make up the time already lost by their false confidence.

In the UŞAK area May and early June is the time of heavy rains, so no large operations could be contemplated before the middle of June; and that gave the Greeks two months in which to complete their preparations.

In June the question always asked in Athens was "are we strong enough to beat the Turks". The anxiety which was racking the mind of the Chief of the Staff in Asia Minor and which he repeatedly expressed to the British Military Attaché during his visit to SMYRNA was regarding time. He dreaded delay at the start, foreseeing the narrow margin of time at the end. But time once lost is hard to recover, and it was not until near the middle of July that the forward movement was begun.

The first stage of the operations, the great turning movement by the right combined with left flanking movement from BRUSA went like clockwork; and the failure to entrap the Turks between the 2 wings was partly compensated by the Greek victory in the pitched battle of the 21st July, East of ESKİŞEHİR.

Now came the crucial question whether to advance on ANGORA, or to entrench and hold the ground that had been gained. As far as is known, General Dousmanis opposed the further advance, but General Papoulas, elated by his victory of the 21st July, urged the advance and the King supported him; and so the decision was made.

Resting and refitting the troops for the new advance was a simple matter; but with the railway broken behind both flanks, the reorganisation of the lines of communication and supply was a work which appeared to demand at least a month's unceasing labour. But the autumn rains were looming near ahead, and the preparations were compressed into 20 days. Possibly a more complete preparation might have prevented some of the frequent failures in the supply of food and ammunition. The privations which the Greek troops endured failed to break their spirit, but it must have impaired their physical powers. They fought like heroes but they did not succeed in either outflanking or breaking through the Turks. By sheer courage and determination, they succeeded in driving the Turks from their successive lines of entrenchment and in gaining the main ridge, but they still saw Kemal's Army in front of them.

General Stratigos contends that the Turks were morally beaten and could not have prevented the Greeks from reaching ANGORA. His belief may not be altogether unfounded; but the possibility of a further advance had become for the Greeks an academic question. The season was far advanced, on any day the rain might come which would turn the country into a quagmire, and common prudence forced a retirement to a sheltered position and shorter lines of supply. General Pallis' early anxiety had been translated into fact; time had failed.

However imperfect this sketch of the events of 1920-21 may be, however faulty in its presentation of proportions and values, it is sufficiently near the truth to show that the Greeks could only hope to realize their aims by gaining a rapid victory, and that they failed because the Turks first eluded them and then delayed them so long that even the partial success that they won came too late.

Throughout the campaign the Greeks were stronger than the Turks in Artillery and Machine guns; but in rifle, available for battle, they never had more than a 15% advantage. The young and inexperienced Greek aviation service maintained a clear command of the air; this advantage mitigated but did not compensate the decided inferiority in numbers of the Greek Cavalry. In the wide and rapid manoeuvres on which their only chance success depended, the Greeks appear always to have been hampered by their weakness in cavalry. This was particularly noticeable in the advance towards Angora, when the Greek Cavalry Brigade had been reduced by lack of horses; in this phase the Turkish Cavalry reconnoitred and delayed the Greek advance, screened its own main army's dispositions and seriously deranged the Greek supply and communications.

General Stratigos writes at some length of the events of August 23-25, but he throws no light on the reasons which led the Greek Army Commander first to postpone the general attack from the morning of the 24th to the morning of the 25th, and later to advance it to the night of the 24th; indeed he gives no direct indication that any change was made in the orders. His account of the circumstances which induced the belief that the Turkish Army was retiring on the 24th August is interesting. This mistaken information was telegraphed to Athens and was given by the Greek General Staff there to the British Military Attaché.

In his account of the struggles of the 25th and 26th of August, General Stratigos indicates clearly the serious situation which developed in the 1st Corps front. This was the critical phase of the battle, for on the 25th the Turks almost broke the Greek centre, and on the 26th the Turkish Commander found his left flank turned and all touch lost with three of his groups which he tried to call to his assistance. Why the Greek 2nd Corps Commander missed his opportunity has not been made known. Unless it is to be believed that he failed to recognize his advantage, it seems likely that he was still ignorant of the recovery of the Greek 1st Corps and hesitated definitely to commit his troops, which might yet be needed to reinforce the centre without reference to Army Headquarters; and General

Stratigos show that communication between Army headquarters and the 2nd Corps was only maintained by mounted officers and with many delays.

The opportunity, lost on the 26th August, never recurred. From that time the Greeks were constrained to frontal attacks on strong positions until they could gain room to shorten their line of communication and evacuate their wounded preparatory to retiring. General Stratigos argues that the immunity of the Greek Army from any serious interference during its 5 days halt on the R. Sakaria and its subsequent orderly retirement proves the Turks to have been hard hit. He might have reinforced his argument by comparing the strength of the Greek and Turkish Cavalry.

The final claim that the Greek Army achieved its mission is certainly not justified. Though, in the article under review, General Stratigos states that the Greek General Staff recognized the impossibility of inflicting a decisive military defeat on Kemal, in his first Survey he not only indicated a victory as the Greek Army's aim but claimed that it had actually been attained. The true wonder is not that the Greek Army failed to gain decisive success but that it went so near gaining it.

It is too early yet to know the political consequences of the campaign of 1921 may be; but the military virtues which the Greek Army showed will certainly have an important moral influence in the Near East for some years to come.

1.1.22.

E.S.H.N.

F.O. 371/7881 E. 322

No. 64

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, 2nd January, 1922, 3.30 p.m.

(Received January 3, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 1. *Telegraphic*

Constantinople telegram No. 802.

It would be interesting to know whether Smyrna information is from reliable source as it seems to be improbable that Greeks could contemplate such a step at this moment. Occupied provinces and Afium Karahissar-Eskishehr railway are the biggest pawns which they have for bargaining and to abandon them on the eve of negotiations would surely weaken their case. To leave the railway intact would give Kemal back all his advantages of lateral communications while to destroy it would antagonize many European interests. Abandonment of Eskishehr would open the road to Constantinople. Greeks would be voluntarily surrendering the primary object of a year's campaign and they would return to position which

occupied at the beginning of the year with this difference that the initiative will have been transferred to the Turks—see my despatch No. 533 enclosing letter to Constantinople of November 25th.

Report if true would seem to indicate that morale of troops is (2 worse than) we had reason to believe but compare Lord Granville's telegram No. 555 and paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 578 and my telegram No. 620.

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/7881 E. 107

No. 65

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 3rd, 1922

(Received January 9)

No. 7.

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a telegram from Angora in the *ILERI* newspaper of January 3 giving the terms of an agreement concluded between the Angora Government and the Ukrainian delegation headed by General FRUNZE, which arrived in Angora some little time ago.

2. A further telegram from the *ILERI* correspondent states that the agreement was signed at 4.30 on January 2, and that ratified copies are to be exchanged at KHARKOFF within three months.

3. I enclose also a translation as published in the *Journal d'Orient* of January 3, of an *Agence d'Anatolie* telegram of December 31, giving the gist of speeches by YUSSUF KEMAL BEY, General FRUNZE, the AZERBAIJAN representative in Angora, and MUSTAPHA KEMAL PASHA on the conclusion of the negotiations.

4. The promptitude with which the news has been telegraphed to Constantinople shows the importance attached to the Treaty by the Angora Government, and their eagerness to dissipate any idea that relations between them and SOVIET Russia are strained. It is evident that General FRUNZE was acting as much for Moscow as for the Ukraine, and that the main object of his mission was to re-consolidate the relations between the Kemalists and Russia.

I have, etc.

(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner.

F.O. 371/7906 E. 314

ENCLOSURE : IN No. 65

Translated from the ILERİ of 3rd January 1922

Angora, January 2nd. (From our Special correspondent).

I have informed you that the negotiations between the Government of the Grand National Assembly and the Ukrainian delegation at Angora have been successfully concluded. The Articles contained in the Treaty of Friendship concluded with a view to secure the future relations of the two countries are as follows:-

Article 1.

The Republic of Ukraina, like the other Republics formed on the collapse of the former Russian Empire, with the Republic of the Federated Soviet Councils at the head, recognises the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the boundaries and rights of which are stated in the National Pact, and this Government recognises the Republic of Ukraina.

Article 2.

The two states, which are pursuing the same object in their struggle, undertake reciprocally not to recognise foreign arrangements of any kind which it may be desired to apply to them without their consent having been obtained.

Article 3.

The two states will inform each other as occasion arises of any treaties which may be concluded with other countries.

Article 4.

The question of the Straits will be regulated by Black Sea States in particular and the States bordering on that Sea on the principle of the absolute inviolability of Constantinople as the Capital of Turkey. (The text appears to be slightly corrupt but the sense is fairly clear. Translators' Note).

Article 5.

The two contracting parties undertake to act together with a view to maintaining the rights and interests of Turkey and Ukraina in the administration of the Black Sea and of the great rivers flowing into it.

F.O. 371/2936/E. 314

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 65

Extract from the "Journal d'Orient" (Constantinople) of January 3, 1921

Le traité d'amitié turco-ukrainien a été signé à Angora

Angora, 31 décembre — Au cours d'un dîner de gala, offert le 30 décembre, en l'honneur de la mission ukrainienne, par Youssouf Kémal bey, le commissaire aux affaires extérieures du gouvernement nationaliste a fait les déclarations suivantes:

"Les pourparlers engagés, il y a quatre jours, en vue de conclure un traité d'amitié avec l'Ukraine sont achevés. La fixation définitive, en un délai aussi court, des bases qui détermineront les relations politiques des deux Etats pourra vous étonner. Il ne faudrait pas perdre de vue cependant que, de longues négociations n'étaient pas nécessaires pour lier les deux peuples.

Nous sommes animés de part et d'autre, de sincères dispositions amicales. Les pourparlers se sont déroulés dans une atmosphère de parfaite sincérité; aucune discussion exigeant un accord préalable n'a surgi pendant les débats.

Un accord parfait règne en ce qui concerne les vues des deux peuples. Le droit de libre disposition des peuples, leur liberté et leur indépendance figurent parmi les principes que nous avons proclamés.

Tant que les deux peuples ne se départiront pas de ces principes, le besoin ne se fera pas sentir de discussions interminables. Nous sommes animés d'ailleurs des mêmes dispositions à l'égard du monde entier. Nous nous entendrons facilement avec ceux qui respectent les droits des peuples."

Le Général Franze a répondu:

"Nos aspirations communes ont eu pour effet un rapprochement entre les deux peuples. C'est pour défendre sa vie que le peuple turc s'est levé; c'est au nom du droit de tous les peuples à l'existence qu'il combat.

Notre unique désir est de travailler en commun en vue d'assurer le relèvement de nos peuples respectifs. Dans ce domaine nous vous prêterons le concours nécessaire.

J'emporterai, de mon séjour à Angora, une profonde sympathie pour votre grand peuple, et j'apprendrai à mes compatriotes à chérir nos amis et nos frères de Turquie."

Le camarade Apiloff représentant du gouvernement d'Azerbaïdjan déclara à son tour:

"Les peuples tels que les nôtres, dont les cœurs battent à l'unisson, peuvent aisément réaliser ce coup de force qui consiste à conclure un traité en quatre jours.

Tous les gouvernements d'Orient sont de cœur, avec la Turquie dans la guerre qu'elle mène. Recevez toutes nos félicitations à l'occasion de l'accord fraternel que vous venez de conclure."

Enfin Mustapha Kemal pacha prenant la parole déclara :

"Le peuple turc n'avait aucun point d'appui le jour où il entreprit la lutte contre ceux qui prétendaient l'ancantir. C'est en ne se fiant que sur son énergie et sur la force de sa foi qu'il prit la décision de vivre indépendant ou de mourir en combattant. Cela ne l'empêche pas toutefois de rechercher les peuples avec lesquels il pourrait vivre en termes de bon voisinage. Un accord sincère a déjà été conclu dans cet esprit avec la Russie. A chaque occasion la sincérité de ce traité d'amitié apparaît plus évidente. Notre nouveau traité avec l'Ukraine ne fera que cimenter notre amitié avec le peuple russe. Nous avons décidé de chasser bientôt l'ennemi de notre sol. Nous ne doutons pas un seul instant du succès.

Le triomphe final de notre cause nationale est proche. On s'imagine que certains malentendus existent entre la Russie et la Turquie. Il n'y a rien de tel en réalité. J'espère qu'à peine de retour dans son pays le général Frunzé se fera l'interprète de nos sentiments auprès de son peuple qu'il me soit permis, à l'occasion du traité d'amitié qui vient d'être conclu de vous exprimer au nom de la Grande Assemblée Nationale ma satisfaction et mes remerciements les plus sincères."

Le traité d'amitié turco-ukrainien devait être signé hier, 2 janvier, dans le salon du président de la Grande Assemblée Nationale, en séance publique. Le soir même le général Frunzé président de la délégation ukrainienne devait donner un dîner de gala de 80 couverts. Au cours de cette cérémonie le général Frunzé devait offrir certains cadeaux aux membres du cabinet national.

F.O. 371/7936/E. 314

No. 66

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 6th January, 1922, 11.50 p.m.

(Received January 7, 6.00 p.m.)

No. 13.

Telegraphic

Signor Tuoizzi, who arrived at Constantinople two days ago from Angora which he left on 11th ultimo, has kindly given me following appreciation of situation in Anatolia.

Political situation.

Mustapha Kemal's position is stronger than ever. As president of national assembly and commander-in chief of nationalist forces, his power is that of a dictator. Present resolve of Angora government is to establish future capital of Turkey either at Angora or at some other spot in Anatolia. Sultan would be left at Constantinople. By fixing seat of national assembly in Anatolia, Mustapha Kemal

counts on escaping from pressure which can be applied to a Turkish government established at Constantinople. A Turkish government having its seat in Anatolia would also be at greater liberty to intrigue with or against surrounding states. Mustapha Kemal, who is now inspired as much by personal ambition as by patriotism, also feels he would no longer be the same personage if Constantinople were maintained as capital of Turkey. The man next in importance to Mustapha Kemal is his personal friend Fethi Bey, minister of the interior, and one of Malta deportees. Refet Pasha does not count for much.

The partisans of Enver do not constitute a danger to Mustapha Kemal in present circumstances though matters might be different if Mustapha Kemal suffered a set back.

When Signor Tuoizzi arrived at Angora, the nationalist declared openly that their policy was to make separate agreements with the three allied powers thus leaving Greeks isolated. Nationalists think allies have abandoned Greek cause though recently reported lifting of (? financial) embargo in case of Greece will in Signor Tuoizzi's opinion have a salutary effect on nationalists. Latter were immensely elated by Franklin Bouillon agreement and are counting on French to support their claims at forthcoming peace conference. Angora government do not like the prospect of this peace conference, but are prepared to attend it.

Angora government were much mortified at Signor Tuoizzi's departure without concluding an agreement and they made many advances to him at last minute. They realize that their policy of making separate agreements with allies has failed, for, although Henry mission encouraged them for the moment and was exploited in the country, Youssouf Kemal eventually admitted to Signor Tuoizzi that it was not a serious mission.

Relations with Bolsheviks are characterized by mutual suspicion and nationalists realize that situation of Soviet government is not nearly as strong as it was. Nationalists are receiving a diminishing quantity of arms and munitions of war from Bolsheviks. These arms etc. are delivered at Black Sea ports, and signor Tuoizzi considers that they should be intercepted. He expressed personal opinion that his government ought to concede the right of search to Greeks.

Representatives of other eastern states such as Afghanistan are busy intriguing at Angora and nationalists indulge in illusion that there is serious trouble in India. They attach undue importance to propaganda they are attempting to carry out in India through Afghanistan.

There is much discontent in Anatolia as is shown by appearance of armed bands whose suppression taxes the resources of Angora Government. Appearance of these armed bands is becoming more and more frequent and Signor Tuoizzi thinks that just as Kemalist movement had its origin in formation of bands, so it may collapse through the agency of bands. Gendarmes have to scour the country for deserters or persons unwilling to serve in the army.

Military Situation

Kemalists are short of arms, munitions of war and money. This is likely to hamper their future operations. Signor Tuoizzi does not however think that Greeks can inflict a decisive military defeat on Kemalists. On the other hand he does not admit that Greeks have been worsted in the campaign to the extent that Kemalists appear to make out. Kiazim Karabekir is the only general who stands up to Mustapha Kemal and resists attempts on the part of the latter to withdraw troops from his army.

Signor Tuoizzi was informed at Samsun that Turks were expecting some submarines from Batoum. A sort of naval college has been started at Samsun.

Economic situation.

This is frankly bad. Signor Tuoizzi travelled for days through country which was completely deserted and looked ruined. The flocks which used to be so abundant have been driven up to the front for needs of the army. Samsun district, which produced twenty million pounds of tobacco the year before last, only produced one million last year and is expected to produce scarcely any this year.

Treatment of minorities.

Deportations are going on the whole time and Signor Tuoizzi saw gangs of christians formed into labour battalions going up into the interior. Out-look for these people is hopeless. Eight hundred women whose male relatives were hiding in the mountains were sent down to Samsun while he was there and it was given out that they would be sent back to the interior unless their relatives came out of hiding. Nationalist view of minorities is quite simple. They consider that these minorities have caused unending trouble to them in the past and that the only way of ending this trouble is to get rid of minorities. Nevertheless nationalists would be prepared to subscribe to any arrangements for protection of minorities while secretly determined not to observe such arrangements in the future. They want Anatolia for Turks. In Signor Tuoizzi's opinion evacuation of Smyrna and its district by the Greeks would be deathblow of christian minorities in that region.

Attitude towards England.

The nationalists hate England and the successes they have had over the Greek army have been considered as so many successes over England. Malta deportees on their return to Anatolia indulged in violent propaganda against England and proclaimed that she was a weak power in reality. Report reached Angora while Signor Tuoizzi was there that His Majesty's Government had come to an agreement with Egyptian government. This was considered a further proof of weakness on the part of England. Angora had carefully followed developments of Irish situation.

General considerations.

Signor Tuoizzi considered unity amongst the allies was absolutely indispensable to any peace. If agreement can be reached by allies on lines along which Near

Eastern question should be settled, Angora would be greatly impressed. He thought treaty which was to take the place of treaty of Sévres should be carefully elaborated article by article and then presented to parties for acceptance. If it contained substantial modifications in favor of Turkey, it should be the policy of the allies anyhow to get Constantinople government to ratify it. In the event of Kemalists proving (group undecypherable) Sultan should then work on Anatolia in the sense (group undecypherable) that Turkey had practically got what she wanted and that Mustapha Kemal alone was prolonging hostilities for his own ends. Signor Tuoizzi thought no compromise would be possible with the nationalists as regards Anatolia, including Smyrna, but that they would be prepared for compromise with regard to Thrace since they affected not to be interested in Constantinople. They were out for complete territorial, economic, and financial independence of Anatolia. Nationalists had given up all idea of recovering former Arab dominions of the Sultan, but he thought their idea was to intrigue for formation of a weak Mesopotamian state in alliance with them. They were using Sheikh-es Senoussi to carry on intrigues in Mesopotamia from (Gr. undec.) They wish to recover Mosul which they consider to be a Turkish town. They were very against King Hussein.

In Signor Tuoizzi's opinion, attitude of France at (group undecypharable) peace conference will be hindrance to situation. Nationalists are counting on France. If France stands firm by her allies, there is a prospect of arriving at a satisfactory settlement for the time being at all events. Signor Tuoizzi anyhow anticipates possibility of trouble for allies in the future when Greek army has evacuated Anatolia.

Signor Tuoizzi spoke with great apparent frankness. His attitude was inclined to be pro-Greek, but this may be reflection of new orientation of Italy's policy towards Greece.

F.O. 371/7853/E. 320

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 560-564, No. 501

No. 67

British Military Attaché, Vienna, to War Office

VIENNA, 13th January, 1922

No. 5

Secret

The Attached note was sent to me by the Minister for Greece.

The passport Officer, Vienna, is being informed.

(Signed) LIEUT COLONEL,
Military Attaché,
Vienna.

F.O. 371/7926

ENCLOSURE IN No. 67

*Note from Minister for Greece (Vienna) to the British
Military Attaché*

Secret

We are informed that Ismail Pasha has arrived lately in Vienna.

Brigadier General in Moustapha Kemal's army, and one of his Staff Officers, he came by Constantinople and Bulgaria, bearer of a Turkish passport, dated September 30th 1921, in which he is given as "Katernilli Dzelep Ismail Avni bin Achmet".

He has come to Vienna to take possession of 10,000 hand bombs, which have been ordered here. They will be sent to Asia Minor through Bulgaria.

F.O. 371/7926

No. 68

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 13th January 1922, 6.00 p.m.

(Received January 16, 8.30 a.m.).

No. 27. *Telegraphic*

In anticipation of Paris conference I venture to lay before you following considerations regarding situation in this country.

Your despatch No. 3189 to Paris foreshadows the possibility that the new peace conditions agreed upon by allies may have to be enforced. Enclosure in your despatch No. 1429 indicates basis of settlement which commends itself to His Majesty's Government.

There is not, in my opinion, the slightest hope that present rulers at Angora will accept such terms or indeed anything which falls substantially short of National Pact. They are out not merely for recovering Smyrna and Thrace in complete sovereignty but they are against real safeguards for minorities, capitulations, and any form of control, financial or otherwise.

I am sending home by next King's Messenger detailed report of debate on draft law mentioned in my despatch No. 1112. Full text of Mustapha Kemal's speech reveals attitude of mind which can only be described as characteristic to the last degree on question of right of Turks to manage their own affairs. It deals with internal issues but it deals with them in spirit incompatible with any idea of yielding to foreign pressure. Every other indication points to probability of his sticking out for all essentials of National Pact. Except as regards Batoum he has not once wavered from that programme since inception of national movement.

I believe appreciation of Mustapha Kemal's position given in paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 1112 to be substantially correct. If anything, I perhaps over-rate his inclination to break with Bolshaviks whose relations with Angora seemed to have improved rather than otherwise of late.

On the other hand there are certain signs of disintegration at Angora. Debate mentioned above shows that opposition to Mustapha Kemal comprises elements which incline towards old constitution and Sultan. They were silenced but opposition to Mustapha Kemal's dictatorship cannot have been stifled. Latest news is that Reouf Bey, who in earlier stages of movement was Mustapha Kemal's alter ego, has resigned from cabinet for reasons which are not given and that Refet Pasha, Minister for National Defence, has also resigned ostensibly for reasons of health.

Financial situation is also precarious.

In these circumstances if allies offer settlement much better than treaty of Sèvres, but falling short of National Pact, I believe Mustapha Kemal will reject it; but it might then be possible to offer it to Sultan on condition that he with moral support of allies should appeal to the country to support it and get rid of Chauvinism. This would certainly be difficult and might prove impossible without direct application of force by allies but facts noted above afford some hope that it might be successful provided

(1) That settlement provided quite definitely for removal of Greeks from Smyra and some part of eastern Thraca and

2 That allies presented really united front and manifested determination to impose settlement at all costs by their own means in last resort.*

F.O. 371/7833/E. 589

D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. XVII, pp. 574-575, No. 506

No. 69

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 16th January, 1922.

(Received January 23)

No. 54

My lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 1112 of the 6th of December, 1921, I have the honour to state that Angora newspapers received since that date throw considerable light on the proceedings in the Grand National Assembly which gave occasion to Mustapha Kemal Pasha's speech. Their interest is so great that I venture to submit a further report based on the account given in the *Yeni Gyun* newspaper.

2. Article 7 of the "Fundamental Law" described in my despatch No. 180 of the 16th of February provided that the duties and responsibilities of the executive authority should be defined in a special law. It appears that in order to give effect to this a Special Committee of the Assembly was charged with the drafting of the further law required. This Committee after many months produced a draft law supported by an *exposé des motifs*. I have unfortunately been unable to procure the

* Bu telgraf üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şu yorumlar yapılmıştır:

See Flag G for Kemal's speech which H. Rumbold regards as indicative of determined insistence on the letter of the Pact. In this summary at last I do not see anything particularly ominous. It may be that Sir H. Rumbold is inclined to underestimate Kemal's difficulties at home which must inevitably affect his policy. All recent reports speak of these increasing difficulties and he has just lost his new friend Briand who was to replace Lenin. It is significant that while here Sir H. Rumbold speaks of signs of disintegration at Angora, the Sultan—See Paper 7—thinks the time is at hand to "passer en activité" and assert himself against the Nationalists.

We have here once more the suggestion that the Sultan should ratify a treaty and then appeal to Anatolia. But if this appeal should fail we have no means of enforcing the treaty outside the Constantinople area and the Nationalist army is still a danger to the Greeks and to ourselves. As circumstances are at present therefore we cannot gamble on a peace with the Sultan alone but must come to a settlement with Kemal. But circumstances may change.

D. G. Osborne

17/1/1922

F.O. 371/7833/E. 589

text of these documents, but it is clear that the majority of the Committee prepared them in a sense hostile to the dictatorship of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, and that the draft law definitely aimed at a great curtailment of his powers. The main proposals appear to have been to convert the council of Commissioners, or heads of departments, deputed by the Grand National Assembly to exercise its executive power in the various departments of state into a real Cabinet, the President of which alone would be designated by the Assembly, and which would be "solidairement" responsible to the Assembly, the choice of his colleagues being left to the President of the Council. It was also proposed apparently to define restrictively the functions of the President of the Assembly, i.e., Mustapha Kemal, and to invest the executive with certain powers hitherto exercised by the Assembly, e.g., that of confirming all death sentences. The *exposé des motifs* appears to have also contained one very notable passage reserving the rights of the Sultanate and Caliphate.

3. The draft was put down for discussion in the Assembly on the 24th of November. The debate, which lasted a week, made it abundantly clear that the supporters of the draft law were "out" to undermine Mustapha Kemal's position. It is not clear whence they draw their inspiration, but it seems probable that even if the Enverist clique were concerned in the attack, it was not engineered solely by that clique, but by a combination of elements opposed to Mustapha Kemal's dictatorship, and that some at least of the assailants of Mustapha Kemal were persons animated by the idea of restoring the Sultan's authority in due course.

4. Two points which engaged special attention during the debate were the fact that at present the nomination to the post of Commissioner lies with the President of the Assembly, who submits candidates for election by the Assembly itself, and the fact that the choice of a president of Council does not lie with the Assembly, but is a matter settled among the Commissioners themselves.

5. One speaker in the debate had the courage to say that Enver Pasha had been a good man until after the Balkan War, but had broken down under the numerous powers entrusted to him on the strength of his past services, and to warn the Assembly against overloading Mustafa Kemal Pasha in such a way as to bring him to the same bad end as Enver. This provoked an angry protest from Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who told the speaker not to compare him with Enver. Another speaker protested his devotion to the Caliphate, to which allegiance had been sworn and which belonged to the world of Islam and to the Turks.

6. Salahuddin Bey, deputy for Mersina, was the reporter of the Committee. In defending the draft law he appears to have weakened on certain points and he himself proposed on the 29th of November that the draft law should be sent back to the Committee to be revised in the light of the criticisms made during the debate. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was evidently not prepared to leave the matter at this, for on the 1st of December he came down to the House and delivered himself of one of

the most remarkable speeches yet made. He spoke for four hours. He showed extraordinary skill in playing on the sympathies of different sections of the Assembly, a heterogeneous collection of "intelligents", theologians, old-fashioned Turks, time-serving politicians, idealists, half-baked communists, and simpletons. He also displayed great boldness in developing his constitutional doctrines, which aim at reconciling his personal dictatorship with the theory that the Grand National Assembly is the most direct possible exponent of the will of the people.

7. Mustapha Kemal devoted the first part of his speech principally to a direct attack on specific articles of the draft law. He argued that the Committee had travelled entirely beyond their terms of reference and produced a draft so inconsistent with the Fundamental Law that the only thing to do with it was to destroy it completely. It proposed, he said, to vest in the Council powers which did and must belong to the Assembly itself, powers which, if entrusted to any one else, could not fail to be abused to the detriment of the principle of national sovereignty. He referred *inter alia* to certain proposals in regard to such matters as the convening of the Assembly, the duration of its sessions, and its dissolution. What would they do, he asked, if the Council dissolved the Assembly? To a deputy who interpolated that they would laugh, he said that they had not laughed when the Constantinople Parliament was taken by the ears and cleared of the Capital. He repudiated vehemently another proposal tending to reduce the powers of the President of the Assembly to those of a consultant, and a channel of communication between the Assembly and the executive, and asserted strongly that the President represented the ultimate control of all decisions exercised through him by the Assembly.

8. He went on to refer to doubts which were known to have been raised in the discussions of the Committee as to the validity of the present form of Government. This question had been that the existing system lacked a legal and stable character. The Government of the Grand National Assembly had been recognised by the nation and the whole world. It had entered into international agreements, and it was in every respect a perfectly valid and definitely established Government resting on principles consistent with the Law of Islam. The question had been asked to what pre-existing model it conformed, whether for instance it was democratic or socialist? It conformed to no pre-existing model. It stood against Capitalism and Imperialism, but it was *sui generis*, the Government of the People. They resembled themselves only.

9. He next referred to a passage in the *exposé des motifs* of the draft law relative to the maintenance of the rights of the Sultanate and Caliphate. Salahuddin Bey had, he said, modified this in his explanations to the Assembly in a sense recognising the rights of the people. He would remind them that existing laws retained their force until the Assembly modified them. This applied to the Constitution as to other laws. There was, however, on record a decision which said that "when the occupant of the Sultanate and Caliphate, freed from violence and

constraint, found himself in the sincere embrace of the people, he would resume his legal position only on the lines which should be laid down by the Grand National Assembly". It must not be supposed that the old position would be maintained intact. The matter would come up for consideration in due course. Salahuddin Bey spoken of sentimental feelings which had influenced him, and had spoken of Turkey's rôle in the Islamic world and her past triumphs in a manner which had created a glow of pleasure in Mustafa Kemal Pasha's heart. He had asked himself, however, whether Salahuddin Bey was hinting at Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. He reminded the Grand Assembly how a former Grand Vizier, Kara Mustafa Pasha, had hammered at the gates of Vienna, and dreamt of great conquests in Europe, and how much harm had been done in the past by such ambitions.

10. Mustafa Kemal Pasha thus led up to the pronouncement on Pan-Islamism, which has already been reported. He concluded it by again referring to the Caliphate. He recognised the sacredness of that institution, but emphasised the doctrine that the Caliph, according to the true Islamic conception was not lord of the people, but their servant.

11. After repeating that the laws passed by the Grand National Assembly were not provisional and declaring that the people could never again be deprived of the rights which they had asserted by rebellion, Mustafa Kemal passed to the most remarkable portion of his speech. He reproached the authors of the draft law with having based themselves on the Constitution, and having worked, perhaps unintentionally, towards the rehabilitation of that discredited ruin. He represented the Constitution as the last of a series of devices by which the Sultans had sought to disarm the tendency of European powers to meddle in the affairs of Turkey. The Sultans had later put it to another use, namely to hoodwink the people, when the people sought to recover their liberties. Abdul-Hamid had revived it for this purpose in 1908. His successor was incapable and in his time a small body of men had made the same use of it. The present Sultan had followed suit. He used the powers conferred on him by the Constitution to turn the representatives of the nation out of doors. The people had made a fresh attempt on the basis of the Constitution. Deputies had again been sent to Constantinople. What had happened? (Malta! a member cried in answer to this question.) The Constitution had been described in a Note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the foreign Ambassadors as a contract between the Sultan and his people. It was in reality a fraud, the source of all their ruin; "yes a rag", Mustafa Kemal said, confirming the interjection of a member.

12. The Pasha went on to contrast the Fundamental Law with the old Constitution. The Fundamental Law, he said, was perfection; perfect in the same way as the Koran, which was perfect because it was the work of one who knew the inmost needs of those for whom it was intended. The perfect law could not be

produced by intuition. It must be a law founded in truth and nature, a law from God. Such a one was the Fundamental Law, sprung from the conscience and conviction of the Nation. The speaker went on to develop at great length the thesis that the Grand National Assembly was the last word in political wisdom, an incomparable and final mode of giving expression to the principle of national sovereignty. The essence of Constitutionalism was the separation of the powers, judicial, legislative and administrative. This was a vicious principle. What was wanted was not the separation of the powers, but the unification of all power in the people themselves, expressing their will directly through the Grand National Assembly.

13. In conclusion, Mustafa Kemal referred to the complaints that there was no President of the Council in any real sense, and that the arrangement by which the President of the Assembly nominated candidates for election to the headship of departments limited the free choice of the Assembly. He said that there would be no objection, if it was desired that the President of the Council should be confirmed in his office by the Assembly. As for the other point, the arrangement was simply one of convenience. If a better system could be devised, he besought them to substitute now (2 new) arrangements, which they could perfectly well do without any breach of the Fundamental Law.

14. The draft law was returned to the Committee on the 3rd of December in accordance with the request of the rapporteur himself. At the same time Mustafa Kemal and several other members submitted a motion asking that the two questions mentioned in the preceding paragraph should be referred to the Committee on the Constitution, and that the Special Committee responsible for the draft law should consider them jointly.

15. Mustafa Kemal had an uphill task in upholding his own absolutism on the doctrine that the Grand National Assembly is the antithesis of all absolutism, and the only possible expression of the principle of the sovereignty of the people. It is easy to detect flaws in his logic, and it is still easier to rate the whole of the proceedings as a tissue of absurdities conceived by doctrineers and politicians in a heated revolutionary atmosphere, remote from the realities of the world. If I attach importance to the speech of Mustafa Kemal, it is because it reveals a general attitude of mind, and especially an arrogance, inconsistent with any idea of surrender to European pressure. This attitude of mind may be expected to prevail as long as Mustafa Kemal continues to dominate the situation at Angora.

16. I enclose two cuttings from the "Journal d'Orient" of the 11th of January, which further illustrate the state of feeling in governing circles in Angora.

I have etc.

(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 69

Extracts from the "Journal d'Orient" (Constantinople) of January 11, 1922

L'AVÈNEMENT D'UN DIEU

Moustapha Kémal raconte la genèse de son régime et dit ses idées.

J'étais à Alep lors de l'armistice et je voulais rentrer.

Au cours d'une longue interview accordée au rédacteur en chef du *Vakit*, actuellement à Angora, Moustapha Kémal pacha se raconte ainsi:

"L'armistice m'avait surpris à Alep et de là, j'avais fait savoir à Constantinople qu'il faudrait immédiatement renverser le cabinet au pouvoir et lui mettre à sa place les personnalités politiques dont j'avais précisé les noms. J'avais ajouté en même temps que ma présence serait utile à Constantinople, mais, on ne m'y appela pas. Lorsque, après la chute du cabinet je me rendis dans la capitale, la situation pouvait se résumer ainsi.

La chambre des députés paraissait hésiter dans la détermination de la ligne de conduite. Je m'étais entretenu avec les ministres sortants ainsi qu'avec leurs successeurs. Mon idée était faite: il s'agissait de créer une forte institution pour la défense du pays. Mais la Chambre avait été dissoute avant d'avoir eu le temps de faire un travail utile.

A Constantinople, il se formait des partis politiques

Les patriotes de Constantinople cherchaient néanmoins des moyens de salut en élaborant différents programmes et en constituant divers partis politiques. Je n'ai attendu aucun résultat d'une collaboration éventuelle avec ce nouvel organisme. J'avais la très ferme conviction que la force de détermination résidait uniquement dans le peuple.

Celui-ci ignorait tout de ce qui se passait à Constantinople et il ignorait surtout la gravité tragique de la situation.

Je pris par conséquent la décision de quitter la capitale et de pénétrer dans la masse de la population. Or, pendant que je discutais ce point avec des amis, le gouvernement me proposa d'aller en Anatolie comme inspecteur de l'armée. Ma nomination servit mes projets. J'ai accepté cette proposition avec une grande satisfaction et j'ai quitté Constantinople le jour même où les Grecs débarquaient à Smyrne. Ma pensée était la suivante:

Presque partout, de nouveaux organismes s'étaient constitués sous divers noms; il fallait donc leur donner un programme unique et intéressant le peuple, et, enfin, utiliser l'armée comme instrument d'exécution. Sitôt arrivé en Anatolie, j'ai commencé mon travail tout en conservant le titre d'inspecteur de l'armée. Les résultats ne se firent pas attendre.

Par contre, dès que mon programme fut connu à Constantinople, je reçus l'ordre de rentrer. Au lieu de répondre à cet appel, j'ai donné ma démission. J'ai

participé au congrès d'Erzéroum comme un simple particulier; un autre congrès fut tenu ensuite à Sivas pour propager dans le pays les principes proclamés dans le premier... Puis vint la chambre de Fındıklı...

Mes principes, je les avais puisés dans des études

Quant à l'origine des principes qui forment l'essence de la charte constitutionnelle, celle d'Angora sans doute / j'avais fait naguère quelques études théoriques sur la représentation, la meilleure, de la souveraineté nationale.

La conclusion que j'en avais tirée était la suivante: La manifestation intégrale de la souveraineté nationale ne peut se faire qu'en appelant tous les individus... la part de la souveraineté qui leur revient de droit. Ceci étant matériellement impossible, il ne restait qu'à assembler les représentants du peuple.

L'histoire nous avait enseigné qu'il était impossible de sauver notre peuple de la tyrannie en confiant la souveraineté nationale à une seule personne ou à un petit nombre de ministres. L'unique moyen consistait dès lors à faire représenter la souveraineté par une Assemblée aussi nombreuse que possible et dont le mandat s'exercerait pour un temps relativement court.

Mes études et expérience m'avaient donné la conviction que cette idée aurait de grandes chances de succès dans le pays. En tout cas, il paraissait d'une nécessité urgente d'instaurer un régime administratif auquel le peuple participa directement et qui lui donna, en même temps, la conscience de lui-même.

Réflexions sur le Khalifat

Ce projet est donc né de ces idées. D'autre part, comme nous étions des musulmans et qu'il nous fallait conserver nos attaches avec le Khalifat, nous ne pouvions pas choisir la forme avec laquelle la souveraineté se manifestait en Europe ou bien en Amérique.

Les résultats qui ont été obtenus jusqu'à maintenant par la Grande Assemblée Nationale confirment complètement et effectivement notre premier projet. Quoique les principes ne soient pas encore appliqués dans toutes les branches de la vie administrative, les résultats en sont déjà très satisfaisants.

Il n'y a pas de doute qu'ils seront meilleurs encore dès que l'organisation populaire prendrait une plus grande extension.

Ce qu'est le Pacte national

Le Pacte national est un programme qui contient nos conditions minima pour la paix. Il renferme les bases nécessaires pour atteindre ce résultat.

Mais cela ne suffit guère. Pour assurer l'avenir de notre peuple il faudrait d'une part étendre et vivifier notre organisation administrative populaire et de l'autre, améliorer les conditions économiques. Nous ne nourrissons aucun sentiment agressif contre personne. Nous tenons à posséder une armée capable de défendre le cas échéant notre pays et d'assurer son indépendance et son libre développement.

Tous ces principes seront conservés dans notre organisation administrative. Et c'est en vertu des mêmes principes aussi, que le gouvernement est représenté par la Grande Assemblée Nationale..."

F.O. 371/7881/E. 809

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 69

Extracts from the "Journal d'Orient" of January 11, 1922

**"Nous devons poursuivre la lutte"
déclare Moustapha Fevzi pacha**

Angora, le 9 janv. (Agence d'Anatolie.)

Moustapha Fevzi pacha, président du conseil des ministres du gouvernement d'Angora, a fait les déclarations suivantes au "Hakimieti Millié" : "En ce moment où la Turquie se sent plus forte que jamais, elle est prête à conclure la paix, à condition, toutefois, que le programme invariable élaboré par notre peuple soit exécuté.

"Pour mieux apprécier notre situation politique nous devons faire un retour sur les événements d'il y a un an. Alors tous les ennemis qui nous avaient encerclés de tous les côtés, s'étaient graduellement retirés de l'arène, laissant la Grèce seule contre nous. Nos seuls adversaires essayèrent un double échec, dans le domaine militaire et politique.

"Pour ce qui est de notre vie intérieure, à l'exclusion des zones de guerre, le régime normal des temps de paix est rétabli sur toute l'étendue du pays. Tous les services de l'Etat travaillent normalement et l'armée est prête à accomplir son devoir patriotique.

"L'ennemi est occupé à se fortifier sur tout le front et travaille à combler les pertes qu'il a subies lors de la bataille du Sakaria. Notre armée a pris les mesures nécessaires pour s'opposer à une dernière tentative de son adversaire.

"Pendant que nous étions exposés à de furieux assauts venant de l'Occident, l'Orient ne nous réservait que de l'amitié et de la sincérité. Néanmoins, notre principe fondamental étant d'obtenir la paix en sauvegardant notre indépendance, le jour où la justesse de notre cause sera reconnue par nos ennemis, nous concluerons la paix avec tout le monde.

"La France a reconnu notre bon droit et a évacué les territoires occupés par ses troupes.

"Nous espérons que les autres gouvernements aussi suivront cet exemple.

"Seulement j'ai la conviction que pour ramener la Grèce vers une politique raisonnable nous devons poursuivre notre lutte."

F. O. 371/7881/E. 809

No. 79

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 16, 1922

No. 496

TURKEY GREEK POLICY

On pages 8 and 9 of Summary No. 476 mention was made of the negotiations between the Greeks and the Anatolian Association (Anadolu Jemieti) for the formation of an autonomous Ottoman Government in Western Anatolia as a rival to the Great National Assembly in Angora. The scheme was to be put forward by the Anatolian Association which was at first favourably received by the Greek High Commission; but on 2nd December M. Votsis suggested a postponement of further discussions until after the return of M. Gounaris.

According to information received from the same sources, which are in touch with the Greek High Commission, conversations were resumed during the second week in December with the result that on the 9th and 10th December the Administrative council of the Association met and after exhaustive deliberations agreed upon the following points, which were to be embodied in a communication which was presented to M. Votsis on the 11th instant in accordance with the latter's request for the views of the Association in writing:-

1. * To organise in the provinces occupied by the Hellenes a Provisional Government in the name of His Majesty the Sultan: to hold Parliamentary elections immediately notwithstanding the military occupation of the said area, and at the same time to hold secret elections in those areas where the Anatolian Association possesses a secret organisation: in this manner to convoke an Assembly which would carry out the political programme of the Anatolian Association.

2. To liberate the whole of Anatolia from the power of Mustapha Kemal by destroying and suppressing his forces and his organisation, but first of all to conclude peace with the Hellenic Government in accordance with the conditions of the intervention or mediation of the Great Powers: finally to prepare the way for an alliance between Turkey and Greece.

3. The Provisional Government to establish judicial, police and other administrative institutions, subject to the approval of the National Assembly.

4. The Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army of Occupation should permit the provisional Government to levy certain taxes and impose new taxes and in order to meet the expenses of the new Government, and to enable it to take action against the forces of Mustapha Kemal.

* This is a textual translation of the draft communication approved by the Council of the Anatolian Association.

3. The Greek Commander-in-Chief should be responsible for the training and equipment of a voluntary Anatolian army, the number of which should be determined by the Hellenic Commander-in-Chief in agreement with the military representative of the proposed Provisional Government: the forces thus raised, which without doubt will be gradually reinforced by numerous volunteers, to be sent to various strategic points against the forces of Mustapha Kemal. At the same time the Greek Commander-in-Chief should in case of necessity, permit a number of Greek officers with a good knowledge of Turkish to be attached to the Anatolian Expeditionary Force.

6. After the completion of the preliminaries in connection with the preceding proposals the Provisional government will beg the Sultan to replace the present Cabinet by a Government in sympathy with the Anatolian National Assembly.

7. The Hellenic Government should first of all place the sum of 100,000 Turkish pounds at the disposal of the administrative council of the Anatolian Association to meet the expenses necessitated by the transport to Brusa of all members of the Anatolian Association in Constantinople and elsewhere. Any portion of this sum spent in this manner to be returned to the Hellenic Government immediately after the opening the Anatolian National Assembly by a first charge upon new municipal taxes.

On December 20th leaders of the Association were informed that the 1st, 3rd and 4th articles were not fully approved by the High Commissioner. Consequently these three articles have been changed and they now read as follows:—

1. For "to organise in the provinces occupied by the Hellenes a provisional Government, etc." read "to organise in those provinces occupied by the Hellenes, excepting that region around and including Smyrna and those parts of Thrace which have been outlined by the Treaty of Sévres, a provisional Government, etc."
2. For "the provisional Government to establish judicial, police and other administrative institutions, etc." read "the provisional Government may reform those judicial, etc."
4. For "..... to permit provisional Government to levy certain taxes and impose new taxes, etc." read "..... to permit the provisional Government to take for its own use all those revenues already levied to be used for general expenditure, and if these do not suffice, new taxes may be levied in accordance with the laws made by the constitution."

These three modifications were accepted by both parties and the approved draft of the agreement was despatched on December 27th by a Greek torpedo-boat to Athens for the final approval of the Greek Government. An early reply denoting acquiescence is expected.

No. 71

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 17th January, 1922

(Received, January 23)

No. 61

My Lord

The "İleri" newspaper of the 10th of January publishes a telegram from its Special Correspondent at Angora, dated the previous day, describing the reception by Mustapha Kemal Pasha of the Bokharan Mission headed by Muhammad Nazari. The Mission is described as an extraordinary one, and the intention would appear to be to pave the way for a treaty and the establishment of regular relations.

2. The Bokharan envoy made a speech in which he saluted the President of the Grand National Assembly in the name of the Bokhara People's Soviet Republic and 5,000,000 Bokharans, Moslems of Turkish stock. Imperialism, he said, had sought but failed to crush the Eastern peoples. The heroic defence of the Dardanelles, which had terrified the West, had caused the sea of revolution to rise in the East. The rescuing arms of the Russian revolutionaries had united the oppressed inhabitants of the East. He referred to the past oppression of Tsarism, and to the newly-won independence of Bokhara, which had hitherto been cut off from foreign intercourse. He made the now not infrequent reference to Turkey as the Big Brother. He brought an ancient Koran as a present from the Bokharan people to the Turkish Nation. He brought also a sword to the victors of In Eunu and the Sakaria, who had fought so well for the National Pact, and he asked that it might be given to the Commander to whose lot it would fall to reconquer Smyrna.

3. Mustafa Kemal Pasha in his reply said that encroaching and oppressive forces had hitherto kept Turkey and Bokhara apart, despite their racial affinities and religious ties. The Great Revolution in the East in which the Turkish Army had a proud part was day by day binding closer together the peoples of the East. He thanked the Bokhara People's Soviet Republic for using the rights of maintaining foreign relations which it owed to the statesmen of the Russian Revolution to send this first mission to the Turkish People's Government. He expressed gratification at receiving the Koran and the sword, which he would present to the Nation and the future victor of Smyrna as requested by the donors. He expressed confidence that by God's Grace the Army which had won the day at In Eunu and the Sakaria would very shortly establish its title to the sword.

I have etc.

(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner,

F.O. 371/7881/E. 814

No. 72

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch

CONSTANTINOPLE, 20.1.1922

No. 532

Extract

THE RESIGNATION OF RAUF BEY: MUSTAPHA KEMAL'S POSITION.

Although Rauf Bey, who was, until recently, Nationalist Commissioner for Public Works, officially resigned owing to reasons of ill health, it is evident from the following that the real reason was a serious difference with Mustapha Kemal, in connection with the project for the limitation of the powers of the President of the Great National Assembly.

According to information from a trustworthy source, in the course of a recent sitting of the Great National Assembly, while Rauf Bey was speaking in favour of the limitation of the President's powers, Mustapha Kemal entered the Chamber. When Rauf Bey had finished his speech, Mustapha Kemal addressed him in the following terms:

"Oh hero, who signed the armistice, when you were cloistered in the Island of Malta, we were struggling with the enemy in the valley of the Sakaria, to obliterate in blood your black writing, which would inevitably have brought about the disappearance of the Ottoman nation."

Rauf Bey, without replying, immediately left the Assembly, followed by Rafet Pasha, and offered his resignation.

From an independent Nationalist source, the text has been obtained of the following letter from Rauf Bey, tendering his resignation to Mustapha Kemal:—

"To His Excellency Mustapha Kemal Pasha,
President of the Great National Assembly.

"Your Excellency,

"The general war which lasted for four years was terminated by an armistice. The invasion of country cherished by a foul enemy caused the formation of the National Forces and the proclamation of the National Pact.

"We, in our capacity as the executive body of the National Forces entrusted with ministerial affairs and given the title of Commissioners on account of the present situation, ought to recognise the fact that we are responsible in the same way as Ministers for the policy which we follow.

"Such of us as find their political functions exceeding their convictions, ought to resign these functions to others of opposite convictions.

"From the first day of my becoming a Commissioner, I determined to pursue a policy free from such principles as would cause suspicion in others, and I held out

against the separate agreement concluded with the French, and declared that Franklin Bouillon's proposal to the commissioner for Foreign Affairs during their interview at Konia, revealed too many dangers for our future policy. On the other hand, a speedy agreement with England in particular, with whom friendly relations must always be observed, would, I stated, be of a more durable nature than the proposal of M. Franklin Bouillon. As I did not succeed in obtaining a majority of votes among my colleagues in favour of my free-thinking policy with regard to what may be called the waiting period, I find myself forced to leave my post and resign my duties.

"It is to be hoped that the interests of the country will be assured with greater foresight and sagacity.

I am, etc.

(Sgd) RAUF."

F.O. 371/7938

No. 73

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 24, 1922.

(Received January 31.)

No. 95

My Lord,

I HAVE had occasion in recent telegrams and despatches to advert to sundry political developments in Angora which have come to my notice since I wrote my despatch No. 1089 of the 29th November last. My information is necessarily somewhat meagre, but it seems worth while to present it, such as it is, in a connected form.

2. The debate in the Grand National Assembly at the end of November, on which I reported fully in my despatch No. 54 of the 16th instant, revealed the existence of a fairly strong opposition to Mustapha Kemal, but it is still not clear whether this opposition represents merely an incoherent congeries of dissatisfied elements, or whether it is being systematically worked up by persons having a definite new policy in view.

3. In the course of the few weeks following this debate, several resignations were reported from Angora. Those of which I have definite knowledge are the resignations of the Vice-President of the Grand National Assembly, the Governor-General of Angora and three Ministers, namely, Rafet Pasha, Commissioner for National Defence; Rauf Bey, Commissioner for Public Works; and Jelal Bey, Commissioner for Economic Affairs. The resignations of the three Ministers have

attracted great attention here, Kemalist sympathisers are at pains to represent all three as being simply due to reasons of health, but this explanation is not very convincing in the case of Rafet Pasha, and still less so in the case of Raouf Bey. There can be little doubt that Raouf has definitely broken with Mustapha Kemal Pasha, a fact all the more significant as he was Mustapha Kemal's principal collaborator in the early stages of the national movement.

4. On the 19th January, a few days after the announcement of the Ministerial resignations, the "Wakt" newspaper of Constantinople devoted no less than nine columns to a glorification of Raouf Bey in the form of an interview given by him to the editor of the "Wakt," Ahmed Emin Bey, who was, like Raouf himself, a Malta deportee, and who is now in Anatolia. The interview was given while Raouf was still a Minister, but it is significant that the "Wakt" should have given it such prominence immediately after his resignation. In the heading of the article prominence was given to Raouf's determination to go on fighting until the Khalifate and Sultanate should be rehabilitated in conditions of complete independence for Turkey.

5. Finally, recent advices from Angora show that the question of the law on the duties and responsibilities of Ministers has been again brought to the front instead of being shelved, as might have been expected. The Angora press announces that the joint committee charged with the elaboration of a new draft law appointed a sub-committee of five to study the question. The names of the five members of the sub-committee are given. The best known among them appear to be persons of extreme and rather Bolshevik tendencies.

6. I find it difficult with my present information to put a confident interpretation on these developments. I can only formulate with great reserve a theory which must be tested by further developments, but which may be useful in attempting to appreciate the significance of such developments.

7. It looks to me as though Mustapha Kemal and those who still support him loyally had swayed back towards the Bolsheviks. There are several signs of a *détente* between the Angora Government and Moscow, whose mutual relations seemed pretty strained in November. Little is now heard of open Bolshevik support of Enver Pasha and his party. A new Bolshevik envoy has just arrived in Angora. The negotiations for the Angora-Ukraine Treaty were rushed through with great celerity at the end of December. Mustapha Kemal's recent public utterances have been characterised by cordiality towards Soviet Russia. In a speech delivered on the occasion of the conclusion of the Ukrainian Agreement, he said that it had been thought that there were misunderstandings between Turkey and Russia, and he categorically denied the existence of such misunderstandings. At another banquet in celebration of the same event he abounded in praise of the Russians, saying *inter alia* that the new administrative system in Turkey was identical with the Soviet system, and that the Russians had been the first to show a sincere desire for the

independence and prosperity of the Turkish people. Again, in his speech of welcome to the Soviet Bokhara Commission (see my despatch No. 61 of the 17th instant) he spoke pointedly of the statesmen of revolutionary Russia as men who had recognised, not merely in theory but in fact, the right of peoples to dispose of their own destinies.

8. Without attaching undue importance to such *discours d'occasion*, I think that these utterances support the view that Mustapha Kemal is leaning once more on the Bolsheviks to greater extent he was disposed to do three months ago. This may be attributed to his internal difficulties, to his fear of being supplanted by Enver working under Bolshevik auspices, and to a realisation of the fact that, in view of the failure of the Tuzuzi negotiations and the intransigence of the British Government, he is further than he supposed from securing the acceptance of the National Pact by the Allies.

9. On the other hand, the two most definite elements in the opposition of Mustapha Kemal appear to be Enver and some others of the old guard of the Committee of Union and Progress, and a party who hanker after better relations with the Turkish Throne. These elements are not necessarily entirely distinct, as it would suit the Enverist opponents of Mustapha Kemal to play off the Khalifate against him. There is a group of Turks at Berlin among whom, I am told, Rahmi bey, formerly Vali of Smyrna, now plays the leading part. Rahmi Bey is one of the strong Salonica element in the Committee of Union and Progress, and he does appear to have received any encouragement to go to Angora. Ahmed Bey, whose glorification of Raouf I have mentioned above, is a Salonica Jew who worked in closely with the Germans during the war.

10. As a possible sidelight it is interesting to note that the Minister most talked about in connection with the latest rumours of a Cabinet crisis here appears to be Faik Nusret Bey, Minister of Finance. This gentleman is also a Salonica Jew, closely connected with Djavid Bey. He is said to manifest resentment at the extreme subservience of the Constantinople Government to Angora.

11. Briefly, the theory which I advance very tentatively is that Mustapha Kemal is endeavouring to reinsure with the Bolsheviks; that the Bolsheviks are less disposed than they were to run Enver in opposition to him; and that the most coherent element in the opposition to Mustapha Kemal is a group of stalwarts of the old Committee of Union and Progress, who, in order to strengthen their position, represent themselves as being favourable to the restoration of the Sultan's authority. If there is anything in this theory at all, it seems more than probable that the strings of the opposition are pulled by Turks and Salonica crypto-Jews in Berlin and Switzerland. It is most doubtful whether the active spirits in such a movement would be more conciliatory in their dispositions towards the Allies and more sincerely loyal to the Sultan than Mustapha Kemal himself, but if they should succeed in undermining Mustapha Kemal's position without themselves

acquiring too much power, their activities might have the result of reinstating the Sultan in a position of greater authority, a consummation which would be to the advantage of Turkey, and should, from an Allied point of view, tend to facilitate a peaceful settlement in the East.

12. As against the theory of a real rapprochement between the Angora Government and Moscow, it is only fair to say that there is still much talk of Russian and Turkish concentrations of troops in the neighbourhood of the Turco-Caucasian frontier. Such concentrations point to a continuance of mutual suspicion, but they do not necessarily invalidate the theory, especially as Kiazim Karabekir, the Nationalist commander in North-Eastern Anatolia, does not necessarily share all Mustapha Kemal's views, and is somewhat independent in military arrangements.

I have etc.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/49, P. 68-70, No. 20

No. 74

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 26th, 1922, 4.30 p.m.
(Received January 29, 9.00 a.m.)

No. 55.

Telegraphic

At an interview which I had with the Grand Vizier yesterday, His Highness spoke about the forthcoming meeting of allied foreign ministers in Paris to discuss Near Eastern question. Grand Vizier told me that Sultan had asked him whether Turkish government would be represented at any conference which might be result of meeting in Paris. He had replied that this would be a matter for His Majesty's decision. Grand Vizier added that Turkish government would not go to a conference at which they would be asked to accept a dictated solution of present conflict. Before accepting an invitation to such a conference they would wish to know basis of discussion. He then modified his observations by saying that if allies straight away proposed an arrangement which seemed equitable to Turkey, Turkish government would, of course, accept such an arrangement at once, and would immediately take all steps necessary to ratify it. Such an arrangement would be welcomed by great bulk of people in Anatolia and he had means of getting them to accept it. If Mustapha Kemal did not come into line he and extremists would be isolated. Grand Vizier spoke with utmost confidence on this point and policy which he foreshadowed is worth nothing.

I asked him what territorial conditions would, in his opinion, be acceptable to Constantinople government. He replied evacuation of Anatolia, including Smyrna, by Greeks and an enlarged frontier in Europe. They would, of course, be willing to agree to real safeguards for minorities.

I thought it best not to discuss question of European frontier with Grand Vizier but I am under the impression that Constantinople government will not claim anything *à* la *lí*ne of Maritza. I am confident, however, that they will stand out for Enos-Midia line.

Please see my immediately preceding telegram.

F.O. 371 7854/E. 266

No. 75

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 2, 1922

No. 344 (Extracts)

My Lord,

The French Ambassador came to see me this afternoon and in the course of our conversation handed me a document of many pages containing, in a formal shape and drawn up, as he believed, by M. Poincaré himself, the observations of the French Government concerning the modifications which they desire to introduce into the text of the proposed treaty of guarantee between France and Great Britain. The substance of this memorandum he had communicated to me before in our various conversations, but only, as he said, in a personal capacity. He now desired to hand it in collectively and formally on behalf of his Government.

His Excellency then passed on to renew, in an apologetic vein, his observations on the recent unfortunate letter of his Government concerning the Græco-Turkish situation, which letter I now knew, and he also was aware that I knew, even though the substance of it might have been sent to him from Paris, had been composed by himself. While he repeated to me with much reiteration what he had intended to convey, I had no alternative, but to reply that he had signally failed to convey it, and that the impression which his letter had produced upon me had been shared by everyone who had read the document.

I told him, however, that I was much more concerned with what we were going to do at the conference at Paris than with what had previously been written. I was aware from a telegram from your Lordship what had passed in the interview between yourself and M. Poincaré, and, indeed, the Count de Saint-Aulaire proceeded to give me the same information on his own account. I was glad, I said, to learn that M. Poincaré had modified his attitude on many of the important particulars upon which I had commented; but there remained two important

points upon which, so far, he did not appear to have given your Lordship or myself any satisfaction. If, as I gathered, M. Poincaré or the Turks were going to press for the complete evacuation of Anatolia by the Greeks, what, I asked, were the guarantees the French were going to propose for the safety and indeed the lives of the large Greek population in Smyrna, Aivali, and other towns in the interior. It was out of the question to trust them to the tender mercy of the Turks. We had ample and reliable evidence that the Angora Turks had been deporting the Christian populations of Eastern Anatolia in large masses to the coast amid every circumstance of cruelty and suffering. Was it the least likely that Europe would stand by to see the Greeks on the Smyrna coast or in the interior treated in a similar fashion? Was it not absurd to rely upon the paper guarantees for minorities in the European treaties?

His Excellency admitted that something much more substantial would be wanted in the present case, though he did not indicate to me clearly where it was to be found. He thought, however, that complete and immediate evacuation would be found impossible and that it could only be effected by stages. Meanwhile he placed great reliance upon the creation of gendarmerie under Allied officers.

I said I did not believe for one moment that any such body would be able to prevent massacre if the Turks were bent upon it, and I earnestly urged the French Government, if their proposals were going to be of the character indicated by M. Poincaré, to address themselves to the case not merely of the Greeks whom they wished to turn out, but of the Greeks who were going to be left behind.

The second point upon which I said I had so far had no reply from M. Poincaré was the view of the French Government as to the steps to be taken if an agreement arrived at between the Povers was absolutely rejected by the Turks.

The Ambassador asked me what I would do in these circumstances, to which I replied that the question was one which I had originally contemplated examining in concert with the French at Paris, but it was they who had forced the matter to the front and compelled an earlier examination by laying down that in no circumstances whatsoever would they apply coercion to the Turks.

His Excellency reiterated that for the French Government to fight the Turks or move forces against them was out of the question, and I readily allowed that we were as little anxious or as little likely to take a similar step. But this did not exhaust the possibilities of coercion which might be applied in many forms, and I urged the ambassador to press upon his Government the deep consideration of this matter before the discussions in Paris began. One such form of pressure I did indeed indicate in my conversation, and that with a particular object. This might be withdrawal of the permission accorded to the Turks (equally with the Greeks) at the last meeting in Paris to purchase arms, munitions and stores, not, indeed, from the Allied Governments, but from any private firms who chose to supply

them: I told the Ambassador that I was well aware that French firms had taken ample advantage of this permission, and that Mustapha Kemal had been largely supplied by them, but the French had gone even further, for, in spite of the pledge against Government action, M. Briand had handed over to the Angora Turks, when evacuating Cilicia, large military stores, a great number of rifles, and so small amount of ammunition, on the plea that they would be useful for the gendarmerie whom it is proposed to set up. M. Franklin-Bouillon had frankly admitted the gift * but had excused it, as did the Ambassador, on the ground that its dimensions had been greatly exaggerated.

I observed that, whether its dimensions were great or small, it was a deliberate violation of an Allied agreement, and tended to emphasise the suspicion and dislike with which we naturally regarded the whole Franklin-Bouillon transaction. The Ambassador, I am inclined to think, entirely shares my views about the latter, for he informed me with some satisfaction that he had declined to meet that voluble negotiator when he had recently been in this country.

D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. XVII, pp. 595-597, No. 517

* M. Franklin-Bouillon had made admission in the course of a conversation at a lunch on January 27 at Sir Howard d'Egville's club (Sir d'Egville was a barrister and a writer on Colonial and Parliamentary affairs) at which Mr. W.J. Childs (temporary clerk in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office) and Mr. Headlam-Morley (Historical Adviser to the Secretary of State) were present. In Mr. Child's record (E 1179/5144) 'of M. Franklin-Bouillon's long and often vehement discourse, given in fluent and almost perfect English', which dealt at great length with 'the situation in the Mahomedan East, Bolshevism, the Treaty of Angora, his own share in it, French policy in Asia Minor, the Turkish Nationalists, and conditions in Asia Minor and Cilicia', M. Franklin-Bouillon is reported as saying: 'The Nationalist army numbers about 200,000 men. They have rifles, but little clothing or boots. A considerable amount of munitions has been accumulated. Shells are being obtained from munition dumps in Constantinople "guarded by somnolent British police"'. The report continued: 'He knew of two consignments of shells which had "evaporated" from this source having reached the Nationalists — one of 8,000, the other of 45,000. They were conveyed by French steamers. Major Henry, said Franklin-Bouillon maliciously, went to Ineboli, and sold the first 8,000 shells from these to the Nationalists. M. Franklin-Bouillon justified the handing over of French uniforms, weapons and munitions to the Nationalists on the ground that otherwise the new gendarmerie would be in rags, and give the christian population the idea that they were brigands. Nor would rifles be available for the gendarmerie unless the French supplied them. The aeroplanes, ten in number, were to convey information speedily in a country devoid of means of communication. They were part of the equipment of the gendarmerie'.

No. 76

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, February 3, 1922

(Received February 4)

No. 306

My Lord,

I Have the honour to transmit to you herewith M. Poincaré's reply to your Lordship's No. 314 of the 30th January in regard to the negotiations on the Eastern question, with the receipt of which I acquainted your Lordship in my telegram No. 59 of to-day's date.

I am sending the enclosures to M. Poincaré's note in original, and should be grateful if I might be supplied in due course with the copies thereof.

I have &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. XVII, p. 599, No. 519

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 76
M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge

PARIS, le 2 février 1922

Mon Cher Ambassadeur,

J'ai relu avec attention la lettre que Lord Curzon vous a adressée le 30 janvier et dont vous m'avez laissé hier le texte. Je ne crois pas inutile de vous exposer les considérations qu'elle m'inspire. Je pense, comme Lord Curzon, qu'il y a de réels avantages à surseoir, jusqu'au 9 février, à la réunion envisagée des trois Ministres des Affaires étrangères; ce délai permettra de continuer de causer par la voie diplomatique et d'éviter tout malentendu lorsqu'on se réunira à Paris.

Lord Curzon remarque que le mémorandum anglais et le mémorandum français ont été rédigés en se plaçant à des points de vue tout à fait différents. Je suis très heureux de prendre acte de l'assurance qu'il donne qu'il n'a pas été influencé, en faisant ses propositions, par les conversations qu'il a eues à Londres avec les Ministres grecs, conversations dont il a, à plusieurs reprises, entretenu mon prédécesseur. Je n'attendais pas moins de la hauteur de vues et d'esprit du Principal Secrétaire d'État; je suis sûr qu'il a recherché seulement les moyens d'arriver à rétablir en Orient la paix que tout le monde désire. Je lui demanderai d'être également persuadé que j'ai moi-même été guidé par ce sentiment. N'ayant pas de rapports officiels avec les Turcs d'Angora, je n'ai d'ailleurs pas pu, comme lui-même l'a fait pour les Grecs, obtenir d'eux, par une conversation directe, qu'ils se placent entre les mains des Alliés. Aussi bien, je voudrais qu'on ne se méprenne pas

sur le caractère du memorandum que j'ai prié M. de Saint-Aulaire de remettre au Foreign Office. Je ne me suis pas plus fait l'avocat des Turcs que Lord Curzon ne s'était fait celui des Grecs. Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec Lord Curzon pour penser que les trois Puissances doivent faire abstraction de toute idée préconçue et de tout intérêt personnel et aborder cette difficile question du point de vue le plus large et avec la pensée, non pas de procurer une victoire aux Grecs ou aux Turcs, mais de dissiper de l'horizon oriental les nuages noirs et de rétablir la paix du monde.

Le memorandum français, pas plus que le memorandum anglais ne saurait être, à lui seul, une base de discussion. Le second n'est en tout cas pas une réponse au premier. Je considère ces deux documents comme de simples exposés des conditions qui paraissent des deux côtés requises pour arriver au rétablissement de la paix, de même que le memorandum italien sera un exposé des vues italiennes. Dans l'entretien que j'ai eu à Paris avec Lord Curzon, j'ai dit qu'il était à mes yeux nécessaire d'arriver à une solution acceptable pour les Turcs comme pour les Grecs. J'avais suggéré à ce moment que le Gouvernement français profitant de ses bonnes relations avec le Gouvernement d'Angora, pourrait s'informer, au moins officieusement, des vues de ce dernier. Cette suggestion n'ayant pas été agréée par Lord Curzon, je n'avais pas insisté.

Nous n'avons pas été préoccupés, en rédigeant notre memorandum, de défendre des intérêts français contre d'autres intérêts concurrents; nous nous sommes bornés, je voudrais que Lord Curzon en fût persuadé, à rechercher objectivement des bases pratiques pour le rétablissement de la paix entre les Grecs et les Turcs et il ne serait pas exact de prétendre que nous ne retenons dans notre memorandum aucune des conclusions du memorandum anglais, d'autant moins, je le répète, que le premier n'était pas, dans mon esprit, destiné à constituer une réponse au second.

Pour Smyrne et pour la Thrace orientale, si l'on compare les deux propositions, on se rend compte que je me suis borné à avancer dans la voie indiquée par Lord Curzon lui-même. Pour la Thrace occidentale, il ressort de cette comparaison qu'il n'y a aucune divergence de vues entre nous. En ce qui concerne Constantinople et la Commission des Détroits, il n'y a pas non plus de divergences notables entre nos deux points de vue, et je ne crois pas qu'il soit impossible de subordonner l'évacuation de Constantinople, par exemple à un commencement d'exécution du Traité. Pour la question de l'Arménie turque, je pense, comme Lord Curzon, qu'il est difficile de maintenir les clauses de Sévres, mais j'estime que ce n'est pas en Cilicie, où il n'y a pour ainsi dire plus d'Arméniens, qu'il convient justement de rechercher une solution à la question arménienne. En ce qui concerne la protection des minorités, ne sommes-nous pas d'accord sur le principe de l'assurer de la manière la plus pratique? Pour ce qui touche aux clauses militaires, s'il est vrai que les Turcs ont besoin d'une armée et qu'il ne faut pas les obliger à la

payer un prix qui ne serait pas en rapport avec leurs ressources financières, l'argument d'ordre général mis en avant par Lord Curzon, qui invoque la nécessité de ne pas traiter différemment la Turquie des autres pays ex-ennemis, l'Allemagne, l'Autriche, la Bulgarie, me semble très fort et retient toute mon attention.

La simple comparaison des deux mémorandums ne me semble donc point si décourageante. Lord Curzon ne doutera pas que nous ne puissions arriver à un accord quand vous lui aurez fait savoir d'une manière très nette que j'examinerai volontiers, dans l'esprit le plus conciliant, toutes les suggestions anglaises, comme il examinera lui-même les suggestions françaises dans le seul désir d'arriver au rétablissement de la paix. Pour atteindre ce but, nous devons toujours avoir présents à l'esprit certains faits positifs et ne point nous bercer d'illusions. J'ai dit à Lord Curzon, lorsque j'ai eu le plaisir de le voir à Paris, que la France ne pouvait envisager la reprise des hostilités contre les Turcs et répugnerait même à des mesures coercitives. Je crois bien que l'opinion anglaise n'accepterait pas facilement l'envoi en Asie Mineure de quelques divisions britanniques. Dans ces conditions, si nous voulons imposer la paix à l'une des deux parties, nous n'aurons pas la force à notre disposition. Je ne crois pas, étant donnée la situation de l'Asie Mineure, qu'un blocus soit un moyen de pression effectif. Je ne crois pas non plus que les Turcs céderaient devant la menace de voir prolonger l'occupation de Constantinople. Cette menace, si on la réalisait, les rejeterait simplement en Asie Mineure, vers les Soviets et vers un panislamisme qui comporterait de graves dangers.

J'ai la crainte, et elle me paraît justifiée, puisque nous n'avons pas de moyens de force à notre disposition, que si nous n'arrivons pas, par la persuasion, à amener les belligérants à la paix, il ne sorte d'une prolongation de la guerre une situation tout aussi dangereuse pour la France que pour l'Angleterre, et c'est dans cette préoccupation que j'ai prié le Maréchal Foch, qui s'était occupé déjà, au cours des précédentes conférences, et d'accord avec ses collègues alliés, à dresser des plans d'intervention militaire en Orient, de remettre à jour la note qu'il avait remise au Conseil suprême sur ce sujet le 27 mars 1920. Il m'a donné hier une nouvelle note, que je me permets de vous adresser ci-joint, en même temps que l'ancienne. Les conclusions, vous le verrez, en sont bien inquiétantes. Le Maréchal Foch craint, avec raison, qu'après une offensive contre les Grecs pour les expulser d'Asie, les Turcs ne songent à une offensive contre les Détroits, accompagnée d'une action à la fois politique et militaire au Caucase, en Arabie, en Syrie, en Mésopotamie, en Perse et aux Indes. Au moment où tout le monde de l'islam est si profondément remué, des prévisions de cette nature semblent parfaitement raisonnables.

Je serais heureux que vous attiriez, d'une manière toute particulière, l'attention du Gouvernement anglais sur ces inquiétudes, que je partage entièrement avec le Maréchal Foch.

Dans la lettre qu'il vous a adressée, Lord Curzon rappelle que l'Angleterre, étant une grande Puissance musulmane, comme la France, a le souci de ménager le sentiment musulman. Je partage ses préoccupations et c'est parce que je suis d'accord avec lui que je recherche objectivement les moyens qui me semblent les plus propres à faire accepter aux deux adversaires une paix dont l'Angleterre et la France ont autant besoin que les belligérants eux-mêmes. S'il m'était démontré que d'autres moyens seraient plus efficaces, je ne témoignerais d'aucune intransigence.

Je suis persuadé que, si vous voulez bien faire part à Lord Curzon des sentiments que je vous exprime librement dans cette lettre particulière, il reviendra sur les appréhensions dont il avait fait part à M. de Saint-Aulaire et qu'il renouvelle dans sa lettre du 30 janvier. Il comprendra que je désire aussi vivement que lui que, le 9 février, les trois Ministres des Affaires étrangères puissent très rapidement se mettre d'accord sur des conditions telles qu'elles soient de nature à éviter un échec de nos efforts communs, échec qui aurait les plus fâcheuses conséquences.

Veuillez agréer, &c.,

R. POINCARÉ

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 599-602, No. 51911

ENCLOSURE x IN No. 76

Note of Marshal Foch

PARIS le 1^{er} février 1922

Au moment où les Puissances alliées vont essayer de s'entendre pour le règlement de la paix avec la Turquie, la question se pose de savoir avec quels moyens elles pourraient éventuellement lui imposer leurs volontés, de même qu'elle s'était posée au printemps de 1920, au moment de l'élaboration du Traité de Sèvres.

En mars 1920, dans un rapport, soumis au Conseil suprême, les représentants militaires et navals consultés ont étudié les conditions d'une action militaire capable, à leur avis, d'assurer l'exécution du Traité de Sèvres.

Sans envisager une opération à caractère décisif, susceptible d'entraîner les Alliés jusqu'au cœur de l'Asie Mineure, le programme proposé se bornait à prévoir une emprise solidement assurée sur les régions vitales de l'Empire ottoman. Il réclamait, néanmoins, alors que le prestige de la victoire était incontestable, la mise en œuvre de forces considérables évaluées à 27 D.I., ce qui, compte tenu des 19 divisions tant helléniques que françaises, britanniques et italiennes alors à pied d'œuvre, aurait exigé de la part des Alliés un effort supplémentaire de 8 D.I.

Les Alliés ont renoncé à s'imposer un pareil effort. Le Traité de Sèvres est resté lettre morte. Le maintien en Asie Mineure des forces helléniques et leurs tentatives

offensives n'ont eu d'autre résultat que d'exaspérer le nationalisme turc et de provoquer le rétablissement progressif de sa puissance militaire.

Aujourd'hui, la situation est encore modifiée, d'une part, du fait des occupations réalisées et consolidées sur certains points, ainsi que de l'évolution qu'ont subie les dispositions des Alliés à l'égard de la Turquie, mais d'autre part aussi du fait des réductions opérées dans les forces militaires alliées en Turquie.

Sans qu'il soit nécessaire de reprendre l'étude faite le 27 mars 1920 en l'accrochant aux circonstances actuelles, il est évident qu'une *action de force* visant à imposer aux nationalistes une paix à laquelle ils refuseraient de souscrire, réclamerait de la part des Alliés un effort supplémentaire considérable, tant militaire que financier. Cet effort est en dehors de leurs intentions et dépasse leurs possibilités.

II

Les moyens dont disposeraient les Alliés pour imposer leurs décisions sont donc limités aux forces qui sont actuellement sur place:

1. Forces alliées des Détroits.
2. Armée grecque de Smyrne.
3. Ils comportent, en outre, l'application éventuelle d'un blocus des côtes turques.

1. *Les forces alliées des Détroits* comprennent:

14 bataillons d'infanterie,

2 groupes d'artillerie,

Quelques escadrons,

c'est-à-dire la valeur d'une division au total, effectif notablement inférieur même à celui que, dans leur consultation du 14 février 1920 à Londres, les Conseillers militaires et navals avaient estimé nécessaire pour assurer l'occupation des Détroits tant que la paix ne serait pas établie (environ 2 divisions et 9 bataillons avec les forces navales suffisantes).

2. *L'armée hellénique de Smyrne* compte 11 divisions d'infanterie (160,000 hommes).

Elle représente l'effort maximum de la Grèce, et son entretien prolongé risque d'entraîner pour cette Puissance des sacrifices financiers incompatibles avec ses moyens et une tension politique et morale, dangereuse pour la situation intérieure du pays. Déjà l'armée hellénique a montré des symptômes graves de fatigue et d'indiscipline; ses échecs successifs semblent avoir épuisé sa capacité offensive. En présence d'une armée nationaliste exaltée par le succès de sa résistance, elle paraît d'ailleurs pour le moment vouloir se borner à maintenir sa situation.

3. Quant au *blocus* d'un pays comme la Turquie d'Asie, il paraît illusoire.

Le blocus des côtes de l'Asie Mineure a déjà été écarté par les représentants navals en mars 1920 comme inefficace, difficile à exercer en raison de l'étendue de la frontière maritime et de nature à aggraver la situation précaire du ravitaillement de Constantinople. Il n'atteindrait en rien les communications de la Turquie nationaliste avec la Russie soviétique, d'où elle tire son matériel de guerre et une partie de ses subsides. Il n'aurait en définitive aucune influence sur un pays essentiellement agricole, qui se nourrit sur lui-même et dont les besoins économiques sont affranchis des relations extérieures.

En regard de ces moyens, ceux des nationalistes turcs se résument dans le tableau suivant:

Un régime dictatorial mettant entre les mains d'un seul chef, Kemal, tous les pouvoirs;

Une armée de 150,000 combattants environ, susceptible d'atteindre le chiffre de 200,000 hommes, disposant 700 à 800 canons et de 2,000 à 2,500 mitrailleuses, et répartis actuellement de la façon suivante:

Front hellénique, 110,000 à 120,000 hommes.

Front Syrie-Mésopotamie, 5,000 hommes environ.

Front du Caucase, 10,000 hommes.

Intérieur, 20,000 hommes.

Alors que les moyens des Alliés et des Grecs ont depuis 1920 subi une diminution très notable, les troupes kémalistes se sont accrues en effectifs et en valeur militaire. Leur force morale est celle de gens qui combattent pour leur pays et dans leur pays.

III

Il résulte de cet exposé qu'en présence de la force nationaliste actuelle, les Alliés, avec la coopération des Grecs, ne peuvent guère que maintenir leurs positions—dans les Détroits et sur le front de Smyrne—et encore à la condition que l'armée grecque échappe à la désagrégation.

Les moyens militaires dont ils disposent ne leur permettent qu'une attitude défensive, c'est-à-dire passive, sur ces fronts. Le seul moyen auquel ils pourraient avoir recours, réside dans le blocus, et l'on a vu que ce blocus est condamné à l'inefficacité. Par suite, les Alliés semblent dans l'impossibilité d'exercer une action coercitive efficace pour réduire la résistance turque.

Mais la continuation de la lutte contre le nationalisme ne risque pas seulement de faire éclater l'impuissance des Alliés; elle comporte en outre des dangers:

Le maintien de l'occupation de Constantinople et des Détroits sans être de nature à faire céder le Gouvernement d'Angora, aura pour résultat de ruiner davantage le prestige du Gouvernement de Constantinople et du Khalifat et de rejeter définitivement en Asie le Gouvernement effectif de la Turquie.

Le maintien des Grecs sur le front de Smyrne entretiendra et développera l'exaltation du sentiment national turc, et continuera à fournir au Gouvernement kémaliste le levier nécessaire pour soutenir et augmenter son effort militaire.

Enfin, la politique de coercition à l'égard du Gouvernement d'Angora aboutira infailliblement à consolider l'alliance factice, mais rendue ainsi plus nécessaire, du pouvoir soviétique et du nationalisme turc. Il est même à prévoir que Mustapha Kemal, qui, dans un but de conciliation, a proclamé son renoncement à tout programme pantouranien et panislamique, sera amené à reprendre la politique ainsi abandonnée, pour s'en faire un instrument de combat contre les deux grandes Puissances musulmanes qui s'opposent à la réalisation du Pacte National: la France et surtout l'Angleterre.

IV

Les entreprises militaires à prévoir comme résultantes de ces conséquences politiques semblent pouvoir viser les objectifs suivants:

Offensive contre les Grecs pour les expulser d'Asie.

Offensive contre les Détroits.

Actions politico-militaires:

Au Caucase, pour interdire aux Puissances alliées toute ingérence dans cette région si intéressante pour elles au point de vue économique;

En Arabie, contre la Syrie et la Mésopotamie;

Vers l'Orient, à travers la Perse, dans la direction des Indes.

Il est difficile de prévoir dans quelle mesure ces entreprises pourront être poursuivies simultanément. Il est même probable qu'elles ne se développeront que successivement.

En tout cas, *l'offensive contre les Grecs* est l'opération vers laquelle le Gouvernement d'Angora concentre manifestement ses efforts à l'heure actuelle, afin de l'entreprendre dès le printemps, si l'action des Puissances alliées ne désarme point sa révolte.

Sans exagérer les possibilités turques, ni sous-estimer la capacité de résistance de l'armée hellénique, on ne peut envisager sans crainte de catastrophe, la reprise des attaques kémalistes. Mustapha Kemal se prépare en effet à mettre en ligne contre la Grèce, non seulement ses réserves, mais encore des contingents turkmènes, afghans, &c., dont des traités récents lui promettent de concours

offensif et défensif. Dans ces conditions, la situation d'équilibre instable qui caractérise le front turco-hellénique peut se rompre brusquement par un effondrement de l'armée hellénique moralement atteinte.

Un succès de cette nature ne manquerait pas d'exalter les Turcs. Il pourrait les amener à une entreprise contre les Détroits visant tout au moins à en border la rive méridionale, que les forces alliées, trop faibles et privées de toute protection sur leur flanc droit, ne sauraient défendre contre une attaque sérieuse.

Mais surtout, la menace qu'une armée nationaliste hostile fait peser sur la situation militaire des Alliés en Syrie et en Mésopotamie prendrait un caractère particulièrement inquiétant du jour où cette armée, débarrassée du front hellénique, ou simplement résolue à le masquer, prononcerait un effort de ce côté.

Dans cette hypothèse, les Turcs pourraient facilement, au moyen de leurs réserves intérieures et de prélèvements opérés sur le front hellénique et au Caucase¹, concentrer, en direction de Mossoul, une force d'au moins 50,000 hommes, suffisante, non seulement pour restaurer la suprématie turque dans le Kurdistan, et y ruiner les entreprises britanniques, mais aussi pour porter un coup sérieux à l'œuvre de l'Angleterre et en Mésopotamie².

Il paraît inutile enfin d'insister sur les dangers que comporte pour l'Empire des Indes une coopération de la Turquie nationaliste et de la Russie bolcheviste en vue de donner appui, à travers la Perse et l'Afghanistan, aux mouvements (sic) séditionnels qui agitent déjà cet Empire. Des entreprises de cette nature sont actuellement en préparation en particulier par l'action de Djémal-Pacha en Afghanistan³.

V

En Résumé:

Toute action militaire coercitive des Alliés vis-à-vis du Gouvernement d'Angora paraît interdite, toute action de blocus paraît inopérante.

Par suite, imposer des conditions qui porteraient atteinte au nationalisme turc, c'est-à-dire qui toucheraient des pays habités par des populations turques, serait pour les Alliés, risquer, en prolongeant la révolte du Gouvernement

¹ *Note on original:* 'Ou un resserrement de l'alliance turco-russe permettrait une diminution des forces aux ordres de Kiazim-Karabekir.'

² *Note on original:* L'Angleterre ne dispose en Mésopotamie que de 1 D.L.:

12 bataillons	8 escadrons
6 batteries	6 groupes d'aviation.

³ *Note on original:* 'Djémal Pacha, avec l'aide d'une mission turque importante, a entrepris la constitution d'une armée afghane dont les noyaux sont en voie d'organisation. Le but qu'il assigne à cette armée est de peser sur l'Angleterre par la frontière des Indes. Il dirige une entreprise analogue en Perse et se propose d'attaquer par l'est les Anglais de Mésopotamie.'

nationaliste, de faire éclater leur impuissance à la réduire, et même de compromettre leur maintien sur leurs positions actuelles en Asie Mineure.

La France et l'Angleterre en particulier, ne sauraient, sans grave danger, s'exposer ainsi à un échec de leur action militaire et politique dans le Proche-Orient. Un tel échec, en outre, de ses conséquences locales et européennes, aurait des répercussions lointaines dans leurs empires coloniaux. Un succès marqué du nationalisme turc sur les Puissances alliées ne pourrait manquer en effet de réveiller et d'exalter le fanatisme religieux, et, avec lui, l'esprit d'indépendance des populations musulmanes dans les royaumes arabes et aux Indes, et de provoquer des mouvements de révolte dont le développement peut dépasser les prévisions.

Ce sont là, semble-t-il, les considérations militaires qui doivent inspirer les Puissances alliées dans les prochaines négociations.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 602-607, No. 519½

No. 77

*Memorandum by Mr. Forbes Adam and Mr. Edmonds respecting the
Means of bringing Pressure upon Turkey*

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 6, 1922

I. Financial and Economic Blockade of Turkey

An essential condition of any kind of financial or economic blockade of Turkey is that France and Italy should not merely subscribe to it but cooperate loyally at home as well as at Constantinople and Syria. A financial blockade would not greatly affect the Kemalists, for they have not hitherto been dependent on the financial help of Western Europe. There is some reason to think that they hope for a loan as part of the peace settlement, but this could only come from private sources, and therefore on onerous terms as to expenditure, &c. In any case, it is well to remember that insolvency is a chronic state in Turkey, and that economic arguments never carry great weight with her rulers. So long as the Kemalists remain masters of Anatolia they can conscript its manhood at will and confiscate its produce for military purposes, and so long as they have the sympathy of Russia they can rely on her for military material. They might regret losing all possibility of purchasing supplies in Western Europe and recovering little by little, as they are now doing, the dumps of captured Turkish ammunition at Constantinople, but latterly they appear, as far as we know, to have had so little actually from Italy and (apart from the Cilicia supplies) from France, that, provided Russia were still ready to supply them via Trebizond and the Caucasus, they would not be greatly embarrassed.

2. A Naval blockade in which Greece would take part would probably cut off the bulk of the direct traffic from Southern Russia to Anatolia, just as it could

effectively seal Adalia and Mersina, but owing to the absence of bases it would be almost impracticable to stop the present traffic from Batum to Trebizond by small coasting vessels, and the land routes would remain open.

It seems, then, that the only blockade of Turkey which would coerce her is one enforced by Russia as well as the Allies. Such a measure, however, presupposes the political isolation of Turkey, an event which, it may well be thought, would of itself reduce her to submission, without the need of any organised blockade. Turkey knows that she cannot face the world without at least one big Power behind her. In fact, Russia's presence at Genoa¹ and Turkey's absence may in itself make Mustapha more amenable to reason owing to the uncertainty created on his mind.

II — Financial and Military Assistance to Greece

3. Some time before the opening of the Greek offensive of last summer His Majesty's Government showed signs of abandoning their strict neutrality and of allowing Greece to obtain supplies in this country. This change in our attitude alarmed the Kemalists and made them considerably less exacting while their fear lasted. Some such effect might be produced now by an Allied agreement to assist Greece with funds and military equipment, while again preventing even private trade in arms, &c., with the Turks.

4. There appears to be no likelihood that any of the Allies would allow their forces to be engaged actively on the side of Greece, and it seems very doubtful whether the French and Italian Governments, or indeed His Majesty's Government, would feel able to make Greece any financial advance. (There is no doubt that any financial facilities, with the moral support they would imply, would have a great effect in Greece and Turkey, but also, it must be remembered, in India.) All that seems possible is that the Allies might agree to allow Greece to purchase military material from them direct — perhaps under an arrangement of deferred payment, or to hand over to her the captured Turkish material at Constantinople — and, at the utmost, to stiffen her army with Allied officers.

III. — Increased Stringency of other Parts of new Treaty against Turkey

5. The formal withdrawal of all or any of the concessions (Thrace, Armenia, Smyrna, financial and military control, &c., Capitulations, admission to League of Nations) suggested in March last² and since then, if it were to be of any effect, would have to be accompanied by a degree of Allied solidarity which has existed since hostilities ceased. Even so it might not carry us any further. The Kemalists would maintain a passive attitude and trust to an eventual split among the Allies or the result of continued pressure on His Majesty's Government of difficulties in the Moslem world.

¹ The first plenary session of the Genoa Conference was held on April 10.

² At the Third Conference of London.

6. The one modification of the treaty to which, given Allied agreement, we should have it in our power to give immediate effect would be the removal of Constantinople and East Thrace from Turkish sovereignty. There have been suggestions lately that the Kemalists would not mind this loss. It is quite likely that they may be inclined to remove their vital services to a safe distance in Anatolia. But that they would willingly forgo sovereignty over Constantinople, with all the political advantages which tradition and geographical position give it, is incredible. The measure of the value which the Turks really attach to Constantinople is to be found in the frantic efforts they and their supporters in this country and elsewhere made during the peace negotiations to retain it.

7. The definite termination by the Allies of Turkish rule in Constantinople, it can hardly be doubted, would be a severe blow to Kemalism. But even supposing the situation in India to allow His Majesty's Government thus to reverse the Cabinet decision of January 1920, and even supposing such an agreement to have been reached and enforced between the Allies, much of the consequent effect would depend on the attitude of Russia, who, after Turkey, is the Power most profoundly concerned in the Straits. If we could give Russia reason to think that the expulsion of the Turk would be followed by a régime of control over Constantinople and the Straits, which suited her better, e.g., immediate and unconditional inclusion in such an international body as the Straits Commission, she would be less likely to continue her support of Turkey, and we might hope to see Kemalism crumble. But if the alternative arrangement seemed to her to be the prelude to, say, Greek occupation of Constantinople, she would doubtless support Turkey in fighting it tooth and nail. In that case the expulsion of the Turk from Europe would have brought us no nearer to the establishment of peace in Anatolia. It seems, then, that here, again, the attitude of Russia is all-important.

IV. Separation of Constantinople Government from Angora Government

8. Sir H. Rumbold has suggested that, as a last resource in the event of Angora refusing a reasonable settlement, peace might be made with the Sultan in the hope that the moderate element would gradually melt away from Mustapha Kemal's side and leave him in a minority. This procedure failed when the Sultan's Government signed the Treaty of Sévres, but it might run a better chance of success with a treaty modified in favour of Turkey to the extent now proposed.

V. Definite Annexation of Turkish Territory by Allies by Unilateral Declaration

9. There are believed to be legal precedents which would justify the Allies in agreeing among themselves to consider such and such a settlement to be at once in force irrespective of Turkish acceptance, e.g., definite severance of Thrace and the Arab countries from Turkey. But an arrangement of this kind would leave the position very much as it is to-day. It would abandon Anatolia to stew in her own juice. It might be possible to combine this step with the evacuation of Constantinople and with an Allied occupation of the Smyrna zone with the troops

so withdrawn from Constantinople. If Greek troops were withdrawn from Smyrna without Allied occupation, the Greek minorities would be left to their fate. In any case, Mustapha would continue to be able to stir up the tribes against Mesopotamia. Anatolia, too, would remain closed to British trade, and in these days the recovery of those markets must be one of our most urgent considerations.

Conclusion

10. Without the definite separation of Russia from Turkey, the indirect methods of pressure on Angora open to the Allies would probably be in the nature of palliatives to keep Greece in the field rather than to end Angora's resistance. It is possible, however, but an offer of generous concessions to Turkey, combined with some clear indication that the Allies were united and prepared in the last resort to use the indirect means of pressure on Turkey and help to the Greeks indicated above, might make Mustapha think it worth while to yield.

F.O. 406/49, pp. 86-89, No. 26

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 612-615, No. 524

ANNEX

Guarantees for Greek Population in event of unconditional Greek Evacuation of Smyrna

1. If the sovereignty and full executive power remains Turkish, it seems only a delusion to think that there can be any absolutely effective guarantee. All we can do is to reduce the chances of trouble. It will perhaps be more convenient to consider the temporary measures, necessary to tide over and follow evacuation by the Greeks, separately from the guarantees of a more permanent nature.

Temporary Measures

2. With regard to the first, Allied officers might, as General Harington has suggested, be attached to the retiring Greek army and to the incoming Turkish forces.

3. The presence of the Allied commissions, suggested by the French² for three or six months in the outer zone, and a year in the inner zone, would be of some moral effect, but a stronger Allied military force than the proposed 'guard' would be desirable over the above transition period in each zone if troops can be spared.

4. For the above periods in each zone, it might perhaps be stipulated that the only Turkish forces allowed should be, say, a platoon to show the flag in Smyrna, Brussa and one or two other military centres. This would be a sop to Turkish prestige, but not a danger to the minorities.

² In their Note of January 27

Permanent Measures

5. Perhaps the most important of all the permanent safeguards is that of insisting that the clause in the Treaty of Sèvres providing for a large proportion of foreign officers in the Turkish gendarmerie shall be applied in the Smyrna zone. Possibly all the officers in the zone should be foreign. This will ensure that the world at large will have some idea of what is going on in remote villages, and that the gendarmerie will not readily be used for measures of wholesale persecution. The presence of these officers will be a better safeguard than that of consuls.

6. The minorities provisions of the Sèvres Treaty are likely to remain for the most part a dead letter, at any rate outside the sphere where foreign influence may be brought to bear. Nevertheless it seems important to maintain them. We should probably be able to obtain Turkish acceptance by making them applicable to cases where Turks have grievances against the Greeks. Mixed commissions of enquiry, with a chairman appointed by the League of Nations are, under these clauses, to enquire into deportations and to rehabilitate victims in their homes. The Turkish Government would probably be glad to accept these conditions if the Turks could profit by them also. It would be worth while to make some such concession in order to get the commissions established on the spot. Very much practical result to [sic] the commission's enquiries may be impossible after so many years of warfare, but where any enquiry was possible a Turkish court of law would certainly be too pressed to deal with it. The mere presence, however, of these commissions in the districts will help to bring them within the pale of civilisation and to make the perpetration of horrors rather less likely.

7. The League of Nations has already appointed a commissioner at Constantinople to enquire into deportations. If the commissions of enquiry, instead of being responsible to the Allies as they are under the treaty, could be brought under this commissioner, the direct influence of the League, which would thus be brought to bear upon the state of affairs in the Smyrna zone, would be of very real value. For whatever may be the difficulties of bringing moral pressure to bear on Turkey while she is defying the Allies and at war, it is quite possible that in time of peace when she is anxious to join the League, that body and the Allies may successfully use on Turkey the weapon of publicity.

Adrianople and Smyrna

8. Turkish law as it already stands provides for representation of all races on local councils, e.g., Smyrna Council, the Smyrna Municipal Council and the Aivali Kaza Council. Turkish law also admits all races to government and municipal employment. Quite apart, therefore, from the similar provisions in the minority clauses of the Sèvres treaty, it should be easy for us to stipulate, and for the Turks to agree, that the application of the guarantees already proposed for the Moslems in Adrianople and Eastern Thrace generally shall be contingent on the equitable application of these principles in the Smyrna zone.

9. The creation of any special separate status for Adrianople and Smyrna seems impracticable and on the whole undesirable. Economically both places are dependent on the surrounding country. Administratively it would be hard to find any Western precedent (e.g., Hamburg, Fiume, Zara, Danzing) the working of which would be applicable to an Eastern town, and to cities without the traditions of a separate corporate existence behind them. Alexandria has a special municipal constitution for purely municipal administrative purposes, but it is cumbrous and is understood not to have worked very well. In any case, it was primarily designed to give a large share of control to the foreign European element—hardly existent in Adrianople⁴.

F.O. 371/7855/E. 1304

D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. XVII, pp. 615-617, No. 514/1

No. 78

Foreign Office Minutes dated February 6, 1922

In accordance with the Secretary of State's instructions in E 1164/5/44 the enclosed Memorandum on possible means of applying pressure to the Turks has been prepared by Mr. Forbes Adam and Mr. Edmonds.

It is quite possible, however, that the best means of exerting pressure on the Nationalists is to maintain the present condition of deadlock. It might be necessary to enable the Greeks by means of financial assistance to maintain themselves in their present position though they must not under any circumstances undertake another offensive. There is good reason to believe the Nationalist financial position to be desperate and one of the most important cards that we hold is that no financial assistance can be obtained without the support of the London market. The economic situation is probably equally bad. There are indications of a growing feeling against Kemal's dictatorship and of an increasing war-weariness in Anatolia. (It is for this reason that a fresh Greek attack would be deplorable: a defensive war would reestablish Kemal in his position as saviour of his country and war-weariness would yield to patriotic necessity.) But assuming a continuance of the present situation Kemal may be forced to reduce his demands even to take the first step for peace (and this may conceivably be the reason for Youssouf Kemal's visit to Europe) in order to meet a growing movement against himself based on his inability to bring the war to an end so avert the resultant ruin of Anatolia, and on resentment against his personal dictatorship. If reasonable terms, backed by the moral force of Allied unity, were offered and refused, the process of the

⁴ Bu memorandum üzerine İngiltere Dışleri Bakanlığı yetkililerinden D.G. Osborne, 6 Şubat 1922 günü aşağıdaki uzun yorumu yapmış ve bu yorumlar Lord Curzon tarafından da görülüp parafile edilmiştir. Bkz. No. 78

disintegration of Kemal's power would be immensely stimulated and if at the same time these terms were accepted by the Sultan on behalf of Turkey and an acceptable peace and the prospect of reconstruction offered to Anatolia the final collapse of Kemal might well result.

The Genoa conference will be of importance. If as a result of it Russia is recognized by the Allies and is induced to suspend what support she still affords the Nationalists and if the French and Italians can be induced loyally to observe their proclaimed neutrality the military situation of the Nationalists may well become critical. No loans will be obtainable and no further purchases of material will be possible.

For all these reasons it would appear that time is against Mustapha Kemal. It seems unlikely that either Greeks or Turks will be anxious to embark on a new offensive. Unless conditions in India imperatively demand it a settlement does not appear to be more urgently necessary than it has been for the past two years. The most effective and least expensive form of pressure may therefore lie in a continuance of the present financial and economic blockade of Anatolia until something happened at Angora. If there is any truth in this diagnosis we may expect as time goes on signs of impatience and agitation for a speedy settlement in Nationalist circles at Angora, Constantinople and Paris. *

D.G. OSBORNE

6/2

F.O. 371/7855/E. 1394

No. 79

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 6th 1922, 1.55 p.m.

(Received February 6, 11.0 a.m.)

No. 82 (R).

Telegraphic

Local papers state that before his departure for Europe to plead the Nationalist cause Yussuf Kemal made a patriotic speech in which he asked National Assembly for a vote of confidence. Assembly at once gave him this and deputies again affirmed that National Pact constituted to-day as yesterday unchangeable basis of policy of Angora government.

* Belge No. 77 üzerine İngiltere Dışleri Bakanlığı yüksek görevlilerinden Osborne tarafından hazırlanan bu not Bakan yardımcısı Sir Eyre Crowe ve Lord Curzon tarafından da paraf edilip onaylanmıştır. B.N.Ş.

Another report states that tension between (2) Mustapha Kemal and National Assembly continues latter reserving to itself right to appoint new minister.

A telegram from Angora states that Yussuf Kemal will leave that town on February 6th for Constantinople travelling via Ada Bazar. He is due here February 9th and will leave again on February 11th by Lloyds "Triestino" steamer for Brindisi on his way to Rome, Paris and London. He will be accompanied by Munir Bey legal adviser, Hikmet Bey director general of political affairs, Ferid Bey director of Cabinet particulier of department of Foreign Affairs and Kemal Bey secretary.

F.O. 371/7855/E. 1426

No. 80

Parker Garrett and Co. to the Foreign Office

LONDON, 15th February 1922

S.S. "BERKSHIRE"

Sir,

We are acting for Underwriters on cargo which was being carried by the s.s. "Berkshire".

A paragraph appeared in Lloyd's List on February 9th as follows:—

"SEIZURE OF AN EGYPTIAN STEAMER"

"London, Feb. 8.- Reuter's Agency reports that the following news has been received in London from an official Greek source: The Greek Naval Staff reports that the auxiliary cruiser Naxos stopped the steamer BERKSHIRE off Mersina. The BERKSHIRE, which was carrying coal and petroleum for Kemal Pasha, has been taken into Piraeus."

We shall be much obliged if you can give us any further information which will be useful to English Underwriters.

We are, etc.

Your obedient Servant,

Signed PARKER GARRETT

F.O. 371/7926/E. 1775

No. 81

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch

16.2.1922

No. 565

Extracts

MUSTAFA KEMAL'S POSITION.

According to information obtained from Nationalist sources in Constantinople, the Commission appointed by the Great National Assembly to consider the draft bill regarding the attributions and responsibilities of the council of Commissioners, had not completed its task by the middle of February. The bill was returned to the Commission after its rejection on the 3rd December last, and the President of the Commission, Jelaeddin Arif Bey, who had been appointed to replace Jami Bey in Rome, had been succeeded by Yunus Nadi Bey.

In the meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal's dictatorship had been prolonged by the Great National Assembly for a further period of three months, until the beginning of May. It seemed likely that the second bill would also be rejected by the Great National Assembly, in which case the dictatorship would be extended for a still further period.

RECEIPT OF FUNDS BY THE NATIONALISTS FROM THE RED CRESCENT

The following is the text of a letter dated Oxford, 1.2.22, from Abdul Rahman Sidigi, an Oxford student and a member of the Khalifat Committee, to Jami Bey in Rome:—

"In a letter received from M. Chotani in Bombay, he still regrets not having received the red Crescent receipt for 5,000 pounds sent to Ghalib Kemali Bey last year, while he was still in Rome. He hopes that it will be forwarded soon.

"M. Chotani has sent £26,000 sterling to Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha direct through the Netherland Trading Company of Amsterdam, and states that as soon as he receives receipts for this amount, he will send another £24,000.

"I once more repeat that Madame Hamid * is very anxious to get to Anatolia for Red Crescent work. Have you not received instructions yet on this matter from Angora? M. Chotani also announces the despatch of parcels and blankets for the Red Crescent".

The informant ascertained that the receipt referred to above was sent by Jami Bey on the 22nd January to Bombay.

F.O. 371/7926

* It was reported in January last that Jami bey wrote to Angora, during that month, stating that he had been informed by Abdul Rahman Sidigi that Madame Hamid, a relative of Abdul Habammi, was desirous of proceeding to Anatolia in connection with Red Crescent work.

No. 82

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan (Received February 18)

FEBRUARY 17, 1922

Since my arrival in London I have been struck by the fluidity of official opinion as to the course which His Majesty's Government should take in the next phase of the Turkish question.

Four main lines of thought appear to prevail, namely:—

- (a) That there is nothing for it but to go in with the Greeks again, so far as this can be done without giving them Government money and without putting troops into Anatolia.
- (b) That there is nothing for it but to let the Turks and Greeks fight another round without any departure from Allied neutrality as it operates at present.
- (c) That a settlement in the Near East is contingent on a settlement with Russia, and that, therefore, no progress can be made until after the Genoa Conference¹.
- (d) That we must go a good deal further than yet hitherto done to meet the Turks; seeking, however, to limit their future military effectiveness on the European side; to keep them altogether out of the European side of the Dardanelles if possible; to do what little we can for the minorities; and to make the best composition we can on questions like financial and economic control and safeguards for Allied interests in Turkey.

In attempting to define these lines of thought, I have doubtless isolated them too much. It is obvious that some of them in reality merge in each other. It is also probably an exaggeration to suggest that anyone now seriously advocates recourse to (a) without some preliminary attempt to ensure the pacification of the Near East by other means. The four currents of opinion are nevertheless sufficiently definite and distinguishable for the purpose of analysis to make it worth while to say how they strike me coming fresh from Constantinople.

(a) We have been strongly impressing on the Turks that His Majesty's Government's policy underwent a definite change a year ago, and that while not prepared to concede the whole of the National Pact, much less to recognise Angora as the Government of Turkey, His Majesty's Government wished to give reasonable satisfaction to Turkey. Any decision to back the Greeks now, without first attempting to come to terms with Turkey, or after offering Turkey only such

¹ The Genoa Conference took place from April 10 to May 19, 1922. See *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-23, 1925*, pp. 25-34.

terms as no appreciable element in Turkey considers acceptable, would appear to all Turks to prove that His Majesty's Government had never seriously modified the San Remo and Sèvres attitude and wished to ruin Turkey. At the same time, what with Allied disunion and the limitations on the help to be afforded to Greece, it is more than doubtful whether the Greeks would come out on top.

If the Greeks succeeded to the fullest extent, we should have to reckon with the hostility of the active elements in such remnant of Turkey as might remain, and with the hostility of a large part of the Islamic world, including the parts which concern His Majesty's Government most nearly. This hostility would be the more bitter as, in this alternative, we could not refuse the Greeks territorial compensation for their fresh efforts undertaken under our auspices.

If, on the other hand, the Greeks failed, we should have to reckon with a Turkey arrogant in her enhanced prestige, and the hostility of Moslems elsewhere would be the more dangerous for seeing in this rehabilitated Turkey a centre round which to rally and from which to derive inspiration.

(b) This is an admission of present Allied bankruptcy so far as the Near East is concerned. The argument in favour of resigning ourselves to it is that a fresh course of blood-letting might leave both sides so exhausted and so war-weary as to make them more amenable next winter to Allied persuasion than they now are.

The validity of this argument depends on the assumption that a new campaign will not materially alter the balance between the two combatants. I myself do not foresee a radical alteration unless the Greeks themselves should decide to evacuate Asia Minor. What I do think probable is a sufficient alteration in favour of the Kemalists to increase their arrogance. If they can keep up the supply of war material, neither financial strain nor war-weariness will suffice to make them amenable, even should the Allies be more united eight months hence than they are at present. The submissiveness of the Anatolian peasant is too great for war-weariness among the people to operate effectively. The leaders, who have been playing a winning game, are not particularly war-weary. There are indications of disunion among them, but they are absolutely united in their determination to keep the Greeks out of Anatolia, if not out of Eastern Thrace as well.

In the less likely event of the balance being altered in favour of the Greeks, they would be less disposed than they now are to relinquish Smyrna and part of Thrace, but they would still be a long way from having reduced the Kemalists to impotence.

In either alternative the Allies would almost certainly be in a worse position than they are even now to impose an equitable settlement.

(c) I cannot express any confident opinion as to the probability of Soviet Russia coming so much into the Allied orbit as to be willing to throw Angora over.

Recent indications from Angora point to a rapprochement between Mustapha Kemal and Moscow. The alliance, though in some ways paradoxical, is a natural one so long as both are violently revolutionary and fundamentally antagonistic to the Allies. I cannot but doubt whether any composition with the Bolsheviks which can be achieved in the near future will strike the roots of this fundamental antagonism on their side, and I doubt their readiness to cast off Angora sincerely as a result of such a composition.

I quite agree that the ultimate stability for any settlement in Turkey must depend largely on the ultimate attitude of Russia, but I do not believe that for immediate purposes we can use Russia to bring about a settlement in Turkey. We may perhaps hope, as a result of Genoa, to make Russia neutral in her attitude towards Angora, but this will leave the Turkish national movement still in being, and with sufficient life in it to give us trouble for a long time to come.

Assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that we may hope to get more from Russia at Genoa, i.e., to secure active Russian co-operation in bringing about a settlement in the Near East, it is necessary to consider the terms which we are prepared to offer to Russia as the price of her co-operation. Are we prepared to go back to the 1915 policy of allowing her to take Constantinople and to acquire a chunk of territory in North-Eastern Asia Minor? Are we prepared to let her reduce the new Turkey to the conditions of a weak vassal State, though without any immediate breach in its territorial integrity? Or, is it expected that the advantages to be gained by Russia at Genoa in the wider sphere, i.e., *de jure* recognition and reinstatement in the European economic system, will suffice without any specific advantages in the Near East itself?

Moreover, it is now pretty clear that the Genoa Conference cannot take place before April at the soonest. This means that before we can come to any arrangement with Russia, serious military operations will again be possible in Anatolia. In my opinion, such operations are bound to take place in or about April, if the situation of the parties remains as at present, i.e., if Mustapha Kemal remains in control at Angora and if the Greeks maintain their army in Asia Minor.

(d) The above considerations lead me to the conclusion that present action on the part of the Allies is desirable, and that this alternative affords the only basis of such action. In my memorandum of the 7th February² I outlined a procedure by which effect might be given to it without showing undue weakness vis-à-vis of Angora.

² Not printed. Mr. Ryan had written: 'Assuming that an agreement can be arrived at between the three Great Allied Powers, the best procedure might be to embody the main lines of it, but not all the details in an Act exchanged between them, and to invite the Turks and the Greeks to adhere to this Act as a preliminary to the assembling of a new conference of the three Powers, the Turks and the Greeks, which conference would discuss the reserved questions of details and draw up a new treaty. In drawing up such an Act it would be essential to make it clear for the benefit of Moslem opinion generally and of all Turks, but especially Turks of moderate tendency—

There are many difficulties—notably that of bringing the French into line, that of devising ultimate means of coercion if the opponents of a reasonable settlement maintain the upper hand in Turkey, and that of inducing the Greeks, to hold on in Asia Minor in the interests of a settlement under which they must eventually clear out. Nevertheless, I consider that the effort should be made.

The proposed procedure would not compromise any real French interest, except in so far as it would commit the French to participation in ultimate measures of coercion if such were necessary. Otherwise, the French have as much to gain by it as we have. They have involved themselves with the Kemalists, but the proposed procedure gives their friends the Kemalists an opportunity to come into line. If the Kemalists will not come into line except on the basis of the full National Pact, French interests in Turkey will be threatened hardly less than ours. What we have to contend with in the case of the French is not that the proposed procedure would compromise their real interests, but that it would excite their suspicion and jealousy.

I need not deal at length with the other difficulties. That of devising ultimate means of coercion must be faced. Unless we are prepared to resort to coercion at long last, we cannot influence the course of events at all and we may as well make up our minds to the necessity of swallowing the National Pact sooner or later in so far as the Greeks may be able to modify it on their own account in respect of Thrace. The difficulty of getting the Greeks to hold on provisionally in Asia Minor, is one which it should be possible to get over by appealing to their own interests and the interest of the Greek population of Asia Minor. The removal of the latter concurrently with the evacuation of the Greeks army seems to be a practical impossibility.

If the proposed procedure should fail utterly, as it might, we should be no worse off in respect of the other alternatives than we now are.

In conclusion, I would lay stress on the danger of complications in Mesopotamia this spring and summer if no settlement is arrived at. I do not wish to exaggerate this danger, but the recovery of part of Mesopotamia is an integral part of the National Pact, and there is always, to my mind, a risk of the Kemalists making an effort in that direction possibly in conjunction with Bolshevik activity in Persia. It is true that the engagements of the Kemalists elsewhere would make it difficult for them to divert any considerable force to the northern frontier of

- (a) That the three Powers desired to make every concession to Turkey compatible with their own interests and their obligations elsewhere.
- (b) That the Allies sought to hold the scale evenly between Turks and Greeks.
- (c) That the three Powers looked to moderate elements grouped round the Sultan for acceptance of the terms offered, even if Angora, as at present constituted, should reject them.
- (d) That the Allies really meant to use coercive measures in the last resort.

Mesopotamia, but they might hope to achieve a good deal by a comparatively small military effort, assisted by intrigue in Kurdistan and in Mesopotamia itself.

A. R.

F.O. 406/49 pp. 103-105, No. 37

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 627-630, No. 533

No. 83

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 21st 1922.

(Received February 27)

No. 194.

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit the following translation of a telegram of the "Anatolian Agency", dated Angora February 17, which was published in the Turkish newspaper "Vakit" of the 19th instant:

"Letter sent by the Emir of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, to Mustafa Kemal Pasha"

"Jelal Bey, Acting Commissary for Foreign Affairs, read in the Grand National Assembly the following letter, sent by Amanullah Khan, Emir of Afghanistan, to Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha, President of the Grand National Assembly. The Assembly decided that a reply should be sent to the letter, the reading of which was applauded".

"To my dear brother, His Excellency, the illustrious and brave Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Zubdetullah, Nasr-ul Azim".

"Abdurrahman Bey, Representative of the Grand National Assembly has arrived here. The desire, which the sister Nation and State, Afghanistan, cherished for long years, has thus been satisfied. The choice of the Representative, who is distinguished by his mental qualities and his enlightened ideas with regard to Afghanistan, has caused us pleasure. Abdurrahman Bey has made us happy by informing us of the high and friendly hopes of the respected Great National Assembly and of the champion, my dear brother, with regard to the Afghan Nation and Government. In my belief, the firm links, which Islamism has welded between Turkey and Afghanistan, cannot be broken. I am convinced that the oppression and sufferings, of which these two Nations are at present victims, will strengthen their hopes and desires, and will help us towards our sacred goal. The Turkish officers, who have come here from time to time and worked with honesty and sincerity in different Afghan administrations, have rendered many services to the Country and the State. That is the strongest proof of the feelings to which I

referred above. I hope that gradually we shall all group ourselves round the "Rope of Allah" (Note, Quotation from the Koran), and realize our essential desire. I conclude with a prayer for the union and increase of Moslems".

Although the "Anatolian Agency" is really an organ of the Angora Government, it is not possible to say that this letter is genuine. It may very well be a forgery of the Kemalist propaganda office.

I have, etc.

(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 371/7944 E. 2233

No. 84

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 4th, 1922, 1.00 p.m.
(Received March 4th, 10.00 p.m.)

No. 134. *Telegraphic*

Mustapha Kemal was re-elected president of Grand National Assembly on March 1st. In his speech on this occasion he made following points:—

The foreign policy of nationalists consists in being friends with those who accept National Pact. Nationalists desire to strengthen bonds of friendship with Russian Soviet republic which had been first to recognize liberty and independence of Turkey. This principle would not, however, impede establishment or reestablishment of relations with states which should recognize complete independence of Turkey. Relations of perfect friendship exist with eastern states.

Mustapha Kemal stated that Constantinople represents goal of all sacrifices of Turkish nation. It has a particular importance for Turks and its preservation from attack is provided for in National Pact.

He paid a tribute to peasantry who, he declared, were real masters of Turkey and who had been unjustly oppressed in the past. These remarks were obviously designed to conciliate bulk of members of national assembly. Mustapha Kemal whilst claiming complete judicial and financial independence admitted that Turkish justice must be brought up to level of that of other countries. Finance: he said financial resources of Angora government were sufficient to last until attainment of Turkish nationalist ideals without having recourse to a foreign loan.

F.O. 371/7856 E. 2448

No. 85

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 5th, 1922, 3.45 p.m.

*(Received March 5th, 8.15 p.m.)*No. 139. *Telegraphic*

My telegram No. 134.

Further passages of Mustapha Kemal's speech as published by nationalist news agency show that it was truculent and uncompromising. His statement that "our friendship with Soviet Russia is basis of our foreign policy" indicates in my view a desire on the one hand to reassure Soviet government with regard to Yussuf Kemal's mission to Europe and on the other hand to threaten allies with bogey of Bolshevist support of Angora. His further statement that "responsibility for bloodshed is on others, and they must know there is not the slightest sign of weakening amongst Turks in defence of their rights", is in the nature of propaganda designed to impress allies on eve of Near Eastern conference. I hope to send full text of Mustapha Kemal's speech by next bag.

371/7856/E. 2452

No. 86

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 6, 1922.

(Received March 13.)

No. 225.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 134 and 139 of the 4th and 5th March respectively, giving the main points of Mustapha Kemal Pasha's speech at the opening of the third session of the Grand National Assembly at Angora on the 1st instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the speech as given by the Anatolian Agency under date of the 2nd March, and published in the local Nationalist press on the 4th March. The passages italicised were cut out by the Inter-Allied Press Censorship Commission.

2. I venture to draw your Lordship's attention to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the speech, in which Mustapha Kemal Pasha deals with the foreign policy of his Government. His statement, that the treaties concluded in 1921 with the Russian Republics and with France showed that the Treaty of Sèvres would be incapable of application, is interesting. Mustapha Kemal Pasha evidently regards these treaties with pride, although his French friends are not likely to appreciate being coupled

with Russian Bolsheviks. The diplomacy of Angora has set itself a difficult task, if it means to hoodwink both Russian Bolhevism and French capitalism. The threat to the Sultan, with which he concluded his statement on foreign policy, would probably not have been made if the Government of Constantinople had authorised his emissary, Yussuf Kemal Bey, to speak on behalf of His Imperial Majesty's Government to the "statesmen of Europe."*

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F. O. 406/49, p. 127, No. 54

No. 87

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch

6.4.1922

No. 590

Extracts

RUSO-KEMALIST RELATIONS: THE QUESTION OF A PAN-ASIATIC CONGRESS.

The following is a summary of information from an informant who is in close touch with the Kemalist Committee in Constantinople, and from an independent and reliable Turkish source in touch with Angora:—

During February, secret negotiations were being pursued between Aralov, the Russian envoy in Angora, on the one hand, and Mustafa Kemal and Jelal Bey, on the other.

These negotiations dealt primarily with the subject of the convocation of a Pan-Asiatic Congress in Anatolia. Aralov had been in communication with the Soviet Government on the subject, and, although no definite decision had been reached at the time of reporting, it was expected that Moscow would support the scheme. The Afghan and Azerbaijan representatives were present at some of the meetings, which took place between Mustafa Kemal and Aralov.

Upon one occasion, Aralov summarised his views on the subject as follows:—

"Henceforth, the peoples of Asia will no longer bow their heads to capitalists and imperialist policy. It is no longer possible to tolerate the repressive measures which are being inflicted upon some of those peoples. Europe, and even America, are falling upon Asia to satisfy their appetites. All European nations, led by the great powers such as Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany, have no other purpose than that of assuring their own interests at the expense of the peoples of

* *Yazışu, M. Kemal'in 1 Mart 1922 tarihli söylesinin çevirisi eklenmiştir. Daha önce yayımlanmış bulunduğu 30. bu söylevin metni buraya alınmadı (B.N.Ş.)*

Asia. It has been made clear to the whole world to-day, that Asia has entered the domain of civilisation and is capable of governing itself. Let the Europeans keep their civilisation for themselves, our civilisation is good enough for us. If the peoples of Asia unite and establish a strong co-operation between themselves, within half a century they will be able to supply their own needs themselves. Every effort must therefore be made to establish a union of Islamic nations as soon as possible, and, for my part, I shall be delighted to do my utmost to assist in the realisation of this ideal."

Aralov was also making energetic efforts to bring about the conclusion of an economic agreement between Anatolia and Russia. The Angora and Moscow Governments had, respectively, appointed commissions to discuss this question; and it appeared probable that a draft treaty would be ready by the end of March.

The informants were of the opinion that this treaty would facilitate the achievement of the objects for which the Pan-Asiatic Congress was to be convened.

F.O. 371/7945

No. 88

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 7, 1922

(Received March 13)

No. 235.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 232, Secret, dated this day, transmitting translations of certain documents which were stated to have been in the possession of Kemal Bey, secretary of Yussuf Kemal Bey's Mission to Europe, I have the honour to transmit the following information, received from the same source.

2. Kemal Bey stated in conversation during his stay in Constantinople that the Grand National Assembly had allocated a sum of £T. 160,000, which at the present rate of exchange is a little less than 25,000l., to the mission. Of this sum £T. 50,000 were for travelling expenses and the remaining £T. 110,000 for secret purposes.

3. Among other statements attributed to Kemal Bey are the following: When Prince Eumer Farouk Effendi was sent back from Inebolu to Constantinople early in 1921, Hamdullah Subhi Bey, a member of the Grand National Assembly, telegraphed the news to Angora, stating that the Prince wished to reign in Anatolia. This telegram was read to the Grand National Assembly, and several Deputies denounced the Prince. The Deputies were given to understand that the Sultan was sold to the British, and the Assembly was adjourned for two months to enable the Deputies to visit their constituencies and carry on an anti-dynastic propaganda. This propaganda did not meet with much encouragement, especially

in the regions of Sivas, Konia and Erzeroum, the inhabitants of which are devoted to the Sultanate and the Caliphate.

4. The last time M. Franklin-Bouillon was at Angora he had advocated the abolition of the dual system of Angora and Constantinople. Mustapha Kemal Pasha had told him that this could only be accomplished by the dethronement of the Sultan, who was a slave of the English and had betrayed his country.

5. Shortly before his interview with M. Poincaré, Yussuf Kemal Bey telegraphed to Ferid Bey, the representative of the Angora Government in Paris, that as long as the present Sultan was on the throne it was impossible to do anything for the French, and that the English were the most important factors in a settlement of the Near Eastern question. In principle the French are of the same opinion, but they are unable to come to terms with Mr. Lloyd George, and the question is put off from day to day.

6. The Angora Government were being pressed by the Russians to grant them mining concessions, and would probably have to give them more than twenty mines. Their only hope was to obtain more favourable terms from the French before the 20th March, when they would have to give a definite answer to the Russians. This question was of vital importance for the Angora Government.

7. Persons in touch with Mustapha Kemal Pasha have the greatest respect for him, and this respect has, if possible, increased of late through admiration of his activity. His entourage say that it is much better to be in the service of a man of sublime character, the saviour and protector of the nation, than in that of an ignorant Sovereign whose sole ambition is to continue to reign. As Yussuf Kemal Bey said to Jelal Mukhtar Bey a few days ago at the office of the Red Crescent, "The Sultan requires spectacles to see his failings, but if he purchases them from English shops and from his brother-in-law (Damad Ferid Pasha), it is not surprising that he is unable to perceive anything new."

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 406/49, p. 132, No. 58

No. 89

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 13, 1922.
(Received March 20.)

No. 255.

My Lord,

HAVING seen in the local press a statement to the effect that the Turkish Government had received several telegrams from Izzet Pasha, in one of which he

had reported at length an interview he had had with your Lordship, I called on the Grand Vizier to-day with a view to ascertaining from his Highness what foundation there was for the statement in question. I also mentioned to his Highness the further statement in the press that the Council of ministers had considered yesterday the results achieved by Izzet Pasha's Mission.

2. The Grand Vizier replied that beyond knowing that Izzet Pasha had reached Paris, the Turkish Government were without news of him. Tewfik Pasha stated that the telegrams exchanged between the Turkish Government and their representatives in European capitals generally took three days in transmission. This caused great inconvenience. The Grand Vizier, who had seen the statement to which I alluded, said that it was an invention. I am not, however, quite satisfied that his explanation is correct as I know that the Turkish Government have received at least one telegram from Izzet Pasha.

3. In this connection, I learn from a good source that Izzet Pasha was at first unwilling to undertake his mission to Europe, since he considered it doubtful whether he would obtain any favourable result. The same source states that the Central Government are by no means in agreement with the National Pact, though they are solid with Angora with regard to the necessity for the evacuation of Turkish territory by the Greeks. The Central Government are also stated to be under the impression that the French Government are beginning to feel considerable embarrassment on account of the extreme claims of the Angora Government. Izzet Pasha has, therefore, been instructed to act solely in the name of the Central Government.

4. From a Havas Reuter telegram from London, published in this morning's press, it would appear that Izzet Pasha is concerned to make out that the ideas of the Angora Government are much the same as his own, and that he will get into touch with Yussuf Kemal Bey as soon as the latter arrives in London. Izzet Pasha is reported as having expressed satisfaction with the conversation he had with your Lordship on the 9th instant.

5. In the course of further conversation, the Grand Vizier referred to the reports of a Veniselist movement in Asia Minor to resist the evacuation of Anatolia. He stated that he had heard that 150 Veniselist officers had left Constantinople via Panderma and Smyrna. His Highness seemed apprehensive of the consequences to the country if the evacuation by the Greek army were not regulated and superintended by Allied officers. It would not do, in his opinion, for the Kemalist forces to replace the Greeks too quickly.

6. I listened to the Grand Vizier's remarks on this subject, but did not offer any comment. I then said that it looked as if Mustapha Kemal was more than ever counting on the Soviet Government for support. The Grand Vizier quoted in reply the Turkish proverb which says that: "A drowning man clutches at a serpent." I

pointed out that the serpent would probably bite Mustapha Kemal. The Grand Vizier said that he had never been able to tolerate Bolshevik doctrines and had always been apprehensive lest the Nationalists might commit themselves too far with the Bolsheviks.

7. The information which has recently been received at this High Commission points to the growth of Bolshevik influence in Anatolia. The Bolshevik representative at Angora appears to be a man of great energy, who has been negotiating the conclusion of an economic agreement with the Angora Government. The Bolsheviks are making propaganda against the granting of concessions in Anatolia to Western capitalists. In spite of the statements made by M. Méry as reported in my telegram No. 121 of the 27th February, I learn from the British military authorities that the pay of the Kemalist army is in arrears and that this state of things can only be remedied by Bolshevik money. The Kemalists seem also to be having friction with the French regarding payment for arms supplied for the gendarmerie. Everything therefore points at present to close collaboration between Mustapha Kemal and the Bolsheviks.

8. The necessity for this collaboration has caused the Nationalists to relax their severity towards the Communists and to allow the "Yeni Dünya," the organ of the Communists, to resume publication. On the other hand, the Grand Vizier stated to-day that he had seen a certain Muktar Bey on his passage through Constantinople to join Yussuf Kemal Bey's Mission. Muktar Bey had informed the Grand Vizier that, with the exception of some twenty Communists, the National Assembly was loyal to the Sultanate and to the Caliphate.

9. I have kept out of the press the telegram from the Viceroy to His Majesty's Government endorsing the demands of Indian Moslems for the restoration of Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople, to Turkey, as I considered that this telegram would lead to undesirable comment at this juncture. I have merely allowed the publication of Mr. Montagu's resignation without any indication of its causes.

10. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 406/49, pp. 139-140, No. 61

No. 90

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 14, 1922

(Received March 20.)

No. 259

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit the following translation of a communication of the "Anatolian Agency," which has been kept out of the local press by the Inter-Allied Press Censorship Commission giving an account of declarations made to the Grand National Assembly by Jelal Bey, Acting Commissary for Foreign Affairs respecting the Turkish mission to Europe:—

2. *"Angora March 7.*—In reply to questions at yesterday's session of the Grand National Assembly respecting the journey of Yussuf Kemal Bey, Commissary for Foreign Affairs, and respecting his interviews at Constantinople, Jelal Bey, Deputy Commissary for Foreign Affairs, made certain statements. After the fall of the Cabinet of Damad Ferid Pasha, whose acts were prejudicial to the country, there came to power the Government of Tewfik Pasha. Izzet Pasha, though lacking in will and sagacity, wished, in virtue of his reputation, to play a part in connection with the life and independence of the country. With his colleagues, he facilitated the enemy's objects, and brought about a cleavage in the feelings of the country. Izzet Pasha, who did not abstain from efforts to cause the dissolution of the struggle which we had started against the terms of the Treaty of Sévres, visited Anatolia to persuade us to accept that treaty. He explained both verbally and in writing that the Treaty of Sévres could not be modified even in the future, and endeavoured to incline Anatolia to his point of view.

3. "Afterwards, Izzet Pasha's Mission agreed, as a result of discussions at Angora, that our policy was right and that they were in the wrong. They declared in writing, in a document dated the 2nd March, 1921, that they shared our views, and that on their departure they would hand in their resignations and occupy themselves at Constantinople solely with their private affairs. Yet, after being allowed to go free on the strength of this guarantee, they on their arrival at Constantinople resigned merely for the sake of appearances and to give the impression that they were respecting their undertakings. They shortly afterwards entered the Cabinet.

4. "Jelal Bey read the telegram sent by Izzet Pasha to Anatolia on his becoming Minister for Foreign Affairs on the eve of the Greek offensive, as well as the telegram sent in reply by his Excellency Mustapha Kemal Pasha. Izzet Pasha stated in his telegram that he had accepted the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on account of the gravity of the political situation, and on account of the danger

which the dispositions of the Allied Powers to aid Greece involved, especially for Constantinople, mentioning that for a few days a calmness had been apparent in European opinion, and that lately there had been a current in our favour. He added, optimistically, that the evacuation of Smyrna had been discussed. In his reply of the 28th/29th June, 1921, Mustapha Kemal Pasha informed him that the position was not in harmony with the undertaking which he had entered into along with Salih Pasha, reminded him of the Angora conversations, and expressed the fear that he had been deceived again. The Greek offensive, which occurred shortly afterwards, showed clearly how erroneous Izzet Pasha's observations were. In view of the constant political changes of the people living in Constantinople in an atmosphere of slavery, tyranny and distress, Yussuf Kemal Bey last week on his passage through Constantinople invited these personages to return to their duty to their country and conscience, and warned them to put themselves in the right and not to interfere with the lawful attitude and activities of the Grand National Assembly. Unfortunately, Yussuf Kemal Bey found himself exposed to a number of intrigues. The best proof of this is Izzet Pasha's visit to Europe.

5. "Another disgusting manoeuvre is Izzet Pasha's wishing to show that this journey is undertaken of his own initiative and after its necessity had been pointed out by foreign diplomatic circles, while it was undertaken only as a result of encouragement given by the Opposition. However, an interview of Yussuf Kemal Bey with a competent personage, alleged to have demonstrated the necessity of this journey, proved that this pretension was not true. This personage could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the conduct of Izzet Pasha and his colleagues.

6. "Jelal Bey concluded his declaration thus:—

"Izzet Pasha is proceeding on his journey across Europe by rail, through territories in Greek occupation, protected by Greek bayonets and perhaps under the Greek flag. Yussuf Kemal Bey is also continuing his journey by sea without touching at the Pineus. This action of certain narrow and greedy politicians of Constantinople, calculated to cause difficulties, cannot possibly prevent us from proceeding resolutely and firmly towards the realisation of our object. We are convinced that, by the grace of God, the blood of the martyrs shed for the realisation of our sacred object will not have been in vain. I desire to declare once more from this seat that we are firmly resolved to reach our final goal, no matter what the sacrifice may be. Though we are exposed to tyranny, and the mothers, who have lost their children, are weeping bitter tears, history will register the end of a narrow, common, wretched, insciant and soulless group which turns its back upon facts. Of course, the nation will say the last word."

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

No. 91

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch

16.3.1922

No. 621

Extracts

THE ANGORA GOVERNMENT AND REFUGEES FROM RUMELIA

According to information from a very good source, the Angora Government, towards the end of 1921, conceived the idea of organising a special force, recruited exclusively from among Moslem refugees, who had made their way to Anatolia from former European provinces of the Turkish Empire. To this end, during December last, Sherif Bey, deputy for Adrianople, was sent on a journey of inspection and investigation to Thrace. This individual, on the 27th January of this year, shortly after his return to Angora, submitted a report on his mission to Mustafa Kemal.

A translation of this report is given as an Appendix to this summary. Sherif Bey stated in it, that he had found the refugees imbued with an ardent desire for the establishment of the independence of the nation, but although the plan that had been suggested might at first sight appear possible, there were certain serious objections to it of a political and administrative nature. In the first place Sherif Bey considered that such a proceeding would be detrimental to the ideal of Islamic unity, which the Angora Government cherished, and would give rise to an impression that there was a certain national difference between the Turks of Rumelia and Anatolia. He pointed out that separatist ideas had developed amongst the Kurds solely on account of the difference in nationality, and a similar reason lay at the root of differences with the Albanians and Circassians. He therefore strongly advised the Government to abandon the scheme in question.

Sherif Bey's report was sent for consideration to a preliminary commission.

A DELEGATION FROM ALEXANDRETTA TO ANGORA.

A Turkish officer, who arrived in Constantinople from Angora on the 19th March, gave the following information:—

A delegation of notables from Alexandretta arrived at Angora on the 12th March. Among the delegates were Redjeb Avni, Bekir Zade-Haji Mohieddin, and Hodja Essadullah Effendi. On the following day they were received by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, to whom they presented a petition signed by 120 notables of Alexandretta, to be submitted to the Great National Assembly.

The petition set forth the reasons of the inhabitants against the form of administration to be given to Alexandretta by the French, and stated that the inhabitants of the region, the majority of whom are Turks, were opposed to

separation from their mother country Turkey. They asked to be considered in the same category as Thrace, and to be included in the National Pact. They suggested that the necessary steps should be taken with the French Government to allow a plebiscite to be taken if necessary. In the event of their demands not being listened to, the petitioners stated that the Turks of Alexandretta would be obliged to leave their houses and property, and to come and settle in Turkey.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha told the delegates that the existing political situation did not permit of taking the steps which they suggested. He asked them to have patience for the sake of their country; but, nevertheless, assured them in the name of the Great National Assembly, that the question of Alexandretta would not be forgotten.

Although the petition referred to may be regarded as having been presented in the interests of the Turkish inhabitants of the Alexandretta region, this information tends, in the informant's opinion, to confirm what is already known of the growing desire of populations in Syria and Palestine, to return to Turkish rule.

F.O. 371/7861

No. 92

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch

24.3.1922

No. 620

Extracts

PARTIES IN GREAT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

The following summary of information from various Nationalist sources is given in amplification of a report on pages 1 and 2 of Summary No.579:—

The Great National Assembly now consists of over 360 deputies, a large number of whom are officers and former members of the C.U.P. Elections are a mere farce and most of these deputies have been simply nominated. *The Defence of Rights party* is in the majority, but are certain members such as Hamdullah Subhi, Jevad Abbas and Kara Vasif, who are not always amenable to party discipline.

Other parties in the Great National Assembly are as follows:—

The Clerical Party: This Party consists of 20 to 25 deputies, led by Hoja Vehbi (Konia), Basri (Karassi), Abdul Ghafur (Karassi), Mehmed Akif (Kastamuni) the poet, Mufid Bey (Kirshehir), and Esref Edib, proprietor of the Sebil-ul-Reshad. Colonel Selaheddin Bey and Colonel Hosref Bey, deputies for Mersine and Trebizond, also support this Party, which cooperates with another group known as the Eastern Provinces Party; and it is said to be secretly encouraged by the Afghan Minister, Sultan Ahmed Khan. Selaheddin Bey is of a very violent

temperament and has been unable to form a separate Party. He is a bitter opponent of Mustafa Kemal, by whom he is feared more than any other deputy.

The Eastern Provinces Party: This Party consists of 45 to 50 members and is distinct from the Clerical group. Its particular members are Salih Effendi (Erzerum), Hussein Avni (Erzerum), Mustafa Torak (Erzerum) and Emir Pasha (Sivas). The coalition between this party and the Clerical group forms the strongest opposition group in the Assembly. It was this Group which openly drew the attention of the Assembly to Mustafa Kemal's private excesses, and which has been instrumental in a certain diminution of Mustafa Kemal's influence.

The So-called Communist Party: This Party is under the direction of Mahmud Essad Bey. Other members of this group are, Tewfik Bey (Menteshe), Numan Usta (Constantinople), Colonel Bekir Sami Bey. The last two are still under arrest, the first at Dadai and the second at Bolu.

The Unionist Group: This Group consists of Yunus Nadi, Nejati, Haji Muhieddin, Hussein Avni and Hafiz Mehmed. Yunus Nadi, however, frequently supports Mustafa Kemal's Party, and his newspaper the "Yeni Gun" receives Ltqs. 1,000 monthly from the Angora Government, which is a powerful factor in Yunus Nadi's conduct.

The Kume Party: This Group is in process of formation and is apparently intended to be a definite coalition of the Clerical Party and the Eastern Provinces Party, together with the dissatisfied section of the Defence of Rights Party. A political programme has been drawn up which is being kept secret for the moment, but will be announced when the party is definitely constituted. The programme aims at the restriction of various abuses in the administration, the existing Constitutional law and the convocation of a Constituent Assembly for the elaboration of a Constitution on European lines.

As an Appendix is given a summary of the political programme of this Group. It should be noted that the word Kume itself means a group. It is not quite clear whether this is to be the title of the party, or whether a definite name has not yet been selected.

The Tevhid Club Group: This Group comprises the personal supporters of Rauf and Fethi Beys. Although opposed for many reasons to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, it does not favour any internal divisions at the present moment, and is endeavouring to reconcile provisionally the various conflicting currents of political opinion. It is, however worthy of note that Rauf Bey, who was recently elected Vice-President of the Defence of Rights Party is reported in the Press to have resigned this position.

No. 93

Sir H. Rumbold to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 26, 1922, 8.45 p.m.
(Received in Paris March 27, 10 a.m.)

No. 12 *Telegraphic*

My telegram No. 10.

Following for Marquess Curzon:—

Grand Vizier has replied in writing to joint communication to the effect that since Armistice question is not the sole concern of the Constantinople Government proposal has been communicated to KEMAL, whose answer will be notified as soon as received.

Reply then proceeds to observe that the joint communication of the three High Commissioners in announcing eventual evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks makes no mention of similar evacuation of Thrace including Adrianople "without which Capital of Empire cannot be considered as free from danger of future aggression".

Repeated to Foreign Office.

F.O. 371/7858/E. 3348

D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. XVII, p. 765, No. 572

No. 94

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 26th March 1922

No. 304

Secret.

My Lord,

The Grand Vizier called on me yesterday.

2. His Highness began by referring to a conversation he had had with Your Lordship at the time of the Conference in London in March of last year. On that occasion he had stated that the Sultan was anxious to conclude a separate agreement with England. The Grand Vizier had recognised that such a solution was not practicable at that moment and Your Lordship had agreed that it was not possible for His Majesty's Government to take separate action from their Allies at that juncture. The conversation in question is recorded in Your Lordship's despatch No. 240 of March 15, 1921.

3. The Grand Vizier then informed me that the Sultan had sent for him yesterday and that he had proceeded to the Palace after the Cabinet Council. The Sultan had then unfolded to him the following proposal which His Majesty had instructed him to communicate to me, with the request that I would lay it before Your Lordship. The proposal is to the following effect:—That an agreement should be concluded between England and Turkey under which the latter would entrust to England the maintenance of the liberty of the Straits in the interest impartially of all nations. England could either use her own troops for the purpose of Turkish Gendarmerie, which would be put at her disposal by the Turkish Government and would be under her orders. In fact the administration of the strip of territory necessary to ensure the maintenance of the freedom of the Straits would be vested in British hands.

4. The Sultan thought that such an agreement would remove the objection to the return to Turkey of Eastern Thrace and Adrianople, since England being invested with the guardianship of the Straits on behalf of all nations, would have nothing to fear in the future. Such an agreement would once and for all destroy the idea prevailing in India and elsewhere that England is hostile to the Caliphate and wishes to destroy Turkey. The agreement would be a striking proof of the contrary and would proclaim to the Moslem world the fact that England was the associate or the protector of the Caliphate.

5. The Grand Vizier went on to say that he quite realised that the Allies had bound themselves not to conclude separate agreements with Turkey. To meet this objection the Sultan had recalled the fact that at the time of the Congress of Berlin, Great Britain had been given Cyprus in return for a guarantee of the protection of Asia Minor against Russian interference. This arrangement had been negotiated directly between England and Turkey without the cognizance of the other Powers and had, he thought, been communicated to the Conference whilst it was sitting. The Sultan had also referred to the policy of England in Egypt. The basis of this policy had been and would continue to be the determination to keep open British communications with the East through the Suez Canal. This object had been achieved and the Egyptians had at the same time secured their complete independence. His Majesty did not see why the same results should not be obtained in the case of the Straits. The freedom of the Straits was of the utmost importance to British interests. England, therefore could be entrusted with the maintenance of that freedom which need not interfere with the full independence of Turkey. The Sultan considered that of all the Powers, England was the most far-seeing.

6. The Grand Vizier said that he was in agreement with the proposal which his Majesty had put forward. He had reflected over this proposal all night and had come to me to-day to ask me to transmit it to Your Lordship. The Sultan had impressed on him the necessity of secrecy in this matter and had even asked him

not to mention this proposal to the other Turkish Ministers not excepting Izzet Pasha. He hoped, therefore, that Your Lordship would treat this matter equally confidentially and not communicate the proposal to the French or Italians. Finally His Majesty had declared that if an agreement on the lines indicated could be reached with England he would sign and ratify it at once.

7. I listened to the Grand Vizier's statement with great attention and at the end of it I thanked him for it as well as for the confidence which the Sultan seemed willing to repose in my country. But I thought it only right to remind His Highness of the criticism which the action of France in concluding the Franco-Kemalist agreement behind the backs of her Allies had aroused on the part of British public opinion. Was not the Sultan asking us to contemplate an action similar to that for which we had blamed the French? The Grand Vizier replied that the circumstances were not quite similar. The Franco-Kemalist agreement, had done great harm; it had made the Kemalists arrogant and intractable. An agreement with England such as the Sultan had suggested would on the contrary be to the benefit of the whole world. I replied that I thought that it would tend to rouse jealousy on the part of the Allies. I also asked the Grand Vizier how the Nationalists would view such an agreement. He replied that they could not possibly object to it, especially if it resulted in the return to Turkey of Eastern Thrace with Adrianople.

8. In speaking as he did of the Franco-Kemalist agreement, it is clear that the Grand Vizier was largely animated by the resentment felt by the Sultan and possibly himself, at having been side-tracked in this matter. Whilst I see the obvious objections to the proposal made by the Sultan, I think it would be a mistake to look upon it merely as a device in accordance with Turkish policy to separate the Allies. I believe the Sultan to be sincerely imbued with the desire for close relations with England. He has never made any secret of this desire. He notes the close relations at present existing between France and Angora and he is afraid of the extent to which Mustafa Kemal has committed himself to the Soviet Government. He foresees the moment when the Nationalists will be free to come to Constantinople bringing with them perhaps their commitments both to France and to Soviet Russia. He looks about for a protector and he instinctively turns to England. I, therefore, hope that whatever reply Your Lordship may see fit to return to the Sultan's proposal, and the Sultan will expect a reply, it will if it is a refusal, be made as palatable as possible to the Sultan and his Government.

9. Before he left, the Grand Vizier told me that the Sultan had often felt the irksomeness of having to converse with me through an interpreter. If he could talk English or French, His Majesty would open his mind much more freely to me.

I have, etc.

(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

No. 95

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch

3-4-1922

No. 630

Extract

The following is a summary of information from independent and well informed sources;—

The announcement of the Allied proposals for an armistice was received with the greatest satisfaction by the mass of the population in all parts of Anatolia as well as by the lower ranks of the Army. At the same time there was a general feeling of anxiety regarding the attitude of the Angora Government and there were certain indications of possible disturbances in the Konia and Tokat areas in the event of the Allied proposals being rejected.

The Angora Government, on the other hand, was more or less prepared for the proposals, and, although it was decided that no definite step should be taken before personal information from Yusuf Kemal had been received, the members of the Government and of the Defence of Rights party, together with the envoys of the various Russian Governments, maintained that the proposals were merely another stratagem on the part of the British Government to protect and assist the Greeks.

In the circles mentioned it was maintained that the Greek Ministers Gounaris and Baltazis knew beforehand the details of the proposals to be rejected by the Greek Army in Anatolia in spite of acceptance by the Athens Government. The British were regarded as being a party to this arrangement and as supporting the movement for the establishment of the Independence of Western Anatolia.

There was also a general conviction in the same circles that the Central Government had become an instrument of the British; and the majority of the members of the Government and the Defence of Rights Party advocated the immediate rupture of all relations with the Sublime Porte.

Mustafa Kemal, who had not given any hint of his own personal views, *had been in constant communication with the Bolshevik envoy, Aralov*, and had, at the same time, invited Ali Ihsan Pasha, Ismet Pasha and Yakib Shevki Pasha to proceed at once to Angora. Telegrams were also sent to Jevad Pasha and Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha with a request for their views.

The Angora Government was nevertheless obliged to observe the utmost caution; for not only was the attitude of the majority towards the Sublime Porte strongly opposed by Rauf Bey, but the various opposition parties were deliberating with a view to pursuing a united policy with regard to the Allied proposals.

The attitude, which the opposition parties would adopt in this connection, was indicated in the course of a secret sitting of the Great National Assembly on the 12th March when Mustafa Kemal Pasha and several General Staff Officers were present. This sitting was held to discuss reports from various Commanders to the Special War Commission with regard to the military situation, morale, munition supplies and the need of officers. These reports were accompanied by the comments of the Special War Commission, which were of an optimistic nature. Fevzi Pasha read a summary of the reports and announced the decisions that had been taken by the Special War Commission. Kiazim Pasha, Commissioner for National Defence, then made a speech, in which he expressed the opinion that nothing more was to be expected from the Paris Conference than from other previous Conferences of Representatives of the "Imperialistic Governments" and that peace on the basis of the National Pact could only be obtained by force of arms.

Both Fevzi Pasha and Kiazim Pasha were loudly applauded by the deputies belonging to the Defence of Rights party; but Colonel Omer Lutfi Bey voiced the opinions of the Opposition in a speech which provoked a tumult. He insisted that the comments of the Special War Commission tended to slur over the hard facts reported by the Army Commanders, viz., the superiority of the enemy armament, the inferiority of the greater part of the munitions supplied by the Russians, and the doubtfulness of the result if hostilities should be resumed. In concluding, he asked who would accept the responsibility, if the Turkish Army were defeated. He therefore moved that the report of the Special War Commission should not be accepted as satisfactory, but the motion was rejected by acclamation and the sitting was suspended.

F.O. 371/7861

No. 96

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 4th April 1922

(Received April 10)

No. 335

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 132 of March 31st I have the honour to submit the following report on the attitude of the local Turkish press since March 23, to the proceedings of the Paris Conference.

2. The nationalist papers (and all the Turkish papers with one exception are nationalist) continue to manifest great hostility to the idea of an Armistice. Their language on this subject is similar to that reported in my despatch No. 310 of

March 28. Prominence is given to affirmations of an unalterable determination not to lay down the sword until the territories occupied by the Greeks have been completely evacuated. During the last day or two accounts have been published of meetings all over Anatolia to protest against the relinquishment of the struggle; more particularly a meeting held at Angora on March 31 outside the Grand National Assembly, at which one of the speakers was Papa Efim the leader of the "Orthodox Turk" movement. The papers also publish an order of the day issued by Mustafa Kemal on March 30 on the occasion of the anniversary of the second battle of the Sakaria (1921). In this order, Mustafa Kemal reminds the Army of its duty to the country, and expresses confidence that it will shortly rid Turkey of the pollution of the enemy's presence.

3. Since March 28, however, the main subject of comment has naturally been the peace basis elaborated at the Conference. The attitude of the Turkish papers towards the peace proposals is one of general hostility, although it is recognised that a great advance has been made, and on certain points the papers are guarded e.g. they for the most part avoid any definite suggestion that an immediate resumption of active hostilities is inevitable, and they take the line that the proposals are to be regarded as a prelude to further discussion, in the course of which Turkey may hope to get a good deal more. The papers abound in declarations that the National Pact constitutes the irreducible minimum of what Turkey can accept and that it admits of no bargaining.

4. Ahmed Emin Bey in the *Wakit* takes the general line that the final Paris proposals supersede the Armistice proposal, which merges in them and becomes merely a question of the modalities of execution of a general settlement. Like all the other leader writers, he rejects any idea of giving up either Adrianople or Gallipoli, but in two articles he admits the right of the Powers to require guarantees for the freedom of the Straits. He does not indicate the nature of the guarantees which in his opinion might be given, but he says that there should be no difficulty in devising safeguards which would protect the free passage of the Straits without endangering the safety of Constantinople. The same paper published in its issue of March 31 an article by a military correspondent criticising the proposed frontier in Thrace. The writer contends that so long as the Greeks remain in Western Thrace and part of Eastern Thrace, Constantinople must be at the mercy of a Greek attack at any moment, and he scouts the idea that this can be guarded against by any system of demilitarisation.

5. The nationalist papers generally make great capital out of information from Paris that the action of the Allies is in the nature of mediation, and that coercion will not be used, should the new proposals be rejected. The *Hürriyet*, developing this theme, draws a distinction between the liquidation of the Greco-Turkish conflict and the general peace settlement. In regard to the former, it says that the Powers can and do assume the role of would be arbitrators. It will therefore be for Angora to state its case as against the Paris proposals. The *Hürriyet*

hopes that such a statement will enlighten the Powers and facilitate their further efforts at mediation. Otherwise no power on earth can prevent the Turkish Army and people from holding the Greeks to account. Turning to the general settlement i.e. the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, the *Ileri* states that Turkey, punished more than sufficiently by the loss of vast territories, is fully entitled to ask for Smyrna, Adrianople, Mosul and Constantinople, and for freedom in fiscal and judicial matters. In its second leading article on the subject, published on April 1, it suggests that the only real way to achieve a durable general settlement is to have a Congress of all the powers interested. It mentions a long list of such powers namely the United States of America, Russia, Bulgaria, Roumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Germany, Austria and Hungary. The writer emphasises rather significantly the special interest of the United States of America, Germany and Russia, especially the latter.

6. The same paper the *Ileri*, of March 30, heads its leading article "Turkey and England". The bulk of the article is an attack on the Greeks. The title is justified only by some general considerations to the effect that, with France and Italy friendly, it only remains to bring British policy into line with the National Pact, and that Turkey and Great Britain have common interests which should bring them together, while there is no divergence of interest to drive them apart.

7. Both the *Ileri* and the *Wakt* of March 28 repudiated violently any suggestion that Turkey should be called on to pay an indemnity to the Greeks, and emphasised the enormous losses in which the Greek occupation had involved Turkey. These articles would appear to have been suggested by some indication in the press or the Agency telegrams that the Powers were considering the Greek claim to be indemnified for their efforts in Asia Minor and Thrace.

8. The Turkish papers generally give considerable prominence to the news from Athens. There is a national tendency to exploit the difficulties of the Greek Government in a spirit of elation. The ready acceptance by the Greeks of the Armistice proposal is hailed as a sign of weakness. Some of the papers represent the Greek Government as having already accepted the peace proposals, and this is regarded as a still further indication of the hopelessness of the Greek position.

9. Two papers of April 3, the *Wakt* and the *Terdjuman-i Hakikat* publish telegrams from their special correspondents at Angora, dated April 2. One of the telegrams in the *Wakt* states that in Angora the peace proposals are regarded as far from satisfying the legitimate national demands of Turkey, and that every one is prepared to do his duty by the country. Another reproduces a strenuous declaration by Sheref Bey, a Thracian deputy. The *Terdjuman-i Hakikat* telegram says that the Angora Government have practically come to a decision to reject the peace proposals as unacceptable, although Yussuf Kemal Bey's arrival is being awaited before a reply is actually sent. He was expected to arrive on the afternoon of April 3.

10. The *Peyam-Sabah*, the only anti-Kemalist Turkish paper in Constantinople, is in a difficult position. Its editor Ali Kemal Bey is an able and fearless writer, though not a man of the highest principles of consistency. He has now to combine hostility to Angora with an endeavour to identify himself with national principles and an effort to prove that the comparative success achieved by the Turks is not due to the Kemalists but to a logical evolution of Allied policy towards reasonableness. Even he, in his leading article of April 4, says that to make the peace proposals acceptable, Adrianople and Gallipoli must be restored to Turkey, the proposals for an Armenian National Home and for the protection of minorities, which he considers at present vague, must be defined in such a way as not to be incompatible with Turkish independence, and the reduction of the Army to 45,000 men and the abolition of conscription must be relaxed. Writing a week earlier on March 28, he was more moderate, admitted that the maintenance of the Capitulations and the Public Debt was natural, and urged peaceful methods.

11. The supply of papers from Anatolia continues to be bad, and only those from the towns on or near the coast reach Constantinople easily. The general tone of such as have reached me since the beginning of the Conference may be inferred the following heading in large letters in the *Istikbal* of Trebizond of March 27.

"The Entente Powers on Curzon's proposal have proposed an Armistice to the belligerents. This proposal is a new English snare, with its very senseless conditions, and its failure to indicate what the future is to be. No Turk will fall into this snare. Peace can be proposed to us in an honourable manner and with the promise and assurance that our National Pact will be accepted". Other papers from Anatolia take a similar line regarding the Armistice proposal. All of course desire a common inspiration from Angora.

12. I enclose three extracts translated from the *Wakt* which illustrate the general attitude of the press here, a longer extract from the *İleri* of April 2, which deals with the bearing of the Genoa Conference on the Turkish question, and a memorandum on the attitude of the local Greek and American press.

I have, etc.

(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 371/7860/E. 3780

ENCLOSURE : IN No. 96

Attitude of the Armenian and Greek Press with regard to the conditions proposed by the Paris Conference for a settlement of the question of the Near East

At the commencement of the Conference the Armenian Press expressed hopes that decisive action be taken with regard to the Armenian question. On learning

that this question had been referred to the League of Nations the tone of the Armenian Press assumed a very pessimistic note, in fact one of utter despair. Desperate attempts were made calling attention to the grave injustice which, it was considered, was being done to the Armenians by neglecting their aspirations and desiderata while every effort was made in endeavouring to settle the Turkish-Greek dispute and the different factors depending on same. The view of the Armenian Press was that neither Angora nor Athens would accept the conditions as proposed in Paris in which event Peace would again be delayed to the further discomfiture and added sufferings of the Armenian nation.

It is considered that Conference has rendered it more difficult than even to solve the Armenian Question. The following is a typical passage in one of the Armenian papers: "The Peace Conference of Paris has opened a thorny and troublesome road on which the Armenians are compelled to walk with their bleeding feet. We must so trudge along as the world is not ashamed in seeing that blood, nor its incapacity."

In general the Armenian Press has dealt only superficially with the Greco-Turkish problem and has confined itself to reproducing the two different points of view as set forth in the Greek and Turkish press.

All the sympathies of the Armenians are with the Greeks and especially in favour of the Christian minorities in Anatolia.

The Greek Press of pro-Venizelist sympathies has busily occupied itself with blaming Gounaris and the Hellenic Government for having failed to win the favour of the Allies attributing this failure to the lack of an able and competent leader to defend capably the Greek claims and interests. The Press was in general, inclined beforehand to be pessimistic with regard to the results of the Conference being in favour of Greece. Their only hope was based on the support of Great Britain. On the full announcement of the conditions as proposed at Paris the Greek papers unanimously expressed disappointment, and great discontent, going so far as to make disparaging illusions against France and Italy. A certain bombastic tone was even remarked in expressions of determinations to retain Smyrna and its hinterland, Thrace, etc. Pictures were drawn of complete evacuation of the occupied territories by the Christians and unredeemed Greeks who could under no circumstances freely subject themselves to the Turkish pre-war regime and persecution. References were made to the Patriarchate having notified the Conference and all the civilized world of the unsatisfactory nature of the conditions proposed by the Paris Conference.

With reference to the acceptance of the terms of Armistice the Greek Press is convinced that this will not occur and telegrams from Smyrna, Athens and the Front have been quoted. The general argument may be taken to be as follows: "The Turks have never honoured Treaties and agreements, hence how can we accept to submit to sufferings, deportations, massacres, etc. which have taken

place up to the present day? The Greek Press considers that the terms drawn up in Paris are all in favour of the Turks who fought against the Allies, while the Greeks were Allies also. That so long as Turkish despotism exists in Turkey, Peace cannot exist. That Greeks are not only in the majority, but are undoubtedly more civilized than the Turks."

The general attitude and tone of the Greek papers is that terms should not be accepted and going so far as to threaten resistance to the last degree as such a peace would be a dishonourable Peace. There has also been talk of the real "National Defence" being forced to devolve upon the Greeks in Smyrna and Asia Minor actually occupied.

F.O. 371 7860/E. 3780.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 96

Concluding paragraphs of leading Article by Ahmed Emin Bey in the "FAKT" of March 31st 1922

Our opinion is that nobody has seriously thought it likely that the conclusion of Peace could be possible on the basis proposed in the Note. We must however, admit this, that having regard to the difficult situation of the Powers, it was not perhaps to be expected that they should show greater goodwill than this or go further at the outset. The path of discussion has been left open and a possibility has been created of continuing the discussion. There is no obstacle in the way of the continuance of discussion on these conditions; only, until the phase of execution is reached there can be no talk of an Armistice.

If Peace is seriously desired it will be fully understood that our minimum claims constitute the only guarantee for a lasting peace. When that time comes another point will also become clear, namely that the Turkish Nation does not, as the informant of the "Times" supposes, cherish Extremist tendencies, and that they have nothing in their minds but the preparation of an era of serious and tranquil endeavour.

F.O. 371 7860/E. 3780.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 96

Concluding paragraph of leading Article by Ahmed Emin Bey in the "FAKT" of March 29th 1922

There is a real difference of interests between us and the Powers on one point, that is, the question of the Straits. To be able to fortify the Straits and to close them when we liked is of course a thing which would please us. If it were so we could lie comfortably in our beds in Constantinople. As against this the powers are interested in the Straits being open and not being closed in or out of season. We are compelled on this point to sacrifice our own interest to the general wish and

interest. We must appreciate and accept this necessity sincerely. Besides the Powers having a Coast line on the Black Sea, there are other Powers having Maritime and Economic interests who are interested in the Straits question. The nature of the guarantees necessary for the passage of the Straits to remain always safe and of the guarantees necessary to enable us to live in security in Constantinople on this open passage, must be discussed and defined with goodwill, the sincere object at issue being kept in view.

F.O. 371/7860/E. 3780

ENCLOSURE 4 IN No. 96

Concluding paragraph of leading Article by Ahmed Emin Bey, in the "VAKT" of April 2nd 1922

In our opinion it is useless to await the answers to be given by Angora and Athens in order to have a clear view of the situation. In view of the last developments, Angora will not give a separate answer to the Armistice proposal, as this proposal has been reduced to the position of a consequence of the proposals for a general settlement. Angora will content itself with stating its point of view on the general proposals. As to what this point of view is, no one has any hesitation. On the other hand the lines of the answer which Athens will give can also be more or less calculated. This means that the matter is in the position in which it will be after the answers of the Governments. If the Powers are animated by an united and sincere desire for Peace, and if signs of these desire are openly shown, Greece will resign herself willingly to paying the price of her dreams.

F.O. 371/7860/E. 3780

ENCLOSURE 5 IN No. 96

Concluding half of leading Article in the "ILERİ" of April 2nd 1922

De quoi les Grandes Puissances s'occuperont pendant ces trois semaines? La Conférence de Gênes discutée depuis la Conférence de Cannes, ajournée depuis le jour où M. Poincaré a pris le pouvoir et, dès à présent devenue célèbre, constitue une des questions diplomatiques des plus importantes.

Pourquoi cette Conférence se réunit-elle?

Récemment Lloyd George a remis à la presse ses mémoires qu'il avait écrit en 1919 et qu'il avait continué à écrire jusqu'à présent. Lloyd George qui est le premier des hommes d'Etat qui ont créé le Traité de Versailles, a vu, même depuis cette époque que le Traité de Versailles était inapplicable et que, tant que la Russie et l'Allemagne se trouveraient dans l'état lamentable où elles sont actuellement l'ordre de l'Europe serait dérangé et qu'il ne pouvait rien faire en vue d'organiser les Affaires d'Europe. Or, Lloyd George voyant en effet, qu'après la signature et

l'application du Traité de Versailles, la vitalité, l'économie et la politique de l'Europe ne se trouvaient pas en harmonie, et désirant, autant que possible, rectifier le Traité de Versailles qui était mal fait, avait fait consentir Briand et Della Toretta dans la Conférence de Cannes, à se réunir à une Conférence Générale dans la ville de Gênes. Son but était de réunir, pour la première fois après la guerre, l'Amérique, l'Allemagne et la Russie autour d'une table avec droit d'égalité, et de chercher des moyens d'éviter des milliers de crises de l'Europe. Ces moyens seraient, non pas politiques, mais exclusivement économiques, financiers, et commerciaux.

De la réunion de cette Conférence l'Europe, et même tout le monde pouvait réellement profiter. Mais pour que ce profit fût complet et définitif, il fallait que tout Pays invité à Gênes fût représenté à la Conférence. Malheureusement l'Amérique dès le premier jour a fait savoir officiellement qu'elle ne pourrait pas participer à la Conférence de Gênes, qu'elle ne voulait pas s'asseoir autour d'une même table avec les Russes, qu'elle ne voulait pas s'occuper des questions de l'Europe et que, malgré la promesse faite que la Conférence aura un caractère économique elle avait peur qu'elle ne prenne pas un caractère politique.

La non participation à la Conférence de Gênes de l'Amérique, le pays le plus grand, le plus riche et le plus progressif du monde et qui a des milliards d'or à recevoir de chaque pays de l'Europe, était suffisant de tuer dans son embryon même cette Conférence Générale que Lloyd George voulait réunir. Néanmoins, décision fut prise de se réunir sans l'Amérique. Cette fois les Français alléguant que les questions qui feront l'objet à la Conférence n'ont pas été examinés convenablement ont proposé l'ajournement de la Conférence. En effet, la Conférence fut retardée encore pour quelque temps. Dans cette intervalle des Grandes Puissances se sont occupées de deux questions importantes, dont l'une la Conférence de Paris pour l'Orient et l'autre la Conférence des Ministres des Finances et des experts financiers, réunis à Londres.

Or, dans l'espace de trois semaines la diplomatie européenne s'occupera des questions de Gênes et, naturellement, la question d'Orient et la Paix de Turquie baisseront au troisième et au quatrième degré. Dans cette intervalle on fera préparer l'opinion publique turque et hellène à certains sacrifices, on trouvera un accord entre les points de vue nationaux et la Note de Lord Curzon et, parmi tout cela, le marchandage continuera au moyen de négociations et de discussions. Cela veut dire que la solution de la question d'Orient est, en tout cas, remise après la Conférence Générale de Gênes, c'est-à-dire que, profitant de la saison du printemps la guerre en Anatolie sera recommencée et le rejet de la Grèce sera ajourné jusqu'à la fin des négociations. Qu'est ce qu'il sera à Gênes? Est ce que nous pouvons attendre du profit de Gênes? Notons, avant tout, que les Turcs n'ont pas été invités à Gênes. Malheureusement nous regrettons ce mal accueil, parce que dans une Conférence où toutes les nations étaient invitées, les Turcs aussi

devaient être représentés, vu que les Turcs sont libres et indépendants, vu que, au point de vue de la situation géographique les Turcs occupent la plus grande position dans le monde économique et vu que parmi les décisions de la Conférence il y aura des dispositions touchant les Turcs. Peut être au dernier moment cette injustice sera réparée et les Turcs y seront invités.

Les Turcs, en tout cas, profiteront de la Conférence de Gênes, parce que les gouvernements de l'Europe Orientale sont aussi invités à cette Conférence. Parmi tous, la Russie fut invitée spécialement à Gênes. Les dispositions concernant la modification du Traité de Sévres, mentionnées dans la note de Lord Curzon intéressant indubitablement aussi la Russie, la question d'Orient sera objet de délibération à Gênes, bon gré mal gré soit officiellement soit officieusement et les Russes défendront leur opinion et leur point de vue. Sachant que dans la question d'Orient chaque Gouvernement et chaque nation a droit de parole, nous demandons au nom de la paix et de la tranquillité du monde, que la Russie prononçât son dernier mot pendant que le Traité de Sévres sera modifié. Puisqu'on veut créer une oeuvre juste et durable, dans ce cas, tous les intéressés dans la question d'Orient devront être écoutés et on doit travailler de commun accord. Les Turcs, qu'ils soient présent ou non à Conférence de Gênes, gagneront en tout cas, parce que des programmes très rapprochés au Pacte National y seront défendus, et, à la fin, le Traité de Sévres sera modifié en notre faveur d'une manière plus équitable que celle proposée par Lord Curzon.

F.O. 371/7860/E. 3780

No. 97

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 15th April, 1922, 5.00 p. m.

(Received 15th April, 8.00 p. m.)

No. 208. *Telegraphic*

French High Commissioner informs me that his reports from French consul general at Adana show that, nationalist army is reluctant to resume fighting.

Recent reply of Angora to armistice proposal is looked upon as a victory for moderates over extremists. Mustapha Kemal was absent at Konia when Grand National Assembly approved of Angora reply.

French High Commissioner does not think that nationalists will accept proposals contained in note of High Commissioner handed in today but that they will not (one group undecypherable).

F.O. 371/7861/E. 3973

No. 98

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch

21.4.1922

No. 634

Extracts

THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF THE ANGORA GOVERNMENT

The following report, from an informant who is in close touch with the Nationalist Committee in Constantinople, tends to confirm information quoted on pages 4 and 5 of Summary No. 621, regarding the serious financial position of the Angora Government, owing to the failure of various attempts to secure outside assistance:

A secret meeting of the Great National Assembly was held on March 13th to consider the financial estimates of the Angora Government for the first six months of the new financial year. In drawing up the new budget, the Finance Department of the Angora Government had made a special effort to make it appear moderate and the total expenditure was estimated at twenty-five million liras Turkish paper. This amount, it was estimated, would be covered by gold to the value of two millions which had been promised by the Ukrainian Government*. Taxes were expected to produce ten million Turkish liras, and the balance of five millions was to be covered by special war contributions including the contribution known as Salyana, the contribution imposed upon every village and district.

The debate which ensued was marked by extremely violent scenes, and the attacks made by the Opposition were directed not only against the Government, but against Mustafa Kemal personally.

The Government's policy in connection with the expenditure on missions of various kinds was, at the same time, strongly attacked in a motion submitted by Ali Shukri (Trebizond), Yusuf Zia (Bitlis) and Selaheddin Bey (Mersin). The motion was supported in the course of the debate by Yunus Nadi (Smyrna), Jelal Nuri (Dardanelles), Tewfik Rushdi and others. A violent scene occurred, and the Vice-President of the Assembly interrupted the sitting for ten minutes.

Upon the resumption of the discussion the proceedings were held in public. The attack was, however, continued by Hussein Ayni Bey who in speaking of Fethi Bey's mission to Northern Anatolia, expressed the strongest objection to the nomination of Vehbi Bey as acting Commissioner in his place, solely upon the strength of Mustafa Kemal's approval, and without consulting the Assembly. Hussein Ayni Bey terminated his speech with a demand for the withdrawal of the two Commissioners in question, Fethi and Vehbi Beys.

*S.I.S. In the previous report the amount was quoted as being 1,500,000 gold roubles.

In the course of the voting which ensued, a still more violent scene occurred and Mustafa Kemal himself was hastily summoned to the Assembly. Upon his arrival Mustafa Kemal made a very threatening speech, but concluded by stating that once the war was over he would wash his hands of all further responsibility. The sitting then came to an end, with a vote of confidence, apparently by acclamation.

TURCO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

On March 5th a dinner was given by the Russian Envoy in Angora, Aralov, in honour of Mustafa Kemal, to which were invited among others the representatives of Afghanistan, Bokhara and Azerbaijan. The speeches made on this occasion by Aralov and Mustafa Kemal were of considerable interest and are given in detail as an Appendix to this Summary.

Aralov in proposing the health of Mustafa Kemal referred to the deliberations of the Allied Governments whom he denounced as the common enemies of all Eastern nations taking council amongst themselves; the first duty, therefore, of all Eastern nations was to strengthen the union that existed amongst them, for this union alone would be sufficient to defeat the plans of their common enemies.

Referring to an article in the "Peyam Sabah" of Constantinople in which the Russians were accused of disturbing all the Eastern nations, Aralov boasted that the accusation was correct and added that it was the duty of the Russians to take special action against the Imperialists. He stated that the Entente Powers were preparing to attack during the summer, and affirmed that the Russians were quite prepared. Further that, even in the most dangerous times, the Russians had been able to gain victories over the Imperialists. He terminated his speech with the words:—"Accursed be the Imperialists of the West and long live the Eastern Entente".

Mustafa Kemal's response was chiefly remarkable for his emphatic affirmation of the unity of the Turkish army with the Russian army which he stated formed one line of defence on the East from North to South; Turkey had come to realise that the forces at work against her were identical with those which were seeking to destroy Russia, and all Eastern nations were in the same position as Turkey, i.e., menaced by the same enemy; Turkish relations with the East were not designed to deceive the West, for the world could be divided to-day into two distinct parts, East and West, and the long line of defence on the East could only be maintained by the complete solidarity of Eastern peoples.

THE ANGORA GOVERNMENT AND AFGHANISTAN

According to information from a competent Nationalist source at Angora, a meeting of the Defence of Rights Party was held at that place on the 1st March, under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, at which a long discussion was devoted to the instructions, which were to be given to Fahreddin Pasha, who had been nominated as Ambassador to Afghanistan.

It was decided that Fahreddin Pasha should be given a letter of congratulation to be transmitted to Gandhi through the Indian Khalifat Association or the Indian Ulema Association. This letter was to convey the congratulations of the Angora Government to Gandhi and his supporters in connection with the 33rd Congress held at Ahmedabad and in regard to the enormous sacrifices that had been made for the realisation of a sacred purpose, by pursuing the movement for five years without despair or discouragement in spite of every peril and difficulty.

Fahreddin Pasha, it was decided, was also to be instructed to investigate the British Secret Service in Afghanistan; to endeavour to identify those who were concerned in that service; to ascertain what groups, parties or individuals in Afghanistan were acting in favour of the British; and finally to discover who amongst the Afghan dignitaries and notabilities were in favour of the British policy and to establish their relative importance.

Any information that Fahreddin Pasha might obtain on this subject was to be communicated to Angora and also to the Indian Khalifat Association and the Indian Ulema Association.

It was further decided that Fahreddin Pasha should transmit a letter, expressing the gratitude of the Angora Government to the Association of Indian Muslims who had submitted their resolutions to the British in the form of an ultimatum in order to ensure a just and equitable peace with Turkey.

An independent informant, in close touch with official circles in Constantinople, generally confirms the above information, but describes these decisions as having been taken by the Angora Government and the letter as being addressed to the Indian Associations in the name of the Great National Assembly, the Council of Commissioners and the party for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia. This informant further states that Fahreddin Pasha was to take with him a fetva promulgated by the Angora Government Foreign Affairs Department (Sheri), proclaiming that the continuation of the Hartal is a religious duty.

Up to the time of reporting (3rd April), no positive information had been received to the effect that Fahreddin Pasha had actually left for Kabul. The Military Attache of the Kemalist Embassy, Lt. Colonel Sherif Bey, arrived in Constantinople on leave, on March 24th, and had not left by the beginning of April, but was expected to proceed to his destination direct from Constantinople via Batum, in the course of a few days. According to an announcement in the Constantinople newspaper "Vakit" of April 1st, Idris Sabih Bey, who has been appointed to the secretariat of the Kabul Embassy had already left Constantinople for Anatolia to join Fahreddin Pasha. It seemed probable, therefore, that final arrangements had been completed and that Fahreddin Pasha would leave Angora for Kabul almost immediately.

APPENDIX

SPEECHES BY ARALOV AND MUSTAFA KEMAL AT
ANGORA ON THE 6TH MARCH, 1922*(1) Aralov's Speech.*

Our friendship is not ephemeral but strong and durable. Our common enemies, taking advantage of every opportunity, are preparing to point daggers at our hearts. The summer is approaching and the Imperialist Powers are preparing to attack us. They are holding conferences and meetings amongst themselves and are doing everything possible to come to a decision against us, but their conferences and meetings invariably fail or are adjourned. Nevertheless we know that our common enemies are continuing to work against us. Is it not therefore our first duty to strengthen our friendship and to draw nearer together than ever? So long as we are friends and united, our enemies will fear us and will be able to do nothing to us. This is the sole means of preventing them from carrying out their accursed schemes. Turkey is a fine country. When coming to Angora I travelled along the road from Samsun and took the opportunity of talking with a considerable number of villagers. I found that their ideas were the same as ours. Yes, all these villagers like us wished for the continuation of this struggle against Imperialism until definite victory has been achieved, until the imperialists have been destroyed. At this moment is not the whole of the East unanimous in this respect? Yesterday evening on the occasion of the anniversary of the independence of Afghanistan, at a banquet given by the representative of that country, was not this affirmed by all the representatives of Eastern peoples? The other day, a Stambul newspaper, I think it is called the "Peyam Sabah", wrote an article against us under the title "Moscow-Angora" in which it was stated that Bolshevik Russia is stirring up all the peoples of the East. Yes, this paper spoke the truth. It is our right to do so and who shall increase our activity still more every day, for it is our duty to do this against the Imperialists who are united against us. Just now I told you that the Entente Powers are preparing to attack during the summer, but I must add that on the other hand we are prepared for that attack and we are sure of our strength. Even when we were weakest and when the situation was most dangerous, we succeeded in winning battles from the Imperialists. The Red Army was always victorious against the enemy that was so well armed and which possessed every means of victory. Because the Red Army was the Red Army of the people! Because it was fighting for liberty, for independence! That is solely and simply why the Red Army won the final victory. We must know that henceforth we shall always be victorious, and the Turkish army which is heroically sacrificing its blood at the front in the name of independence will win the final victory also in the near future. All the Eastern peoples who have representatives around this table, Turks, Russians, Afghans, Bokhariots, repeat together as with one voice

"Accursed by Western Imperialism, long live the Eastern Entente". To conclude I raise my glass which is filled with pure water and I drink with the wish that our friendship shall be as clean and as pure as this water and so last for ever."

(2) *Mustafa Kemal's Speech.*

After having made a personal and flattering reference to Aralov, Mustafa Kemal replied as follows:

"Five years ago the present government of Russia brought about a great revolution. Their purpose was solely to war against tyranny and oppression in the form of Capitalism and Imperialism. All mankind was and is against these forces and wish to destroy them, but every movement is accompanied by difficulties at first and those who are able to succeed from the beginning deserve the utmost praise. The Russian revolutionaries, therefore, deserve the extraordinary reputation which they have won amongst mankind. That revolution opened the eyes of the whole world and proved that Russia was ready to assist the whole world desirous of escaping from Capitalist and Imperialist tyranny. Present-day Russia has given liberty to all those peoples who were in slavery under the old regime and who suffered under Tzarist despotism. Time is proving more and more clearly the good faith of Soviet Russia. Three years ago the Turkish people were also impelled to revolt, for it was found that their independence was in danger from those who occupied the country. I am obliged to confess, however, that when we commenced that revolt, unlike the Russians we did not know anything about Imperialism and Capitalism... and we thought only of the forces which were threatening our independence. In time, however, we came to understand that the forces which threatened us were the same as the forces which threatened the Russians before us and that we had a common enemy. Turkey also took her place amongst the enemies of the Imperialists and Capitalists.... Both Turks and Russians realised that they had a common purpose and this realisation naturally led to a strong friendship between the two peoples. Friendships and unions brought about on natural grounds are durable and indestructible! In referring to this Turco-Russian friendship and union, I must also mention at the same time the fact that the more important nations of Asia, such as the Afghans, Azerbaijanis and Bokhariots, are in the same position and entertain the same feelings as ourselves. Our relations and our friendship with the peoples of the East are not designed for the purpose of deceiving the West and for securing our own interests. No, we are united to secure our common independence and rights. I am sure that time will strengthen this friendship more and more. There was a time when the Imperialist Powers proclaimed their recognition of the lawful rights and independence of all peoples, but events have shown that their proclamations were false and that these Powers lied.

They think still that the whole world is their property, that the whole of mankind are their slaves, who must work solely for their benefit. That is their peculiar mentality. Sometimes the declarations of those Powers are in appearance humane and just, but if they are carefully studied, it will be understood that they are not sincere and that the declarations are merely made to deceive and disarm mankind, in order to enslave them more easily. There is also another reason, for they wish to deceive their so-called friends, each in order to secure a greater profit than the others. One may say that they compete among themselves as to which can be most cunning. The world is therefore separated to-day into two principal divisions, one is the East which realises its existence, its humanitarian duties, its independence and all the peoples of which are united on this basis and the other is the West thinking only of its own interests and its own ambitions, striving also to achieve an ideal, an ideal not based upon the welfare of mankind but on the contrary an ideal aiming at the oppression and enslaving of mankind. We also therefore are right in hating and cursing the West. So long as these Powers are strong and are capable of doing what they wish, there is not and never will be any pity or mercy or peace amongst mankind. From them it is utterly useless and ridiculous to expect anything good for which we can only, hope when we have succeeded in utterly disarming them. In order to explain clearly to you what we must do in these circumstances, I will cite an order of the day issued by Comrade Trotsky. Our Comrade, speaking in this order of the day on the attitude to be observed against the hypocritical overtures of the Imperialists, stated that the sole means of securing the independence of the Soviet Government was to strengthen the solidarity of the Red Armies. I will add this on my part to the order of the day of our Comrade. Against that association of evil and pestiferous minds there is a very long common front, not only in Russia but stretching from the North and extending to the South, i.e., the entire line which separates the East from the West. The defence of this long front is only possible through the solidarity of the peoples whose fate is the same. This solidarity exists in a natural condition amongst ourselves. Each of the nations who have entered into this association must be strong taken separately; they must be imbued with feelings of independence; therefore it is the duty of each of us to be strong and to secure independence. The West will lay down its arms only before this strength and only then will cease its inhuman and tyrannous actions. There is no need to wait long to achieve this. So long as we pursue the ideal of mutual confidence, friendship and intimacy, the road to be travelled will be shortened. Comrade Aralov has taken the limpid water in his glass as a symbol of our friendship. I will take the same symbol in another form. The water in this glass is composed of a union of hydrogen and oxygen. Let our union be as close. I thank Comrade Aralov and as a sign of friendship I give him my hand with the approval of my colleagues."

After this speech Mustafa Kemal and Aralov embraced each other amidst applause.

F.O. 371/7862

No. 99

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 23rd, 1922, 11.00 p.m.)

(Received April 24, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 220 *Telegraphic.*

My immediately preceding telegram.

Reference ambiguous expression "special point" and specific reference (? made to) Thrace and to "political, judicial and economic chains" confirm my views as to intentions of Angora to regard anything they like in Paris proposals as open to discussion.

In view of what we know of French dealings with nationalists since Paris conference, I trust any French draft rejoinder will be carefully scrutinized.

Passages in note evidently intending to bid for sympathy in India and Moslem countries are significant.

Suggestion we should meet nationalists in town in Anatolia of their own choosing for preliminary conversations without any understanding beforehand regarding either armistice or scope of negotiations appears to me open to strongest objection. Proposal appears to be in the nature of a trap, apart from other objections, it must be remembered that they would be quite capable of attempting to exclude Constantinople government altogether from meeting at Ismid, unless points were made perfectly clear.

Omission of any reference to Greek participation in proposed preliminary conference at Ismid deserves attention.

When handing me note Hamid Bey said he had instructions to state that if proposals for meeting at Ismid were accepted Mustapha Kemal would attend himself, and would be able to take all necessary decisions on the spot. He could not attend conference elsewhere as he could not leave national territory.

F.O. 371/7862/E. 4251

No. 100

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 25th April, 1922, 12.15, p.m.

(Received April 26, 7.00 p.m.)

No. 224

Telegraphic

Three allied High Commissioners met today to discuss Angora's reply as summarized in my telegram No. 219.

I drew attention to considerations touched upon in my telegram No. 220 and we were, I think, agreed that answer of allied governments should be so worded (1) as to counteract propaganda which forms such a large part of Yussuf Kemal's communication, and (2) as to take strong exception to statement that bulk of peace conditions concerns exclusively Great Powers and to implication following therefrom that Greek army is being maintained in Asia Minor in allied interests. Omission of any reference to Khalifat in Yussuf Kemal's note might be emphasized in manner indicated in my immediately following telegram.

Our discussion, however, principally turned round the question whether proposal for preliminary conference at Ismid should be accepted or refused and if latter whether allied answer should yet leave the door open for further discussion or not. We were unable to agree in this respect to make any identic recommendation to our governments. French High Commissioner, who considered critical moment of our negotiations had arrived, was obviously anxious to meet Angora's wishes as far as possible though he admitted it would scarcely be dignified for the three High Commissioners to go to Ismid.

Italian High Commissioner adopted the middle course. So as not to close the door to further discussion, and incur responsibility therefor, he suggested that High Commissioners may consent to go to Ismid on the clear understanding that they had not full powers to take decisions and that they could not enter into the merits of Paris proposals but solely in order to give and receive general explanations.

My own view was that any acceptable proposal for preliminary conference at Ismid was open to serious objection and danger, and contrary to spirit of Paris decisions. Yussuf Kemal's note in addition contains two main points. It insists on immediate evacuation as the only means of saving Mussulman population of Asia Minor from further Greek excesses, it enquires as to exact meaning in our previous communication of expression "special point" and requests preliminary conference at Ismid to settle this doubt. Moreover remark made to me by Hamid as reported in my telegram No. 222 implies that if Mustapha Kemal comes to Ismid he expects to arrive at definite decisions of some sort if only as to what point can be reserved for discussion at final conference.

I find it difficult to regard Angora's present reply as anything but tactical manoeuvre in attempt to drive us into a position where responsibility for breakdown of negotiations can be thrown upon the allies. Apart from courting a rebellion and giving Mustapha Kemal opportunity for strengthening his own prestige at the expense of allied representatives consent to preliminary conference at town on nationalist soil would be in the nature of further concession. Allied governments do not presumably wish to make immediate statement as to exact scope of special points which can be I believe discussed at final conference or to modify their last decision as regards moment from which evacuation can begin.

In these circumstances I can only suggest that in replying on line indicated in second paragraph of this telegram, we should state that explanations which Angora appears to desire scarcely call for meeting of plenipotentiaries, but that we are prepared to give in Constantinople fullest explanations in this respect to any delegate whom Angora government may desire to send here for the purpose of receiving them.

Finally I think reply of allied governments should indicate locality proposed for conference.

F.O. 371/7862/E. 4342

D.B.F.P., 1st series. Vol. XVII, pp. 793-794, No. 607

No. 101

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, May 1, 1922

(Received May 2, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 248 Telegraphic: by bag

Your telegram No. 152 of April 25th.

I am sending by bag tonight copy of Monsieur Poincaré's reply to Your Lordship's suggestions as to attitude to be adopted towards latest note from Angora government.

Monsieur Poincaré takes opposite view and maintains that opening of 'pourparlers préparatoires' with that government affords best chance of eventual settlement. He considers that to address an ultimatum to them would only furnish extremists with pretext for continuing struggle—a responsibility which the French government could not undertake. He therefore urges that the allies should consent to a meeting at Ismid, which would probably ensure presence of Mustapha Kemal himself. Prolongation of negotiations would in his opinion make renewal of hostilities more difficult.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, p. 803, No. 615

No. 102

Sir H. Rambold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 1, 1922

(Received May 8.)

No. 408.

My Lord,

INFORMATION regarding the internal political situation at Angora continues to be extremely meagre. Such reports as I have received since the beginning of the year support the impression which I had formed towards the end of 1921 that there were three principal parties, namely, the supporters of Mustapha Kemal, the partisans of Enver, and those who favoured a reconciliation with the Sultan. It has unfortunately been impossible to assess the relative strength of these elements. The Sultan's party has given no indication, so far as can be judged from here, of making its opposition to Mustapha Kemal effectively felt. The partisans of Enver are said to be still active, but, since the Bolsheviks more or less threw him over in favour of a rapprochement with Mustapha Kemal, a good deal less has been heard of them. Mustapha Kemal has undoubtedly a good deal of opposition to contend with, and he is said to be unpopular with a large number of officers in the army, but he, nevertheless, appears to dominate the situation. It is significant that some, if not all, of the Ministers whose resignations caused some little sensation towards the end of last year have been reabsorbed into the Kemalist machine. Thus Reouf Bey became Vice-President of the Grand National Assembly on the 1st March, Jelal Bey was made Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during Yussuf Kemal's absence in Europe and Hamdullah Subhi Bey has been entrusted with some sort of a mission in Turkestan.

2. Two recent pieces of news deserve some little attention. The first is a telegram from Angora of the 27th April reproducing a statement by Fethi Bey, Commissioner for the Interior, regarding the attitude of the Government towards Unionists now in foreign countries. He is reported to have said: "The doors of the country have never been closed to those of its children who are not opposed to the national struggle. For Unionists also these doors are always open. There is no obstacle in the way of their returning to Anatolia. A great many Unionist leaders have already come to Anatolia. They have met with no opposition. Consequently the doors of the country are open to the others as well." This statement derives all the more significance from the fact that a good many of the Unionists now in Europe are in Germany, and that it was made just after the news of the assassination of Behaudding Shakir and Djernal Azmi Beys in Berlin.

3. The other piece of news referred to above is that of the resignation of three members of the Angora Cabinet—Hassan Fehmi Bey, Commissioner for Finance;

Sirti Bey, Commissioner for Economic Affairs; and Mustapha Fehmi Effendi, Commissioner for Religious Affairs. There is also an unconfirmed report of the resignation of Kiazim Pasha, Commissioner for National Defence. The exact reasons for the three resignations definitely reported, and for the alleged threat of Kiazim Pasha to resign, are not known. They doubtless indicate political unrest, but none of the three commissioners has played any important rôle so far as I am aware, and I fear the Nationalist papers here are justified in treating the resignations as unimportant from the point of view of foreign policy.

4. There is in fact no indication that any important section of politicians at Angora are disposed to weaken on the national pact. The Kemalists appear to have inherited the capacity of the Committee of Union and Progress for sinking differences whenever it is necessary for the accomplishment of their main purpose. As at present advised, I do not consider that it would be safe to found any hope of an early collapse of Turkish resistance to the latest Allied peace terms on internal dissension at Angora.

5. Looking at the situation from the point of view of foreign policy alone, the politicians at Angora appear to divide into those who favour a "Russian orientation" and a "Western orientation" respectively. Just now those who favour the Russian orientation appear to be more than ever in the ascendant. No opportunity is lost of advertising the closeness of the relations between the Angora Government and the Soviet Republics. The Russian representative, Aralof, and the Azerbaijan representative, Abilof, are much in evidence. They have been taken to the front, and, whatever impression they may have formed there, they have allowed glowing appreciations of the admirable state of the army to be published in their name. Bekir Samy Bey, who is said to stand for the Western orientation, has once more been disavowed. It has been categorically announced from Angora that his present journey to Europe is a private one, and that he has no mission.

6. I may mention as bearing on the question of the relations between the Angora Government and the Soviets, a secret report to the effect that Yussuf Kemal informed the Foreign Affairs Commission that the reply of Angora to the Allied armistice proposal had been shown to Aralof before transmission. He is stated to have added that this did not indicate Russian control of Angora policy, but was merely a matter of friendly collaboration.

7. In what precedes I have attempted to give a connected view of the internal situation at Angora. The question of the military situation is a distinct one, which I have dealt with to some extent in my despatch No. 409 of the 2nd May, 1922. Your Lordship will see by that despatch that I consider the balance as between Greeks and Turks to have altered in favour of the former. At the same time it must be remembered that Anatolia, as a social and economic organism, is of a low type, more capable of standing internal strain than in the case of an European country;

that important military operations can be carried on with armies smaller in proportion to the man power of the country even in its depleted state than in Europe; and that until and actual breaking point is reached the attitude of the rank and file counts for less than that of the officers, who have nothing to gain by a cessation of hostilities. While, therefore, in my despatch No. 409 I have given due weight to the reports which reach me of an increase in the number of desertions in the Kemalist army, of eagerness on the part of the troops to see an armistice concluded, and of differences of opinion among the military leaders, I would warn your Lordship against assuming too readily that the Kemalist fighting machine has entered on a stage of disintegration. Mustapha Kemal has shown throughout the last three years a great capacity for pulling his movement together at critical moments. The sound conclusion appears to me to be that, if military operations of a serious kind should be resumed, neither Greek nor Turk is assured of success, and the result of a campaign this summer, while uncertain as regards its effect on the military equilibrium, would almost certainly be as inconclusive as that of last year.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 406/49, pp. 296-297, No. 109

No. 103

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 2nd May, 1922
(Received May 8)

No. 411.

My Lord,

The local Turkish press has contained little of interest since the date of my despatch No. 374 of 18th April, with the exception of such comments as have been published on the last Note of the Angora Government to the Allies. Every effort has naturally been made in the Nationalist papers to represent this document as a most reasonable and conciliatory production.

2. The "Tevhid-i-efkar" of April 24 develops this view at some length. It adds a warning that the conciliatory spirit shown by Angora must not be interpreted as implying any renunciation of the national aims, and it goes on to say that the answer now given is the last. The rejoinder to it must be Yes or No.

3. The "Wakt" of April 27 in an article headed "The Ismid Conference" dwells on the proof of pacific intention afforded by Mustafa Kemal Pasha's expression of readiness to come himself to Ismid. The writer replies to various objections to the selection of that place for a Conference. He insists that there can

be no objection to a conference between the Angora Government and the three Allied Powers only, as the sole object is to clear up verbally points between those four parties which must otherwise be the subject of notes. He qualifies this by the curious suggestion that the United States Government might very well send an "observer" as in the case of Genoa. He recognizes the difficulty which the Allied High Commissioners might have in leaving their numerous occupations in Constantinople, but says that this objection is founded on the supposition that the Allied High Commissioners would necessarily be chosen to represent the Allies. This is followed by two passages, deleted by the Censor, which are worth reproducing as a sample of Nationalist mentality:

"This supposition is not necessarily true. If the Powers approve of a preparatory meeting at Ismid, they may perhaps consider sending competent personages other than the High Commissioners as plenipotentiaries, and, in choosing such persons, they would naturally take into account Mustafa Kemal Pasha's personality and position...."

"According to very well substantiated information which we have received from Angora, the possibility of a Conference at Constantinople cannot, in the view of Angora, ever be discussed."

4. The "İleri" strikes a more bellicose note than the other papers. On April 29 it published a leading article, the burden of which was that peace could not be attained without further military effort. It is worth noting that in this article Mosul is specifically mentioned among the places to which Turkey's right can only be established by force, the one dominant factor in the world of to-day. The same paper in its issue of May 1 has a leading article, in which, discussing Genoa and the Near East, it pooh-poohs the utility of Conferences.

5. None of the leading Nationalist papers has made any comment on the recent Note from the Central Government, though they have printed it in extenso. This ignoring of the Constantinople Government is of course intentional, and is indicative of the increasing tendency of those papers to recognize Angora as the sole Government of Turkey. The "Tevhid-i efkâr" has gone particularly far in this direction. It had the impertinence a short time ago to print under a photograph of General Pellé and General Gouraud leaving the house of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a description describing it as the residence formerly used by Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This gave great offence to İzzet Pasha, who complained that the Turkish Censor had drawn attention to it and that it had nevertheless been allowed by the Allied Censors. On inquiry I found that the French Censor had actually passed the matter for publication. I drew my French Colleague's attention to it, and he appeared genuinely shocked, but the incident is only one of several which shows a tendency on the part of the French to uphold Angora as against Constantinople.

6. Another direction in which the "Tevhid-i efkâr" has been peculiarly offensive is in its attitude to the Armenians. It has attacked them more than once since the date of my last despatch on the press. The French, who are at present primarily responsible for the censoring of this paper, have shown great laxity in the matter, and I have had to direct the British delegate on the Censorship Committee to pay special attention to it.

I have, etc.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 371/7863/E. 4703

No. 104

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquis Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 9th May 1922
(Received May 15)

No. 434.

My Lord,

With reference to previous correspondence relative to the Kars Treaty, I have the honour to state that a telegram from the semi-official Angora news agency, the Agence d'Anatolie of May 2, announces that the Treaty was ratified by Armenia on March 20th, by Georgia on April 4, and by Azerbaijan on March 3.

2. The same Agency announced on the same day that the Angora-Ukraine Treaty was ratified by the Ukraine on March 22, and two days later that Riza Nour Bey was on the point of leaving for Kharkoff to exchange the ratifications of that Treaty. It was stated that Riza Nour Bey was to proceed from Kharkoff to Moscow subsequently on a special mission.

3. These announcements afford further evidence of the extent to which Angora is being drawn into the Soviet Net. It is, in my opinion, too soon to say, as some are inclined to do, that the foreign policy of Angora is dictated by Moscow, but evidence accumulates to show that Mustafa Kemal is being forced into ever closer relations with his Bolshevist friends, and the more his position at home is weakened by the causes which I have indicated in recent despatches, the greater becomes the danger of his relations with them developing into dependency.

I have, etc.,

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 371/7936/E. 4995

No. 105

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 10, 1922

No. 1405

My Lord,

It is now six weeks since the conference between the Foreign Ministers of France, Italy and Great Britain separated at Paris after agreeing upon a number of definite proposals for the termination of hostilities between the Greeks and the Turks, for the final conclusion of peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey, and for the settlement of the most important aspects of the Near Eastern question. These proposals, which it is unnecessary to recapitulate here, were communicated by telegram to the Governments concerned and an early reply was requested. The Greek Government immediately accepted the first suggestion of the Powers, viz. the conclusion of the Armistice. No further reply from them has been received. In the case of the Turkish answer the situation has been complicated by the facts: (1) that there are two Turkish Governments in existence whose replies had to be received (2) that the replies, though nominally distinct, were compelled by the force of circumstances to be more or less interdependent, the Constantinople Government not being likely or willing to return any answer which would not be in general consonance with the views entertained at Angora; (3) that each of these two Governments, in true Oriental fashion, welcomed the opportunity either to dispute about the precise meaning of the terms submitted to them, or to reopen the entire discussion which it was the object of the proposals to close, or to manœuvre for position in the Conference which had been suggested. It is not necessary for the purposes of the present argument to analyse with any closeness the replies of the Constantinople Government since, as M. Poincaré has remarked, they do not differ sensibly from that of the Angora Turks.

The reply of the latter has assumed a double form. Its first edition was contained in the note of 5th April in the Angora Government advanced the claim *inter alia* that evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greek troops must be proceeded with as soon as an Armistice had been concluded, and in particular that the evacuation of the advanced strategic position held by the Greeks upon the railway Eskisehir-Afium [m] Karahissar must be effected within fifteen days—no regard whatever being paid to the fundamental considerations which underlay the proposal of the Powers, viz. that the Armistice had been proposed in order to allow for the discussion of peace preliminaries; that evacuation could only begin after the expiration of the Armistice; and that evacuation was only one, although doubtless the most important, of the conditions upon which the Allied Foreign Ministers had agreed, at Paris, for the settlement of the entire problem.

A reply to these pretensions drafted by the French Government was accepted without demur by the British and Italian Governments, in which the three Powers, in their anxiety for conciliation, expressed their willingness to agree to evacuation as soon as the body of the peace conditions proposed by them had been accepted.

The second and more detailed reply of the Angora Government was contained in a note dated the 22nd April, which was even more obviously intended for purposes both of propaganda and procrastination. In this reply, the Angora Authorities entered into a long and partisan disquisition about massacres in Asia Minor; definitely the idea of evacuation subject to the acceptance of the *ensemble* of the peace conditions; insisted on the commencement of evacuation simultaneously with the acceptance of an Armistice; demanded to know what precisely were the special points which had been reserved for discussion outside the aforementioned *ensemble*; and ended by saying that Angora delegates would be ready to meet plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers at Ismid for preliminary negotiations — the information being subsequently added that Mustapha Kemal would be willing to attend such a Conference in person, and that it was desirable for the Allied plenipotentiaries to have full powers to take decisions without reference to their Governments. This communication appeared to His Majesty's Government to raise three questions: (1) the attitude and policy of the Angora Government, to be deduced from the Note as a whole, (2) the nature of the Conference suggested at Ismid, (3) the selection of Ismid as the place of meeting.

His Majesty's Government did not hastily form an opinion upon any of these issues, being anxious to lose no opportunity that might point to an honourable exit from the present deplorable *impasse*; nor did they fail to receive from their High Commissioner at Constantinople full advice upon every one of these points.

This examination and advice rendered it impossible for His Majesty's Government to form any other conclusion than that the Angora Government definitely refused to accept any of the fundamental conditions underlying the policy of the allied Powers, that they intended at the suggested Conference to reopen any and every question, and that their reply was in reality only a tactical manœuvre to drive the Allies into a position where the responsibility for the breakdown of negotiations could be thrown upon the latter.

It is more particularly necessary in this context to examine the proposal for the Conference at Ismid. His Majesty's Government would welcome the opportunity of meeting Mustapha Kemal at a Conference table, just they have welcomed the opportunities recently afforded to him in London of discussing matters with Izzet Pasha and Yusuf Kemal Bey. But a moment's scrutiny will reveal that the meeting as suggested is to be of a very one-sided and compromising character.

It is to be held at Ismid, i.e. in the part of Turkey which is under Nationalist influence. It is not, like the Conference suggested by the Powers, to be a meeting at

which their High Commissioners at Constantinople will meet representatives of both Turkish Governments and of the Greek Government in order to discuss with them the conditions of peace. Far from this the High Commissioners are to be summoned to meet the head of the Angora Government alone. It is clear that the Constantinople Government is not to be admitted, that the Greeks are equally to be excluded, and that the High Commissioners are to be placed in a position where they must either accept the terms submitted to them by Mustapha Kemal, or, having neither the authority nor the willingness to accept them, return to Constantinople with the onus of failure upon their shoulders.

As regards the suggestion of Ismid itself, His Majesty's Government have at different times declared their willingness to agree either to Constantinople or Therapia as the site of the Conference proposed at Paris. They would not object to Prinkipo or Moda, or to any suitable place in Western Europe. But the suggestion of Ismid as the place of meeting for a Conference to which two of the principal parties, Constantinople and Greece were not even to be admitted, appeared to them to surpass the limits of what they could reasonably or properly concede.

In these circumstances I suggested on the 25th April the terms of a draft reply to the Angora Government which might be sent by the Allied Powers, and in which the principles upon which the Foreign Ministers had agreed at Paris and since, were reaffirmed, and Therapia was suggested as the most convenient place of meeting.

The reply of the Italian Government to this proposal has not yet been received, although I learn by telegram from Constantinople that it has the approval of the Italian High Commissioner. On the other hand I have received from M. Poincaré an expression of the view of the French Government to the effect that the general tone of the Angora reply manifests a clear desire to arrive at an understanding, that it is desirable to accept the proposed meeting at Ismid, and that if conversations are opened there, it will be more difficult for hostilities to be resumed. He is not willing, therefore, accept the terms of my proposed reply to the Angora Note.

It is difficult for his Majesty's Government to believe that in making these proposals the French Government can have fully considered the nature of the suggestion as I have above explained it. Do they realise that the Angora Note definitely refuses acceptance of the Paris peace proposals as a prior and essential condition of evacuation, and thereby, for the second time, rejects the allied offer? If the Allied Governments are to surrender to the Angora demand for a preliminary Conference before acceptance of the armistice and peace conditions, why should not a similar demand be made by Athens and by Constantinople, and how could it logically be refused?

Do the French Government really consider it desirable at this juncture to interpolate another stage never contemplated at Paris, and certain to have been

rejected had it been then proposed, in which one of the Parties concerned is to have a conference all to himself, certain to have no other result than to postpone the Conference proposed by common consent at Paris, and doomed in all probability to end in a fiasco which would not only be humiliating, but disastrous?

If Mustapha Kemal desires any explanation as to the intentions of the Allies or the meaning of their terms, let him depute any representative whom he pleases to Constantinople, where the High Commissioners will be ready to give him the fullest explanations, or better still, let him either propose or acquiesce in the selection of some spot where the Conference, as originally proposed, can be held without further delay.

In inviting the serious attention of the French Government to these considerations, His Majesty's Government are compelled to point out that the responsibility for further delay in carrying out the Paris proposals is a burden which none of the Allies should be willing to bear. The sands are running out. In the interval that has elapsed since Paris, the situation, particularly if it be viewed from the Greek side, and the possibility of Greek resistance to the demands of the Allies, becomes daily not more, but less favourable. Equally is there a danger, confirmed by all the reports that have been received, of an even closer understanding and more active military co-operation between the Angora and Soviet Governments—a situation that cannot be any more beneficial to French than to British interests in the Middle East. If the Powers represented at Paris were sincere in their proposals, and if they meant by every means in their power to secure their acceptance by Greece and Turkey, there can be no excuse for these protracted delays with their attendant perils. Rather should the allied policy be one of adhering to the plan there prepared, and making a further, even if it be a final, effort to extract a definite acceptance or refusal of it from Angora, Constantinople and Athens alike.

His Majesty's Government would view with profound regret the abandonment of this plan, to which so much labour was devoted, and they are slow to believe that the French Government can have any such intention. It is in this spirit that I am now addressing them in the hope that the common allied action which has here been urged may be resumed, in the general sense of the proposals which I have previously made.

Should this be found impossible, His Majesty's Government will have to deal with the matter in a different and independent way; and the prelude to any such action on their part will of necessity be the publication of the entire correspondence on the matter that has passed between the Allied Governments and the Governments of Athens, Angora and Constantinople.

They would greatly prefer, however, that the three Governments should once more unite in the communication of an identic note to the Governments of Athens

and Constantinople, intimating that a definite reply to their proposals must now be made, and that there can be no further delay in summoning a Conference of the character agreed upon at Paris.

His Majesty's Government will be grateful if, in view of the urgency of the matter, they may be favoured with an early reply to this communication.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

F.O. 371/7864/E. 4853

D.B.F.P. 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 813-817, No. 627

No. 106

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch

No. 678

15-5-1922

Extract

RUSO-KEMALIST RELATIONS: THE EFFECTS OF THE RUSSO-GERMAN TREATY.

The following is the text of a communication recently received by the Sublime Porte from Angora. It affords additional confirmation of the intimate nature of the relations between the Russian Bolsheviks and the Turkish Nationalists:—

"Taking into consideration the recognition of Turkish frontiers on the basis of the National Pact by both Russia and France, it is not to be imagined that France will change her policy towards Turkey because of the Russo-German Treaty. In any case Russia has recognised the National Government and has supported it, at the same time giving up the traditional Czarist policy of invasion of Turkey.

"During a recent visit of inspection to the front, with Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Araloff informed him that the Russian point of view did not admit of the right of the Allies to dispose of Constantinople. Before the war, Araloff stated, it had already been agreed between the Entente Powers that Constantinople should, in certain eventualities, be given to Russia. Although Russia separated herself from the Allies by the peace of Brest-Litovsk, Russia nevertheless had a right to compensation for losses and sacrifices during the war, and had not renounced these rights. In consequence, Araloff stated, he was authorised to declare that the Soviet Government, as a further proof of its friendship for Turkey, would abandon its rights to Constantinople to the Angora Government, which was the legal Government of Turkey.

"Under these circumstances, it is sufficiently established that Angora can count on the friendship and support of the Soviet Government, and need not fear unfavourable developments from the Russo-German Treaty.

"In any case, the Treaty cannot be regarded as something spontaneously produced at Genoa, for the bases of such an agreement were already laid some time before, and even France ought to have known of it. The Russians have done with

regard to debts between them and Germany, as they previously did with regard to Turkey, and have regarded them as cancelled. That the Treaty between Russia and Germany was envisaged already some time ago, is further proved by a speech made by Herr Rathenau at the end of March, in which he stated that a direct entente with Russia was essential, and by the declarations of the German journalists at Genoa.

"The discussions which have followed the question of the Russo-German Treaty at the Conference, cannot in any case affect adversely the benevolent attitude of Russia, and of France to the Government of Angora, and there is no need for apprehension of fears of any sort on the subject."

In the above connection, a Kemalist official, who recently arrived in Constantinople from Angora, stated that there could be no doubt as to the *intensification of Russian influence in Anatolia*. This, he stated, was to a large extent due to the energy displayed by the former Unionist propagandists, Yusuf Akchura and Ahmed Agaieff, but it was also to be attributed to the fact that the *Angora Government had recently received substantial sums of money from the Soviet Government*. Mustafa Kemal, the informant stated, was acting in complete agreement with Araloff.

F.O. 371/7864

No. 107

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 16, 1922

(Received May 22)

No. 446

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 408 of the 1st May, I have the honour to state that while the internal political situation at Angora is still exceedingly obscure, there are certain further indications that the Grand National Assembly is no longer an united body or a docile instrument in the hands of Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

2. Mustapha Kemal was recently confirmed by the Assembly in his office of commander-in-chief of the army for a further period of three months from the 5th May. There would appear to have been some opposition, however, as the necessary law was passed by a majority vote, not unanimously.

3. An even more significant symptom of uneasiness is the great delay which has occurred in filling two of the Cabinet posts vacated by the resignations mentioned in paragraph 3 of my despatch under reference. The Commissionership of Finance was filled without difficulty on the 24th April by the election of Hassan

Fehmi Bey, previously Vice-President of the Assembly. The other two vacancies which occurred about the same time were filled only about the 11th May. The more important of the two was the Commissionership of Economic Affairs. The former incumbent, Sirri Bey, was vigorously interpellated on or about the 25th April, and a vote of confidence was asked for. Sirri Bey obtained a majority, but as there was no quorum the vote was invalid. A second vote some days later resulted in a tie. A third gave a very small majority against Sirri Bey.

4. Mustapha Kemal then submitted three candidates for the post in accordance with the usual practice, but on a vote being taken it proved impossible to elect a commissioner owing to the very large number of abstentions. The matter stood over, and it was only after ten days or so that the post was filled by the election of Hassan Bey, who three weeks ago vacated the Commissionership of Finance.

5. A similar delay occurred in the election of Abdullah Azmi Effendi to the vacant Commissionership of Religious Affairs, but I have no special information regarding this case.

6. The probable meaning of these incidents is that Mustapha Kemal is still able to impose his will on the Assembly, but has increasing difficulty in doing so. There is nothing in them to alter my previously expressed conviction that, whatever dissensions may exist at Angora, the bulk of the Assembly remain faithful to the National Pact, that the partisans of a "Russian orientation" of foreign policy are still in the ascendant, and that Mustapha Kemal himself has no immediate intention of breaking with the Bolsheviks.

7. This situation might conceivably be altered by the outcome of the Genoa Conference, which Turkish politicians are following with close attention. If the result of Genoa should be to divide Great Britain and France acutely as regards their respective attitudes towards Russia, the partisans of the Western orientation might secure acceptance of their policy in the shape of an understanding not with the Allies as a whole, but with France and possibly Italy as well, notwithstanding the present cooling off in the relations between Angora and Rome. Such an understanding with France or with France and Italy would produce a situation rich in possibilities of further surprises, for the Bolsheviks would be unlikely easily to relax their hold on Anatolia, and they are said to have a network of small organising centres in the eastern vilayets.

8. While these speculative possibilities are worth bearing in mind, I feel that great caution should be used in accepting the view, to which some observers of the situation incline, that there is already a radical alteration in the relations between Angora and Moscow. Even if France broke loose from Great Britain and carried Italy with her, so far as the Eastern question is concerned, a complete understanding between these two countries and the Kemalist Government would not be so very easy of realisation, despite all the efforts of Ferid Bey in Paris, Hamid

Bey here, and Jelaluddin Arif Bey in Italy, to facilitate it. In the meanwhile Mustapha Kemal is not likely to throw over the substance of an alliance with Moscow for the uncertain prospect of an understanding with two only of the three Western Powers.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 406/49, pp. 329-330, No. 131

No. 108

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 18, 1922

No. 211 Telegraphic

Difficult situation has arisen as a result of the conflict of views between His Majesty's Government and their allies as to the reply to be returned to the last note from Angora, and I should be grateful for your views in the light of the following considerations.

You will have seen from Paris telegram No. 248 (of May 2nd) ¹ that M. Poincaré replied to the proposal contained in my telegram No. 152 to Paris (of April 25th) by advocating acceptance of the Angora proposal for a meeting with Kemal in order to avert a renewal of hostilities. I replied in a despatch No. 1405 to Paris (of May 10th), the text of which should reach you on May 20th by bag. I pointed out that the Angora reply of April 22nd was obviously intended for purposes of propaganda and procrastination, that it definitely refused to accept the allied conditions and that it was a tactical manoeuvre to impose on the allies the responsibility for the breakdown of negotiations; that the allied High Commissioners were summoned to Nationalist territory to meet the head of the Angora government while the other two interested parties, the governments of Athens and Constantinople were excluded; that the proposal appeared to His Majesty's Government unacceptable and they had accordingly suggested to the French and Italian governments, a carefully worded but explicit answer to Angora; that the French government had replied advocating assent to the suggested meeting and refusing my proposed reply; that this would involve submission to Angora's refusal to accept the armistice and peace proposals before evacuation, might expose us to similar demands for preliminary negotiations with Athens and Constantinople and would interpolate a new stage in the Paris plan; and that if Kemal desired explanations he had only to despatch a delegate to Constantinople or accept the conditions preliminary to the conference. I ended by

¹ No. 101. This telegram was dated May 1.

insisting on adherence to the Paris plan and suggesting a final effort to extract an acceptance from all three parties.

I have now received a further unsatisfactory note from Paris². M. Poincaré denies that the Angora note necessarily excludes the representation of Athens and Constantinople and that a conference with all three would involve any departure from the Paris plan. Preliminary pourparlers with the representatives of all three as the proposed conference would, he is confident, result in acceptance of the allied proposals. He therefore proposes, as a final attempt at conciliation which would absolve the allies from any responsibility for a rupture, that the three governments be invited to send delegates to a conference on French man-of-war in Ismid harbour.

We still lack definite information as to the final attitude of the Italian government. The Italian Ambassador has presented a memorandum dated May 1st indicating that his government was inclined to share the original views of the Italian High Commissioner as reported in your telegram No. 224 (of April 25th). Meanwhile your telegram No. 239 (of May 7th) tells us that His Excellency has modified his views as the utility of the meeting and that you yourself consider there are strong objections to it; I note however from your despatch No. 390 (of April 25th) that you nevertheless consider it would be unwise to close the door altogether to further discussion. We are endeavouring to ascertain definitely the position of the Italian government which appears to be still hivering.

It is clear to me that the Paris conference plan is the only solid basis on which to stand and I have hitherto insisted on its integral maintenance although I have no illusions as to its chances of success. I should have no difficulty of traversing the arguments contained in M. Poincaré's last note and in showing that the conference he proposes is quite inconsistent with the Paris plan seeing that it abandons both the important stipulation that opening of negotiations must be preceded by acceptance of armistice, and that evacuation is dependent upon general acceptance of Paris conditions. If Italian government support us I might take this line with force, if not with success. On the other hand it might lead to a complete rupture of negotiations and to attempt by France in which Italy might conceivably join to throw entire blame on His Majesty's Government.

Before, therefore, deciding on my reply I should be glad to learn your views of the French suggestion and the probable attitude of your colleague; also your estimates of the results at Angora and Constantinople of a refusal on our part to accept the Paris Angora proposal. Like you, we should wish negotiations to proceed if we could find a fair basis. In formulating your opinion you will of course bear in mind our recent proposal to send a mission to enquire into atrocities and the consequent possibility of our reaching a break with Angora over either the

² Of May 15, not printed.

atrocities of the conference. Further vital factors in the situation are the negative results of Genoa, which may tend to tighten the bond between Angora and Moscow; the Smvrna movement in favour of local resistance to the Turks, and the fall of Gounaris³. We shall be glad to consider any alternative plan, if such can be found, that you may suggest.

Repeated to Paris No. 185 (by bag).

F.O. 371/7864/E. 4987

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 825-826, No. 634

No. 109

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston Curzon

CONSTANTINOPLE, 22nd May, 1922, 8.30 p.m.

(Received May 23, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 253. *Telegraphic*

Your telegram No. 211.

1. A recent conversation with my French colleague shows that he is in favour of peace at almost any price. He is no doubt influenced by various considerations, not the least of which is the hope of restraining Turkey from making trouble in Syria and French Moslem dependencies. This hope is, in my opinion, exaggerated but we must expect that, in so far as they are guided by advice of their representative here, French government will tend to advocate surrender to Kemalists at each successive stage in any coming negotiations. Whether French government are prepared to push surrender to the point of definite rupture with His Majesty's Government seems to depend largely on developments in European situation, as to effect of which you can judge better than I. French here attach exaggerated importance to direct contact with Mustapha Kemal. If they cannot get it in any other way, we must be prepared for them once more engaging in separate action at Angora, where they are already sending French officer ostensibly representing French High Commissioner in Syria.

2. Italians have one clear objective which is to secure economic advantages in future in Turkey. They only waver as to best means of achieving this. Recent conversations with my Italian colleague lead me to hope for his (group omitted) in immediate future in carrying out any policy which His Majesty's Government may firmly adopt. He is anxious to antagonise Angora as little as possible, but he

³ M. Gounaris had resigned although he had obtained a majority of one in a division following a financial debate on May 10. M. Stratos had then formed a government, himself taking the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs. This government lasted only a few days. On May 21, M. Protopapadakis formed a Government which included M. Gounaris (Justice), M. Baltatzis (Foreign Affairs), and M. Theotokis (War).

has been very amenable to my views since incident of Turko-Italian treaty. It is, however, impossible to count on Italian solidarity with us over any long period. Kemalist representative in Italy is even now doing his utmost to win Italians back to support of Angora.

3. Italian High Commissioner informed me yesterday that he had received communication of latest French proposal which he does not understand. He is definitely opposed to Angora proposal for a preliminary meeting at Ismid between nationalists and the three allied powers. If preliminary conference at Ismid between all the parties is to develop into conference as contemplated originally, he is equally opposed to it on the ground that nationalists have not accepted bodily peace conditions. He has telegraphed to his government in the above sense. He told me categorically four days ago, i.e. since despatch of my telegram No. 239, that he considered a further exchange of notes with Angora unprofitable and that both parties should be called upon to accept Paris peace proposals—that is, take it or leave it.

4. While there are continuous symptoms of opposition to Mustapha Kemal at Angora, he appears to retain his ascendancy. He and his supporters are more intractable than ever as regards national pact. They are also, in my opinion, as deeply committed as ever to Bolshevism, although there are occasional minor quarrels with Moscow and although Moscow is not yet in a position to dictate Angora policy. In this connection please see my despatch No. 446. Negative result of Genoa conference will only strengthen relations between Angora and Moscow unless and until Kemalists are persuaded that His Majesty's Government are making separate arrangements with Bolsheviks behind their backs.

5. Attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding atrocities reported by Americans from Kharput is already stiffening Kemalists in their hostility to Great Britain. Every effort is being made by Kemalists to represent Great Britain as being one sided and using atrocities as pretext to embroil situation. I have received document which purports to contain instructions to Kemalist representative as to reply to proposal for commission of enquiry. Whether genuine or not, it represents pretty accurately present frame of mind of Kemalists. Please see summary in my immediately following telegram. Kemalist representative himself appears of late to have grown more uncompromising in his general attitude.

6. Constantinople government or at any rate Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom I am most in contact, are jealous of growing pretensions of Angora to be regarded as sole government of Turkey and view with anxiety increasing tendency of Europe to recognise that pretension for practical purposes. Please see my despatch No. 394.

They are still too impotent to divorce their own foreign policy from that of Kemalists but they dislike idea of conference in any shape which would enable

Angora to impose its pretensions still further. When I mentioned my objections to Ismid to İzzet Pasha recently, he endorsed them with alacrity.

7. Viewing situation in the light of above considerations, I entertain little or no hope of bringing Kemalists to accept Paris conference proposals by any diplomatic procedure. Only objects, which we can hope to secure in that case, are in order of importance:

(A). To avoid immediate rupture with France and,

(B). To postpone inevitable rupture with Kemalists and to prevent it from occurring in manner which will enable them and our allies to throw responsibility on His Majesty's Government.

With these aims in mind and in view of potential danger to Mesopotamia, etc., of Kemalist army and of effect on agitation in India if blame for rupture is attributed to His Majesty's Government—though I agree that Paris conference plan is only real solid basis on which to stand—it may seem to you expedient to adopt alternative procedure.

8. New French proposals for meeting in warship at Ismid, to which Constantinople and Athens governments would be invited, is certainly preferable to Angora proposal for meeting on shore from which, whatever French may say, it was certainly intention of Angora to exclude both Constantinople and Greeks. But, even as modified, I still see gravest objections to new proposal for following reasons.

(A). We should have waived our declared right to select place of meeting and have appearance of going to Ismid at the dictation of Mustapha Kemal and our prestige would suffer accordingly both now and for purpose of future negotiations.

(B). It would be difficult to refuse claim of French High Commissioner, if put forward, to preside over the conference in French warship and he would tend to abuse the position of president at every turn to weigh scales in favour of Angora.

(C). Unless we had clear understanding with French beforehand on the line to be taken by respective delegates, open rupture with French, which we wish to avoid, would occur in worst possible conditions, i.e., in the presence of adversary and in place to which he had induced us to go. Italian High Commission generally shares my misgivings as to conference on a French warship.

End of part I.

F.O. 371/7865/E. 5299

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 830-832, No. 638

No. 110

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 23, 1922, 1 a.m.

(Received May 23, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 253 *Telegraphic*

Part 2

Following is continuation of my telegram No. 253¹. Begins:

9. I doubt, moreover, whether Mustapha Kemal would come on board warship, and, if he did not, any advantage expected to result from his personal attendance would disappear. Constantinople and Athens governments would probably agree, but neither would like the idea. Constantinople delegates could not live ashore and would be altogether in ambiguous position. Greeks might object to warship on special ground of its being French. In my opinion nobody concerned except French would really like new French proposal, but everyone would be relieved to see His Majesty's Government bear onus of refusing it.

10. On the other hand I fear it is too late to exclude possibility of intermediate stage not contemplated when Paris decisions were taken. Acceptance in French draft of first reply to Angora of wording 'special point' prejudiced our whole position as regards securing bodily Paris decisions before conferring with Turks and Greeks. But, if preliminary meeting be held and wherever it be held, its exact nature needs careful consideration from use of expression 'special point' and to endeavour to secure acceptance by all parties of Paris proposals with modifications of detail only as basis of further negotiations.

11. If you consent to such preliminary meeting, I suggest with a view to obviating as far as possible objections formulated in sub-paragraphs of paragraph 8 above, that it be proposed to convene it at some place in immediate neighbourhood of Constantinople e.g. Beicos and that proposal to this effect be based on your draft rejoinder to Angora with necessary modifications. It might in connection with preliminary meeting almost be necessary to waive stage of formal assent to armistice (please see paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 152 to Paris), since correspondence up to date seems to indicate impossibility of securing Kemal's assent to armistice without some promise as to immediate evacuation and, after recent revelations, evacuation without real guarantees for minorities is unthinkable even on an impossible hypothesis of Greeks now agreeing to it.

12. It would also have to be made quite clear that acceptance by all three, i.e. Constantinople, Angora and Athens, was essential condition of meeting; and, as between allies themselves, that they spontaneously stand loyally by Paris proposals in their main line of resistance to any attempt to secure alternative thereof in essential particulars on pretext of discussion of special points and discouragement

¹ No. 109.

of [any] attempt by Turks to obtain evacuation of Asia Minor before agreement had been reached on body of conditions.

13. If French cannot be brought to accept this, I would as last resort, in order to avoid rupture, overcome my strong objection to their new Ismid proposal, though I would prefer Italian to French warship as I should have more confidence in presidency of my Italian colleague. Conditions in preceding paragraph should also be insisted on. Acceptance in last resort of Ismid proposal should, I think, also be accompanied by clear statement of disadvantages, which His Majesty's Government themselves see in it even though they defer to French wishes.

14. I repeat that I expect little or no concrete result from preliminary meeting whether held at Ismid or Beicos. What I have in view, is attainment of objective indicated in paragraph 7. Your Lordship is the best judge of what action should be taken, if and when breaking point is reached with French or Kemalists. Please note that antepenultimate paragraph of your despatch No. 1405 to Paris foreshadows possibility of independent British action. I trust that in this grave eventuality any separate action, so far as it concerns Turks, will aim at using Constantinople government as counterpoise to Kemalists.

15. Atrocities question has introduced new factor into situation. I would recommend handling this separately from question of peace negotiations as long as it is possible to do so.

16. I think that in shaping present procedure vis-à-vis Turks we should not be influenced by movement of resistance at Smyrna and political changes in Greece, though they will be material factors in determining ultimate course of events. If Kemalist prove obdurate, Greek government will presumably consider themselves absolved from their engagement to place themselves in our hands².

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 832-835, No. 639

² Lord Curzon minuted on May 25: 'We have reached a very difficult point. All Sir H. Rumbold's instincts and arguments are against an Ismid [or] Beicos Conference—as are mine, and yet he ends by tentatively proposing it in a halfhearted fashion, thinking in some way to shift the responsibility for failure from our shoulders.'

'My view of the case is that we should decline to be shuffled or squeezed or shouldered out of the Paris agreement letter by the tactics of Angora or the disloyalty of M. Poincaré.'

'Either the Paris Agreement is worth something—as representing the belated but still published and formal [?] consensus] of the Powers, or it had better be cancelled and the blame placed upon the right shoulders.'

'Really everything turns on the attitude of Italy. M[atthieu] Giannini is entirely against Ismid and in favour of adhering to the Paris proposals.'

'But we can get nothing out of S[ignor] Martino or S[ignor] Schanzer. Their hearts are panting with loyalty to Great Britain and the Paris agreement. But they have not so far lifted a little finger to demonstrate the former or to implement the latter.'

'My view is that we should first assure ourselves of the Italian attitude. If they are prepared to support us, we can then proceed with some confidence. If they are not, we shall have to tell them that their vacillation will become manifest when the papers are published—as will be inevitable, when the breakdown occurs.'

No. 111

Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with M. Venizelos¹

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 27, 1922

I had a long conversation yesterday with M. Venizelos, who had asked me to receive him for the purpose. He began by assuring me that he maintained his intention of not returning to politics in Greece. When I rather smiled at this profession, and suggested that events might prove too strong for him and that the moment would come, perhaps not long hence, when his country would want him, he shook his head and said 'no,' he was getting on in years, and if he were not firmly determined to stand aside, he would actually now be in Smyrna. But he must leave the conduct of affairs to younger men. He retained, however, the greatest anxiety on the subject of the fate, and in fact the lives, of the unfortunate Greek population in Asia Minor, and the way he envisaged the problem of their safety made it impossible to speak on this subject without touching upon political issues. He begged me to understand that that was his only excuse for wishing to speak to me about the tragic situation rapidly developing in Anatolia. He said he accepted the

"In either case we ought I think to put quite clearly to the French the situation to which their policy is driving us, namely the abandonment of the Paris agreement, the responsibility for which will be theirs and we should ask them to define with precision what is their present position about (a) armistice (b) evacuation (c) terms, and what is M. Poincaré's ground for saying that thanks to direct contact (at Ismid) between the different parties the formal acceptance of both Greeks and Turks of the Paris propositions, which the exchange of notes is not likely to bring about, *will without doubt be obtained*. If owing to his influence with Angora M. Poincaré were able to assure us that this would be the result I would risk a conference at Ismid or Beïros or anywhere else.

"But when we know, as we do, that M. Poincaré is secretly promising the Turks his assistance and telling them that the Paris terms will never be enforced, and when we collate this knowledge with the proposal to hold the meeting on a French ship with a French Chairman, — we can have little doubt in our own minds, as Sir H. Rumbold and M[arquis] Gironi also very clearly see, that what M. Poincaré is really after is a rupture, the responsibility for which can be laid upon us.

"Therefore before we fall into that trap, I would make one more effort (a) to make certain of the Italians (b) to commit the French to the Paris terms, or at least to ascertain what they are now after. I may add, as an explanation to Lord Balfour, that the reference to an alternative or independent action on our part, which Sir H. Rumbold did not understand, meant the idea which I put forward in a note a little while ago and on which Mr. Leeper wrote a very valuable minute of appealing from the disloyalty of France and the timidity of Italy to a conference of the signatories of the original Treaty of Sevres to assist us in arriving at a solution. We should there obtain the backing of Japan, Roumania and Yugo-Slavia. We might even obtain some material assistance. In any case we should, I expect, establish the isolation of France.

"But this is merely the suggestion of an alternative course of action if we fail now. I only note upon this file because it reached me while I was still functioning as Sec[retary] of State. But if Lord Balfour would prefer any other course of action, I need hardly add that I will willingly acquiesce."

¹ M. Venizelos had arrived in London on May 23.

position that Greece's old Allies were not able to take active measures in that area. He did not wish in any way to criticise the fact that neither French, nor British, nor Italian military or financial assistance could any longer be expected. He fully understood the reasons which made this inevitable now, and he wished to waste no words about it. But he ventured to doubt whether the Allied Governments fully realised what at present they were up against. His information was that the prospect[s] of Angora accepting the Allied conditions of peace were extremely slender. Of course if these conditions were accepted, he desired to say nothing more, except that he hoped any arrangements which the Allies would make for the protection of Greek subjects in any part of what remained of the Turkish Empire would really prove effective. He had his doubts. But he started from the assumption that peace would not be concluded, unless indeed the Allies were definitely to capitulate, and agree to Mustapha Kemal's terms, which, as we knew, were the integral fulfilment of the conditions of the National Pact.

He foresaw indeed the time when, after vainly struggling to avoid such a complete capitulation, and the admission that Turkey had won the war and not the Allies, the latter might feel compelled, however much they might deplore it, and however deeply they might feel the humiliation of it, to retire from the field and let Angora have its way. He believed that not only in France, but in England, the opinion was widely held that it must come to this, and it might as well be done at once. But what he felt quite sure of was that those who held such opinions did not in the least realise what consequences were involved in such an event.

M. Venizelos said one thing was at present clear: the Greek army must retire from Smyrna. It was no use discussing the matter any further. They must go. What would follow? There was nothing that could stop Mustapha Kemal, after occupying Smyrna, from turning against the Allies. He would by that time have his head swelled more than ever. In such circumstances he would probably be a match for the French in Syria, and throw them into the sea. He would undoubtedly then go for Constantinople, and close the Dardanelles. All military and naval authorities would agree that the latter process would be quite simple for him: he need only throw a few mines into the channel, and unless the Allies held the Asiatic side of the Straits in force, it was quite impossible to prevent their being closed in this manner. The Turks would concentrate on Ismid, and the Allies would have to evacuate Constantinople, even if they had not done it before. Turkish rule would be definitely re-established over the Straits, with all that this is [sic] implied. Did we for a moment believe that, having so reconstituted the Turkish Empire, Mustapha Kemal would hesitate to pursue actively the problem of the reconquest of the Arab countries, and engage in every kind of hostile action against us in the East?

I asked M. Venizelos, when he had finished painting this gloomy picture of the situation, whether he had anything in his own mind in the way of a suggestion

of how such a menace could be met, or at least palliated. He said he could think of only one thing, as in his view the succession of events which he had sketched followed necessarily from the withdrawal of the Greeks from Anatolia. The situation would be changed if something could be put in the place of the Greek army in Smyrna that would prevent Mustapha Kemal from having his hands free to move either against the French, against the Dardanelles, or against the Allies in Constantinople. He did not wish to be over-confident, but he thought there was a means of doing something, and that something was, not merely justified, but urgently called for, in the mere interests of humanity, from the point of view of saving the Allies or the Christian populations in Western Anatolia. He thought that if the districts still inhabited by those Christian groups extending from the Smyrna vilayet to the Ismid district, were patrolled and guarded by local organisations formed for the defence of hearth and home against outrages, and for preventing high-handed interference of any Turkish authorities, this would make it impossible for Kemal either to penetrate into these districts with his army, or to leave them aside whilst undertaking enterprises across the water. M. Venizelos considered that it would not be difficult to set up such an organisation. When the Greek army left, there would be plenty of officers and men originally drawn from those districts, who, as a matter of course, would remain if some security [were] offered to them. The one thing, however, which neither they nor the Greek Government could supply was money, and it was here that he asked for earnest consideration of the question whether the Allies would not be serving their best interests and protect their States against the Turks by the expenditure of sums which would be certainly quite small, if divided amongst them, and if we gave assistance to the Greeks in taking their share of such a financial arrangement. He said the organisation might well take the form of a local gendarmerie or corps of guards, who, if properly armed and led, would compose a formidable barrier against Turkish aggression. He begged me to bear in mind that all this proposal rested on the hypothesis of our not obtaining from Mustapha Kemal the assent to our conditions of peace, and he repeated that, if the Allies either did nothing or formally capitulated to Kemal, some such measures as advocated seemed to constitute the only possibility of saving the freedom of the Dardanelles.

M. Venizelos now turned to the question of the commissions of enquiry which the Allies intended to send both into Turkish territory and into the territory occupied by the Greeks. He entirely approved of the plan, but he desired to call attention to certain features of it which he thought might not otherwise be considered with sufficient care. To his mind there were two dangers to be guarded against; one was that comparisons might be made between two states of conditions and events differing entirely from each other fundamentally. It would in his opinion be not merely useless, but entirely unjust, to set up a comparison between what may have happened on an actual battlefield or in the theatre of war whilst

hostile operations on both sides were being conducted over it, with atrocities committed within territory which was for the time under the peaceful administration of their respective Governments. It would be quite fair to compare the conduct of Turkish and Greek troops before, during and after a battle in their advance through enemy country, or in the course of a retirement before a pursuing enemy. He ventured to think, however, that nothing was to be gained by such an enquiry, and he felt convinced that, if he were to appeal to the experience of British and French commanders in the French theatre of war, they would agree that such enquiries would inevitably reveal certain incidents on either side which might or might not look, at first sight, very horrible, and perhaps without being approved, would yet be admitted to stand outside the proper scope of any such enquiry as was now contemplated in regard to Turkey. It was quite a different matter to enquire on the one hand into what happened to the Greek or the Christian population in districts of the countries where no hostilities had taken place, and which were under the normal peace administration of the Turks, and on the other hand what happened to Turks residing in territory occupied by the Greeks and administered through civilian organisation, such as Macedonia, Thrace, or at present the Smyrna district, etc. M. Venizelos ventured to think that if any enquiry on the latter point were to be made, the Greek administration would receive the warmest praise from any impartial observer. He was well informed of the conditions of the Smyrna district, and he said they undoubtedly reflected the greatest credit on the Greek administration. He hoped that the distinction which he had drawn between the two kinds of events and conditions should be carefully observed by the commissions of enquiry which the Allies proposed to send.

The second difficulty which M. Venizelos envisaged was the difficulty of measuring the importance and the seriousness of events under conditions prevailing on the Greek side according to the same standard as would be applied on the other side. If two entirely separate commissions, with practically no communication between them, made separate investigations, it would be very difficult to ensure such identity of standard. It would, for instance, be possible that the very extent of Turkish atrocities might lead to certain minor events connected with them to be looked upon with less severity than minor events of exactly the same kind would be regarded in another place where these minor events constituted the sole outrages that were encountered. He thought that one way to avoid this difficulty was that there should be only one commission, under one supreme head, who would then divide this commission into two sub-commissions, to go to the Turkish and Greek sides respectively. The investigations would certainly take a little time, and this would allow of the exchange of a certain number of officers from one sub-commission to the other, so that each sub-commission should have direct and first-hand knowledge of what was actually being seen by the other. Finally, it would be the head Commissioner who would make the report, on receiving the evidence submitted by the two sub-commissions. In this way only M. Venizelos thought could real impartiality be ensured.

These were the main objects for which M. Venizelos came to see me. I would, however, like to record two stray remarks which he made in the course of our conversation. One was that all his information tended to show that what the French were pursuing in the East was not so much a pro-Turkish policy, as an anti-British policy. The second remark which I found interesting, was that King Constantine could not possibly survive the return of the Smyrna army to Greece. So soon as this event, which, as I have already explained, he regards as now inevitable at once, King Constantine will have to go².

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 836-841, No. 642

² Lord Curzon intimated on May 25, 'Monsieur Venizelos's anxieties as to the fate of the Greek populations of Asia Minor are well founded, and I entirely share them. He is also probably correct in his estimate of the proceedings of a victorious Kemal, when the Greeks have disappeared:

'I would have made a much better provision for the Christian minorities in Smyrna and elsewhere (vide my note of suggestions submitted to the French and Italians before the Paris meeting) had it not been for the sturdy opposition of Monsieur Poincaré, and the complete indifference of Signor Schanzer.

But Monsieur Venizelos's suggestion that the situation can be saved and the safety of the minorities secured by the arming of local organizations in the area between Ismid and Smyrna—to be financed by Europe—is in my view quite illusory. That the Allies will finance the attempt is doubtful. That the bands so organized would be able to stand against the armies of Kemal (with all the resources of modern warfare) and to hold the wide area from Ismid to the Mediterranean is quite out of the question.

'How then are we to secure the threefold end

- a. save the minorities,
- b. prevent Kemal from marching to the Dardanelles and again blocking the Straits,
- c. save Constantinople from a similar attack?

'I suggest that it can only be done through the intervention at the right moment of Nations. In the Paris agreement we decided to ask the League of Nations to assume responsibility for the protection of minorities in Anatolia, with a special machinery—inspection—officers and so on—for the purpose.

'When this request reaches them, I suggest that they should reply that it is inadequate; that they cannot assume the responsibility without more substantial safeguards; that the complete and immediate evacuation of Smyrna and the surrounding regions is out of the question; that an interim régime must certainly be set up, whether it be on the lines of the Saar, or the Lebanon, or some other analogy; that this régime must last for a period, say, of five years; that the Allied Powers or the principal nations represented in the League must keep them [so] to do it; that a League Commission must be responsible for these areas during that period; and that the reserved area, whether it extend as far east as Ismid or not—I doubt the possibility of this—shall at least include the Sangak of Chanak so as to escape the danger of the seizure by Kemal of the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles.

'As regards the latter question, I am in some difficulty.

'At the Paris meeting the French and Italians, and notably the former, would have given back both shores to the Turks. It was only by an absolute refusal to continue negotiations on that basis that I saved the European shore and Gallipoli. More I could not do.

'The military authorities and even Marshal Foch's committee were of opinion that by these means (an Inter-called garrison at Gallipoli, complete demilitarisation of both sides of the Straits including the whole Sangak of Chanak, visits of inspecting officers, and presence—as provided for in the original treaty of Sevres—of an allied ship or ships in the Marmora or off the Dardanelles) we could assure the safety and integrity of the Straits, and maritime access to Constantinople.

No. 112

*Extracts from a Speech by Sir Charles Townshend, M. P., at the House of Commons,
on 30 May 1922*

NEAR EAST.

SIR CHARLES TOWNSHEND: As was disclosed by the Debate of last Thursday, the solid fact which remained in connection with the Genoa Conference was the Russo-German Alliance, and I wish to try quite shortly to prove to the House that that is part and parcel of our Near East policy. I think that everyone in the House will agree with me that that Russo-German Alliance, apart from the question of menace of war, has upset the equilibrium of Europe, and, therefore, the vital necessity, as it appears to me, arises for stopping this conflict at once between the Turks and the Greeks. I do not wish to exaggerate, but have only tried to put the point as plainly and as practically as I can, without regard to whether I speak eloquently or not. It seems to me, as a reader of history, that, if we do not stop this war at once, we shall be face to face with the possibility of driving Turkey into the arms of Russia. I have preached that in and out of this House for nearly two years—certainly before I came into the House. That is our great danger. If Turkey should be driven into an alliance with Russia and Germany, there is no one here who will doubt what that means to our Indian Empire, to Iraq, and every where else. Everyone must become grave on thinking what the consequences of that would be.

'The Admiralty and Admiral de Robeck take a different view. They declare that unless we hold the Chanak positions also, the Straits will be lost. Monsieur Venizelos evidently shares this opinion. Between these authorities I cannot decide, though I think there is force in the more pessimistic presumption. Anyhow it is desirable to guard against the danger of a triumphant Kemalist advance to Chanak and hence the scheme which I have adumbrated in this note.

'It is not perhaps a question of practical politics at this moment. But I desire to suggest it to Lord Balfour as worthy of being borne in mind.

'As regards Monsieur Venizelos's suggestions for co-ordinating and effecting some kind of equality of treatment between the two atrocities enquiries his observations appear to me to be theoretically sound. The difficulty in giving practical effect to them is mainly geographical. The two commissions will be or may be separated by hundreds of miles of inaccessible territory. One party may be at Karatepe (Smyrna region), a second down in the South, a third in the remote East at Kharput or Sivas. The interchange of officers may prove to be difficult or even impracticable. If there is to be a single Chief Commissioner, from what nation is he to be drawn? Impartiality cannot be expected from a Frenchman or an Italian. Both, or at least the French, are too deeply committed to Angora. The Americans are either suspicious and disloyal, like Admiral Bristol, or frightened by publicity. It might be possible to make the two sub-commissions report to the High Commissioners at Constantinople or to select someone of the Doctor Nansen type to act as liaison between the two sub-commissions. To decide upon this requires more local knowledge than I possess.'

Since my entry into Parliament, and, in fact, before I came to Parliament, I have been, it is not too much to say, upset at the policy that our Government has adopted in the Near East. When Turkey came out of the War it was a lucky moment for England, and matters would then have been easy for us. The Government know that, but they never acknowledge it. We know what the result was. Austria gave in at once. It set the whole house of cards tumbling. I thought, when I came away from the Island of Mudros at the time of the Armistice, "At least this will temper the wind to the Turks afterwards". Not a bit of it. We have treated them with the most merciless severity. I know the story of atrocities, and I will come to that later. We have treated them with merciless severity, on a par with the way in which we have treated Austria. One would have thought that Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Arabia, the Hedjaz, and what not, having been taken from the Turks, Turkey had been punished sufficiently, but that was not enough for the director of our foreign policy. I might have added that we took all of Thrace right up to the shores of Constantinople—really within punching range of their guns at Constantinople—and also the holy city of Adrianople, as if the director of our foreign policy had deliberately intended to create a 20-years' war. Another Alsace—Lorraine question with that, however, the director of our foreign policy, influenced by M. Venizelos and those associated with him, then invited the Greeks to invade Turkey in Asia Minor, I suppose in order still further to exasperate the Mahommedan world, to put the Turks with their backs to the wall, and to make them fight, as they say, on the carpet.

The occupation of Constantinople by our troops appeared to me to be such a blunder that, although I was on my way to America, and had not even thought of coming to the House of Commons, I wrote to the Foreign Secretary and begged and implored him, on the strength of my friendship with him, not to consent to such a mad step. That was a gross tactical blunder, as I told the House, and it was a still bigger political blunder, for it at once lit up the Turkish Nationalist party, and created this patriot Kemal, whom the Prime Minister described as a revolting general. There have been other revolting generals in history. Washington was one. If you come to think out this question of Constantinople, the directors of our foreign policy have committed, probably, every blunder that opportunity and time permitted them. That cannot be denied. Why should we say things that are not true? I am for speaking out the plain truth. If I am wrong, I hope that hon. Members will get up afterwards and say so. I can only say that I speak honestly what is in my mind. With your Grand Fleet anchored 600 or 700 yards off the Sultan's palace, and with the Dardanelles in your hands, you go and land troops in Constantinople. As I have told the House before, the only soldier I would have landed in Constantinople would have been the corporal of marines, to bring all the officers' washing on Saturday night. What was the result of this landing of our men in a Mahommedan city? The Turks saw that there was no hope, they ran to arms,

and the Nationalist party was created. What did they do? The Prime Minister is credited with saying — I do not know whether it is right or wrong — when he heard that Smyrna was occupied: "We have closed the door to Turkey now. If she wants to get out of the windows, let her do it." That was the last straw.

I am talking of the Mahommedan world now. Will not our Government understand that the whole of that world of Islam stretches in a broad belt from Morocco to China, and from Turkestan to the Congo? They are undergoing new aspirations. They are stirred to a great ferment. England is a great Mahommedan-owning Empire, and let me point out how France has tumbled to that. Marshal Lyautey *and* is one who served at the oar before he took the helm. That is a necessity which our Government will not realise. I have seen so much of it in my years of service. When the Government has sent out governors, they have always preferred the advice and experience of the gentleman in the office with the blotting-paper cuffs. Apparently they do not recollect the maxim of the Roman General Sulla, who said, "He who would take the helm, must first serve at the oar". What did Marshal Lyautey say about Angora? He said, "We do not want want the mess in North Africa that these English are having in India. We must have peace with Angora". And North Africa, as far as I know is at present as peaceful as Piccadilly.

With a very much superior army, far greater in numbers and excellently supplied with guns and all other material of war, they (the Greeks) at once got beaten on the Sakaria river after hard fighting. It is the man behind the gun that does it always. To me there are only two kinds of soldiers in the world, the good soldier and the bad. If you give a good soldier an inferior gun and everything else, he will beat the man whose heart is not in the right place. I daresay there are many amongst the Greeks who are good soldiers, but with regard to the fighting value of the lot we have not a great opinion. What happened? They were repulsed. They are now thrown on the defensive, and they at once began to dig in, and what they want to do is to hold on to what they have got. There is no doubt about it. Our Government stepped in at once with the idea, I must suppose, of protection, and proposed an armistice at once, announcing also that they would not put pressure on the Greeks. That means that the Greeks can make themselves thoroughly comfortable, and after three or four months they may say, "We have altered our minds. We mean to stop." Then our officials and the Cabinet wonder that Kemal will not accept such a fool proposition. Let anyone who has served put himself in the place of the Turkish general and say, "We want an armistice. We are not going away. We want to remain here". No one in his senses would grant an armistice. Time after time I have heard it said, "Kemal will not do this, Kemal will not do that". We ought to hear Kemal's side of the question. At the beginning of this month Kemal proposed to have a conference at Ismid. He chose a place quite close to Angora, where he has a direct line of telegraph. He can be on the spot and decide the question once and for all. I am certain that peace would come from that conference. I have talked with many Turks, and I am certain of it.

The French replied that they found the proposition of the Conference a very acceptable one. They were not bound to accept all Kemal's conditions because they attended it. They also agreed to have this inquiry on the Turkish atrocities if at the same time we would have an inquiry into the Greek atrocities at Smyrna, which the Prime Minister has put in a pigeon hole. I know what was in that inquiry. I have seen the whole of that inquiry and it summed up entirely against the Greeks. Do you think everyone does not know that? I cannot call it honest. I have been very busy and I find out now that the Atrocity Report is absolutely false. The facts have been sent to the American and the French Governments. Whether they have come to our Government, I do not know, but there it is. I hope our Government will not go on and make themselves ridiculous in the eyes of the Eastern world and Europe by accepting the thing without any proof. We do not all believe in Conferences. Some of us believe that a Conference is where bustle and confusion are mistaken for the activity of business. Our Prime Minister believes in them and I agree that his heart and soul were in what he tried to do. Why did he not go to Ismid? Why did he not take a light cruiser at Taranto travelling 22 knots and go through the Canal of Corinth to the Gulf of Ismid? He would have had it all over in three or four days. He could have talked with Kemal and made him moderate his demands. That is why I desired to go there. I know him well and respect him and I wanted to say to him, "For heaven's sake, Kemal, moderate your demands. We must have peace". And I would have worked heart and soul for it, but the Foreign Office were not of the same opinion. I have not altered my opinion and I only wish the Prime Minister could have been induced to go there. I believe fighting will begin before June is over. There is a large movement of Turks from the Eastward moving West. By our Government rejecting the plan of Ismid—I defy anyone to contradict me—we have broken off negotiations for peace. I dare say there is still time. I do not wish to criticise. I have only said what I think is absolutely true. I only beg that the Government will try to alter their policy and follow Beaconsfield, Palmerston and the great man Salisbury, who were of one opinion and that was to have that military race, the Turks, as our friends on the road to India.

Lieut-Commander KENWORTHY: I am sure the hon. and gallant Gentleman has performed a great public service in raising this question on one of the few last occasions on which the matter can be ventilated before the unhappy events that he feels justified in prophesying may come about, namely, the re-starting of fighting in the mountains and uplands of Anatolia. I propose to deal with one or two aspects of this very complicated and serious question. Why have the Government suddenly started to give exceptional publicity to the excesses, which I am afraid have occurred in some measure, committed by the Turks? Why have they been silent, and more than silent? Why have they suppressed the reports of their own officers on the excesses committed by the Greeks? Why have they

suddenly taken the step of putting up a private Member to ask an inspired question, and then read out this long, dramatic account of the horrors committed on the Black Sea coast by the Turks? What is the meaning of it? Is it in preparation for a General Election? Is the right hon. Gentleman going to try to stampede us with the story of Turkish atrocities as Gladstone did three generations ago with much more cause? The whole story that we have been allowing ourselves to believe is open to the greatest doubt.

F.O. 371/7065

No. 113

Sir H. Rambold to the Earl of Balfour

YENIKEUY, June 13, 1922

(Received June 20)

No. 537

My Lord,

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me yesterday to enquire as to the present position of the negotiations for a peace settlement in the Near East. He pointed out that it was now about five weeks since the Turkish Government had sent a note on the subject to the Allied High Commissions. I referred Izzet Pasha to the answer given by Mr. Harmsworth in the House of Commons on the 25th May in answer to questions on the subject by General Townshend and Mr. Aubrey Herbert. I gave Izzet Pasha the substance of Mr. Harmsworth's reply, showing that His Majesty's Government would prefer to obtain a definite acceptance or refusal of their offer from the three Governments concerned.

2. I pointed out that if the Near East settlement had been hung up the fault lay mainly at the door of the Angora Government. That Government had proposed a preliminary meeting at Ismid from which the representatives of the Constantinople and Greek Governments were apparently to be excluded. This proposal had never commended itself to me, nor did I believe that His Majesty's Government was in favour of it. Izzet Pasha enquired why we had not already objected to this proposal. I suggested that Beicos would be a suitable place for a meeting to which all the parties concerned could come.

3. Izzet Pasha told me that when he had been in Paris recently he had asked the Kemalist representatives why the Angora Government had not launched an attack against the Greeks, seeing that the Kemalists were always proclaiming that their army could and would drive the latter out of Asia Minor. He went on to say that the Kemalists had made a great mistake in not accepting a regular armistice which would have prevented incidents such as the recent bombardment of Samsoun by a Greek squadron. As it was, a state of armistice practically existed on the front at the present moment.

4. We then discussed the attitude of the Angora Government towards the Committee of Union and Progress. Izzet Pasha said that the attacks made on himself by the Angora Government at the time he had gone to London and Paris had recoiled on the head of Mustapha Kemal. Many people in Anatolia knew him (Izzet Pasha) very well, and resented the attacks on him. These had had the effect of weakening Mustapha Kemal's position, and, in order to strengthen it, the latter was now endeavouring to get support from the adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 406 49, p. 377, No. 156

No. 114

Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl to Baljout

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 20, 1922
(Received June 26)

No. 556

My Lord,

IT was announced in the local press a couple of weeks ago that preparations were being made at Ismid for the reception of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, and it was even rumoured that he had already arrived at Ada Bazar. These reports proved at the time to be baseless. Hamid Bey, the Kemalist representative here, contradicted them flatly in conversation with Mr. Ryan.

2. On Wednesday, the 14th instant, however, Mustapha Kemal Pasha did actually arrive at Ada Bazar, and he came on to Ismid a day or two later.

3. While at Ada Bazar, Mustapha Kemal gave an interview to a correspondent of the "Waki", who had gone post haste to meet him. The pasha said that his object was to inspect the Ismid front, which he had been unable to visit previously, and that he had found everything satisfactory. Questioned regarding the Pontus atrocities, he said that the Greeks had been removed for military reasons from certain areas, and that such measures would necessarily be taken so long as the war continued. Asked whether the Greek fleet would continue its piratical operations in the Black Sea, he said that last year the Greeks had bombarded Inebolu, and this year they had bombarded Samsoun. The Nationalists had reckoned with such eventualities beforehand. They produced no result, except to strengthen the national resolve.

4. The correspondent observed that Ali Fuad Pasha's departure from Moscow had been interpreted unfavourably in certain quarters. Mustapha Kemal replied that there was no ground for this. Relations with Russia were excellent.

5. The Pasha said that there was no intention of altering the fundamental law, but that the draft Law on the duties and competency of commissioners was now ready and would shortly be laid before the Assembly. As your Lordship is aware, the question of Cabinet responsibility became a burning one in Angora towards the end of last year, and served as a peg on which to hang a strong attack on Mustapha Kemal's position.

6. There can be little doubt that Mustapha Kemal's visit to the Ada Bazar and Ismid area is due mainly to military considerations. Apprehension was felt a short time ago in Turkish circles lest the Greeks should be contemplating forward action in the direction of Constantinople or Ismid, or both. Still more recently there has been a good deal of talk—though principally in Greek circles, so far as I can gather—of an intended Kemalist offensive. The most definite reason given for Mustapha Kemal's journey is, however, the anxiety caused at Angora by an armed anti-Kemalist movement in the neighbourhood of Bolu. That such a movement exists no longer admits of doubt. I have not hitherto reported on it owing to the difficulty of obtaining accurate information and estimating the importance of the movement.

7. It would now appear that various discontented elements have combined in a kind of revolt in the district in question, and that this revolt has attained sufficient proportions to necessitate the despatch of loyal forces to repress it. A certain colonel, Shevket Bey, formerly a deportee in Malta, who was after his return placed in command of a unit of the Kemalist army, is said to have put himself at the head of the malcontents. The Greeks are also alleged to have a finger in the pie. According to some accounts, Shevket Bey is acting in the Enverist interest. According to others, the movement is connected with the recent re-entry into activity of the old gang of the Committee of Union and Progress. Yet another theory is that it is an attempt to put into effect the scheme for the establishment of a local anti-Kemalist Government under Greek auspices in Western Asia Minor.

8. The truth probably is that the movement such as it is has brought together desperate elements. The insurgents are said to number 2,000 or 3,000, but I doubt whether it will prove to be beyond the power of the Angora authorities to repress the revolt fairly quickly in the same way in which they have got the better of other local movements, notably in the Konia region. At the same time, the present movement derives a special importance from the fact that it appears to contain a Turkish military element; from its having occurred in an area close both to Constantinople and to the Greek front; and from the existence in the area of large numbers of Circassians, who for various reasons, including their past association with Ferid Pasha's Government and later on with the Greeks, are compromised in the eyes of the Kemalists.

9. M. Claude Farrère left for Ismid on the 18th June to visit Mustapha Kemal Pasha. He was sent there in a French destroyer, and was accompanied by Hamid Bey, the Kemalist representative here.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 406/49, pp. 389-390, No. 163.

No. 115

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch

No. 742

22.6.1922

TURKEY & CENTRAL ASIA.

The Soviet Government's Intrigues with Mustafa Kemal and Enver Pasha; the Latter's Activities in Turkestan.

The appended report is from a thoroughly reliable intermediary, based upon information which he has obtained from one of Enver Pasha's most intimate followers, who recently arrived in Constantinople from the Caucasus. Although the statement is somewhat lengthy, it is given in full, on account of its great interest. It describes the Soviet Government's amazing duplicity and intrigue, in its dealings with Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal, and gives an account of the circumstances which led to Enver's journey to Turkestan earlier in the year, and to his subsequently turning traitor to the Bolsheviks.

Cross headings have been inserted in the report to facilitate perusal, and the following is an outline of its salient features:

The report begins by describing the relations between Mustafa Kemal and Enver, and shows how deep personal animosity has existed for a long time between these two, between their respective partisans. Enver had, from time to time, offered his services to Mustafa Kemal, but such overtures have been rudely repulsed.

Relations between the Soviet Government and Enver Pasha are then described. It is shown how for more than two years, Enver Pasha had co-operated closely with the Bolsheviks, and had enjoyed great popularity at Moscow. The Russians, at first, regarded the Turkish Nationalists with great disfavour on account of their imperialist and anti-Communist aims, and it was their intention to utilise Enver Pasha to overturn Mustafa Kemal's government.

Enver, in accordance with this phase of Soviet policy, set to work to establish himself in Anatolia. He used The Caucasus as a base for his activities, and achieved considerable success in securing the allegiance of the "Defence of Rights" centres in the Eastern Provinces. He also succeeded in winning over certain units of the Nationalist Eastern army, and in establishing certain of his agents in Anatolia.

Towards the end 1921, the turn of events began to cause Mustafa Kemal great alarm, and the latter radically changed his tactics by virtually throwing himself into the arms of the Russians. While requesting that he should not be forced to make open declaration of adherence to Soviet principles, he pledged himself gradually to alter the system of Anatolian administration in accordance with the wishes of Moscow, signing a secret and personal agreement to this effect. Frunze and Araloff were thereupon sent to Angora.

It is then shown how, having won Mustafa Kemal over to their side, the Bolsheviks were faced with a difficult situation as regards Enver. The Bolsheviks, however, conceived a skilful but dishonest plan of preventing Enver from succeeding in his attempt to upset Mustafa Kemal, without permitting him to realise that it was the plans of the Soviet Government itself which had changed. They organised a revolt against Enver in the Batum area, and succeeded in inducing Mustafa Kemal to adopt vigorous measures with a view to suppressing Enver's activities in the Eastern Provinces. Enver was thereupon obliged to return to Moscow, after having seen the frustration of all his plans.

The Soviet authorities then, in order to gain time, sent Enver on his Mission to Berlin, during December, 1921, and held him in play by vague promises of affording him assistance in his Pan-Islamic schemes.

Early in 1922, the plans of the Soviet authorities materialised, and they proposed that Enver should proceed to Turkestan to conciliate the insurgents in that country, by announcing that Communist principles would be adapted to Islamic customs. Enver accepted this proposal with enthusiasm.

It is then described how Enver, shortly before his departure, discovered by chance, from one of Chicherin's private secretaries the real motives of the Soviet Government in sending him to Central Asia, i.e. to get him out of the way, and the true significance of that Government's past intrigues with him and with Mustafa Kemal.

As the result of these revelations, Enver decided to turn against the Soviet Government on his arrival in Turkestan, and to place himself at the head of the insurgents.

The remainder of the report deals with Enver's activities in Turkestan, and describes his present policy, of which a noteworthy feature is his intention to fight the Bolsheviks to the bitter end.

It will be seen that the above report, while throwing a new light on the circumstances leading to Enver's Mission to Turkestan, confirms and amplifies various reports, recently issued by S.I.S regarding Russo-Kemalist relations, etc.

F.O. 371/7947/E. 6421

APPENDIX

*The Soviet Government's Intrigues with Mustafa Kemal and Enver Pasha: The Latter's Activities in Turkestan**Relations between Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal*

There are people who think that the hostility between Mustafa Kemal and Enver is assumed, but this is not so. Not only are these two leaders mutually hostile to each other, but there is also a deep animosity between their personal partisans. The principal reason for this is Mustafa Kemal's indescribable megalomania and lust for power.

It is true that Enver has, from time to time, offered his services to Mustafa Kemal, and has suggested that the past should be forgotten. Realising that any appearance of co-operation between the Angora Government and the former Unionist leaders would be unfavourably regarded by the European Powers, Enver proposed that he and his friends should work in the background, and without showing themselves in any way.

These proposals were, however, brusquely rejected by Mustafa Kemal and his supporters, a circumstance which still further accentuated Enver's animosity, with the result that an exceedingly complicated situation has been created.

The Soviet Government and Enver Pasha

It is well known that Enver has been co-operating with the Russian Bolsheviks for a long time, and for more than two years he was a great favourite of the Soviet Government. The Soviet leaders promised their assistance to the Turks and Moslems, and Enver on his part promised them to influence the Moslem world in favour of the Communist cause.

At one time the Russians became exceedingly dissatisfied with the Angora Government and came to regard the Nationalists as a serious obstacle to their plans. It was felt that, as long as Mustafa Kemal and his partisans were in power, the Soviet Government could never be secure against capitalist and imperialist intrigues.

The Soviet leaders therefore urged Enver to overturn Mustafa Kemal's Government. In all his reports, Nazaranos, the former Russian Envoy in Angora, spoke of the necessity of carrying this out. The Russian leaders themselves were divided in two parties, one of which favoured Enver and the other Mustafa Kemal, but as a result of the Kemalist campaign against Communism in Anatolia, and the murder of Mustafa Subhi and his companies, the party which favoured Mustafa Kemal was obliged to yield to those who supported Enver.

Enver Pasha's Activities in Anatolia

Enver has succeeded in obtaining a certain degree of support in Anatolia, and, although his following was not strong enough to upset the Government of Mustafa Kemal, he determined to make the effort.

The Communist organisation in the Caucasus was first strengthened by Enver and his friends, and they then made a successful attempt to win over the "Defence of Rights" centres in the Eastern Provinces. As a matter of fact these centres were already largely composed of Unionists and it was with little difficulty that they were won over to Enver's cause.

At the same time, the Russians had created a strong secret organisation throughout the Eastern Provinces which was also placed at Enver's disposal. Enver had furthermore already succeeded in winning over the labour guilds or artisans, porters and lightermen in the Trebizond area. In fact, such was Enver's influence that Khalil and Kutchuk Talaat were able to establish themselves in Trebizond in spite of Mustafa Kemal's orders to the contrary.

Finally, Enver succeeded in winning over two regiments of the Eastern Army. By this time relations between Angora and Moscow had become so strained that the Russian Envoy Nazaranos was recalled from Angora.

The Soviet Government and Mustafa Kemal

Mustafa Kemal then took fright and threw himself on his knees before the Russians, to whom he promised he would be for ever faithful, and that he would serve them even more loyally than Enver. He only begged that he should not be forced to make an open declaration of adhesion to Bolshevik principles, but that changes in the Anatolian administration should be introduced very gradually, and in accordance with the circumstances of the moment. Mustafa Kemal gave these undertakings personally in writing to the Soviet Government, and even Ali Fuad Pasha, the Kemalist representative in Moscow, knew nothing whatever about the matter. This secret agreement, signed by Mustafa Kemal, was taken to Moscow by his young A.D.C., Sami Bey, who was himself completely ignorant of the contents of the sealed envelope in which the communication was placed, and he fulfilled his mission with complete loyalty.

The Bolshevik leaders were exceedingly pleased, and General Frunze and Araloff were shortly afterwards sent to Angora.

Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders had little faith in the sincerity of either Mustafa Kemal or Enver, and, although they were delighted at the prospect of gaining Mustafa Kemal as a willing tool, they did not wish to lose Enver altogether.

Soviet Arrangements to upset Enver Pasha's Plans

They, therefore, carried out a very skilfully conceived plan in order to prevent Enver from succeeding in his attempt to upset Angora, but without permitting him to understand that it was the plans of the Soviet Government itself that had changed.

First of all the Soviet authorities organised a kind of revolt against Enver and his partisans in the Batum area, ostensibly by Caucasian Nationalists. The scheme

was carried out with such skill that at last Enver was thoroughly puzzled, and found he could not cope with the situation. Mustafa Kemal, in the meanwhile, acting upon information given to him by the Russians, sent a Colonel Sami Bey to Trebizond to withdraw the two regiments which had been won over by Enver, and to deal with the "Defence of Rights" centres. Colonel Sami Bey succeeded in his task, and also captured and imprisoned Yahya Kahaya, the leader of the lightermen of Trebizond. A reign of terror was instituted in the Eastern Provinces in spite of the protests of Kiazim Kara Bekir, who had remained in complete ignorance of what was happening. Enver, seeing all his plans destroyed, left for Moscow, and his partisans dispersed.

The Bolsheviks gave Enver a very warm reception upon his arrival in Moscow, and persuaded him that the failure of his plans had been due to incomplete organisation.

They promised to give him further assistance, and at the same time, they began to discuss with him and with Ali Fuad Pasha the possibility of adapting Communist principles to Islam. They also agreed to recognise peasant landholders as proletarian elements. Enver and Ali Fuad were delighted, and Ali Fuad, believing that these satisfactory results were due to Enver's influence, sent praiseworthy accounts of Enver's activities to Angora.

The Soviet Plan to send Enver Pasha to Central Asia

The Soviet Government then proposed that Enver should go to Turkestan and conciliate the insurgents in that country by announcing that the Soviet Government had adapted Communist principles to the laws and customs of Islam.

Enver accepted the proposal with enthusiasm, and believed that he would increase his influence by advertising the value of his services to the Moslem world. In his enthusiasm he forgot the ill fortune he had encountered in the Caucasus, and began to prepare for his journey to Turkestan, for which he had received funds from the Soviet Government.

Enver's Discovery of the Soviet Government's Intentions

Just before he was to leave Moscow, however, one of Chicherin's private secretaries, who for some unknown personal reason, had conceived a grudge against his chief, secretly interviewed Enver, and gave him full details of the secret intrigues of the Soviet leaders in the Caucasus, together with details of the secret personal agreement between Chicherin and Mustafa Kemal: more especially he laid stress upon the contempt and distrust of the Soviet leaders both for Enver and Mustafa Kemal, and all the Turkish leaders in general.

These revelations illuminated the situation for Enver like a stroke of lightning and he understood everything, but he determined in his turn to act with cunning and discretion. He, therefore, went to Turkestan as arranged, but instead

of carrying out the Soviet Government's instructions, he placed himself at the head of the insurgents, and succeeded in creating a very awkward situation for the Bolsheviks in Turkestan.

Enver Pasha's Activities and Policy in Central Asia

The informant is of the opinion that this period of success will continue for some time, for there are considerable supplies of war material in the country and an important proportion of these has already fallen into the hands of the insurgents.

Furthermore, there were already a number of Enverist officers in the country and even after Enver's defection from the Bolsheviks, a large number of Turkish officers joined him, in spite of the closing of the roads by the Russian authorities. At the same time, Enver will be assisted by the Bokhariots, the Afghans, and other Moslem peoples with whom the Bolsheviks have made themselves thoroughly unpopular by their policy of robbery and oppression.

The following is an outline of Enver's plans, so far as can be gathered from his most intimate associates:

- (i) Being convinced, that, without Russian assistance, Turkey will never be able to resist the European Powers, and in order to obtain such support in all sincerity and without intrigue, Enver's primary object is to force the Bolshevik leaders to realise that his party is not a negligible factor in the situation, but that, on the contrary, his party is stronger and in every way to be preferred to the Kemalists.
- (ii) To this end Enver is determined to fight the Bolsheviks in Turkestan to the bitter end, and to organize anti-Bolshevik revolts whenever and wherever possible.
- (iii) In order to strengthen the means of coercing the Bolsheviks, Enver will continue to develop the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asiatic propaganda campaign in Central Asia and act in every respect as if the Enverists were co-operating with the Kemalists.
- (iv) In order, furthermore, to be able to exert pressure upon the Kemalists, the Enverist party will strengthen by every means possible the Unionist organisation in Anatolia and Constantinople, but in a very discreet and secret manner, so as not to arouse the attention either of Mustafa Kemal or the Russians. In this connection, particular importance is attached to the development to the Unionist organisation in Constantinople.
- (v) In order that neither the Kemalists nor the Russians should realise the true nature of these plans, nothing decisive or outwardly important will be done under item (iv) until the campaign in Central Asia has met with a certain measure of success.

It will now be understood why both the Russians and the Kemalists are puzzled by the attitude of Enver. The Russians do not know that Enver has learnt

their secret. They thought rather that Mustafa Kemal had been co-operating with Enver, and it was for that reason that for a while relations between Angora and Moscow have been somewhat strained. It is for this reason that Ali Fuad Pasha was suspected of having connived at Enver's activities, and has, therefore, been disgraced and recalled to Angora by Mustafa Kemal at the request of the Soviet Government.

F.O. 371/2947 E. 6421

No. 116

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch

23.6.1922

No. 744

Secret.

THE GREAT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO ATROCITIES

The following is a summary of a confidential document recently sent from Angora to Hamid Bey, the Nationalist representative in Constantinople:—

At a secret meeting of the National Assembly held on May 8th at which Mustafa Kemal Pasha was present, the question of permitting a Commission of Enquiry to enter Anatolia was discussed, and the following is the gist of the resolutions taken:—

1. In principle the Commission would be allowed to come into contact with minority elements in Anatolia but would not be permitted to make an enquiry in the Pontus region.
2. To prove that the Government had been justified in taking severe measures in the Pontus region, and was not to blame for what had happened there, the following steps should be taken:
 - a. Preparation of official reports on the revolt of the Greeks against the Government, and the danger of a hostile landing on the Trebizond-Sinope seaboard. Collection and photographing of intercepted correspondence from Greeks to the Patriarch at Constantinople proving their connection with enemy forces.
 - b. Collection of photographs, documents and arms proving or relating to Greek secret revolutionary organisations in the Pontus region.
 - c. To compile a list with photographs of Turkish officers and soldiers assassinated by Greek hands; buildings and arms depots destroyed by them; and attacks made in the military zone, even on important strategic points behind the front.

- d. Draw up a report based on the logical arguments of the rights of governments to deport, intern or punish subjects suspected of, or proved to be in contact with the enemy.
- e. Present all these documents to the members of the Commission of Enquiry who wish to be in contact with minority elements other than those belonging to the Pontus region.
3. To try to show that the Greek and Armenian populations, which, for strategic reasons, were evacuated from the vilayet of Konia to Nigde, Semindre and other places, are permitted to follow their occupations without molestation.
4. To prove by documentary evidence how the granting of equality rights and liberty to the Armenians in the vilayet of Kharpüt was spoilt by the revolutionary aims of certain individuals, and that it had in consequence been necessary to deport some suspected persons in order to safeguard the Iraq front, but that these people were now peacefully established in the Sivas vilayet.
5. To compel the Greek and Armenian priests, teachers and notables to present reports and memoranda to the commission in favour of the National Government and to prepare some examples to be given to the Greek communities to be copied.
6. To insist that the Powers make an enquiry in the regions occupied by the Greeks.
7. To form a Commission with Fethi Bey, Commissary of Interior Affairs, as President: to draw up a programme of these decisions and take steps for their fulfilment.

Note by S.I.S. The above was obtained from a new agent who, as far as can be judged at present, is reliable. The information is, however, classified as A. 2, pending further experience of the agent.

F.O. 371/24000 F. 16483

No. 117

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 27th, 1922

(Received July 3)

No. 572

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 284 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the speech delivered by Mustafa Kemal Pasha at Ismid on June 18, as reported by the Anatolian Telegraph Agency.

I have, etc.

(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD

High Commissioner

F.O. 371 7867 E 6366

ENCLOSURE IN No. 117

A Speech delivered by Mustafa Kemal Pasha at Ismid on June 16, 1922
June 16 (Anatolian Agency).

The following is the text of the speech delivered by Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha, President of the Great National Assembly of Turkey, Commander in Chief, before Mr. Claude Farrère and the whole people and officials of Ismid on the occasion of a tea banquet given at 6 p.m. in the Palace Garden at Ismid:

"Gentlemen,

I consider it my duty to express publicly the sentiments which I feel at seeing here in our midst Mr. Claude Farrère, the very precious friend of Turkey and of the Turkish people. Our dear and respected friend, Mr. Claude Farrère! I am very pleased and very happy to meet you on territory in which Turkey lives independent and free, even though it be but a corner of that territory. The joy which I personally feel is shared equally by every one.

Our respected guest, you may feel assured that from the Gulf of Ismid to the fortress of Kars, from the shores of the Black Sea to the oases of Arabia, the heart of our nation at this moment beats every where with the same feelings of love and of appreciation towards you.

Gentlemen, Mr. Claude Farrère has proved very clearly that he is really and sincerely the friend of Turkey. When our country was passing through perilous times, when our nation was exposed to oppressions, and when the combined injustice of the world was attacking us, a sublime humanitarian voice was heard rising to the sky against these oppressions. The owner of that voice was Claude Farrère, whom we are happy to have among us.

Gentlemen, in education customs, character, sentiments, inclinations and even ideas men cannot escape from the general tendencies of the Social Group in

F. 19

which they are born and to which they belong, but we have some great persons born who have the same feelings in their hearts not only towards the social group to which they belong but also towards the whole of humanity. Mr. Claude Farrère is one of these great persons.

Besides this, our friend has also another special quality: he is one of the chosen sons of a very noble nation which shed its blood and made revolutions in order to proclaim its liberty and independence to the whole world.

It was indeed to be expected that a person so heartily attached to Turkey and to the Turkish people should come to see Turkey at those quarters in the painful times through which she is passing. Our friend appreciated this point and as was hoped and expected, he has taken the trouble to come here after visiting Constantinople. I do not know what impressions our friend obtained during his short visit to Constantinople. He has naturally however been brought into contact with the suffering in the hearts of our poor and unfortunate people who still live under the bayonets and threats of our enemies. It must be admitted that for a friend of Turkey this feeling will be very painful and grievous.

It is also painful that there should exist a number of miserable people who have in that milica controlled for years nay for centuries, the fate of this poor nation, have played with its destinies and have now at the last abandoned it.

If our friend, Mr. Claude Farrère, had ended his journey at Constantinople, that journey must necessarily have been considered as incomplete.

In order to see the Turkey of today, it was necessary to come not merely to that centre which is under slavery but also to those other centres which are happy through having preserved their liberty and their independence.

Gentlemen, the people of Turkey are the sons of an heroic race who have lived for centuries in liberty and independence and who have considered independence an essential for existence. This nation has not lived, cannot live, and will not live without independence.

But a number of men who held in their hands the destiny of the nation made it lose its way, thanks to their arbitrary despotic and bad administration and to the unceasing influence and exertions of enemies who aimed at the life of this nation. We shed tears in face of the blow dealt at our independence and of the breach opened in its existence. The position was such that it was impossible to distinguish friends from enemies and before it the nation became plunged in painful thoughts. Then our enemies, who were waiting for the opportunity to give us a final knockout blow took as a pretext the situation of our country which was on the point of ruin and thought that the right moment had come.

The decision was taken; the move began; the mask was thrown aside; Turkey was to be partitioned; the people of Turkey were to be made prisoners, humiliated and rendered poor and miserable. This was the aim.

In order to realise this tyrannical aim, recourse has been had to every imaginable means, and in particular certain governments and certain western statesmen have pursued and continue to pursue these means. There remain no means to which they have not had recourse in order to make excuses for their actions and for this persistence of theirs and in order to hide them from the eyes of their nations.

There was nothing easier than to invent all kinds of calumny, for, by repeating the formula unjustly invented by oppressors and invaders to the effect that the Turks are savage, tyrants, and incapable of accepting the principles of civilisation, they have endeavoured to deceive public opinion and thought that they would succeed in their attempt. They did not find it necessary to act otherwise for they had supposed that Turkey was entirely deprived of its capacity for existence. But they have been completely mistaken in their belief. This is certain. Actually, it is not possible to change the truth nor for it to be extinguished by the actions of men whose brains are filled with certain sentiments of avidity and with false ideas. So far the world has not shown this to be possible. If, after this misfortune, recourse should be had to the conscience of nations, I have no doubt that those who are really noble and civilized will condemn the oppressive acts of these politicians. If there are those who doubt it, I pardon them, for the existence of the statesmen of these same Governments prevents people from realising the true character of the calumnies invented daily about Turkey.

Turkey's capacity.

Gentlemen, in spite of the poverty and indigence of the people of Turkey, in spite of the awfulness of the whirlpool into which through the Agency of secret and open enemies, Turkey has fallen today, the capacity and power for administration shown since she took charge of her own destiny three years ago, the capacity shown in the matter of Public instruction with a view to bring up these children whom you see pointing to the school children present, to be worthy of the enlightened fatherland, the capacity shown, in spite of the country being Turkey, or to abstain from strengthening and encouraging the enemy whom they have made to attack the sacred territories of Turkey, have proposed as though they were the most neutral Governments in the world, to institute inquiries by means of making officers tour about our country. It is to be regretted that they have induced other nations to associate themselves with this step. I can imagine in the world no act more illogical or audacious than this.

Question of Enquiry.

Is it possible to imagine any independent state in the world acquiescing in the interference in its domestic affairs of its friends, let alone people who still preserve the character of enemies?

If it is desired not to recognise and not to cause to be recognized the independence of the Turkish people and of the Turkish Empire which for centuries has lived in independence, which has been the personification of independence, and which today – awakening has raised on high its resolve, its faith and its love for independence, we meet this attitude with amazement and to held up such folly to the astonishment of the whole world.

Because our poor nation refuses to accept slavery, it is condemned to the heaviest punishment, to death!

No gentlemen, no, let the whole world be assured that this nation is deserving most, not of death and extermination but of life. The Great National Assembly is successfully carrying out the historic task which it has undertaken and it will complete it with the greatest victories.

Gentlemen, we would have been very proud if we had been able to welcome our dear and honoured friend, Mr. Claude Farrère, to this country of ours in peace and tranquillity. If we have found it impossible to do so today, the fault is not ours. I should have liked to show him every corner of our country, and to let him get to know at close quarters my compatriots who, in complete confidence and innocence but with the faith and feelings of independence in their hearts, are everywhere ploughing their fields and driving their flocks to pasture. Then our honoured friend would have an even greater love for Turkey and for the Turkish people and he would appreciate more deeply the senselessness and the injustice of those who are attacking the independence of a nation.

Gentlemen, sincere friends are condemned to torture by those they love. The torture consists of listening to the afflictions of those they love. At this moment, our valued friend is in that position. I would have much preferred to utter joyful words rather than be the herald of bitter truths. But, let him excuse us. We are men fighting for life and independence and our hearts bleed at the sight of the whole civilized world standing an unconscious spectator of the bloody dispute, being almost entirely blockaded, in the organisation of economic matters which are recognised as being the basis of our continued existence and the very great capacity and power shown in the formation of powerful regular armies who have been successful in the East and in the West and who – let there be no doubt about it – will continue to succeed – do not these prove that our enemies have been mistaken in their second theory that Turkey is devoid of capacity.

But Gentlemen, certain tyrannical Western politicians who close their eyes to the truth, seek to turn their heads from this truth and do not want to see the great example set by the noble French nation in understanding this truth.

Gentlemen, is it possible to imagine a grosser ferocity than the feeling of the tyrannical desire to wipe out a nation which has comprehended its existence, which appreciates the difference between liberty and slavery, which prefers death to slavery and which proves this by its deeds every day?

Lie and Calumny.

In order completely to attain their ends, our enemies are daily inventing fresh pretexts for they want to bring about the complete ruin of Turkey and to kill, with the utmost torture and the most cruel attacks, its innocent inhabitants, even including the women and children. For this reason, we have going on one side the ferocity of the Greeks whom our enemies made attack us, and on the other a thousand different calumnies and false reports invented to mislead the opinion of those nations which are beginning to show signs of understanding the nobility and innocence of the Turks.

These are very skilful tactics. I know this because I myself and soldiers very often use them. But soldiers use these tactics against enemies on the field of battle. I say against enemies, but certain Western statesmen and politicians employ these tactics to occupy and to deceive those who regard them as friends, and who think them the protectors of humanity and justice and factors for peace and tranquility.

Gentlemen, our enemies wish to confuse the public opinion of the civilised world by putting it about on the strength of the calumnious statement of a lying well that Turkey is unjust to Christians. They endeavour to lead into another path the ideas of those who incline to admit the holiness of the Turkish cause and to recognise Turkey's rights. All these claims are nothing but lies and calumnies; it cannot be otherwise.

The National Assembly which undertook the responsibility for the administration of the new Turkish Empire does not at any time hesitate to give an account of all its actions before history and before civilization for it has no doubt that it would emerge completely victorious and unscathed from such an account. However, if there is any fault in subjecting to military exigencies dangerous elements which have been formed equipped, and excited by our enemies who last year bombarded İnebolu and, some days ago, Samsoun in order to make them revolt then the authors of that fault must be sought not in Turkey nor in Angora but in Athens and perhaps in a great capital.

I definitely declare that the Government of the Great National Assembly is employing and will employ without fear the rights and powers inherent in every independent state and nation in order to preserve and to assure the existence and the independence of the Empire by means of the powers derived from the nation.*

* *Bla tıgde; azeron İngilize Dışişler Bakanlığında ya rumun zıfırlıgıdır.*

"This throws no new light on the real state of mind of the Angora leaders. It is merely what any unscrupulous propagandist might in the circumstances be expected to say.

The speech contains rather an unguarded admission on p. 3 that the Turks themselves have waged a war of lies against the Greeks.

No action required.

No. 118

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, 28th June, 1922, 10.00 p.m.

(Received June 29, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 234. (R.)

Telegraphic

My telegram 229.

M. Sterghiades called this morning and informed me that he had been summoned by Greek government with whom he had not yet conferred officially. His personal views of situation were as follows:

He was opposed to retirement to new line of defence because it would raise the morale of the Kemalists which was waning. It would afford them additional resources in men and material. It would entail on Greek authorities expenses for maintenance of refugees equal at least to saving effected by diminishing number of troops. It would be necessary for Greeks to destroy railways and probably villages which would cause outcry abroad. It would probably compromise allied defence of Straits. Nevertheless he believed that new commander-in-chief, of whom he spoke well, was in favour of such a retirement.

Although Kemalists were much less strong than last year, he did not think that Greek government could safely withdraw more than two or three divisions which afforded no great saving. Matter had reached a complete deadlock since Greek government could not continue the war alone for financial reasons and would not evacuate and leave the population to be massacred or to flee to Greece for political reasons. A catastrophe could only be avoided by powers making up their minds to enforce some decision. Greece would accept decision though Kemal would not since war was necessary to his position. But with allied moral and financial support for one year Greece would wear Kemalists down and establish durable peace.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 234, repeated to Constantinople No. 122.

F.O. 371/7867/E. 6451

No. 119

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Earl of Balfour

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 29, 1922, 5.55 p.m.

(Received June 30, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 289 *Telegraphist**Very confidential*

Athens telegram No. 214.

Greek High Commissioner informed me to-day of a visit he had received from an ex-minister representing himself as a member of anti-Kemalist association here. This person said that he and his associates were afraid that if Mustapha Kemal came here they would either be exiled or even executed. The Sultan shared these fears. This personage suggested conclusion of a peace between Sultan and Greece. In order to attain this object it would be necessary to get rid of present Constantinople government. His informant further stated that if the Sultan were assured that Greek government was ready to make peace with him he would get rid of Constantinople present government which was Kemalist in complexion. The new government would be willing to make peace with Greece on following basis:

(A) Formation of an autonomous state under suzerainty of Sultan in Asia Minor whose boundaries would be those laid down in article 66 of treaty of Sévres. The governor to be Christian but not a Greek.

(B) Frontier in Thrace as defined in (?) Paris proposals of March last.

Should Greeks require better terms Constantinople government would be ready to discuss these and would abide by all decisions of British government.

Greek High Commissioner had asked his informant how Constantinople government could impose acceptance of this arrangement on Angora. His informant replied that anti-Kemalists had already undermined Mustapha Kemal's position and that as soon as bulk of Mustapha Kemal's officers saw Sultan had come to an arrangement with Greece they would desert Mustapha Kemal. At present Nationalist army saw no end to the war.

Greek High Commissioner asked for my opinion on above. I replied that opposition here did not count for much and that it was always trying by one means or another to upset present government. I was convinced that Sultan had not entertained intention (?) attributed to him and I consider that it would be unwise to attach importance to declarations of this ex-minister.

Repeated to Athens No. 66.

F.O. 371/7867/E. 6899

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 868-869, No. 669

No. 120

*Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*CONSTANTINOPLE, June 29th, 1922, 5 p.m.
(Received June 30, 10 a.m.)*No. 288 Telegraphic*

I asked Greek High Commissioner today whether report in local press that he had been summoned to Athens to take part in discussions between new Greek Commander-in-chief and Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna and Greek government was correct. Greek High Commissioner said that he had not yet been telegraphed for, but that he would not be surprised if he were summoned to Athens. He described the situation of Greeks in Asia Minor as grave and dwelt on the necessity of bringing the war to an end somehow or other. I asked whether Greek army was likely to withdraw to a line nearer Smyrna. He professed ignorance, but said that such an intimation was quite possible. Such a withdrawal would, however, unduly encourage Mustapha Kemal, who in the present circumstances was losing credit, owing to non-execution of his boast that he would turn Greek army out of Asia Minor.

Withdrawal of Greek army to a shorter line would create a new situation, and I venture to think, having regard to this possibility as also to my telegram No. 288, it is essential that Near Eastern settlement should be handled irrespective of results of commissions of enquiry.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 291, repeated to Athens No. 67.

F.O. 371, 7867, E. 6488

No. 121

The Earl of Balfour to Sir L. Worthington-Evans

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 3, 1922

Dear Worthington-Evans,

Your letter of the 22nd June¹ about the possibility of evacuating Constantinople raises political considerations of some difficulty. Withdrawal at

¹ Not printed. This letter communicated to the Earl of Balfour a letter of June 3 from General Harrington, who, having recommended the evacuation of Constantinople, concluded "...I am fully aware of what this recommendation means to me and to the officers with me, but I cannot conscientiously recommend the retention of this force and these commissions as a military necessity in view of the present urgent need of economy, and I think His Majesty's Government would be well advised to come to an agreement with the Allied Governments to withdraw their forces except, perhaps, for a small detachment, which could be withdrawn by ship in case of danger, and entrust the administration to the Allied High Commissioners. At present, they have no power to enforce their will, as, under martial law, the control of the forces of the military and police is in my hands, and I have never departed from this point of view."

the present moment must in practice mean that the Allies, as a whole, are washing their hands of the Turco-Greek situation. The retention of an Allied contingent of one or two battalions might be enough to prevent the Greeks from entering Constantinople, but it would involve a great increase in the prestige of Angora, and probably a gradual infiltration of Kemalist elements into Constantinople with French connivance, until the position of our battalions became impossible. It might not mean an actual Kemalist attack on Constantinople, as long as Mustapha Kemal is faced by Greek troops in Asia Minor, and if he can obtain indirect control over the city. So long, therefore, as any attempt is to be made to pursue the Paris plan and to cooperate with the French, I feel that we should keep our present garrison at Constantinople.

If that plan is definitely abandoned, it will probably be in favour either of such definite support of Greece by Great Britain as we are still in a position to give her, or of an indefinite continuance of Allied neutrality, Greeks and Turks being allowed to settle the issue themselves. In the former case, we should want to keep our hold on Constantinople, if only to maintain it as a British naval base, which is understood to necessitate the presence of a strong garrison on land.

In the latter case, we might, for reasons of economy, have to reduce our garrison at Constantinople, and possibly to retire to Gallipoli. If so, we may have again to consider whether it would not be in our interest to allow Greece temporarily at any rate to enter Constantinople. If left to her own resources, and in the absence of an Allied veto, she would doubtless be able to do this.

This is the view I take of the situation, and until M. Poincaré's visit a month hence, the garrison must, I fear, be maintained as at present. Every sympathy is, however, felt for Sir Charles Harington in his difficult position², and the whole question will, I hope, be gone into at the next Allied discussion.

Yours sincerely,

BALFOUR

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 874-875, No. 675

² General Harington had said in his letter of June 3: 'Frankly speaking, I do not think there is now room for two sets of machinery, viz., the High Commissions and the Allied command. I recognise to the full the support that has been given to me by the British Government and by the British High Commissioner. The difficulty is that the other two Powers do not recognise my authority under martial law. They claim to be the *de facto* Government of Turkey.'

No. 122

*Extracts from a report from the British Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean,
dated 4th July, 1922*

(h) Miscellaneous Sanitary and Economical

An outbreak of cholera is reported from the Asiatic Side of the Bosphorus, and an area extending half a mile North and South of the quarantine station at Monastir Agiz has been placed out of bounds for Allied troops and Naval personnel.

A considerable amount of rabies is reported in Constantinople and Moda. Many animals besides dogs are affected, and over 200 persons are undergoing Pasteur treatment on account of bites by suspected animals.

2. TURKEY "B" ANATOLIA

(1) Naval

Reports have been received from agents who have recently returned from Anatolia that the Kemalist Naval Authorities have undertaken mining operations on an extensive scale. Mines are reported to have been laid at Amasra, Cape Vona, off Samsoun and in other places, but no confirmation has yet been obtained, and this information must be treated with some reserve as no special instructions appear to have been issued to Italian and French ships which are permitted by the Kemalists to call at Anatolian ports.

The gunboats AIDIN REIS and PREVEZA have been located in Batum.

The Great National Assembly are reported to have offered a reward of Ltqs. 10,000 to anyone sinking the Greek GEORGIOS AVEROFF. (Censored Press Report).

It is reported that a small J.B. flying Turkish colours was seen off Constantza proceeding to the northward (Censored press report.)

(k) Political

There is little of importance to report in regard to the political situation in Angora, but it may be interesting to note that the Opposition in the Great National Assembly seems to be gaining ground slowly, and that Mustafa Kemal and his "Defence of Rights" party are finding it increasingly difficult to hold their own.

(l) Economic

The Standard Oil Company are making yet another effort to obtain concessions from Angora, and one of their representatives has now proceeded there to interview some of the Deputies of the Great National Assembly. French and Italian firms are also trying for concessions, but the Great National Assembly appears to be in no hurry to come to any definite arrangements.

(m) Relations with Foreign Powers

The visit of Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Ismid coincided with the visit of M. Claude Farrère to Constantinople, and this person proceeded to Ismid accompanied by Hamid Bey, the Nationalist Representative, to meet Mustafa Kemal. A great deal of fuss was made over M. Farrère's visit, and a specially enthusiastic welcome was arranged by the Turkish Authorities.

Mustafa Kemal received M. Farrère in the Palace Gardens at Ismid and made a long speech in which he emphasized the power and importance of the Nationalist Cause, and the strength and courage of the Turkish Army. The whole tendency of the speech was the reverse of conciliatory, and Mustafa Kemal reiterated the intention of the Great National Assembly to continue the fight for Nationalist Independence. He referred bitterly to the attitude of the Western Powers towards Turkey, and protested against the insults offered to Angora by the charges of atrocities. He attempted to justify the deportations of the Greeks from the Pontus on the grounds of military necessity.

M. Farrère replied with great cordiality.

Mustafa Kemal also granted interviews to the Editors of two of the local Turkish papers. In addition to repeating the sense of the remarks mentioned above Mustafa Kemal stated that the economic and agricultural situation was very satisfactory, and the year's harvest very good. He commented on the friendly relations which existed with Russia, but denied that Turkey had participated in the German-Bolshevik agreement.

Yussuf Kemal bey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Great National Assembly, has categorically denied that direct peace pourparlers have been opened with the Athens Government.

The Great National Assembly have addressed a Note to the Allied High Commissioners protesting against the recent bombardment of Samsoun by the Greek Fleet. In addition to the formal protest against the bombardment of an open town the Note points out that the Greek Fleet carried out this operation from a Neutral Base which is in Allied Occupation, and protests strongly against the action of the Allies in allowing the Greek Fleet to use Constantinople as a Base contrary to the declaration of Neutrality. The Note further instances other cases of what it considers unneutral action by the Allies, including an episode which occurred in August 1921 when H. M. Ships MONTROSE and TRINIDAD visited Anatolian Ports, and in the course of their cruise, boarded various caïques in order to obtain information.

(n) Relations with Central Government

It is reported that M. Claude Farrère made an attempt to reconcile Mustafa Kemal and the Central Government without success.

(q) Military

The Military situation at Chanak has remained stationary since my last situation report.

The efforts of the Gendarmerie and Mutasarrif to secure the wanted brigands have so far been unsuccessful. The two senior Turkish Officers of the Gendarmerie concerned have been relieved in consequence, and the case of the Mutasarrif is still under consideration. Colonel-Commandant Shuttleworth has again gone to Chanak (taking passage in *SPORTIVE*) and proposes making a tour of the affected area himself. The Loyal Regiment has not been further employed in anti-brigandage operations.

F.O. 371/7943

No. 123

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 9th, 1922, 4.40 p.m.

(Received July 10, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 302

Telegraphic

My telegram No. 300.

Italian high commissioner informed me yesterday that he was in favour now inviting belligerents to conference without binding them to any conditions beforehand. Personal ambitions of Mustapha Kemal were he said principal factor in the situation. Mustapha Kemal was determined not to make peace except on his own terms leaving him master of Turkey. He would welcome demand for yes or no answer, which would give him opportunity of continuing war without loss of prestige. In Italian high commissioner's opinion, therefore, only chance of peace was to invite belligerents and Central government without commitments to a conference preferably with high commissioners out here but if not then elsewhere.

Italian high commissioner appears in this respect to have modified his original views on this subject as previously reported.

F.O. 371/7867 E. 6845

No. 124

Mr. Neville Henderson (Constantinople) to the Earl of Balfour

CONSTANTINOPLE, 11th July 1922

(Received July 17)

No. 623.

Confidential

My Lord,

A certain amount of speculation has been aroused here by the appearance a few days ago in the *Peyam Sabah* newspaper of an article applauding the performances of Enver Pasha in Central Asia. As Your Lordship is aware the *Peyam Sabah* is the only anti-Kemalist Turkish paper now appearing in Constantinople, and is published by the well-known politician Ali Kemal Bey. This gentleman is always very personal in his ideas, and has frequently been at variance with other persons opposed to the Kemalists, but he has of late been taking a hand in the attempts to combine the various anti-Kemalist elements here into a single party, a fact which gives his advocacy of Enver Pasha greater significance, especially as one of the main planks in the platform of an united anti-Kemalist opposition would be to restore the Sultan's authority.

2. It is apparently believed in some quarters that the article in question was due to British inspiration and those who hold this erroneous opinion see in it an indication that Enver has come to some arrangement with the British Government.

3. Another theory is that Enver, having fallen foul of the Bolshevists, and being hostile to Mustafa Kemal, is coming out as a man loyal to the Sultan-Caliph. There have been scattered indications that he may be moving in this direction, and it is quite within the bounds of possibility that the Sultan may see in Enver a possible means of destroying Mustafa Kemal, whom His Majesty detests as strongly as ever, and whose tendency in internal politics has been to become more and more antidynastic and revolutionary. There can be little doubt that the one potentially strong element opposed to the present Angora Government in the interior of Anatolia is the Enverist faction, as it has adherents not only among the population but in the Army. Now that Enver has gone against the Bolshevists, whom His Majesty also detests and fears, the Sultan might well be tempted by the prospect of utilising this potential force to oust Mustafa Kemal, and re-establish his own authority.

4. I have had no sort of direct indication that the Sultan's mind is working in this direction. As regards Enver's attitude there is also a lack of positive evidence. I

therefore regard the suggestion that they are coming together as being for the moment no more than a theory which must be tested by close observation of future developments. If there should be anything in it, it would by no means mean that the Sultan had abandoned the hope of obtaining British support in extricating himself from his difficulties. His idea would more probably be to use Enver with the approval of His Majesty's Government, who he feels will sooner or later be reduced to the necessity of finding weapons against Mustafa Kemal. Enver himself would also no doubt like to secure the patronage of His Majesty's Government for immediate purposes. Indeed, it has been twice suggested to this High Commission within the last year that touch might be established with him. These suggestions reached the High Commission so circuitously and through such doubtful channels that Mr. Ryan to whom they were made refused to have anything to do with them, and they were not for the same reason worth reporting at the time. It is, however, of interest to recall them in the present connection, and in connection with attempts made recently in Afghanistan, as I gather from private telegrams, to interest His Majesty's Government in Enver's activities in Bokhara.

5. A rumour reached me within the last couple of days that Enver's brother, Nouri Pasha, is actually in Constantinople at present *incognito*. I consider this very doubtful, but I am attempting to ascertain definitely the truth or falsehood of the statement, as, if true, it would have a material bearing on the subject of the despatch. Another statement of the same kind, equally important, is that Kutchuk Talat Bey one of Enver's most devoted adherents also arrived in Constantinople. This appeared in this morning's *Journal d'Orient*, and I have as yet had no opportunity of checking it.

6. There is a possible connection, also worth studying in the light of future developments, between the idea of Enver's returning to the Turkish stage, and the re-entry into activity of certain former leading members of the Committee of Union and Progress, to which Sir Horace Rumbold has adverted in more than one recent despatch. There is as yet no proof that they are working in internal politics against Mustafa Kemal, but it is conceivable that they are elaborating a plan to secure power in Constantinople, and to bring the nationalist machine in Anatolia under their control. In that case they also might be attracted by the idea of using Enver and the Enverist faction in Anatolia as an instrument to secure their object. A detail, not wholly unworthy of attention in connection with these possibilities, is that Fethi Bey, Commissioner for the Interior, whose declaration that the doors of Anatolia were open to Unionists attracted attention some time ago (See Sir H.

Rumbold's despatch No. 408 of May 11 has recently obtained leave to proceed to Europe for reasons of health.*

I have, etc

(Signed) NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/7868/E. 7072

No. 125

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Earl of Balfour

CONSTANTINOPLE, 14th July, 1922, 6.10 p. m.
(Received July 15, 8.30 a. m.)

No. 305.

Telegraphic

Telegrams from Angora correspondents of ? group omitted have announced resignation of Angora government.

No official statement has been made.

Resignation followed on adoption of new law on procedure for election of ministers by Grand National Assembly and is stated to have been presented for sake of form in order to give Assembly opportunity of confirming or withdrawing mandate given to ministers under old procedure.

Information regarding exact nature of new procedure is somewhat contradictory but it certainly curtails power hitherto exercised by Mustapha Kemal. Nevertheless latest press telegram indicates that principal members of

* *Bu rapor azerane İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şu yorumlar yapılmıştır:*

"An anti-Kemal combination of the Sultan, Enver and the C.U.P. is an interesting hypothesis, now particularly in view of the recent inclusion in the new Angora Cabinet of a member of C.U.P. Minister. On the face of it sound an unnatural alliance but in the Sultan's very difficult position it is by no means impossible.

"I doubt if we could swallow Enver for the sake of the Sultan, even to get rid of Kemal.

D. G. Osborne

18.7

"It is perhaps worth noting that Fethi Bey, Nationalist Commissioner for the Interior, (and therefore controller of concessions in Anatolia), who registered the Franklin-Bouillon agreement, is now in Europe on his way to Paris. Meanwhile Dzhavid Bey, a noted member of the C.U.P., is in Constantinople as Turkish delegate to the Debt and is believed to have some understanding with French financiers.

"These facts may indicate a development by the French of the Franklin-Bouillon policy.

D. G. Osborne

L. Oliphant

This is very speculative.

July 19"

F.O. 371/7868/E. 7072

retiring Cabinet including Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of National Defence have been re-elected.

F.O. 371/3867/E. 7021

F.O. 424/254. pp. 32-38, No. 41

No. 126

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 16, 1922.

(Received July 16).

No. 308.

Telegraphs

YOUR telegram No. 268.

Since all Colonel Mongin's *etc.* telegrams pass through Constantinople, I expressed regret to French High Commissioner that he had not informed me direct of *démarche* of Angora Government.

French High Commissioner stated that, so far as he was aware, there had been no mention in any of Colonel Mongin's telegrams respecting readiness of Angora Government to accept an armistice.

French High Commissioner said that Nationalist agent here had given him account of interview with Mr. Ryan reported in my telegram No. 300, and that he thought, therefore that I was aware of wishes of Angora Government in this respect. What had been said to Colonel Mongin by both Nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs and Mustapha Kemal Pasha did not amount to very much more.

I understand from second paragraph of your telegram under reference reply [? group omitted], that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider intimation if made officially. I would, however, observe that there are two conferences in the air at present—at London and Beicos—and that Angora Government's suggestion, as made both to Colonel Mongin and through Hamid Bey, refers solely to participation of belligerents in forthcoming conference in Western Europe.

Hamid Bey made this still clearer in subsequent interview with Mr. Ryan on 13th July.

I have no indication nor French High Commissioner either, that Angora would agree to Beicos, which I see from confidential print that His Majesty's Government contemplate meeting-place for preliminary conference, without commitment. I should be glad there, to learn whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider intimation if it conveyed desire of Angora to participate in forthcoming conference in London.

I shall not mention views of His Majesty's Government to Nationalist agent here until I ascertain this. If this were ultimately arranged, French High Commissioner suggests that Nationalist delegate might possibly be Fethi Bey, Commissioner of the Interior, who is actually at Beirut on his way to Paris and who was principal negotiator in Franklin-Bouillon Agreement.

F.O. 424/254, pp. 38-39, No. 44

No. 127

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 18, 1922

(Received July 24.)

No. 646

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 305 of the 14th instant, it is now possible to present a somewhat clearer view of the circumstances attending the recent Cabinet changes at Angora, although the inner workings of the matter are still obscure.

2. It will remembered that, as a result of the debate in the Grand National Assembly at the end of last November on the draft law on the duties and responsibilities of the Ministers or Commissioners (see Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 54 of the 16th January), it was decided to refer the draft law back to the special committee, and to refer at the same time to a joint committee the question of the Presidency of the Council and the mode of nominating candidates for vacancies in the Cabinet.

3. Since that time it has more than once been reported that the matter was again coming before the Assembly but it is only recently that these reports have taken definite shape. The committee or committees concerned would appear to have prepared two draft laws, one on the mode of electing the Commissioners and the President of the Council, and the other on the duties and responsibilities of the Commissioners. The former of these was laid before the Grand National Assembly on or about the 6th July, and was passed with material modifications after a two days debate.

4. It is still not clear in what form the law was finally passed. According to one account, it was decided that a committee composed of the President, Vice-President and two Deputy Presidents of the Assembly, the chairman of standing committees of the various branches of administration and the President of the Council of Commissioners should prepare a list of candidates for any vacant commissionership, and that the Assembly should make its choice from among the candidates so nominated. According to another account, the Assembly rejected

the principle of nomination altogether, and decided that the Assembly should make its choice from among the whole body of its members in a completely untrammelled fashion. I believe the second of these versions to be correct, and the first version to represent, not the final decision, but the proposals in the Bill as laid before the Assembly.

5. The law also provided for the election of a President of the Council of Commissioners. I understand that he was hitherto chosen by the Commissioners themselves. The exact arrangement now adopted is again uncertain, but it seems clear that the final choice in this case also rests with the Assembly.

6. In either case the new law deprives the president, *i.e.*, Mustafa Kemal, of the right which he has hitherto exercised of himself nominating candidates for vacant commissionerships. As all the existing Commissioners had been elected under the old system, all of them, or at any rate all who were in Angora, presented their resignations in order that a new election was duly held on the 13th July. It would appear to have proceeded smoothly in a full house. It resulted in the selection of a Cabinet differing little from the old. The following is the composition of the new Government:—

President of the Council: Reouf Bey (new).

Chief of General Staff: Fevzi Pasha (hitherto combined this office with the Presidency of the Council; re-elected only to the post of Chief of General Staff).

National Defence: Kiazim Pasha (re-elected).

Religious Affairs: Abdulla Azmi Effendi (re-elected).

Foreign Affairs: Yussuf Kemal Bey (re-elected).

Finance: Hassan Fehmi Bey (re-elected).

Justice: Jelaluddin Arif Bey (new; hitherto Kemalist representative in Rome).

Economic Affairs: Mahmoud Essad Bey (new).

Interior: Ata Bey, acting for Fethi Bey, absent on leave (Ata Bey is new, he appears to have been elected in advance of the others, owing to the necessity for filling the temporary vacancy due to Fethi's departure).

Commissioner for Public Works: Rechad Bey, acting for Feizi Bey, absent on leave.

Public Health: Fuad Bey acting for Riza Nour Bey, absent on a mission in Russia (re-elected to acting post).

Public Instruction: Vehbi Bey (re-elected).

7. Only three members of the previous Cabinet disappear definitely, namely Hasan Bey (Economic Affairs), Refik Shevket (Justice) and Adnan (Acting Public Works). So little is known of the first two that it is not possible to estimate the significance of their failure to secure re-election. The third, Adnan Bey, is a well-known extremist but the importance of his disappearance from the Government is

greatly diminished by the fact that he was elected a day or two later Vice-President of the Assembly in succession to Reouf Bey.

8. It is too soon to say whether the remodelling of the Cabinet as a whole makes any change in the situation at Angora from the point of view of the Allies. Reouf Bey has been somewhat of a dark horse since the incident last year, when he resigned his then position in the Government and appeared to have quarrelled with Mustafa Kemal. Now that the first blow has been struck at the latter's dictatorship, it is possible that Reouf may emerge as a rival, possibly with leanings towards loyalty to the Sultan Caliph. He is none the less a most ardent Nationalist and is not very likely to stand for any weakening in foreign policy. The same is probably true of such other members of the Cabinet as are at all well known. Jelaluddin Arif, though primarily a guinea-pig lawyer, keen on business with the Italians, is a strong Nationalist. So is Mahmoud Essad Bey, another of the new importations. I know nothing of Ata Bey, the Deputy elected to act for Fethi Bey, the reasons for whose departure are still the subject of a good deal of speculation.

9. In short, it is once more necessary to suspend judgment on the trend of events at Angora. The situation may possibly become clearer in the course of the discussion of the other draft law on the duties and responsibilities of Commissioners, which is understood to have already begun. All that can be said for the moment is that Mustafa Kemal's authority has suffered an important curtailment, but that it remains a matter of uncertainty whether this curtailment is a triumph of doctrinism, which is rampant in the Assembly, in which case Mustafa Kemal may have found or may find new means to secure his ascendancy in spite of it, or whether he has suffered a real political defeat.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 424/254, pp. 55-56, No. 64

No. 128

Consul Palmer to the Earl of Balfour

DAMASCUS, July 18, 1922
(Received August 1.)

No. 216

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that a new Italian consul *de carrière*—Signor Alberto Tuozi—arrived here a few days ago and took possession of his post on the 14th July.

Signor Tuoizzi came here from the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but he had recently been in Angora, where he was the guest of Mustapha Kemal.

2. According to him, Anatolia is in a fairly desperate condition, from the point of view of finance, food supplies and military efficiency. He appeared to consider the organised Kemalist military resistance might collapse at any moment, *i.e.*, without Bolshevik aid.

3. He considered it significant that Russian gold was now legal currency at Angora, and he produced a Russian gold coin from Angora which he had kept as a souvenir, but which was in free circulation there.

It was, in fact, the usual gold currency, according to him.

4. Signor Tuoizzi informed me that he would be the Italian delegate to the commission of investigation as to Turkish atrocities against the Christians of Anatolia, if such a commission ever materialised.

He gave me his personal opinion that there was no doubt that such atrocities had taken place in "Pontus" (*i.e.*, near Trebizond, &c.) on a large scale, and while admitting—upon my suggestion—that the Greeks had also committed similar atrocities, declared that he considered the Turks had really done as much or more, and hinted they were following a policy of extermination.

5. The above is, of course, not news to your Lordship, but, as coming from an Italian official, I have deemed it worth reporting. At the same time, in fairness to Signor Tuoizzi, his remarks should be treated as strictly confidential.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER

F.O. 424/254, p. 85, No. 102.

No. 129

Consul-General Saloo to the Earl of Balfour

BEIROUT, July 18, 1922

(Received August 1.)

No. 109

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegrams Nos. 28 and 29 of the 15th and 18th instant regarding the arrival at and departure from Beirout of Major-General Sir Charles Townshend, K. C. B., M. P.

He arrived on the 12th July by the steamship "Lotus" coming presumably from Marseilles. General Gouraud, whom he had met somewhere or other, and whom he had advised of his arrival, requested the British liaison officer to go down with a member of his staff to welcome him. After spending a night in Beirout, he went up to Aley in the Lebanon, where he was lodged in a house used as a resthouse

for senior military officers. He had interviews with General Gouraud and with M. de Gaix, and at the 14th July reception the former mentioned to me that General Townshend was on his way to Angora. By the following day the news had become common property in Beirut.

Yesterday I received from Constantinople communication of your Lordship's telegram No. 271 to Mr. Henderson, with instructions to endeavour to induce General Townshend to abandon his journey to Angora. In the afternoon I went up to Aley, but found that he had already left Beirut to take the train for Aleppo that night. Before returning to Beirut I decided to speak to General Gouraud, and before seeing him I happened to meet a French officer, Captain Roubini, who told me that he had been detailed to go with General Townshend to Aleppo.

When I saw General Gouraud I explained that General Townshend was, as a private individual, proceeding to Aleppo and thence to Angora against the wishes of His Majesty's Government, and said that while I could not ask him to stop General Townshend I would request him not to do anything to facilitate the enterprise. He told me that General Townshend had asked for a French gunboat to take him to Mersina and that he had refused this because no such boat was available. He also said that he had only detailed an officer to accompany General Townshend because this was his custom with visitors of distinction, the object being to mitigate the minor difficulties and discomforts of journey, and that the letter for General de Lamoignon, his delegate at Aleppo, which he had given, was to request merely that assistance might be given to General Townshend to hire a car from some private garage for the journey to Alexandretta. I suggested that he might withdraw these facilities, but he was not apparently disposed to do this. He seemed to feel that he had given his word, and that in any case he was only showing the courtesy which one military officer of high rank had the right to expect from another.

I then went to Beirut and found General Townshend in one of the hotels preparing for his journey. I invited him to abandon it, but as I expected he declined to do so. His object being by that time widely known, it was unlikely that, having burnt his boats, he would have consented to give up his plan. He told me that he knew Mustapha Kemal well, that he had been invited to go and talk with him, that at least 100 Members of Parliament approved of his scheme and even the Prime Minister had favoured it. He was sure that nothing but good could come of his visit to Angora of which the main opponent was the Foreign Office. As for his promise given when his passport was granted to him, I understood him to say that he had never given any assurance that he would not go to Turkey at all, but only that he would not go "for the present," meaning within a few weeks of his receiving a passport. However, he declares that he has careful notes of the undertaking he did give, and he will no doubt present his own defence in due course. I told him

briefly what I thought about the Turks in general and the Kemalists in particular, and I then left him. As I left he said that he expected to be back in about three weeks and that he would then tell me what had happened. As planned he left last night for Aleppo.

(Copy sent to Constantinople.)

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW

F.O. 424/254, pp. 85-86, No. 103.

No. 130

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Earl of Balfour

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 23rd 1922, 5 p.m.
(Received July 23, 8.15 p. m.)

No. 314

Telegraphic

Your telegram No. 273.

Information from all sources tends to confirm extreme improbability of Mustapha Kemal agreeing to Beicos as meeting place for conference. In the event of his so refusing I venture to submit for your consideration possibility or desirability of holding conference here with Greek and Constantinople governments only. In this connection please see my despatch No 647.

Idea that Powers might take such steps might possibly induce Angora government to agree to Beicos and to be more conciliatory at conference itself, were it further realized that conference might continue and agreement be reached with other two parties concerned if Angora's recalcitrancy proved unsurmountable.

It might be expedient to examine feasibility of some such course as affording loophole for continuation on negotiations in the event of Mustapha Kemal remaining stubborn. I realise however that Constantinople government might in last resort prove too scared of Angora to accept settlement from which latter were excluded and that French government in view of its commitments with Angora would be loth to agree to such an arrangement.

If you approve Constantinople government might be definitely sounded on the point especially as I see no objection to rumour getting abroad that such a contingency were possible.

Only ² pressure I can suggest viz-à-viz French government is to lay stress on ever-growing influence of Soviet government at Angora at which I am aware French High Commissioner is seriously perturbed.*

F.O. 371 7808 E. 7558

F.O. 424 254, p. 50, No. 60

D.R.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, p. 890, No. 692

No. 131

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 25, 1922

(Received July 31.)

No. 653. Confidential.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, with reference to your despatch No. 1465 to Paris of the 16th May last, that I have been shown the summary of what purports to be the text of a secret Russo-Turkish Agreement concluded at Angora on the 20th June last. The agreement is alleged to have been signed on behalf of the Soviet Government by Aralof, its representative at Angora, and on behalf of Turkey by Kiazim Pasha and Yussuf Kemal and to have been ratified by the Nationalist Government at the beginning of this month.

2. The agreement as shown to me contains six clauses:

By the first article Turkey undertakes not to make peace with Greece without the consent of the Soviet Government.

* *Bu telegraf üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şu yorumlar yapılmıştır:*

"I think it is certain the French would never agree to this and for the reasons given in the Minutes on (E. 7292. I doubt its desirability at all in present circumstances.

"But I am not sure that the suggestion might not have same effect if Kemal (and the French) maintain their insistence on Izmidt or a French ship. The suggestion might either be raised by Sir H. Rumbold on his return with his Allied colleagues or with M. Poincaré, if he comes to London shortly. Perhaps the latter would be most effective. In this case we can use the argument in the last paragraph of this telegram.

"When and if a decision is taken we had better inform Mr Henderson of it and at the same time thank him for his despatches Nos 634, 641 and 647.

D. G. Osborne

24/7²⁴

"I have discussed this with Sir H. Rumbold who shares my doubt as to the need or advisability of pursuing the matter.

"He will himself be back at Constantinople on 30 July.

"Tel. as annexed.

L. Oliphant 24 Jul."

The main points of the other clauses are to the following effect:—

- a. Turkey, in event of her concluding peace with her present enemies, undertakes not to allow Turkish territory to be used in any action which may be taken against Russia.
 - b. In event of any attack being made on Russia by a Balkan or Caucasian State, Turkey undertakes to intervene in favour of her ally with all her available forces.
 - c. Turkey undertakes to ratify the Rapallo Treaty between Germany and Russia and any other treaties which the latter may make with other countries, provided those countries engage to accept as the basis of their relations with Turkey the Russo-Nationalist Treaty of 1920.
 - d. The Soviet Government undertakes to supply Turkey with all the military supplies necessary for the prosecution of the war against Greece.
3. Soviet military mission is to be attached to the headquarters of the Nationalist army for the purpose of supervising the effective execution of the engagement under (d.).

4. I was also assured that there existed a further clause dealing with the eventual future relations of Turkey with the Western Powers, but of such a secret nature that the agent of my informant has been unable to ascertain its terms.

5. I am undecided as to whether to express belief or disbelief in the authenticity of this document. It was shown to me by a friend in whom I have confidence and who procured it from a source which he considers reliable and trustworthy, qualities which, however, do not prevent one from being honestly misled. My informant, however, who is an American correspondent, was sufficiently impressed by its veracity to telegraph it to his paper.

6. It is on the one hand inherently not improbable that such an agreement should have been concluded. The ever-growing influence of the Soviet Government at Angora is one of the most disturbing features of the present Near East situation. It would be only natural that Moscow should have been anxious to

"Sir H. Rumbold will, on his arrival, send a review of the position, then prevailing which may be useful in any discussion with the French. Meanwhile it would be a mistake to run off a fresh issue, especially while our latest draft to the French is about to go off. Sir H. Rumbold thought it (from the local point of view) entirely meet the case.

Tell to Mr Henderson as annexed.

L. Oliphant 24 Jul.

I agree

E. C. Jul. 25"

Lord Balfour replied, in telegram No. 280 of July 27: "It is practically certain French would never agree and in present circumstances I deprecate sounding Constantinople government."

FO 371/2888/E 7558

DBFP, I, XVII, p. 890, No. 692

induce and have succeeded in persuading the Kemalist Government to give contractual expression to an undoubted state of dependence. The Nationalist movement is so beholden to Russia for all the material resources in money and arms which are indispensable for its successful issue that Mustapha Kemal, even though he might prefer not to so bind himself, could scarcely have resisted a desire on the part of the Soviet Government to round off the Rapallo Treaty with an alliance with Angora.

7. On the other hand, the inherent probability above referred to is in itself sufficient to provoke scepticism. The production of such a document by those interested in such forgeries supplies an exact need of the moment. In that sense it is as likely to be false as genuine. It is, moreover, difficult to reconcile the existence of such an agreement with the inferences to be drawn from the public utterances of Mustapha Kemal at Ismid and of Yussuf Kemal at a recent banquet given by the Soviet representative to the newly-arrived Persian Ambassador at Angora, but in that respect again public utterances are often notoriously misleading.

8. I would prefer, therefore, to reserve any definite opinion as to the authenticity of the document of which I have had the honour to give your Lordship a summary until such time as further information from other sources shall have tended either to confirm or to refute it.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 424/254, pp. 79-80, No. 96

No. 132

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 25, 1922
(Received July 31.)

No. 656

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 646 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to state that later information from Angora confirms my belief that the Grand National Assembly rejected altogether the principle of nomination of candidates for the post of commissioner. The proposal that the right of nomination should be vested in a committee was that submitted to the Assembly. The Assembly rejected it, and decided that election to vacant commissionerships should be made without any preliminary nomination, and that the Assembly

should be free to elect any member it chose, the only conditions being that voting should be by ballot, and that the member elected must receive an absolute majority.

2. The most salient development since the election of the new Cabinet has been the indefinite prolongation of Mustapha Kemal's functions as commander in chief of the army. Your Lordship will remember that he has hitherto been maintained in this post for periods of three months at a time, and that on the last occasion there was a certain amount of opposition to the law prolonging his command. It is now announced that on the 20th July the Assembly unanimously adopted a law conferring the command "provisionally," but without limitation of period, on Mustapha Kemal. The law is carefully worded so as to assert the supreme authority of the Assembly. It expressly states that the office of commander-in-chief is vested in the moral personality of the Assembly itself, as being the one and only supreme authority in the country, and that what is conferred on Mustapha Kemal is the "effective" command. It further states most explicitly that the Assembly may withdraw the powers conferred on him whenever it considers it necessary.

3. The adoption of the law was preceded by a debate in which Mustapha Kemal himself spoke. He referred to the previous legislation regarding his command. He said that last August the Assembly had inserted in the law on the subject a special article delegating to him "an important portion of the national will, their own will," and had charged him with the duty of achieving victory. No Assembly in the world, he said, would delegate its powers to such an extent except in extraordinary circumstances and to persons in whom they had full confidence. He thanked them for that confidence. It was only thanks to the powers conferred on him that it had been possible to raise the army to its present level. He was proud to be able to say that the *moral* of the army was now so high that the realisation of the national aims could be assured without recourse to extraordinary measures. There was no longer any need to continue the powers in question. He hoped that the necessity, on the disappearance of which they could congratulate themselves to-day, could not recur. By the fundamental law, which asserted the unconditional sovereignty of the people, the office of commander-in-chief was to-day a temporary office. The powers and authority of commander-in chief were directly vested in the Assembly. The office which they were now provisionally creating could at most last until definite results consonant with the spirit of the National Pact were attained. The Assembly had from the start adopted a programme the realisation of which they would doubtless await with confidence, the recovery of Smyrna, of Broussa, of Constantinople, seat of the Sultanate and Caliphate, and of Thrace. The coming of that happy time would bring great joy to the Assembly and to himself as a simple member of the Assembly. To him it would bring a twofold happiness, for he would have the added satisfaction of returning to the position

which he occupied three years ago. There could be no greater happiness than to be a free individual in the body politic. Pride of place had no value for men whose ideal was the securing of sacred rights. In conclusion, he begged them to remember that the law which they were about to discuss did away with the powers in question.

4. The new law has been advertised here as a prolongation of Mustapha Kemal's command for the duration of the present hostilities. A careful perusal of the text of it and of his own speech shows that he is really fighting for his position. With his customary skill, he is going half-way to meet his difficulties, and covering his gradual loss of unchallenged personal authority by playing on the doctrinaire spirit of the Assembly. It is still too soon to judge whether by judicious concessions to this spirit he will regain the substance of his old power. Much will depend on the attitude of Reouf Bey, the new President of the Council. Various indications show that the solution of the Cabinet crisis was not a complete success for either Mustapha Kemal or the Opposition. There is reason to believe that the adversaries of Mustapha Kemal sought to oust a certain number of particular Ministers, some of whom were re-elected, while two of them, the Commissioners for Justice and Economic Affairs, were successfully kept out of office. Mustapha Kemal is now reorganising his own particular party, which goes by the name of "Defence of Rights," and it is significant that the two new vice-presidents are Younous Nadi Bey, the *rapporteur* of the rejected law on the mode of election of commissioners, and Refik Shevket, the dispossessed Commissioner for Justice.

5. Reouf Bey is regarded in some quarters as a Moderate, in others as a *moyen terme* between Mustapha Kemal's supporters and the Enverist faction, who would appear to be the main element in the Opposition.

6. I have dealt with these internal developments at some length, because anything which materially affects Mustapha Kemal's position at Angora must react to some extent on the international situation. It would, however, be rash to assume that, even in the unlikely event of his being got rid of altogether by his opponents before the Greeks leave Asia Minor, any person or group who succeeded him would be less intractable than he has shown himself. The same spirit, to which he is being forced to make concessions of form if not of substance, operates in favour of the utmost insistence on the theory that Turkey must have entire independence within the armistice frontiers at all costs. It is not likely that Reouf Bey, who was second only to Mustapha Kemal himself in zeal for launching the national movement, or Enver Pasha, if he returned to power in Turkey with a Central Asiatic policy, or the old guard of the Committee of Union and Progress, who are now so active, would show an accommodating spirit in dealing with the Allies except under compulsion. Such hope as there is lies not in the likelihood of Moderate men coming into power at Angora, but in the possibility of the Nationalist movement as a whole being weakened by dissension among men, few,

if any of whom are individually Moderate, and in the further possibility of a change in the good relations between Angora and Moscow.

7. Meanwhile two points in the semi-official report of Mustapha Kemal's speech, on which the above account of it is based, are perhaps deserving of attention. He speaks of the necessity of achieving definite results, consonant with "the essential spirit of our National Pact," and in the list of places to be recovered by Turkey he makes no mention of Mosul. Read strictly, his language might be made on certain points, *e.g.*, Mosul, but I should be loath to suggest with any confidence that Mustapha Kemal chose his words with so definite an intention. It may well be that "the essential spirit of the National Pact" is merely a fine phrase, and it is obvious that Mosul, though its recovery is an essential part of the Pact, does not hold the same position for the purpose of a sentimental appeal as Smyrna, Brussa, Constantinople and Thrace.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

P.S.—I have inadvertently omitted to mention that Reouf Bey seems to have been promoted to the rank of Pasha after his election as President of the Council. Unless this should be contradicted, he will in future despatches be referred to as Reouf Pasha. There is no other Pasha of the name in any position of prominence at present.

F.O. 424/254, pp. 80-82, No. 97

N.H.

No. 133

Sir M. Maurice Henkey to Sir Eyre Crowe

26th July, 1922

My dear Crowe,

A few days ago I received a letter from Colonel Aubrey Herbert, M.P., who, as you know, if (*sic*) very interested in Turkey, asking if I would see privately a friend of his—Captain Armstrong, a regular soldier who has lately been employed in the Constantinople region in the Gendarmerie. I had a conversation with Captain Armstrong who has sent me a short Memorandum of the views he then expressed.

Armstrong was a gentleman and a very nice modest kind of fellow, very anxious not to appear personally—and indeed he has marked his notes "Private and Personal."

He appears in the course of his duties to have been approached in some kind of subterranean way by persons representing the Sultan, and he once saw the Sultan

himself for a short time. I don't fancy that these kind of relations have any value, but for what they are worth I send you his notes as the appropriate Department of the Foreign Office may like to see them.

The points in Armstrong's verbal communication to me which most impressed me were, first his insistence that the Angora Turks are very tired indeed, which I believe confirms your official information, and second, that in his view, their man-power is enormously decreased, so that he thinks the Turks will sooner or later fall an easy prey to Russia.

I asked Armstrong if he would be willing to see someone from the Foreign Office if they wished, in the same kind of way as he had seen me, and he replied that he would, though he realises that he has no official status whatsoever, and he only came to me rather reluctantly because Aubrey Herbert thought he ought to make a communication to some official person who could pass it on to the right quarter.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY

F.O. 371/7968/E. 7460

ENCLOSURE IN No. 133

Memorandum from Captain Armstrong to Sir M. Hankey

Private and Personal.

a. Various notes.

i. Turks do the preparation of all their important things through A.D.C.s. and junior officers. They consider "the bigger the man, the bigger the liar." Also the diplomatic road is more or less barricaded and under fire, and parleys can only be done very publicly under a white flag. Hence quite a lot of important things are never known. (Also the Turks are amazingly incapable of self-expression or effective propaganda).

ii. Provided it is constructive and not merely negative the British Government can have carried out what policy it cares to indicate at this moment.

From the Sultan.

b. The Sultan says "if Great Britain wishes to maintain the Sultan and Khalif, and if they wish to maintain me as Sultan and Kalif, they must come to my help right quickly and now, before it is too late.

If they wish this, let them send me somebody junior (not a big diplomat) to tell me what help I may expect: I will tell this delegate what I can do with the help he can offer and we can arrange details.

c. Roughly (as an indication) I want:—

i. A clear British (Allied) statement that the British Empire (Allies) will only deal with an united Turkey and united under me, the Sultan; that it will on no

condition deal with sections of Turkey such as Mustapha Kemal and Angora. This declaration means a 75 % increase of power to me.

ii. A promise that the Greeks (Hellenes) will leave Anatolia and hand over to me. A promise will be sufficient for me to start work on.

iii. £ 4,000,000 in bits as I succeed. Against this I will give good and satisfactory mortgages.

iv. Perhaps I shall require the use of some aeroplanes for propaganda and a cruiser to protect me and my men.

v. I want no open mandate but you may have all the influence you desire.

d. With these I will

i. Put in an efficient Government that will do my will and yours.

ii. I will go out personally and take over my territory from the Greeks.

iii. I will call my people to me—I can destroy those who will not come. Most of the rebels will come in and with money I can find soldiers. Many of my people believe that, they fight to release me from my British Captors (as well as for their homes) (This idea is prevalent in Irak and India and Egypt.)

e. The French are a difficulty. I will deal with the French exactly as you instruct me to do. Up to date I have looked to you and repulsed them, I can easily make friends with them. They wish to be friends with me.

(Many important Nationalists have approached me lately.)

(Here the Sultan ends.)

f. The above is a request from the Sultan that, if the Greeks evacuate, the evacuated territory may be handed over to him and not to the Nationalists. He guarantees to settle the Nationalists and unite Turkey on certain conditions from the Allies.

g. It is presupposed for sake of argument that the Greeks are evacuating; it is realised that the British Empire does not want to interfere in an internal quarrel and that she has no intention of running Turkey, but desires to reduce her commitment to a minimum and clear out as far as possible and as soon as possible.

h. The Nationalists are hostile to British interests. The Sultan is potentially friendly. The Nationalists are reactionary and represent the worst elements of Turkey. They cannot be controlled away in Angora. A Government at Constantinople can be controlled with little effort. It is as easy to hand over to the Sultan as to Mustapha Kemal, in the event of an evacuation. This can be done by the Sandjak system.

i. *Sandjak System.*

This means retiring Sandjak by Sandjak, and gradually taking the Greek line back to the sea. Take the Afion-Kara-Hissar Sandjak as an example. The Greek front line is now on the East of that. The Sultan is warned that his official Mukhtars,

Mudirs, Mutessarif should take over from the Greeks on a fixed date. The Gendarmerie recruited by and under Allied Officers to be on the front by the same date. When in position the Greeks should be requested to retire to the Western edge of the Sandjak, the Nationalists having previously been warned that if they enter the Sandjak the Greeks will go forward with Allied full authority and even assistance. When the Allied officers are satisfied that all is going well, another Sandjak is evacuated.

This system has been carried out with complete success up to date, in the Skutari Sandjak.

The result will be that the Sultan will take over; the *raison d'être* and power of Mustapha Kemal and the Nationalists is sapped; and his army largely deserts.

j. To look to British interests. Angora is far away. It cannot be controlled. It is hostile. It is anti-Christian and very anti-British. Whereas a Sultanic Government in Constantinople can be controlled and will be friendly.

i. Straits. The Sultan will willingly agree to troops on the shores and the open Straits.

ii. The Christian population. These he will protect and he will invite Allied Officers to supervise the Gendarmerie.

iii. He will refuse to have any closed spheres for trade and will assist British merchants.

iv. He will put the full spiritual and moral power of the Khalifate at the disposal of the British.

k. I suggest that, provided the Allies state clearly (a) that they will not deal with a section of Turkey but only a united Turkey under the Sultan and the "de jure" Government, and (b) that the Greeks will leave Anatolia when such a position has been reached and when such a Government can be treated with, then, Constantinople, and Angora can and will unite under the Sultan. Their aims are the same; their policies are much alike: it is only their personnel that is different.

Question. Provided all this is done will Angora submit to this old gentleman, the Sultan?

Answer. a. The evacuation of the Greeks cuts at the base of the power of Angora. The power of Mustapha Kemal is based on the existence of the Greeks in Anatolia. The Greeks gone, will Turk fight Turk for nothing? I think not. They are very tired.

b. The success of the beginnings of the Sandjak system means large desertions from Mustapha Kemal's army and the end of his power.

c. The personal equation. The Nabobs of Angora are regretting the flesh-pots of Constantinople. They hate Angora and its discomforts. The troops will fight no more when they find the Sultan has taken over in front of them and the Greeks are going. They only fight the Greeks.

d. The Sultan will give a complete amnesty to all, including Armenian massacres etc., if the British Government wish it.

Many at Angora would come back now if this were given, but they are afraid without it.

F.O. 371/7868/E. 7490

Note

I suggest that all this is only temporary. The Turks are carrion. It is only a question which bird gets fed. It is probable that Russia will one day come to Turkey.

The process at present at work may be termed one of "vacuum making" and this is being done in a potentially rich and fertile country. The danger is obvious.

If it is decided that Russia should clear up the Near East question the problem is finished and it is only a matter of keeping the place open till Russia is ready. If however Russia is not wanted in Alexandretta or Constantinople, the future needs to be looked to, and one day the British Empire might have to champion Islam against the Russian controller of the Khalifate.

F.O. 371/7868/E. 7460

No. 134

The Earl of Balfour to Sir M. Chertham (Paris)

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 27, 1922

No. 2359

Sir,

I transmit to you herewith a memorandum regarding the negotiations for a settlement in the Near East, which I request that you will communicate to the French Government in reply to their note of the 13th July¹ enclosed in Lord Hardinge's despatch No. 1629 of the 13th July².

I am, &c.

BALFOUR

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, p. 896, No. 699

¹ Not printed. This was the French Government's reply to the Earl of Balfour's memorandum of July 5.

² This ran: "The French Government, while accepting conditionally the points put forward by His Majesty's Embassy as preliminaries for the meeting of the conference in return for their acceptance of the French proposals for procedure, press for an early indication to the three Governments concerned of the place and date of the meeting."

ENCLOSURE IN No. 134

Memorandum regarding the Negotiations for a Settlement in the Near East

His Majesty's Government have carefully considered M. Poincaré's memorandum of the 13th July in reply to their conditional agreement to the proposed preliminary meeting of Allied representatives with delegates of the Governments of Athens, Constantinople and Angora. Seeing how important it is that the meeting, if it is to take place at all, should assemble as soon as possible, they regret to find that while in their anxiety to promote a settlement they have consented to make a further concession, and have, however reluctantly, agreed to the general principle involved in the French proposal, the French Government still declare themselves not satisfied on several minor points on which they maintain that they must continue to insist as essential conditions of the proposed meeting.

2. It is material to the proper appreciation of the position, to bear clearly in mind the origin and purpose of the proposal to hold the meeting. The French memorandum refers in its first, third and last paragraphs to the 'preliminary conference,' but in subsequent paragraphs it refers to it as the conference contemplated by the three foreign Ministers in the course of the Paris conversations of last March. It would appear as if the French Government regarded the meeting to take place at Beicos or other spot in the vicinity of Constantinople, as that provided for in the Paris programme. This can hardly be. There is clearly a vital distinction between the conference as originally contemplated at Paris and the meeting now under consideration.

3. The first was an integral part of the Paris programme, and prior acceptance of an armistice and of the peace conditions in general, as then formulated, was an essential preliminary to its assembly; its purpose was not to present the peace conditions to the delegates of the Governments of Athens, Constantinople and Angora, but, the armistice having been first concluded and the peace conditions already accepted in principle, to discuss their application with the delegates of the three Governments, with the view of reducing them to treaty form.

4. The meeting now proposed is essentially different in its object and in the conditions under which it assembles. It is not preceded by an armistice, and the belligerents who take part in it are not already committed to the Paris proposals. Their object is to ask for explanations of those proposals, not to deal with details of proposals already accepted. The Allied representatives should therefore not be expected to do more than reiterate and expound the Allied offer comprised in the threefold programme elaborated at Paris, and endeavour to persuade the Greek and Turkish delegates to accept this programme. Their first duty will be to urge on the Angora Government the conclusion of an armistice, to which the Greek Government have already agreed, and to which the Angora Government have,

according to M. Poincaré, expressed to Colonel Mougin their readiness to agree also. Their next duty will be to recommend and explain to both Greeks and Turks the peace conditions drawn up at Paris.

5. M. Poincaré in his note of the 15th May expressed the confident hope that personal contact would have the result of securing acceptance of these conditions. In this case the preliminary meeting, its object having been attained, could be transformed into the conference contemplated by the Paris programme for the discussion in detail of the peace conditions and for the elaboration of a preliminary draft of the final settlement.

6. But should M. Poincaré's confidence prove to have been misplaced, and should the peace conditions not be accepted in principle, there would remain no question for discussion or negotiation between the Allies and belligerent representatives. At the most, the former could take note, for reference to their Governments, of the various and, doubtless, mutually conflicting counter-propositions which may be brought forward by the Greeks and Turks. In that case, the preliminary conference would come to an end, since the offer proceeding from the Paris Conference of March would have been definitely repudiated.

7. As regards the place at which the preliminary meeting is to be held, His Majesty's Government strongly object to a meeting on Nationalist territory. They are equally opposed, for practical reasons, to a meeting on shipboard. They see no more reason for consulting in this respect the convenience of the Angora Government than that of the Greek Government, who have suggested Athens or Corfu for the meeting; nor is it clear that the presence of Mustapha Kemal Pasha in person is necessary, seeing that, according to recent reports, it seems doubtful whether he would be entitled to represent the Grand National Assembly of Angora as the sole and responsible head of that body. His Majesty's Government therefore maintain their preference for Beicos, or possibly Prinkipo, as the meeting place, though they would be prepared to consider any alternative suggested by the French Government which would not be open to the objections above explained.

8. His Majesty's Government cannot assent to the doctrine that the resolution passed by the Supreme Council on the 10th August, 1921, either altered or was intended to alter the law of nations with regard to the right of search; but they are quite prepared to consider any scheme consistent with that law, by which the export of arms to any belligerent which refused to accept the armistice might be checked or wholly prevented.

9. His Majesty's Government trust that the French Government, in expressing their desire to make the strengthening of the minority clauses conditional upon acceptance by the belligerents, do not mean to imply that any objection on the latter's part would be considered a sufficient reason for the Allied Governments to cease from insisting on effective safeguards. In view of the recent disclosures of atrocities committed against racial minorities, His Majesty's

Government deem it essential to demand acceptance of really adequate measures for the protection of surviving minorities in Thrace and Asia Minor. These measures, as the French Government are aware, have still to be worked out by experts, and there is no question of the consideration of specific arrangements at the preliminary meeting. The Allied representatives at that meeting should make it clear that, when the moment comes for framing the actual measures, the Allied Governments reserve to themselves the right, in the interests of both Greek and Turkish nationals, to exercise the widest latitude in the interpretation of the minorities resolution of the Paris Conference.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 896-898, No. 669/1

No. 135

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Earl of Balfour

ATHENS, 28th July, 1922, 10 p.m.

(Received July 29, 8.30 a.m.)

No 267. *Telegraphic*

I learn from what has generally proved to be good source that intention of Greek government is to issue ultimatum to Mustapha Kemal that unless he accepts March decisions of Powers Greeks will occupy Constantinople. In view of allied occupation it is difficult to see how such a threat could make much impression upon Mustapha Kemal.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 267. Repeated to Constantinople No. 139.

F.O. 371/7868/E. 7508

No. 136

Sir H. Rambold to the Earl of Balfour

CONSTANTINOPLE, 1st August 1922

(Received August 8)

No. 678

My Lord,

With reference to recent correspondence relative to the journey of Major General Sir C. Townshend M.P., in Asia Minor, I have the honour to state that General Townshend's visit has created great excitement in Turkish circles, as was to be expected. The Constantinople press has given much prominence to accounts of his movements. He is not given nearly as much space as was devoted to Monsieur Claude Farrère, but the Turkish papers treat him in very much the same way as they did that gentleman i.e. as a noble friend of Turkey visiting his spiritual home.

2. Reference to General Townshend were severely restricted by the British censor until the arrival of telegrams from London defining the attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to his journey. Immediate publicity was given to these telegrams, and, once this had been done, it was not considered advisable to delete accounts of his proceedings. The only important matter which has since been refused publication has been a very undesirable leading article submitted by the "Aurore", which as Your Lordship is aware is a strong pro-Turkish paper, published under local British auspices.

3. The telegrams about General Townshend's movements are somewhat contradictory in detail, but it would appear that he passed through Mersina and Adana on or about July 22, proceeded from Adana to Konia, and after a short stay in the latter place reached Angora on July 26. At Konia he saw Mustafa Kemal Pasha, with whom he apparently had two interviews. At Angora he has been the guest of Reft Pasha, former Commissioner for the Interior, the same gentleman who, it will be remembered, was concerned in the proceedings of Major Henry and his colleagues last autumn. He has seen various notabilities at Angora, including Reouf Pasha, the new President of the Council, Kiazim Pasha, Commissioner for National Defence, and Colonel Mougin, the French representative. No details have been published of what passed between him and Mustafa Kemal or the other persons mentioned.

4. General Townshend appears to have been sparing in his utterances for public consumption in Anatolia. More than one account has been published of statements attributed to him. It rather looks as though he had in reality given only a single interview to an Adana newspaper, and as though this had been dished up in various forms. According to one account he gave an interview to journalists at Angora, but if this is correct he would appear to have merely repeated what he had already said at Adana. Anyhow the main points in the public pronouncements attributed to him up to July 27 were that he was proud to be the defender of Turkey, that he was not authorised to discuss political questions; that there was a constantly growing pro-Turkish party in the House of Commons; that there was a lack of definite ideas in England on the subject of atrocities enquiries; that he himself regarded the question as an old one; that it should be divided into two parts; that an inquiry into the Greek atrocities in occupied territory was necessary; that the English knew all about the misbehaviour of the Greeks; that he would say nothing about the object of his journey; that he expected to stay about 14 days in Anatolia; and that he attached no importance to rumours about the evacuation of Cilicia. It is not clear to what rumours the last of these observations was intended to refer.

5. Apart from accounts of the interview or interviews summarized above, the Anatolian Agency has circulated the correspondence between General Townshend and the London "Evening News" regarding the accusation brought against

him by His Majesty's Government of having broken a written pledge by going to Turkey. This correspondence has presumably already appeared in the press at home.

6. I have also received from the telegraphic censorship here a copy of a telegram sent by General Townshend from Angora to Captain Gee M. P. This was intended for publication, and will doubtless have appeared in the London Press before the present despatch reaches Your Lordship. I enclose a copy, however, by way of precaution. It will be observed that General Townshend speaks of leaving Angora on July 31, but later telegrams from that place to the press here indicate that he actually left for Alexandretta on the evening of July 29 or on July 30. The "Aurora" of July 31, publishes without giving its authority a much less probable statement that he intended to visit the Eski-Chehr front with Refet Pasha.

7. CONFIDENTIAL. On July 28, the Sultan sent a message to Mr. Ryan inquiring about General Townshend. Mr. Ryan explained the position of His Majesty's Government in the matter in the most explicit terms. He said that His Majesty's Government were not only not parties to General Townshend's activities, but had done everything in their power to discountenance them and to prevent his going to Angora. He said that they disapproved of General Townshend's proceedings on many grounds, one of which was that the General stood for the policy of treating Angora as though it were the sole authority in Turkey, a policy which His Majesty's Government had steadfastly refused to adopt as their own. A reference in the conversation to Lady Townshend's French nationality, elicited a suggestion from the Sultan's messenger that the French might have an interest in General Townshend's activities. Mr. Ryan said that he thought General Gouraud had found his way to Beirut, and had preferred to adopt a neutral line of conduct; and that, if the attitude of the French authorities had any political significance at all, it probably meant no more than that they were unwilling to give umbrage to Mustafa Kemal by standing in the way of General Townshend, whose visit was a score for the Angora Government.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 371/7945/E. 7838

INCLOSURE IN No. 136

General Townshend, Angora, to Captain Gee, M.P., House of Commons, England

29/7/22

After conversation with Mustafa Kemal Pasha am absolutely convinced immediate peace can be obtained by immediate evacuation by hellenic troops of vilayet of Smyrna and occupied territories in Asia Minor to be restored to the

Turks. All other points and obstacles can be easily settled. Turkey to a man desires honourable peace. My views absolutely shared by French officier de liaison at Angora. If peace effort fails now a grave situation will arise which my experience of Musulmans for seventeen years permits of no doubt. Wish to explain this situation to Government on my return starting after two days.

Welcome I have received from all classes including peasantry wonderful.

As you know, my promise not to enter Turkey was conditional, I said in commencement of May when I was insulted by passport for Turkey being refused, begins "It is not my present intention to enter Turkey" ends. Afterwards in May, despairing of our negotiations when Government refused to meet Kemal at Ismid, I attacked policy in House thirtieth May in long speech declare my desire to go to Kemal. I felt it a duty to use my influence with Turks for peace, humanity and most vital interests British Empire.

I look to you to defend me in house during my absence.

Please shew this to Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Asquith, Sir Joynson-Hicks, Gritton, Ashley, Guinness, Hoare, Clynes, Admiral Sueter, King, Hall, Kenworthy, tell my secretary and send copy newspaper of my constituency.

Shall reach Alexandretta about second August.

F.O. 371/7945/E. 7838

No. 137

Debates in the House of Commons and Speech of the Prime Minister Mr. Lloyd George on British Near Eastern Policy, August 4, 1922

NEAR EAST.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: I hope the right hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I change the subject. I will only refer to the subject with which he has been dealing, by saying that the right hon. Gentleman made the usual exhibition of himself as a well-meaning but rather inefficient brake, just preventing the Government coach from plunging over the precipice of reaction. An opportunity is provided by the present conditions of trade for the unscrupulous employer to sweat his workmen, and I think I shall be doing a service to the workmen if I try to point to one cause for the depression of trade to-day. May I say that I am speaking now either as a Turcophobe or a Greekophobe, but I am speaking on behalf of a national and Imperial interest, namely, the employment of the inhabitants of the cities of these islands, and especially my own constituency. I want to make it perfectly clear that I am not making any sort of attack upon my hon. Friend who represents the Foreign Office. In fact, I want to go out of my way to say that the recent replies that he has given in regard to the question of Asia Minor have been frank and statesmanlike and a great improvement on the attitude of other sections of the Government.

Yesterday we had the usual defence by the Prime Minister, when the foreign policy of this Government is attacked, that it is not his fault that things go wrong, but the other boy's. He did not want to sign the Treaty of Versailles, but M. Clemenceau insisted on it. In spite of M. Clemenceau's great courage, it appears that he could not tell the French people the truth, and therefore they signed the Treaty. Or it was President Wilson, or somebody else. It was the usual excuse of that sort, and the Prime Minister will now, of course, again do the statesmanlike thing and think of his Allies. I will now deal with a matter in which the position is the precise reverse, in which long since peace, with all it means to British trade, could have been made if the only countries concerned had been France and Italy. I refer to the great question of Asia Minor and the present state of affairs there, and I think it is right to raise this point very briefly, before we disperse for a long Vacation, because many serious things may happen there. At the present time British troops are marching and being sent to man the lines of Chatalja, because of the impudent threat of King Constantine. British ships are steaming up and down the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus instead of being at their proper stations, and this is a matter when certainly concerns the House of Commons. We had a great Conference at Genoa, in which the Prime Minister, I must say, made very laudable efforts to do something to restore the trade of Europe. I am going to propose to him a policy which will do much to restore our trade in another area, namely, in the Levant and Turkey, a country with great possibilities for British trade and where in the past we have had a sure and valuable market, a country in which 30 per cent. of the trade went to this country in the past, and which is of great importance, particularly to the textile areas of this country.

First of all, in spite of it having been stated before in this House, I must remind the Prime Minister, because I am going to criticise his policy, of the pledge that he made in the spring of 1918, in the Central Hall, Westminster, I believe, to a meeting of trade union leaders, who had been disturbed by the reports of what our War aims were, by the publication of secret Treaties, and so on. The right hon. Gentleman assured them of the cleanliness of our war aims, and he particularly dealt with the question of Turkey, and before doing so, he said he had consulted the right hon. Member for Paisley Mr. Asquith and Lord Grey. This pledge, of course, was that we were not fighting to deprive Turkey of her capital or of the rich and ancient lands of Thrace and Anatolia, the homelands of the Turkish race. That message mollified the trade union leaders at the time, and they went off heartened. It was also of great value in our Moslem dependencies in India. It was circulated throughout India, placarded in the bazaars, and it did much to reassure our gallant Moslem fellow subjects, who formed such a great part of the British armies, and who were gravely disturbed by what they called the threat to break up the ethnographical territories of Turkey. That was a pledge, and one thing that we used to be proud of was that the word of a Britisher was respected. Whatever our faults, we had that reputation. That was what enabled us to rule India with 1,200

civil servants, that the right hon. Gentleman rightly boasted about on Wednesday—faith in the word of a British statesman.

How has that been proven in this case? I need not go into the details of the Greek landing at Smyrna and what happened there. Greece was not our Ally in the War. Greece waited till the War was over. It was only the threat of the British guns, and an occasional shot fired in the gardens of the Palace at Athens, that kept Greece out of the War on the side of Turkey. Greece was sent to occupy Smyrna. What happened there has been described by a Committee of Inquiry, the members of which were Admiral Bristol, of the United States Navy, General Hare, of the British Army, and two very distinguished Allied generals, one Frenchman and one Italian. They have made a Report on what happened, the slaughterings, the excesses, and the outrages that were committed there—a Report which has been suppressed. That, of course, roused all Turkey. It brought thousands of men to the banner of Mustapha Kemal, and to-day the gentleman who is referred to occasionally by Members of this Government as some rebel general is the great national hero of Turkey, and is looked upon as the wielder of the Sword of the Faithful.

Might I, in passing, say a word about Armenia. To-day Armenia, I am sorry to say, is being used as an excuse for Greek Imperialism. I give way to none in my desire that the Armenian people should have the promises so freely made to them. The Armenians stood by us in the War, and rose against their Turkish masters and embarrassed the Turkish armies. That is why they were massacred. We ought now to fulfil our pledge to them, but I believe I am right in saying that at the present moment there is a Republic of Armenia set up, that it is recognised by the Turkish Government, and that Treaties have been exchanged, and I understand that the Turks are willing to give further guarantees against the scattered colonies of Armenians in places outside the Republic of Erivan. Provided we will give them a fair deal, they will play the game and look after these people and see they are not proceeded against. But all the killings of Turkish peasants in the Vilayet of Smyrna by the Greeks, the bombardment of Turkish ports by Greek warships, the blusterings of Constantine at the gates of Constantinople, do not protect the Armenians. Do not bring in the Armenians, therefore, as a red herring across the track in this case. We shall be told by the Prime Minister, I suppose, that the Christian minorities will all be massacred unless the Greeks remain where they are. I am now talking of the Greek minorities. They have lived there for 500 years when the Turk was supreme, and not only that, but they grew to great positions of wealth and influence. A large part of the wealth and great positions were held by these Pontine Greeks, and the Greeks in the Vilayet of Smyrna held honourable positions until the intrigues of the Imperialists in Athens, with the sympathy, open or covert, of the right hon. Gentleman, led them astray.

When the French, after their agreement with the Kemalists, left Cilicia, a great many Greeks and other Christians evacuated the country in terror, very largely, I am afraid, because of the propaganda. The evacuation was supervised by French officers, and the advance of the Kemalist army was also accompanied by French officers. I believe that there are not 20 cases of killing or other maltreatment which can be produced, and the occupation of the evacuated territory was carried out peacefully and with good results, considering the fearful state of fanaticism and war spirit that prevailed. I say that in passing, because, in answer to a question of mine in the House this week, the Government said that when the opposing Governments were invited to an armistice this year, the Greeks accepted and the Turks refused, and that, therefore, the Turks put themselves in the wrong and our support of the Greeks was justified. But I understand that, although the Greeks accepted, they had armies far beyond any just limits of Greek territory, and the Turks said that, before there was an armistice, the Greeks should begin, at any rate, to retreat and that the retreat should be supervised by Allied officers. I think that is perfectly fair. For a long time we refused overtures on the part of the Germans until they evacuated Belgium, and we did make them evacuate it before there was any sort of peace negotiations. I do not think that is unfair.

I now wish to turn to two aspects of the question. The first is the extraordinary demand of King Constantine and his Ministers that the Greeks should be allowed to occupy Constantinople in order to bring pressure to bear upon the Government. Constantinople has been occupied by the British at enormous expense. In Angora, which is now the capital of the Turkish Nationalists, there is a representative of every Moslem community in the world. There are ambassadors from Persia, Afghanistan and every independent Moslem State. Even the Moors in Morocco are represented. I got this information a month ago in Paris from French gentlemen—men of repute—who have recently returned. No Englishman has been there for many months, except my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wrekin (Sir C. Townshend). Any Englishmen going outside the range of the guns of the English warships at Constantinople are likely to have their throats cut, and those are the people who had 30 per cent. of the trade of the country in their hands, and are now in danger because of the hostility aroused against us. It is true there have been faults on both sides. One of the reasons why the French left Cilicia, and came to terms with Angora, was the advice of the Governor-General, who told us in Paris that he could not go into the most remote village in Southern Morocco without the headman coming and saying, "What are the French Government doing in Angora? Are they helping the Turks?"

We have this tremendous demand that Constantinople should be occupied by the Greek armies, and, I suppose, King Constantine should be re-crowned as Emperor of Byzantium in the mosque of St. Sophia. Could they have had any

opportunity of occupying Constantinople if we had not beaten the Turks, largely with the aid of Mussulmans? I am astonished to see that we have landed troops, and have had to send special ships from Malta to Constantinople. During the War, the only argument which the Greeks seemed to understand was a fleet at the Piræus. If ships have to leave their stations at Malta, let them go there. It will have more effect than moving a few extra troops to Constantinople. I see that the British Government have issued a very stern warning to the Greeks against any such venture, but it shows the effect of our policy that such a thing should be ventured upon. A much more serious matter, however, is the apparent intention to imitate the example of D'Annunzio and Żilogowski in an attempt to set up an independent Ionian State in Smyrna. Apparently the Greek Army is going to remain there and we are to be defied as in the case of D'Annunzio and other adventurers. I am sorry to say, with success.

I hope we shall make it clear to Athens that any announcement of that sort is going to bring severe retribution on the Greeks. Without the connivance of the Powers with sea power, it will be impossible for the State of Ionia to be maintained from the mainland, and there will be no excuse if we permit it. I do ask the Prime Minister to recognise that the atrocities committed by the Turks, which are the excuse put forward by the Lord Privy Seal and other Members of the Government, are not sufficient for encouraging a continuance of war in Asia Minor. There have been, unfortunately, terrible excesses committed on the other side as well. War in that part of the world means excesses. The only way to stop them is to stop war. May I trouble the House by reading from independent reports of neutral observers? There is Professor Arnold Toynbee, who has written most strongly in the "Manchester Guardian" and elsewhere, about the excesses committed by the Greeks in Asia Minor. Miss Allen and Miss Billings, two American ladies, and Mr. Gehri write about villages where the Greek armies were hospitably treated, and which were burnt by the Greek armies when they retired after defeat. This is the signed report of those two devoted American ladies:

"When the Army went through here we did everything they asked us to do. We gave of our butter, our eggs, our chickens; we baked bread. But what good did it do? This (the ruined houses) is our reward!" Later it is said:

"As we were about to leave the village, a group of women surrounded us, telling us of the various happenings. One said: 'It was my sister-in-law who was shot when she tried to escape from the hands of the soldiers. My daughter-in-law was seized and violated. I begged the soldiers not to burn my house, and their reply was: "Is not your husband a Kemal soldier? Get your rights from Kemal."'

No, their remedy should come from us who loosed these fanatical intolerant, bigoted Imperialists on these defenceless peasantry. There have been equal, or worse, deeds done on the other side—in greater volume, no doubt. The opportunity has been greater. But two wrongs do not make a right. I am perfectly

certain if, in his reply, the Prime Minister makes it clear that we are not going to support this War of aggression, for such it is, in Asia Minor, that we are prepared to throw ourselves on the side of Greece, with the French and the Italians, that peace will come. The offers made by the Kemalists are quite fair under the circumstances.

Recently the Prime Minister addressed a great meeting in London, ably assisted, of course, by the Chief Secretary for Ireland. I refer to the gathering of the Free Churchmen. The right hon. Gentleman said to that assemblage that he proposed to devote his life to the cause of peace. It was an admirable sentence. Is the right hon. Gentleman going, in face of that, still further to estrange us from the great world of Islam? There is a generation in Turkey that are taking an interest for the first time, an observer who has recently been in Anatolia has paid a tribute to them, and says there is a recrudescence of Turkish national life. Are we alive to the dangers of force? The worst thing that can happen to us of the British Empire would be a great victory. I beg the Prime Minister now to have the courage that he praised in Lenin and to change his policy. We have been in the wrong in this matter. It is not a question of Cross against Crescent. It is not a question of helping the underdog. In this case the under-dog is the Turk, disarmed, rendered helpless by British arms, before Greece. I beg the Prime Minister to take his opportunity of restoring a great market, and perhaps to pave the way for a reconciliation between our ideas and the great world of Islam.

Major GLYN: I was surprised that the tone of the hon. and gallant Gentleman was not more constructive to bring about that at which he aims, because it seems to me that it is the business of this House and the Government to do everything they can to put an end to these mutual atrocities, and to try to find some common ground by which peace can be re-established and trade set going. The difficulty experienced by some of the Turkish nationalists is that if they demobilise their Army they will lose control over large numbers of men for whose actions they cannot have any responsibility. They are anxious to see peace established and trade set going. These men of the Turkish Nationalist Army want to be reestablished back on the rich and fertile soil of Anatolia, cultivating their farms, and working, through the Greeks, as they have done before. The Greek's function is that of a trader. Without him the Turk cannot market his goods. The Turk is a very bad trader, but an excellent cultivator. If we refuse to recognise the fact that large masses of Greeks and Turks, no matter what the Allied Powers may say, or whatever any Peace Conference may say, have to live cheek by jowl, both in Constantinople, in Asia Minor, and other places, so much the more our attention should be directed, not to work up passions, but to re-establish trade and try to wipe out the passions of the past. It is a little ingenuous of Members here to throw stones at the British Government, because, so far as I can understand, they have endeavoured over a very long period to bring about peace in Asia Minor. It may be a defeat for this country, although I rather doubt it, if the Greeks gain a victory.

But I am perfectly certain that if the Turks gain the victory that it would not be a victory for Christianity.

We have got a very solemn duty to perform. It is this country that gave the Greeks their freedom. Our history, and the history of the Greeks, is bound up. Let us not forget the words of Byron and the words of Mr. Gladstone which combined our actions and Greek destinies. Personally I believe that M. Venizelos was one of the most remarkable men that came to the front during the late War. M. Venizelos, however, is not a Greek. He is a Cretan. I believe that all the trouble has been that M. Venizelos' idea of Imperialism was on such a very high level that a great many of the Greeks could not follow it. I am convinced that when we backed up the policy of M. Venizelos we did so in good faith, and that action over which anybody had any control occurred. The death of the young King of the Greeks from the bite of a monkey was a terrible catastrophe that could not have been foreseen. But is it our business to interfere with Greek affairs and their form of government when we are always saying that it is our right and duty to help small countries to work out what Constitution they themselves think they should possess?

I would ask the Prime Minister, if he can possibly do so, to reconsider the difficult position in which the present Greek Government are placed. I had the good fortune to be in Athens a short while ago, where I met M. Venizelos and the Royalists. I found one very curious thing displayed in that country as in this—the impossibility of the older politician working for the common good. The younger man wants to allow for the discrepancies of the political ideas of the past. I was struck by the younger Venizelos and the young Royalists who saw quite clearly that the financial position of the Greeks could not stand against the present strain. They believe, just as the Prime Minister himself believes, that the future of the country can best be served by forming a Coalition Government. If you can fuse the interests of Venizelos and the Royalists and get them to pursue a sensible policy, the Greeks will walk hand in hand with the Great Powers. I should have thought our association with the Turk in the past would be a sufficient guarantee that we could not allow the Turkish position to suffer by being guided by our advice. Obviously, as the hon. Member for Central Hull said, we must consider all the Moslems who are our fellow-citizens, but it is a curious fact that those whom I met who were Nationalists, and who tried to bring about a *rapprochement* as between the Allies and the Turks were at once disowned by the Turkish National Government. It is extremely difficult to know to whom you can go and whom you can meet as a real representative of the Turkish Nationalist Government. Again, the hon. and gallant Gentleman spoke about a famous French administrator for whom we all have got the highest admiration, but he will find that at Fez there is a Moslem university from which they send out emissaries to every part of the world, who carry on propaganda against the civilised nations of the world, and stir up trouble and place coals of fire on the smouldering embers of Moslem feeling against

Christianity. I think if the Prime Minister could adjust the position of the Greek Government and recognise the position, it would be found possible to have a Coalition Government in Greece. Anybody who will inquire will find that the Greeks and the Turks are both ready to combine and forget the past and proceed along lines of peace. It is too much to expect that we should demand of the Greeks that they should evacuate their own people, and leave them defenceless against men who have shown no inclination to respect them.

I hope it may be possible for the League of Nations to take some part in the settlement of this most difficult problem. I know there was at the Versailles Conference an idea that Constantinople should be in some way brought under the administration of the League of Nations, and it is curious to note now that the League of Nations is established at Geneva. I should like to see a branch of the League of Nations established at Constantinople, with control up the Maritsa, forming a buffer state between Greece and Turkey. If the British wish to have a strong policy, it is high time that this country, which has taken such a prominent part in guiding the destinies of the nations of the Middle East, should again come to the front and help to establish the prosperity amongst those people. If we do that without pushing selfish interests at the expense of people who are trying hard to extricate themselves from terrible difficulties, I believe we shall have contributed towards history as we did in the days of Mr. Gladstone.

Brigadier-General SURTEES: My remarks are always noted for their brevity, and I do not propose to depart from that golden rule on this occasion. I happen to have an intimate knowledge of Turkey and Greece, and I wish to say that I think it most unfair to the people of those two countries that no definite peace has hitherto been brought about. This is not the time to discuss the Turkish Treaty, or to allude to the conditions which some of us consider were a gross injustice to Turkey, nor do I wish to animadvert upon the preferential treatment shown to Greece, a country which has done very little to deserve it. I do claim, however, that in the interests of tranquillity and trade, an end should be put to the very unsatisfactory state of affairs existing in the Near East. That is all I wish to impress upon the Government, and I hope they will redouble their efforts to obtain peace.

The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Lloyd George): I think there is very little in the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull—Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy—with which I can say that I am in agreement. There is, however, one observation which he made which I will accept, and that is that it is desirable, before we separate, that there should be a discussion on the affairs of the Near East. The Government have nothing to conceal in their policy. I agree with the observations made by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Gateshead—Brigadier-General Surtees—in the very shrewd and sensible speech which he has just addressed to the House, in which he said it is desirable above all things that

peace should be established in that portion of the world. The Government have no other desire. There is, however, one very important consideration, and it is that the peace must be a just and fair peace and one which is likely to be enduring. There, I think, I shall also have the assent of my hon. and gallant Friend.

The hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull seemed to present the case to the House of a friendly Turkey alienated by the policy of His Majesty's Government. I know it is only a few years ago since this country had such a large influence in Turkey, but the hon. and gallant Member for Hull seems to have forgotten the very recent history of that country. He has forgotten that eight years ago, when the Dardanelles, the Bosphorous, and free access to the Black Sea was very vital to us, this very friendly Power slammed the gates of the Dardanelles in the face of the two countries without whose continuous assistance the Turkish Empire would have not been in existence. We fought one great war to preserve Turkey against her enemies. Before that we had constantly intervened to protect her against those who attacked her, and, as late as 1878, the whole power of this country was mobilised to protect and save Turkey from the consequences of a disastrous defeat inflicted upon her by her old enemy.

In August, 1914, when we were engaged in a struggle of life and death, when Turkey should have assisted us without hesitation, as a result of a conspiracy which she entered into before the War with our greatest enemy, she did us the greatest dis-service any country could have done; and I have no hesitation in saying, from my knowledge of the War, and I am sure that I am confirmed in it by everybody who has ever read the history of the War, that the action taken by Turkey then had the effect of prolonging the War by probably a couple of years. I will go beyond that and say that the collapse of Russia was almost entirely due, and it would probably never have happened, if the Black Sea had been free; and the same applies to Roumania, because, under other circumstances, we should have poured a sufficient amount of ammunition into those countries. The difficulties we had in supplying Russia in 1915 was almost entirely due to the fact that we could only get to Russia through Archangel during a few months of the year. There was only one line which we could use for a few months in the year. We could not pour ammunition in, and the failure of Russia was entirely attributable to that fact. That was due to the action of Turkey, who for a whole century, by finance, by diplomatic influence, by military support, and by the blood of our sons and the blood of the sons of France had been kept alive. That was the payment we got in August, 1914. What is the use of talking of the friendliness of Turkey a few years ago?

There is another illusion under which the hon. and gallant Gentleman seems to be labouring, entirely through ignorance of the facts. He is under the impression that the occupation of Smyrna and the proposals of the Sèvres Treaty were entirely the work of Great Britain. He clearly cannot have acquainted himself with the

facts. What was done there was due to a Commission appointed by the great Powers, upon which France, Italy, Japan and ourselves were represented. We were represented by one of our greatest Dominion statesmen, Sir Robert Borden, who, in addition to being a man of very great breadth of mind, was a great jurist. He represented Great Britain with the aid of the officials of the Foreign Office. We never interfered with that Commission. We left it to them to recommend, and they recommended, upon the facts, that Smyrna and the adjoining villayets ought to be handed over to Greece, because they were predominantly Greek in population, in interest, and in industry. That was not our decision. France took the same view. *America took the same view*¹. The only Power that expressed no opinion was Italy, for very obvious reasons. *Italy was claiming Smyrna herself at that time. That was why this part of Asia Minor was assigned to Greece*². It is perfectly true, for reasons which are thoroughly well known, that France has changed her mind since, but it was not our action alone. It was action, in which the jurists and experts of France agreed with ours to put Smyrna under the control of Greece, which led to the occupation.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: But they went there to restore order, according to the dispatch. They were sent there because of alleged atrocities which were afterwards found to be false.

The PRIME MINISTER: The hon. and gallant Gentleman is now getting away from the point he made. The point which he made was that we are responsible. I am answering that by saying that it is not in the least consistent with the facts. It was the report of a Commission upon which we were *only one out of five that made that recommendation*³. It was not our action. The only change has not been a change of policy on our part. Such change of policy as there has been has been a change of policy entirely on the part of other Powers. I want, to make that perfectly clear. What is the position? The position is that the fall of M. Venizelos and the accession of King Constantine has produced a certain chilliness of opinion in France, and also, undoubtedly, in this country, towards Greece. It made a very considerable difference to French opinion. I do not believe that you would have had any of this trouble at all if M. Venizelos had still remained at the head of affairs. His influence, as one of the greatest democratic statesmen in Europe, would have been sufficient to keep French public opinion loyal to its original decision in this respect. But King Constantine had been responsible for certain acts of hostility to the Allies which hurt France very deeply, and I am not at all surprised at the fact that French opinion felt angry with Greece because it elected to stand by its King. If Greece is loyal to her King, that is her business. We must judge the whole question upon its merits. But it did produce a modification of the Treaty of Sèvres.

¹ İngilizce Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nda bu cümlelerin altı çizilmiş ve karşısına "No" hayır) sözcüğü eklenmiştir.

² Bu satırların karşısına bir ünlem işaretidir konulmuştur.

³ Bu satırların karşısına bir "No" hayır) sözcüğü eklenmiştir.

Two efforts have been made to try and get the parties to agree. The first was in London where very considerable modifications were introduced into the Treaty of Sèvres, and there was good reason to believe that the representative of Angora was on the whole, in favour of accepting. I have no doubt that if they had accepted, Greece also would have accepted. *I have good reason to know that Greece would have accepted the terms then proposed*⁴. But the Angora Government repudiated its representative, and the failure to come to terms was entirely the failure of Angora. Then another effort was made by my Noble Friend the Foreign Secretary to secure another modification in Paris which would secure peace and tranquillity in this region. I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Gateshead that this is highly desirable in the interests of everybody. It was proposed that there should be a meeting of all the parties somewhere in the East—Turkey, and Greece as well as the Great Powers—but as a preliminary it was stipulated that there should be an Armistice. I should have thought that was a most obvious condition to impose. How could you sit in Constantinople or anywhere else to discuss terms of peace when the belligerents were engaged in cutting each other's throats somewhere down in Basra? It has been the condition of every conference of peace that has ever been held. Therefore, without any hesitation, the Powers were perfectly unanimous in imposing this condition upon both parties. Greece accepted; the Angora Government refused⁵. The Constantinople Government were, I believe, prepared to accept, and that is where the Sultan is; that is where the Caliph is. That is where the head of Islam dwells. Mustapha Kemal may be a great general and a great patriot; but the head of Islam is in Constantinople. He is the Caliph. Mustapha Kemal refused, with the result that nothing has been accomplished. *He insisted upon preliminary evacuation by the Greeks*⁶. He professes to desire peace, but the Turks were encouraged in their refusal of the one condition which the Powers thought to secure from them. That is not the road to peace. The Greek Army said, "We cannot evacuate the position, and leave our people behind, until we know what provisions have been incorporated in the Treaty for the protection of those people." That was not unreasonable. The hon. and gallant Member admits quite frankly that there have been atrocities committed by the Turks. He has dwelt with great indignation upon one or two isolated instances of Greek atrocities, but I did not notice the same tone of indignation when he referred to the Turkish atrocities. His anger is reserved for the Greeks. Has he read the Official Report? It is perfectly true that in some cases there have been deplorable outrages by Greek soldiers. It is almost inevitable in that part of the world where there is war. It happened in Macedonia, in conflicts between various nationalities there. There have been inquiries instituted by the French, Italian, and British Missions. There is no doubt there have been a large number of atrocities and that

⁴ Bu cümleden karyona bir soru işaretini konmuştur.

⁵ * Bu cümlelerin yanına "indirectly" "dolaylı olarak" sözcüğü eklenmiştir.

those on the part of the Turks have been more considerable and more ferocious than those on the part of the Greeks. But all the indignation the hon. and gallant member had was reserved for the atrocities committed by Greek soldiers.

I wonder whether the hon. and gallant Member has acquainted himself with the Report of the American Mission with regard to the atrocities at Pontus. There have been individual cases of outrages by the Greeks in the war region, but at Pontus *there was not the slightest suggestion there was any rebellion or preparation for rebellion*⁷; and, indeed, it would have been an act of supreme folly on th part of the population to have acted in such a manner. Under the conditions that obtained I cannot imagine they would have done so, for whatever the Greeks lack, they do not lack intelligence. What has happened there? Not individual instances, but tens of thousands of men, women and children have been deported, and tens of thousands have died. The reports with regard to the women are perfectly horrible, and all these outrages were committed *without any rebellion, and without any provocation*⁸. It was pure deliberate extermination. "Extermination" is not my word used by the American Mission.

It was open to the Greeks to say: "Before our troops retire from the lines which we have occupied after driving the Turks out with great loss, there are 500,000 men, women and children of our race behind us, and we want some guarantee that the same thing may not happen here as happened at Pontus." Our business is to hold the balance justly and fairly between both parties. It is not a question of Mussulman versus Christian. I want to make that perfectly clear. Supposing the Armenians were in control of Asia Minor, and supposing they had been guilty of these atrocities, these wholesale atrocities against Mussulman, we should have been bound to intervene. We should have been bound to use the whole of our influence as a great Mahommedan Power. Scores of millions of Mahommedans are our fellow subjects, and we should have been bound to intervene on their behalf. It is a pure question of humanity. After all, the responsibility for the defeat of the Turks was our responsibility. They were our troops who overthrew the Turks, and, therefore, the responsibility for the establishment of peace in Turkey must be our responsibility. We cannot abrogate the predominance which has been won by the sacrifice of our own people. We have a right to say we will make no peace which will place hundreds of thousands of poor defenceless people who are looking to us for protection at the mercy of those who have been guilt of the deportations and outrages at Pontus without some guarantee.

These outrages have undoubtedly modified and profoundly modified the position. First there is the fact that the Turks have refused to accept the conditions imposed by all the Powers quite unanimously with regard to an armistice. *We could*

⁷ Foreign Office'de, bu satırların karşısına "incorrect" doğru değil sözcüğü eklenmiştir

⁸ Bu satırların karşısına "No" hayır sözcüğü eklenmiştir

not allow the war to go on in that very important quarter⁹. We could not afford to allow the trade of the district to be kept in a condition of disturbance and uncertainty. But the Turks have deliberately insisted on it. In addition to that, they have disturbed the balance of the Paris proposals, after having shown that *they cannot be trusted with complete sovereignty and sway in a quarter like the Smyrna Vilayet*¹⁰, where there are hundreds of thousands of Christians who would be entirely at their mercy. The Turk is an Oriental. He knows many things. He does not always know, perhaps, the value of time, but he always plays for time in diplomacy. He hangs on in the hope that the other party will give way first. *It ought to be made quite clear that the terms I have mentioned are not indefinitely open to the Turk, who is saying to himself, "If I hold out I may have a chance of getting everything I want, and if I do not, the worst that can happen to me will be that I shall get the Paris terms offered to me." That cannot be the case*¹¹. The hon. and gallant Gentleman quoted what I said at the end of 1917, or the beginning of 1918, about a year before the end of the War. That was a definite offer to Turkey to go out of the War, and she did not. The same offer was made, I believe, privately. There were the usual sort of approaches, coming, perhaps, from an authorised person—I cannot tell. It is very difficult to tell, when a war is on, whether a man is authorised or not. At any rate, we got the same proposals. Turkey went on for a year. She went on until she was completely beaten, and had added scores of millions to our debt, and tens of thousands to the casualties. Turkey thinks that she is entitled to the same offer a year later, when all that has happened, as was made to her at a time when there was a good deal to be gained by getting her out, and it was worth our while to give her better terms.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Of course, if it was a just offer. Why not?

The PRIME MINISTER: The question whether it was a just offer was tried by this Commission, and this Commission—a perfectly fair, reputable and honourable Commission—gave that decision, and we abided by it. I forget who it was that said that we were not fair as between the parties. I am not sure that we are. What has happened? *Here is a war between Greece and Turkey. We are defending the capital of one of the parties against the other*¹². We must not overlook that fact, and it is a very important fact. If we were not there, there is absolutely no doubt that the Greeks would occupy that capital in a very few hours, and that would produce a decision¹³. There is only one way now in which the Greeks can have a decision, and that is by marching through almost impenetrable defiles for hundreds of miles into the country. I do not know of any army that would have gone as far as the Greeks have. It was a very daring and a very dangerous military enterprise. They established a military superiority in every pitched battle. They were barred by the

⁹ Bu cümlelerin karşısına Foreign Office'de ünlem ve soru işaretleri (!?) eklenmiş.

¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹² ¹³ Bu cümlelerin karşısına Foreign Office'de birer soru işareti konmuştur.

confirmation of the country, and the fact that they had to maintain lines of communication that no other Army in Europe would ever have dreamed of risking.

But there was one way in which they could have established a decision. If we were simply holding the ring between them and said, "There you are, fight it out," they would have marched to the capital and taken it, I will not say to-morrow, but in a week. Who is preventing that? British troops, French troops, Italian troops, and the British, French and Italian navies. It is quite right that we should do so, but do not let us say that we are unduly favouring the Greeks, that we are giving them some sort of preferential treatment. There are even suggestions, not altogether, perhaps, without foundation, that the Kemalists forces are being re-equipped from Europe. The Greeks, under other conditions, would have been entitled to blockade the coast of Asia Minor. If it had been any other belligerent, they would have been entitled to search ships and to prevent arms from going to the Kemalists. They are not allowed to do that. That is what the hon. and gallant Gentleman calls preference for the Greeks. On the contrary, one of the unfairnesses of the situation is that we are driven, by the position we occupy there, into not giving a fair field and no favour to fight the issue out. Peace the Kemalists will not accept, because they say we will not give them satisfactory armistice terms; but we are not allowing the Greeks to wage the war with their full strength.

We cannot allow that sort of thing to go on indefinitely, in the hope that the Kemalists entertain that they will at last exhaust this little country, whose men have been in arms for 10 or 12 years, with one war after another, and which has not indefinite resources. That is the position. We only want to see a just peace established. Facts which have occurred during the last few months make it clear that, whatever happens, there must be adequate efficient protection of the minorities in this part of Asia Minor, as an essential part of any settlement which Great Britain can accept. By these guarantees I do not mean the word of anger (Angora). That was given in Armenia. What has it been worth? It has not saved the life of a single Armenian or Greek. The protection must be an adequate one, which will take form and effect in the very constitution of the government of this particular province.

The hon. and gallant Gentleman talked about events in the past history of Turkey, when the Greeks were not massacred and the Armenians were not massacred. Yes; that is the change which has come over the policy of Turkey in the last 30 years. There is no doubt at all, in the mind of anyone who has watched what has happened, there that a sentiment has grown up that there is only one way by which Turkey can get rid of her embarrassments with non-Mussulman populations. What does the Turk say? He says, "As long as these people are here, Europe will interfere. I shall be receiving diplomatic notes. I have been threatened constantly. I cannot always control my Pashas and my Beys. Therefore, the best

thing is to get rid of them, and to get a homogeneous population." There is no doubt that that is the policy which is governing and controlling a great many Turkish officials, and it is written in blood in the history of the last thirty years in Turkey. It is now extending to the Greeks. It is no use referring to the Turkey of a hundred years ago, or even of fifty years ago—certainly not to the Turkey of 200 or 300 years ago. There has been a complete change in their attitude. I agree that there was a Turkey which was tolerant, which, on the whole, was indulgent in its treatment of people of a different religion and race. There is a new spirit which is inspiring a good many of those who direct the policy of the country, and we must take that into account in every settlement that is made.

There is one word which was said by an hon. Friend behind in his most interesting speech, that Greece is suffering undoubtedly from the unfortunate division amongst her people, the division between the followers of Venizelos and Constantine, which is paralysing her activities. It is remarkable that she has been able to accomplish what she has. She has maintained an army, and a large army. I am told there are men who have not been home to see their families for 12 years in Greece—peasants drawn from the soil—and they are prepared still to go on for the liberation of the men of their race. They have made financial sacrifices which are almost incredible. There is that ingenious device, in order to extricate themselves from financial difficulties, by which notes are halved, one half remaining currency and the other becoming a forced loan to the country. It is a device worthy of the ingenuity of the Greek mind. By that means you enforce loans of all the currency in cash circulating throughout the country. It was accepted without a murmur by the whole of the population, and it has enabled them to keep their sons still longer in the field. A people who have done that are worthy of consideration at the hands of any country, and therefore I earnestly trust that, whatever happens, we shall see that the Christian populations of Asia Minor are adequately protected against a repetition of such horrible incidents as have disgraced the annals of that land.

Sir D. MACLEAN: There are just two minutes in which I might contribute very briefly to the very useful Debate which has taken place. Whatever may be said about my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy), he has rendered a service in inducing the speech from the Prime Minister in regard to a most difficult problem in the Near East, with which I desire to say that I find myself in substantial agreement. The great tradition of the great party to which I belong has been, I am glad to recognise, fully reflected in the speech which the Prime Minister has made this afternoon. I am glad that the Session closes this afternoon, not on the note of mere pounds, shillings and pence, but on the note of humanity and of our obligations towards the

oppressed races of the Near East under the heel of a nation which, after all the lessons which have been read to it during the past few years, has learned nothing if anything all¹⁴.

No. 138

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Earl of Balfour

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 5th, 1922, 9.15 p.m.

(Received August 6, 8.20 a.m.)

No. 335. *Telegraphic*

Following summary of position as seen here may be useful in case Foreign Minister find ^{his} time to discuss Near Eastern settlement next week.

Everyone here would welcome ² proposal for conference between Allies and belligerents. The principal difficulty is to secure agreement as to place. Minister for Foreign Affairs just informed me that Constantinople government is ready to go to Beicos. Angora government so strongly opposed to Beicos that it may be impossible to get it to come there. Failing Gulf of Ismid, Angora would like meeting attended by Foreign Minister in western capital. Neither Constantinople nor Angora government can be got to commit itself to general body of Paris proposals of March 26th. Assuming Asia Minor is to be evacuated the greatest difficulty is Thrace. Both governments are bitterly hostile to any settlement which would deprive Turkey of effective sovereignty of Adrianople and technical sovereignty of Gallipoli peninsula. Both will give trouble over other questions e.g. minorities and capitulations when it comes to preparing definite agreement for signature. Angora government will be much more intractable of the two on such questions but even Constantinople will do its utmost to evade definite commitment.

Constantinople government is still too impotent to dare to sign away anything considerable so long as Kemalist organisation remains in being. The latter is subject to great internal strain. Mustapha Kemal's personal ascendancy has undoubtedly been much shaken. Opposition in Grand Assembly and in army, which is more important, appears to be growing. There is, however, no indication as yet that these internal dissensions mean that any party at Angora is ready to weaken on the National Pact. In so far as they affect international situation they will operate indirectly through their effect on the morale of the army and perhaps on relations between Angora and Bolsheviks.

¹⁴ Bu demir azerine, 9.8.1922 günü "The Times" gazetesinde Atina'daki bir haber görünmektedir.

GREEK APPROVAL

According to a telegram from Athens M. Thonokis, the Minister for War, has decided that appropriate passages from Mr. Lloyd George's speech in the House of Commons last Friday on the Near Eastern question are to be circulated through the Greek Army in a special Order of the Day. *The Times*, 9.8.1922

If Mustapha Kemal goes under (a contingency which must now be reckoned on (2) however) though not counted upon) possible candidates for reversion of his authority are (1) Enverists, (2) old leaders of Committee of Union and Progress and (3) Sultan. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive of each other. Indeed if Enverists or old Committee of Union and Progress leaders or both assumed control they might well seek to use Sultan but they would hardly allow him to play authoritative rôle and they would probably give Allies as much trouble as Mustapha Kemal himself. From our point of view development still most to be desired is the Sultan should regain some real authority but chances of his doing so are slight so long as he is unable to obtain backing of Great Britain or Allies or to tell his people that if they trust themselves to him he can obtain what average Turk considers essential to reasonable peace i.e. elimination of Greeks both from Asia Minor and eastern Thrace.

Above shows that factors in situation on Turkish side are very uncertain but that there is little in them to encourage hope of securing acceptance and practical application of Paris proposals by diplomatic methods only. It nevertheless seems very desirable that Foreign Minister should review situation and should reduce proposal for conference of Allies and belligerents to practical form. Fact that Greeks have greatly strengthened position in Thrace, even though they have abandoned immediate threat to Constantinople, should be useful as means of pressure on Turks.

Consideration that Kemalists are hand in glove with Bolsheviks and that Angora will give French no real peace in Syria so long as it remains in present mood may weigh with French.

F.O. 371/7869/E. 7790

F.O. 424/254, pp. 97-98, No. 128

No. 139

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour, Acting Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs*

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 5th, 1922

(Received August 14)

No. 690

My Lord,

I paid a visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 3rd instant.

2. Izzet Pasha began by saying that Constantinople had recently passed through some critical moments, but that matters on the Chataldja frontier seemed now to be calm and that Turks generally were re-assured.

3. I then asked Izzet Pasha what he thought of the present situation at Angora. He replied that everything pointed to the fact that Mustafa Kemal's position had been considerably shaken. Mustafa Kemal had made two speeches, the first of which had aroused considerable criticism in as much as he had hinted that he was cast for the part of a Napoleon. He had therefore had to make a second speech watering down the statements made in the first. In the second speech he had expressed his readiness to retire into private life when the National aims had been fulfilled. The Ministers of the Angora Government were no longer chosen by Mustafa Kemal but by secret ballot of the National Assembly. Izzet Pasha considered that this was a distinct advantage as Reouf Bey, the President of the Council of Commissaries, was a man of moderate views whom he knew well.

4. I then asked Izzet Pasha what view the Constantinople Government took of Beicos as the meeting place of the proposed preliminary conference. He replied at once that he and his colleagues had no objection whatever to Beicos and he went on to discuss the building in which the conference might be held. He explained that the Constantinople Government had originally deprecated the holding of a conference at Constantinople or in its environs. As this attitude had aroused hostile criticism on the part of the Nationalists, the Constantinople Government was now quite ready to agree to any place in the neighbourhood of Constantinople. It remained as firmly opposed as ever, however, to Ismidt.

5. Izzet Pasha further volunteered the statement that he was trying by indirect means to get Reouf Bey to attend the preliminary conference as the representative of the Nationalist Government, and he considered that the Allies should suggest to the Nationalists that their representative should be invested with full powers for purposes of this conference.

I have, etc.

(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 371/7870/E. 8057

No. 140

Consul General Salow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

BEYROUT, August 10th, 1922

No. 119

Copy Cairo. Constantinople

My Lord,

I have the honour to confirm my telegram No. 31 of August 7th and to report that General Townshend left yesterday for Marseilles by the S.S. "Lotus".

I was able to see his passport which is marked "not valid for travelling to Turkey" and which, apart from a visa for Beyrouth given at Alexandretta on August 3rd, bore only a diplomatic visa for Syria given by the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs on June 14th last. This of course explains how General Townshend was able to land here and the attention shewn to him by the French authorities.

I had a short interview with General Townshend who was quite frank in his statements and left with me for a brief perusal a diary kept by him to record events prior to and during his visit to Angora.

His movement were as follows:— he reached Konia on July 23rd and the next day Mustafa Kemal came down to see him. On July 26th he was taken to Angora by motorcar and he left on July 30th. On the evening of July 31 he left Konia for Alexandretta by special train.

He appears to be obsessed with the idea that an immediate peace with the Kemalists is of vital importance to the British Empire as being the only means of averting the Moslem menace to India and another Mutiny.

He discussed with Mustafa Kemal possible terms of peace. Mustafa Kemal laid the utmost stress on the necessity of the immediate evacuation of Smyrna and Asia Minor by the Greeks, saying that if that was carried out all other points could easily be settled.

Mustafa Kemal threatened that if his terms were not accepted and peace was not made he would let loose an anti-British Moslem movement directed against our security in the East, a weapon which he had hitherto been reluctant to use.

General Townshend's suggestion as to the venue of any conference held to discuss in Asia Minor is Mersina in order that Mustafa Kemal may be able to attend in person. In this way matters would be expedited and the reference of question to Angora be avoided.

He seems to believe that a new Turkey, and that an efficient one, has come into being, and his conviction is that the Kemalist forces are in a highly efficient state. He did not visit the front, although invited to do so, but he saw some camps at Konia and Angora. According to him the Turks have now as much artillery as they had during the war. There is an arsenal at Angora which has replaced the breech-blocks removed by the Allies and has made new ones out of railway wheels and such like material. They have also re-bored the guns so as to take Russian shell. Some of these impressions may have been derived from Colonel Mougin, the French "expert" on Turkish affairs who acts as French representative at Angora who had recently been round the front.

His views and those of General Townshend as to the situation and its remedy appear to coincide. Colonel Mougin telegraphed the views of General Townshend both to Monsieur Poincaré and to General Gouraud. As was inevitable General Townshend received every attention and much flattery which does not seem to

have been altogether disagreeable. He was met by high officials with guards of honour and bands of school children in attendance, and at Adana was handed a letter on behalf of the Christians remaining in Cilicia (they must be very few) to say how well treated they are.

While here General Townshend saw both the French High Commissioner and M. de Caix, the Secretary-General, on several occasions. Their views as to the urgent necessity for making an immediate peace with the Kemalists appear to agree. While at Aleppo he twice dined with General de Lamoignon who is a firm believer in the impending Moslem menace idea. No doubt all these French officials were, on the principle of the tail-less fox, not sorry to see an English member of parliament taking the road to Angora, although against the wishes of his Government.

As regards General Townshend himself, it is only fair to state that he appeared sincerely to believe that by acting as he has done he was only performing a public duty and that at some cost to himself. He seemed to think that by his action he had lost the chance of an Indian Governorship which he would otherwise have obtained.

I have etc.

(Signed) H.E. SATOW

F.O. 371/7945/E. 8338

No. 141

War Office to Foreign Office

WAR OFFICE, 12th August, 1922

P 10249.1 (M.1.2.).

The Director of Military Operations and Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to forward for his information copies of telegrams which passed through the Constantinople telegraph office relative to General Sir Charles Townshend's visit to Angora.

F.O. 371/7945/E. 8038

ENCLOSURE IN No. 141

*Telegrams Relative to General Sir C. Townshend's
Visit to Angora*

28/7/22

To: Agency, Stamboul

From:—Anatolian Agency, Angora

The following telegrams have been exchanged between General Townshend and the London paper "Evening News".

To General Townshend, per Mustafa Kemal, Angora.

The Government has informed Parliament that you have not kept your written promise by visiting Turkey. Reply.

DIRECTOR, EVENING NEWS, LONDON

To the Chief Editor "Evening News" London.

Please apply to Captain (2 Gee) M.P. who is au fait with the question.

My statement made on May 8th commencing "As I have said" and finishing with the words "this was not my desire today", also my speech on May 30th in the House of Commons suffice to show you clearly why, in changing my opinion, I wished to see Mustafa Kemal Pasha. My visit to Mustafa Kemal Pasha was made on the insistence of several M.P's among whom figured Field Marshal Wilson and I consider it my duty in spite of the opposition from the Foreign Office to use all my influence to bring an end to this war, and this is in the interests of the British Government and Humanity.

I wish to show them that if the war does not stop immediately, the whole of Europe will be surrounded by flames.

I am convinced that, as in 1918, I shall ensure the conclusion of peace with the Turks and assist them. I hope that I shall be excused if I am capable of bringing it about.

Please give a copy of this telegram to Lady Townshend and to our party.

TOWNSHEND

Resumé. As a proof he pointed out the history and policies of Lord Palmerston, Lord Salisbury and Lord Beaconsfield, shewing that they were all friends of Turkey and that their policies were sound.

"The party to which I belong works for the strengthening and consolidation of Great Britain and it wishes to see Turkey a strong nation and auxiliary to Great Britain".

General Townshend gave the following reply on being asked what state he found Turkey in.

"During this journey I have seen a great miracle. I have seen active manifestation of the resolutions and efforts of Turkey, of which Europe has been convinced, Turkey is in a state of activity and in a feverish struggle".

General Townshend will spend to-day at Konia and go on to Alexandretta to-morrow.

To Aksham, Stamboul.

From Bilal, Angora.

30/7/22

General Towshend left Angora this morning, he says "I am very grateful for the reception which you have given me. I have seen Turkey strong and vigorous.

The object of my visit is only to do my bit towards ensuring peace, I am returning content, that can prove the reality of my desires which prompted my voyage."

To İdam, Stamboul.

30/7/22.

From Hidayet, Angora.

General Townshend left this morning at 4 o'clock for Konia. I visited him at Ralet Pasha's farm at Ketshi Uri. He told me "have loved the Turks since my youth, during the war I came to know them still better. I have undertaken this voyage with the object of taking steps to ensure peace in the Orient. I return with great hope after having talked with Mustafa Kemal and the other Ministers."

To Agency, Stamboul.

30/7/22

From Anatolian Agency, Angora.

Angora 30/7/22. General Townshend made the following statement to the Hakimiet-Millie "I am interested in the Turks and in Turkish military history. I myself have witnessed the heroism and kind and gentlemanly acts of the Turkish soldier. There is a party in England which appreciates the importance and superiority of Turkey. I am trying to assure English and Turkish interests. I find it very easy and quite possible to make an entente between Turkey and Great Britain so that both may pursue the same policy. I find that this is the way to bring about a rapprochement between the two countries".

F.O. 371/7945/E. 8038

No. 142

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 21st, 1922, 7.30 p.m.

(Received August 22, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 352. Telegraphic

Sir H. Lamb reports privately that an Italian steamer, which arrived at Smyrna from Mersina on August 17th, brought a party of Italians on their way home from Angora, where they had been delivering aeroplanes to Mustapha Kemal.

The Italians said openly that Kemal was preparing an offensive somewhere on the Eskishehir front, and thought it had a good chance of success. The idea is to drive Greeks out of their present strong positions while fine weather lasts and keep them on the run until the winter. The Italians stated that French are pouring war material up to the Kemalists through Mersina, and that they had seen many French officers serving in Kemalist army.

F.O. 371/7928/E. 8355

No. 143

General Review of the British S.I.S. Information (Exclusive of that on Communism) During the Period April-August, 1922

23.8.22

*Secret**Misc./15, Ia**Extracts*

This memorandum contains an outline, *for purposes of reference, of information on certain of the more important subjects dealt with in S.I.S. political and economic summaries (as indicated in marginal reference) during this period. Communism has been treated separately in various S.I.S. Reviews on that subject, prepared at the request of the Home Office, the last of which was No. Misc./14, dated 7.7.22.*

It is emphasised that this Memorandum deals with *S.I.S. information only*, which should, of course, be considered in conjunction with reports from official and other sources.

Since the information is, to a large extent, based on very secret documents and reports, it is desirable that the memorandum be treated as Highly Confidential.

The following is an index of the subjects dealt with *;—

(5) TURKEY	(i) The General Political Situation: Nationalist Internal and Foreign Policy, etc	22.
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(5) TURKEY

(i) *The General Political Situation: Nationalist Internal and Foreign Policy etc.*

Mustafa Kemal and the Defence of Rights Party: Reports have shown that Mustafa Kemal Pasha has continued to exercise supreme power at Angora; but the

* Rapor, Rusya, Almanya, Balkanlar, İtalya ve Yakın Doğu, Türkiye, Mısır, Orta Asya ve Afganistan bölümlerinden oluşmaktadır. Buraya yalnız Türkiye bölümü alındı. (B.N.Ş.)

Nationalist leader's position appears to have been somewhat weakened by the opposition which has grown in the Great National Assembly, and apparently also in the Army.

Mustafa Kemal's power has been exercised through the medium of his own Party, the "Association for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia". This Party has adopted an intransigent attitude in demanding that Turkish claims be recognised in the full sense of the National Pact, both as regards frontier and general independence, implying, in the latter respect, complete emancipation from any form of European control. It has afforded Mustafa Kemal whole-hearted support in maintaining that Angora represents the whole nation, and that any negotiations with the Western Powers, without the consent of Angora, are invalid.

The Party is also shown to have been working energetically for the union of Asiatic peoples, under the leadership of Turkey. "The National Pact", one of the members of the Party stated, "is merely an instrument for the attainment of the real goal. Every effort will be made by the Angora Government to achieve complete independence and dominion, and to eliminate foreign interference in Asia".

Attitude towards the Khalifat etc.: Relations between Angora and Constantinople are shown to have been strained.

As regards the attitude of Mustafa Kemal and his supporters towards the Sultan, reports have pointed to the maintenance of a vigorous anti-dynastic propaganda campaign throughout Anatolia. Striking evidence of the intentions of the Nationalists in this respect was afforded by a statement made by Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, to a secret envoy sent by the Sultan to win over to the support of the Imperial Government. Kiazim Karabekir declared that, if the Nationalist succeeded in their aims, they would abolish the Sultanate, and would refuse to recognise any members of the present dynasty. The Khalif alone would be maintained.

In this connection, it is noteworthy that a number of delegates from Moslem countries, who assembled at Angora earlier in the year, to discuss a scheme to convoke a Pan-Islamic Conference, refused to participate in such a conference on discovering that one of its objects was to discuss changes in the Khalifat.

The Nationalist attitude towards the Sublime Porte was further demonstrated by a report regarding an endeavour made early in June by M. Rufos, one of the Greek delegates to the Genoa Conference, to pave the way for an agreement with the Turks, through the medium of Ghalib Kemali Bey and the Central Government. The latter communicated M. Rufos' proposals to Angora, through Hamid Bey. Mustafa Kemal, however, refused to encourage these advances and maintained that if the Greeks wished to commence negotiations, they had first to

accept the National Pact, and afterwards to communicate directly with the Angora Government, without employing intermediaries connected in any way with the Sublime Porte.

As regards internal politics, the Defence of Rights Party has carried out Mustafa Kemal's policy in attempting to establish a National Orthodox Church, through the instrumentality of Papa Eftim and other Greek priests, and in abolishing all privileges accorded to Christians by previous Ottoman Sultans. The Party has also adopted the policy of putting every possible obstacle in the way of the proposed Commission of Enquiry of the Powers, into the alleged atrocities in Asia Minor.

The growth of the Opposition: At the same time, a number of reports have shown that the Great National Assembly is not completely united in its submission to Mustafa Kemal, and his personal supporters.

The existence of a number of opposition groups has been reported; but it has appeared that this opposition is the result rather of personal, than political antagonism. At the same time, although the opposition elements have appeared to display more moderate tendencies as regards foreign policy, they do not seem to have differed greatly with the Government in fundamentals. There has been little evidence of a real tendency to compromise on the National Pact.

It has been shown that the core of the opposition consists of a group of deputies comprising the so-called Clerical Party, who are opposed to any change in the status of the Khalifat, and the Sultanat; and with these have been associated certain personal enemies of Mustafa Kemal, a number of former Unionists, and other elements comprising the Eastern Provinces Party, the so-called communist Party, the Kume group and the Tevhid Club group.

These opposition elements appear to have gained some ground of late. Indications of the progress made towards the formation of a homogeneous opposition was afforded by the interpellation which brought about the resignation of Sirri Bey, commissioner for Economic Affairs, during April, when the latter was accused of illicit transactions in connection with the exploitation of certain gold and silver mines, and of having entered into secret arrangements with the New York Foundation Company. On other occasions, members of the opposition groups, while supporting the National Pact, have attacked the Angora Government in regard to abuses and extravagance. They have also strongly opposed to the economic penetration of Russia, and the granting of concessions to the Soviet Government in return for a loan. On the subject of the Allied peace proposals, the Government has, in particular, been accused by Selaheddin Bey of shortsightedness and irresponsibility. The Government has also been experiencing difficulties with the Opposition groups on the subject of the status of Unionists.

Information received at the end of July pointed to a further increase in the opposition to Mustafa Kemal's policy. As instances in support of this, it was shown

how at the recent election of commissioners Mustafa Kemal's intimate adherents, such as Kiazim Karabekir received a small proportion of votes compared to those obtained by individuals such as Raouf Pasha; that criticism of the Government on questions of internal policy, particularly that adopted towards the peasants had become much stronger; and that an opposition newspaper called "Sharkin Sessi" had made its appearance in Angora and had more or less openly attacked Mustafa Kemal's Party.

It was reported, at the same time, that while, on the surface, the influence of ministers such as Raouf Bey and Jellaledin Arif Bey would have a moderating effect as regards foreign policy, in reality Mustafa Kemal would probably succeed in carrying out his usual policy of discrediting or getting rid of any ministers who displayed weakness in advocating a modification of National Pact, in the event of a resumption of negotiations with the Allies.

(ii) *Internal Conditions in Anatolia*

General: Information has pointed generally to conditions in Anatolia being far from satisfactory. Discontent at the oppressive nature of the administration has been manifested by open revolts in various parts of the country, particularly in the north. These revolts have been ruthlessly dealt with by the Revolutionary Tribunals and by the employment of troops. Trouble has also been experienced in dealing with the Kurds. The morale of the army does not appear to have been wholly satisfactory. Trade and industry have been stagnant; and attempts on the part of foreigners to commence commercial enterprises in the country appear to have yielded small results, owing to the failure of the Angora Government to fulfil lavish promises of concessions, etc. which have been made. Financial conditions are shown to have been very serious; and attempts to obtain loans appear to have met with little success. Moreover, heavy exactions for military purposes have added to the financial strain, and to the general discontent. This state of affairs has been aggravated by rampant bribery and corruption.

Unrest in Northern Anatolia: In spite of official denials, it has been clear that the disturbances in Northern Anatolia have been of a serious nature. Though Greek and Enverist influences may have been contributory causes, it has been evident that general dissatisfaction with the repressive methods of the administration and of the Revolutionary Tribunals have been the main reasons for the unrest.

The situation in the north was considered to be so serious that, at the end of March, Fethi Bey, the Commissioner of the Interior, was sent to carry out a special tour of inspection in that area. Fethi Bey attributed the unrest primarily to Greek intrigues, and advocated the severest measures to restore order, including the carrying out of deportations on a larger scale. The next step was the despatch of an expedition under Major Shukri Bey, which, however, was unable to suppress the rebels completely, owing to the nature of the country. This gave rise to a

temporary policy of conciliation towards the rebels, which was followed, during May, by further repressive measures, which comprised the confiscation of goods, horses and cattle.

Towards the end of May, more serious disturbances broke out in the Kastamuni and Sparta areas, which resulted in suspension of all passenger traffic via Ineboli. These risings necessitated the employment of additional troops; but the rebels succeeded, to a large extent, in evading the punitive detachments, by seeking refuge in the mountains.

Shortly afterwards, a serious revolt broke out in the Bolu-Duzji region, under the leadership of Colonel Shevket Bey. The latter, who was one of the internees at Malta, had been sent in command of a Nationalist force, to suppress disturbances connected with those at Kastomuni. He, however, neglected this order, and placed himself at the head of the rebels. He was also joined by a number of other rebel bands and by Kemalist deserters.

The Kurds: The situation as regards the Kurds appears to have been quiet of late. Reports have shown, however, that this has not been due to the Kurds having decided to co-operate loyally with the Nationalists, although certain of the influential chiefs have been won over by a promise of autonomy. The present lull is rather attributed to the fact that the situation in the West has enable the Angora Government to give Jevad Pasha more extensive means to suppress revolts; to the Kurds being cowed by other measures, such as the seizure of hostages, and to the inability of the dissaffected tribes to obtain outside support for the continuation of their activities.

The Morale of Kemalist Troops: Evidence was afforded of the dissatisfaction existing among certain elements in the army, by an incident which took place at Sivri Hissar, on 17th April, during an extensive tour of inspection undertaken by Mustafa Kemal, to encourage the troops and strengthen their morale. At that place, he was unexpectedly confronted with a deputation of non-commissioned officers, who after explaining that they had been away from their homes for years and been deprived of everything, wished to know what the outcome of the situation was to be. They had been given to understand, they stated, that they had been fighting in order to strengthen the position of the Khalif; and they wished to be informed as to the significance of statements which had been circulating "against the glorious Khalif without fear in God and without respect for the Prophet". "If, your highness", they stated, "is unable to prevent this, leave the matter to us and we will do what is necessary". Mustafa Kemal, on subsequently making enquiries, was informed that the majority of the soldiers were imbued with similar sentiments, and that it was impossible to punish them for fear of producing a serious reaction.

Reports have also been received regarding the defection of certain units on the Eastern front. Cases have also occurred, as is shown above, of desertions to the rebels in Northern Anatolia.

Financial Distress: During April, information pointed to the Angora Government being in very serious financial difficulties, which were aggravated by the failure of various attempts to secure external assistance. At that time, the Government decided to attempt to remedy the situation by adopting measures such as the suspension of pensions to retired officers and to the wives and children of officers, and the reduction of allowances made to officers on account of the increase in the cost of living. The budget of 1921 showed a deficit of at least £Tqs 8,000,000. It appeared that the deficit for 1922 would be even greater.

Information received at the end of July did not point to any improvement in the financial situation. For example, great difficulty has been experienced in paying contractors, and a case has been reported of a contractor having been paid by the expedient of the Ineboli customs having been credited to him daily until the sum due was met. Delays and difficulties in obtaining payment resulted, in fact, in the reduction of commercial activities, not only on the part of regular Government contractors, but also on the part of merchants in Constantinople, who have been furnishing goods to Anatolian firms.

As regards attempts to obtain foreign loans, it was reported during April that negotiations were in progress for the conclusion of a loan of 1,500,000 gold roubles from the Ukrainian Government, but these negotiations apparently did not materialise owing to excessive Ukrainian demands for concessions for the exploitation of mines in Eastern Anatolia.

Reports have also been received regarding attempts made by the Nationalists to obtain a loan from the French, but the latest information is to the effect that nothing has materialised in this direction.

The Nationalists are also shown to have been unsuccessful in their endeavours to obtain American financial assistance. A proposal put forward some months ago by a Special Commission of the Great National Assembly for the despatch of a delegation to the U.S.A. to negotiate a loan at 5% and 6% interest on the security of petrol mines on the Baghdad railway route apparently did not materialise.

During June, it was reported that the Grand Rabbi of Turkey, Haim Naum, had been conducting a propaganda campaign in the U.S.A., in favour of a loan to the Turkish Nationalists. The Rabbi, however, had to inform the Angora Government that his schemes had been upset by the decision of the American Government to participate in the Commission of Enquiry into the treatment of minorities in Asia Minor. His only advice was that the Nationalists should first come to an agreement with the Powers, when the conditions for the obtaining of a loan in the U.S.A. would become more favourable.

(iii) *The Nationalists and the Unionists*

General: Attitude of Mustafa Kemal: Reports have pointed to a recrudescence of Unionist activities in Anatolia and the Near East. The information has indicated, that no hard and fast distinction can be made between the two Turkish parties, the differences between them being of a personal nature, rather than of principle. It has been shown how practically all the political leaders and prominent officials in Anatolia were closely connected with the C.U.P. up to the time of the Armistice, and it has apparently been chiefly those individuals who were very intimately and closely connected with Enver Pasha, who have denied access to Anatolia.

The recrudescence of Enverist activities, has evidently been viewed with some apprehension by Mustafa Kemal. It was reported, during May, that Nationalist leader had sent Edhem Hidayet Bey, director of the Information Bureau of the Angora Government, to Constantinople, in order to carry out careful enquiries regarding the activities of the Enverists in the capital. Mustafa Kemal, moreover, in the course of his visit to Ada Pazar, blamed Velid Bey, the editor of the "Tasfiri Efkar", for allowing Unionist Propaganda to be spread in his journal, and referred indignantly to the manner in which the Unionists were gaining ground in Anatolia. In the event, Mustafa Kemal said, of the Great National Assembly becoming Unionist, it would have to be dissolved. Mustafa Kemal also caused a declaration to be published in the "Hakimiyet-i-Millie" and the "Yeni Gun", conveying a general warning against the activities of these Unionists, who were stigmatised as perpetrators of political errors, which had led the country to disaster.

Mustafa Kemal also ordered that energetic steps should be taken to suppress the Enverist organisation in Trebizond, and Colonel Sami Sabit Bey was sent to that place for this purpose. The measures applied by the latter, however, do not appear to have been very successful. In this connection, the murder of Yahya Reis, the doyen of the Trebizond boatmen, and a supporter of the Enverist cause, is attributed to the Turkish Nationalists. Mustafa Kemal has also endeavoured, but without success, to prevent the incursion into the Eastern Provinces of the Caucasian Turks who were fleeing from the famine. He suspected that this incursion was specially arranged by the Enverist party.

Enverist Activities: Enverist intrigues in Anatolia appear to have been based primarily on the Caucasus, though, to a lesser extent, they have also been engineered by organisation in Constantinople, such as the Turanian Artisan's Association. In the Caucasus the Nationalists appear to have had particular cause to complain of the activities of Unionist agents in Daghestan and Azerbaijan. These agents, apparently working through Trebizond, are shown to have endeavouring to secure defection of Turkish Nationalist troops in the Eastern Provinces, particularly in the Erzerum area. Cases have been reported of officers and men of Kiazim Karabekir's army having deserted to join the Enverists in the Caucasus.

Unionist Activities in Constantinople: During April, a number of influential Unionists held meetings in the vicinity of Constantinople. These meetings were convened by Midhat Shukri, the former general secretary of the C.U.P., and were attended, among others, by Kara Kemal Bey, the former Food Controller of the Unionist Government, who had entered the service of the Turkish Nationalists. As the result of these meetings Midhat Shukri proceeded to Angora, in order to submit proposals to Mustafa Kemal, regarding the resuscitation of the old C.U.P. organisation under Kemalist auspices.

Midhat Shukri returned to Constantinople from Angora towards the end of May, having been unsuccessful in his mission to the latter place, and having failed to obtain concessions from Mustafa Kemal. The latter sent a delegation to attend the meeting of these Unionists, which was held at Ada Pazar at the end of May. This delegate stated that only those Unionists who were favourably regarded by the Angora Government would be allowed to work in Anatolia. The others would first have to demonstrate their good faith, by bringing pressure to bear on Enver Pasha, to abstain from anti-Russian activities in Turkestan. The Unionist representatives, after deliberations, came to the conclusion that they would be unable to exercise influence over Enver, and that their only course was to confine their activities to Constantinople itself. They thereupon elaborated a scheme for carrying out propaganda in the capital, and for maintaining contact with sympathisers in Anatolia and Europe, with a view to preparing for eventualities. Organisation on these lines was entrusted to Kara Kemal and Kutchuk Talaat.

Unionists at Angora: Report received during June described the re-election of Yunus Nadi Bey and Mahmut Essad, both prominent members of the C.U.P., as President and Vice-President, respectively of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Great National Assembly. It is noteworthy that these individuals insisted that no peace incompatible with the terms of the National Pact could be accepted by the Angora Government. To quote other instances of Unionists being given appointments in Anatolia, Haji Adil Bey was appointed, during June, General Superintendent of Revenue in the Adana area, and Kemaleddin Bey, deputy for Mersina, was appointed in a similar capacity at that place. The recent Cabinet changes afforded further evidence of this.

(iv) *Turkish Measures with regard to the Commission of Enquiry into the Alleged Atrocities*

General: Serious consideration was given to Dr. Yowell's report at a secret session of the Great National Assembly on the 18th May. At this session a motion was advanced by certain deputies of the Eastern Provinces, demanding that the Government should give a categorical denial to the accusations of massacres and deportations in the Pontus. These deputies, while repudiating the assertions which had been made, admitted that perhaps the punishment of certain political criminals might have given rise to the story of massacres.

In the course of the same discussion, Fethi Bey admitted that certain measures had been taken against Greeks and Armenians, but justified such action by the necessity of safeguarding the independence of the coastal area.

Measures adopted at Angora: In the meanwhile it transpired that on the 8th May a secret session of the Great National Assembly was held, under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal, at which a number of resolutions were adopted, regarding measures to be taken in the event of the Commission of Enquiry entering Anatolia. These measures, which were adopted with the object of proving that the Government had been justified in the action it had taken in the Pontus, were to comprise the preparation of official reports showing that the Greeks had planned a hostile landing on the Trebizond-Sinope sea board; the collection of documentary and other evidence regarding Greek secret revolutionary organisation in the Pontus region; the preparation of data regarding the assassination of Turkish officers by Greek hands and acts of sabotage by those hands; and by the compilation of a report regarding the rights of Governments to deport, intern, etc., subjects suspected or proved to be in contact with the enemy.

It was also decided that the Commission should be allowed to come into contact with minority element in Anatolia, but that it should not be permitted to make an enquiry in the Pontus region.

Measures adopted at Constantinople: Subsequent information was also received from Constantinople, to the effect that the Minister of the Interior had been arranging with Ali Sami Bey, A.D.C. to the Sultan, for the preparation by the latter of evidence against the Greeks. The Sultan's A.D.C. was to employ certain agents for the collecting of information, and funds for this purpose were to be provided by the Ministry for the Interior. Anti-Greek evidence of a political, administrative, financial and military nature was to be collected; and the population was to be encouraged by propaganda and other measures to make complaints against Greek treatment. Such complaints were to be brought forward during the course of the Commission of Enquiry.

(v) *Turco-Russian Relations*

General: Reports have pointed to a steady increase of Soviet influence in Angora, which has been manifested in various directions. This can be largely ascribed to the successful diplomacy of the Soviet representative Aralov. There appears to be no doubt, however, that the friendship of the Turkish Nationalists with Moscow has been a matter of expediency, and has not been of a sincere nature. Mutual mistrust has existed between the two parties as regards the Enverists and other questions; and the measure of the good faith of the Soviets was demonstrated by a report from an excellent source, during May, regarding the existence of a Russian plan for bringing about an internal revolutionary movement in the Eastern provinces, in the event of peace being signed between the

Turkish Nationalists and the Western Powers. It was intended that the risings should result in the establishment of a Soviet republic, which would be ostensibly independent, but which would, in reality, be under the aegis of Moscow.

The influence of the Russians was strikingly demonstrated by the attitude of Kiazim Karabekir, when during the spring he was approached by Mahmud Sadik Bey, with a confidential communication from Izzet Pasha, on behalf of the Sultan. To quote Mahmud Said's (sic) own evidence, when he handed Kiazim Karabekir this communication, the latter turned very pale and asked with visible anxiety, "Have the Russians seen this letter? My God. What shall I do now? What a misfortune if this letter fell into the hands of the Russians. Everything would be lost". Kiazim Karabekir, at the same time informed Mahmud Sadik that Chicherin had sent an intimation to the Angora Government to the effect that an agreement between the latter and Constantinople would be regarded by the Soviet Government in the light of an agreement with the Western Powers, and would result in the immediate cessation of friendly relations between Moscow and Angora.

The most recent reports, however, have indicated that the relations between the two countries have become somewhat less cordial. The reception of the French Colonel Mougin at Angora appears to have been one of the causes of this tendency, which has been manifested by difficulties regarding the forwarding of supplies from Moscow to Anatolia. It is noteworthy, however, that Colonel Mougin, in his first report to the French High Commissioner at Constantinople, drew attention to the fact that the Angora Government was being drawn with increasing rapidity into the orbit of Russian influence, and expressed the opinion that there was little hope of arresting the development of Kemalist policy in that direction.

Treaty Negotiations: Early in the year information was received to the effect that Aralov had been negotiating with the Turkish Nationalists for an extension of the existing treaty. Litvinoff, in a report from Genoa, to Moscow, dated 17th April, spoke of a "trump card", which the Bolsheviki expected to play later on, and which, from a reference to the possibility of the Soviet's supporters being "increased by one new and very real ally", evidently implied relations with Angora.

The next development was the signing at Angora, on the 22nd April, by Yusuf Kemal and Aralov, of an offensive and defensive interim military agreement, between the Nationalists and the Russians, which contained a special clause regarding action to be taken against Rumania, in the event of that country affording assistance to the Greeks.

Further information has been received to the effect that negotiations have since been in progress at Moscow for the conclusion of a treaty of a more comprehensive nature than the existing one of March 1921, to which Persia, Afghanistan and the Moslem states under Russian influence are apparently to

become parties. These negotiations were initiated by Ali Fuad Pasha, on the latter's recall they have been continued by Riza Nuri (sic) Bey. The latter, in a despatch sent to Angora during July, held out favourable prospects regarding these treaty negotiations, but thought that difficulties might arise over questions regarding supplies from Russia. In this connection, Colonel Mougin, in his first report from Angora to Constantinople, foreshadowed that the Riza Nuri Mission to Moscow was only preliminary to the despatch of a much larger mission, which would include military, diplomatic and commercial representatives.

There have been indications that Angora might become a party to the Russo-German Treaty of Rapallo; but information on this subject has become somewhat indefinite.

Aralov's Influence. Apart from his activities in connection with treaty negotiations, Aralov appears to exercise considerable influence in other directions, particularly in the sphere of Nationalist foreign policy. He has even been referred to as "the political and military adviser of the Angora Government".

At a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Angora Government, which was held toward the end of April, Yusuf Kemal stated that the Government's reply to the Allied armistice proposals had been shown to Aralov before transmission. Yusuf Kemal endeavoured to excuse this action, by explaining that it was simply a "matter of friendly co-operation", and that it afforded no indication of Russian control of the policy of the Great National Assembly.

During May corroborative information was received from several sources that Aralov, acting on instructions from Chicherin, had been bringing pressure to bear on the Nationalist leaders to procrastinate on all questions regarding peace and armistice negotiation, relations with the Sublime Porte, and foreign affairs generally, in order that their attitude might comply with the developments of the Genoa Conference.

About the same time, Aralov accompanied Mustafa Kemal on a tour of inspection of the front, and gave the latter various assurance of Soviet friendship. Aralov informed Mustafa Kemal that the Russian point of view did not admit of the right of the Allies to dispose of Constantinople. Further, that he was authorised to declare that the Soviet Government would abandon its rights to Constantinople, to the Angora Government, which was the legal Government of Turkey. The Turkish Nationalists, Aralov also stated, could count on the friendship and support of the Soviet Government, and need not fear unfavourable developments from the Russo-German Treaty.

Simultaneously with the receipt of this information, it was reported that the Angora Government had received substantial sums of money from the Soviet Government, and that Mustafa Kemal was acting in complete agreement with Aralov.

The Turkish Nationalists and the Bolsheviks at Genoa: It was ascertained, early in May, that the Soviet Delegation at Genoa had notified Jelaeddin Arif Bey that information had been received from Moscow to the effect that certain members of the Angora Government were contemplating arriving at an agreement with Great Britain regarding the status of the Straits. The Nationalist representative was requested to notify his Government that the Soviet Government was strongly opposed to any such arrangement, which they considered to be contrary to their agreement with Angora, and which would be opposed to the interests of both Turkey and Russia. Further that should the Angora Government negotiate such an agreement, or arrive at any decision on the subject of the Straits, without the previous approval of Moscow, the Soviet Government would not only refuse financial assistance to Turkey, but would assume a definitely hostile attitude towards that country.

Before Jelaeddin Arif left Genoa for Paris, on the 13th May, he received a communication from Chicherin stating that the Soviet Government was firmly decided to continue the support of Turkish Nationalist claims and interests. Chicherin also requested Jelaeddin Arif to put out feelers in Paris as to the possibility of an agreement between the French and the Bolsheviks, but the Nationalists representative found that any attempts in this direction would be foredoomed to failure, and would not proceed with the matter.

(vi) *The Nationalists and the French.*

General: It has appeared from the reports received during the period under review that the French have been losing some ground in Anatolia, and that the hopes cherished at the time of the conclusion of the Franklin Bouillon Agreement have not been realised to the extent anticipated.

Although, as is shown above, the reception of Colonel Mougin at Angora had a somewhat detrimental effect on the relations between the Nationalists and the Soviets, the French representative's first report to Constantinople showed that he himself was by no means satisfied with the existing state of affairs, and that he had doubts as to whether it would be possible to make headway against the growing Russian influence.

On the other hand, information obtained from the Kemalist Committee in Constantinople showed that the Angora Government regarded Colonel Mougin as the official representative of the French Government. In addition to his Mission being concerned with the settlement of outstanding question connected with the Agreement of October 1921, one of its main tasks was the neutralising of Russian influence. There is little to show that in the latter respect much success has been achieved.

Moreover, statements made by the Comte de Chambrun at the end of April to a prominent Turkish politician showed that the French were disappointed at

the impossible attitude which the Nationalists were adopting over the peace proposals. The French representative pointed out that Yusuf Kemal had sought to use France as an intermediary for peace, but that the unexpectedly intransigent attitude which the Nationalists were adopting was placing the French Government in an awkward position.

At the same time, evidence has been received regarding the close relations which have existed between General Pellé and Hamid Bey at Constantinople. During May, considerable correspondence was exchanged between the two on the subject of the views of the Angora Government concerning the Russo-German Treaty. The French Government had instructed General Pellé to ascertain what would be the personal attitude of the Angora Government in the event of the French occupation of further German territory in connection with reparations. General Pellé, however, was unable to elicit either from Hamid Bey or from the Angora Government any precise reply to his enquiries.

The Question of the Syrian Frontier: Reports received during June showed that negotiations at Beirut between General Gouraud and Muhieddin Pasha on this subject did not proceed smoothly. The Nationalist representative endeavoured to persuade General Gouraud to agree to the frontier being moved to the South, so as to include Alexandrette. General Gouraud rejected this proposal and complained of the incursion of Syrian bands from Turkish territory, which was apparently being carried out with the connivance of the Nationalists. He also protested against the establishment of a Bolshevik Consulate at Mersina.

Further, in a French secret report on the situation in Syria and Cilicia for the period, compiled during May, it was pointed out that the Nationalists were carrying out propaganda to the effect that the French might be willing to cede the Aleppo and Alexandretta districts. This propaganda, it was pointed out, was against the spirit of the Franco-Kemalist Agreement.

Information obtained about the same time, from the French High Commission at Constantinople, showed that dissatisfaction was felt in that quarter on account of the dues imposed by the Turks upon the Syrian frontier, which were tending to kill the commerce of Alexandretta.

Jelalledin Arif's Activities in Paris: Prior to leaving Genoa for Paris on the 13th May, Jelalledin Arif had cordial interviews with M. Barthou. It was ascertained that the Nationalist representative's visit to Paris was carried out with the object of discussing with the French the subject of the proposed Commission of Enquiry into Turkish atrocities, of discussing the question of the Turco-Syrian frontier, and of obtaining further assurances of French support of Turkish claims regarding peace terms. On his return to Italy, Jelalledin Arif expressed himself as satisfied with the negotiations on these points. He, however, as stated before, did not find conditions propitious for carrying out another object of his mission, i.e., the preparation of a common ground of agreement between the French and the Bolsheviks.

A Possible Change in French Policy: There have been indications of late, though of an indefinite nature, that the French might be disposed to modify their very friendly attitude towards the Turkish Nationalists. It was reported at the beginning of August, by a Turkish Nationalist source in Paris, that M. Poincaré had conveyed an intimation to Angora that if the Nationalists persisted in causing trouble in Syria, and in intriguing with France's enemies, the French Government would be obliged radically to change its policy. This, however, appears to require confirmation, and is being made the subject of further enquiries.

vii) *Relations with Italy*

The information received on this subject falls under the following main headings:

The question of Turkish participation at the Genoa Conference: It was shown how, at the beginning of April, the Nationalist representative in Rome addressed a note to the Italian Government, asking that the Angora Government might be represented at the Conference. At first this note was not acknowledged, and the Nationalist representative had to send a reminder. The Italian Foreign Office eventually replied that, although every effort had been made to do so, it was impossible to overcome British resistance to Turkish representation at Genoa. Jellaledin Arif Bey was, however, advised to go to Genoa unofficially.

Unofficial Activities in Anatolia: It was ascertained, during May, that the Italian Government contemplated sending a party of Italian deputies on an unofficial mission to Anatolia. In this connection, the Italians submitted to Angora, through Jellaledin Arif, conditions for their political support, which comprised concessions for the construction of a railway through the Meander Valley, for the exploitation of the Heraklea coal field, and for the exploitation of oil in the Eastern Provinces. Of these, the Nationalists were only disposed to agree to the railway and coal concessions. As regards the oil concession, the Italians were reported to have approached the Rome representative of the Standard Oil Company, with a view to the participation of Italian capital in any concession that the Americans might secure.

The Italians and the Central Government: Reports on this subject, which contained confirmatory evidence from several independent and well-placed sources, showed that the convention concluded between the Italian Government and the Sublime Porte derived added significance from the fact that the negotiations had been conducted with the secret connivance of the Angora Government, with a view to ensuring Italian support of the claims of the Turkish Nationalists.

The Italians first approached the Constantinople Government, through the medium of Tewfik Pasha during the London Conference. Owing to the failure of the Italians to give guarantees for the evacuation of Smyrna by the Greeks, these negotiations were without result; but they were continued by the Marquis Garroni in Constantinople, and subsequently in Paris, during İzzet Pasha's stay there.

The Informants reported that the convention was signed in Constantinople by agreement with the Angora Government, with a view, as far as possible, to disarming British criticism. The Angora Government regarded the agreement as valid, and intimated that it would be officially accepted "as soon as Turkish affairs were settled". The protest transmitted to the Italian Government through the Nationalists was of a purely formal nature, it having been agreed by both parties that it should be sent. The convention was also reported to have contained secret clauses to the effect that the Italian Government, in return for concessions, would support the claims of the Turkish Nationalists against those of the Greeks, at any future conference.

In this connection, it was also reported that, in accordance with the terms of the convention, a financial conference was held at Milan on the 18th April, at which Jellaleddin Arif was present. Proposals regarding the formation of an Italian Consortium for the development of Anatolia were submitted and were forwarded to Angora for consideration.

Relation between Signor Schanzer and Jellaleddin Arif Bey. According to information obtained from Nationalist circles in Rome, and to a great extent from Jellaleddin Arif himself, the latter was in close touch with Signor Schanzer, prior to the Italian Foreign Minister's first visit to London. Jellaleddin Arif drew up aide-memoires for Signor Schanzer's use, setting forth the Turkish peace claims and the terms for the solution of the Dardanelles question. According to that he would support the policy of France, and not that of Great Britain, in Eastern matters. Jellaleddin Arif stated subsequently that Signor Schanzer's visit to London had resulted in no modification in Turco-Italian relations. The Italian Foreign Minister had promised the Nationalist representative that definite evidence would be forthcoming of Italy's friendly attitude towards the Turks. Jellaleddin Arif was also convinced that the recent Italian political crisis would not in any way alter Italy's friendly attitude towards the Angora Government.

(viii) *The Nationalists and the Vatican*

It was reported that, prior to the death of the late Pope, the Vatican was unofficially approached by a prominent Moslem resident of Rome, on the subject of the Greek orthodox Church in Anatolia. The matter, however, did not arouse much enthusiasm in Vatican circles, and was accordingly dropped. During June, however, it was reported that Jellaleddin Arif Bey, believing conditions under the present Pope to be more favourable for discussions on this subject, proposed shortly to resume the previous unofficial conversations. To this end he had sounded the Vatican through Signor Petacci.

The latest information has indicated that Jellaleddin Arif Bey is confining his efforts to paving the way for negotiations, and that he has also been in touch with Cardinal Vico and Monsignor Vercesi. He considered that, before definite

progress could be achieved, it would first be necessary to undermine the strong British influence at the Vatican, and that exercised by the Greek representative, Monsignor Papadopoulos.

Later information, received during August, was to the effect that Jellaleddin Arif had informed the Vatican that the Angora Government was willing to place at the disposal of the Pope its influence among Moslems in Palestine. At the time of reporting, discussions were taking place on this subject, but apparently nothing had actually materialised.

ix: American Commercial Activities in Anatolia

General: Information received during the period under review, while indicating that American commercial interests, official and otherwise, have been active in endeavouring to further their enterprises in Anatolia, shows that the results have not been commensurate with the efforts made. This appears to have been primarily due to the insistence of the Angora Government upon conditions involving the abolition of the necessary guarantees for the security of foreign property. The obstructive influence of the Russian Bolsheviks appears also to have been a contributory cause.

Activities of the Standard Oil Company and other Firms: It has been shown how, subsequent to the failure of negotiations initiated at Angora in 1921 by Lieutenant Dunn on behalf of Admiral Bristol, for obtaining concessions from the Nationalists in return for credits, independent negotiations were carried on by the General Export Company, the Guarantee Trust Company, the American Foreign Trade Corporation, and the Standard Oil Company. Misfortune befell the activities of the first three, but the Standard Oil Company maintained its position. That Company worked strenuously for the obtaining of an oil monopoly, but the Angora Government refused to grant more than regional concessions. The Standard Oil Company refused to sanction a loan on such conditions; and after a pause fresh negotiations were more recently initiated through the medium of Mr. Foster. Subsequently, parallel negotiations were carried on by Mr. Macdowell on behalf of the Foundation Company of New York, with a view to securing railway concessions through the area coveted by the Standard Oil Company. It appeared that, in reality the two groups were co-operating with a view to securing the practical monopoly of oil and railway concessions in the richest part of Anatolia.

Information received during April pointed to the definite failure of the negotiations conducted at Angora on behalf of the Standard Oil and Foundation Companies. As a consequence, indirect methods were attempted and the French Government were approached by Mr. Vanderlip with a proposal that the American groups should co-operate with the French, in securing the concessions in question. It was proposed in return that measures should be taken which would ameliorate the financial position of France with regard to the U.S.A.

As the result of these proposals, M. Oblet and Grandjean, of the Omnium Oil Company and the French Department of Commerce, respectively, proceeded, towards the end of April, to Anatolia. These individuals made a tour of inspection in the Eastern Provinces, accompanied by representatives of the Angora Government; but, according to the latest reports, their efforts did not materialise. Russian influence again appeared to be the cause.

Early in July, however, it was reported that Mr. Joblin, of the Standard Oil Company, had come to an agreement with the Angora Government, whereby the Standard Oil Company, in return for a payment of £Tqs 5,000,000 would receive a concession for the erection of oil tanks throughout Anatolia.

Mention was also made of the return during June, of Mr. Chester, to Constantinople. This individual, who was formerly local representative of the Shipping Department of the U.S.A., was also apparently going to Angora on behalf of the Standard Oil Company. He was reported to be desirous of obtaining the support of the Angora Government for the railway and mining scheme which had been drawn up by his father in 1907.

F.O. 371/7916/E. 13321

No. 144

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch

28.8.1922

Extract

No. 866

A PROPOSED ISLAMIC CONGRESS.

According to information obtained from a member of the Kemalist Committee in Constantinople, plans for the convocation of an Islamic Congress have been discussed of late by a Committee at Angora consisting of:—

Mustafa Kemal,
Abdullah Azmi, Commissioner for Religious Affairs of the Angora Government,

Sheikh Senussi,
Ajemi Saadun Pasha,
Jevad Pasha, C-in-C. Diarbekir,
Fevzi Pasha,
Sultan Ahmed Khan, Afghan Ambassador,
Mumtaz ul Dowle, Persian Envoy,
Ibrahim Abiloff, Azerbaijan Envoy.

There were also present at the meetings of this Committee numerous deputies and journalists, including the editor of an Islamic review, published in Angora,

entitled the "Sirat i Mustakim". The Sheikh Senussi, Ajemi Pasha and Jevad Pasha did not attend the meetings of the Committee in person as they were not in Angora, but expressed their opinions by correspondence.

Details of the proceedings of this Committee are not at present available, but it would appear that at the outset considerable differences arose concerning the place at which the proposed Islamic Congress should be held. The Afghan Envoy wished it to be held at Kabul, the Persian Envoy insisted upon its being held at Teheran, whilst Mustafa Kemal insisted, with equal vehemence, upon its being held in Angora, or at least in some city in Anatolia. As a result of these and other differences, it was decided that the question should be postponed for the time being.

This decision was probably brought about by the desire of the Angora Government to do nothing at present to arouse suspicion and resentment in Europe.

Note by S.L.S. — It was also recently reported that, at the instance of Araloff, the question of the convocation of an Asiatic Congress was also discussed at Angora, but, owing to the disturbed condition of Central Asia, it appears that this project has been definitely postponed.

F.O. 371/7889

No. 145

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 29th August 1922

(Received September 4.)

No. 770.

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit herewith what purports to be the translation of the principal portion of a speech delivered by Mustafa Kemal Pasha in the Angora Grand National Assembly on August 19. It was given to a member of my staff by an American journalist, who is usually well-informed and who has, I understand, telegraphed a summary of it to the Chicago News.

2. If this speech is genuine, the language used by Mustafa Kemal is of no little interest. Notwithstanding the defiant tone of the references to Constantinople and the general hostility displayed towards Great Britain the concluding passages seem to indicate a desire for a rapprochement with His Majesty's Government.

3. I feel, however, considerable doubt as to the genuineness of the speech as no reference to it is made in any telegram sent from Angora through ordinary channels on or just after August 19. It is true that certain telegrams from Angora about that time stated that Mustafa Kemal was expected to make an important political pronouncement early last week, but the enclosed translation reached me too soon to be a report of the speech foreshadowed in those telegrams.

4. The enclosed document should in my opinion be treated with reserve pending the receipt of further information from Angora as to whether Mustafa Kemal did address the Grand National Assembly on August 19, or whether, as foreshadowed in the telegrams referred to in the preceding paragraph, he has made a public statement subsequently to that date e.g. at a reception which he is reported to have held on August 21, or at a banquet given by Ali Fuad Pasha in honour of the foreign representatives at Angora on August 23. The latter is the sort of occasion on which Mustafa Kemal might easily make a statement on the general international situation, but I have as yet no detailed information as to what passed at the banquet.

I have etc.

(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 371/7872/E. 8805

ENCLOSURE IN No. 145

*Moustafa Kemal's Speech**

Translation.

After having answered the deputies in regard to the interior situation and the powers of the Tribunals of Independence, Moustafa Kemal passed to the exterior political situation and declared:

Our relations with the Russians are very badly understood and badly looked upon in foreign countries. However, it is our political situation and the community of our interests that makes us Allies. A Russia, having no views upon our country and which has broken with its former traditions is certainly our friend, and circumstances have consolidated this friendship by a treaty of alliance.

We also owe to Russian efforts a great part of our good relations with Oriental countries.

The general situation in Europe proves once more the urgent necessity of establishing peace in this part of the Orient in which all the states of Europe are

* Bu sözleşcin düzenleyici olduğu anlaşılıyor. Atatürk, 19 Ağustos 1922 günü Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi açık veya kapalı celselerinde bulunmamış ve konuşmamıştı. Büyük Taarruza başlatmak üzere gizlice cepheye gitmiş bulunuyordu. Ama düşman tarafı şaşkınlık ve taarruz hazırlığını gizli tutmak amacıyla Başkumandan Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Ankara'da bulunduğu haberleri yayılmıştı. 20 Ağustos tarihli *Halkın İhtiyar Gazetesi* Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın 21 Ağustos günü Çankaya'da çay partisi vereceği haberi yaymıştı. Bu haber İstanbul'da İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğine de ulaşmıştı. Yine 23 Ağustos günü Ali Fuad Paşa'nın Ankara'da vereceği davette Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın da bulunacağı haberi yayılmıştı. Bu şaşkınlara haberlere bir de Mustafa Kemal'in 19 Ağustos günü T.P.M.M.'de bir konuşma yaptığı haberi eklenmiş ve bu düzenleyici konuşma memi İngilizlere ulaşmıştı. B.N.Ş.

vitaly interested. To all offers of peace we have answered with pacifistic ideas so that peace might be established. We must however add that the many efforts from different sides for the establishment of peace have been sacrificed to ambitions and the poor Orientals have to suffer. English policy which accuses us of having delayed peace, has for a long time done nothing but adjourn the necessary meeting and openly encourage one party against the other.

It must not be forgotten that the peace Conference which is to be convoked can only be the result of the military situation and that is why the Turkish army is the only factor to decide about any part of Turkish territory being given over to Greece.

The eternal story of massacres is again becoming the weapon of our adversaries. Mr. Lloyd George has no doubt forgotten the reports of the Allied Investigation Commission handed in after the Smyrna occupation. All the documents of the Greek atrocities which have been supplied to the Foreign Office have been overlooked in Lloyd George's speech and the Turks are accused of massacres without any proofs. Confronted by such religious fanaticism we must not forget that the Mussulmans have sacrificed themselves greatly on behalf of the Allied victory.

We cannot be threatened with the occupation of Stamboul by the Greeks. Constantinople for us is under foreign occupation. Since March 15, 1920, we regard Constantinople as a city to be delivered. When it is a question of the violation of our integrity it makes no difference whether our cities are occupied by Greeks, British or any other foreign State.

Our "National Pact" speaks of Stamboul as well as of Smyrna and Thrace. But a similar occupation will provoke besides the international difficulties, a feeling of great irritation among the Nationalists and the responsibility will be in no way ours.

The Greek autonomy in Anatolia is of no legal or political importance. This attempt has been made with the aim of calling the Mussulmans under arms. In this case who will prevent the sending of Greeks in Asia Minor to the front?

These events prove once more that in the present fight Greece holds a secondary part. We, however, have confidence in the righteousness of our cause and we desire that the importance of our place in the Orient should be well understood.

We understand clearly the reasons of the British policy. But I firmly declare that in the question of an occupation of foreign mandate—Greece or another power makes entirely no difference.

It is not a question of this or that power—we do not desire that any foreign State without exception should mix into our affairs and independence. Complete integrity and independence! We are ready to accept any suggestions or offers of

peace once this basis is thoroughly established. We hope that the new Conference will commence its activity after largely taking cognizance of this vital Turkish formula. We are optimistic regarding the new efforts for peace. This optimism on our part is well justified by the cordial efforts of several European statesmen. The French policy has given proofs of its clear-sight by the signature of the Treaty of Angora. Italy also by its recent offer has shown a desire for peace in the Orient.

But wrongly understood interests have caused us in the Orient losses as important as those they have caused to England. That is why any attempt at coming together can only be received with good-will. This point will be very clearly announced in our answer to the Russian Government. We have never thought of contesting the interests of the Allies in the Orient. We know well that we not only cannot exploit our riches, but we are incapable. Consequently we have to receive with good-will similar efforts of existing after peace without foreign aid. Therefore we have asked in the interests of the Allies to create several zones of activity in Asia Minor.

We are ready to discuss any kind of economic concessions without however leaving room for differences and disputes between the Powers and ourselves.

That they should exploit our riches for their profit only and treat us as a herd of cattle under their direction—is what we will never accept.

We will accept no economic oppression as this is more dangerous for the life and happiness of our Nation than political oppression. Work and interests in common—that is our formula for the economic activity of foreigners in our country. It is satisfactory that up to the present foreign demands have always taken this essential point into consideration.

Regarding the question of whether we will accept private individuals or representatives of English societies in Anatolia it is certain that as long as the English will not accept an official representative of Anatolia in London, this question will remain open.

F.O. 371/7872/E. 8805

No. 146

Consul Palmer (Damascus) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

DAMASCUS, August 29th, 1922

(Received September 20)

No. 251/1849.

Secret

My Lord,

I have the honour to refer to a previous despatch in which I reported that HAMZEH EL GOUTH — an agent of Ibn Rashid — had left for Kemalist Anatolia, having been nearly arrested here by the French.

This man has lately returned here after a stay of 4 months at Angora and a circular tour through much of Anatolia and Cilicia, during which he stayed with Sheikh Senoussi, Haji Hanan Agha etc., and was in constant contact with the various Moslem Envoys now at Angora as well as the Angora "Cabinet". He is still under French surveillance here, but managed to pay me visit and I now propose to give his information and views in extenso, because, in his quality of a representative of the former Ibn Rashid Power, Gouth was at first well-received. His complete disillusionnement is very striking and I am convinced he is quite sincere as to this. I can not, of course, venture to vouch for it all, but Gouth talked quite freely and openly and almost entirely without any prompting on my part.

It will be noticed throughout his remarks that he considers the Kemalists to be at their last gasp and to be a very broken reed for any other Islamic country to lean upon.

2. *Résumé* follows:—

A. Gouth first stayed with the Senoussi, who was intending to move into Cilicia later. The Senoussi was not content because he was making large disbursements without any adequate return in prospect from the Kemalists. Gouth was sure he would now be ready to drop his propaganda against us and Irak — for a consideration — but admitted that he need scarcely be taken seriously; especially as he has now moved or will soon move to Adana and was now rather a "back-number" with Angora.

B. Gouth then proceeded to Konia, but missed Mustafa Kemal there. He, however, met him in Angora. Gouth's description of Mustafa Kemal was the most striking contrast to the usual fervid praise of this "Hero of Islam" that could be imagined. He did not consider him a genius by any means, and added that while Kemal had undoubtedly acted originally from patriotic motives he had lately gone to the dogs: — "He now devoted much of his time to wine and women, and as the present Bolshevik envoy at Angora supplied the latter from Russia and

occasionally supplied sufficient Russian gold to purchase the former he was gradually acquiring some influence. The National Assembly had, moreover, lost confidence in Kemal and most of his entourage and the only thing that stopped open revolt was the fear that the Greeks would attack in strength as soon as they obtained definite news of any such revolt."

As an instance of the above he quoted a quite recent order of Kemal's to make an offensive against the Greeks. Ali Ihsan Pasha refused to obey this and when Kemal attempted to arraign Ihsan before the National Assembly, this latter body refused to convict him.

In short Kemal and his following were now almost exactly in the situation of Enver and Talaat towards the end of the war. If they made peace there would at once be a popular revolt which would eject them from power, and having realized this it was to their interest not to make peace. Their motto was once again "*Après moi le déluge*," or as Gouth put it "Not one of them looks even one day ahead. They just exist by temporary shifts and expedients only contrived to meet the necessities of the moment."

The only persons who received their salaries regularly were the "Cabinet", the Assembly, and the Officers. The latter were, therefore, also against peace. The soldiers were heartily sick of the war and only the fear of losing the rest of Anatolia to the Greeks kept what remains of the army from revolt. The Anatolian hills were simply swarming with deserters as it was, while the population of the villages, now consisted almost entirely of old men, women and children.

Civilian employes had their salaries 7 months in arrears, and were consequently exploiting their districts in the time-honoured Turkish fashion.

The only men in the Cabinet who seemed to him of any value were Yusuf Kemal Bey and Raouf Bey-especially the latter.

C. He considered any Pan-Islamic propaganda on Kemal's part as childish. A few fanatics might react, but there could be no military backing for them from Angora. At Angora he was very friendly with the Afghan Envoy, and he considered the latter was also disillusioned. The Persian Envoy was only sent on a special Mission to form his impressions and return to report them.

Just before Gouth's departure from South Anatolia for Syria he heard rumours that "Ali Fuad Pasha (?)". The Kemalist Ambassador at Moscow has been mishandled, and his residence ransacked in the belief that proof would be discovered of his secret dealings with Enver. Though no such proof was apparently found, the above envoy returned to Angora and refused to listen to Kemal's entreaties that he should go back and resume his duties at Moscow.

Gouth had also heard that Enver had been killed somewhere in the Caucasus, but was not certain of this, though sure of Kemal's decease.

D. Resuming the subject of Anatolia Gouth pointed out that extremely few influential men, landed gentry etc., had accepted nomination to the "Grand National Assembly". Most of its members had only a past history as petty Officials, schoolmasters etc., Even so they found their salary of 160 paper liras montly (lately reduced from the former 200) insufficient.

E. Gouth believed that the Franco-Kemalist Treaty had really given Kemal a new lease of life-though possibly only a short one. Its conclusion probably prevented a revolt against Kemal. "Had this Convention not been concluded, by now 'Kemalism' might have faded away".

F. As regards alleged supplies of materials to Kemal, Gouth did not believe most of the rumours. "He had certainly seen 9 French aeroplanes at Adana which later on arrived at Angora. He had, however, been allowed to visit one or two depots at Angora and elsewhere on his return journey but had not noticed any rifles of French Manufacture".

I naturally pointed out that many former German and Turkish rifles had been abandoned in Syria and that some of these might have been sent northwards.

Note. Gouth, according to his own account, was treated with some suspicion towards the end of his stay in Angora, as he had not proved quite as enthusiastic about Kemalism as had been expected of him. I do not wish without definite evidence to attempt to discount his statement that he had seen no French Rifles in the Dépôts he was allowed to visit; but cannot myself fail to remark the presence at Adana of 9 French Aeroplanes "*sold to the Kemalists by the French*". (Gouth's own words.)

Gouth himself pointed out that the Kemalists needed Lorries for transport purposes even more than they needed rifles (and as they have lost control of most of the railways and usually have to use ox-carts, he is probably quite correct in this statement as it stands above). He went on to say that he had noticed an extreme shortage of such Lorries and a complete absence of any of French Make. He deduced from this that the French had *not* sold military requisites to the Kemalists in any considerable quantities.

Note. I here venture to analyse this argument; as your Lordship is, of course, aware that in November and December 1918 I spent 23 days on a tour between Constantinople and Konia, during which I incidentally took notes of all Arms and Ammunition Depots I could trace for the use of the High Commission at Constantinople.

My conclusion then were that the Turks were very naturally loath to reveal them; and that they did their utmost to lead any investigator off the trail. Gouth is very unlikely to have been allowed to see anything which the Kemalist *Military* did not want him to see.

As a civilian who was later regarded with some suspicion he was scarcely in a position to estimate this question. I am not arguing that the French *have* really supplied Munitions to the Kemalists, but merely that the accuracy of Gouth's *other* remarks should not be estimated by those on this one particular subject.

G. As regarding generalities—such as the likely victor in any future Greco-Turkish Campaign—Gouth's ideas must be taken even less seriously. He appears to think the Kemalists are exhausted both financially and morally, and in this I quite agree with him.

The refusal of Ihsan Pasha to attack if true might seem to indicate this at first sight.

Noone will deny that the Turk possesses a certain power of recuperation. He does *not*, however, in my own opinion possess the long-enduring tenacity which wins long drawn out wars.

Here again I believe, if the Greeks are ever allowed to continue their activities, history will repeat itself. The Turk will fight with the utmost tenacity and devotion for any cause over which his enthusiasm is aroused provided the war does not last too long. He fought magnificently at the Dardanelles in 1915 and did pretty well for some time longer. But in 1918 he had had enough. At Konia in December 1918 I was quite popular with the remnants of the Southern Turkish Army who were as often as not seizing trains and demobilizing themselves; and the reason was that "Thanks to you English we are now able to go home." I underline the preceding words, as I firmly consider that no more striking example of the Turkish Peasant mentality could possibly be produced in so few words.

The corollary is that the waning Turkish Patriotism has once again been aroused by an entirely new danger—the Greek Landing at Smyrna;—but that any previous danger to which the Turks were already habituated (and to which they were therefore more or less resigned) would possibly not have produced any reaction.

H. Gouth interviewed several prominent men both upon his journey to Angora and upon his return to Syria via Keisarié, Malatia, etc. According to him the real feeling of these notables was:— "Let the Greeks keep Smyrna and any other districts they already hold, provided they leave us in peace in what still remains to us of Anatolia."

J. Gouth therefore considers that, quite apart from the growing unpopularity of Kemal and his close associates, the Turks themselves are once more beginning to become apathetic—in view of the failure of Kemal's régime to bring any substantial relief from their present unhappy position.

3. The conclusion therefore is:—

(1.) The remnants of the Turkish Nation would be only too glad to make peace on any conditions whatsoever.

(2.) The Officers of the Kemalist Army and Kemalist leaders- excepting perhaps Raouf Bey- see no future at all for them when peace is made; and prefer to continue the state of war.

Note. This idea would certainly explain the exorbitant peace terms of Kemal's clique.

(3.) The façade to the Kemalist Edifice was never more than Stucco; even this has been worn thin by the weathering of recent years; it is wearing thinner daily; and if it still possibly required more than a mere push to overthrow it at once, it would probably collapse next year upon any serious thrust.

In other words a Greek Offensive in 1923 might be rapidly successful, even if there were still chances of more serious resistance this year.

4.) Gouth was invited to join the Kurdish Chief Hajji Hanan Agha of the Kurd Daghs, who is now near Killis. This man had often aided the Kemalists against the French, and was furious when his villages were left within the French zone by the Franco-Kemalist Accord. He went to Angora to protest, but met with no success. He is now in open revolt against Angora.

(5.) Gouth thinks of going to Ibn Saoud to obtain a job. He wanted to know if the British would object to this. I answered that I could not reply off-hand.

(6.) Oscimi has assured Gouth that there is no treaty between Ibn Saoud and the French. He considered rumours had been started by the Sherifian party to

a.) Discredit Ibn Saoud with us.

b.) Create mistrust between England and France.

My own idea is still that there has been an exchange of views. Ibn Saoud has apparently decided to remain quiet on the Irak frontier, but his followers continue their attacks on Trans-Jordania, — as for example the recent attack in force on the Bani Sakr.

Gouth also considered that messages had passed between Ibn Saoud and the Kemalists.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) C.E.S. PALMER
Consul

F.O. 371/2890/E. 9597

No. 147

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, September 2nd, 1922, 2.30 p.m.

(Received September 2, 4.30 p.m.)

No. 358 *Telegraphic**Very Urgent*

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 358, repeated to Constantinople.

My telegram No. 356.

In connection with possible request for armistice I venture to submit following for consideration:—

1. If Kemal should grant armistice doubtless he would demand evacuation of troops from Asia Minor to a locality named by him.
2. Evacuation at least of Eastern Thrace.

When all possible Greek support to us had thus been removed he would probably march on Constantinople, where it is possible that French would not oppose him.

On the other hand if he should refuse armistice Greek army in south will be in grave peril but it will probably be found possible to transport at least part of the troops from the north to Thrace.

Looking from this end it would appear that defence of Constantinople without aid of Greek troops would be a problem. I presume military authorities have considered this aspect of the case.

F.O. 371/7885/E.18747

F.O. 424/254, p. 143, No. 198

No. 148

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, September 2, 1922, 4.55 p.m.

(Received September 2, 6.50 p.m.)

No. 359 *Telegraphic**Very urgent**Confidential*

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just sent his private secretary to communicate to me sense of two telegrams which are being sent to Greek legation, London, for immediate communication to you.

1. States that High Commissioner Smyrna has telegraphed that in view of impossibility of defending Smyrna against Kemalists Powers should be warned to take urgent measures for protection of town in the interests of their nationals.¹

2. In view of military situation Greek government would accept proposals for an armistice on the basis of immediate evacuation of Asia Minor. Greek government begs His Majesty's Government immediately to take such steps as they judge necessary in the circumstances.²

Message concludes with expression of faith in His Majesty's Government's friendly services.

These communications are being made to His Majesty's Government only.
Repeated to Constantinople and Smyrna.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, p. 947, No. 755

No. 149

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, September 2, 1922, 6.15 p.m.

(Received September 2, 9.10 p.m.)

No. 360. Telegraphic

Very urgent

Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent me word in answer to my enquiry to explain that Commander-in-Chief has not yet replied to suggestion made to him as to advisability of asking armistice of Kemal (see my telegram No. 356) but that Greek government have in my immediately preceding telegram of their own initiative made definite request of His Majesty's Government to arrange an armistice for them on basis of evacuation which Kemal had demanded since last March but to which up till now Greeks had not been prepared to agree.

Chief of the General Staff told Military Attaché to-day that evacuation of Asia Minor including Brussa would be begun immediately. He wished British

¹ This was communicated by the Greek Charge d'Affaires in his letter No. 2897 of September 2, not printed, its substance was communicated to Sir H. Rumbold in Foreign Office telegram No. 345 of September 2, which instructed him as follows: "In view of above and of Sir H. Lamb's telegram No. 56 of today [not printed] you should concert with Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean for protection and possible evacuation of British colonies."

"You should also inform your colleagues and Sir H. Lamb."

² This was communicated in a Memorandum of September 2, left at the Foreign Office at 6.15 p.m., the substance of which was communicated to Sir H. Rumbold in Foreign Office telegram No. 344 of September 2, not printed.

Commander-in-Chief Constantinople to know this. He added that troops had practically ceased to fight. He expected troops embarked at Mudania would be sent to (? Rodosto) as nearest port.

During recent operations (? three) regiments had been sent from Thrace to Smyrna or elsewhere so that present strength in Thrace is two divisions in eastern and one division in western Thrace.

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 424/254, No. 200

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, pp. 947-948, No. 756

No. 150

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, September 3rd, 1922, 1.15 p.m.
(Received September 3.5 p.m.)

No. 362. *Telegraphic*

Very Urgent.

Smyrna telegram No. 59.

I entirely agree. Greeks have asked His Majesty's Government to arrange armistice and obviously His Majesty's Government will be able to obtain better terms for them than they would themselves obtain by direct request to Kemal (see my telegram No. 360).

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 362; repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/7885/E. 8750

F.O. 424/254, p. 146, No. 208

No. 151

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, September 5th, 1922, 11 p.m.
(Received September, 6th, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 380. *Telegraphic*

Constantinople telegrams Nos. 378 and 379.

First paragraph of telegram No. 379 seems to indicate that His Majesty's high commissioner has information of state of things at front which has not reached me and which I should be grateful to receive. Last telegram from Constantinople on this subject referred to reports from Major Johnstone on the situation as it was on August 30th. Gravity of situation was realized here on night of September 1st

when second corps was reported to be lost and according to official Greek reports on which I had had to depend Greek troops had ceased to fight. My recent telegrams will show that situation has been improving since evening of September 3rd and we believe Greek troops will fight under General Tricoupis.

I have no knowledge here of Kemalist attitude and mind but it strikes me that if after His Majesty's Government have abstained for nearly two years from giving Greeks any material aid Kemal is not convinced of our neutrality, but still identifies His Majesty's Government with Greek government and army, nothing we can do now will convince him to the contrary. So far as he is concerned we might just as well give Greeks effective assistance and gather what profit we can. Had we during last twenty months given Greeks half the assistance in material which Kemal has received from our allies, present catastrophe would most probably not have occurred. Credits and material placed at disposal of Greeks would even now have great effect. If it is not the policy of His Majesty's Government to assist Greece in any way materially, I submit in the name of humanity that we should lose no time in evacuating multitudes of refugees now pouring into Smyrna.

I still think His Majesty's Government would obtain better terms for Greeks than Greeks could by themselves. If His Majesty's Government have no influence with Kemal they have strong potential influence in compelling French to exert pressure. (? French) and Kemal could not force Greece to evacuate any part of Thrace if His Majesty's Government might probably still enable Greeks to enter Constantinople which would facilitate defence of Thrace. French realize this even if Kemal does not yet.

So far as morale of Greeks is concerned occupation of Constantinople would be a far different matter from defence of Asia Minor with knowledge that it will have to be evacuated in the end.

I have not lost sight of arguments contained in your telegram No. 115.

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/7885/E. 8951

F.O. 424/254, pp. 157-158, No. 240

No. 152

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 5th September, 1922, 3.30 p.m.

(Received September 5, 8 p.m.)

*Telegraphic**Very Urgent.*

My telegram No. 380.

I have acquainted my colleagues with substance of last paragraph of Sir H. Lamb's telegram No. 60 and have discussed with them question of Smyrna, an armistice, and Venice conference.

Smyrna.

My colleagues fully appreciate the considerations advanced by Sir H. Lamb but they are firmly opposed to any action which would bring allied forces into conflict with Kemalist forces. They consider detachments should if necessary be landed from ships to protect our respective colonies in Smyrna town. The mere presence of these detachments on land would inspire confidence and prevent excesses. Should, however, excesses occur, French High Commissioner considers detachments should put a stop to them in the interests of humanity. Detachments might occupy various points in Smyrna and eventually hand these over to regular Kemalist officials. My colleagues do not see how we have any practical means of preventing disorders and excesses outside limits of Smyrna town.

My French colleague has given great latitude to French Admiral as regards measures for protecting French subjects. I am in agreement with foregoing.

Armistice.

French High Commissioner has now heard of Greek request to His Majesty's Government to bring about an armistice. I pointed out to my colleague that speedy conclusion of an armistice would tend to prevent disorders and excesses always attending a disorderly retreat and a hot pursuit. Both my colleagues agreed that allied governments might very properly intervene to secure a suspension of hostilities and an armistice. French High Commissioner considers proper course to be for allied governments to recommend to Greek government to ask for an armistice and to inform Greek government simultaneously that they will use their good offices with Kemalists to back this request. Allied governments would intimate to Angora that suspension of hostilities and conclusion of an armistice had in view the immediate and orderly evacuation of Asia Minor by Greeks. I am in agreement with my colleagues about this.

Venice conference.

French High Commissioner has now got instructions but Italian High Commissioner is still without them. The latter states that his government propose that High Commissioners should fix date of conference. We are all three agreed that it would be wiser to wait a few days before inviting Turks to attend conference so as to allow time for present excitement to subside.

According to French High Commissioner, Turks are quite carried away by their victories and they even talk of recovering Western Thrace as far as Seres. We think an immediate invitation to a conference would be construed by Turks as a panic invitation and would play straight into the hands of Mustapha Kemal Pasha. We consider proper moment for issuing an invitation to conference would be when or if there is a stabilization on front, in lieu of on conclusion of an armistice.

F.O. 371/7885/E. 8890

F.O. 424/254, pp. 155-156, No. 234

D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. XVIII, pp. 7-8, No. 7

No. 153

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, September 6th, 1922, 5.30 p.m.

(Received September 6, 10.10 p.m.)

No. 384. Telegraphic

Very Urgent.

Constantinople telegram No. 383.

I venture to submit following considerations as situation strikes us at this end.

1. Greeks have asked His Majesty's Government to arrange armistice for them on basis of evacuation of Asia Minor by Greek army which according to official statements here *was then* no longer prepared to defend it. Thrace is quite another matter (see my telegram No. 346) and was not mentioned in Greek request. Discretionary powers granted to allied generals, it seems to me, should not therefore include anything but evacuation of Asia Minor.

2. Until reliable information is received as to morale of army (see my telegram No. 381) it is too early to assert definitely that it is not now in a position to defend some portion of Asia Minor and this is still more the case as far as Thrace is concerned (see my telegram No. 380).

3. In my opinion question of armistice which is immediate is connected with evacuation of Asia Minor only whilst objects of eventual conference are to arrange the other matters to which Sir H. Rumbold refers.

4. If as Sir H. Rumbold and I have anticipated (see my telegram No. 358) Kemal should demand as condition of armistice all that he could obtain from most favourable peace, we appear to be left with a choice between:

a. Surrender to Kemal and French (see last paragraph Constantinople telegram No. 379) or

b. Immediately giving Greeks material aid which France and Italy have been giving to Kemalists.

5. If Kemal should make exorbitant demands he has still to show his power to take anything more than Asia Minor. Without command of the sea he surly cannot do so if Greek 3rd Army Corps is transferred to Thrace.

6. If His Majesty's Government are prepared to take strong and independent line would their hands not be strengthened rather than weakened by exorbitant demands on the part of Kemal?

7. If His Majesty's Government are considering giving any form of material assistance to Greeks see Lord Granville's telegram No. 298 of June 3rd, 1921, but military attaché thinks most immediate needs would probably be aeroplanes, transport, guns, rifles, ammunition and supplies. Tanks would have great moral effect but military attaché doubts whether Greeks would be able to manage them without expert aid. The fifteen new aeroplanes ordered by Greek government from Armstrong are hardly expected to arrive before another month.

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/7886/E. 8991

F.O. 424/254, pp. 158-159, No. 242

D.B.F.P., 1st series Vols XVIII; pp. 10-11, No. 10

No. 154

General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office

Desp. 0100 7.9.22

Recd. 1000 7.9.22

Paraphrase.

Secret.

2195 cipher 6th September, 1922.

To-day's news is conflicting.

Sir H. Lamb wiring from Smyrna reports evacuation of Alashehr, Odemish and other places and that panic is imminent. On other hand Naval C.-in-C. gives more hopeful news of steadier situation. Undoubtedly it is exceedingly grave and in my opinion Powers should, if they wish to save minorities and avoid complete debacle, act immediately. I have to-day impressed on Essad Bey, head of police,

that Mustapha Kemal, with whom he is in close touch, should show himself to be a man and prevent massacres both for good of himself and of Turkey. I have asked Sir Horace Rumbold to consult his colleagues with a view to an immediate effort on part of allies to obtain armistice and avoid unnecessary bloodshed.

I feel that there is no time for further delay what with places above vacated and Turks reorganizing for further effort. Have just received wire from Johnston at Kassaba saying 15,000 Greeks passed him going west as a rabble. Only desire to get out of country? 12,730 is estimate of Greek casualties.

F.O. 371/7886

No. 155

Letter from a British M.P. to Sir William Tyrrell, Foreign Office

7th September 1922

My dear Tyrrell,

I have sent Townshend a polite acknowledgement of this Memorandum, and have told him that the P. M. will take it into consideration when the terms of peace come to be discussed.

I have only glanced at it, but some of it may be of interest to the Eastern Department.

Yours ever,

(Signature)

F.O. 371/7946/E. 9114

ENCLOSURE IN No 155

Memorandum by Major General Sir Charles Townshend

ANGORA, 27th July, 1922

CONDITIONS WHICH THE TURKS WOULD ACCEPT AS AN HONOURABLE PEACE.

Conditions which I consider would be acceptable to the Turks as an honourable peace.

1. *Evacuation of the province of SMYRNA* and all occupied territories in Asia Minor by the Hellenic troops which will be restored to the Turks.

The Turkish Government to give guarantees for the lives and possessions of Greek population in above territories, especially with regard to the province of Smyrna.

2. *The Frontier of Thrace*

The eastern frontier line of Thrace was modified by the last Conference at Paris much as follows:—

- (a) The frontier line was run from GANDUS on the shore of the Marmora in a north and north east direction to a point on the Bulgarian frontier in the western part of the ISTRANJA mountains. This frontier line leaves RODOSTO, a Greek town, to the Turks. (The Turks declare, however that Rodosto is a Turkish town.) It leaves BABA ESKE and KIRK KILISSE to the Greeks i.e. on the Greek side of the frontier line.
- (b) This frontier line drawn up by "Military Experts" is claimed by them as ensuring the security of the Turkish capital, they demilitarised the entire zone of eastern Thrace.
- (c) However there are other military experts who are equally certain that such a frontier line makes the defence of Constantinople impossible almost from a combined attack of Greeks and Bulgarians, i.e. two armies advancing, the one from the north (Bulgars) and the other from the west (Greeks) given the *small* Turkish Army proposed by the Allies in Paris last March viz. an Army confined to 80,000 combattants of which 45,000 gendarmerie would be scattered all over the interior of Turkey on police work, and so would be unavailable (*sic*) for battle. This *regular* Army of 40,000 men is also supposed to guard all the Russian, Persian and Mesopotamian frontiers as well!
- (d) Such a small Army in its central position in the *narrow slice of terrain*, with the Sea of Marmora on one flank, and the Bulgarian frontier on the other, could only but beat a rapid retreat to hold the lines of TCHATALDJA whence the long range guns of the Greeks could set Constantinople in flames behind them.
That is certainly the opinion of General Gouraud, the Turkish Marshal Izzet Pacha and myself, and personally I would add that I cannot understand any General who has studied 'la grande guerre' and commanded in the field, holding any other opinion.
- (e) The Ministers and their assistants who draw up these frontiers, can surely never have contemplated a Bulgarian attack on Constantinople, and everyone who knows the Turk and the Bulgar, knows that the Turk fears Bulgarian ambition far more than Greek.
- (f) Either the frontier line should be modified, or if the 'Grande Puissances' will not do this, then *England and France should guarantee the security of Constantinople against all comers*—just as in the case of England guaranteeing the security of Japan on the sea, before the Japanese-Russian War.
- (g) I believe that M. Poincaré is of the opinion that the present frontier line, as indicated at the Paris Conference last March, should be modified again, and that he told Lord Curzon so.
- (h) If the Great Powers will consent to modify the frontier line without giving back to the Turks what I maintain is the best and a sound strategic

frontier, viz, the line of the Maritza river, which included the holy city of Adrianople, and so satisfies all Turkish desires and prejudices, as it did before the late war, then I would suggest that the new frontier line should run from ENOS on the Aegean shore along the river Maritza to where it bifurcates with the ERKENE, thence along that river to CHASKOI and BOUJOK-DARBAND connecting to *Adrianople* by a "corridor" as in the case of DANTZIG, and thus *Adrianople* would be left to the Turks; this would give great satisfaction to our Mohamedan subjects in India, Egypt, etc. Another suggestion as a frontier line, i.e. as an alternative frontier: — and which would satisfy all Turkish desires and hopes — would be to follow the ERKENE river from ENOS as far as ESKE BABA and then to follow the line of the TAMDJIA river to include *Adrianople*. There are 'embêtements' as regards a "corridor" to *Adrianople* as is experienced in the case of Dantzig with regard to land properties cutting the "corridor".

In this case also the Dardanelles would be left to the *Turkish zone* instead of in the *Greeks zone*, but would be occupied by an international garrison.

3. *The Dardanelles Guarantee*

In order that 1914 should not be repeated an international garrison is indicated, and I would suggest as I did at Constantinople in 1918 when arranging, with the Turks for an Armistice, that it should be composed of British, French, Italian and Turkish detachments under the governorship of a man chosen for high character belonging to a nation which had no interest whatever in the question of the Dardanelles—for example, a *Dane*. The occupation might be fixed for five years, and then a Conference between the Powers as to whether it was desirable to continue the military occupation.

4. *Other points than above requiring consideration and modification*

a *As regards the armed forces of Turkey.*

How can it be possibly imagined that 45,000 gendarmerie and 40,000 regular troops can safeguard the frontier of Turkey in Asia Minor and Europe? Especially when we consider that once we have peace and Turkey our friend, she will at once have the old Russian menace from the Caucasus.

(b) I estimate roughly 150,000 combattants for the *Russian front* and the *Persian front*, alone, i.e. seven divisions of 20,000 combattants each, until such time as the Russians show they are prepared to live peaceably.

For the *European front* I should also want 150,000 men, a minimum—at once I have a total of 300,000 combattants exclusive of the 45,000 gendarmerie, which must of necessity be scattered all over Asia Minor and Turkey in Europe, à la pepper pot, to ensure the ordinary police

service, and so are not available for war; the garrison in Asia Minor of 150,000 men, I must observe, is just as much in the interests of England and France as a bulwark against Bolshevism, as it would be in the service of Turkey.

At the same time she will have to ensure the north, north eastern and Persians frontiers in addition to the Bulgarian and Greek frontiers in Europe.

Considering all the above, I confess myself astonished when Commissioners of the Paris Conference in March last, remarked with regard to the grant to Turkey of 80,000 combattans, including 45,000 gendarmerie—"this is very markedly in advance of the 50,000 Turkish troops allowed by the Treaty of Sévres"! they should have added the "unratified Treaty of Sévres"

- (c) The Turkish Nationalists *are solidly* united for their "liberty", the freedom of their country—and that they mean to have or perish; "you can kill the Turks" said Napoleon "but you cannot conquer them".
- (d) Even a second lieutenant of Militia, I should say, would be aware that 40,000 regulars for the defence of Turkey is a preposterous proposal and cannot be taken seriously—and in order to make the suggestion more 'opera comique', it was added at the Paris Conference last March, that the "*Turkish Army must be a voluntary one*"! to which there is only one reply i.e. Turkey cannot afford luxuries like that! it is only *England* that can afford to pay her private soldiers a preposterous amount of pay—all the other nations have to the cheaper and far more secure form of *conscription*. The Turks will not hear of any foreign officers being in the service of Turkey anymore, I speak of the National Turks—*not one* is allowed; it is thought at home that there are German officers in the Turkish Army—there is not one; thus they will not accept foreign officers either in the regular Army or in the gendarmerie.

5. *The Mohamedan menace to England*

I have been convinced during this visit that there is a great Mahomedan movement on foot now directed against the British in India and Mesopotamia; up till now the Nationalist Turks (and remember that in Asia Minor the Turks are for Kemal to a man—and in Constantinople they are 90% for Kemal. Kemal up till now has refrained from attacking England by means of the great weapon of Islam but now see para 75 above in diary where Kemal at dinner informs me that if now this time he does not get peace, he will use this weapon and it will have far and wide reaching results, and great wars and bloodshed; and see in my diary my talk with General de la Motte at Aleppo prior to my visit to Kemal, where he tells me that Aleppo is a *good observation post* for all that is going on in Turkey, and that he was

convinced that there was a great movement amongst the Turks and the Mussulman world in general against the English in India and Mesopotamia, and in consequence against the French in Syria. "We must have peace" he said repeating the words of Marshall LYAUTEY with whom dined the night before I embarked for the Near East. This grave news (for it is the gravest I have known in all my 21 years experience of life amongst the Mohamedans of Northern India, inclusive of 4 years in the Sudan with Lord Kitchener, and exclusive of two years and six months amongst the Turks) in a week is confirmed by *Kemal* himself, and his influence in the Mohamedan world as the National Turkish Leader, coupled with an iron will and courage, are known throughout the world—it means the unfurling of the green flag of Islam everywhere, and if this is not stopped *at once* it means that in two or three years our position in India will be an impossible one, and also in Egypt, and it will be the same for the French in Syria.

Everyone in Turkey speaks openly of this Mussulman movement against England, and they speak much of the alliance between Germany and Russia, and there are plenty of Russians in evidence at Angora—and plenty of Russian gold. They only ask for an honourable peace and friendship with England—but "England is always against us" they say. "She even allowed the Greeks to deliver their treacherous offensive in the middle of an armistice, and during the Conference at London". It is idle to try and convince them that the British Government, if they did not actually engineer the offensive of the Greeks, that our Prime Minister could not have stopped it by raising a finger.

The Russian Bolshevik doctrine, they say, will never gain ground in Turkey, but if England pushes us against the wall we will call in the Russians and then you may look well to India, Egypt, etc.

6. *State of Efficiency of the Turkish National Army*

I do not think our Government has any idea of the fighting value of *Kemal's* army, the morale is wonderful—it is the only word—they are all united and determined as one man, the food and equipment is good, ammunition in plenty, they have all the guns and all the rifles they had in the late war! all the breech blocks of the guns and rifles demanded by the Great Powers at the Armistice have all been replaced by means of the factory at Angora where wonderful work is done by Turkish artisans taught by the Germans in the war; breech blocks for guns and rifles are made out of wheels of locomotives, railway trucks and so forth. Russian projectiles are altered as regards calibre to fit the calibre of the Turkish guns; there is nothing that they cannot do and they work like bees.

At Konia in the aeroplane factory I saw machines captured from the Greeks being repaired with new wings and propellers, 14 Greek aeroplanes had been captured from the Greeks, they said, since the battle of Sakaria, and they themselves had lost one.

The Turkish General officers are good and efficient, generally speaking there is a great change since pre war conditions. Ismet Paşa, the Commander-in-Chief has a good knowledge of strategy and higher tactics of a high character and high ability. The battalion officers are *excellent* after ten years of war, and are second to none in Europe.

7. *This is a new Turkey* with new aspirations and a wonderful spirit for self sacrifice and liberty; this does not seem to be understood in England, though the French Government has tumbled to this fact; the Nationalist Turks are united to a man to get their freedom and independence, and nothing short of it — *and no foreign interference*. All the young Turks repeat to one time after time that they are modern people, we are not the vieux jeune Turk, the old Turk against all Christians — we are for making a Nation of Christians *and* Mussulmen.

I do not think that they will agree for one moment to *any foreign control of their finances*; they recognise the old debt, of course, and foreign control of it. *As regards capitulations* that matter can easily be discussed, I should say, and settled easily; the Turks I think will willingly set up some *mixed court* in which foreigners might be tried at Constantinople and say at Smyrna where foreigners mostly abound.

8. *Foreign Trade with Nationalist Turkey*

It is being rapidly picked up by the French, Italians and Americans as a result of the hostile attitude of the British Government. I found that the French and Italians have *missions* at Adana in the capital of Cilicia, (*sic.*) a most important district and with the growing port of Mersina, and also at Konia. The longer that Smyrna is occupied by the Greeks so long will the Turks from the interior blockade it and send all goods etc. from the interior to Mersina. Smyrna is now a desert, so to speak, and I am told that the Greek inhabitants of Smyrna now wish for the Turkish return so that they can "make a bit" and Mersina is rapidly growing in importance in consequence. I found an American consul at Angora, and the American Standard Oil Company have a shop at Adana where they buy petrol from the surrounding villages and ship it at the adjacent port of Mersina. There are two British merchants who trade and reside at Adana in cotton etc. which I find strangely in contradiction to the propaganda at home—that English traders are being persecuted by the Turks!!! I took care to inform Mr. Satow, the British Consul General at Beirut, of this fact as it was he who had informed me how the British had been persecuted.

9. *Conclusions.*

England and France must, in common necessity, march hand in hand in this Near East question (as also in European affairs).

As long as France has Turkish sympathies and the British Cabinet has Greek sympathies, how on earth can we make peace! ? — well that is the state of affairs at present.

What is the common danger to England and France? see para 5 above, it is the *Mohamedan menace*, it is the Turkish danger as it embraces the Mohamedan movement against England—in consequence France will receive the counter blow in North Africa and Syria; it will be Islam against Christians and we shall have another and far greater Indian Mutiny in India.

Then we must make up our minds to make peace (as the French and Italians have already made up their minds) by putting the Greeks out of Asia Minor, cease empire building in the Near East. You must either make peace or else *force* Turkey to obey the wishes of our Foreign Office by force of arms.

Does the British Government want war? If it wants war then let it put its army in order and make it efficient at once—which they are far from at present.

We have demobilised (*sic.*) our Army to a far greater extent than the French. We have not the men to support the Greeks in their enterprise in Asia Minor, an enterprise entirely due to our Government's encouragement and invitation to embark on this adventure recalling that of the Knight of La Mancha, and I cannot see Mr. Lloyd George coming down to the House of Commons and asking for 100 millions or so and permission to raise 150,000 men to support the Greeks in a new offensive. That would end this Govt. at once—and the Prime Minister with it.

Unless England and France unite and tell the Greeks to remove themselves immediately from Asia Minor * and thus make *peace*, our position in India will, in three or four years, be *impossible*, and the same with the French in Syria and in North Africa—no need to speak of Egypt and Mesopotamia.

In my opinion it is madness to try and push the Turk out of Europe into Asia Minor, if that is done then the Turk becomes an Asiatic power pure and simple and will act against us on our road to India and Egypt.

I add my speech in the House of Commons on the 30th May last as an appendix to these notes; everything I said in that speech was true and is justified. I found on my visit to Angora that that speech had been translated into Turkish and printed in the schools.

OBSERVATIONS on BEKOS for a CONFERENCE.

I was told at Angora that the British Government had proposed BEKOS as a place suitable for a Conference. The universal opinion at Angora was that the

* *And after the last "open rupture" advance of the Greeks against Constantinople! in the past few days I trust the eyes of our Government will at last begin to open! To imagine that England and France would permit an advance on Constantinople whilst occupied by themselves! a step which would not only light up India and all the Mohamedan world at once! but would bring in the Serians and the Bulgars who would never permit the Greeks for a moment to remain at Constantinople.*

Personally speaking I am delighted at this last "gaffe" by the Greeks as it greatly strengthens my hands.

Army would not permit Kemal to go to Bekos for fear of assassination especially as Bekos is in the territory of Constantinople Govt. and Djmal Pacha's assassination had just been reported. BEKOS also being in Constantinople territory would entail the Presidency of the Conference being taken by Izzet Pacha the Marshal.

BEKOS is an ill omened name for the Turks on account of a shameful Treaty for Turkey being drawn up there — ISMID was by far the best place for I look on it as essential that Kemal himself should be present. His Ministers dare not come to any decision on their own but must always consult him — hence delays and indecision. PORT MERSINA might be a desirable place, it is easy to get at, Kemal could be there, but it has no wireless station etc. Why our Foreign Office would not agree to hold the Conference on a French warship is an enigma to me !!!

Angora.

27th July 1922.

F.O. 371/7946/E. 9114

No. 156

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 19th September, 1922, 5.30 p.m.

(Received September 9.40 p.m.)

No. 403 Telegraphic

My telegram No. 393

Communication by dragomans to Hamid. Hamid Bey on instructions from his government, has asked French High Commissioner whether armistice proposal had been put forward officially by Greek government and what its object was, i.e., to discuss peace or suspend arms.

French High Commissioner has replied to the effect that request for armistice emanated officially from Greek government and that object was immediate evacuation of Anatolia on conditions to be fixed by representatives of the two armies with a view to preventing further loss of life and devastations.

Italian High Commissioner and I have approved his reply.

As dragomans made position perfectly clear in putting proposal forward, enquiry of Angora government would seem undoubtedly to have been made with object of delaying matters.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 403, repeated to Athens No. 128.

F.O. 371/7886/E 9093

F.O. 424/254, pp. 174-175, No. 290

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. XVIII. p. 18. No. 19

No. 157

*M. de Martino to the Marquis Curzon of Kedleston**Translation*

ITALIAN EMBASSY,

Confidential

LONDON, September 9, 1922.

(Received September 11.)

My Lord,

IN accordance with instructions recently received, I have the honour to communicate the following to your Lordship:—

The Italian Government have always considered it highly necessary that every endeavour should be made to re-establish peace in the East, and with this object have even recently offered the hospitality of their own territory in order to induce the Greeks and Turks to terminate hostilities on the basis [group undecypherable]. In view of the military events in Asia Minor, the Italian Government now consider it more than ever necessary that the Allies should do all in their power to bring about immediate peace and so avoid further and more serious complications in the Eastern situation.

The Italian Government, whilst they have already given instructions to their representatives to associate themselves in all such measures as might be considered advisable to decide on in concert with their Allied colleagues for the termination of hostilities, do not, however, disguise from themselves the fact that the differences of opinion manifested in the British and French points of view in the matter of the armistice may give rise to discussions that might delay any really effective action on the part of the Allies. It might therefore prove more conducive to the object in view if, putting aside for the moment any direct intervention in the military situation that has developed, the Allies were to send an urgent invitation to belligerent Governments to despatch their representatives immediately to Venice, where, with the participation of Allied representatives, the situation that has arisen might be examined and the possibility studied of drawing up the preliminaries of peace.

The Allied Governments might confine themselves to recommending to the belligerents the stipulation for an armistice previous to the despatch of their representatives to Venice, or at least to bring about as soon as possible a termination of hostilities concurrently with the commencement of the conference. This, of course, would be of an entirely different character from the conference originally proposed, and it might be limited for the time being to a preliminary meeting for the purpose of facilitating the conclusion of the Greco-Turkish peace on the basis of the general peace with Turkey. The invitation to the Governments

at Athens, Constantinople and Angora, which should be sent collectively by the respective Allied representatives, might be in the following terms:—

"The Governments of Italy, Great Britain and France, being convinced that it is necessary in the interests of all to arrive at an early and definite restoration of peace in the East, invite the Governments at Athens, Constantinople and Angora to send their plenipotentiaries to Venice on the (it might be the 25th September) with a view to examine the situation and possibly to draw up the basis of a preliminary peace. The Allied Governments recommend earnestly that the belligerent's Governments should bring about a termination of hostilities which may facilitate the favourable outcome of their labours at the conference at Venice."

If this formula is approved by the British Government, it is desirable that it should be telegraphed immediately to their representatives at Athens and Constantinople, who should be given instructions to make an identic communication to Angora.

I have, &c.

G. DE MARTINO

F.O. 317/7886/E. 9137

No. 158

A. Hamid Bey to Sir H. Rumbold

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 9 Septembre 1922

Excellence

J'ai l'honneur de remettre ci-inclus à Votre Excellence la copie de la protestation de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie contre les atrocités perpétrées par l'armée hellénique lors de sa retraite.

Veuillez agréer, excellence, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

(s) A. HAMID

F.O. 371/7889/E. 9438

ENCLOSURE IN No. 158

Protestation de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie contre les Atrocités grecques

ANGORA, le 7 Septembre 1922

La Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie, constituée dans le but de chasser de l'Anatolie l'armée hellénique qui avait pu pénétrer jusqu'au sein de la Patrie au moment où la Turquie avait été désarmée après la guerre générale et pour assurer l'indépendance du pays dans ses limites nationales, vient, grâce à l'armée qu'elle s'est créée, de défaire complètement l'ennemi.

L'armée ennemie qui se retire vaincue, continue les méfaits dont elle s'était rendue coupable sans aucune nécessité militaire, détruit villes et villages, brûles les habitants musulmans après les avoir enfermés dans des édifices publics et religieux et détruit tous les monuments d'art qui ont une valeur historique séculaires. Eski-Chehir, Afion-Karahissar, Ouchak, Ala-Chehir et les environs livrés à la ruine et à l'incendie témoignent des dévastations helléniques.

La Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie, mise au courant de ces atrocités, a, dans sa séance du 7 septembre 1922, manifesté sa douleur extrême et délibéré sur cette situation. Dans le but de prévenir pareils vandalismes dans les villes de Brousse et de Smyrne qui possèdent des chefs d'oeuvre d'art et dont l'occupation par nos troupes est imminente, la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie a chargé son Président de protester en son nom devant le monde civilisé contre ces agissements du Gouvernement hellénique et de faire comprendre qu'à aucun moment notre peuple ne pardonnera de tels crimes.

Au nom de la

Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie

Signé: —Dr. ADNAN

(Vice-Président).

F.O. 371/7889/E. 9438

No. 159

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 10th, 1922, 7.30 p.m.

No. 371 Telegraphic.

Urgent

Your telegram No. 399 (of September 8th: armistice and Thrace).

Greek troops appear to have evacuated Smyrna and, so far as our information goes, may be able to withdraw northern forces via Mudania without serious molestation. If Turks refuse armistice except in return for partial evacuation of Eastern Thrace, there seems no reason why such a concession should be made, even at the risk of failure of armistice negotiations. Once Anatolia is evacuated, belligerents will no longer be in touch. Question might assume a different aspect if, pending discussion of armistice, there are still important Greek forces and material in Anatolia, which could only be saved from destruction by some further concession. Greeks will be best judge of that. On general grounds we should be most reluctant to witness any modification of European situation which may be invaluable factor in ultimate settlement.

In present state of Greek forces and Greek military and political moral, Greek threat to Constantinople cannot be seriously regarded. It will doubtless be used as

bogey by French and Italians to secure Greek withdrawal, and they may still entertain genuine but quite unfounded suspicions of Anglo-Greek collusion. On the other hand, fear of Greek occupation of capital may be an important card in future negotiations with Kemal; and Greek support for allied troops in Constantinople and Straits area, if Kemalists threaten latter, might also not be negligible factor.

We, therefore, object to retirement to any of the three lines suggested by Generals. Of these (b) and (c) are clearly inadmissible, and (a) though less objectionable, would contravene principle which it is desirable to maintain, and could only be justified by a military necessity, which so far as we know, has not arisen.

Repeated to Paris No. 291 (by bag), Athens No. 212, and Rome No. 262.

F.O. 371/7886/E. 9086

F.O. 424/254, p. 179, No. 305

D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, p. 18, No. 20

No. 160

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ROME, September 10, 1922

(Received September 11.)

No. 271. *Telegraphic.*

My telegram No. 270.

I happened to meet to-day Osman Nizami Pasha, Turkish Ambassador designate to Rome. His views are of some interest as representing those of Fathi Bey, who is staying here with him. He deeply deplored that His Majesty's Government had refused to receive Fathi, who was only intimate friend and confidant of Kemal, and had been sent by latter to ascertain our views and wishes. This refusal, regarded by Kemal as personal slight. [two groups undecypherable] speech had rendered Turks desparate and had driven them to stake all on an offensive which had succeeded beyond their wildest expectations. Situation was now very difficult as Kemal and his army were naturally over elated and full of exalted ideas. Kemal would certainly agree to armistice, but only on terms similar to those we had imposed on Germans which would hand over Greeks bound hand and foot to their conquerors. He was determined to retake Constantinople and Adrianople by force of arms if necessary; he was in the midst of victorious army of 300,000 men splendidly equipped and regarded any Allied threat to stop him as mere bluff. No effective action could be counted upon from France or Italy and England had no troops to send.

In the circumstances only hope of obtaining breathing space and of allowing passions and elation to calm was to adopt proposal for Conference of Venice. Osman Nizami Pasha assured me that Angora Government would accept invitation and would be represented by Fathi Bey as principal delegate. Djelaleddin, Farid from Paris, perhaps himself and possibly other delegates sent from Angora.

Such a conference should not be confined to Turco-Greek question, which was now practically liquidated, but should endeavour to secure lasting settlement between Turks and Allies. Some hope should be given to Turks of retaining Constantinople and Adrianople and of question of Thrace being settled on ethnographical lines this would shelve the question for detailed examination by experts.

Finally Osman Nizami Pasha, speaking, as he declared, also in the name of Fathi, beseeched me to urge His Majesty's Government to change their attitude while there was yet time. Turks were naturally irritated with us, their ancient allies, and grateful in some degree to France and Italy, but they could never feel the same confidence in latter Powers that they had in us, and one friendly gesture on our part might still alter the whole situation in our favour.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

F.O. 424/254, pp. 188-189, No. 325.

No. 161

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ROME, September 10, 1922

(Received September 11.)

No. 272. *Telegraphic.*

FOLLOWING is continuation of my immediately preceding telegram:—

Greeks were proved useless as guardians of Straits, only practical solution was to neutralise Straits and surrounding area and to entrust protection to Turks as mandatory of Allies or of League of Nations. Turks could be trusted to execute mandate faithfully, and to put up defence against Bolshevik or any other kind of Russia.

Kemal had been obliged to accept Russian help, but was well aware he was only being used as a tool and Turks detested the Bolsheviks and [? group omitted].

I listened, practically without comment to what Osman Nizami Pasha had to say, merely thanking him for his frankness, but I did point out extreme danger to Kemal of coming into collision with Allies in any attempted *coup-de-main* against Constantinople.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 189, No. 326

No. 162

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Signor de Martino

Confidential.

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 11, 1922

Your Excellency,

CAREFUL consideration has been given to your note of the 9th September and the verbal representations with which you accompanied its communication regarding the Venice Conference.

2. His Majesty's Government reciprocate the desire of the Italian Government to achieve an early cessation of the hostilities between Greece and Turkey, and to take all possible steps to have the way for a durable peace both between Greece and Turkey and between the Allies and Turkey. They deeply appreciate the courtesy of the Italian Government in proposing that for this purpose a conference should still be held at Venice, although modified in form and scope from that originally suggested, and that its meeting be expedited by the despatch of immediate invitations to Athens, Constantinople and Angora.

3. His Majesty's Government have, however, been impressed by the recent joint recommendation of the three High Commissioners at Constantinople to their respective Governments to the effect that any invitation to the Kemalist Government to a conference at this stage would be undesirable owing to the extravagant hopes raised at Angora by the recent Turkish victories and the danger that the Allied invitation might be regarded by Kemal at this moment as a sign of Allied weakness. In the view of His Majesty's Government, the situation in Anatolia should be allowed to develop until an armistice is concluded or the military situation is stabilised before the Allied Governments decide whether a conference should be called, and, if so, what its nature should now be. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government agree with the Italian Government that the proposal to hold a conference at Venice, where the Allied Powers were to be represented by their High Commissioners, and where the latter were merely to explain and recommend to the acceptance of the Governments of Athens, Constantinople and Angora the resolutions of the Paris Conference of last March, is now out of date. His Majesty's Ambassadors at Rome and Paris have already been instructed to explain his point of view to the Italian and French Governments.

4. For the rest, the Italian Government will doubtless realise that for the moment the presence of the Allied High Commissioners will be more urgently required at Constantinople than at Venice owing to the rapidly changing local situation and the constant need for decisions on the spot which they alone are competent to take.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

F.O. 371/7886/E. 9137

F.O. 424/254, pp. 183-184, No. 310

No. 163

British Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty

(Received September 11.)

No. 301. Telegraphic.

DURING interview this evening, Sunday, Nouredin asked me to explain why British troops were being sent from Gibraltar to Smyrna, which he had gathered from the press. He seemed to think they were [? intended to] support Greek army. Rumour was without foundation. Mustapha Kemal arrived this evening, Sunday and is staying at Cordelio north side Smyrna Bay.

(Repeated to Senior Naval Officer. Afloat, Constantinople, for information General Officer Commanding-in-chief and British High Commissioner).

F.O. 424/254, p. 188. No. 323

No. 164

War Office to General Harington, Constantinople

11/9/22, 5 p.m.

Unparaphrased

See telegram No. 374 of today's date from Curzon to Rumbold.

As Cabinet do not intend to hold Chanak we do not propose to reinforce there; you can evacuate at your discretion, after informing Allied Generals. Evacuation might be postponed if French and Italian troops are also placed in Chanak, but we do not wish the position to arise of British troops alone being in Chanak and forced to evacuate, either after some public declaration by Kemal calling upon them to do so, or after a military threat on their part. Before evacuation any Turkish guns left in Chanak area should be destroyed.

As we do not intend to defend the Ismid Peninsula you may, at your discretion, also withdraw these troops.

We shall endeavour to secure a declaration by the Allies that they will not allow Kemalists to transfer troops from Asia to the European side and the Navy have instructions to prevent transport from being used for that purpose; if our Allies do not co-operate we shall act alone in that respect.

We are not satisfied that Gallipoli shall be held by French and Italians alone; therefore we suggest that troops at Chanak should be evacuated to Gallipoli.

Do you require the additional battalion from Malta in the above circumstances?

F.O. 371/7872

No. 165

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty

September 11, 1922

(Received September 11.)

No. 302.

Telegraphic.

FOR Foreign Office from consul-general, Smyrna:—

(No. 69.)

"Mustapha Kemal Pasha arrived here yesterday afternoon, Sunday, 10th September, and will administer the country in the name of the Great National Assembly. I should be glad to be instructed as soon as possible to what extent His Majesty's Government has recognised or intends to recognise that Government.

(Addressed to Foreign Office Repeated to Constantinople for British High Commissioner.)"

F.O. 424/254, p. 188, No. 324

No. 166

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 12th September, 1922

No. 799

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith copy of a letter which I have addressed to General Harington in reply to his letter to me of the 7th September regarding the protection to be afforded to the Sultan.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 371/7889/E. 9438

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 166

Lieutenant General Sir Charles H. Harington to Sir H. Rumbold and to the Senior Naval Officer (Constantinople) H.M.S. "AJAX"

September 7th, 1922

Secret.

C.R.A.F./1528/3.

Your Excellency,

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith for your information copy of War Office letter No. 0152/6134 (D.M.O. & I) dated August 22nd, 1922.

I beg to draw Your Excellency's/your attention to paragraph 3 of the War Office letter regarding the measures to be taken for the protection of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

Will Your Excellency please inform the Senior Naval Officer (Constantinople), what accommodation will be required and will the Senior Naval Officer please inform me in what ship the accommodation will be reserved, so that I may arrange any escort that may be necessary on shore to enable His Imperial Majesty to reach the ship.

I have etc.,

(Signed) C.H. HARRINGTON
*Lieutenant General,
 Commanding-in-Chief,
 The Allied Forces of Occupation (Turkey).*

F.O. 371/7889/E. 9438

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 166

War Office to General Sir C. Harington (Constantinople)

WAR OFFICE, 22nd August, 1922

Secret.

0152/6134/(D.M.O. & I.)

Sir,

I am commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter C.R.A.F. No. 3292/L of the 5th inst., in which you ask for certain advice and instructions in view of the situation which has arisen owing to the concentration of Greek troops on the Frontiers of Thrace, and the threat of a similar concentration of Kemalist forces in the Ismid Peninsula.

I am to say that the telegrams and letters sent to you personally by the Secretary of State and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff since the despatch of your letter under reply, as well as the official communications from the War Office, will no doubt have given you the advice and information you require on most of the points raised in your letter.

As regard the person of the Sultan himself, the Council consider that you should take all precautions for his safety, and that preparatory arrangements should be made with the Navy to provide accommodation for him in one of His Majesty's Ships, should it become unsafe for him to remain in Constantinople.

I am to add that the Council concur in your appreciation of the situation from the point of view of International Law.

I am, etc.,

(Signed) B.B. CUBITT

F.O. 371/7889/E. 9438

INCLOSURE 3 IN No. 166

Sir H. Rumbold to General Sir C. Harington

CONSTANTINOPLE, 11th September, 1922

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant forwarding me copy of a letter from the War Office, dated the 22nd ultimo, and drawing my attention to paragraph 3 thereof, regarding the measures to be taken for the protection of the Sultan.

2. The Senior Naval Officer at Constantinople, to whom a copy of your letter under reply was likewise sent, informs me that, having referred the matter to the Commander-in-Chief for instructions, Admiral Webb has now received a reply directing him that "he should be guided by the instructions of the High Commissioner".

3. If and when I hear that there is serious likelihood of the Sultan requiring protection in Constantinople itself or desiring to leave the City, I will consult immediately with yourself and the Senior Naval Officer.

I have, etc.

(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 371/7889/E. 9438

No. 167

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*CONSTANTINOPLE, September 12, 1922
(Received September 18.)

No. 801.

My Lord,

ALTHOUGH I have reported by telegraph every important development here during the last ten days, it may be useful to describe in broad outline in a single despatch the course of events since I wrote my despatch No. 780 of the 2nd September.

2. Only a few hours after I had drafted that despatch I received a telegram from Sir H. Lamb to the effect that the military situation of the Greeks had become desperate, that Ushak had been abandoned, and that the Greek army were flying and appeared to be incapable of further resistance. Subsequent events showed that this telegram did not overstate the gravity of the situation, so far as the southern army was concerned, though for a very short time it looked as though the disaster in the neighbourhood of Ushak had not been complete. During this brief interval of comparative hopefulness it was thought that General Tricoupis's forces had re-established contact with the main body of the retreating army and that the Greeks might find it possible to make a stand on a line in the neighbourhood of Alashehr.

3. Neither of these hopes was realised. The belief that the Greeks might rally on an interior line was finally disposed of on or about the 5th September by a report from the British military representative at Smyrna, who had personally visited the front, that he had found 15,000 men fleeing in disorder. The fate of General Tricoupis and his troops remained uncertain for a day or two. On the 6th September the Angora representative in Constantinople announced, on the strength of official information from Angora, that General Tricoupis had been taken prisoner. The news was received with some scepticism. It was confirmed on the following day. It is said that General Tricoupis received the first intimation of his promotion to the post of commander-in-chief, which had in the meantime been decided in Athens, from Mustapha Kemal Pasha himself. This, if not strictly true, is *ben trovato*.

4. It is unnecessary to dwell on the subsequent military developments inland from Smyrna. The Kemalists occupied centre after centre. By the 8th September the Greeks had completed all arrangements to evacuate Smyrna and to wind up the civil administration. On the 9th September the advanced cavalry of the Kemalist entered the city.

5. The Greek army in the Broussa area, consisting of three divisions, still remains in being. The *moral* of the troops appears to be better than it was in the

seuth, and it seems probable that the Greeks are in a position to liquidate the situation in that region in a more orderly fashion than in the Smyrna hinterland. They are however, making all preparations to embark their troops as soon as possible.

6. The first concern of the British authorities here on receipt of the news that the plight of the Greeks was desperate was to do everything possible to avert disorder and danger to the British community at Smyrna. Admiral Brock left for that place on board the "Iron Duke" on the 2nd September. The "King George V" followed the next day. A number of destroyers were also sent. The Allied Powers followed suit....* quarters, especially in the shops. Processions of demonstrators have for several days paraded the streets. High-water mark was reached on the evening of the 10th September when an enormous crowd of people surged across the bridge from Stamboul to Galata and made its way to "Liberty Hill," on the confines of the town at the other side of Pera. A great many windows were smashed in certain quarters, and similar damage has been done on a smaller scale in the course of other demonstrations. As a rule the window-breaking has been indiscriminate. It has mostly taken place in quarters where Christians predominate, but there is no evidence that Christian houses or shops have been expressly singled out, except perhaps in some of the outlying villages. The only important cases which have come to my notice in which particular buildings have been deliberately attacked in the town are those of the Greek military mission in the main street of Pera, and the headquarters of the Turkish Opposition Party known as the "Entente libérale" in Stamboul. Great nervousness prevails among Christians and anti-Kemalist Turks, but on the whole the demonstrations have been conducted in an orderly fashion. It is doubtful whether a similar occasion would have passed off so well in a European capital. It is nevertheless undesirable that such demonstrations should continue as they might easily take an uglier form. General Harington has given orders that they must now come to an end. French officers have been observed to take some little public part in the general rejoicing.

16. Government circles in Constantinople share the general elation, but I think the more responsible men realise that the Kemalist victory has not settled the Near Eastern question. Izzet Pasha in particular continues to wear a worried expression. On the 9th September he spoke to Mr. Ryan of his anxiety regarding Thrace. He referred to reports that the Greeks were again collecting troops there, and he enquired as to the possibility of the Bulgarians taking advantage of the difficulties of the Greeks in order to make a move on Adrianople. Izzet Pasha also feels that the new situation will make Angora more arrogant in its pretension to be the sole Government of Turkey. This is a consideration which must affect the Sultan, more particularly as His Majesty has been consistently hostile to the Kemalist leaders. I have as yet had no indication of his personal views, but I should

* Belgede uzunca bir cäsiklik var. Tamamı bulunamadı. B.N.Ş.

not be surprised to find that he was again nervous as to his tenure of the throne. So far, however, the only demonstration in the neighbourhood of the palace appears to have been friendly rather than otherwise.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Athens.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 424/254, pp. 223-224, No. 413

No. 168

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 12, 1922
(Received September 18.)

No. 806.

My Lord,

ON the 9th instant I received a telegram from the Moslem association at Nairobi asking me to convey to the Sultan "the offer of hearty congratulations of the Moslems of Nairobi at the Turkish successes in Asia Minor, with sincerest prayers for the complete restoration of the Khalifat and the further victory of Gazi Kemal Pasha's brave army." I took no action on the telegram but I imagine that it is only one of many similar communications which will have been received by Mustapha Kemal from Moslems in India, Egypt and elsewhere.

2. It can, I suppose, be affirmed with certainty that the unexpectedly sweeping successes of the Kemalist army over the Greeks will have stimulated Moslems all over the world and even have raised the question of Islam *versus* Christianity. Very much, therefore, seems to depend on developments during the next two or three weeks. Now that what remains of the Greek army appears to be in process of being able to extricate itself from Anatolia without further loss, an armistice seems superfluous, and I cannot but feel relieved by this fact. In the present mood of elation of the Kemalists, armistice negotiations would inevitably have proved a source of embarrassment to the Allied Powers, even although the Allied representatives would have declined to discuss questions outside the evacuation of Anatolia. A realisation by the Kemalists that the command of the sea by the Allies can effectually prevent the Kemalist army from crossing to Thrace must inevitably have a sobering effect both on the Kemalists and Moslem opinion generally.

3. I have noticed slight indications that the French have been somewhat taken aback and are slightly apprehensive at the extent of the Kemalist successes.

F. 26

They are beginning to realise, even although it may be dimly at the moment, the potential danger of a strong and chauvinistic Turkey. This frame of mind may incline the French to a more loyal attitude in regard to the Near Eastern question.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 424/254, pp. 224-225, No. 414

No. 169

Lord Peel to the British Cabinet

Secret.

I circulate the following telegram which has been received from India, as I think that my colleagues will be interested to see the view of the situation taken by the Government of India.

PEEL

13th September 1922.

*From Viceroy, Foreign and Political Department, to Secretary of State for India,
11th September 1922*

1124—S. Greco-Turkish crisis must be expected to cause violent repercussion throughout the Islamic world, and may add considerably to our difficulties in India, on North-West Frontier and Afghanistan. We therefore earnestly beg that His Majesty's Government will give every possible weight to India's interest before reaching their decision. We recognise the immensity and complexity of the problem and the limited area of our own knowledge of the international situation, but India's interests, internally and externally, are so deeply involved that we dare not let this deter us from pressing our views. From India's standpoint, the essential thing is the restoration of the old cordial relations between Great Britain and Turkey, and fact that Greek *débacle* was preceded by Greek demand for Allies' evacuation of Constantinople seems to us to afford an opportunity. Whether our own proposals last February would still suffice seems very doubtful, they are at all events absolute minimum. In any case we earnestly beg that His Majesty's Government, whilst taking steps for adequate protection of minorities, will assume the leading rôle amongst Allies with which she is credited throughout the East, and will not suffer France and Italy to reap credit of taking the initiative in recognising fundamental change in ... position. Restoration of our old relations with Turkey would mean:—

(1) Immediate reconciliation with Muslem India as a whole, and crippling, if not extinguishing, of non-co-operation movement.

(2) Material strengthening of our position in Afghanistan and consequent easing of our frontier difficulties.

(3) Detachment of Turkey from Russia, and consequent set-back of Bolshevism.

Even if it should involve readjustment in our general Arabian policy, this would be compensated for by increased stability, the cutting down of our own commitments and eventual restoration of our general prestige and influence throughout the East. On the other hand, any attempt to rob the Turks of the legitimate fruits of their victory would awaken a storm much greater than before throughout Islam, and might, probably would, involve serious consequences to India.

C.P. 4186

F.O. 371/7872/E. 9331

No. 170

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty

September 13, 1922

(Received at Foreign Office, September 13.)

No. 311.

Telegraphic.

FOR Foreign Office, immediate. From British Consul-General, Smyrna, No. 70:—

Mustapha Kemal Pasha, whom I met more less fortuitously this evening, Tuesday, asked me to define my capacity. To my reply that I was the representative of the High Commissioner, Constantinople, he retorted that his Government considered itself in a state of war with Great Britain and therefore did not recognise High Commissioner, Constantinople, or myself either as his representative or as consul. (Corrupt group.) He would be justified in interning all British subjects; he did not, however, intend to do so, and we were free to leave if we liked. I request instructions urgently as to whether I should embark colony or not. Civil Governor, to whom Mustapha Kemal then referred me, assured me that I need not be in an anxiety regarding their safety until to-morrow night, Wednesday."

(Sent to Foreign Office; repeated High Commissioner, Constantinople.)

F.O. 424/254, pp. 194-195, No. 341

No. 171

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*CONSTANTINOPLE, September 13, 1922
(Received September 13)

No. 409.

Telegraphic.

SMYRNA telegram No. 70.

lest your instructions should not reach Sir H. Lamb in time, I am repeating this telegram, which contains my views, to him:—

"Subject to other instructions from His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs I consider that if Mustafa Kemal confirms in writing his statement that a state of war exist between Great Britain and Angora Government you should embark any British subjects who do not wish to stop in the event of your departure and you should come away yourself. We cannot afford to take risks. Openly declared intention of His Majesty's Government to hold Constantinople and Gallipoli Peninsula will doubtless still further inflame hostility of Angora Government to Great Britain, and Nationalists are capable of visiting this on British subjects.

"Kemal should however be reminded that His Majesty's Government have always declared their neutrality in the war between Greeks and Nationalists and that I have received frequent official notes from Angora Government addressed to me in my capacity as High Commissioner. How then does he explain his non-recognition of myself. You should also ascertain attitude of Kemal towards French and Italians. It is of course possible that Kemal's statement to you was a piece of insolent bluff".

(Repeated by Senior Naval Officer to Commander-in-chief, Smyrna, No. 65.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 196, No. 345

No. 172

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 13, 1922

No. 385. *Telegraphic**Urgent*

IF as appears from Harington's telegrams, Italians and French are acting in co-operation with British troops in holding Chanak position and Ismid line, it would seem to be a pity to withdraw from either position except in case of serious

military risk. These positions, which as long as they are held by the Allies, Kemal is not likely to attack, may constitute a useful pawn in negotiations with him.

F.O. 424/254, p. 200, No. 353

D.B.F.P., I, XVIII, p. 24, No. 26

No. 173

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Lamb (Smyrna)

(Sent by the Admiralty.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 13, 1922

No. 29.

Telegraphic. En clair.

YOUR telegram No. 70 of 13th September: Colony.

I approve action recommended by Sir H. Rumbold in his telegram No. 409, repeated Smyrna No. 65 of 13th September. You should act accordingly and embark yourself with least possible loss of time, together with as many of colony as you can persuade to accompany you.

Inform us whether similar action has been taken by Mustapha Kemal with regard to your colleagues.

(Repeated to Constantinople, unnumbered.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 201, No. 355

No. 174

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 301, Telegraphic (by bag)) and Rome (No. 270, Telegraphic (R))

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 13, 1922

MUSTAPHA KEMAL'S attitude.

12th September, Mustapha Kemal informed Sir H. Lamb that he considered himself at war with Great Britain and did not recognise His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople or Sir H. Lamb as Sir H. Rumbold's representative or as consul-general. He said he would be justified in interning British subjects, but he did not mean to do so.

Civil Governor of Smyrna, however, told Sir H. Lamb that he need not fear for safety of British subjects until night of 13th September.

Admiral Brock has asked Mustapha Kemal to confirm in writing his declaration about state of war.

Sir H. Lamb has been instructed that if Kemal confirms declaration he is to leave Smyrna with all British subjects who wish to accompany him.

Sir H. Lamb has also been instructed to report Kemal's attitude towards other consuls and to remind him of neutrality of His Majesty's Government in Graeco-Kemalist conflict and of fact that Angora Government have frequently addressed Sir H. Rumbold as His Majesty's High Commissioner.

You should inform Government to which you are accredited.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 220.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 201, No. 356

D.B.F.P., I, XVIII, pp. 23-24, No. 25

No. 175

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 13, 1922

No. 271. *Telegraphic. R.*

YOUR telegram No. 271 of 10th September: Conversation with Nizami Pasha.

I observe that you report Osman Nizami Pasha as deeply deploring, on behalf of Fathy Bey, that His Majesty's Government refused to receive latter, who had been specially sent by Mustapha Kemal to ascertain our views and wishes, and refusal to receive whom was regarded by Kemal "as a personal slight." This absurd and belated attempt to throw responsibility for recent Turkish actions upon attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Fathy Bey has received wide circulation in press and merits emphatic repudiation. No intimation was made to us that Fathy Bey came on special mission from Kemal. He is not even Foreign Minister of that Government, as was Yussuf Kemal Bey, with whom I spent many hours in fruitless conversations in March last. He did not ask Prime Minister to see him, nor did His Majesty's Government refuse to receive him. On the contrary, after he had already had conversation with my private secretary, I asked, being unable, owing to medical treatment in country, to receive him myself, that he should be specially invited to Foreign Office to make full statement of his case to Sir W. Tyrrell and Mr. Lindsay. This he did, and when it was found that he had nothing to propose beyond terms of National Pact, it was felt unnecessary to pursue the matter, the more so as at that time we were arranging for joint conference of Allied High Commissioners with Turkish and Greek representatives, and that negotiations with Kemal by any single Power had always been regarded by us as inconsistent with loyalty to the alliance. You may make such use of this explanation as you think desirable.

(Repeated to Paris (by bag.), No. 302; Constantinople, No. 386; and Athens, No. 221.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 200, No. 354

No. 176

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean (via Constantinople), to Admiralty

(Received September 13, 1922)

No. 312. Telegraphic.

FOR British High Commissioner, immediate:—

"In view of Mustapha Kemal's interview with Sir Harry Lamb, I am writing a letter which will be sent to-morrow morning, Wednesday, asking him to confirm statement that he considers a state of war exist between Great Britain and the Angora Government. This is opposed to Nouredin Pasha's statement. Have you any further instructions?"

(Addressed High Commissioner, Constantinople; repeated Admiralty and for information of Foreign Office.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 195, No. 242

No. 177

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty

September 13, 1922

(Received September 14.)

No. 318. Telegraphic.

FOR British High Commissioner:—

"Letter from Mustapha Kemal received. Its nature is considered satisfactory. Substance of letter follows."

(Sent to Constantinople. Repeated to Admiralty.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 203, No. 362

No. 178

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean (via Constantinople), to Admiralty
(Received September 14, 1922.)

No. 325. *Telegraphic.*

FOLLOWING letter, dated 12th September, was given to [corrupt group] Kemal by my chief of staff at 10 A.M. this morning, Wednesday:—

"Your Excellency,

"Sir Harry Lamb, representative of His Britannic Majesty's High Commission, has informed me that at interview which you accorded him this afternoon, Tuesday, you stated [corrupt group] National Assembly Angora was in state of war with Great Britain. On Sunday, 10th September, 1922, when I saw Nouredin Pasha he denied this categorically. In order to avoid the possibility of any misunderstanding I have the honour to request that if this is a correct statement of your views you will be good enough to confirm it in writing so that I may be in a position to inform His Majesty's Government and those of the Allied Powers authoritatively of this fact."

Mustapha said reply would be sent at 5 p.m. to-day, Wednesday. He added that Sir Harry Lamb had misunderstood him, and was obviously perturbed at the communication.

(Sent to Constantinople for British High Commissioner. Repeated to Admiralty).

F.O. 424/254, p. 203, No. 361

No. 179

Admiral O. de B. Brock, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Sir H. Rumbold,
Constantinople

H.M.S. "IRON DUKE," SMYRNA,
 14th September, 1922

No. 742.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to forward a copy of the letter which Mustapha Kemal Pasha sent yesterday, and of which the substance was telegraphed briefly yesterday evening for your information.

The letter was brought off to the "IRON DUKE" at 5.0 P.M. by Mustapha Kemal's Chief of Staff, who handed it to me. I read it in his presence, acknowledged its receipt verbally and then returned the Turkish Officer to the shore in my barge.

2. My French and Italian Colleagues, Admirals Dumesnil and Pepe were present, and were made acquainted with the contents of Mustapha Kemal's letter; a fact which the Turkish Officer could not fail to observe, although they took no part in the brief conversation which succeeded the delivery of the letter. The two Admirals were on board for the purpose of discussing the refugee question. I had arranged that this discussion should co-incide with the receipt of Mustapha Kemal's reply, since it would indicate that the matter was one which did not concern Great Britain alone. I need scarcely add that I had made this point clear to my Allied Colleagues beforehand.

3. With regard to the letter itself, it will be observed that an attempt is made to reproduce verbatim part of the conversation which I had with Nouredin Pasha on Sunday last 10th September. It is a somewhat free interpretation of what actually occurred, but the only point of interest in this connection is the translation of Nouredin's expression that he hoped our relations would become more cordial in the future. In the letter he is represented as saying "il n'existe pas actuellement de relations politiques entre nous et l'ouverture de ces relations est sujette à certaines formalités."

I have etc.

(Signed) O. de B. BROCK
Admiral,
Commander-in-chief

F.O. 371/7895/E. 9978

F.O. 371/7893

INCLOSURE IN No. 179

*Moustapha Kemal Pacha à S. E. l'Amiral Commandant en Chef de B. Brock, à bord de
L'IRON DUKE en rade de Smyrne*

Privée,

Excellence,

J'ai bien eu un entretien privé avec l'honorable Sir Harry Lamb, mais non pas une entrevue avec un représentant accrédité auprès du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie. Quant à l'entrevue de Votre Excellence avec Son Excellence Noureddyn Pacha sur les points qui font l'objet de la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser, la conversation m'a été rapportée de la façon suivante:

S. Exc. l'Amiral:— Puis-je demander la position du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie vis-à-vis la Grande-Bretagne, et si ce Gouvernement se considère en état de guerre avec elle?

S. Exc. Noureddyn Pacha: — Pour pouvoir répondre à cette question je dois à mon tour demander si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique se trouve en guerre ou en amitié avec nous.

Après que ces questions furent examinées amicalement entre les deux parties,

S. Exc. l'Amiral: — Puisque nos relations sont celles de paix, il est évident qu'entre nous doivent être respectés les usages admis entre les nations.

S. Exc. Noureddyn Pacha: — Sans doute, Excellence, seulement il n'existe pas actuellement de relations politiques entre nous et l'ouverture de ces relations est sujette à certaines formalités.

Je m'associe au Général Noureddyn Pacha dans l'avis et la manière de voir ainsi exprimés, et j'ai l'honneur de vous soumettre à titre privé, et en réponse à votre lettre privée, que les deux Gouvernements pourraient bien établir les relations politiques en suivant les formes usuelles.

Agréez, Excellence, les expressions de ma haute considération.

Le Président de la Grande Assemblée Nationale,

Commandant en Chef.

(Sd) MOUSTAPHA KEMAL

Smyrne,

le 13 Septembre 1922.

F.O. 371/7895/E. 9978

F.O. 371/7893

No. 180

Telegram (by Telephone) from Paris

(Received September 14, 1922.)

No. 464. Telegraphic

MUSTAPHA KEMAL'S statement to Sir H. Lamb.

I communicated to M. Poincaré the sense of your telegram No. 301 and have received in reply a note stating that the French consul-general at Smyrna, in informing his Government of this "regrettable incident," added that he intended, at the request of his British colleague, to approach Mustapha Kemal on the subject.

F.O. 424/254, p. 205, No. 366

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 14, 1922

(Received September 15.)

No. 415. *Telegraphic.*

YOUR telegram No. 267 to Rome.

I agree that Venice Conference proposal as originally conceived is now out of date. It seems to me most important, however, that some conference of Allies and belligerents should be arranged as soon as possible.

Military situation is already almost entirely [?] decided] in sense that if evacuation of Brussa [?] area] is complete in a few days, as appears likely, belligerents will no longer be in contact. This is the best moment to put forward proposal for conference on basis sufficiently modified to ensure attendance of Kemalists. Such conference will at least give us breathing space. If we allow situation to drift, Kemal will not rest quiet. Kemal told army that first objective was Mediterranean. Second is almost certainly Thrace. Unless negotiations supervene, he will endeavour to get there via Constantinople or Chanak.

We cannot trust French one inch in present situation, but they would find it difficult to oppose concrete suggestion for conference, and they are sufficiently hesitant to make them refrain from further commitments to Kemalists before conference took place.

If we delay, our position here and at Dardanelles may in near future be so threatened that it can only be safeguarded by considerable military effort, for which we are not prepared. Danger in Irak will also be aggravated, for Kemalists are certainly concerned, at least indirectly, in attacks reported in the "Times" of 8th September.

The conference I have in view would be one having for its object bringing about formal cessation of hostilities. The basis would be examination by Allies and belligerents of questions of [group undecypherable] Thrace, the Straits and minorities. This need not prejudice declared policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to Straits, Constantinople, &c.

I invite your attention to account telegraphed on 12th September by correspondent of "Daily Mail" at Smyrna of his interview with Mustapha Kemal. The latter's language, though bombastic, is significant.

F.O. 424/254, p. 210, No. 379

No. 182

*G.O.C. Allied Forces, Constantinople, to War Office**Despatched 0100 14/9/22**Received 1000 15/9/22**Paraphrase.**2267 cipher.**1st of 2 parts.*

Following from Lord Plumer.

I arrived this morning at Constantinople. I have seen General Harington and discussed situation fully with him and he has shown me his telegram No. 2262 of September 13th. It is only in accordance with this that I am expressing any views on situation. On my way here I saw Commander of troops at Chanak and through him was able to appreciate situation there. I am sure General Harington's arrangements have been absolutely correct and sound. Situation is in my opinion serious and requires very firm and decided action without delay. It is quite clear Kemalists mean to try and impose their conditions on Allies preferably by threatening force; but actually by force if no result is produced by threats.

Last part.

If things are allowed to drift further it is absolutely certain we shall be driven into a corner militarily and politically. Allied Governments must state now definitely what conditions they are prepared to accede to and must warn Mustapha Kemal that it will mean war with all Allied Powers if any attempt is made to exceed those terms or to forestall them. It is essential that our troops shall at all chief points be accompanied by French and Italian troops, whoever small their numbers. I think that if this is done it is extremely unlikely Kemal will attempt to use force, but we must show that we are all in earnest and united by bringing up all the troops and taking all military precautions as is being done by Harington.

F.O. 371/7889/E. 9491

No. 183

*General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office**Despatched 2300 14/9/22**Received 1000 15/9/22**Paraphrase.**2270 cipher.**1st of 3 parts.*

Many thanks. Position in Chanak is now quite clear. As long as I can I shall show bold Allied front without getting seriously committed retiring if necessary as rearguard to Gallipoli, sending battalion from Malta and squadron up to Scutari front. I shall also as long as I can show as bold an allied front as possible on Yarmje frontier if forced on Maltepe-Geuk Dag-Chibukli line. If as reckoned on French send troops to hold their sector we could put up stubborn defence with aid of guns of allied fleets against attack by say 4 divisions and could hold till arrival of reinforcements. We should at same time have to look out for trouble in Constantinople.

Part 2.

If force not sent by French, British could only hold reconnaissance line from Bostanjik-Chamlia Constantinople. To talk of holding Constantinople for long without Scutari is useless. Mustapha Kemal knows quite well that we cannot stay in Constantinople for long if he gets to Scutari though we will do our best. It is at mercy of (1 group undec) heights on Asiatic side. As he has stated, Mustapha's objective is Chatalja which he states must force British to evacuate Constantinople. With best will in world Navy could not stop troops crossing at all points of Bosphorus and Constantinople would rise against us if Kemalists were on Asiatic shores.

Last part.

Kemal will in my opinion, based on information I have, prepare his threats in next few days and will state his terms. If Powers act together he will stop his attacks. If bulk of his terms cannot be got by conference with Powers he is determined to try to get them by force in which case preparations must be made by Powers to meet it and crush him and I will hang on as an advanced guard while Powers send large reinforcements, and this we are quite prepared to do. French have sent detachment only to Yarmje so far but² sending Chanak. Italians have sent to both frontiers.

F.O. 371/7889/E. 9492

No. 184

*Senior Officer, 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, to Admiralty**(Received September 15, 1922.)*

No. 406.

Telegraphic.

FOLLOWING from Sir Harry Lamb for Foreign Office, No. 71, and High Commissioner, Constantinople:—

"Your telegram 13th September.

"Attitude of Mustapha Kemal towards my French, and more particularly my Italian [group omitted] has obviously [?] been] more cordial [?] than to] myself, and I do not think he has raised [?] with them] question of official recognition, though I find both of them considerably embarrassed about ambiguity of their position. Situation is now further complicated by the almost entire destruction of all but the Mussulman quarter of the town, which I am convinced has been [?] arranged accordingly]. Consulates except Spanish [?] Belgian and Norwegian have been burned out, and the American consul has already left. British colony has been practically all evacuated, and French and Italians are being rapidly embarked. I would suggest that I place British interests *pro forma* in charge of Spanish consulate and come. As Mustapha does not recognise me officially, I can make no formal notification to him. Have sent Vice-Consul Hole and part of staff with archives to Constantinople, retaining [?] Messrs.] Gout, Urquhart, Chalkias and Miss Routh."

F.O. 424/254, pp. 210-211, No. 380

No. 185

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 15, 1922

*(Received September 15.)*No. 418. *Telegraphic.**Very urgent*

MY telegram No. 415.

At the request of my Allied colleagues we discussed the situation this morning. I found that they are in entire agreement with views expressed in paragraphs 2 and 4 of my above mentioned telegram.

On information at their disposal they consider that Mustapha Kemal Pasha will wait a few days to see whether he is likely to obtain by diplomatic means, *i.e.*, by a conference, what he wants in Thrace, &c. If, however, he comes to the

conclusion that Allied Powers are delaying the taking in hand of a settlement he will take advantage of present elation of his troops and of remainder of fine season to advance against Constantinople and the Straits. This would bring him into conflict with the Allies.

The three High Commissioners therefore consider that Allied Governments must face the prospect of war with Mustafa Kemal Pasha unless they act without further delay in the sense of summoning a conference.

It is true that as long as Allies maintain control of the seas Mustapha Kemal Pasha cannot transport troops across the Sea of Marmora or Straits, but denial by Allies of use of sea for this purpose would be tantamount to a declaration of war against Kemalists.

French High Commissioner pointed out that even if Mustapha Kemal Pasha could not transport his troops to Europe he had other means of stirring up trouble in Thrace. According to his information, Greek forces in Thrace are thoroughly demoralised, and soldiers are boarding trains and forcing officials to transport them. He also said that Greeks are inviting reprisals by arresting Mussulmans in Thrace. We have indications that a considerable number of Kemalist sympathisers are prepared for action in Thrace. One of this morning's papers states that a revolution has broken out in Adrianople, and that Greek officers there have proclaimed a republic.

If Allied Governments are not prepared to allow Kemalists to impose their conditions on them they should lose no time in reinforcing their troops in the Straits and at Constantinople to the utmost possible extent and in shortest time. French High Commissioner laid great stress on necessity for Allied solidarity at this juncture.

Allied High Commissioners originally recommended that invitations to conference should not be issued until an armistice had been concluded or there was stabilisation of front (see my telegram No. 388).

They consider, in practice, this condition is fulfilled, as hostilities have now practically ceased owing to absence of contact of Greeks and Turks. They recommend that a conference should be summoned as soon as possible, and that it is urgent necessity that three Allied Governments should be in agreement before conference assembles as to extent of concessions they are disposed to make to Turks in Thrace, &c.

I understand that my colleagues are telegraphing to their Governments in above sense.

F.O. 424/254, p. 214, No. 390

D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, pp. 25-26, No. 27

No. 186

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 15, 1922

(Received September 16.)

No. 417. *Telegraphic.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs called yesterday evening to say that Central Government hoped now that Nationalists had liquidated situation in Anatolia, Allied Powers would at once take in hand settlement in Thrace, &c. The Central Government hope that a conference will be called immediately, and in view of fact that it has been suggested in Nationalist quarters that there should be a preliminary conference at Smyrna, Central Government consider that Allied Powers should declare at once that conference will be held at Venice. As Smyrna has been burnt down, a preliminary conference there would, anyhow, be out of the question. It seems to me clear that Central Government, whilst rejoicing at successes of Kemalists over Greeks, are nervous of Kemal and anxious that Allied Powers should serve in some sort as a buffer between themselves and Mustapha Kemal.

*F.O. 424/254, p. 213, No. 389**D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, p. 26, No. 28*

No. 187

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, September 15, 1922

(Received September 15.)

No. 443. *Telegraphic.*

MY telegram No. 440.

Young American journalist gave following information this afternoon:—

He saw Kemal in Smyrna on 13th September at noon. Kemal was ready to answer questions, and said he would be in Constantinople within eight days. When asked what he would do if British opposed him, he replied, why should they oppose him? He had no quarrel with Britain, but only with Greeks. But, anyhow, he would be in Constantinople in eight days' time. He was also going to have Thrace up to the River Maritza line. When asked how he would get there, he replied, across the sea; he had made all preparations for crossing.

Kemal said he was going to have Mosul. Vilayet was thoroughly Turkish, but he admitted that Mosul town was not Turkish, but Arab. But he must have Mosul town as well, as it was necessary to the life of the vilayet. He laid no claim to Mesopotamia, and would not try to take it.

Only question which Kemal would not answer was his intentions in regard to Syria. He merely smiled.

Informant had represented himself as a French journalist, and does, indeed, represent French newspapers.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 209, No. 276

No. 188

British Embassy, Paris, to Foreign Office

September 15th, 1922

No 2157

His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the undermentioned paper.

Reference to previous paper

To Foreign Office tel. No. 464 of September 14th.

Enclosure

Name and date
Monsieur Poincaré

September 14th.

F.O. 371/7888/E. 9351

Subject
Mustapha Kemal's statements to
Sir H. Lamb.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 188

Note de M. Poincaré à Lord Hardinge sur l'attitude de Mustapha Kemal vis-à-vis de l'Angleterre

Par une note en date de ce jour, l'Ambassade d'Angleterre a bien voulu informer le Gouvernement de la République d'un incident qui s'est produit à Smyrne entre Mustapha Kemal et le Consul Général de Sa Majesté Britannique.

M. Poincaré s'empresse de faire connaître à Son Excellence Lord Hardinge que le Consul Général de France à Smyrne en lui rendant compte de ce regrettable incident, a ajouté qu'il comptait faire, à la demande de son collègue britannique, une démarche à ce sujet auprès de Mustapha Kemal.

PARIS, le 14 Septembre 1922

F.O. 371/7888/E. 9351

No. 189

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 16, 1922

*Telegraphic. Very urgent. No distribution**Private and Secret*

Your No. 415.

I think I should send for your personal guidance confidential indication of lines upon which our policy is proceeding. Cabinet yesterday was gravely impressed with danger of position in which victorious Kemalist army may, either now, or even while a Conference is sitting, ignore Allied unity, and attempt a military move either upon Straits or Constantinople, or even seek to interfere in Thrace. They felt that if we are to maintain our position in a Conference, it must be supported by adequate force.

Accordingly two more battalions and two squadrons of aeroplanes are being sent to Harington. Arrangements are also being made for further reinforcements by a division if required later on: and Dominions Governments are being approached. Meanwhile I am addressing Roumania and Yugo-Slav Governments, pointing out to them menace to their own interests of a Kemalist descent upon Europe, and a Kemalist solution of Straits question, and am offering to support their admission to European Conference to construct new Treaty, if they will give an earnest of their sincerity by providing troops without delay for defence of Constantinople and the Straits.

I propose to go to Paris next week for a private conversation with Poincaré, being convinced that only by Franco-British understanding can a solution be reached. If I have obtained or can promise military reinforcements above referred to, I shall be in a position to exert strong pressure upon him and to claim similar military support from France. As regards Conference I agree with you that early meeting of such a gathering is indispensable. My idea has been to propose at Paris, that it shall be summoned without delay, that it shall be Peace Conference with power to make new Treaty, that it shall consist of the Great Powers, and, upon understanding already referred to, of States locally concerned, viz. Roumania and Yugo Slavia, that Greece and Turkey shall of course be present, and that any Power possessing local interest e.g. Bulgaria shall if thought necessary be heard. As to locale of such a conference Italy is pressing hard for conversion of Venice meeting as originally planned into a full European Treaty Conference. Choice lies between Venice and Paris, since for reasons of expediency we do not propose to press for selection of London. Between France and Italy, there is not in respect of loyalty, much to choose; but we are rather afraid of an Italian chairman, playing off France against England and always coming down on the side of former.

Drawback of either Paris or Venice is that Kemal would not attend, and that his representative might either not have full powers or be liable to be thrown over on his return.

I am not clear however whether the conference that you suggest is satisfied by above conception, or whether you still have in mind a local meeting, devoted as you say, to bring about formal cessation of hostilities and to examine larger points at issue. I am sceptical about desirability of two conferences but await your views on this point, and also your own idea of best manner and place in which conference whether major or minor should be held.

Alleged Turkish atrocities at Smyrna, if confirmed, strengthen our position and will secure popular support to strong action which I have foreshadowed.

Greatest confidence is felt in judgment both of Harington and yourself, and the more freely you communicate with me, if necessary confidentially, the better will it be.

F. O. 371/7891

No. 190

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 307. Telegraphic (by bag) and Rome (No. 274, Telegraphic)

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 16, 1922

YOUR telegram No. 363 of 14th September (my telegram No. 270 of 13th September): Mustapha Kemal's attitude.

Mustapha Kemal replied to Admiral Brock that his interview with Sir H. Lamb was not an official interview with a representative accredited to Angora. He says that although we are not at war formalities are essential before political relations can be opened. He suggests unofficially that political relations might well be established between the two Governments.

Please inform Government to which you are accredited.

(Addressed to Paris. No. 307 (by bag), and Rome, No. 274; repeated to Athens, No. 226.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 218, No. 404

No. 191

War Office to General Harington, Constantinople

Secret. Paraphrase. Clear the line.

Despatched 2200 16/9/22

91068 cipher D.D.M. & L. 16th September 1922.

1. It is intention of Cabinet, if the French agree at the conference mentioned in S. of S's telegram of to-day, to back their decision to resist Kemal by mobilising one and possibly two Divisions in addition to troops now being ordered to join you from Malta and Gibraltar. Your views are required (i) as to any modifications in normal composition of Divisions to suit your special conditions. We should prepare on a Horse Transport train basis. (ii) As to requirements in extra Divisional troops, especially Artillery, cavalry, or Tanks.

As regards order of despatch first Division, this must necessarily be automatic and would be as follows: on 14th day after mobilisation Infantry begin to embark and complete embarkation during third week arriving between 27th and 33rd day. The Divisional Artillery would begin to embark between 14th and 21st days and flow would be continuous. Their embarkation would be complete within four or five days of departure of last Infantry ship. Any Cavalry you might want would have to follow Divisional Artillery. 12 days average voyage from England to Constantinople.

2 As regards above-mentioned reinforcements from Malta and Gibraltar, last Battalion Gordon Highlanders and No. 10 6" Howitzer Battery from Malta and 1st Battalion North Stafford Regiment from Gibraltar are being sent you at once and will arrive on following dates:—

No. 10 6" Howitzer Battery with transport but less guns and horses and 1st Battalion Gordons from Malta in "Derbyshire" on 21st September.

North Staffords from Gibraltar and guns of No. 10 6" How. Battery from Malta in "Hecuba" on 27th September.

36 horses for No. 10 Battery in "Glangorm Castle" on 28th September.

We intend also to send as soon as possible another Medium Battery. Should this be horse or tractor drawn? Latter would be quickest as it could come from Gibraltar. Presume 6" How. is preferable to 60 pdr.

3. As regards possible operations do you consider (a) that Chanak position and safety of Dardanelles is vital to any operations on large scale on Bosphorus and (b) that it is practicable to build up an army further East without securing that passage. We regard Kemal's first probable move, should he decide to attack Allies, as occupation of Asiatic shore of Dardanelles. How is destination of reinforcements affected by this?

4. Equal effort by French is presumed by Cabinet decision. Should we therefore come to co-operation with French General Staff, would you like us to

press them, if they can send complete formations before we can, to make their first task the securing of the Chanak position and with what forces presuming we still hold that position. If, as is possible, Turkish pressure has compelled us to evacuate it before we can reinforce it in sufficient strength, do you regard recapture of it as your first task, and how is your general plan affected by such a consideration especially as regards length of time you could hold your Maltepe position.

5. We hope of course that it will not come to war but above are points on which we must have your views in case of such eventuality.

F.O. 371/7891/E. 9650

No. 192

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

16. 9. 1922

No. 874

THE KEMALIST OFFENSIVE: FETHİ BEY'S REPORT TO ANGORA.

A trustworthy informant, who is in very close contact with the Turkish Nationalist representative in Rome, has forwarded the following outline of a telegram sent, about the 25th August, from Fethi Bey, in Paris, to Angora, a repetition of which was sent to Rome:—

Fethi Bey referred in highly pessimistic terms to the attitude of the British Government towards Turkey. He expressed himself convinced that Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Curzon were bent on the destruction of Turkey and that their intention was to prolong the situation which then existed in the hope of exhausting the Turks and of imposing a disastrous peace on them. The two British statesmen hoped to win over France and Italy to their views by affording them alike compensation in the East, and concessions in other matters in which these two powers were interested.

Fethi Bey reported, in the same telegram, that his personal impressions regarding British intentions were confirmed by information which he had received from the French Foreign Office, to the effect that the British would use every endeavour to hinder the conclusion of a peace favourable to Turkey, unless the Greek army should meet with a serious reverse at the hands of the Kemalist troops.

The French Government, he pointed out, had received reliable information regarding the increasing demoralisation of the Greek Army and the political situation in Greece, where the economic situation had produced great discontent, and war weariness was everywhere apparent. Party dissensions in the Greek Chamber were also represented as being very acute.

Fethi Bey added that the Quai d'Orsay, whilst advising the Angora Government not to remain inactive at a moment when the Greek front in Anatolia

had been weakened by the transfer of troops to Thrace, considered that the Nationalists would be well advised to defer as far as possible to the Allied Powers. The French advised the adoption of a conciliatory attitude by Angora which should protest its willingness to lay down its arms when once the Turkish homelands of Anatolia and Thrace had been freed from the invader, and the independence and sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire clearly and definitely recognised. It would be inadvisable, in French opinion, to be too unyielding in other peace conditions.

* * *

On the 27th August, an independent informant in Paris was informed by Munir Bey, the confidential secretary of Reshad Nihad, that Fethi Bey had received a reply from Mustapha Kemal to the telegram quoted above.

In this reply, Mustafa Kemal informed Fethi Bey that he was unable to accept the latter's view that Great Britain was frankly hostile to Turkey. He had been assured on high authority that the British attitude was due rather to apprehension lest French influence should become paramount in the Near East.

Fethi Bey was directed to assure Great Britain that Turkey was not committed to France "to any great extent", and that she would welcome British friendship as an aid to her complete independence.

Fethi Bey was also directed by Mustafa Kemal to remember that he was merely an agent of the Great National Assembly, liable to account to that body, and that his personal feelings must be forgotten in the national interest.

No. 193

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, September 16, 1922

(Received September 16.)

No. 444 Telegraphic R.

ALLEGED that Kemal twice declared to newspaper correspondent that he was not at war with Great Britain.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 213, No. 387

Note by S. I. S. — *The second portion of the above report is classified A. 2, because Munir Bey is known to dislike Fethi Bey, and might be inclined to exaggerate the extent of any reproach which the latter might have received from Mustafa Kemal.

F.O. 371/7889

No. 194

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, September 16, 1922

(Received September 17.)

No. 448 Telegraphic.

YOUR telegram No. 38 to Sofia.

I informed Secretary-General at Ministry for Foreign Affairs of action taken by His Majesty's Government for which he expressed gratitude.

He said Serbia was loyal ally, and further details had been communicated to Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. Greek Government would, however, be grateful if His Majesty's Government could say word to Serb-Croat-Slovene Government with a view to their showing a little more activity.

Reports are arriving daily from intelligence centres confirming information received and stating that [? many] bands 1,200 to 1,500 strong were being formed with a core of ex-non-commissioned officers.

Greek information was to the effect that power was passing from Stamboliisky's hands into those of the military.

Secretary-General thought Mustapha Kemal and Bulgarians were bound sooner or later to quarrel over Thrace.

Deputy Chief of the General Staff told military attaché that rifles, machine guns and cannon are concealed near Bulgarian Thracian frontier. He believed that total strength of bands was between 10,000 to 20,000 men including Turks and Bulgarians under Bulgarian ex-officers. He has also definite news of Turkish irregular force forming at Istrandja and that Constantinople Turkish shipowner has contracted to bring them 10,000 to 20,000 rifles. Minister for Foreign Affairs has just learned that a komitaji raid has been fixed for 25th September.

It is impossible for me to obtain very reliable information as to *moral* of Thrace army, since I am exclusively dependent on Greek sources, and censorship has been recently extraordinarily severe with regard to news from Thrace. It is, however, rumoured that *moral* is not good.

(Repeated to Constantinople and Sofia.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 219, No. 406

No. 195

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 16, 1922

(Received September 25.)

No. 822

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that Izzet Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, called on me on the 14th instant to urge the desirability of the Allies immediately taking in hand, by means of a conference, the settlement of the questions of Eastern Thrace, the Straits, &c. I have reported in my telegram No. 417 what his Highness said on this subject.*

2. There is no doubt that the Sultan's Government is genuinely anxious that the Allies should summon a conference to meet as soon as possible at a place of their own choosing. One reason for this eagerness for a conference is anxiety as to Mustapha Kemal's next move. Should Mustapha Kemal attempt to advance on Constantinople, and even, owing to a weakness of the Allied forces, succeed in reaching Scutari, a serious situation would arise. It is to the interest of the moderate elements in the Turkish Government, and especially of those who wish to maintain the present Sultan, that the territorial questions, other than that of Anatolia, should be settled before the Kemalists take control of the capital.

3. In the course of our conversation I mentioned to Izzet Pasha the substance of the telegram sent by the correspondent of the "Daily Mail" to his paper after his interview with Mustapha Kemal. I alluded to the way in which Mustapha Kemal had spoken of the probability of a change in the person of the Sultan. Izzet Pasha admitted that the present Sultan was looked upon with hostility by many of his subjects. Mustapha Kemal could not do away with the House of Osman, but Izzet Pasha implied that a change of sovereign was not improbable.

4. The outlook for the Sultan is indeed gloomy. His Majesty has steadily refused to telegraph his congratulations to Mustapha Kemal on the latter's victory over the Greeks, although I understand that his Government advise him to do so. He attended a service at the mosque in the grounds of the Seraglio Palace for those who had fallen in the recent fighting and he went to the Mosque of the Conqueror yesterday where a similar service was held. It is significant that at least two of the important Turkish papers have passed this over in silence. Indeed, the Turkish press in the capital is now entirely Nationalist or Committee of Union and Progress in colour. The one anti-Nationalist paper, which was formed from a combination of the "Payam" and the "Sabah," has been dissolved.

* See No. 186.

5. I asked İzzet Pasha how he thought that the fusion between the Central and Angora Governments would be brought about. He was not very explicit in his reply. He affirmed with considerable emphasis, however, that he himself would never make any advances to the Nationalists. The Grand Vizier might take steps in that direction. He thought that a Grand Vizier would be appointed who would be acceptable to Turks of all shades.

I have, &c

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 424/254, pp. 316-317, No. 593

No. 196

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CAIRO, September 16, 1922
(Received September 27)

No. 743

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Turkish victory in Asia Minor appears, so far, to have had a slighter effect in Egypt than might have been anticipated.

In Alexandria, the town which is usually the first to respond to events affecting Turkey, there have been no public manifestations, and no overt acts of hostility to Greeks. The pleasure which is felt at Mustapha Kemal's sweeping success has chiefly taken the form of domestic conviviality, and hilarious banter in the native cafés.

A few individuals in the neighbourhood of Mansura and Zagazig have sent congratulatory telegrams to the Sultan of Turkey.

The vernacular press is naturally delighted, but, with the exception of newspaper which have a pan-Islamic tinge, such as "Al Afsar" and "Al Lewa-al-Masri" it uses moderate language.

Mohammed Bey Wahid, whose name will be familiar to your Lordship as the self-styled leader of the Egyptian "Liberal Party," and long friendly to us, has written letters to the press eulogising the French as the friends of Islam, and is alleged to be in communication with Prince Omar Toussoun and Mohammed Pasha Said, with a view to organising a pro-French demonstration.

I have recently conversed with King Fuad and with Tewfik Pasha Nessim on the subject of the Turkish victory. Tewfik Pasha expressed the view that Mustapha Kemal Pasha, having secured Anatolia, would, if he acted in accordance with his character, probably be content to rest on his laurels; he thought that if His

Majesty's Government now recognised him they would recover the friendly feelings of the Moslem East, and he remarked that the close sequence of the Turkish offensive upon General Townshend's visit to Angora had not passed unnoticed in Egypt. Neither he nor the King anticipated any co-operation between Mustapha Kemal and the Wahabis.

I have, &c

ALLENBY, F. M.
High Commissioner

F.O. 424/254. p. 363. No. 645

No. 197

Acting Secretary to the Cabinet to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

September 17th, 1922

Secret

Dear Lord Curzon,

Greco-Turkish Situation.

This is to remind you that at the Meeting of the Cabinet this morning it was agreed:—

- (1) That while using every effort to bring hostilities between the Turks and Greeks to a speedy end, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should continue to base his Near East Policy on the Agreement concluded by the Allies in Paris in March last;
- (2) That the maintenance of the control of the deep sea water separating Asia and Europe was a cardinal British interest, and any attempt by the Kemalists to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula should be resisted by force;
- (3) That the naval forces in that region should be increased by the provision of a patrolling flotilla with the object of preventing Kemalists gaining access to the Gallipoli Peninsula;
- (4) That some British troops should occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula along with the French troops now stationed there, and the Secretary of State for War should concert the necessary arrangements with the Commander-in-Chief, Constantinople, by transferring British troops from Chanak, or a battalion from Malta, or otherwise;
- (5) That in the event of the Kemalist forces making an attack on the Ismid lines, which are at the present moment held exclusively by British troops, the Commander-in-Chief should be at liberty to withdraw the latter to

Constantinople; but that any attempt on the part of Kemal to cross the Bosphorus and attack Constantinople should be resisted with the full strength of the British forces by sea and land;

- (6) That a joint report should be prepared by the War Office, Admiralty and Air Ministry on the policy to be followed in the event of Constantinople and the Ismid Peninsula being menaced by the Kemalists; *
- (7) That the President of the Board of Trade should consider the diversion of British ships to Smyrna to take away refugees, other than the British subjects who are being removed by the Admiralty.

Yours sincerely,

F.O. 371/7872

No. 198

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Received September 17, 1922)

No. 342. Telegraphic.

FOLLOWING received from Senior Officer, Third Light Cruiser Squadron:—

"The following resolutions were passed at a conference of Allied admirals and consuls held on board French 'Jean Bart' this afternoon, Saturday, to consider the question of relief for the refugees in Smyrna:—

"1. That the gravity [group corrupt] situation was such that immediate steps must be taken to prevent approximately 200,000, mostly Greeks, from starvation or massacre.

"2. That an appeal should be sent to the several Governments represented asking that the Greek Government be requested to send ships to Smyrna to evacuate these refugees.

"3. That the Italian admiral should call on Mustapha Kemal to-morrow morning, Sunday, to obtain his assent to these proposals.

"4. That in the event of Kemal allowing Greek ships into Smyrna, the Allied [? group omitted] should provide the necessary shipping. The American Red

NOTE.* The Acting Secretary has since been informed that a plan for the defence of Constantinople had already been prepared by the General Staff in consultation with the Admiralty and Air Ministry.

Copies to: The Prime Minister,

Mr. Chamberlain,

Sir R. Horne,

Sir L. Worthington Evans,

Lord Peel,

Mr. Churchill,

Lord Lee,

Mr. Stanley Baldwin Capt. Gurst.

Cross have promised to ensure feeding the [? refugees] pending evacuation, on the condition that they receive a definite assurance that this will be done at the earliest moment. They are already affording relief to 15,000."

F.O. 424/254, p. 220, No. 409

No. 199

G.O.C. Allied Forces, Constantinople, to War Office

Paraphrase.

Desp. 1800 18.9.22

Recd. 1000 19.9.22

2295 cipher 17th September, 1922.

1. It is reported by a usually reliable agent that following capture of Ushak Raouf Bey received a wire from Mustapha Kemal as follows "Commence intrigue in Balkans. If necessary send half million pounds (Turkish) for the purpose and getting rid of Stambulinsky. We must get Bolsheviks to cause trouble in Balkans also".

2. Same agent states that Nationalists were prepared before recent operations to promise Dedeagach to Bulgaria but now Nationalists are only willing to offer Kavalla.

Comment. It is confirmed by information available that Nationalists are endeavouring to remove Stambulinsky whose policy does not coincide with that of Mustapha Kemal.

3. Fouad Bey's Bulgarian-Nationalist bands are increasing their activity in Thrace. Shipment of stores and arms into Thrace is indicated by unconfirmed reports.

4. Rumours are current that disturbances have occurred in Adrianople between rival Greek parties. For following reasons discipline in Greek fourth Corps is considered very bad: (a) Promised demobilisation of classes 1910 to 1918 from Asia Minor, (b) grant of indiscriminate leave to all troops from Asia Minor.

F.O. 371/7891/E. 9677

Minutes and Conclusions of a Conference of the British Cabinet Ministers held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Monday, 18th September, 1922, at 12 Noon

Secret

Present:—

The Prime Minister (In the Chair)

The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P.,
Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne,
G.B.E., K.C., M.P., Chancellor of
the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. W.S. Churchill, M.P.,
Secretary of State for the Colonial.

The Right Hon. the Lord Lee of Fareham
G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Right Hon. the Viscount
Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.

The Most Hon. the Marquess Curzon
of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. Sir L. Worthington-
Evans, Bart., G.B.E., M.P.,
Secretary of State for War.

The Following Were Also Present:—

Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty,
O.M., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., D.S.O.,
First Sea Lord.

General the Earl of Cavan, K.P.,
G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B.,
Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Mr. H.A. Payne, C.B., second
Secretary, Board of Trade,
For conclusion 4.

Mr. C. Hipwood, C.B., Mercantile
Marine Dept. Board of Trade,
For conclusion 4.

Lieut.-Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B.,Secretary, Cabinet.

Lieut.-Col. Sir John Chancellor, K.C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Principal Assistant Secretary, C.I.D.

Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, Bt.,
K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air
Staff.

Air Commodore, J.M. Steel, C.B.,
C.M.G., C.B.E., Director of
Operations and Intelligence, Air
Ministry.

Mr. R.E. Faulkner, C.B.E., Mercantile
Marine Dept. Board of Trade,
For conclusion 4.

Sir Edward Grigg, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.,

The Greco-Turkish Situation.

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR read a telegram which he had received from General Harington, reporting that he had informed the Kemalists that the neutral zone of the Straits must be observed. General

NOTE. Under the Prime Minister's instructions a telephone message was sent before the meeting to the India Office, asking if the Secretary of State or Parliamentary Secretary would be present, but the reply was received that the Secretary of State was in Scotland and the Parliamentary Secretary was in India.

Harington feared that unless immediate steps were taken to strengthen our forces Kemal might act precipitately and advance on Constantinople, but he was hopeful that prompt action by us might have a deterrent effect upon him. General Harington estimated that if the French were sincere in their promises of support, he could hold out in Constantinople for three or four weeks.

THE PRIME MINISTER read telegrams from the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean (Nos. 339 and 340) referring to the naval action proposed to be taken to deal with any attempt of the Kemalists to transfer troops to the European side of the Straits. He read a further telegram from the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean (No. 342) forwarding a report from the Senior Officer of the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron as to the resolutions passed at a conference of the Allied Admirals and Consuls at Smyrna regarding the action to be taken to deal with the situation. A further telegram from the Senior Officer of the Light Cruiser Squadron to the Admiralty (No. 499) on the same subject which was also read.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY drew attention to the opinion expressed by the Naval Commander-in-Chief that surveillance would not be sufficient to deter the Kemalists from attempting to cross the Straits. We might therefore hear at any moment that he had been compelled to use force and so commit an act of war against the Kemalists.

It was agreed. —

(See Conclusion (a))

Assistance for Greek Refugees at Smyrna.

2. LORD CURZON raised the question as to whether it was possible to do more to assist the Greek refugees in Smyrna. The situation there was deplorable. There were from 100,000 to 200,000 Greeks in Smyrna who could not be removed, as Greek shipping was not allowed to enter the port. He reminded the Conference that when the question of the assistance of British ships was raised before it was agreed that no assistance should be given unless the whole of the Greek shipping was made available for the removal of refugees. He suggested that the Board of Trade might be asked as to whether British shipping could easily be made available in case of need.

THE PRIME MINISTER read a telegram from Mr. Bentinck at Athens (No. 447) in which reference was made to the massacres at Smyrna and in which it was stated that the Greek Press was criticising adversely the inaction of the British Warships at Smyrna.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN reminded the Conference that at our instance the Italian admiral was approaching Kemal to enquire whether he would allow Greek ships to enter Smyrna and remove refugees. If that request is not granted we must

ask Kemal if he will allow British ships to enter Smyrna with that object. If necessary, the Naval Commander-in-Chief should be authorised to divert British ships to that service.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER pointed out that the requisitioning of British ships had previously been objected to on account of the expense and legal difficulties that would be created if the ships were compelled to break their contracts. He suggested that if it became necessary to charter ships, the work had better be done through the Board of Trade, who could do it more cheaply and easily than the Minister at Athens, as they were accustomed to such transactions and they could easily get into touch with the managers of the leading shipping companies operating in those waters.

[THE PRIME MINISTER here gave instructions for the representatives of the Shipping Department of the Board of Trade to be summoned to discuss this question].

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that the Americans had consented to assist the refugees and he considered that it was desirable that we should vote a certain sum for that purpose.

It was agreed:—

(See Conclusion (i)).

3. THE PRIME MINISTER stated that according to press repute Marshals Foch and Petain took an altogether different view from President Poincaré as to the situation. They shared the views of the British Government as to the necessity for action to prevent the Turks from crossing the Straits.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR informed the Conference that it would be possible to put the Experimental Brigade at Aldershot on board transports in a few days. The numbers of the brigade could be made up by transfers from other battalions without interfering with our mobilisation arrangements. The brigade would have a strength of about 3,000. He added that the General Staff attached the greatest importance to the retention of Chanak in order to ensure the free passage of the Straits.

THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF stated that according to the reports received, the Kemalists have a force of 52,000 rifles within 300 miles of Chanak. To that force we could only oppose one battalion. The Kemalists could push that small force into the sea within a fortnight. If we lost Chanak the troops in Constantinople would be cut off. If we are driven out of Chanak, and His Majesty's Government decide to re-conquer the Southern Side of the Straits, it meant a big war and the employment of a force of 20 divisions. The Kemalist Army was estimated to have a strength of 300,000 men.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that the C.I.G.S.'s estimate of the strength of the Kemalist army was far in excess of the estimate he had seen in the reports from General Harington. General Harington's estimates had been that the army numbered about 70,000 bayonets and sabres. He believed that if it was seen that we were taking immediate action to reinforce our troops on the Dardanelles, Kemal would probably be deterred from attacking us. He enquired as to the nature of the support that our naval forces could give in the event of an attack on Chanak by the Kemalists.

THE FIRST SEA LORD explained that the naval guns were high velocity guns with low trajectory. They were therefore unable to search out the country near Chanak by short range fire. The ships could, however, take up positions on both flanks and bring an effective fire to bear with the aid of aerial observation. They could keep the coasts clear.

THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF stated that according to the the Turkish guns at Chanak could not be destroyed by such long range naval gun fire. To deal with the guns mounted at Chanak, it would be necessary to mount howitzers on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the force on the Gallipoli Peninsula was composed of French troops and the force at Chanak was British. He raised the question as to what action should be taken in the event of the French refusing to take military action against the Turks. If we decided to mount howitzers on the Gallipoli Peninsula, it was necessary that we should make sure of having sufficient troops to enable us to protect them.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR pointed out that the whole of our plans had, up to now, been based upon the assumption that the French troops would co-operate in the defence of the Gallipoli Peninsula. If the French withdrew, the situation would be completely revolutionised and our plans would have to be reconsidered.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES urged that the Secretary of State for War should be given authority at once to make the necessary arrangements for the early despatch of the Experimental Brigade from Aldershot. It was desirable that the situation should be reviewed in order that we should be clear as to what force we could send to the Straits in a short time. In this connection he remarked that it might be assumed that there would be no demand for reinforcements from Iraq. If we were pressed in that region, the British forces would be withdrawn altogether. He suggested that a telegram should be sent to Lord Allenby asking if he could send two or three battalions from Egypt to the Dardanelles on condition that they were replaced in a short time by two or three unmobilised battalions from England. He considered it essential that our forces should be increased at the earliest possible moment so as to prevent their being

rushed by the Kemalists. It was also desirable that heavy howitzers should be mounted on the Gallipoli Peninsula at once.

THE PRIME MINISTER concurred and expressed the opinion that the mounting of heavy howitzers on the Gallipoli Peninsula would be very important from a diplomatic point of view. The French were afraid of our establishing a second Gibraltar on the Gallipoli Peninsula and that consideration would make them more inclined to co-operate with us.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR stated that a telegram had been sent to Egypt enquiring whether a brigade of medium artillery and two cavalry regiments could be spared and a reply to that telegram was still awaited.

It was agreed:

See Conclusions (b), (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), & (vi).

THE PRIME MINISTER asked the First Sea Lord for his views as to the nature of the assistance that could be given by the Admiralty.

THE FIRST SEA LORD read an appreciation of the situation prepared by the late Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean in June, 1921, the sense of which was that the Navy could keep open the Dardanelles in the face of any action that could be taken by the Kemalist forces. The Navy could ensure the withdrawal of the forces at Constantinople in case of need. If the risk of the passage of the Dardanelles by troopships was too great, the troops could be put on board battleships. It would also be possible to evacuate them by conveying them by sea to the Bulair Peninsula across which they could march and be re-embarked on the Mediterranean side.

THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF reported that, as regards Air Force reinforcements, the "Argus" was due to leave England today with a flight of seaplanes and shipfighters, that is, 10 seaplanes and 6 aeroplanes, with a reserve of 150 per cent. The "Pegasus" was already in the Mediterranean. In anticipation of eventualities orders had been sent to Egypt to prepare a squadron for transfer to Constantinople. That squadron would be ready to sail, the first part on Wednesday and the second part on Saturday, if shipping were available; and would be able to fly in 10 days. There was no other squadron in Egypt suitable for transfer to the Dardanelles. The next squadron must therefore go from England. It was proposed to ask the Admiralty if the "Ark Royal" could be spared, but it would probably be found more convenient to send a squadron of bombers.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY observed that the "Ark Royal" would be available by Saturday, if it were decided that she should be sent.

THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF said that in view of the statements that had been made as to the situation, he suggested that a further squadron of bombers should be despatched. He was of the opinion that the fighting machines could disorganise the traffic on the roads and that the bombers would be of great

assistance in stopping the movement of the heavy guns on the road and interfering with their fire. It was necessary to provide some single seater fighters, as the Turks are reported to possess some French "Spads". He was doubtful if many of them were fit to fly, but in any case it was necessary that we should be able to destroy them at once.

It was agreed:—

(See Conclusions (d) & (e)).

(The Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Air Marshal Trenchard left at this point).

*Conclusions reached at a conference of Ministers on Monday, September 18th, 1922,
at 12.0. Noon*

Secret.

The Conference agreed:—

- (a) That the Admiralty shall send a further telegram to the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, notifying him that the Navy is responsible for preventing, as far as lies within its power, the passage of Mustapha Kemal's forces from Asia into Europe, and giving him authority to take all steps which he deems necessary for the fulfilment of this obligation.
- (b) That the War Office should take the following steps:—
 - (i) Prepare for embarkation and order the necessary shipping transport for the experimental brigade at Aldershot, composed of two battalions of Guards, one Battalion Rifle Brigade, and one Battalion Royal Fusiliers. This should be subject to possible suspension of action by the Government if circumstances should render this desirable;
 - (ii) Subject to a favourable reply to a telegram already sent to Egypt, arrange for the early despatch to General Harington's Command of a brigade of field artillery from Egypt, as well as of two regiments of Cavalry, and two Batteries Pack Artillery;
 - (iii) Consult Lord Allenby as to whether he can permit two Battalions of infantry to proceed forthwith to Constantinople on the understanding that these battalions will be replaced at the earliest possible moment by Battalions on home service establishment;
 - (iv) Send 9.2" howitzers to General Harington for use at Gallipoli, if this is found to be feasible, and suggest to General Harington the immediate preparation of sites for their reception;
 - (v) Enquire from General Harington whether the Turkish guns and howitzers in the Gallipoli Peninsula have yet been destroyed, and invite him in the contrary event to consider whether they could be used to assist

in maintaining the passage of the Straits or, alternatively, whether the guns and their ammunition should now be destroyed;

- (vi) Send to General Harington's Command additional medium artillery (if any) that can be spared from Malta or Gibraltar.
- (c) To take note of and approve the despatch at the end of the present week by the Admiralty to Constantinople of a force of 1,000 Royal Marines.
- (d) That the Air Ministry should immediately prepare and arrange shipping for and, if General Harington desires it, should despatch a squadron of bombing aeroplanes from England to Constantinople, in addition to the two squadrons and the naval aircraft for which arrangements are already being made under Cabinet authority. Immediate steps to be taken to consult General Harington as to whether he requires this additional squadron.
- (e) That the First Sea Lord, Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Chief of the Air Staff should meet at 3.0 p.m. the same afternoon, and report to the Conference at 5.0 p.m. on the following questions: —
 - (i) The power of the Navy to secure the passage of warships, transports, and other shipping through the Dardanelles in the event of the loss by the Allies of the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles, while they still hold the Gallipoli Peninsula. Special consideration to be given to the appreciation sent to the Admiralty in June, 1921 by Admiral de Roebeck after consultation with the military authorities at Constantinople;
 - (ii) The present position as to the reinforcement of the naval, military and aerial forces at the Dardanelles*.

F.O. 371/7892/E. 9770/G.

* *Bu Kabine toplantısı ve kararları üzerine İngiltere Denizlerinde gemiler not alınmıştır:*

"In the Cabinet decision to send British ships on 2 conditions, The Board of Trade are ready-on receiving authority from us- to place from 12-15 cargo ships at the disposal of the Com-C. Mediterranean. They should begin to reach Smyrna 48 hours after we inform the B. of T. The expense will presumably fall on the F.O.

W.S. Edmonds.

22.9.22

"As the result of later discussions the B. of T. have been authorised to charter up to ten British ships, the F.O. to pay.

26.9.22

No. 201

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Lindley (Athens)

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 18, 1922

No. 230. *Telegraphic. R.*

YOUR telegram No. 447 of 16th September.

There is not, so far as we are aware, the slightest foundation for the disparaging statements concerning British action or inaction at Smyrna which you report, and they should be emphatically repudiated. On the contrary, His Majesty's Government have warmly supported the proposal of the Allied admirals and consuls (*vide* telegram from Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, of 17th September, repeated to you), to obtain consent of Mustapha Kemal to admission of Greek vessels to Smyrna harbour to evacuate Greek refugees. In case this should prove unsuccessful or inadequate, we are making immediate enquiries as to any available British shipping in the neighbourhood, and are prepared to charter British vessels for the purpose, provided we have assurance that they also will be able to carry out their object, and, further, that Greek Government will be prepared to receive the refugees on Greek mainland or on the islands.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 396.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 231, No. 431

No. 202

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, September 18, 1922

(Received September 19.)

No. 455. *Telegraphic.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

As regards the future I must warn His Majesty's Government most seriously that Greek army cannot be counted on as a serious factor in the situation anywhere unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to treat Greece openly as an ally. Policy of relying on Greek army for success of British plans while refusing all help to Greece, and [group omitted] French and Italians [?] to reinforce Kemal, has broken down for good and all. But Greece has now exhausted her moral and material resources as she was bound to do this autumn; and her army will certainly not unaided defend any part of Thrace which has not been definitely promised to Greece even it defends the rest.

Two courses appear open:—

1. To treat with Kemal at once on basis of National Pact and trust that Christians of Constantinople and European Turkey will be treated better than those of Smyrna.

2. To inform Kemal that after experience of Smyrna His Majesty's Government will oppose all return of Turks to Europe and Straits.

His Majesty's Government know the consequences of either course better than Athens, but if the second is chosen I believe even now Greek army would be the cheapest weapon which could be found for carrying it out provided Greece is treated as an ally and supplied with funds and material and possibly organisers. Events are moving rapidly, and I do not know whether it will be possible to say the same in a fortnight's time.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 249, No. 444

D.B.F.P., I, XVIII, pp. 31-32, No. 34

No. 203

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty

September 18, 1922

(Received September 18.)

No. 355. Secret.

Telegraphic.

FOLLOWING message received from Rear Admiral, Third Light Cruiser Squadron:—

"My No. 758.

"As a result of [? Italian Admiral's] interview, Kemal has applied to Angora Government for permission for refugees except men between 18 and 36, to be embarked in Greek ships in Smyrna harbour. He states that no refugees will be allowed to leave after 30th September. Fire appears to have burnt out. I was able to see whole town from a high roof"

F.O. 424/254, p. 254, No. 457

No. 204

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean

September 18, 1922

(Received at Foreign Office, September 19.)

No. 924. Secret.

Telegraphic.

"REVENGE" has been ordered to leave Devonport to-morrow, 19th September, to join your flag. "Ramillies" and "Malaya" follow when stored.

Second submarine flotilla is being ordered to Devonport in readiness to proceed if necessary.

Cabinet decided this morning that you should be notified that the navy is responsible for preventing so far as lies in its power, the passage of Mustapha Kemal's forces from Asia into Europe, and you are authorised to take all steps which you deem necessary for the fulfilment of this obligation.

F.O. 424/254, p. 252, No. 450

No. 205

Mr. Millington-Drake to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

BUCHAREST, September 18, 1922

(Received September 18.)

No. 115. *Telegraphic.*

YOUR telegram unnumbered of 15th September [? No. 79].

I consulted Minister for Foreign Affairs [group undecypherable] this morning as instructed, and impressed on him necessity that if Roumania wished to be represented at conference she should be ready to assume some share of our responsibility.

M. Duca assured me that Roumania could not admit that Kemal should decide by force of arms question of Straits, which vitally interested Roumania.

In principle, Roumanian Government consider they ought to participate in military action. After Cabinet meeting this afternoon he will give me official reply as to decision taken. I gather [group omitted] and Prime Minister agreed on subject and are in favour of immediate action, but must consult their colleagues.

He said that Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister was waiting probably to enquire as to policy of Roumanian Government, and if so that he should urge him to recommend his Government to reply similarly to enquiry in the same as Roumania. I can see Roumanian Government are ready to support His Majesty's Government at conference in regard to Straits question. I pointed out that three Great Powers had publicly announced intention to defend military position pending final solution, [? which] proved that in supporting us Roumania need not have friction with France. He quite realised situation was clear.

F.O. 424/254, p. 227, No. 418

No. 206

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

BUCHAREST, September 18, 1922

(Received September 19.)

No. 116. *Telegraphic.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

After seeing Minister for Foreign Affairs I met M. Diamandy, just returned [? from] League of Nations, who has been instructed to remain at hand.

He enquired whether conference on Turkish affairs was likely to take place. I gave no indication, whereupon he expressed the view that Constantinople or the neighbourhood would be suitable in order to ensure early attendance of Mustapha Kemal or his representative.

F.O. 424/254, p. 251, No. 448

No. 207

Mr. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

BUCHAREST, September 18, 1922
(Received September 25.)

No. 493. Confidential.

My Lord,

ON receipt of your telegram of the 15th instant instructing me to enquire most confidentially of the Roumanian Government whether they would be willing to place a division without delay at the disposal of the Allied commander-in-chief for the purpose of aiding their Allies in defending the military position at Constantinople in view of the menace which Kemal is in a position to exert, I lost no time in endeavouring to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. M. Duca received me at the earliest possible opportunity this morning, on his return from Sinaia. He informed me at once, privately, that M. Bratiano had reported having received a telegram from Mr. Lloyd George on the same subject, so that he was prepared for the enquiry which I had been instructed to make. I found M. Duca entirely favourable in principle to the idea of Roumanian military participation for the defence of the Straits, the complete freedom of which, he observed, was a matter of such vital importance to this country. He made no reference at all to Thrace. He said, however, that it was first necessary to consult his colleagues of the Cabinet, which the Prime Minister and he would do to-day. He would send me their official decision this evening. It would also be despatched to Mr. Lloyd George by the Premier in reply to his telegram. M. Duca stated his view that Kemal must not be allowed to settle the question of the Straits in advance by force of arms. I replied that this was the view of the Great Powers also. In reply to his enquiry whether the latter were in accord on the subject, I quoted your Lordship's telegram to the effect that the three Great Powers had publicly signified their intention to defend the military position pending the final solution of the problem. His Majesty's Government would be able to support a request by the Roumanian Government to be represented at an early conference, provided that Roumania proved willing to assume some share of the responsibility by offering military assistance.

3. I added, as a personal and confidential observation, that there need therefore be no fear that Roumania's support of His Majesty's Government at the

conference, if she took part in it, need in any way cause friction with France. M. Duca agreed, and said that unfortunately a good measure of Kemal's present military success must be attributed to certain assistance which he had secretly received from certain quarters, a circumstance which had doubtless precipitated the present situation. I thought it opportune to express satisfaction at the close relations which Mr. Lloyd George by his present telegram to M. Bratiano evidently desired to maintain with the Roumanian Premier. M. Duca replied that this desire also afforded M. Bratiano the keenest pleasure. From this I deduce that if Roumania is represented in a forthcoming conference in Turkish affairs we may count on Roumanian support for the British point of view.

4. M. Duca said he believed that we had made a similar suggestion of military support to Jugoslavia. The Serbian Minister was in fact in the antechamber at the moment, and had probably come to ask about the attitude of the Roumanian Government. I observed that M. Ninchich, from what I had been able to gather from perusal of telegrams in a short time since my return, has as yet not appeared to take any decided line, but would perhaps do so when he heard the views of the Roumanian Government. The Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked that M. Ninchich's position *vis-à-vis* of M. Pashitch was somewhat difficult. The latter was failing in health, proving alternately lethargic or apt to take an unexpected line, which embarrassed his Minister for Foreign Affairs. His reluctance to take any decision was, he understood, causing it to be debated in Jugoslavia whether it would not be better to *écarter* him soon from Government. If M. Tcholak Antich had now come to ascertain what the reply of the Roumanian Government would be to any suggestion of military support of the Great Powers, he could tell him that Roumania in principle was favourable, and that the Cabinet would consider the matter and reply without delay. He would even urge the Minister to advise his Government to take a similar line.

5. M. Duca was extremely frank and evidently desirous of keeping in close touch with me. It should therefore not be so difficult, so far as I can at present anticipate, to obtain further expression of opinion from the Roumanian Government when required. I should judge that they will probably press for their adequate representation on the Inter-Allied Straits Commission, counting on our support in the matter. There seemed to be no need at this moment to ask for any expression of opinion as to Thracian boundaries, which probably do not interest the Roumanian Government so greatly as the Straits question.

6. It would not surprise me, if Roumania is invited to attend a conference, to see M. Diamandy selected as her representative. I met him in the antechamber on leaving M. Duca. He is an old friend and colleague, and stopped me to enquire what I thought of the Turkish situation and where a conference could take place. I was guarded in reply, and ascertained that he had just returned from a meeting of the League of Nations and had been instructed to remain here, so as to be available

if required for other work. He seemed to think that, if an early conference and the presence threat of Mustapha Kemal or his representatives were desired, Constantinople or some neighbouring locality might be found the most suitable. My reply indicated that the Governments concerned would probably settle this in due course.

I have, &c.

HERBERT G. DERING

F.O. 424/254. pp. 317-318, No. 394

No. 208

War Office to General Harington, Constantinople

Desp. 2230 18.9.22

Paraphrase.

Clear the line.

91093 cipher D.D.M.O. & I.

It is stated by First Sea Lord that great assistance can be rendered by Navy in retarding the approach of Kemalists and especially of their guns by the roads leading to Chanak. In order that Kemal may not be allowed to come too close before his action is taken as the commencement of hostilities is there any special warning which he should be given. If it is necessary to give any special warning, please inform Rumbold.

F.O. 371/7891/E. 9656

No. 209

General Harington to War Office, repeated Malta, Gibraltar

Despatched 0100 18.9.22

Received 1000 18.9.22

Secret

Paraphrase.

2304 cipher 17/9. 1st of 3 parts.

I am very grateful to S. of S. for his wire 91066 and for all W.O. wires forecasting support which in all quarters is being prepared to deal with situation. I am confident myself that Kemal will be deterred by firm and united action taken from putting into action his plan for capture of Straits and Constantinople, which he undoubtedly would have done had not powers stood together. It is of course possible that he may attempt to gain his objective before the arrival of reinforcements. On the other hand despicable act of his troops at Smyrna must

have lost him prestige. He also cannot afford to fail in any coup and although he talks a lot of seizing Constantinople and Chanak, the latter position is being strengthened hourly with help of navy and Sussex Regiment arrives today.

In addition 2 battleships and destroyers are there and we have 1 squadron 3rd Hussars, 1 battery and Loyal North Lanes.

2nd part.

Since a week ago therefore problem has changed considerably. I also do not think he can rush Maltepe position. To do that he would have had to build up sufficient concentration at 2 Ismid to go² right through to Haidar Pasha and Constantinople. His other ² alternative is power of calling out Constantinople; I should deal very firmly with any attempt at this and at once seize ringleaders who are known to me. I am asking French and Italians to strengthen their detachments at Chanak and Maltepe tomorrow and I face myself the knowledge that business is meant by Allies when they speak with one voice and that Mustapha will be taught lesson he wants and shown that solution of this question is by conference and not by bloodshed. Firm action taken will also have a steadying effect on city where signs of fear were being plainly shown by various elements, especially after (gp. omitted) at Smyrna. I am very grateful for reinforcements being hurried here from Gibraltar and Malta, and with regard to mobilization of a further division or more to follow—which I realize is dependent on a similar agreement by French. ² Details of preferable requirements will be forwarded tomorrow.

Last part.

Serious and expensive rate of having to send me this support is realized and, in order that I may be able to save the Government from sending me any formations which I can do without, I am having the details worked out of what I shall actually require for fighting in this country. I also realize that I shall have a good deal of assistance from naval guns unless fleet is required for other purpose. I am in communication with Air Vice Marshal Ellington regarding air units. Howitzers and pack artillery will be my principal requirements and I am very short of horses and mules as it must be realised that I had reduced to a minimum. In fact transport with my present force is just enough for defensive warfare and no offensive. Grant wants extra signal personnel and I shall certainly want R.E. companies as early as possible in view of absence of roads in Asia.

I am very short of medical personnel and I would strongly urge that Buffs be made up, as battalion, including band and drums, is only 340 strong. I am confident we shall now be able to deal with situation and having advice and help of Plumer with me at moment is great comfort to me.

F.O. 371/7891/E. 9654

No. 210

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 19, 1922

*(Received September 19)**Unnumbered. Secret**Telegraphic.*

ADMIRAL BROCK has just communicated to me a telegram from Admiralty, dated yesterday, conveying decision of Cabinet that navy is responsible for preventing as far as lies in its power passage of Mustapha Kemal's forces from Asia to Europe and authorising him to take all steps which he deems necessary for fulfilment of his duty. The admiral asks me to make a notification to Nationalist agent here that transfer of Nationalist forces from Asia to Europe will not be allowed.

I have informed Admiral Brock that I cannot make such a notification alone and without definite instructions from you. I should never carry my colleagues with me, and I doubt whether their Governments would authorise them to join in such a notification at present juncture. Although I am in entire agreement with decision of Cabinet, a notification of this kind would, in my view, be equivalent to a declaration of war against Mustapha Kemal, but belligerent character of notification would be attenuated by a statement to the effect that *status quo* must be maintained, i.e., that Mustapha Kemal must keep his forces in Anatolia pending meeting of a conference and (two groups undecypherable) I would directly connect question of transfer of troops with meeting of conference. An alternative would be not to make any notification at all.

Meanwhile I understand that the admiral intends to clear the whole southern shore of Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus of craft of every description and to stop ferry service of town and suburbs after 6 P.M. These measures, and a notification to Mustapha Kemal in the sense requested, will either precipitate action on Mustapha Kemal's part, or, if he is hesitating, call forth a written protest.

F.O. 424/254, p. 259 A, No. 473-A

No. 211

*Senior Officer, Third Light Cruiser Squadron, to Admiralty**(Received September 19, 1922.)**No. 506, Telegraphic.*

FOR Foreign Office from Sir H. Lamb. No. 74:—

My Italian [? colleague], at interview with Mustapha Kemal, found latter most uncompromising, and gathered he contemplated early departure from [?]

here] to meet [name of five letters—corrupt] Bey somewhere to the north. [2 Italian] colleague urged necessity of making immediate concessions with a view to avoiding conflict. There are indications that a considerable force of cavalry and infantry is being sent north. It is reported that embarkation of Greek army still continues at Chesine [three corrupt groups]."

F.O. 424/254, p. 254, No. 459

No. 212

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, September 19, 1922

(Received September 20.)

No. 469. Telegraphic. D.

I SAW President of the Council this afternoon and I gave him a copy of your Lordship's telegram No. 308. He read it carefully but said nothing. I think that he would like to have disputed the second paragraph.

I told him that I had seen announcement that orders had been sent for withdrawal of French troops from Asiatic side of the Straits, and I had also seen it stated in press that His Majesty's Government had been informed yesterday of fact by French Chargé d'Affaires. I was therefore greatly surprised when I received telephonic message from Foreign Office this morning asking for confirmation of news which was published in British and French papers. It seemed to me that His Majesty's Government should have been informed of such an important fact as withdrawal of French troops, which had been sent solely to make a demonstration of solidarity between Allies.

President of the Council replied that he did not know whether French Chargé d'Affaires had informed your Lordship or not but there could be no doubt whatever that French Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople would have informed his colleagues as soon as he received the instructions sent him in order that military authorities might take necessary measures.

I said at once that to withdraw French troops that had been sent as a demonstration of solidarity, leaving British troops exposed to any attack that might be made, was in my opinion the very way to provoke war by giving encouragement to Kemal in showing that solidarity no longer exists. President of Council became very excited and in a long tirade said more than once that His Majesty's Government were pursuing a policy of war. I told him flatly that I would not allow him to say that sort of thing to me and that it was absolutely untrue and that no Government or people desired peace more than His Majesty's Government and the British people. He then calmed down, retracted what he had said and told me that he was much preoccupied with the knowledge that position at Chanak was in serious danger of an attack by Kemalist troops, since Angora

agent in Paris had yesterday informed Ministry for Foreign Affairs that Kemal would not recognise any neutral zone on the Asiatic side or any place as neutral which had been previously occupied by Greek troops, and mentioned Chanak in particular. He maintained that French troops would be withdrawn only in complete agreement with General Harington but there could be no compromise on that subject, since public opinion in France would not permit the life of a single French soldier to be exposed to the risk of an attack by Turkish troops or Turkish irregulars.

I remarked to President of the Council that what seemed to me the best course to put an end once and for all to the chance of any hostilities between Kemal's troops and Allies would be to invite Kemal within a day or two to a conference.

Part 2 (despatched at 10.10 p.m.)

It might be done without fixing date or place which could be settled later, but if done it should be done at once. President of the Council agreed entirely but added it was absolutely hopeless to think that Angora delegates would come to conference unless it was clearly understood in advance that their territorial demands would be granted. Unless these were granted President of the Council declared his opinion that there would a general conflagration in which Turks, the Bolsheviks and Bulgarians would be found in close alliance. He said that Italians and Serbians were also agreed that territorial demands of the Turks must be conceded. I asked him what they were. He said Maritza frontier with Adrianople and Turkish sovereignty over the Straits when neutralized. They would be ready to accept control of League of Nations or of an inter-allied commission preferably the former and that they would accept nothing less. I said that in addition to political reasons there were very strong sentimental reasons why Turks should not be allowed in Gallipoli Peninsula owing to number of British soldiers who are buried there. He replied that he had considered that point as regards French graves there and he was of the opinion that cemeteries could be extraterritorialized and made British or French territory. I asked him whether he considered all safeguards of last March, such as restriction of Turkish military forces should be maintained. He answered that all those questions must be discussed but that once territorial demands of Turkey had been conceded we would find they would be much more amenable to reason on other points although he admitted useless to uphold... last March for Turkish military forces would, under present circumstances, have to be increased.

Finally I asked whether French High Commissioner had gone to Smyrna to see Kemal. He replied that according to information he had received Kemal is no longer present in or near Smyrna.

F.O. 424/254, pp. 265-266, No. 494

D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, pp. 32-34, No. 35

No. 213

Mr. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

BUCHAREST, September 18, 1922
(Received September 25.)

No. 495. Most Confidential.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 493 of yesterday's date, respecting the participation of Roumania in the defence of Constantinople, I have the honour to state that M. Duca did not communicate to me last night, as he had promised, the reply of the Roumanian Government to the suggestion that Roumania should take part in the effective defence of the Straits by placing a division at the disposal of the Allied Commander-in-chief. He asked me instead to call on him this afternoon.

On my arrival he informed me that the decision of the Roumanian Government coincided with what he had already told me, and that he would read to me the text of the telegram sent to M. Djuvara by M. Bratiano in reply to Mr. Lloyd George's personal telegram, which reply should already be in the Premier's hands. I have already telegraphed its substance to your Lordship as M. Duca did not offer me the text, but read it over twice at my request.

As your Lordship will have noted, the Roumanian Government are preoccupied for the safety especially of their Eastern frontier on the Dniester, and also of their Bulgarian frontier, neither of which it would, M. Duca said, be safe to denude. The bulk of the Rumanian troops were therefore required there. I will refer to his cause for anxiety on the Bulgarian frontier later in this despatch.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that this would not prevent Roumania from providing a contingent, in accordance with the suggestion of the British Government. I enquired if this denoted that the troops could be used at Constantinople, for I did not observe that the locality was mentioned in the Roumanian telegraphic reply. M. Duca answered in the affirmative, and authorised me to make specific mention of Constantinople in my reply to your Lordship in order that there should be no misunderstanding. He added that Jugoslavia had not the same extent of frontier needing special attention, and should therefore be able to offer a much larger contingent for Constantinople if required.

I asked him to read once more the passage affirming the interest of Roumania in the settlement of the Straits question, and remarked that the Roumanian Government evidently desired to be consulted when the final settlement of the dispute between Turkey and Greece was made, in so far as her own interests were affected. M. Duca replied that this was what the telegram was intended to convey, and that Roumania would wish to be represented at the Peace Conference. This

being so, I observed I would venture to make an entirely private and unofficial enquiry whether it would not be advisable for the Roumanian Government to prefer their request simultaneously and very soon in London, Paris and Rome. It would be well not to run any risk of arousing the susceptibilities of our Latin Allies by intimating a desire to be represented at the conference to Great Britain only. M. Duca appeared pleased, and, after expressing his thanks, said he would make a note of this point, as that would be a proper course to pursue. I have no doubt that he will take this initiative now, which I also pointed out privately must naturally come from Roumania. I ventured to add my personal conviction, and speaking without instructions, that such initiative would be wholly agreeable to His Majesty's Government now that Roumania had expressed her readiness to aid in the defence of the Straits. I presumed that the Jugoslavian Government would probably have and would express similar desire. M. Duca said that they would certainly also wish to attend the conference, and mentioned that M. Ninchich had just left for London.

It is in consequence of this portion of our conversation that I despatched my second telegram to-day stating my conviction that the Roumanian Government would make a *démarche* in the above sense at the three capitals.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked what the French Government were doing and what view they took. I said I had no information beyond that the Allies appeared in agreement that, once the broad lines of principle were established, any divergence of opinion between ourselves and the French could be satisfactorily removed by discussion at the Peace Conference. If the Roumanian Government participated there in I had no doubt that their representative, together with one from Jugoslavia, would be useful as a means of reconciling opinions which might not quite coincide. "Just as we were able to do at Genoa," observed M. Duca, to which I replied with a compliment to the tact of M. Bratiano.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that while Roumania was vitally concerned in the Straits question, she would be strongly opposed to any alteration of the Treaty of Sévres which would give Turkey and Bulgaria a joint frontier. Too many intrigues were in progress already between the Turks and Bulgarians. I replied that this objection would probably arise at the conference, but that it was as well to know the Roumanian view now. M. Duca said that only to-day he had received news from Sofia of a secret meeting last night at Philippopolis of some 3,000 ex-military officers, who had decided to encourage attacks by Turco-Bulgarian bands on the Thracian frontier and if possible bring about a revolution in Sofia as well, involving the fall of the Stambolisky Cabinet. It was to this determination to create trouble on the Bulgarian frontiers that he begged me to invite your Lordship's special attention, in connection with the present crisis between Turkey and Greece, for he felt that a protest by the Great Powers should again be made at Sofia, and that one from Great Britain would

carry most weight. He feared that this movement had the connivance of the Bulgarian Government. The result of this meeting might equally be to render the Bulgaro-Roumanian frontier insecure, and he felt that it could not be left unguarded.

I said I would duly report to your Lordship, but that I understood that only recently a protest had been made by most of the Allies to the Bulgarian Government concerning alleged Turco-Bulgarian activity and intrigues near the Greek frontier. I had no doubt that the Bulgarian Government would deny all complicity, but I thought it also quite feasible for them to prove their goodwill by wholesale arrests of these ex-officers, who were out of a job, thoroughly discontented and ready for any desperate action. When I remarked that M. Stambolisky was apparently leaving for Geneva, M. Duca expressed the view that he might be designedly absent in order to avoid any appearance of complicity in a pro-Turkish movement. From my personal knowledge of the Bulgarian Premier I should doubt whether he is as deep as this.

I trust that I shall have your Lordship's approval for the private hint which I have conveyed to M. Duca in regard to an early initiative in requesting admission for Roumania to the Peace Conference. I asked him where he thought that conference could be summoned. He seemed of opinion that Constantinople would be unsuitable, and observed that it ought to be possible to secure Kemal's attendance "somewhere in the west." He said that he should not be surprised if the Soviet Government claimed the right to be present at such conference, which would seriously complicate matters, in view of their undoubted relations with Mustapha Kemal.

I have, &c.

HERBERT G. DERING

F.O. 424/254, pp. 322-323, No. 598

No. 214

General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office

Paraphrase.

Clear the line.

Desp. 0100 20.9.22

Recd. 1000 20.9.22

2335 cipher 19th September.

1st of 3 parts.

Your 91094 D.D.M.O. and L. 18th September received. In addition to extra formations mentioned including Marines, I shall be very glad to have brigade

from England. I am very grateful for support? given on all sides. It is imperative to know what the French are going to do. My view to-day is exactly as given in my cable 2323 of yesterday.

In my opinion, England has to decide whether she will take on business single-handed for her position in East, which of course means mobilization. The French are very afraid that we shall. They are deeply committed to Mustapha Kemal and are between devil and deep sea and regret very much having sent to Asiatic side those allied flags and detachments.

Admiral Brock will see Turkish Minister of War and Minister of Marine together tomorrow and make it quite clear that any infringement of neutral zone will be answered by stringent measures here both on land and water. In order to allay alarm I have issued communique to-day to inhabitants.

Part 2.

I have just been informed by General Charpy that French detachment at Chanak is to be withdrawn to Gallipoli at once by order of French Government and I have issued necessary instructions. He says reason for decision was that British Government had decided not to hold Chanak. Charpy says he thinks Kemalists are going to attack Chanak. As I consider it vital in present situation as an essential military measure to ? guard Straits I have decided to hold it as long as I can. It is quite likely that bluff resistance, especially when not expected by French or Kemalists, will bring Mustapha Kemal to reason and stop further trouble at outset. British policy is going to be tested here at Chanak in my opinion. A withdrawal without fighting would be signal for an outbreak here which we must avoid and which with present resources we might not be able to cope with.

Last part.

To gain time for reinforcements to arrive must be our object. I have disembarked Gordon Highlanders at Chanak and placed Sherwood Foresters at short notice as Yarıncı front is not yet threatened. My action is strongly supported by Lord Plumer and Admiral. Much subsequent trouble may be saved by a bold front now at Chanak and Constantinople. Am embarking wives and families on S.S. "Derbyshire". As they are not safe alone with foreign servants, it is wisest precaution to take. When she arrives will embark sick on "Maine". All well and confident. Everything working smoothly. Will wire destination of troops as soon as decided and orders will be given ships at Chanak. Just heard that in order to conform with French Italians also withdrawing from Chanak to Gallipoli.

F.O. 371/7893/E. 9845

No. 215

British Secretary's Notes of Conference between the French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay, 11 I a.m. Wednesday, September 20, 1922 (Received at Foreign Office September 22, 1922.)

PRESENT: *France*: M. Poincaré; M. Laroche; SECRETARY, M. Massigli.

Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston; Lord Hardinge of Penhurst; SECRETARY, Mr. Forbes Adam.

M. POINCARÉ began by asking Lord Curzon to open the conversation.

LORD CURZON said that he would begin by explaining the whole situation briefly, and His Majesty's Government's justification for their attitude. He need not refer to past history, except to remind M. Poincaré that all attempts to bring Mustapha Kemal to a conference after the Allied meeting in Paris last March had failed. After a long exchange of notes between the French and British Governments, Venice had been agreed upon as the place for a conference. Mustapha Kemal had then, however, decided to attack, and the Greek defence of Asia Minor had collapsed. It became obvious, from that moment, that the territorial question in Asia Minor had been liquidated, although the problem of the protection which the French and British Governments were equally pledged to provide for the racial and religious minorities there remained. On the other hand, the European question (Thrace, the Straits and Constantinople) was left to be decided. Nothing, however, had occurred to modify here the broad principles of agreement reached in March last, and in so far as modification would be required, it ought to be arrived at in friendly consultation between the Powers, either by themselves, or preferably in a full peace conference. His Majesty's Government were unable to admit the view that a decision on these questions could be taken out of their hands by Mustapha Kemal. It was not for him to settle such questions as those of the Straits or Thrace, or even to prejudge them in any way by a military occupation. Nor could he be allowed to rush the position at Constantinople and thus set the whole of the Balkans aflame. These questions must be settled by conference and not by force—by negotiation and not by invasion. They were emphatically matters for the Allies; and there would be nothing more disastrous than a failure to settle them by agreement and co-operation between the Powers. The question would arise later how far other Powers were involved in the question of the Straits; for the moment, it was a matter primarily for the Great Powers alone. Meanwhile, action had been taken in two directions—at Constantinople by the three High Commissioners and generals, and in Europe by the Allied Governments. It was satisfactory to know that when danger threatened at Constantinople General Sir Charles Harington had acted in complete accord with his French and Italian colleagues, who had agreed with him as to the dispositions

necessary to represent the Allied flags on the İsmid peninsula and on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles. He had already reported the actual steps taken to place detachments of the Powers in both places. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government had asked the French Government what was their point of view regarding the defence of the neutral zones around Constantinople, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles: and Lord Curzon had received with much satisfaction M. Poincaré's note of the 14th September stating that the French Government thought it most desirable, in agreement with His Majesty's Government, to maintain the neutrality of the zones occupied by the Allies, without, however, prejudging the future peace, and that they were ready, in concert with the British and Italian Governments, to inform the Angora Government that the Allied Governments expected that these zones would be respected by the Turkish troops.

Sir Horace Rumbold had immediately been instructed to make a communication to the Angora Government in conjunction with his Allied colleagues. There was some doubt as to whether these instructions had been acted upon at once; but Lord Curzon had received a telegram that day reporting that the communication to the representatives of the Angora Government at Constantinople had been formally made by the High Commissioners yesterday.

His Majesty's Government naturally drew the only possible conclusion from the terms of M. Poincaré's above-mentioned note—that the Allied forces were prepared to defend both zones, and that they would never permit Kemal to violate them. His Majesty's Government had thought and hoped that the declaration of the Allies would be itself sufficient to deter Kemal from any attempt to violate either zone. At the same time they had continued to receive from their representatives at Constantinople and in the Straits zone alarming information as to the intentions of Kemal. His forces were reported to be advancing northwards from Smyrna, and already actually to have reached the borders of the neutral zone. His Majesty's Government had heard further that Kemal had announced his intention of settling the question of Thrace by crossing to Europe and deciding it by force of arms. They also heard that he was threatening the İsmid position. Meanwhile, advice was said to be reaching Kemal from many quarters to settle the whole question at once, without a conference, behind the backs of the Great Powers. With this object he was counselled to provoke a rising at Constantinople, and to encourage the military bands who were already said to be active in Eastern and Western Thrace. In consequence of these reports, and in pursuance of a policy which they firmly believed to be that of the Allies as a whole, His Majesty's Government had resolved to reinforce the Allied positions at Chanak and Constantinople. At Chanak, up to the time of that decision, there had only been one British battalion, the garrison at Gallipoli comprising a French Senegalese battalion, but with the establishment of the three flags at Chanak, and relying on their presence there, His Majesty's Government had proceeded to order all

available reinforcements to that place. There was already a considerable British force there (one squadron of cavalry, two battalions of infantry and a battalion of field artillery). Further, His Majesty's Government had decided to send as large naval reinforcements as could be obtained from the neighbouring waters, and had no intention of allowing Kemal to take the position out of the hands of the Allies, or to cross the Straits at any point. All the available forces of Great Britain were ready to support this decision, and Lord Beatty, who had come to Paris specially for the purpose, would explain to M. Poincaré the precise steps which had been taken by the British navy, and the naval reasons which justified His Majesty's Government in confidently believing that Kemal could not attack or cross the Straits.

Lord Curzon wished here to recall to M. Poincaré the fact, of which he had already reminded him in March that Gallipoli was a sacred and Imperial interest of the British empire; and the recent appeal of His Majesty's Government to the Dominions and their response showed their ready recognition of this fact.

The attitude of His Majesty's Government was similar in regard to the positions at Scutari and Ismid. Again in pursuance of what they believed to be the Allied policy, His Majesty's Government had reinforced, with all the means at their disposal, the positions there, and were ready, with their Allies, to prevent an invasion of Europe across the Bosphorus by the Kemalists. It had been stated in some quarters that the whole situation could have been easily liquidated by diplomacy, and that the forcible measures of precaution taken by His Majesty's Government were unnecessary and even dangerous. It would be well, however, to remember that diplomacy was not always effective in checking an Oriental army flushed with victory, and any weakness on the part of the Allies would simply have been an invitation to Kemal to cut the Gordian knot by force of arms. His Majesty's Government had therefore thought it necessary to act promptly. Had Kemal been permitted to advance to both the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles he could at any moment during the conference have decided to break up the peace discussions and dictate his own terms by throwing his sword into the scale. For the rest, the British action in sending reinforcements was identical in procedure with the recent French action in bringing forces from Syria to Chatalja when the Greeks were threatening those lines. Both had been perfectly legitimate actions. Indeed, up to the present His Majesty's Government had believed that the steps they had taken had the full sympathy of the French Government, since they were in pursuance of an agreed policy. It was therefore with considerable surprise that Lord Curzon had heard that orders had been given yesterday by the French Government to withdraw the French contingent from Chanak. This step seemed a direct invitation to Kemal to pursue his designs, relying on France and on the fact that the British forces were faced with the alternative of either defending alone the neutral zone (which the other Allies nevertheless recognised) or of withdrawing and allowing Kemal to settle matters in his own way.

As regards the position at Ismid, there was still some doubt as to whether the French troops had equally been withdrawn from the Allied position in front of Scutari but on this point, as well as on the question of the withdrawal from Chanak, Lord Curzon sought the fullest explanations which M. Poincaré was prepared to give him. At the same time, it was his duty to point out that if the French Government took the pointed action of withdrawing their forces in one or both of these areas, it was a clear indication to Kemal that France was not ready to support Great Britain, who would have to act alone. Lord Curzon thought it unnecessary to indicate to M. Poincaré the grave consequences to the alliance and, indeed, to the future of Europe, of this step. For the moment he would only ask for the fullest explanation of French policy. His Majesty's Government had been carrying out an Allied policy, and had applied it in practice with sincerity, courage and promptitude. There was no new factor necessitating a breach of this Allied unity. In Lord Curzon's opinion, it would be disastrous and deplorable to allow it to be broken by the victorious Kemalist forces. To permit Kemal, not only to beat the Greeks, which was a comparatively easy task—but also to overcome the Allies—would have consequences, the range of which it would be impossible to forecast. Lord Curzon had come to Paris to concert urgent steps with his Allies to save the situation while it was still possible, and to insist on an immediate conference to settle the political issues. He would not now trouble M. Poincaré with the question of the place and form of the conference, and the Powers who should be represented at it. These were points which he would be ready to discuss later. For the present he would only confine his statement to the full account which he had just given of the naval and military steps taken by Great Britain, and their desire to maintain the Allied position in the Straits area in the interests of a continued alliance and of the peace of Europe.

M. POINCARÉ began by thanking Lord Curzon for his full and lucid statement. He was unable, however, to accept the explanation which Lord Curzon had given of the failure since March last to bring Mustapha Kemal to a conference. He would recall that he had explained on several occasions during the March discussions that he feared the Turks would not accept the proposals upon which they were agreeing and would only become more and more exacting. A time would soon come when the Allies would find themselves powerless to impose any terms at all. In his opinion, events had proved his forecast to be perhaps too optimistic. In his talks with Fethi Bey and Ferid Bey, M. Poincaré had repeated how deplorable it would be if Angora were to take the offensive when an Allied conference had been practically decided upon at Venice. His advice had, however, not been taken, and the Turks had been too well informed about the state of the Greek forces not to resist the temptation to attack. Incidentally, M. Romanos had told him the day before that the Greek commanders had been deceived by the information given to them by alleged deserters and refugees from the Kemalist

army to the effect that the latter was demoralised. Be that as it may, the position to-day was that the Allies could no longer maintain the position which they had taken up in March last. They were now confronted with a nation of fanatics flushed with victory, and it had become a question of saving the general peace of Europe and Asia.

At this point M. Poincaré read a telegram which he had received from General Pellé from Smyrna that morning. The general reported that he had just had a long conversation with Kemal to whom he had intimated as clearly as possible the exact nature of the Allied note as to respecting the neutral zones. He had urged Kemal not to abuse his victory and to show Europe that the Turkish State, of which he was the head, was a modern civilised organism. Mustapha Kemal had protested his friendship with France and his desire to avoid conflict with the Allies, but he had frankly stated that he could not stop his troops now from occupying all the territory covered by the national pact. It was for the Allies to realise the situation and to allow his troops to occupy Constantinople and Thrace. The Greeks could not defend the latter and he, Kemal, had no intention of occupying more territory than the national pact contemplated. For the rest he was only sending the minimum of troops and men necessary to maintain order in Thrace, but he must finish the campaign before the winter. Delay would be fatal. He also feared the Allies had no real intention of abandoning Constantinople. He concluded by stating that he was summoning his Government to Smyrna and expected them the next evening. He would ask General Pellé and the French Government to await the full reply of his Government.

M. POINCARÉ suggested that in these circumstances it was essential to have a conference as soon as possible. To this the Turks must come, but if the Allies told them now that they were not to be allowed to pass the Straits or to occupy the zones they would simply refuse to come to the conference, and meanwhile attack. France, for her part, could not defend herself against such an attack. On the one hand there was a moral impossibility. France was a Moslem Power and could not neglect the serious situation which was arising in all her Moslem colonies. M. Poincaré here quoted a telegram from Tunis explaining the numerous telegrams of congratulation sent by the natives to Mustapha Kemal on his victory. These telegrams have been held up by the French authorities, but would eventually have to go forward. Again the Governor of Indo-China had told him only yesterday that a war between France and Turkey would be completely misunderstood in that colony. The community of feeling between Asiatics was so strong there, and the Governor said that the Annamite troops sent to Syria had told him before their departure that they would only go when they were assured that they would not have to fight against Turkey. M. Poincaré felt that Lord Curzon, as perhaps the only British statesman who had ever visited the colony of Indo-China, would appreciate the force of these facts.

In addition to the moral question France was faced with the material impossibility. She had no forces to send there. Only recently the Commission of Finance of the Chamber of Deputies had expressed their anxiety regarding the small credit with which the French Government wished to cover the expenditure on additional forces to be sent to the East. It was only when M. Poincaré explained to the commission that the forces were intended to defend Constantinople against the Greeks, and in no circumstances for an attack upon Turkey, that they had voted the required sum. To prevent the passage of the Straits it was not enough for the Allies to make declarations. Either they must have sufficient strength to prevent the passage of the Straits, or they must persuade the Turks to come to a conference. If the Allies stuck to the March proposals there was no hope of a successful step in the latter direction. M. Poincaré did not believe that they would accept the March proposals either as regards Thrace or Gallipoli.

With regard to the action of the Allied commanders at Constantinople in establishing the three flags at Chanak and Ismid, M. Poincaré emphasised that the only step to which the French Government (as distinct from the French Government's subordinates) had agreed to was to send to the Angora Government the Allied note asking them to respect the neutrality of the two States in Constantinople. The French Government, however, had never agreed to send troops to force Turkey to accept the neutrality of these zones. They never even agreed to send French troops to the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. It was true that General Pellé had acted on the spot in a spirit of camaraderie, but as soon as he, M. Poincaré, learnt it he had thought the step dangerous and had sent contrary instructions. It must be remembered that there were Turkish irregulars in the neighbourhood who might attack quite apart from regular troops. Once a shot had been fired the outbreak would extend. It was not a question of France favouring the Turks. All France desired was an honourable peace. At the same time, to secure that peace, France was not prepared to defend the Greeks. It was true that Greece had been an ally of France for a time during and since the war, but she had then elected to bring back King Constantine who was responsible for shooting of French troops in the streets of Athens. There was here for France a question of sentiment like that of Gallipoli for the British Empire.

M. Poincaré here recorded that Ferid Bey had come to him yesterday officially to inform the French Government that Mustapha Kemal would not cross the Straits at once, but that he had among his followers extremists elated by victory who might drive him to precipitate action.

In these circumstances M. Poincaré considered that there could only be one answer to the question, whether Allied troops were to stop the advance of the Turks. It was a material impossibility and the only action which they could take was to persuade the Kemalists to come to a conference. For this purpose they must tell him plainly that he was to obtain Constantinople, and that the Allies would

offer him an acceptable settlement in Thrace and Gallipoli. Hitherto France had refrained from giving any such assurance alone without her allies to Kemal.

As for precautionary measures, M. Poincaré recognised the prompt answer given by the Dominion Governments to the Mother Country, but before such reinforcements could arrive on the scene something irreparable might take place. In the opinion of the French Government there were not sufficient naval forces on the spot to stop the Turks crossing the Straits waters or the Sea of Marmora, at any rate in isolated packets of men. He would again therefore repeat that France's only wish was to obtain peace and that she only disagreed with Great Britain on the question of means for this purpose. She felt that the Turks would not be stopped now merely by the arrival of Allied reinforcements. She feared too that a Turkish attack would be followed by a Bulgarian attack on Serbia and by a Russian attack on Poland and Roumania.

To bring the Turks to a conference, it was essential to tell them in the invitation that they would get such-and-such satisfaction. They must even be given promises as to terms of peace and if England thinks that she could not do this herself or join in such an Allied communication, France must do it alone. Otherwise M. Poincaré felt sure that the Turks would never come.

LORD CURZON said that he would like to answer some, at any rate, of the points raised by M. Poincaré. He would begin with the various issues involved in the explanation just given as to the withdrawal of the French troops from the southern shore of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. When the French Government suggested the Allied declaration as to defending neutral zones and had agreed to the French signature being put to the communication to the Angora representative at Constantinople, His Majesty's Government had thought the latter a serious action taken to support its application. His Majesty's Government had hoped for some act of Allied solidarity similar to that taken by the British in the defence of the Chatalja line against the Greek threat upon Constantinople. If General Harington had answered General Charpy's appeal as the latter had been instructed by the French Government to answer General Harington's, and if General Harington had then excused himself by saying that the English were the friends of the Greeks and could not risk having to fire upon them, the French would have been shocked, and would have thought such action inconsistent with the alliance. It now appeared that the French general on the spot had been only too anxious to help General Harington, but that his action had been disavowed, and in consequence the French forces had been withdrawn both from Chanak and apparently (though this was not quite clear) from Ismid.

If, as appeared to be the case, Kemal was now to be allowed to violate the neutral zones and to remain in unrestricted control of the shores of the Marmora and the Straits opposite Gallipoli and Constantinople, a very serious position for Great Britain would arise.

M. Poincaré had offered in return as slender encouragement of Ferid's assurances that Kemal would not cross the Straits at once. As a matter of fact, the latter could not and would not be allowed to cross them. For the rest, the British Foreign Office knew in fact from their own sources of information that Ferid had actually advised Mustapha Kemal to cross the Straits and attack the Allies.

Lord Curzon had understood M. Poincaré to say that it was impossible for the Allied military forces to prevent Kemal from crossing the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, and in consequence his advice was that the Allies should abandon the game and accede to Kemal all his demands in advance of the conference. He would therefore ask M. Poincaré to hear Lord Beatty's opinion on this subject. He would be in a position to explain that the British naval forces on the spot would soon be quite sufficient to prevent Kemal from crossing the waters between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Meanwhile he, Lord Curzon, would ask M. Poincaré to consider seriously what value a conference would have if Kemal were to be allowed to advance and take possession of Thrace, Constantinople and Gallipoli. His Majesty's Government wanted a conference, but it must be a conference with reasonable chances of success.

He could not understand the French view that in order to induce Kemal to come to the conference we must concede him in advance all the terms of the national pact. Lord Curzon saw no reason why the terms of the March conference must be torn up simply because 70,000 Turks had driven the Greek forces into the sea. There was of course the question of Moslem opinion to be considered. It was a factor with which His Majesty's Government had to deal in Egypt, India and Mesopotamia, just as the French Government had to deal with it in Indo-China, Morocco and Tunis; but it was not a factor which compelled us to surrender the fruits of victory, and agree to set up in Europe a State of militant Turks. He fully agreed with M. Poincaré that the sooner the conference was held the better, but there was no reason to bribe Mustapha Kemal in advance by conceding the full national pact. The main point was that the Allies should not enter the conference divided. It would therefore be necessary to consider before the conference, questions such as the future of Gallipoli. Here M. Poincaré had spoken as if it were quite enough to trust the word of Mustapha Kemal but the British Government could not take such risks. Then there was the question of Constantinople. Lord Curzon had been surprised to hear doubts expressed in certain quarters as to the Allied attitude in this matter. So far as the British Government were concerned, the March proposals stood in this respect, and as soon as peace was ratified the Allied troops would be withdrawn. Thirdly there was the question of the frontier in Thrace. Many lines had already been discussed but there was no need to say before the future conference that such and such a frontier was the final decision of the British Government and of the Allied Governments. On this point the Turks, Greeks, Roumanians and Serbs must all be

heard. As to the fears expressed by M. Poincaré of Bulgarian and Russian action, Lord Curzon had seen M. Ninchitch, the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs, in London, and he was seriously alarmed with regard to Kemal's advance in Thrace. His Majesty's Government had already consulted the Roumanian Government, and from communications received this morning, Lord Curzon understood that they too were very anxious about the situation and were prepared to resist Kemal's attack by military measures.

Meanwhile Lord Curzon would urge M. Poincaré to reassure the Turks that all points which he had stated would be taken into grave and sympathetic consideration by the Allies: that the Allies were perfectly willing to give up Constantinople after peace was established and that an acceptable frontier would be found in Thrace, but that as regards the Straits and Gallipoli, their freedom must be clearly defined. For the rest, it was essential that the Allies should stand together, and in this respect France must realise the dangerous position which would be created if Great Britain were to be left to stand alone while Turkey was given every assurance by the French Government that all her demands would be conceded. He could not sufficiently emphasise that the British action in this matter was not one of bluster and bravado. He hoped M. Poincaré would be convinced of this by the statement which Lord Beatty was to make that afternoon.

M. POINCARÉ asked to be allowed to make a further explanation regarding the French attitude in the matter of the note as to the neutral zones. He recalled that he had refused to send any ultimatum to Angora during the March discussions, and Lord Curzon and Signor Schanzer had yielded to his point of view. Nevertheless, M. Poincaré had regarded the note which the Allied Foreign Ministers had then sent to Constantinople, Angora and Athens as serious, just as the present note about the neutrality of the Straits was serious. France could not, however, engage herself to take any forcible action in Asia Minor. In March last it had never been contemplated that Allied troops were to be established on the southern shores of the Straits. As regards Chatalja, the French had had a battalion there already when the Greeks threatened the Allies, and all they had done was to reinforce it; but they had never had any troops south of the Straits. Again, it was a physical possibility to stop the Greek advance, but it was not possible now to stop the Turkish advance and if they really wanted to prevent the Turks from reaching the Straits, the Allies must not seek to assume a threatening attitude, but do all they can to bring Kemal to a conference. For the rest, he, M. Poincaré, had no wish to give up everything to the Kemalists. There were many points, for example, minorities, the Allied garrison at Gallipoli, and the military provisions of the future treaty, which would have to be debated at length with the Turks. As regards the Straits, their problem would have to be definitely settled one way or another. Possibly the League of Nations would be found the best solution; but as regards the territorial provisions of the national pact the Allies must be prepared to meet the

Turks in advance in some measure. For, even supposing, as Lord Curzon seemed to think, that the Allies would be found capable of preventing the Turks reaching Europe, the Turks would simply turn again to Syria and Mesopotamia. Then Bulgaria would attack Yugoslavia, and Russia, Poland and Roumania. In these circumstances it seemed to him an act of blindness to invite the Turks to a conference on the basis of the March proposals. This does not mean that he wished to take the Turkish word as a sufficient guarantee for Gallipoli. Here, of course, serious safeguards would have to be provided, even if the Allies were to accept nominal Turkish sovereignty. As for Thrace, the Yugoslavian Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that he would accept a common Turco-Bulgarian frontier, and had so stated publicly in the press in Paris. He could only repeat again that it was useless to tell the Turks to come to a conference and simply to rely on Allied justice, while, in the meantime, barring their route to Europe by military measures. They must be promised a settlement on certain points in advance, even if others were left for examination and discussion at a future conference. This was the only way to persuade them to come to a conference.

LORD CURZON proposed to discuss the question of the conference later, but desired first to return to a point about the seriousness of the document intimating to Kemal the Allied intention to defend the neutral zone. The question of its seriousness could be measured by the fact that it was immediately followed by the French and Italian withdrawal of troops from the two vital places in the zones. M. Poincaré was quite right in saying that the Allied occupation had been confined under the March proposals to Gallipoli and the northern shore of the Sea of Marmora as far as Rodosto. But those were provisions for the final peace settlement, and meanwhile under the armistice, neutral zones had been fixed by Allied action for the safety of the Straits and Constantinople. Were these safeguards now to be overthrown by one-sided French action? Again, how were the Allies to make Turkey accept in the final settlement demilitarised zones south of the Asiatic shores of the Straits if Kemal was to be allowed to advance to occupy the neutral zones which were actually only part of the larger demilitarised areas contemplated in the final settlement? Lord Curzon trusted that M. Poincaré would again consider the gravity of the French action in withdrawing from Chanak in the light of these observations.

Turning to the question of the conference, Lord Curzon agreed that there were several points, such as minorities, and the military provisions of the treaty, which would have to be discussed in the future conference. But he did not see why all the territorial questions, such as Thrace, the Straits, Constantinople and Gallipoli, were to be settled in advance of such a conference. It was quite true that we might have to modify the March frontier of Thrace, and he did not even wish to exclude the possibility of nominal Turkish sovereignty being allowed in Gallipoli—but these were all points for the future conference.

As regards M. Poincaré's fears in the direction of Syria and Irak, His Majesty's Government, for their part, were prepared to run the risk. They trusted, however, that the French would have no trouble in Syria, and, indeed, they felt confident that, as a result of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement of October 1921, France had a real insurance against such trouble. In any case, a firm display of Allied unity seemed the best way to make the Turks pause, if they were really contemplating an attack on Syria and Irak.

M. POINCARÉ asked to be allowed to add a few words regarding the Allied occupation of the neutral zone. He wished to point out that it was the French Government alone who could settle vital movements of French troops, and it was their view that these troops should not be exposed on the southern shores of the two Straits. Even if British naval action could prevent the Turks crossing the Straits, the force at Chanak was hopelessly exposed. He would emphasise once again that an immediate conference was vital, and that the Turks must be persuaded to come to it. If France were to join with Great Britain in shutting the Straits without agreeing to give the Turks some hope of substantial assistance in the future conference, she would simply be courting disaster in Syria, trouble in her colonies, and a big Moslem upheaval in Asia.

F.O. 424/254, pp. 278-285, No. 323

D.B.F.P. I, XVIII, pp. 38-50, No. 41

No. 216

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(Received September 20, 1922.)

FOLLOWING for the Cabinet from Lord Curzon:—

"Have just returned from first conversation of two and a half hours with M. Poincaré. It was delayed by appearance upon the scene of Sforza, who had been brought back to Paris by Poincaré for the express purpose, and who insisted upon the right to be present. I replied that I had come over by arrangement with Poincaré to have a private conversation with him, and until this had taken place I could not agree to convert conversation into an Allied conference. The conversation with Poincaré alone thereupon proceeded.

"In the meantime, I asked Sforza to come and see me after the meeting, and I shall invite him (with Poincaré's consent, which has been given) to attend this afternoon to hear Lord Beatty's statement.

"At Poincaré's invitation, I commenced the conversation by an exposition of the British position and intentions, saying that they were based on the principle of Allied unity, appealing definitely for French support, and asking for an immediate explanation of the astonishing news that France, after suggesting the solemn

warning to Kemal, upon which we had at once and loyally acted, had withdrawn her troops from Chanak. Was she going to do the same at Ismid? Did she mean to break the Allied understanding in this respect? Was she prepared to admit Kemal to the shores of the Dardanelles, Marmora and Bosphorus? Was the decision of the conference — an early meeting of which I urged — to be taken out of our hands by a triumphant march of Kemal to the sea and an invasion of Europe? This was a situation in which we, at any rate, declined to be partners. We were prepared, as we still hoped in conjunction with our Allies, to defend the Asiatic position, and at all hazards to prevent a Kemalist irruption into Europe pending the meeting of the conference. Might we rely upon French assistance?

"Poincaré described conversation of Pellé with Kemal, in which latter had said he could not arrest the movement of his armies until they had occupied all the territories claimed in the National Pact, that such action must be taken before the winter and that he was doubtful about Allied intentions in respect of Constantinople.

"Poincaré admitted that this was blague, but said that Kemal would attend the conference only on his own conditions, which were acceptance of Nationalist demands as regards Thrace and Constantinople.

"Poincaré then defended French action in withdrawing from Chanak on grounds — which I disputed, and propose further to rebut this afternoon — that the French Government had never been a party to French military action south of the Straits, and that the French commander at Constantinople had acted *ultra vires*. Position of French Government was that, though the warning to Kemal was serious, it was not an ultimatum, that it was both a moral and physical impossibility for France to resist the Turks if they advanced, and that French public opinion would not admit of a shot being fired against a Turk. He further said that no steps that could be taken would suffice to keep back the Turks, and that they could cross to Europe when they pleased.

"I entirely denied this assertion, and asked that Beatty should be heard on the subject. I further declined to agree to bribe Kemal to attend the conference by conceding the major part of his demands in advance. There would be no need for a conference under such conditions. The only chance of success for the conference was (1) that Kemal should realise that the game was not in his hands (2) that no final arrangement should be arrived at except after full discussion and with the consent of all parties concerned, including the Balkan States.

"Poincaré declared that M. Nincic had told him that Serbia would not move and was prepared to concede the Maritza boundary straight away.

"I cited views and intended action of Roumania.

"As regards Turkey, I said that there was no dispute about Constantinople, which would under the March proposals, revert to Turkey after peace; that, as

regards Thrace, we were quite willing to discuss and to accept the modification of the frontier previously proposed, but that, as regards the Straits, whereas we attached little importance to the technical question of sovereignty, which could be arranged, the British Empire could never agree to conditions which would place Gallipoli in danger, or sacrifice entire results of the war.

"Conversation will be resumed presently.

"Poincaré made no complaints of British action or communiqué and said nothing offensive. His whole attitude was that, whatever we might chose to do France would decline to co-operate in any way south of the Straits, and that her co-operation in Europe would take the form of purchasing Kemalist adherence to a conference by conceding all essential points of Kemalist programme in advance.

"I hope to define the position rather more clearly this afternoon".

F.O. 424/254, pp. 266-267, No. 496

No. 217

British Secretary's Notes of Conference between the French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Italian Ambassador in Paris, at the Quai d'Orsay, 4 p. m. Wednesday, September 20, 1922. — (Received at Foreign Office, September 23, 1923.)

(Second Meeting.)

PRESENT: *For France:* M. Poincaré.

For Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst.

For Italy: Count Sforza; SECRETARIES: M. de Laroche, M. Massigli, Mr. Forbes Adam, M. Clinchant, Mr. Leeper, M. Bargeton.

Admiral Earl Beatty and Admiral Grasset were also present for part of the meeting.

LORD CURZON, at M. Poincaré's request, opened the conversation. He referred first to a minor point raised by M. Poincaré that morning namely, the views of M. Ninchitch appearing in the press that morning, notably the "Matin", about the Turco-Bulgarian frontier. The Serbian Chargé d'Affaires had since called at the British Embassy to explain that M. Ninchitch formally denied the version of his interview given in the press; the gist of all that he had said was that Anglo-French unity was essential.

M. POINCARÉ, explained that the declaration of M. Ninchitch, to which he had referred that morning, was not that given by the "Matin", but the views which the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs had explained to M. Poincaré himself.

What he had then said was that he did not care much one way or the other about a common Turco-Bulgarian frontier, but that he feared a *blow* between Bulgaria, Turkey and Russia.

LORD CURZON said that he must now recur to a point of major importance, namely, the withdrawal of France and Italy from Chanak and Ismid. The arrangement of the Allied troops in the neutral zone had been merely a matter of convenience between the Allied commanders on the spot. Thus, the English had been stationed at Chanak and the French and Italians at Gallipoli. So much was this the case that when the Greeks threatened Chatalja, or, rather, the Chatalja line, General Harington had at once sent British troops to help the French there. He, Lord Curzon, must ask whether M. Poincaré definitely repudiated responsibility for those portions of the neutral zone which lay on the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and if so, whether he thought it in accordance with the spirit of the Alliance. Further, he would like to know whether, because the French held certain views about Kemal's strength and the deference which should be paid to him, they were therefore at liberty to withdraw their troops and leave all the responsibility for the defence of these zones on the Asiatic shores to the British alone. If so, public opinion would hardly regard this as a just and loyal arrangement. At the same time, Lord Curzon did not wish to reproach the French Government, but he merely wanted some explanation, and he must add that if they really repudiated their responsibilities in the manner that he had outlined, his Government, with whom he must communicate at once, would take a very serious view of the situation.

M. POINCARÉ, said that, as Count Sforza was here this afternoon, he would go back a little way in order to explain the position of the French Government in the matter. It was quite natural that the local commanders should distribute their troops between the zones, but the French Government had never been consulted about the distribution and had never agreed to sending French troops to the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles. He was personally prepared to take all responsibility for the orders given for the French retirement. He would not have given such orders two months ago, but a new situation had arisen and England did not seem to understand the extent of the Turkish victory and their resultant state of elation. There was no soldier in the world who would stay at Chanak in the present military situation. It was not only a question of the defence of the town of Chanak but of some fifty miles of front along that territory. They would have to echelon a whole army in order to make any real defence of the Asiatic shore of the Straits. The Allies were, in fact, in face of an imminent peril and he, M. Poincaré, was not prepared to expose French soldiers to that peril. In his opinion, Mustapha Kemal could cross to-morrow if he wished to do so.

LORD CURZON felt, with all respect to M. Poincaré, that the latter could not fully understand the gravity of his declaration. Since May 1921, with the full

knowledge of the Allied Governments, neutral zones had existed on both sides of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. It was purely a matter of local convenience on which side and in which place the troops of one particular Ally were placed. Who, for instance, had a greater right to be in Gallipoli than the British, with their 25,000 graves on the peninsula? Now, apparently, M. Poincaré contended that the Allied responsibility for the neutral zones was a matter only for normal times, to be changed at the first breath of danger. Surely if the danger was so real and so imminent, the French Government should have sought the opinion of their local commanders by telegraph in the first instance, but the opinion of the local commanders was sufficiently reflected by the fact that they had agreed (both the French and the Italians) to the despatch of their troops and had collaborated in drawing up the sectors for the defence of both Chanak and Scutari. However, as M. Poincaré had defined the position, Lord Curzon could only explain to his Government that so far as Asia was concerned, the *Entente* had ceased to exist, and that the French were leaving Great Britain to bear the brunt of the defence of the Asiatic shores of the Straits. In the course of all the Allied Conferences since the Armistice, Lord Curzon had never known a more serious statement than that recently made by M. Poincaré.

M. POINCARÉ thought that Lord Curzon had misunderstood him. What had really happened was that in a time of imminent danger France had been asked to modify the normal situation in the neutral zone to her detriment. It was due to a recent decision of the local commanders apparently taken out of nervousness. Otherwise it appeared to M. Poincaré incomprehensible. Neither the French Prime Minister nor the French Government nor the French Parliament, whose sovereignty was involved, was prepared to allow local French commanders to expose French troops to the danger of being shot by Turks. M. Poincaré could only beg the English to follow his example, because militarily the situation at Chanak was untenable.

LORD CURZON pointed out that M. Poincaré's statement merely affirmed all that he had said. He had no wish to impugn the sovereignty of the French Parliament, but he must again record that a change in the local situation had led France to withdraw her troops from Asia regardless of the Allied responsibility for the defence of the neutral zone. Since, therefore, the Allied agreement on Asia no longer existed, it must be understood that England would be free to take a similar line of independent action in Europe—for instance, at Gallipoli. She was in a position to do so, and would do so if she desired. He, Lord Curzon, had come to Paris to re-establish the alliance, and not to upset Allied agreements, but the French withdrawal from Chanak might compel Great Britain to take isolated and independent action. The necessity would have arisen from the French procedure, and was deeply deplored by Lord Curzon himself.

M. POINCARÉ stated that he could not prevent His Majesty's Government from interpreting French action as they liked. All that he would add was that during the armistice there had been a certain distribution of troops, and suddenly in a moment of danger this was modified in such a way as to expose French troops to being shot.

LORD CURZON suggested that the French Government might have done what we should have done in similar circumstances, namely, consulted His Majesty's Government or the Allied Commander-in-chief on the spot through the French General there.

M. POINCARÉ explained that he had to save his men in a most perilous situation, and for this purpose urgent action was necessary.

LORD CURZON pointed out that at Chatalja the situation had recently been just as critical. His Majesty's Government might then have withdrawn the troops which they had sent and exposed the French to face the Greeks. They did not do so.

M. POINCARÉ enquired why Lord Curzon felt it necessary to refer to this incident again. The incident of Chanak, he thought, had already been settled by his full explanation that morning.

LORD CURZON said that, in thinking over what M. Poincaré had stated that morning, he had come to the conclusion that M. Poincaré could not have realised the gravity of his attitude, and he had therefore felt it necessary to ask for this further explanation.

M. POINCARÉ again emphasised that it was simply the urgency of the immediate danger which had led to the recall of the French troops. The French Parliament would never allow France to go to war with Turkey or to expose French troops to being shot by Turkish soldiers.

COUNT SFORZA interposed to say that he shared M. Poincaré's views. Italy, like France, would not fight against Turkey or run the risk of Italian troops being attacked by Turkish troops.

LORD CURZON said that he did not wish to add anything more to what he had already said on this point. He could only adhere to his view about the French action—a view which, he felt sure, would be that of his Government also. He would now ask M. Poincaré to permit Earl Beatty to explain the British Admiralty's views on the defence of the Straits and Gallipoli.

M. POINCARÉ asked that Admiral Grasset, who appeared to hold a less optimistic view than Earl Beatty, might also be allowed to make a statement.

LORD CURZON agreed.

Earl Beatty and Admiral Grasset here entered the room.

M. POINCARÉ began by asking Earl Beatty if it were possible for the naval forces now on the spot to defend the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.

EARL BEATTY replied that with the forces there, and now on the way, the Allies could hold all the waters from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea.

M. POINCARÉ enquired whether if the Turks approached the south coast of the Marmara and the Straits, Allied ships could pass up them and hold them whatever the strength of the Turkish artillery on the coast.

EARL BEATTY considered that with the forces and artillery which the Turks were known to possess, it was possible for ships to keep the passage of the Straits open. Light artillery and infantry would have no effect on the movement of ships of war. Any Turkish guns of sufficient calibre to threaten ships of war would have to come from a big distance. To the Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles there were only two roads: one to Panderma and one through Edremid. The first ran for 18 miles along the coast, and was accessible to shell fire for a large part of the distance. The second road through Edremid also ran along the sea for a considerable distance, and was equally open to shell fire. By intelligence and air reconnaissance it ought to be perfectly possible to ascertain what guns of sufficient calibre to threaten the Allied ships were being brought up by the Turks along these roads. If and when these guns had reached the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, their effect would not be great unless they were in a position to deliver a direct fire. Even then, the British navy ought to be able to bring a direct fire in return upon them and make their position untenable.

ADMIRAL GRASSET said that in his opinion the passage of the Dardanelles would be very difficult even if there were no Turkish artillery on the Asiatic shore. He had been on the spot in 1915, and then medium artillery (15-inch) had made the situation very difficult for ships of war. If the Turks were to use the artillery which they had recently captured from the Greeks, the holding of the Dardanelles by the Allied navies would be a very dangerous proceeding, at any rate for any ships other than capital ships. In theory, Lord Beatty was quite correct in saying that it was easy to detect land batteries, but experience in the recent war had shown that in practice it was a very different matter.

LORD CURZON enquired whether Admiral Grasset had not left out of account the fact that Gallipoli was now to be held by the Allies. If the Admiral's experience meant that Gallipoli could not be held if the Turks had artillery on the Asiatic shore, the question of keeping the Straits open permanently became a most complicated one.

ADMIRAL GRASSET replied that we had held positions on the Gallipoli Peninsula during the war, and these had been freely sprinkled by shells from the Asiatic batteries as well as by batteries from other parts of the Gallipoli Peninsula.

LORD CURZON pointed out that if this were so, the situation created by allowing the Turks to reach the Asiatic shore would be a very dangerous one, and merely by holding Gallipoli we might find it very difficult permanently to demilitarise the strip on the opposite coast.

M. POINCARE thought that a distinction should be made between the occupation of Gallipoli and the demilitarisation of the Asiatic shores. In future in times of peace we should necessarily have to trust to the Turks to some extent to carry out this demilitarisation under periodic Allied inspection. But in the Gallipoli Peninsula we should have an Allied force or a League force in permanent occupation. These were matters for later examination. For the moment it was necessary to record that we could not keep troops on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles.

EARL BEATTY continuing his statement pointed out that in 1915 the position had been quite different from to-day. The Turks then had a large number of heavy guns in well established positions on both sides of the Straits. To-day they had no guns either on the southern or northern shores of the Straits. The British Admiralty's information showed that the heaviest guns which the Turks could bring up were of 15 cm calibre and that there were not many of them. In Gallipoli they could not plant any such guns. If, however, they succeeded in placing some on the Asiatic shore this would of course make the passage of ships to and fro difficult, but he, Earl Beatty, saw no special difficulty in the Allies being able to place guns of equal calibre in commanding positions on the Gallipoli Peninsula and with aerial spotting (the Allies could surely assume command of the air), and with the aid of sun-ranging (non-existent in 1915) it should be perfectly possible to keep Turkish artillery fire down to reasonable proportions.

ADMIRAL GRASSET pointed out that if cannons were thus to be placed on both sides of the Straits a zone of fire would be created such as existed on the front in France during the recent war and it would be equally dangerous for vessels to pass between these two lines of fire.

M. POINCARE asked Earl Beatty to extend his statement to the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus.

EARL BEATTY explained that the defence of the Marmara was simply a matter of control by the Allied navies over surface vessels. So long as the Allies had command of the sea, they could make it impossible for any Turkish vessels to cross the Marmara.

LORD CURZON enquired whether vessels now on the spot could exercise such control.

EARL BEATTY answered that it was now possible to exercise considerable control, but not one so fully effective as that which they would be able to establish in a short time.

COUNT SFORZA enquired whether, if Earl Beatty's optimistic views were accepted as against Admiral Grasset's pessimistic opinion, and if we were really in a position to stop Turkish transports crossing, it might not still be necessary to remember that the Allies had very few troops in Europe and that the Turkish

Government and soldiers in Constantinople were in fact hostile to them. On the other hand, to the south of the Straits and of the Sea of Marmara, there was a large victorious and fanatical army. How then would it be possible for the Allied navies to stop packets of men and officers and propagandists crossing the Bosphorus from time to time, and what would be the situation if, while we kept control of the sea, the fire broke out on both sides of the water?

EARL BEATTY admitted that the navies could only control the sea, but they could ensure that effective support could not be transferred by the Turks from one side to the other. The rest of the question appeared to him to be a military and political, and not a naval matter. It was true, however, that if Gallipoli were attacked by a European army the navy could play a very real part in controlling the entry to the Gallipoli Peninsula across the Bulair lines, a distance of about 6 miles. Naval gunfire could be brought to bear from ships both inside and outside the Straits and it would be almost impossible for any effective attack to be delivered upon the Allied forces holding Gallipoli from Thrace.

LORD CURZON interposed to say that he thought Count Sforza was referring rather to the Bosphorus end of the Straits and the question of stopping a number of small ships and boats from crossing.

EARL BEATTY replied that, provided the naval commanders received clear instructions in plenty of time, they could secure control of all vessels in the Bosphorus. The Turks might build rafts, but it ought to be possible to capture or destroy these. They would then have to swim across.

ADMIRAL GRASSET pointed out that the Bosphorus was very narrow, not more than three times the width of the Seine, and it would be very difficult to stop an infiltration of men and troops across its waters.

EARL BEATTY said that very likely such an infiltration might take place, but it might take years for any considerable body of troops to pass in that manner.

LORD CURZON drew attention to the fact that the views of both Earl Beatty and Admiral Grasset provided an overwhelming argument for holding on to the Asiatic shores of the Straits as long as possible. It was essential, therefore, not to break up Allied unity at either end of the Straits. It was for that reason that he regarded the French and Italian action in withdrawing their forces as disastrous.

M. POINCARÉ stated that in Marshal Foch's opinion it was essential to have armies and not outpost of men on the southern shores of the Straits in the present military situation. To control the whole of the Straits one must have forces echeloned along their whole length. M. Poincaré urged that the optimism which preceded our failure at Gallipoli should not be again allowed to blind us. There was no military expert who would now claim that the Allies could defend the Asiatic shores against a Turkish attack, and we must not expose ourselves to attack both from the back and the front. By that he referred to the possibility of a

revolution in European Turkey. A letter which he had just received from M. Sterg, of the Ottoman Bank at Constantinople, went to confirm Count Sforza's view as to this danger. The one step which the Allies must take must be to hold a conference at once.

LORD CURZON reminded M. Poincaré that his observations seemed to leave out of account the fact that both Italy and France were on very friendly terms with Kemal, while even Great Britain was not at war with him. Surely Kemal, who was a very shrewd person, was not going to shoot Frenchmen and Italians; and, if so, the whole hypothesis of M. Poincaré, that if the Allies did not run away they would be fired at, broke down. If the French and Italians would only remain firm, and if they would only send sound and resolute advice to Kemal, he would obey it and would not shoot at anyone; but, if they retired from Chanak and Scutari, they would make Kemal think that he had only to go down and shoot at the British who were stupid enough to remain. Surely the French and Italian action and advice amounted to being more Kemalist than Kemal, and it would make any successful holding of a conference impossible.

M. POINCARÉ pointed out that Angora might well follow their advice officially, but would let Turkish irregulars do her work for her, or perhaps be unable to stop them from doing it. This had happened to the French in Cilicia. It was partly a danger from Turkish irregulars just as much as from Turkish regulars which had led the French troops to be withdrawn from Chanak. Further — and this had been his principal point — the despatch of these French troops to Asia would have been an innovation and in a sense a provocation to the Turks, and it might have started a war between France and Turkey. He would again repeat that it was essential to have a conference, and that if we merely took a negative attitude towards the Turks about the Straits and were to say nothing positive as to concessions to Turkey in the future, they would not come to the conference.

EARL BEATTY then completed his statement as regards the Bosphorus by pointing out that the two coast roads down the Ismid Peninsula to the shores of the Straits could be brought under effective gunfire by ships either from the Black Sea or from the Marmara side, and even the road down the centre of the peninsula, which had been recently built by the British forces, could be similarly controlled. The defence of Constantinople was primarily a military and not a naval question.

The meeting then adjourned for tea.

LORD CURZON said he thought that the position was now clear. On some points, such as the possibility of defending the Straits and the means for defending it, there was unfortunately disagreement. It was, however, agreed that there should be a conference as soon as possible to make a final treaty of peace with Turkey. There was already an existing draft treaty, that signed at Sevres in August 1920 and drawn up in London and at San Remo earlier in that year. Parts of that

treaty had a permanent value, and would be incorporated in the new one. Most of it, however, would have to be changed, and some of it would have to disappear completely. Until the recent Kemalist advance, there had been an idea of holding a preliminary conference at Venice to arrange an armistice to provide for the evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks, and thirdly, to explain the Paris proposals of last March. All these proposals had now disappeared. There was a *de facto* armistice between the Greeks and the Turks. The Greeks had left Asia Minor, and the proposals of the March conference were now in some respects inapplicable. It was now a question whether there was any need for a preliminary conference at all. The Italian Government had very courteously suggested that such a conference might be called at once to Venice. He (Lord Curzon) entirely concurred in the urgency of calling a conference, but he did not agree as to the necessity of that conference being a preliminary one. On this point, however, he would like to have M. Poincaré's and Count Sforza's views. For the rest, much would turn on place and something on the composition of the conference, whether the latter were a preliminary one or a full peace conference. The natural place for a peace conference was at some European capital. As it was Great Britain who had chiefly brought the defeat of the Turks, London might have been the most suitable choice; but, for various reasons, he did not wish to press for London. In any case, it would be personally very difficult for him as Minister for Foreign Affairs to be absent for any length of time from London while Parliament was still sitting, or at any place not easily accessible from England. This point was not, however, an essential one. Then there arose the question of Kemal's attitude towards the place of the conference and the conditions under which it were held. It was certainly desirable to secure the presence of Kemal himself, but he was apparently unwilling to leave Asia Minor, and was prepared to send Fethi Bey in his place. It was, perhaps, more important to decide what Powers were to be represented at the conference. Hitherto, the Great Powers had drawn up all treaties of peace, giving the smaller Powers a hearing and inviting many of them to sign. In his opinion, it was not desirable to have a conference at which all the signatories of the Treaty of Sévres would be present. It would be a "Duma" rather than a conference. At the same time, no conference ought to be held without the presence of States directly interested, such as Roumania and Serbia. For the former, the Straits was a vital matter, while to the Allies it was rather a question of great international policy. Serbia had an interest in the Straits, and she also had a strong interest in the question of a common Turco-Bulgarian frontier. M. Poincaré claimed that the Serbs were perfectly prepared to accept the Maritza as the frontier of Turkey. Be that as it may, they were closely interested in the question of the Straits and of Thrace, and they ought to be given a seat. Bulgaria was on a different footing, but she might claim a hearing, and possibly other States ought also to be heard. Lord Curzon suggested therefore a conference of the principal Allied Powers, together with Roumania, Serbia, Greece and Turkey. It was essential to announce that

such a conference must be led, and to invite the participants — even if it took a little time actually to bring them to the place of meeting. For the moment we were ignorant of Kemal's attitude; in some quarters he was said to require the Allied acceptance of his desiderata in Thrace as a conditions for his entry into a conference. In any case, Lord Curzon was apprehensive of two conference — a preliminary and a final one — since, if the former were a failure, the whole prospect of peace might break down. It would be more difficult for a full peace conference to collapse.

COUNT SFORZA agreed that a definitive conference was better than a preliminary one. The latter only increased the difficulties and risks. As regards the place of the conference, he spoke from his experience as Foreign Minister of Italy, and did not agree with Lord Curzon as to the objections to absenting oneself when one's Parliament was sitting. He thought, however, that there were advantages from other points of view in having a conference at some town which was not a capital, such as Venice. He also believed it to be in the interest of a successful conference that the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers should only come from time to time, while a Minister Plenipotentiary with full powers, who could telegraph home at intervals for instructions, was in a better position to conduct the permanent business of the conference. He agreed as to the presence of Serbia and Roumania, although M. Ninchitch had informed him of his readiness to accept every decision reached in agreement by France, Great Britain and Italy. The first essential step towards holding the conference, as, however, in his opinion, to reach a preliminary Allied decision as to how far the Principal Allied Powers were prepared to go in meeting the Turks.

M. POINCARE entirely concurred as to the necessity of holding an immediate full peace conference and not a preliminary conference. As to the place, he would accept Venice, but feared that the Kemalists might not agree to come to any European town. If so, it was desirable not to sacrifice the conference to the town, but rather the town to the conference. He preferred, as far as possible, that the conference should be one of a technical character, conducted by diplomatists, as in this treaty particularly there were so many technical points to be decided by experts. As to the representation of the Powers, he agreed that Roumania and Serbia should come and that Bulgaria should be allowed to state her opinion about Dedeagatch; but his information went to show that Serbia would not in any case accept any increase of Bulgarian territory. On a point of detail he would like to suggest that no mention should be made of the Treaty of Sèvres. Legally it did not exist, as it had not been ratified, and the mention of its name would infuriate the Turks. That did not mean, however, that it would not be necessary to take many articles of permanent value from the Treaty of Sèvres and insert them without modification in the new treaty.

LORD CURZON expressed his agreement on the latter point. As regards the conference as a whole, he was happy to find everyone in accord. There remained, however, the very important question as to the Great Powers reaching a measure of agreement on certain points in advance of the conference. He thought that he might be able to telegraph to his Government at once and obtain authority to continue the discussion on these points. They appeared to him to comprise the questions of the Gallipoli Peninsula, the status of the Straits, the demilitarized zones and the frontier of Thrace. It would perhaps be possible to have his Government's authority to continue these discussions on Friday afternoon, which he understood was the earliest possible date for M. Poincaré. In the meanwhile, he would urge the French Government to use their very well-known influence to stop Kemal from precipitate action. This was essential in order to give time for a discussion of the conditions under which the conference was to be held, and at which it was desired to meet the Turkish views as far as possible, taking into account the changed situation. If any appearance of Allied disunity were shown, Kemal might act and compel Great Britain in return to act alone as the Allies would not follow her. Therefore once again he, Lord Curzon, would urge M. Poincaré to use every channel of influence with the Turks, who appeared to be so docile to the French and so hostile to the British. For instance, it might be possible to make use of Franklin-Bouillon or Ferid Bey.

M. POINCARÉ pointed out that General Pellé was at Smyrna, and had instructions not only to examine into the damage done by the fire, but also to talk to Mustapha. M. Franklin-Bouillon could not go to Smyrna at present, but it might be possible to induce him to undertake another mission. He was very well fitted for it and very Anglophile. As regards Ferid Bey, M. Poincaré was uncertain how he transmitted advice given him into his telegrams to Angora; but on this point he knew England would be better informed. The war had shown that her administrative services were much better at decyphering telegrams than the French. As to the question of terms, he thought that the Turks would be willing to accept certain provisions for the freedom of the Straits, provided they were placed under the trust of the League of Nations. They would probably also accept an Allied garrison upon the Gallipoli Peninsula. It seemed advisable to warn the Greeks as well as the Turks off the neutral zones, and he personally was in favour of Greek retirement behind the Maritza.

LORD CURZON replied that even if the Greeks could be persuaded to withdraw beyond the Maritza after the conference, if that were the decision of the conference, it would be difficult if not impossible to induce them to do so before the conference had met.

M. POINCARÉ added that he thought it essential that the Turks should be informed that Thrace was to be given back to them. On this point England should use the influence which she possessed with the Greeks.

COUNT SFORZA suggested to Lord Curzon that Sir H. Rumbold should be asked to telegraph at once whether in his opinion there was not a danger of anarchy in Thrace. His information pointed to growing chaos there with continued thefts and murders. He was sure Sir Horace Rumbold would confirm this, and he proposed that for the time being Thrace might be placed under the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan and be occupied by Allied instead of Greek troops.

M. POINCARÉ thought that the question of the Sultan's authority was a question for the Peace Conference.

LORD CURZON suggested that it might be possible to induce the Greeks to withdraw beyond the Ganos — Istranja line. If they were withdrawn beyond the Maritza, the question of the sovereignty of Thrace would inevitably be prejudged. In any case Lord Curzon preferred to have the views of his Government on the question of Thrace. It was really a matter for their further discussion on Friday. Meanwhile he would again urge M. Poincaré to use his influence to calm Kemal.

M. POINCARÉ promised to do his best, but said that he was not sure how far his influence went.

A discussion followed as to the communication to be made to the press, and in particular as to the enumeration of the Powers to be invited to the forthcoming conference.

LORD CURZON proposed that it was necessary to include Japan.

M. POINCARÉ expressed astonishment.

LORD CURZON reminded the conference that Japan had participated in the preparation of the Treaty of Sévres, as a Great Power on the Supreme Council, that it was to be represented with two votes on the Straits Commission and had a High Commissioner at Constantinople.

It was agreed to include Japan.

The following statement to the press was then decided upon:—

"Lord Curzon, Count Sforza and M. Poincaré have agreed upon the expediency of bringing together a conference at which will be represented England, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Yugoslavia, Roumania and Turkey, and at which will be arranged the conditions of future peace. The conversations will be resumed on Friday afternoon at 2 o'clock.

"At to-day's conference Admiral Beatty gave a report upon the situation in the Straits and the Bosphorus, and Admiral Grasset added some supplementary observations".

F.O. 424/254, pp. 293-300, No. 545

D.B.F.P. I. XVIII, pp. 50-61, No. 42

No. 218

*Telephone Message from the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Cabinet and Prime Minister**(Received September 20.)*

THIS afternoon I saw Sforza before the meeting and explained the situation to him, adding that I should welcome his presence to hear Admiral Beatty, and to take part in subsequent discussion. He attended, and was helpful rather than otherwise. Meeting began with an attempt on my part to elucidate the position taken up by Poincaré this morning with regard to southern shore of both Straits. I asked whether French Government, in issuing recent orders to withdraw all French troops from Asiatic side of both Straits, meant to repudiate any Allied obligations on Asiatic coast, and whether they regarded it as a loyal proceeding to take such action in supersession of orders of their own commanders without any notice to their allies, leaving the latter to bear the sole brunt of Kemalist attack and the odium, if retreat were necessary, of that retirement.

M. Poincaré exhibited extreme irritation at revival of this question in so embarrassing a form, and had no reply except that action of French commanders had not been authorised by him, that he had personally countermanded it that the sovereign authority of the French Government and French Parliament was involved, and that French public opinion would not tolerate the death of a single French soldier at the hands of a Turk or of a single Turk at the hands of a Frenchman. I said that this answer cleared the air, because it meant that the French were at liberty to tear up the alliance as soon as a French life was imperilled. If this was to be the rule on one shore of the Straits, it could equally apply on the other, and I should not hesitate to report to my Government this novel interpretation of Allied duty, and to claim for them an equal degree of independence at Gallipoli and at Constantinople. I asked M. Poincaré whether he had measured the full meaning of this extraordinary declaration, and what would have been the feelings had we for fear of endangering British lives returned a similar response to French appeals for support at Chatalja or elsewhere. Nor could he relish the position of compelling an Allied force to retreat because he was afraid of imperilling a single French life. This argument, though provocative at the moment of a rather lively scene, had, as will be seen, an extraordinary effect upon M. Poincaré's attitude later on, more particularly when at a subsequent stage, discussing the responsibility for sole action that had just been thrust upon us, I said that we were quite prepared to act upon it, and that though I had come to Paris to urge Allied action, now that the French had openly disavowed this I was perfectly prepared to recommend single action, and that my Government would not, in respect of the Dardanelles, hesitate to act alone if compelled to do so. We do not want to act alone, I said; but we have the power to do so, and, if compelled, we will. Effect of this was seen later on.

Lord Beatty then came in and gave an exceedingly concise and impressive account of the power of the British navy (*a*) to prevent the Turkish seizure and armament of Chanak position, (*b*) to keep the Straits open, (*c*) to hold Gallipoli Peninsula against all attack, (*d*) to prevent the invasion of Thrace across Marmora, (*e*) to prevent the capture of Constantinople from the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus.

M. Poincaré had, with commendable astuteness, mobilised the French Admiral Grasset to counter all these propositions, which he did with equal amiability and lack of success. I then utilised Grasset's argument as to the ease with which the Turks could occupy either position and threaten Europe to emphasise the folly of abandoning the Asiatic shore and conceding to Kemal this gratuitous advantage.

The Admiral having retired, I then initiated the discussion on desirability of early peace conference and without committing myself before hearing French and Italian views recommended the immediate summoning of such a conference to include Great Powers, Greece and Turkey, Serbia and Roumania, to sit wherever France and Italy desired, and not to proceed with any preliminary conversations, but with drawing up of a new peace.

Both Poincaré and Sforza agreed to summon such a conference at once, to hold it at Venice or some other agreed spot, to have no preliminary discussions and to admit the above Balkan States. But they urged that our conversations should be extended so as to arrive, if possible, at a preliminary understanding between ourselves concerning the bases on which such a conference could profitably be held. I said that I could not enter upon any such conversations without authority of my Government, and that I must refer to them before proceeding further. I will indicate in another telegram the lines upon which I desired to proceed. The extreme amiability with which Poincaré had accepted these proposals encouraged me to make a final appeal to him. Reverting to the terrible responsibility which he had assumed by his attitude as regards the Straits, I said that it was incumbent upon him to use his influence with Kemal, which I knew to be supreme, to desist from any action which might imperil the success, or even the meeting, of the conference thus accepted in principle, and might compel Great Britain to act alone. Poincaré at once accepted this responsibility, and appeared to be confident as to its success.

In my own mind I entertain little doubt that he will now stop Kemal from any precipitate or foolhardy advance, and that our strong policy will thus have been justified. I can hardly exaggerate difference between his attitude at beginning and end of sitting, and begin to think we may emerge from this very difficult position with success. For the moment I would urge that while maintaining our position we desist from any action likely to provoke immediate hostilities.

No. 219

Sir H. Rumbold (No. 19) to Lord Hardinge. (Repeated to Foreign Office; Received September 20)

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 20, 1922

No. 437. Telegraphic

FOLLOWING for Lord Curzon:—

"French High Commission states that French High Commissioner will probably be back to-morrow from Smyrna. I am inclined to attribute delay in his return to his having encountered difficulties with Mustapha Kemal, whom he has no doubt seen.

"(Repeated to Foreign Office. No. 437.)"

F.O. 424/254, p. 262, No. 484

No. 220

Sir H. Rumbold (No. 21) to Lord Hardinge. (Repeated to Foreign Office; Received September 20.)

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 20, 1922

No. 439. Telegraphic

Very urgent

FOLLOWING for Lord Curzon:—

"My immediately preceding telegram.

"It is more than probable that haste with which French Government has recalled its detachments from Chanak and Asiatic shore of Bosphorus indicates that it has received unfavourable reports from French High Commissioner as to Kemal's intentions, or is result of some transaction with Kemal."

F.O. 371/7891/E. 9640

F.O. 424/254, p. 263, No. 486

No. 221

Sir H. Rumbold (No. 22) to Lord Hardinge. (Repeated to Foreign Office; Received September 20.)

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 20, 1922

No. 440. Telegraphic. D.

Most urgent.

FOLLOWING for Lord Curzon:—

"Italian High Commissioner has informed me that he has recalled Italian detachments from Chanak and Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus under instructions from his Government.

"I made the same observations to him as I had done to French secretary, and Italian High Commissioner admitted that my remarks were unanswerable. He laid stress on fact that public opinion in Italy would not tolerate possibility of hostilities with Kemal. In reply to an enquiry as to whether we could count upon Italians to help to maintain order in Constantinople, he replied that he had asked for instructions from his Government on general attitude to be observed by Italian force here."

F.O. 371/7891/E. 9641

F.O. 424/254, p. 263, No. 487

No. 222

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, September 20th 1922, 10.30 p.m.

(Received September 21, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 463. Telegraphic

Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 430.

There are probably about 150,000 refugees at present in Thrace and Greek possessions. Authorities do not know any details but there are certainly many thousands in islands and mainland of Greece so that Kemal's allegation is false as well as cynically impudent. In my opinion large Turkish population living unmolested in Greece will be lucky if they are not all expelled and their houses and land given to refugees.

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/7891/E. 9636

No. 223

Sir E. Crowe (Foreign Office) to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 21st 1922, 2.5 a.m.

*No. 312 Telegraphic**Urgent. Most Secret.*

Following telegram has been sent to-night to Sir C. Harrington by War Office, begins:—

A summary of the political situation disclosed by to-day's discussions in Paris is being telegraphed to Rumbold separately. This will show you the importance of avoiding anything likely unnecessarily to precipitate hostilities. A revised programme of troop movements showing the earliest possible date of arrival of the reinforcements we are expediting by every conceivable means is also being telegraphed. You should have both these telegrams before you when considering what follows in this message. We think it right to set out for your guidance and subject to your better judgement the relative importance which we attach to the various positions committed to your charge. The foundation of all our policy is the Gallipoli Peninsula and the freedom of the Straits. For this it is of the highest importance that Chanak should be held effectively. Quite apart from its military importance it has now become a point of immense moral significance to the prestige of the Empire. We should regard it as an invaluable achievement if it could be retained. A blow at Chanak is a blow at Britain alone, whereas Ismid and Constantinople are matters of international consequence affecting all the allies. Compared to Chanak we think Constantinople comes second and Ismid third. Probably the Kemalists will not attack the Ismid position. If they do and reach the Bosphorus Admiralty have declared they can still prevent the passage of the Turkish army into Europe. If they bombard Pera Navy can retaliate on some convenient area or take other reprisals. We regard the Ismid position as at once the most difficult to hold and the least fatal if lost. Thus it might well be that at the proper moment you would withdraw your troops from Ismid and even Constantinople to Chanak, and thus secure the position there on an adequate front and in good time. We have entire confidence in your judgement as to whether such a concentration at Chanak is necessary and when it should be made. Should you decide on a consideration of the above and of all the circumstances that there is a good chance of holding Chanak for two or three weeks what ever happens we shall cordially approve such a decision. We are deferring decision about two divisions till next phase of situation develops. In this case you are authorised to make through the High Commissioner any notification to Kemal that may be necessary for the purpose of securing Chanak. For instance, you may warn him against penetrating the neutral zone in this region, and should he do so that he will be fired upon if he uses the roads along the sea-coast to approach the position held by your

troops. We leave the form and scope of such warning to you. All the above should be taken by you as a guide rather than as a rule for we have the utmost confidence in your comprehension of the whole situation.

Show copy of this to Naval Commander-in-Chief.

F.O. 424/254, pp. 276-277, No. 518

F.O. 371/7894/E. 9952

D.B.F.P., I, XVIII, pp. 62-63, No. 43

No. 224

Telephone Message from Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(Received September 21, 1922.)

FOLLOWING from Lord Curzon for Cabinet:—

"Greatly obliged for kind words of encouragement from Cabinet. Meeting for to-morrow is fixed for 2 p.m. owing to Poincaré's engagement in the morning.

"Its object will be to arrive at a preliminary understanding as to the conditions in which the Allies will enter conference and which French will doubtless at once communicate to Kemalists, with whom they are in the closest contact. It will be a difficult task; the Kemalists, backed by France and Italy, press for full acceptance of National Pact as condition of entering conference, and may raise other objections, such as choice of place of meeting, admission of Russia, retirement of Greeks from Thrace. Against these pretensions my best arguments are:—

"1. Absurdity of convoking conference in which Roumania and Serbia are to take part and then decide main issues in advance and in their absence.

"2. Consciousness of France of moral weakness of her own position in deserting the Allies from admitted motives of fear.

"3. Her genuine apprehension, which was quite apparent yesterday, that we not only mean but are able to act alone.

"The area which will have to be covered in discussion is as follows, and I will state *seriatim* the positions which, subject to the approval of the Cabinet, I propose to take up. I may not be able to sustain them all without modification, but will do my best:—

"1. *Constantinople*.—Here we shall agree, as in March last, to hand back Constantinople and full sovereignty to the Turks after the ratification of peace. All the Allied garrisons will then be withdrawn. Difficulty will be experienced in arranging for demilitarisation of Asiatic shore of Bosphorus. But step will have to be taken under the supervision of the League of Nations as provided for later on to secure that doorway of Black Sea is not closed, and that fortifications and batteries are not placed on the Bosphorus.

"2. *Thrace*.—Here French will press (a) for the complete and immediate evacuation of Thrace by the Greeks; (b) for the recognition of the Maritza frontier. I absolutely declined yesterday to go so far, on the ground that it would be anticipating work of conference. Suggestion I made, and propose to repeat, is that if neutral zone at Ismid Peninsula is respected by Kemal, Greek frontier forces shall, for similar reason—*i.e.*, protection of Constantinople—be withdrawn behind the Enos-Istranja line proposed at March conference.

"All evidence is that Greek army in Thrace is in a state of considerable demoralisation. Sforza read telegrams showing that country is in a state of complete anarchy, and that Greeks are incapable either of maintaining order or if left in Thrace, of holding it.

"He is very likely therefore to propose some form of Allied occupation. This would mean troops which I am sure that Italy would not provide, and which France would not be too keen to furnish.

"Immediate recognition of Turkish sovereignty may also be pressed for, but here again I shall argue that this is doing work of conference in advance.

"When we come to question of future frontier France and Italy will press for Maritza, and will be strengthened by avowed acceptance of that line by Serbia. I will ascertain to-day what are the exact views of Serbian King and Minister and if possible, also of Roumania on the subject. Our attitude must be determined by broad considerations of British Imperial interests. If we can safeguard Gallipoli position, which is cardinal point for us, I do not know that it is of vital importance to us at what exact point boundary line is drawn. Much more important will be future form of government and control in Thrace.

"Here it may be prudent to revive the idea, which was discussed and abandoned in March, of creating an autonomous State in Eastern Thrace under League of Nations, while allowing symbol of Turkish sovereignty in the shape of a flag or some other innocuous emblem. Success would depend on willingness of League of Nations to accept charge and of interested Powers and States to provide requisite gendarmerie or police. Area will have to be demilitarised. A good deal will depend on the attitude of Serbia and Roumania as to which I will report later.

"I shall argue on Friday that it is not for us to fix final boundaries now, but merely to formulate general ideas in our own minds. M. Poincaré thinks that Turks will be rather favourable to League of Nations idea as less wounding to their pride and carrying with it their own participation when admitted to League.

"Finally, we come to Dardanelles. French now know that, sooner than abandon this position, we shall take and hold it alone, and of this Poincaré's attitude yesterday shows that they are in great apprehension. It should therefore not be difficult to arrange for occupation by Allied and other forces under auspices of League of Nations. I propose to ask Serbia and Roumania whether they would

contribute. If difficulties are raised, I always have lever of British intentions in background. Technical Turkish sovereignty might be admitted, and even a flag flown.

"When Admiral Grasset contended yesterday that appearance of Kemalists at Chanak would render Gallipoli position untenable, I at once used his argument, which is, I believe, wholly fallacious, to point out to Poincaré that, if Gallipoli is to be held, which he admitted, Chanak must therefore either be held also or be demilitarised, as proposed in March. This he could not deny, and we shall have, I think, to arrange after all forts or gun positions have been destroyed, that periodic visits are paid by officers of Gallipoli force to see that nothing is being done.

"I should add that intervention of League of Nations in Thrace may admit of guarantees to Bulgaria of rail exit to Dedeagatch without any territorial concession, which her neighbours, I am sure, would decline to allow.

"Foregoing is general sketch of policy which I should like to advocate tomorrow.

"If modified by later information, I will telegraph again. But I would ask for discretion to move within reasonable limits, and of course the defiant attitude of Kemalists may at any moment bring fabric to ground. On the other hand, publicly stated intention of Allies to hold very early conference will make it increasingly difficult for Kemal to move."

F.O. 424/254, pp.274-275, No. 513

No. 225

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 21st 1922, 8.45 p.m.

(Received September 22, 8.30 a.m.)

No.443 Telegraphic

Confidential

My immediately preceding telegram.

Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister said that he had instructions from his government to report fully on situation here and asked me to describe it. I did so. He expressed approval of energetic line taken by His Majesty's Government and said that French and Italian policy was calculated to directly encourage Kemalists to come to Constantinople. He expressed personal opinion that Serb-Croat-Slovene government would have no difficulty in sending one or two Serbian divisions to the Dardanelles in a few days provided transports were available at Salonica.

I have noticed that French and Italians here are making the most of the size of Mustafa Kemal's army and its armament. They quote effectives between 150,000 and 300,000 men. I understand that this is a gross exaggeration.

French here also profess not to be convinced that Mustapha Kemal cannot (1 group omitted) his (group omitted) across to Europe.

F.O. 371/7892/E. 9722

No. 226

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 21, 1922

(Received September 22.)

No. 444 Secret.

Telegraphic.

GREEK High Commissioner states that he has secret information that Kemal recently asked Seri Sefain Company to let him have four ships to transport his troops to Europe. He also asked Minister of Marine to let him know whether Turkish warships in Golden Horn were fit for service, and whether he could use them. This latter enquiry was considered by a Council of Ministers, as a result of which Grand Vizier replied that for many reasons it would be impossible to use ships in Golden Horn

F.O. 424/254, p. 287, p. 530

No. 227

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 21st September 1922, 1.10 a.m.

(Received September 22, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 445. *Telegraphic*

Very Urgent

Addressed to Paris No. 23 for Lord Curzon.

French High Commissioner who returned from Smyrna this morning has given me a full account of his interview with Kemal. French High Commissioner stated that he received no telegram from his government whilst he was at Smyrna and that he was unaware of withdrawal of the French detachments from Asiatic shore of both Straits. French High Commissioner saw Kemal twice. He described him as talking more like a victorious general than as a politician. He began by urging him not to violate neutral zones as such action would bring him up against

three most powerful countries in Europe. Kemal replied that his troops were already in motion and that he intended to march on Constantinople as soon as possible. Whilst French High Commissioner believes Kemal's statements regarding rapidity of his army's movements were partly bluff he is convinced that he does mean to march on Constantinople. He will probably march on Chanak simultaneously. Kemal said that he must have Eastern Thrace up to Maritza line. He made no mention of Western Thrace. He said he did not propose to transport a large army to Thrace but that he must send a certain number of troops there to maintain order. He said that as he was convinced that England would not agree to modification to any considerable extent of her policy in Thrace he must settle matter by military means. His army had accomplished one part of its task and must accomplish the rest. He must either go on or demobilize and he must finish the business before the winter set in.

French High Commissioner had pointed out that Mustapha Kemal must surely be reluctant to destroy Constantinople but this argument did not seem to weigh much with the Turks.

Mustapha Kemal said that he would come to a conference but would not arrest movements of his troops. He suggested conference might be at Scutari.

French High Commissioner derived impression that Nationalists only care about territorial question at present moment. Mustapha Kemal and his staff were suffering badly from swelled head. Mustapha Kemal had summoned his ministers to meet at Smyrna. This meeting will probably take place tomorrow and French High Commissioner thinks it will decide line of policy to be followed.

Mustapha Kemal is in great fear of being assassinated.

French High Commissioner implored Mustapha Kemal not to prejudice meeting of conference by committing any rash act. He also warned him of tenacity of England when once she was engaged in a struggle.

I told French High Commissioner that you were pressing for an immediate conference.

F.O. 424/254, pp. 287-288, No. 531

F.O. 371/7891/E. 9711

No.228

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul London (Geneva)

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 21, 1922

No. 47 Telegraphic R.

YOUR telegrams No. 37 and 39, and Lord Curzon's telegram to you of yesterday.

In present circumstances evacuation of refugees to Constantinople cannot be allowed. There is no room for them and their arrival might cause an outbreak. Greece and the islands is their proper destination and we understand Greek Government will admit them.

We are supporting application of Allied admiral to Kemal for permission to Greek ships to enter Smyrna and remove refugees. If this is unsuccessful or inadequate we are making enquiries as to available British shipping in neighbourhood and are prepared to charter British ships provided they may carry out their task.

We concur in the recommendation to place 100,000 fr. at Dr. Nansen's disposal, and authorise you to co-operate in larger relief expenditure, not exceeding 50,000*l.*, on condition that other Powers will incur equal expenditure with Great Britain.

(Addressed to Geneva No. 47. Repeated to Paris No. 317)

F.O. 424/254, p. 276, No. 516

No. 229

Foreign Office to the Admiralty

21st September, 1922

Very Urgent.

Sir:—

With reference to telegram No. 355 of the 18th instant from the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to the Admiralty, reporting that Mustafa Kemal refused permission for the embarkation of the Greek refugees at Smyrna, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to state, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that according to messages from the "Times" and "Morning Post" correspondents at Constantinople, dated the 19th instant, the Kemalist authorities have now waived their objection to the departure of the refugees except men of military age. As his Majesty's Government have already undertaken to charter shipping provided firstly that the Greek Government are ready to receive the refugees (which is known to be the case), and secondly, that embarkation will be feasible, I am to request that an immediate telegraphic enquiry may be addressed to the Senior Naval Officer, Smyrna, whether Mustafa Kemal is in fact prepared to allow the refugees to embark.

I am, etc

F.O. 371/7891/E. 9634

No. 230

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.— (Received September 21, 1922.)
No. 376. *Telegraphic.*

FOLLOWING received from Rear-Admiral Commanding Third Light Cruiser Squadron is passed to Admiralty for information:—

"[? Mustapha] Kemal still here. Has been in close consultation with Pellé until latter's departure this evening, Wednesday. [?Several] reliable sources, including General Nouredin, [three corrupt groups] great importance is attached to the date, 30th September. [? Any] attempt at further evacuation of refugees must be carried out before date mentioned. Nouredin stated that any refugees remaining after the 30th September would be massacred. General demeanour of Turks during evacuation was distinctly unfriendly. I and my flag-lieutenants were arrested near railway pier, where evacuation was taking place. [Corrupt group] troops observed proceeding northward to-day, 8.49 p.m., 20th September.

F.O. 424/254, p. 273, No. 511

No. 231

Admiralty to Rear Admiral 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron

September 21st, 1922, 11.20 p.m.

No. 436. *Telegraphic.*

Re your 2049 of 20th September. Request confirmation that Kemal is in fact permitting refugees except men of military age, to be evacuated now and that evacuation can continue up to 30th September.

F.O. 371/7893

No. 232

General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office

Disp. 1600 21.9.22

Recd. 1000 22.9.22

Paraphrase Secret

2375 cipher

Your 91137 last part. My telegram 2367 September 20th shows you that I took action you recommend yesterday with Hamid who wired it at once to Mustafa Kemal. Mustapha Kemal beyond all possible doubt now knows we are in

earnest, and that all our preparations are for peace, but that he comes up against might of England and Dominions if he crosses neutral zone. After meeting, Hamid put a lot of propaganda to American journalists that an ultimatum had been handed by him to me. Truth is I sent for him at four p.m. and handed him my communique after speaking to him very seriously. You need have no fear that hostilities will be precipitated by me. I am much too anxious to avoid them.

Reference to telegram 75 September 21st from Sir H. Lamb wirelessly to Navy regarding necessity for immediate solution and that the decisive date is September 30th. This bears out exactly the impression received by me in conversation with Hamid yesterday who discussed necessity for not wasting one day in summoning conference.

F.O. 371/7893/E.9816

No 233

British Representative at the Hague to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

THE HAGUE. September 21st, 1922

No. 445.

My Lord,

Interest in the Dutch press has of late been centred round the situation in the near East and the following is a summary of the more general opinions held by the leading newspapers.

All branches of the press agree in stigmatising the energetic action and warlike preparations of the British Cabinet as light-hearted. The "Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant" in an article which is frankly anti-Mr. Lloyd George, quotes the semi-official statement by Reuter which elicited the equally semi-official statement by Havas that France would not risk the limbs of a single poilu against Kemal Pasha, and goes on to say that the statement in question was circulated by Mr. Lloyd George without the approval of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, thus confirming an open secret that the Prime Minister is often also his own Foreign Minister. The "Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant" is of opinion that the threat of war was not meant too seriously and that the circle of caution drawn by France and Italy will not be overstepped. From all sides people in England are calling for a restoration of unity with France and this is considered an excellent idea, for no healthy thinking Englishman would regret that a few paper promises to Greece were to be burnt.

"Het Volk" the big socialist paper in Holland attaches great importance to the statement that the British Government had invited the Governments of Greece, Roumania and Serbia to help to defend the so called neutral zone against the Kemalists, for the Southern Slavs and Roumania had up to the present relied for

all support and protection not on England, but on France. "Het Volk" deduces, therefore, that England wants to take the leadership of the Little Entente in this matter, a step which it considers will undoubtedly accentuate the friction with France.

I have etc.

(Signed) CHARLES M. MARLING

F.O. 371/7892/E. 9743

No. 234

Sir H. Dering (Bucharest) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

BUCHAREST, September 21st, 1922

(Received September 25)

No. 489.

My Lord,

With reference to my most confidential despatch No. 496 of 20th instant relative to Roumania's attitude regarding the present crisis at Constantinople, I have the honour to transmit herewith a Memorandum by the Third Secretary of this Legation, Mr Baggallay, regarding an interview which he had this morning with the Chief of the General Staff, General Cristesco, the Sub-Chief having left rather suddenly for Paris. Mr. Baggallay held a Commission in the war and served in the Near East. He is acting for the Military Attaché who is expected to return shortly.

The substance of the enclosed Memorandum was reported in my telegram No. 120 of today's date.

I have etc.

(Signed) HERBERT DERING

F.O. 371/7894/E. 9890

ENCLOSURE IN No. 234

Interview With General Cristesco

BUCHAREST, September 21st, 1922

Memorandum.

I saw General Cristesco, the Chief of Staff this morning.

I began by asking whether he had any information as to movements of troops in Russia as a result of the Soviet decision to support Kemal Pasha. He replied that he had nothing definite but would keep me constantly informed should anything

come to his notice. He begged me to do the same for him as he knew that the British Intelligence Service was the best of any as regards the Near East, and the Roumanians were in fact almost entirely dependent on their Allies for information, even regarding the Ukraine. I promised to communicate anything which came to my knowledge.

We then passed on to the situation at Constantinople. He asked if the British really meant to defend Constantinople and I said that it seemed evident that they did. He said he sincerely hoped they would, as the question was vital to Roumania, and that from the material point of view he did not consider that we should have any difficulty in doing so. In his opinion the troops and resources of Kemal were much overrated, the fact of their having beaten the Greeks signifying nothing. The Fleet should be able quite easily to prevent any crossing of troops into Thrace, except in the smallest bodies.

I then suggested that, as the matter was so vital to Roumania, she was hesitating unduly about her own attitude. He replied that the English must make allowances for the difficulties of small nations. All instructed opinion in Roumania, military and otherwise, was entirely on the side of England, who was the one Power actually carrying out the policy of Roumania's own heart. There were, unfortunately, misunderstandings, which nobody regretted more than Roumania, between England on the one hand and France and Italy on the other, over this same policy. Much as she would like to, Roumania did not dare openly to proceed against France's wishes. France supplied her with munitions and equipment and there was a definite understanding that she should supply more in case Roumania were attacked.

This led to the question of the potential military effort of Roumania. I asked whether he thought that the division which they had been asked to put at the disposal of the Allied Commander-in-Chief was rather a large force for Roumania to supply. He said that it was, if it were required to leave the country, but that the Allied Command could regard much more than one division as available against Bulgaria, should the latter make any move in Thrace. The question, however, was largely one of munitions. Roumania had enough to start a campaign anywhere, but she would immediately need to receive further supplies from her Allies. For this purpose England was, as he put it, "far off".

Taking all things into consideration, he thought that Monsieur Bratiano's latest decision (i.e. not to send troops out of Roumania) was wise from the military point of view, though no one regretted more than he the divergence of opinion between England and France, which made it impossible for Roumania to take a more decided stand.

The principle impression I gathered was that the General Staff, at any rate, are wholly with England in regard to the question of defending Constantinople, but that they are tied hand and foot to France, partly because they are under

obligations to her, and partly she is ready and anxious to promise, at least, munitions and other assistance, to which England, since the armistice, has been very chary of committing herself.

F.O. 371/7894/E. 9890

No. 235

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 318, Telegraphic (by bag)), Rome (No. 280, Telegraphic), and Washington (No. 284, Telegraphic)

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 22, 1922

MUSTAPHA KEMAL and Greek refugees.

Reply returned by Mustapha Kemal 18th September to associated admirals and consuls through Italian admiral is tantamount to condemnation of quarter million people to death by starvation. His Majesty's Government feel confident that Government to which you are accredited will instruct their naval representative at Smyrna to protest again for permission for embarkation of refugees. British Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna is being instructed to do so.

Please inform Government to which you are accredited.

(Sent to Paris, No. 318; Rome, No. 280; and Washington, No. 284; repeated to Constantinople, No. 415, and Athens, No. 243.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 292, No. 544

No. 236

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul London (Geneva)

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 22, 1922

No. 52. Telegraphic, R.

YOUR telegram No. 41 of 20th September: Greek refugees.

Following for Lord Balfour:—

"September 18—Mustapha Kemal informed the associated admirals at Smyrna that he must refer to Angora before permitting the 250,000 Greeks who are starving there to be embarked, and that in any case none could leave after 30th September. This is tantamount to condemning them to death, for obviously he could have given permission had he wished it. It is possible that criticisms in the League Assembly might influence him. Please take such action as you consider appropriate.

"Full report received from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople leaves no doubt that sacking of Smyrna was carried out with object of exterminating native Christian and foreign influence."

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 414, and Athens, No. 241.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 292, No. 543

No. 237

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 22nd, 1922

(Received September 23, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 449. *Telegraphic.*

Your telegram No. 400.

General Harington repeated to Hamid Bey yesterday for the information of Kemal his determination to defend neutral line. We consider no further communication with Angora necessary.

General Harington also made it quite clear to Hamid Bey that our preparations were solely for peace not war.

F.O. 371/7892/E. 9767

F.O. 424/254, p. 303, No. 554

No. 238

General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office, repeated Baghdad, India and Egypt

Desp. 0200 22, 9.22

Recd. 1000 22, 9.22

Paraphrase. Secret

2374 cipher 21st September, 1922. 1st of 2 parts.

Your 91137 D.D.M.O. and I. is now coming in asking for my views on F.O. wire to Sir H. Rumbold which I have not yet got and which I will answer later.

In order that Mesopotamia, India and Egypt may know where we are I am sending this short appreciation.

There are 4 danger points, as I have said in former wires, namely, Chanak, Constantinople, Ismid front and revolution in Thrace. We have been very firm and though there is strong under-current of agitation both Constantinople and Thrace are more or less quiet at moment.

Ismid front cannot be in danger for another 10 days or so. It is in my opinion the? main defence of Constantinople. The crux is at Chanak and I think to-day Mustapha Kemal is trying to make up his mind whether to violate neutral zone or not.

Last part.

I have told him quite plainly that he comes up against full powers of England and her Dominions if he does violate the neutral zone. The French and Italians, as you know, have withdrawn their detachments from Asiatic side. I have 3 battalions at Chanak under Colonel Shuttleworth and another going from Ismid front to-day. 1 battery R.F.A. and 1 battery 4.5 howitzers going tomorrow. 1 squadron 3rd Hussars. The Navy are splendid and are rendering tremendous help and I hope to get some aeroplanes before long. I think we are all right and shall see it through but I badly want the 6 inch howitzers on Gallipoli. I am very grateful for all reinforcements being sent and we ought to see this business through if I can keep a grip on this city another 48 hours till other reinforcements are within reach of Chanak.

F.O. 371/7893/E. 9815

No. 239

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Foreign Office

PARIS, 22nd September 1922, 10.25 p.m.

(Received September 23, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 474. *Telegraphic*

Very Urgent.

Following for Sir W. Tyrrell from Lord Curzon.

Please communicate to Cabinet following telegram from Sir H. Rumbold.

"General Harington appears very anxious about situation at Constantinople. It should be realised that we are living on a sort of volcano. Many undesirable elements have drifted to the town and it is known that some 20,000 Turks and probably an equal number of Greeks are armed. The force at his disposal consists of three battalions two of which are very weak indeed. If French and Italians do not assist in maintaining order in the town in the event of a rising he feels that his force would be inadequate to defend approaches to Scutari and put down rising. This might entail abandonment of Constantinople at short notice. I personally believe that French who have fairly strong force here would be obliged in self defence to help to maintain order but I think it urgent that we should obtain an immediate and categorical statement from French and Italian governments as to their intentions in this matter. I note from your telegram No. 404 that Lord Beatty

is confident that navy can prevent capture of Constantinople from Asiatic side of Bosphorus, but Admiral Brock informs me he does not concur that navy can do this unless approaches to Constantinople are held by navy. He has so reported to Admiralty. If we had to leave Constantinople owing to defection of our Allies Mustapha Kemal would be in a position to move troops across to Europe.

Wives and children of British officers and men are embarking tomorrow and arrangements have been made to embark British colony at very short notice."

F.O. 371/7892/E. 9763

D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, p. 65, No. 47

No. 240

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean

(Received at Foreign Office, September 22.)

September 22, 1922

No. 262. Telegraphic

YOUR No. 381.

As stated in your No. 293, whole problem hangs on transport. Kemal cannot cross if all craft which he could use for passage are entirely removed. Navy has it in its power to remove by destruction or otherwise all floating craft in Bosphorus. In telegrams Nos. 897, 915, 924 you have been given definite instructions that the navy is responsible for preventing the passage of Kemalists forces from Asia to Europe, and authorised to take all steps necessary to fulfil this obligation, which includes removal or destruction of all craft which they might use for this purpose. It has never been contemplated that His Majesty's ships could remain in narrow waters after Asiatic shore had passed into Kemal's hands. It is recognised that small force of light cruisers, submarines and destroyers would have to be maintained in Black Sea to prevent advent of other means of transport.

End of part 1).

F.O. 424/254, pp. 288-289, No. 534

No. 241

Sir H. Rambold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 22, 1922

(Received September 22.)

No. 446. *Telegraphic D.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

French High Commissioner likewise stated that it might still be possible to deter Mustapha Kemal Pasha from any adventurous action if he were assured that Eastern Thrace up to Maritza would be handed over to him. French High Commissioner felt sure that even if Mustapha Kemal Pasha consented to send delegates to proposed conference he would maintain his army on borders of neutral zone in order to exercise military pressure on Allies. Thus conference would be held under threat of military movements.

French High Commissioner saw comparatively few refugees at Smyrna, and gathered that bulk of these were collected on outskirts of town. Destruction of Smyrna had made a considerable impression on Mustapha Kemal Pasha, but had not affected other Turks who seemed to consider it as an incident of war. Mustapha Kemal Pasha appeared anxious that such foreign enterprise as had been spared by fire should be allowed to develop unhindered. French High Commissioner discredited reports that Turks had been responsible for destruction of Smyrna. I said our information was to the contrary effect.

F.O. 424/254, p. 288, No. 532

No. 242

British Secretary's Notes of the Conference between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Italian Ambassador in Paris, Friday, September 22, 2 p. m. (Received at the Foreign Office on September 25.)

Third Meeting.

PRESENT: *For France:* M. Poincaré.

For Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston; Lord Hardinge of Penshurst.

For Italy: Count Storza; SECRETARIES: M. de Laroche, M. Galli, M. Massigli, Mr. Forbes Adam, M. Clinchant, Mr. Leeper, M. Barjoton.

M. POINCARÉ opened the proceedings by enquiring whether Lord Curzon had received any information from British sources or from his Government regarding the situation.

LORD CURZON said that he understood that their endeavour that afternoon would be to lay down the bases of agreement on certain important points upon which the future peace conference would proceed. The difficulty was undoubtedly great, but it was essential that the three Great Powers, while reaching a general agreement upon these bases, should not lay down publicly on this subject any too precise conditions without consulting the smaller Powers, who might well object to them. It would not only be disrespectful to them, but it would also amount to trying to do the work of the peace conference in advance. To-day, he suggested that the main points of importance should be discussed one by one, and that they should exchange their views upon them and see how far agreement was possible. By this procedure Lord Curzon did not despair of finding some common ground upon which the three Allies could stand. He proposed that they should begin by taking the Bosphorus and Constantinople, then proceed to the question of Thrace, Adrianople, the Straits and Gallipoli. Here he would like again to repeat, as he had done in so many conferences, that it was not in the power of the Allied Governments to reach a pacific solution unless they were firmly resolved to stand together. For each ally to proceed upon a different policy and to put forward a different solution would be fatal to any chance of success.

Great Britain, for her part wanted peace as ardently as any other Power, and it distressed him to read as he had done recently in the press, that one Ally stood for peace but another for war. The last thing that Great Britain wanted was another war. At the same time public opinion was not prepared to throw away lightly the fruits of the Allied victory in 1918. The British people did not want, merely because the Greeks had lost the war, to lose all the gains in that hard-fought struggle. Subject to this reservation, Lord Curzon was ready to open a discussion upon the points which he had already mentioned.

Lord Curzon concluded by stating that he had no fresh information of interest to give to the conference. His own telegrams from his High Commissioner at Constantinople merely passed on the information from General Pellé which M. Poincaré had already outlined to the conference. He himself did not now know where Kemal was but he trusted that M. Poincaré would have news to give them on this point and others.

M. POINCARE said that he did not quite understand the position as explained by Lord Curzon. All that he wished to do that day was to find a means which would make it possible for the Turks to come to peace conference. He did not wish to arrange terms of peace without their presence. His aim was to be in a position to state that France, England and Italy were sufficiently in agreement on certain important points to enable Mustapha Kemal or his representatives to come with confidence to a conference.

M. Poincaré then proceeded to read two telegrams giving an account of conversations between General Pellé and Mustapha Kemal at Smyrna. General Pellé had found Kemal in a state of some exaltation. He had stated that his troops were ready and eager to advance; but in General Pellé's opinion, Kemal was prepared to exert some sort of pressure upon them. General Pellé's personal opinion was, that even in the event of the Allied fleets and soldiers being able to prevent the Turks from crossing to Europe, the result would be war, preceded probably by revolution in Constantinople and Thrace. The mere presence of Turkish troops on the southern shores of the waters between the Black Sea and the Dardanelles, together with artillery torpedoes, &c, would make it extraordinarily difficult for the Allied navies to maintain their position. In his opinion, the only means of avoiding a conflict was to propose at once the opening at Mudania of some sort of conference provided Great Britain would agree to it and send representatives. It would then be possible perhaps to arrange with Kemal to stop his troops. In General Pellé's opinion, it was quite certain that Kemal would only stop them however, if he were at once promised that he would receive Thrace up to the Maritza at the future conference. General Pellé concluded his telegrams by asking for urgent instructions as to the movements of the French fleet and army in the Near East.

M. Poincaré suggested that in these circumstances, and as the possibility of a Kemalist attack seemed now imminent, it was essential for them at once to decide to give Kemal those territorial assurances which would alone satisfy him. Even if England and Italy would allow France to give him some such assurance at once on their behalf war might be stopped, and the dangers of a revolution in Constantinople and Thrace be avoided. If England and Italy refused to join in or send any such communication to Kemal, France would have publicly to explain her position, and repudiate all responsibility for the failure of the Allies to stop the war.

As an instance of the feeling in France and her colonies on this point, M. Poincaré referred to a recent communication from the Sultan of Morocco, who was in Paris, and who had told him that it was absolutely essential that France should not go to war with the Turks.

M. Poincaré concluded by urging again that if only the Allies could say at once to Kemal that, subject to future agreement regarding the freedom of the Straits, the Allies were prepared to accept at once his desire to obtain the Maritza frontier, Kemal would not advance, and the one means of stopping the war would have been found.

COUNT SFORZA then gave some confidential information which he had received that morning from Constantinople. Since he regarded as vital to the interests of the Alliance and of Europe the most intimate co-operation between the

Allied military and naval forces at Constantinople, he asked that the information which he was now going to give might be kept strictly confidential, and not regarded as gossip to be passed on to people outside the Conference Chamber. His telegram showed that General Mombelli had had a conversation either with General Harington or with one of the British generals on the spot. Mombelli had told this general that if a Turkish attack were to develop, he would do his best under General Harington's orders to meet it and to help the British, but in his opinion the military situation was hopeless. The other had replied that it was undoubtedly grave, but that the British were in a position to count on the arrival of French and Italian divisions. Even if these did not come, there were other ways of meeting the danger, and he had then suggested that it might be possible to arm the Christian population of Constantinople and the surrounding country. Count Sforza drew the earnest attention of the conference to the gravity of this advice and the incalculable disasters that might result when war began.

M. POINCARÉ said that he had had a report in something like the same sense from his own military authorities on the spot. At any rate, the latter were quite as pessimistic as General Mombelli.

LORD CURZON thanked Count Sforza and M. Poincaré for the information they had just given to the conference, to which he attached much importance. He would like to point out, however, that it was quite natural that Kemal should state the position in the glowing colours in which he saw it. It was natural that he should try to show to the Allies that their measures of defence would be useless. It was natural that he should say that he could advance across the neutral zones and the Sea of Marmara. He was simply endeavoring to make a certain impression upon his hearers. Lord Curzon's own information was not quite identical with that of his colleagues. It was true that General Harington was bitterly disappointed that the Allied co-operation on which he had counted had failed. So far, at any rate, as the Asiatic shores of Asia Minor were concerned, General Harington realised thoroughly the danger to himself and his troops, but with the forces at his disposal and the presence of the British fleet he believed that he could render a better account than either his French or Italian colleague appeared to think possible. His attitude was one of resolution and determination. If he were compelled to fight the Turks and withdraw from the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles or of Ismid, the fault would not be wholly that of Great Britain. Public opinion would remember that in the circumstances Great Britain had been abandoned by her Allies, and public opinion would appreciate the very heavy blow dealt at the Alliance by those who had chosen to desert us.

Lord Curzon understood from their previous discussions that they were all agreed that the essential need was to have a conference at once. He himself had entirely concurred with this point of view, and had asked that it should be held as

soon as possible and in any place that suite his colleagues. Everything went to show that Mustapha Kemal took the same view as to an immediate meeting, but the suggestion which Kemal had made and which M. Poincaré and General Pellé had appeared to support, that this meeting should be held at Mudania, seemed entirely unreasonable. He asked his colleagues to think what this would mean. Were British, French, Italian, Serbian, Roumanian and Greek delegates to embark upon a ship and go to meet their conqueror at one of his won port? For his part he must absolutely decline thus to tear up the Venice proposal and proceed to Mudania dragged by Mustafa Kemal like a Roman conqueror in his train. Once at Mudania, the Allies were apparently to be invited by Kemal to give him certain provinces in advance of any conference, for instance, Thrace up to the Maritza. Did M. Poincaré suppose that he, Lord Curzon, had received authority from his Government to agree to such proposals? M. Poincaré seemed to expect that the principal work of the future peace conference was to be done in advance of the conference itself, with a view solely to induce Kemal to come to Mudania and discuss with the Allies whether he would stop his attacks.

Lord Curzon said that he would now like to explain and analyse a little further exactly what it meant to allow Kemal to return to the Maritza at once. It seemed to him essential that when both parties were entering upon negotiations, they should know exactly what they meant as to the point upon which negotiations was to take place. Mustapha Kemal apparently expected nearly all the Turkish territory up to the pre-war Turco-Bulgarian frontier to be returned to him at once, that is to say, territory bordered on the west, south-west and south by the Aegean sea, and the Straits, and the Sea of Marmara respectively. It was quite possible that he might agree as to conditions regarding the keeping open of the waters of the Straits. Meanwhile, the restitution of Turkish sovereignty over the whole of the above area was to be complete. Lord Curzon asked his colleagues to consider what this would mean when they reached the peace conference at Venice or elsewhere. Were Jugoslavia and Roumania to be faced with this agreement in advance of the conference and without their consultation? Surely not. If Kemal were now to march to the Bulgarian frontier, there would be a disastrous war in the Balkans following in his train. Lord Curzon trusted that his colleagues would realise these dangers and regard the proposal as unacceptable. It would not be statesmanship, but suicide. He (Lord Curzon) quite understood M. Poincaré's wish that, as far as possible, the Allies should be accommodating about the future terms in this part of the world. He had asked himself what could be done in this direction. He would recall that, before the Paris Conference in March, various frontiers in Eastern Thrace had been proposed. The British Government had put forward a proposal to push back the Sevres frontier in Thrace to the Midia-Rodosto line. The French Government had proposed a frontier running down the Tunja River and the eastern bank of the Maritza as far as Kuleli-Burgas, and then across the Sea of

Marmara, leaving Rodosto and Gallipoli to the Greeks. In the conference itself the French Government had changed their proposal to that of a buffer State lying to the north of the Enos-Midia line, which was to be the northern frontier of Turkey in Europe. Finally, the military advisers had reached a compromise upon another line, and this had been accepted by the conference. But this line was still open to reconsideration and the whole question would have to be again carefully examined. It was a large area. There were big towns in it such as Adrianople, Kirk-Kilisse, Baba Eske, Rodosto and Gallipoli. Again, as to the population, it was unnecessary now to argue again the old question of statistics which had been fully explored at the March conference.

For a long period of years the population had fluctuated with the wars and the successive deportations from which the country had suffered. It was well, however to remember that the Greeks had been there nearly since the armistice and that probably as a result of their own measures, and certainly as a result of Moslem emigration, there was an actual majority of Greeks in the country now. Even if there was not a majority, there was a very considerable minority. In addition to the native population there was the Greek army. Lord Curzon had no exact information as to its numbers, but in addition to the forces there before the recent *débâcle* in Asia Minor, they had transferred to Europe via Mudania and Panderma several divisions which had fought a good fight against the Turks in the neighbourhood of Eskishehr. He thought that there would perhaps be some 50,000 * Greek bayonets in Thrace in addition to a native population of several hundred thousand.

He (Lord Curzon) would ask the conference how the Greeks were to be turned out of Eastern Thrace. Were they to allow Kemal to come there now and evict them forcibly? There would be another horrible war in Thrace followed by the well-known Turkish methods of dealing with minorities. Europe had looked on with sickening disgust at the stories of deportation in the Pontus region and elsewhere. They would not stand it again as a result of an act of the Allies in Eastern Thrace. It was true that the Greek troops had behaved badly in their retirement and had committed atrocities and depredations, but they were under a provocation to which Kemal was not subjected and their misdeeds differed from the Turkish in degree. Take, for instance, the happenings which had followed the Turkish entry into Smyrna. Kemal was apparently refusing to allow any refugees between the ages of 15 and 45 to leave the town and any refugees at all to leave after a certain date. Already the deportations appeared to have begun. Similar proceedings would follow his entry into Thrace, and it was impossible in these circumstances for the Allies to give him a promise at once that he should have

* N. B. — After this statement, Lord Curzon received and gave to the conference the correct figures of the Greek forces in Eastern Thrace as 32,000 rifles and 104 guns.

possession. If this was definitely M. Poincaré's policy, Lord Curzon would have to ask for an immediate adjournment in order that the views of the Serbians and Roumanians might be taken by the conference.

LORD CURZON proceeded to suggest that it would be well to examine a little more carefully what was the real aim of the conference as regards the future of Eastern Thrace. We wished to provide for a suitable and stable Government there. For this purpose it was necessary that all should co-operate and see whether it would not be possible to find perhaps some provisional and temporary arrangement to cover the few years ahead, and to give time for the present disturbances to subside. Some form of an autonomous buffer State under the League of Nations might meet this purpose. There was no novelty in the idea. In fact M. Poincaré had suggested it himself during the March conference, but the buffer State which he had proposed was to have been of a very restricted size, as it was only the territory lying east of the Maritza and north of the Enos-Midia line. On that occasion Lord Curzon had enquired whether the League of Nations would really undertake such a responsibility; whether it was possible to provide for the defence of such a State, or to finance it; and whether it would not be a prey to the neighbouring countries. The situation was now, however, rather different; and there seemed to him (Lord Curzon) more practicability in the idea if a larger block of territory were taken, such as the whole of Eastern Thrace up to, say, the Rodosto-Midia line and east of the Maritza. At any rate, the idea was worth further examination. Turkish sovereignty might be maintained for instance, in principle by the display of a flag or some other emblem. The analogy of the Saar Commission under the League of Nations formed a needed precedent. A governing commission might be formed, on which Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria could be represented — perhaps Roumania and Serbia. Such a régime, under the commission, could supervise the possible evacuation of Thrace, look after the minorities and act as the defence for Constantinople by forming a buffer between it, Bulgaria and Greece. At any rate, he would ask his colleagues to consider the proposal further. It must be remembered that the Allies could not turn Greece out of Eastern Thrace without offering her any compensation in return, or any proper protection for the Greeks in Thrace. Lord Curzon ardently desired a pacific solution and peace, and he thought that it was worth while to go a long way in exploring such a solution as he had proposed with this end in view. He would point out that he was ready to concede a great part of the March proposals in order to meet the views of his colleagues; and, in return, he would ask them to do the same with regard to the British attitude in the matter of Thrace. Always subject to the views of the Balkan States concerned, he was ready to say now that he was prepared to look favourably on such a proposal as that which he had just outlined. Did M. Poincaré realise that the proposal which he understood him to have made, that we should telegraph at once at Kemal and say that he might march forward

immediately to the Maritza, meant war forthwith? Lord Curzon concluded by pointing out how far he had already gone to meet his Allies, and urging them to endeavour in return to accept his proposal.

M. POINCARÉ was afraid that he had not made himself properly understood. When he had previously given information as the result General Pellé's visit to Smyrna, he had not been putting forward simply the views of Mustapha Kemal. He (M. Poincaré) quite admitted, and so did General Pellé, that there might be a good deal of bluff in Kemal's attitude; but he was quoting the evidence of General Pellé himself, who was a soldier of considerable experience and merit, and had played a great part in the recent war. General Pellé, as the result of these conversations, had summed up the situation as very grave.

At this point M. Poincaré read a telegram from General Charpy to the Minister for War, of which he had sent a copy to the British Embassy the previous day. The gist of this telegram was that the Allied generals had had a meeting with General Harington on the 18th September. The latter, preoccupied by the possibility of the violation of the neutral zones, had emphasised to his colleagues the necessity of "holding themselves in readiness, in conformity with the decision of the Powers, to bar the road to the Turkish Nationalists with all their forces, if the need arose". General Harington had asked, therefore, for French and Italian reinforcements in both sectors on the Asiatic shore, and that the works of defence should be pushed forward. The Italian and French generals had reminded General Harington in reply of the decisions taken at the meeting of the Allied High Commissioners and Generals on the 10th September namely, to send small Allied detachments to the neutral zones, simply by way of demonstrating the *Entente*, and the co-operation for the principle of respecting of the neutral zones; and secondly, they wished to ask instructions from their Governments, since it was impossible to defend, with any chance of success with the military means at their disposal, the said zones.

General Mombelli and General Charpy had explained to General Harington that the situation at Chatalja in August had been quite different. The Greek Government was, hesitating, and their forces were demoralised and without discipline. The "terrain" was favourable for the defence, and there was the support of the fleet. The situation now was very different. There was a numerous enemy, with exalted *moral* and much material, determined to reconquer Constantinople and the national territory. On the Asiatic shore, the ground was unfavourable for the Allied defence, owing to its length, and the fact that the sea was behind their backs. There were hostile Turkish elements actually in the zones of occupation. It was necessary effectively to watch the Chatalja zone because of the troubles in Thrace and the organisation of bands. There was certain to be a rising in Constantinople as soon as Kemal came close to it.

Chanak meant an occupation far away from the centre of the zones being defended. They should not therefore open a fight with several fronts, insecure interior lines, a certain check in front of them, with the possible insult to Allied military prestige. The plan of action was actually based on material means which were quite insufficient. They really required expeditionary corps for the purpose. Even if several battalions come to reinforce the Allies, the latter would be insufficient to fight the Kemalists with any chance of success. These reinforcements in any case would probably arrive late, and have to be scattered along the front.

General Charpy and his Italian colleague therefore expressed the view that the best way to solve the problem would be by diplomatic means rather than by military action. It had been decided, on his proposal, that the generals should confer with the Allied High Commissioners, and indicate to them the gravity of the consequences of operations risked after the military point of view had been explained as above.

After reading this telegram M. Poincaré stated that, according to the first paragraph of it, General Harington had attributed a decision to the Allied Governments which they had never taken. His statement, as reported, was incorrect, and in sending a copy of General Charpy's note to Lord Hardinge, the day before, he had energetically protested against General Harington's action.

LORD CURZON said that he could not allow this attack on General Harington to pass. General Harington naturally thought that if the generals and High Commissioners had agreed to the movements of the troops to Ismid and Chanak, their Governments were in accord. He could not have foreseen that they would disavow them.

M. POINCARÉ said that General Harington had actually referred to a decision of the Governments which had not been taken, and he must maintain his point of view.

LORD CURZON regretted that he could not allow the incident thus to pass. General Harington had always acted with conspicuous loyalty to his allies ever since he had been in command at Constantinople.

M. POINCARÉ, reverting to General Charpy's telegram, said that in face of such a telegram the Allied Governments ought not to allow such a dangerous operation as that contemplated by General Harington to continue. He cited the opinion of Marshal Foch and various other French generals and members of the French General Staff and of the French Naval Staff who had come to see M. Poincaré the night before. One and all agreed that the present position of the Allied forces and navies was an impossible one.

LORD CURZON pointed out that he had already known for two days that this was the view of the French and Italian generals and their experts, and he did not understand why M. Poincaré kept referring to the matter.

M. POINCARE said that he had understood Lord Curzon to have said that morning that, if the Allies were now attacked and defeated by the Turks, France would have to bear the responsibility. In fact, that if, after France's defection a misfortune occurred, it would be the fault not of Great Britain but of her Allies. M. Poincaré could not allow this to pass. He emphatically repudiated the idea that he was committing a felonious act, an act of treachery towards his Allies, in withdrawing the French troops from the Asiatic shores of the Straits. It was simply a step necessitated by the situation and essential for the protection of precious lives. He would recall that once before France had allowed herself to be led into danger at the Dardanelles. It was true that they had taken the advice of a man, a civilian, whom M. Poincaré himself much respected, but they had come into it reluctantly, and the results had been disastrous. He did not wish to take such a risk again. Lord Curzon must not be surprised if in such a matter he displayed emotion.

LORD CURZON asked to be allowed to say something to defend himself against the charges which M. Poincaré had made. For the last ten minutes M. Poincaré had been attributing to him certain words which he (Lord Curzon) had not employed, and upon that basis he had built up a fierce attack. As far as he could remember, the words which he had used were that if General Harington had to withdraw from Asia Minor the fault would not wholly lie with Great Britain. For the rest, he would remind M. Poincaré that they were holding intimate conversations, and in the privacy of the Council Chamber they did not always prepare their words in advance. However, he would ask M. Massigli to read the passage to which M. Poincaré referred, as he had taken it down and interpreted it.

M. MASSIGLI then quoted a passage in which Lord Curzon had said that if General Harington were compelled to fight and withdraw from the Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles or Ismid the fault would not wholly lie with Great Britain; that public opinion would remember that in this instance Great Britain had been abandoned by her Allies; and that public opinion in England would thus realise the very heavy blow dealt at the alliance by those who had chosen to desert her.

M. POINCARE said that he must ask Lord Curzon to withdraw that statement.

LORD CURZON said that he could not do so M. Poincaré had attributed to him the word "responsibility" which he had not used, and had wrongly quoted him.

COUNT SFORZA intervened to suggest that it would be well for them to consider how many times during the war there had been difference of opinion in the Council Chamber on various points, and how the necessity for Allied unity had overcome such differences. For the moment, in considering the Allied attitude towards Turkey, it was essential to remember that France, Italy and Great Britain

were Moslem Powers. It was particularly owing to that factor in the situation that France had felt compelled to withdraw her troops, as he understood it, and that was certainly one of the main reasons behind the Italian attitude.

M. POINCARÉ entirely agreed with Count Sforza. For the rest, he, M. Poincaré, had never agreed to the despatch of troops to the southern shores of the Straits, and it was to the common Allied interest that these troops should be withdrawn. He agreed with Lord Curzon that in the Council Chamber they did not always, and could not be expected to, weigh their expressions very carefully. But this matter was a very grave one, and he was afraid that he would have to make a public declaration as to what had been said at the conference if British troops were attacked and beaten back from the southern shores of the Straits.

M. Poincaré then proceeded to read a message which he had sent to the French Embassy in London on the 18th September, before the present conference. In this telegram he had clearly explained the French attitude, as he had explained it since at the conference, and showing then that the French Government feared and were greatly impressed by the serious initiative taken by the British Government in sending and seeking reinforcements for the defence of the Straits at this time. He had then explained that it was impossible for the French Government to associate themselves with the measures contemplated by the British Government. He would recall that in March last he had warned Lord Curzon of the dangers they were running in not meeting the Turkish point of view to a greater extent and the difficulties which actually negotiated with the Turks. He then feared that Kemal might defy them with grave consequences to Europe and the Moslem world. His pessimistic forecast was now being proved by events. The British Government, however, appeared entirely to overlook the realities of the situation. The French Government, however, could not afford not to face the dangerous consequences of the Kemalist victory, at which all Moslems throughout the world were rejoicing. The French Government realised the risk of wounding Moslem susceptibilities at the moment, and they were certain from all the information which had reached them that Kemal insisted that he must receive back Adrianople and Eastern Thrace with safeguards for the Straits, or he would never come to a conference and a conference was the only method of settling the present dangerous situation.

LORD CURZON regretted that he was unable to understand why M. Poincaré had read his instructions to the French Embassy in London at the present conference. He was perfectly well aware of the French Government's views, as were his own Government. He had never for a moment attempted to throw doubt on M. Poincaré's entire consistency, not only during the present crisis, but since March last. He was well aware of M. Poincaré's views regarding the necessity of promising Kemal the Maritza frontier. He was well aware of the views of French

expert military opinion upon the whole situation. All Lord Curzon had asked that day was that they should examine quite calmly and rather more deeply the concessions which they were proposing to make to Kemal and the consequences which might follow from them.

M. POINCARE said that he had understood Lord Curzon to say that he, M. Poincaré, had changed his views on that question from those that he held two days ago.

LORD CURZON said that he had never made or implied any accusation of inconsistency against M. Poincaré.

M. POINCARE then continued to read the instructions which he had sent to his Embassy in London on the 18th September. These instructions, among other things, had pointed out that if England adopted a threatening attitude and proposed to cross the Straits, the Turks might for a short time be prevented from doing so, but they would certainly take Mesopotamia in the meanwhile. As regards the possibility of relying on support from other States in the Balkans, M. Poincaré had then pointed out that the Serbian Government had informed him that they were on excellent terms with Kemal and had been for some time. They did not fear him. Apparently, also, England was now applying for Greek help. M. Poincaré then read out a telegram from a responsible in Athens to the effect that the British Minister had recently applied to the Greek Government for 60,000 men to help the British Government in defending the Straits. (Lord Curzon intervened to say that he did not believe for a moment that this information was correct.) The British Government must understand that the French Government would never agree to fight beside the Greeks. He wished again to emphasise to Lord Curzon that his point of view on this question had been throughout consistent, and that he was perfectly certain that Kemal would not stop his advance on the Straits and Constantinople, without receiving, before the conference, certain soothing assurances. He regretted that, in spite of all that he had said, Lord Curzon and the British Government still appeared to share the optimism of General Harington regarding the military situation and that we had only to talk to the Turks in vague terms about giving them back the sovereignty of parts of Thrace in order to stop the Kemalist advance. He, M. Poincaré, did not exclude the possibility of providing some demilitarised zone on the Turkish side of the frontier in Thrace if the Maritza frontier and Adrianople were conceded to them. We could explain to Turkey that there were precedents in the other treaties for imposing restrictions on the sovereignty of other European States. Take, for instance, the case of the Rhineland. Of course, if the Allies were to demilitarise a part of Turkish Thrace, they would have to do the same across the frontier in Greek Western Thrace.

At this point, Lord Curzon, explaining that he could not tolerate the repeated and unfounded charges against himself and his country that M. Poincaré had thought fit to make, asked leave to suspend the sitting and take time to consider his action.

After an interval, in which private explanations were exchanged, the sitting was resumed.

M. POINCARÉ proceeded to develop again the question of the demilitarisation of ports of Thrace. When the Versailles Treaty was made, a phrase to which he objected was inserted in one of its articles which described the frontiers of Germany on the west as Belgium, Luxembourg and France. Thus Germany was left with the Rhineland under her own sovereignty.

Servitudes were, however, imposed as a military precaution—for instance, the Allied occupation and various other controls. On this analogy it might be possible, in the areas to the east and west of the Maritza, to inform the Turks and Greeks respectively that military precautions must be taken by the Allies in the matter of demilitarising certain zones. That, however, was a matter for the future conference, but meanwhile, the Allied Governments should be able to say something definite to the Turks about the frontiers of Thrace. In doing so there would be no question of treason to Serbia and Roumania. In short, what M. Poincaré desired was to know whether, in the name of France, he could inform Kemal that the Allied Government were agreed about such and such a frontier in Thrace. Otherwise, France must speak alone.

LORD CURZON thanked M. Poincaré for his explanation which he thought had advanced the case without, however, making it absolutely clear. The proposal, as he understood it, was that the three Allies should say to Turkey that her frontiers would now be extended to the Maritza, but that this would not prevent measures of military precaution on the Turkish side of the frontier, and equally on the Greek side of the frontier. This still left one point undecided. He was not accusing M. Poincaré of any inconsistency; he simply wanted some further information as to what M. Poincaré really meant. This was the point on which he had doubts. If he understood M. Poincaré aright, the Allies were to give to Turkey, in advance of any conference, an absolutely definite pledge that she was to receive the Maritza frontier. This seemed a very serious step for the Allies to take at that stage. M. Poincaré appeared to be satisfied after his interviews with the Roumanians and the Serbians that they would accept the position without difficulty. Lord Curzon's interviews with these Balkan representatives had left quite a different impression on his mind as to the gravity of the view which they would take about any such step. He, therefore, thought that it was better not be definite at this stage, but to try and elaborate provisions for Thrace in the future conference. Lord Curzon wondered whether it would not be possible to arrive at some general formula to-day which might be given to Kemal in the invitation to the peace conference. He had been surprised that M. Poincaré should pick out what was perhaps one of the most controversial questions of the peace discussion, namely the Maritza frontier, and suggest that an assurance could be given about this, but that nothing should be said about the Straits. If it were agreed that it was

absolutely necessary to give an assurance to Kemal before the conference (assuming of course that the peace conference would be at Venice and not at Mudania, which General Pellé had seemed to advise), the question arose whether the assurance should not be given in wide and general terms. Before coming down to the meeting that afternoon Lord Curzon had prepared a formula which he thought his Government would allow him to put forward for discussion. The difficulty was that he was not quite certain whether M. Poincaré and Count Sforza had exactly the same intentions as himself in the matter. He did not want to go to Mustapha Kemal and say something which the latter would understand in one way and the Allies in another. Under this reserve, and provided his colleagues were agreeable, he would now present his draft of formula to the conference. Meanwhile, he was afraid that the narrow and very precise assurance suggested by M. Poincaré would not be acceptable, either to himself or his Government.

Lord Curzon would like to add that he particularly wished to say in the formula to be presented to Kemal something about Constantinople. From the various observations made by Ferid and Kemal himself on this point there was obviously some misunderstanding as to the Allied intentions.

M. POINCARE said that he would like to read some further passages from his instructions of the 18th September to the French Embassy in London. He then cited a paragraph in which he had said that it was essential that the Allies should say something definite to Kemal on the important points of Constantinople, Gallipoli, the Maritza frontier and Adrianople.

As regards Serbia and Roumania, it seemed to him quite possible that if they were asked their opinion they would say that they much disliked a long common frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey. But in the last resort the Allies could make them agree to anything, and it must be remembered that under the March proposals a common frontier between Turkey and Bulgaria had been conceded. It was only now a matter of adding a few more kilometres to that frontier.

M. Poincaré had found some differences in the views of M. Ninchitch and the King of Serbia on the one side and M. Pasitch on the other side regarding Thrace. M. Pasitch seemed entirely opposed to conceding anything in Europe to Turkey, while the King and his Minister for Foreign Affairs were as completely opposed to preventing Kemal from obtaining the Maritza frontier.

COUNT SFORZA interposed to say that M. Ninchitch had told him that M. Pasitch was antipathetic to a long Turco-Bulgarian frontier, but that, as a matter of fact, he disliked change, and it took time for any new idea to sink in.

M. POINCARE thought that this was quite true. For the rest, he had recently had breakfast with M. Ninchitch and the King of Serbia—a family party, at which both the Queen and the King's doctor were also present; and the King and his Foreign Minister had then told him that their relations with Kemal were

excellent, and that they had no fears regarding the return of the Turks to Thrace. The French Government had therefore no apprehensions on this score.

LORD CURZON thought that, at any rate, from the point of view of the Straits, Roumania was perhaps more important than Serbia. Even as regards the latter, it was a curious fact that he had seen the King of Serbia, M. Ninchitch and M. Pasitch; that the first two had taken a different view from the Serbian Prime Minister, but that the positions of both parties were precisely the reverse of those which they had explained to M. Poincaré. In any case, all his information went to show that Roumania took a very serious view of the situation, and her voice must be heard at the conference. He would now ask leave to have his formula read.

M. MASSIGLI then read the draft invitation to the Angora Government which Lord Curzon had prepared before the conference (see annex to these minutes).

M. POINCARÉ stated that he could adhere to much that was in this document; but there was one grave omission, and that was the lack of any precise statement as to the return of the Maritza and of Adrianople to the Turks. Again, he was not sure that Venice was a good choice for the conference. It was too far from Asia Minor, and Kemal might insist on a conference in the neighbourhood. He would suggest leaving the place of the conference vague in the invitation, and allowing the generals to settle it with Kemal when they met him at Mudania, as suggested in the latter part of the invitation.

COUNT SFORZA interposed to say that Fethi Bey had expressed himself in favour of Venice.

LORD CURZON suggested that if Mustapha Kemal refused to have a conference anywhere outside Asia Minor it would be quite impossible for the conference to be held.

M. POINCARÉ thought that it might be possible to have a conference on a ship at some Asia Minor port.

Both LORD CURZON and COUNT SFORZA pointed out that a peace conference could not be held in this way.

M. POINCARÉ then said that, unless something more specific could be said about the Maritza, he thought that France would have to send a separate note to Kemal.

LORD CURZON enquired whether M. Poincaré meant a kind of separate annex to, or gloss on, the joint note, which would be on the lines of the draft he had prepared, this annex or gloss making definite mention of the Maritza and Adrianople, or whether he meant an entirely separate note, emanating from the French Government.

M. POINCARÉ said that he could not agree, in any case, to the British draft without obtaining the French Government's consent.

COUNT SFORZA asked whether the draft represented England's last word.

LORD CURZON said that it did not, and that he was afraid of the Greek population in Thrace and outside Thrace revolting if Adrianople and the Maritza were specifically promised in the note.

M. POINCARÉ enquired whether His Majesty's Government would oppose the Maritza frontier when it came to a conference.

LORD CURZON replied that they had no intention of being intransigent on the point; all he desired was that the note should not be excessively precise on this question, and that some latitude should be given for the conference to hear the views of others, such as the Serbians and Roumanians, and explore other solutions, such as the autonomous buffer State. The British Government were ready to be sympathetic, but they did not like to pledge themselves in advance. M. Poincaré was quite at liberty to say to Kemal that the French Government desired that the future frontier of Turkey should be the Maritza, and include Adrianople.

M. POINCARÉ enquired whether he could inform Kemal that at least there was some hope on the side of England; whether in fact, he would be able to say that France and Italy supported the Maritza frontier; that there would be no serious opposition from Serbia and Roumania; and that there was hope from England.

LORD CURZON said that he could not give any pledge on the point, as he did not wish to rule out now, before the conference, some form of League of Nations' solution. He did not wish to tie his hands, and so prevent himself from making such a proposal at the conference.

M. POINCARÉ expressed himself as against the League of Nations proposal, which he would oppose.

LORD CURZON asked whether M. Poincaré really proposed to give back to Turkey all the 1914 frontier, subject only to League of Nations' guarantees for the demilitarisation of certain strips of territory on each side of the frontier, the latter not be mentioned now to the Turks, but to be discussed later at the conference, after the promise as to the Maritza had been given to them. For his part, Lord Curzon could not confine himself to this. He wanted to argue for the League of Nations solution at the conference.

COUNT SFORZA suggested that it was essential to take into account the state of mind in Turkey now, and therefore to give her some definite assurance about the Maritza. This would not imply that such safeguards as the Capitulations might not be discussed at the conference and continued in Thrace.

At this point M. POINCARÉ asked to be allowed to read a long telegram which he had received from Admiral Dumesnil regarding his recent conversations

with Mustapha Kemal at Smyrna. He quoted passages from the admiral's account which made it clear that Kemal was relying more and more on France to secure a favourable attitude on the part of the Allies towards his territorial terms. He also quoted passages to show how loyally Admiral Dumesnil had insisted to Kemal that there could be no question of disagreement between the Allies in their policy towards Turkey, and that Kemal must expect to meet a united Allied front. Kemal had explained to him that the refugees situation in Smyrna had been difficult, because for the first two days he had not been able to bring into the town any Turkish police or gendarmerie. After that, perfect order had reigned. Another passage from the admiral's despatch showed the firm language which he had held regarding the neutral zones and Allied solidarity in defending them. Kemal had informed him that he recognised the neutral zones, but not the terms of the armistice as between Turkey and the Allies. The admiral had pointed out to him how the firm Allied attitude towards Greece and their neutrality had enormously helped Kemal in Asia Minor. It had led the Greeks to take reinforcements of good regiments back to Thrace and place them before the Chatalja lines just before Kemal's offensive. The admiral urged Kemal again and again to rely now on diplomacy, and not to take military action at the risk of war with the Allies. Kemal had replied that, provided he could get what he wanted, namely, the territorial terms of the National Pact as regards Eastern Thrace, he was prepared to obtain them by diplomatic means. He also mentioned the idea of a plebiscite in Western Thrace, in accordance with the terms of the National Pact. He had referred to the question of the liberty of the Straits, and had said that he was prepared for reasonable guarantees, such as were allowed for in the National Pact. He had, however, talked more than once to the admiral about the necessity of driving the Greeks from Eastern Thrace.

LORD CURZON thanked M. Poincaré for his information, and said that he thought the admiral had acted with courage and loyalty in his conversations, but the more he heard of Kemal's views the more he was afraid of the intentions of the Allies being misinterpreted by Kemal. For instance, let them take Gallipoli. The British Government took the view very strongly that, in order to guarantee the freedom of the Straits, both sides of the Dardanelles must be garrisoned permanently, and he would have to defend this point of view at the forthcoming peace conference. The National Pact, however, said nothing about the Dardanelles or about any such guarantees. It was therefore essential that the Allies should be agreed on this point in the conference. Lord Curzon concluded by asking M. Poincaré to take his draft and to submit it to his Cabinet. It was essential that the Allies should agree upon a collective note, and not attempt to send separate documents.

M. POINCARÉ feared that he could not agree to any collective note unless the question of the concession to Turkey of Thrace was made more precise. For the

rest, he would point out that Lord Curzon had made entirely new proposals as regards garrisoning the southern shore of the Dardanelles. Under the March proposals, the garrisons were to be confined to the northern shore.

LORD CURZON agreed but explained that he had precise instruction from his Government on this point, and that in any case, the March proposals, as M. Poincaré admitted were now open to modification, and had, indeed, been modified by circumstances. The question of guarantees for the freedom of the Dardanelles was in any case a matter for the peace conference. He would like to point out that Great Britain would soon have strong forces in the Gallipoli Peninsula, and, if necessary be in a position to dictate her terms on this point. He did not mean this in any way as a threat.

At this point M. POINCARÉ read extracts from the *procès-verbal* of the March discussions about the Allied garrisons at the Straits and Lord Curzon's views at that time.

LORD CURZON again explained that this was a new situation and that his Government thought it important to strengthen the guarantees for the Straits. They had all heard Admiral Grasset's views, which made it quite clear how essential it was to hold the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles in order to keep the passage free.

At this point it was agreed to adjourn the meeting until 2 p. m. on Saturday afternoon, the 23rd September.

It was agreed to issue the following communiqué to the press:

"Lord Curzon, M. Poincaré and Count Sforza have devoted the afternoon to the consideration of the formula under which an invitation could be addressed to the Government of Angora for the conference of peace. The examination of the formula will be continued to-morrow afternoon".

F.O. 424/254, pp. 335-346. No. 621

D.B.F.P. I. XVIII, pp. 66-84, No. 48

ANNEX

Draft of Invitation to Angora Government

BRITISH and French Foreign Ministers and Italian Ambassador in Paris have the honour, on behalf of their Governments, to invite Mustapha Kemal to come himself or the Grand National Assembly of Angora to send a representative with full powers to a meeting at Venice or elsewhere, to which will also be invited plenipotentiary representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Jugoslavia, Roumania and Greece. The meeting will be held as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made by Italian Government and the other Governments

concerned. Its object will be to negotiate and draw up the final treaty of peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey, and thus among other things to mediate a settlement of the outstanding points in dispute between Greece and Turkey.

The British, French and Italian Governments desire at the same time to take this opportunity of recording that they view with sympathy and are ready to examine with benevolence at the coming conference the desire of the Government of Angora to secure the return of the greater part of Thrace to Turkish sovereignty. They hope it will be found possible, after taking into account at the conference all the vital interests of the countries concerned to give such satisfaction to Turkish aspiration in this direction as can be reconciled with the provision, not only of those guarantees for the permanent maintenance of the freedom of the water between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean which the Allied Powers are united in regarding as indispensable, but also of that protection of racial and religious minorities under the aegis of the League of Nations which the Government of Angora have already declared their willingness in principle to accord. The Allied Governments solemnly reaffirm the assurances which they gave in March last to withdraw their troops from Constantinople upon the entering into force of the treaty of peace.

As a pledge of their good faith, the Allied Powers are prepared, while the arrangements for the Venice Conference are being made, to use all their influence to secure the withdrawal of the Greek forces to such a line in Eastern Thrace as may be agreed upon between the Turkish and Greek military authorities and the Allied Commander-in-chief at Constantinople and his Allied colleagues, provided always that the Government of Angora first declare their readiness, pending and during the peace conference, not to enter the neutral zones or cross the Sea of Marmara.

For the above purpose a meeting could be arranged between the Allied generals and Mustapha Kemal at Mudania or Ismid.

F.O. 424/254, pp. 346-347, No. 621/1

F.O. 371/7892/E. 9756

D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, pp. 84-85, No. 48/1

No. 243

*Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Foreign Office*PARIS, September 22nd, 1922
(Received September 23)*No. 472. Telegraphic
En clair. By bag*

Following from Lord Curzon.

Have just returned from meeting of quite unprecedented description. Our object was, I understood, to discuss terms of possible general agreement between ourselves as to bases of future conference, and indications that might be given in issuing invitation to Kemal. Accordingly I began by expounding main propositions concerning Constantinople, Thrace and Straits, for which I sought and received approval of Cabinet yesterday.

As regards Thrace, I was particularly anxious that any invitation given to Kemal should not wholly prejudice question, or leave him to think that Turkey would regain entire pre-war frontiers and authority. I had in mind possible erection of a buffer State under League of Nations in Eastern Thrace. Poincaré commenced by reading out accounts of military position of most menacing description, declared that the sole chance of peace was to make overtures to Kemal at Mudania, since he would absolutely decline to come to Europe, and that indispensable condition was immediate promise of Maritza frontier and Adrianople. He wanted this declaration to be made to-morrow without any reserve or qualification. I contested Poincaré's account of military situation, and remarked incidentally that if it was as he said, and if Harington were forced to evacuate, which I did not believe, the reproach would not be his, but that of those who had abandoned him.

Poincaré then commenced a second speech by a bitter attack on Harington whom he accused of having deliberately misrepresented to his colleagues the attitude of the French and Italian Governments. It instantly and indignantly repudiated this charge; whereupon Poincaré lost all command of his temper, and for a quarter of an hour shouted and raved at the top of his voice, putting words into my mouth which I had never uttered, refusing to permit the slightest interruption or correction, saying that he would make public the insult to France, quoting a telegram from Athens to the effect that the British Minister had asked the Greek Government to furnish 60,000 men for the defence of Thrace and the Straits, and behaving like a demented school-master screaming at a guilty school-boy. I have never seen so deplorable or undignified a scene. After enduring this for some time I could stand it no longer and rising, broke up the sitting and left the

room. Monsieur Poincaré ultimately came out and made an apology, explaining that he had been exasperated at the charge that France had abandoned her Ally—a word which for my part I declared my willingness to withdraw—although I suspect that the sting lay in its incontestable truth. I only report this scene as illustrating the peculiar character and ungovernable emotions of the man with whom I am dealing. I should not have thought it possible for anyone in such a position, the Chairman and host of the proceedings, to make such a display, and it needed more than ordinary self-restraint not to terminate the conference abruptly and announce my intention to return to England.

After half an hour I reentered the room and the discussion was resumed. Monsieur Poincaré once more insisted on his formula for submission to Kemal, and defined it as meaning the full restoration of Turkish sovereignty up to the old frontiers, subject to the demilitarisation of a strip on the Turkish side of the future boundary and a corresponding strip on the Greek side of the same boundary in Western Thrace. All other question were ignored, Kemal being left to interpret the silence in his own way. I asked whether Monsieur Poincaré was really prepared to restore the pre-war conditions, and whether Serbia and Roumania would accept such a solution. In reply he categorically declared that the Serbian King and Ministers had yesterday given him assurances in a sense absolutely opposed to their conversations with me and that Roumania was of the same opinion.

Seeing that we were rapidly approaching another impasse, I said at once that I must decline to make the statement which he proposed, which involved an absolute surrender to Kemal on the most important point of the Pact, while leaving everything else unsettled. But I then produced a formula which I had prepared in advance as indicating in general terms the limits to which I was prepared to go. Text of this has been telephoned. It closes with a proposal that Harington should go to Mudania to meet Mustapha Kemal and endeavour to arrange the recognition of lines behind which the Turks and Greeks are respectively to stand in Asia and Europe pending final conference. Poincaré said that he could not accept any formula without submitting it to his ministers, and he suggested that if we could not agree we might send the invitation in our own terms, and the French and Italians in theirs. He even asked if he might assure Kemal that though holding back now, there was a good chance of our falling into line later on. I declined all these suggestions and said that I was willing to stay in Paris, and resume discussion of British text to-morrow afternoon, after Monsieur Poincaré had consulted his colleagues in the morning. This was agreed to and a meeting is fixed for 2 p.m. I shall do my best to secure a collective invitation, if that be possible, and, even if the French choose to add a private gloss of their own. If not, we must each address Kemal in our own way.

The British Cabinet will I trust appreciate that by these steps we have gained another day both here and at the other end, and that Mudania will mean several

days more. Before the end of this time our preparations should be complete and in any case the prospect of an attack upon Chanak or Ismid seems now to be receding.

I grieve to have to report to my colleagues an experience so painful as that which I have passed through this afternoon and which I hope never to be compelled to repeat.

I intimated to Poincaré that at conference we should have to raise question of future military position on Chanak-side of Straits, upon which he taunted me with departure from terms of March last. I replied that military situation was now wholly changed, as had been admitted by his own generals and admirals. Indeed he has always declined himself to be bound by anything that was settled in March.

Since writing above I have received a request from Count Sforza to consider whether in lieu of general phrases about Thrace I cannot accept to-morrow a definite reference to the Maritza and Adrianople in the draft formula suggested. He will of course support Poincaré; and he points out undesirability of several Notes to Turks, and certainty that if concession has ultimately to be made, French will get the entire credit. This afternoon I argued that this might produce violent explosion among Greek army and Greek population in Thrace, and would involve complete surrender to Turkish demands. I am reluctant therefore to make concession, and cannot do it without Cabinet authority. I will await your decision.

F.O. 371/7892/E. 9755

F.O. 424/254, pp. 305-307, No. 563

No. 244

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

22.9.1922

No. 887

Secret

TURKEY

The Near Eastern Crisis: French Attitude., etc.

The following is the text of a telegram, dated the 20th September, which has been received from the S.I.S. representative in Turkey:—

In accordance with information from an authoritative secret source, discussions are proceeding in Angora regarding action in the immediate future.

Strong differences have arisen between the Military Party, under Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and the less extreme elements, headed by Raouf Bey. The former are being encouraged by the Russian Bolsheviks, and wish to make an attack upon

the Straits and Constantinople, without parley with Allies. Raouf Bey and his followers favour diplomatic methods, relying upon French support at a Conference.

The Military Party is considered to be the stronger, because of a general feeling of doubt regarding French fidelity to the Nationalists; but definite decisions are not believed to have been taken yet.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha may take the decision into his own hands at any time, as his influence is now practically supreme.

According to sure information from Hamid Bey's office in Constantinople, during the recent constant exchange of views between Pellé and Hamid Bey, the former told Hamid Bey that the Kemalists might assert their rights, but should moderate their attitude towards the British.

Hamid Bey communicated this to Raouf Bey, at Angora, who replied that Angora's attitude could not be modified, because the British had mobilised the Balkan States against Turkey. Raouf Bey also stated that the Angora Government's actions would not be directed against the French, or against the Straits, in the fate of which France is interested; but that Angora would only endeavour to secure Turkish rights in Thrace. Raouf Bey asked, at the same time, that the return of Thrace to Turkey should be guaranteed by the French. Angora, he said, would accept such a guarantee and would be prepared to discuss the Straits question at a Conference.

According to further information from Hamid Bey's office, this information was telegraphed to Poincaré, who sent instructions to Colonel Mougin to inform Raouf that the French Government would insist upon a diplomatic settlement of the question. Mougin was, at the same time, to urge the Turks to refrain from attacking.

Raouf informed Mougin, in reply, that the execution of the National Pact was in the hands of Mustafa Kemal, who had been entrusted with dictatorial powers for the fulfilment of the National Pact. He advised the immediate French evacuation of Constantinople in the event of the city being attacked.

Poincaré, on receipt of this information discussed with Franklin Bouillon the extent to which France was bound by Treaty to assist the Turks. Hamid has subsequently been given to understand by the French High Commission that Angora need not fear the French assisting the British in the event of hostilities.

Authoritative secret information also shows that the Italian attitude is similar to that of the French. The Italian High Commission has sent a long report to Rome urging the inadvisability of any action involving hostilities.

In the above connection, it is noteworthy that an official Press message from Angora states that the Nationalist Government has officially requested Russian action against the Balkan States if they intervene. Aralov replied, referring to a

message from Karakhan, urging that Turks should endeavour to liberate Constantinople and the Straits, and promising full Russian support.

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The following telegram has been received from the S.I.S. representative in Constantinople, dated 22.9.22, and in continuation of the last paragraph of a telegram from the same source, dated 20.9.22, which was circulated in Summary No. 887, of which a copy is attached for reference:—

The Near Eastern Crisis: Question of Russian Intervention

Sure information has been received to the effect that the Soviet Government, in reply to the Angora Government's communication to Moscow on the subject of Russian intervention, stated that the Russian Army in the Caucasus was being strengthened with a view to assisting the Turkish Army in Anatolia.

The Soviet Note stated, however, that with regard to military operations against Roumania, the Angora Government should communicate with the Soviet Ukrainian Government, at Kharkov.

The Angora Government thereupon sent a long communication to the Ukrainian Government, invoking the Treaty with the Ukraine of January-March, 1922, and dwelling upon the situation created in the Balkan States by British diplomacy. The Angora Note terminated with a request for information as to whether the Ukraine would, at the present juncture, act in accordance with the provisions of that Treaty, and take action against Roumania.

Up to the evening of September 18th no definite reply had been received by Angora from the Ukraine; and it was for this reason that no decision regarding action against the Straits had, up to that time, been taken.

It was Mustafa Kemal Pasha's intention, however, to attack the neutral zone of the Straits without delay, in the event of a favourable reply being received from the Ukraine.

In forwarding the above, the S.I.S. representative comments as follows:—

We believe this to be correct, but doubt the conclusion of a new Treaty between the Turkish Nationalists and the Russians, because the existing Treaties are sufficient to form the basis of any action by Russia, whether in Europe or Anatolia. Actual operation (here group mutilated) would necessitate discussions for the settlement of special (group omitted).

F.O. 371/7893

No. 245

British Secretary's Notes of the Conference between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Italian Ambassador in Paris, Saturday, September 23, 5 p.m. (Received at the Foreign Office on September 26)
(Fourth Meeting.)

PRESENT: *France:* M. Poincaré; SECRETARIES, M. Laroche, M. Massigli, M. Glinchant, M. Bargeton.

Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst; SECRETARIES, Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Leeper.

Italy: Count Sforza; SECRETARY, Signor Galli.

M. POINCARÉ opened the meeting by referring to the desire of the British Government to secure Serbian and Roumanian troops for the defence of Constantinople. He understood that in fact, the week before, a direct request for such assistance had been addressed by His Majesty's Government to Belgrade and Bucharest. This action seemed to him very grave. He was quite sure that the arrival of such troops at this moment at Constantinople would be regarded as provocative by the Turks, and could only risk the peace which they were so anxious to secure instead of helping them to obtain it. He was very strongly of opinion that before the Serbian or Roumanian Governments came to a decision as to the despatch of troops the Allied Governments should have received and considered Kemal's reply to their invitation. As long as they were in communication with Kemal, they should not seek assistance either from Serbia or Roumania. If Kemal refused the invitation, it might then be necessary to press for the despatch of these Balkan troops. The news of the British Government's request, had, however, already been announced in Bucharest and Belgrade and had agitated public opinion. This appeared to him (M. Poincaré) a serious situation, and he was already taking steps to make representations at both capitals on this subject.

LORD CURZON replied that he had listened with great respect to M. Poincaré's statement, but he was unable to admit that any of the suggestions to which reference had been made were in the nature of a provocation either to their Allies or to Kemal. In his conversation with the representatives of the Balkan States, he had emphasised the British Government's desire to secure peace. In any case the actual decision, whether troops should be despatched to Constantinople now or later, lay with the Balkan Governments concerned, and, as M. Poincaré doubtless was aware, those Governments had in fact given no direct undertaking as to the immediate despatch of contingents. Indeed, the Serbian Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary, together with the King of Serbia, were understood to be

on their way back to Belgrade, and there could be no meeting of the Serbian Cabinet until Wednesday. Roumania might reach a decision sooner, but in any case he (Lord Curzon) saw no necessity for the conference to take any collective action at Bucharest or Belgrade in this matter. If there was any force in M. Poincaré's remarks, and Lord Curzon thought that there might be, it would obviously be appreciated in Bucharest and Belgrade. He would like in any case to explain once again the reasons which had prompted His Majesty's Government to make the representations which they had made at those capitals. He did not wish to touch further on the question of Allied co-operation on the Asiatic shores of the Straits, but he desired it to be clearly understood that in all communications addressed to the Serbian and Roumanian Governments he had insisted most emphatically on the necessity for Allied unity. In asking the Roumanian and Serbian Governments to show their flags at Constantinople, the only object which he had had in view was to make a display of the unbroken alliance not only of France, Great Britain and Italy, but of the smaller Allies. Such a display would be symbolic of the common Allied front, and would inevitably create a serious impression on Kemal's mind. Whether it was necessary for immediate action to be taken as regards the despatch of troops he (Lord Curzon) was not in a position to say. Be that as it may, he thought that, since the French as well as the British point of view had been made clear at Bucharest and Belgrade, the matter might be left there for the moment.

M. POINCARÉ said that he did not wish to hint that the British Government had intentionally taken provocative action. The sense of his observations simply was that the despatch of troops from Belgrade and Bucharest at this moment might have been regarded as provocative by Kemal. The principal Allies should as far as possible prevent the present trouble from spreading to the Balkans, and, although there had been no mention yet of the actual embarkation of troops from Serbia or Roumania, the press at both Belgrade and Bucharest was talking about it, and the Turks were thus sure to know and misinterpret the Allied intentions. Thus, if Kemal were to ask the French representatives what these rumours meant, M. Poincaré wished to be able to say that there was no immediate question of the sending of Roumanian or Serbian troops to Constantinople.

COUNT SPORZA suggested that the question of the despatch of these troops might be further considered when Kemal had answered the Allied note. He did not think that it was necessary for the three Allies to take any further decision on the matter at present. It was mainly a question for Serbia and Roumania to decide this, as Lord Curzon had pointed out.

LORD CURZON said that there was no question of a decision on the part of the British Government to provoke Turkey. It was simply now a question of the best way of preventing the Turks from overwhelming the zones declared neutral by the Allies. He had asked the Serbian and Roumanian Government whether

they were indifferent to such a Turkish advance, and they had both replied that they were not, and that they were in fact seriously alarmed. He had further suggested that they should give concrete effect to their feelings of alarm by displaying their flags at Constantinople. In any case, if only the three Allied Governments could decide on some step which would clearly indicate that the Allies were united, he (Lord Curzon) trusted that there might be no need for a recourse to arms or for the arrival of reinforcements at Constantinople.

M. POINCARÉ was apprehensive of the arrival of even a detachment of Serbian and Roumanian troops which, however small, might prove a dangerous provocation to Mustapha Kemal. That was why he had raised the matter. He would now like, however, to refer to the question of the invitation to Kemal. The French Cabinet had considered the British draft, but they must first decide at the conference whether they were going to present a single note or three separate notes to Kemal.

LORD CURZON suggested that they should first examine the British note paragraph by paragraph.

M. POINCARÉ replied that he was in general agreement with the main text, subject to certain drafting alterations, except, however, that he regarded it as essential to be precise regarding the frontiers which they were prepared to offer Kemal in Thrace.

LORD CURZON again suggested that they should run through the text and see what changes M. Poincaré and Count Sforza desired. They would thus ascertain whether they were able to reach a general agreement in principle on the rest of the note, and they could return at the end to the frontiers in Thrace. He would, however, like to urge and emphasise again the importance of sending a single note in the name of the three Allies to Kemal, and not three distinct notes. Three separate notes would show *ipso facto* that there was disagreement among the Allies, and his whole object in coming to the meeting that afternoon was to reach an Allied agreement upon the text of a single Allied note. He wanted to discuss the whole question in the most friendly spirit to see whether their different points of view could be reconciled.

M. POINCARÉ said that he could bargain about everything except one point, and that was question of the frontier in Thrace. A Frenchman, a Catholic, who was if anything anti-Turkish, although Bulgarophil, had just telegraphed to him from Constantinople to say that the French colony there were convinced that there was a serious menace to the town unless the Allies promised the Turks at once the frontier of the Maritza and Adrianople. They had the example of Smyrna in front of them, and they must avoid a repetition of it at Constantinople. He (M. Poincaré) therefore was anxious to be able to telegraph in reply to his friend at Constantinople that France was at any rate able to promise the desired concession. There was no use in sending an identic note unless mention were made of the Maritza and Adrianople.

LORD CURZON said that he would like an explanation from M. Poincaré on one point. M. Poincaré had repeatedly emphasised the need of making this concession to Kemal as a condition of the latter accepting the proposed conference. Could M. Poincaré give him an assurance that the Turks would not advance, and would come to the conference if this concession were made? It was a very important point. M. Poincaré was proposing that the Allies should throw away their most powerful card, but a very serious situation would arise if, after taking this important step, they found that they had not attained the object at which they aimed.

M. POINCARÉ said that he felt unable to give such an assurance. All that he was prepared to say was that Kemal would not come to the conference without this concession. But he was not absolutely certain that he would come even if this were offered him, or that he would be prevented from passing the Straits.

LORD CURZON asked M. Poincaré to be kind enough to tell him what other parts of the British text he was prepared to accept. If no agreement could be reached about the Maritza there would be no question of tying M. Poincaré to anything he might say about the rest of the note, but he thought this would be the best procedure.

COUNT SFORZA suggested that they might avoid a useless discussion if they could only settle the Maritza question first. It seemed to him a case where the form and substance of a document were bound up together. They could not separate the decision on the form of the note from the decision upon this question of principle. He suggested that they should adjourn for fifteen minutes, and each work out fresh drafts and then compare notes.

M. POINCARÉ said he agreed with Count Sforza's remarks as to the form and substance of the document, but thought that there was nothing in the British note to necessitate a new draft except the omission of a precise reference to the Maritza and Adrianople. He then proceeded to translate the British text into French. In the first paragraph he suggested that it was to be inferred from the form in which the last sentence was drafted that Greece was still an Ally. France had refrained from regarding her as such since King Constantine's accession, and he could not agree to sign a note which placed Greece among the Allies.

LORD CURZON said that as far as he was able to gather from M. Poincaré's version of the British note, an entirely new text was being proposed. As he had already explained privately to M. Poincaré, he had had to await the views of his Cabinet upon the text of the British draft, which he had communicated to them the day before. If they were now to propose an entirely new text, he would probably have to refer to London, and the delay which they had desired to avoid would be inevitable. He was perfectly ready to consider French modifications of the text provided they were not of a nature to knock the whole bottom out of the English draft.

COUNT SFORZA suggested that it was in the British and Allied interest not to send out a document which stamped itself as a purely British text. The Turks would resent it as such, and their object would be thwarted rather than furthered. In effect it was only now a question of form and *nuance*, and not of any change in the substantive proposals of the British draft.

LORD CURZON replied that he was quite prepared to accept a French version of his text, and he would ask M. Poincaré to continue reading his French translation of it. In the first paragraph of his own text he would like to substitute the word "désire" for the words "have the honour on behalf of their Governments."

After some discussion on this point, it was agreed to substitute the words "prient le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de vouloir bien leur faire savoir s'il serait disposé à envoyer sans retard" for the corresponding passage in the English note.

M. POINCARÉ then asked that the words "or elsewhere" (*ou ailleurs*) should be inserted after the word "Venice" in the first paragraph. He thought that it would be necessary to hear Kemal's views on the place of meeting of the peace conference and that the Generals and High Commissioners might discuss this with him at Mudania.

LORD CURZON said that he was quite ready to accept this insertion, but he particularly did not want any conference at Mudania except the meeting of the military authorities for the specific purpose suggested in the British note, namely, that of deciding the lines on which the Greek and Turkish troops were to stand pending and during the conference.

COUNT SFORZA supported Lord Curzon. He had sent the text of the British note to Rome, and subject to some drafting alterations and to a change in the French sense regarding Thrace, he had received full authority to accept it. But his Government were emphatic as to the Mudania meeting being one strictly confined to the soldiers and to the military question raised in the British note.

After some further discussion, it was agreed to substitute the word "conclude" for the words "draw up" in the last sentence of the first paragraph, and in order to meet M. Poincaré's point regarding Greece and the Allies the last half of the last sentence of the first paragraph of the British note was omitted, and the word "Greece" inserted between the words "Turkey and the Allied Powers."

M. POINCARÉ then proceeded to read the French version of the second paragraph of the British text (see annex to these minutes for full French version as approved by the conference and despatched).

The second sentence of the second paragraph of this version as originally put forward read "si le Gouvernement d'Angora est disposé à ne pas envoyer."

LORD CURZON, while agreeing with M. Poincaré that some such insertion would usefully strengthen the British text, suggested that the version might be made stronger by the substitution of the words "à la condition que" instead of "si" and of "n'envoie pas" instead of "est disposé, &c."

These amendments were accepted.

LORD CURZON said that he could not accept the first sentence of that paragraph at this stage, but would return to it later.

Lord Curzon then asked to be allowed to insert in the second half of the second sentence of the second paragraph of the French version the words "pour protéger les intérêts des pays voisins, pour obtenir le rétablissement paisible et régulier de l'autorité turque." These insertions were to meet instructions which he had received that day from his Government, and he believed they would not only be acceptable to his colleagues and to Turkey, but in particular they would show the Balkan Allies, were they summoned to the conference, that their interests were not being lost sight of.

M. POINCARÉ said that he could not accept the first half of this insertion, unless some mention were made of the interests of Turkey. He would willingly, however, accept the second half.

After some discussion, the words "pour sauvegarder les intérêts de la Turquie et de ses voisins" were accepted instead of the first half of the insertion suggested by Lord Curzon.

M. Poincaré then suggested that the words "and that Turkey should be free to choose Constantinople as her capital" should be inserted after the assurance which was given in the English text about the withdrawal of the Allied troops from Constantinople.

Both LORD CURZON and COUNT SFORZA thought this insertion unnecessary, and as possibly being open to the inference that the Allies claimed the right to interfere in Turkey's choice of her capital.

M. POINCARÉ then withdrew his suggestion.

M. Poincaré then suggested the insertion of a phrase as to the Allied Governments supporting Turkey's admission to the League of Nations.

LORD CURZON and COUNT SFORZA willingly accepted this insertion.

M. POINCARÉ then proceeded to read the French version of the fourth paragraph of the British text (the third paragraph of the French text).

It was agreed to omit the words "as a pledge of their good faith" at the beginning of this paragraph of the British text. It was also agreed to substitute the words "fixed by the Allied general in agreement with the Turkish and Greek military authorities" for the words "agreed upon between the Turkish and Greek military authorities and the Allied Commander-in-chief at Constantinople and his

Allied colleagues," since M. Poincaré desired to avoid any reference to the Allied Commander-in-chief in this note.

M. Poincaré also proposed that the British text of this paragraph should be split into two sentences, and the second sentence should begin with the words "en retour de cette intervention, le Gouvernement d'Angora serait sans doute disposé."

LORD CURZON agreed to the proposed change, except that he thought that the words "serait disposé à" should be made much stronger, and he would suggest the words "s'engagera à."

With this alteration the French proposal was accepted.

It was also agreed to substitute the words "the zones provisionally declared neutral by the Allies" for the words "neutral zones."

Some discussion followed on the last paragraph of the British note (penultimate paragraph of the French text).

M. POINCARÉ suggested the words "in order to conclude the armistice" instead of the words "for the above purpose."

LORD CURZON said that it was essential that the meeting at Mudania should be strictly confined to the single point of fixing the line in Thrace to which the Greek troops might be withdrawn. There could be no question of sending High Commissioners to this conference or of widening the terms of reference such as would be inevitable if all the provisions of an armistice between Greece and Turkey were to be raised.

COUNT SFORZA agreed.

M. POINCARÉ withdrew his suggestion.

M. Poincaré then enquired whether Lord Curzon could accept the first sentence of the second paragraph of the French text. He thought that it would flatter the Turks and satisfy the Allies if, instead of mentioning the Maritza and Adrianople, the Allies offered to concede the full frontiers of the National Pact in Thrace.

LORD CURZON replied that, in order to secure what he considered to be absolutely essential, namely, a joint note instead of three separate notes, he was prepared to make a concession in this direction, but he could not in any case agree to any mention of the National Pact. The latter covered more than the Maritza frontier and raised the question of the autonomy of Western Thrace. He would therefore agree to a reference to the Maritza frontier and Adrianople in the second paragraph of the French text. He would also accept the French proposal as to the three Governments willingly supporting at the conference such an extension of the Turkish frontiers in the final treaty. He made these concessions in the interests of peace and of the *Entente*, but he trusted that in this case none of the three Allies would attempt to give independent assurances as to their intentions at the final

conference. He hoped that M. Franklin-Bouillon would not attempt when he arrived at Angora to make concrete promises to the Turks outside the terms of the Allied note.

COUNT SFORZA here interposed to say that he was apprehensive lest M. Franklin-Bouillon might promise the Turks other concessions which the Allies were not prepared to give.

M. POINCARE replied that he thought that there was no danger of this, since he had in order to avoid any such risk, given M. Franklin-Bouillon written instructions, and had told him that all he was to do was to give counsels of moderation to Kemal to persuade him to come to the conference.

The French text of the note (see annex) was then accepted by the conference.

LORD CURZON said that in conclusion he would like to point out that Serbia and Roumania would soon join them at the conference table. His Government had been anxious therefore to secure their signature to the present Allied invitation to Kemal. It would have given the latter greater weight, and would have shown Serbia and Roumania that the invitation to the conference was not a sham. As, however, it was essential to avoid delay in the despatch of the note, and since it would not be possible to obtain the signature at any rate of the Serbian Ministers until they reached their capital during the next two days, it did not seem possible to do more than communicate a copy of the note to each Government at once. This might be done by the French Ministers at Belgrade and Bucharest on behalf of the conference and, in communicating a copy, the Ministers should express the hope that it may meet with the concurrence of both Governments. He would like to have done more than this, as his Government strongly desired it, but he did not feel in the circumstances able to do so.

COUNT SFORZA, who agreed generally with Lord Curzon's suggestion, said that he was rather apprehensive as to the results of giving Serbia and Roumania an *a priori* equal footing with the other Powers at the forthcoming conference. He said this from no anti-Balkan point of view. He was notorious in Italy as a friend of the Balkan Powers and of the policy of an *entente* between Italy and them; but, if we had asked them to sign this note with the other Great Powers, we should have given them a standing which might prove rather dangerous later. In fact, the British Cabinet might find them adopting an independent attitude at the conference, and that they were actually opposed to the views upon Thrace and the Straits which the British representative would there be advocating.

Lord Curzon's proposal was then accepted by the conference, and it was also agreed that the French Minister at Athens should communicate a copy of the invitation to the Greek Government without, however, commenting upon it in any way.

F.O. 424/254, pp. 335-360, No. 637

D.B.F.P., L. XVIII, pp. 88-96, No. 51

ANNEX

French Text of a Note despatched by the Conference on September 23 to the Angora Government, based on the British Text of September 22 (see Annex to Minutes of Third Meeting).

LES trois Gouvernements alliés prient le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de vouloir bien leur faire savoir s'il serait disposé à envoyer sans retard un représentant muni de pleins pouvoirs à une réunion qui se tiendrait à Venise ou ailleurs à laquelle seraient également invités, avec les représentants de la Turquie, les plénipotentiaires de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Italie, du Japon, de la Roumanie, de l'Etat serbe-croate-slovène et de la Grèce. Cette réunion aurait lieu dès que les dispositions nécessaires auraient été prises par les Gouvernements intéressés. Elle aurait pour objet de négocier et de conclure le traité de paix définitif entre la Turquie, la Grèce et les Puissances alliées.

Les trois Gouvernements alliés saisissent cette occasion pour déclarer qu'ils considèrent avec faveur le désir qu'a la Turquie de récupérer la Thrace jusqu'à la Maritza et Andrinople. A la condition que le Gouvernement d'Angora n'envoie pas son armée pendant les pourparlers de paix dans les zones dont les Gouvernements alliés ont proclamé la neutralité provisoire, les trois Gouvernements soutiendront volontiers à la conférence l'attribution de ces frontières à la Turquie, étant entendu d'ailleurs que des mesures seraient prises d'un commun accord dans le traité pour sauvegarder les intérêts de la Turquie et ses voisins, pour démilitariser, en vue du maintien de la paix, certaines zones à déterminer pour obtenir le rétablissement paisible et régulier de l'autorité turque et enfin pour assurer efficacement, sous les auspices de la Société des Nations, la liberté des Dardanelles, de la mer de Marmara et du Bosphore, ainsi que la protection des minorités de race et de religion. Les trois Gouvernements appuieront, du reste, volontiers l'admission de la Turquie à la Société des Nations. Ils sont d'accord pour renouveler l'assurance déjà donnée au mois de mars dernier que les troupes alliées seront retirées de Constantinople aussitôt que le traité entrera en vigueur.

Les trois Gouvernements alliés useront de leur influence pour provoquer, avant l'ouverture de la conférence, le retrait des forces grecques sur une ligne qui sera fixée par les généraux alliés, d'accord avec les autorités militaires turques et grecques. En retour de cette intervention, le Gouvernement d'Angora s'engagera à n'envoyer, ni avant ni pendant la conférence, de troupes dans les zones qui ont été provisoirement déclarées neutres et à ne pas franchir les Détroits, ni la mer de Marmara.

Pour déterminer la ligne dont il est question plus haut, une réunion pourrait immédiatement avoir lieu entre Mustapha Kemal et les généraux alliés à Moudania ou à Ismid.

Les Gouvernements alliés ont la conviction que leur appel sera entendu et qu'ils pourront collaborer avec la Turquie comme avec leurs Alliés pour le rétablissement d'une paix à laquelle aspire toute l'humanité civilisée.

CURZON POINCARÉ SFORZA

Le 23 septembre 1922.

F.O. 424/254, pp. 360-361, No. 637/1; and p. 310, No. 571

No. 246

Lord Hardinge to the Marquis Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, September 23, 1922

(Received September 23.)

No. 476. Telegraphic.

FOLLOWING is the English text of telegram sent to-night by the three Allied representatives to the Angora Government:—

"The three Allied Governments request the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to inform them if they are ready to send without delay a representative with full powers to a meeting which will be held at Venice or elsewhere and to which will be invited, together with the representatives of Turkey, plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Greece. This meeting will take place as soon as the necessary arrangements have been made by the Governments concerned. Its object will be to negotiate and conclude the Final Treaty of Peace between Turkey, Greece and the Allied Powers. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring that they view with favour the desire of Turkey to recover Thrace as far as the Maritza and Adrianople.

"On condition that the Government of Angora does not send its armies during the peace negotiations into the neutral zones, the provisional neutrality of which has been proclaimed by the Allied Governments, the three Governments will willingly support at the conference the attribution of these frontiers to Turkey, it being understood, however that steps will be taken in common agreement in the treaty to safeguard the interest of Turkey and her neighbours, to demilitarise with a view to the maintenance of peace certain zones to be fixed, to obtain the peaceful and orderly re-establishment of Turkish authority, and, finally, to assure effectively under the auspices of the League of Nations the freedom of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, as well as the protection of religious and racial minorities. For the rest, the three Governments will willingly support the admission of Turkey to the League of Nations.

"They are in agreement in reaffirming the assurance which they gave in March last to withdraw their troops from Constantinople as soon as the Peace Treaty enters into force. The three Allied Governments will use their influence to procure before the opening of the conference the retirement of the Greek forces to a line to be fixed by the Allied generals in agreement with the Greek and Turkish military authorities. In return for this intervention, the Government of Angora will undertake not to send troops either before or during the conference into the zones which have provisionally been declared neutral and not to cross the Straits or the Sea of Marmora.

"In order to fix the above-mentioned line, a meeting might immediately take place between Mustapha Kemal and the Allied generals at Mudania or at Ismid.

"The Allied Governments are convinced that their appeal will be listened to, and they will be able to collaborate with Turkey and with their Allies to re-establish a peace for which the whole civilised world is longing."

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

F.O. 424/254, pp. 307-308, No. 564

No. 247

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Sir W. Tyrrell

PARIS, September 23, 1922

(Received September 24.)

Telegraphic.

FOLLOWING from Lord Curzon for the Cabinet:—

"I am very grateful for wide liberty given to me in your instructions. I at once attended meeting at Quai d'Orsay, which lasted for four hours, and resulted in preparation and signature of joint note, which was communicated to press at 8.30 p.m. and will presumably appear in London papers to-morrow. Cabinet will see that every one of its desiderata was obtained, although French idiom—that being language of note—compelled departure from exact words of English formula as originally framed. In two respects I refrained from going as far as I was authorised. Firstly, by specific mention of Maritza boundary instead of geographical area of Eastern Thrace between that river and Bulgarian frontier, which may be useful lever to them in conference discussions. Secondly, by refraining from naming a precise line to which Greek troops will presently be asked to retire, some latitude will be left to Allied commanders in projected meeting at Mudania to make whatever arrangements are thought best. On the other hand, conditions imposed upon Kemalists are very precise; and a phrase was introduced providing for demilitarisation of various zones unspecified, a point which I had forgotten in my draft. A sentence was also added about admission of Turkey to League of Nations.

I declined to allow the Mudania meeting to be converted into anything but a military conference on a single and narrowly defined point.

"It is, of course, possible that Kemal may endeavour to secure suspension of reinforcements or withdrawal of British troops as a condition of attending peace conference. But no legitimate loophole for this is left in text of note, and it can therefore be resisted and refused on its own merits.

"In expectation that I would not meet him on subject of Thracian frontier, M. Poincaré had prepared a note for despatch by the French alone. This contained declarations of wider compass. Nevertheless, I think he was greatly relieved to find that a single pronouncement was possible; and I believe that French Government are genuinely anxious, for reasons of self-interest, to see the invitation accepted and the conference summoned.

"Sforza lent no aid throughout the proceedings, and was little beyond a shadow in wake of the French. Had it been possible to obtain the concurrence of the Serbian and Roumanian Governments before issue of the note, this would have been done. But the Serbian Ministers have already dispersed and are not to meet in Belgrade till Wednesday. Such a delay would have been disastrous. Accordingly I proposed and it was agreed to telegraph the text of note to them at once and express earnest hope that they would concur.

"In reply to Prime Minister's telegram concerning situation at Constantinople, which did not arrive till sitting was over, I have at once telegraphed to Graham at Rome requesting Italian Government to telegraph orders to their representative to assist in maintenance of order. Poincaré is being addressed in same sense.

"I return to London to-morrow and will report to Cabinet if thought desirable, on Monday morning.

"Lord Hardinge lent me valuable assistance throughout."

F.O. 424/254, pp. 313-314, No. 583

D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, pp. 96-97, No. 52

No. 248

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 23rd, 1922, 3.40 p.m.

(Received September 23, 5.50 p.m.)

No. 450. Telegraphic

Very Urgent. Secret.

Admiral Brock has shown General Harington and myself orders he has received to remove craft of every description from Bosphorus so as to prevent

Kemalists from crossing to European shore. The Admiral is to decide in conjunction with General Harington and myself when exact moment arrives to take these measures.

I understand Admiral Brock is already taking all measures to prevent Kemalists from crossing Dardanelles and Sea of Marmora. He is also watching Black Sea.

I do not think Admiralty can possibly realize difficulty of carrying out their orders as regards Bosphorus. I entirely appreciate vital importance of preventing Kemalists from transporting their troops to Thrace. But we have to consider effect of situation on Constantinople of removal of all floating craft in Bosphorus.

He can, as a preliminary measure, prevent all traffic at night.

It will be difficult to determine exact moment for dealing with Turkish craft in Bosphorus. In my view this moment will, in principle, have arrived if or when Mustapha Kemal sends an ultimatum to evacuate Constantinople, possibly as a condition of his attending a conference or when General Harington tells us definitely that Mustapha Kemal has concentrated forces, which he is unable to resist, for an advance on Constantinople, or when Mustapha Kemal crosses neutral zone at Chanak. Crossing of neutral zones would be an act of war which would justify action on the part of Admiral.

The repercussion of measures ordered by Admiralty on Constantinople population would be such as to endanger safety of General Harington's force as at present constituted and make it difficult to extricate it. General Harington considers therefore that these measures should not be put into force until British troops are in a position of safety i.e. have gone to Gallipoli.

We recognise urgent importance of holding Constantinople as long as possible if only to prevent Kemalists from transporting their troops to European shore. But His Majesty's Government must realize that if hostilities unfortunately break out they will be playing a war part from enemy's capital which means holding down a hostile population. The Admiral informs me that he can not ensure these measures ordered by Admiralty being effective if he has to wait until British troops evacuate, while General Harington states that if they are put into force before he evacuates Constantinople his troops will be in danger.

This is dilemma with which we are faced.

I therefore consider that while bearing steadily in mind necessity of doing our utmost to prevent Kemalist troops crossing Bosphorus it is very difficult for Admiral to carry out his instructions in their entirety.

We must remember necessity of victualling and maintaining economic life of city both of which are largely dependent on water transport.

We cannot remove all Turkish craft from Bosphorus without also taking measures to prevent allied and neutral shipping from falling into Kemalist hands.

It will, therefore, be necessary to notify allied and neutral shipping that they must be prepared to leave harbour at twenty-four hours notice. I understand that it would be practicable within a period of three days to intern Turkish shipping in Golden Horn. It must be recognized that this is only a delaying measure as if and when Kemalists arrive on Asiatic shore shipping in Golden Horn will be at their disposal. The wholesale destruction of shipping in Golden Horn would, I am convinced, produce an explosion which would have most far-reaching consequences without compensating advantages because means of crossing Bosphorus can always be extemporised.

The situation here necessarily varies from day to day and subject to general instructions from His Majesty's Government I trust Admiral Brock, General Harington, and I myself may be given full latitude to deal with it to the best of our ability.

General Harington is in entire agreement with above.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 450.

Repeated to Paris No. 26 for Lord Curzon.

F.O. 371/7893/E. 9803

F.O. 424/254, pp. 303-304, No. 555

D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, pp. 86-87, No. 50

No. 249

Mr. W. Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the British Cabinet

September 23, 1922

C.P. 4200

Secret.

THE TURCO-GREEK SITUATION. CO-OPERATION OF THE DOMINIONS.

Telegrams between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and Governors General of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, and Officers administering the Government of Newfoundland.

(Circulated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies).

{1}

Paraphrase of a Telegram sent to the Governors General of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, 11.30 p.m. 15th Sept. 1922.

(Similar telegram sent to O.A.G., Newfoundland, 4.10 p.m. 17th September 1922).

Secret.

Following for your Prime Minister from the Prime Minister begins.

Decision taken by Cabinet today to resist aggression upon Europe by the Turks and to make exertions to prevent Mustapha Kemal driving the Allies out of Constantinople and in particular and above all to secure firmly the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to maintain the freedom of the Straits. We have received a notification from the French Government that they are in agreement with us in informing Mustapha Kemal that he must not violate the neutral zone which protects Constantinople and the Straits and that their High Commissioner at Constantinople has been instructed accordingly. The Italians also are acting in general concert with us. We hope to secure the military participation of Greece, Roumania and Serbia in the defence of the deep water line between Europe and Asia and we are addressing them accordingly. All the aforesaid Powers are being notified of our intention to make exertions and that British division is to be placed under orders to reinforce the Allied Commander-in-chief, Sir Charles Harington. The co-operation of the British Navy will also be forthcoming to the fullest extent necessary. The object of these arrangements is to cover the period which must elapse before it is possible to secure a stable peace with Turkey. Proposals are being made to hold a Conference for this purpose probably at Venice, but possibly at Paris and the essential point is that we should have sufficient strength to maintain our position round the Straits and in Constantinople until this peace has been achieved. It seems improbable that if a firm front is shown by a large number of Powers acting together, the forces of Mustapha Kemal will attack. His armies, which have so far not had any serious resistance to encounter from the disheartened Greeks, are estimated at between sixty and seventy thousand men. But timely precautions are imperative. Very grave consequences in India and among other Mohammedan populations for which we are responsible might result from a defeat or a humiliating exodus of the Allies from Constantinople.

I should be glad to know whether the Government of the (Dominion/ Commonwealth/ Dominion Union) wish to associate themselves with our action and whether they desire to be represented by a contingent. Not only does the freedom of the Straits for which such immense sacrifices were made in the War involve vital Imperial and world wide interests, but we cannot forget that there are 20,000 British and Anzac graves in the Gallipoli Peninsula and that it would be an abiding source of grief to the Empire if these were to fall into the ruthless hands of the Kemalists.

The announcement of an offer from all or any of the Dominions to send contingents even of moderate size would undoubtedly exercise in itself a most favourable influence on the situation and might conceivably be a potent factor in preventing actual hostilities.

This telegram has also been sent to the Governors General of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa.

(2)

Paraphrase of telegram from the Governor General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Dated 16th September

(Received, Colonial Office, 1-30 p.m. 16th September, 1922)

Your telegram 16th September. Following from my Prime Minister for Prime Minister begins. Government of New Zealand wish to associate themselves with action which is being taken and will send contingent.

JELlicoe

(3)

Paraphrase telegram from the Governor General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Dated 19th September

(Received, Colonial Office 10-35 a.m. 19th September, 1922)

Following from my Prime Minister for Prime Minister, Begins. I should be glad to receive early information as to whether immediate despatch of small contingent is required for sake of moral effect to be followed if necessary by reinforcements.

It would be of assistance if recommendation could be made as to strength and composition of advance contingent and of larger force.

JELlicoe

(4)

Paraphrase telegram from the Governor General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Dated 20th September

(Received, Colonial Office 8-0 a.m. 20th September, 1922)

Unanimous resolution was passed last night by House of Representatives endorsing action of Government communicated in my telegram 16th September after amendment of Labour Party to the effect that Parliament and people should have first been consulted had been defeated by fifty-seven to seven. Over five thousand had registered names up to last evening although no volunteers yet called for. Imperial spirit strikingly exhibited throughout the Dominion. Prime Minister would appreciate telegraphic review of the general situation from time to time.

JELlicoe

(5)

Paraphrase telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General of New Zealand. Dated 19th September

(Sent 10.50 p.m. 19th September, 1922.)

Following from me for your Prime Minister begins.

I have referred to War Office your telegram of the 19th September and will send you an answer to-morrow. I am also forwarding you a further message on the general situation from the Prime Minister. May I add with what deep emotion this

country and especially my colleagues in the Cabinet have received your prompt and generous response and your own stirring words. Ends.

CHURCHILL

(6)

*Paraphrase telegram from the Officer Administering the Government of Newfoundland to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Dated 18th September
(Received, Colonial Office 8-45 p.m. 18th September, 1922)*

September 18th. Your telegram 17th September following reply sent at the request of the Acting Prime Minister. Begins:

Ministers appreciate position taken by His Majesty's Government and Allies and are in fullest sympathy therewith. I believe that as in past Newfoundland will be ready to render all assistance available. Ends.

HORWOOD

(7)

*Paraphrase telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Newfoundland. Dated 19th September
(Sent 9-50 p.m. 19th September, 1922)*

Following for your Prime Minister from Prime Minister. Begins:

Your prompt response to our enquiry regarding troops to resist any thrust against sanctity of Gallipoli Peninsula and freedom of Straits has been received here with enthusiasm. The Empire cannot consent to the results of the gallant struggle and final victory of its sons in the Eastern theatre being sacrificed. Ends.

(CHURCHILL)

(8)

*Paraphrase telegram from the Governor General of the Union of South Africa to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Dated 18th September
(Received Colonial Office 4-38 p.m. 18th September, 1922)*

Clear the line.

Secret. With reference to your telegrams of 15th and 17th September on the subject of the Turkish situation. Following is personal message from Mr. Malan for your Prime Minister. Begins: General Smuts is not in Pretoria at present but is expected back towards the end of this week. Your secret telegrams are being communicated to him and we hope to send at a later date a further telegram.

ARTHUR FREDERICK

(9)

*Paraphrase telegram from the Governor General of the Union of South Africa to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Dated 19th September
(Received Colonial Office 9-55 p.m. 19th September, 1922)*

The absence of the Prime Minister in Zululand is the cause of the delay in replying to your Secret and Personal telegrams of September 15th and September 17th.

ARTHUR FREDERICK

(10)

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors-General of the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand
(Sent 7.20 p.m. 18th September, 1922.)

Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister.

Your prompt response to our enquiry regarding troops to resist any thrust against freedom of Straits and sanctity of Gallipoli peninsula has been received here with enthusiasm. The Empire cannot consent to sacrifice results of gallant struggle and final victory of its sons in the Eastern theatre.

(11)

Paraphrase of telegram from the Governor General of Canada
(Received 3.40 a.m., 18th September, 1922)

Secret. September 17th. Following from my Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins: Before communication could be sent to myself or other members of the Government of Canada of the contents of your cable sent through Governor General despatches from England appeared in our press announcing the British Government's invitation to Canada to participate in resisting Turkish Forces by despatch of troops. This has caused a most embarrassing situation and Press representatives are enquiring of me if any, and if so what, communication has been received from the British Government. Seeing that your message takes the form of a secret cypher telegram your sanction seems to be necessary before disclosure of its contents. I should be glad to receive immediate reply by telegraph as to your wishes in the matter stating whether I am at liberty to disclose the contents of the communication the British Government desires to have made public as coming from them to Government of Canada.

Parliament will certainly ? ask for copies of all official correspondence in this matter to be produced and I should be glad therefore if you would clearly indicate if any what communications should be considered as not coming within the return that may be expected.

BYNG

(12)

Paraphrase of telegram from the Governor General of Canada to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. (Dated 18th September; received Colonial Office, 7.50 a.m., 19th September, 1922)
September 18th. Secret

Following for your Prime Minister from Prime Minister. Begins: Representations contained in your telegram of September 15th have been under consideration of Cabinet. The Government's view is that public opinion of Canada would demand authorisation on the part of Parliament as a necessary preliminary to despatching a contingent to participate in Near East conflict.

Fullst possible information will be welcomed by us in order that we may decide upon the advisability of summoning Parliament. Message ends.

BYNG

(13)

Telegram from the Governor General of Canada to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Dated 19th September. (Received Colonial Office 10.18 a.m. 20th September, 1922.)

September 19th. Following for you from my Prime Minister. Message begins. Please accept my best thanks for your two telegrams of yesterday which were duly received. We have arranged daily sittings of the Cabinet and shall await information in accordance with understanding of my cable message in answer to that of Prime Minister of the 15th September. Message ends.

BYNG

(14)

Paraphrase telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General of Canada. (Sent 4.15 p.m. 18th September, 1922.)

Clear the line.

Following from me for your Prime Minister. Secret and Personal. Begins.

The message from the Prime Minister which I transmitted to you on the 15th September is not suitable for textual publication. There would be no objection to the substance being given to the public as has been done in Australia, but I send you on behalf of the Prime Minister a further telegram separately in case you want a message the actual text of which can be laid before your Parliament.

It was in view of the special associations which they have with Gallipoli that we have communicated with Australia and New Zealand and we felt bound to make the message common to all the Dominions. There is no probability of a serious war, but it is essential to prevent the Kemalists from crossing the Straits and entering Constantinople except in accordance with the decision of a peace Conference which will, among other things, effectively secure the freedom of the Straits probably under some international arrangement. The main factor on which we rely is of course the British Navy and we think it unlikely that hostilities will occur if the allies continue to act together in forbidding the Kemalists to invade the neutral zone now guarded by allied troops. However, it is extremely important that Great Britain should adopt a firm attitude, and anything that your Government can contribute towards the sense of Empire solidarity would be of the utmost value. At this juncture a statement to the effect that the Dominion of Canada associates itself with the general position of the Allied Powers in insisting upon the freedom of the Straits and would be represented by a contingent if the need arose, would be quite sufficient. That the actual need for despatching the contingent will arise seems most improbable and in any case it is contemplated that it would be only of a very moderate size. Australia and New Zealand have already replied in a favourable sense.

It is a matter of great regret to me that it was not possible to give you longer notice, but the crisis developed too suddenly. I am sure that you will so handle the matter as to give the utmost moral support at this stage. Message ends.

CHURCHILL

(15)

*Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General of Canada
(Sent 5.0 p.m. 18th September, 1922)*

Clear the Line.

Following for your Prime Minister. Following for publication. Begins.

In view of the possibility that the Turks under Mustapha Kemal may attempt aggression upon Europe His Majesty's Government in concert with the Governments of France and Italy have decided to resist any such attempt to safeguard for the time being the position of the Allies at Constantinople and above all to maintain the freedom of the Straits by securing their firm hold on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

The Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople have accordingly been instructed to inform Mustapha Kemal that he must not violate the neutral zone which protects the Straits and Constantinople. British reinforcements have been placed under orders to join the Allied Commander-in-Chief at Constantinople Sir Charles Harington and the British Navy will co-operate to the fullest extent. These arrangements are intended to secure the situation pending the meeting of a Conference the aims of which will be to secure a stable peace with Turkey and timely precautions are imperative.

His Majesty's Government trust that in view of the vital Imperial and world-wide interests involved in the freedom of the Straits for which such immense sacrifices were made by the Empire during the war the Dominion of Canada will associate themselves with the proposed action and the evidence of united purpose which would be afforded by the despatch of a contingent should circumstances render it necessary would exercise a most favourable influence upon the situation. Ends.

CHURCHILL

(16)

Paraphrase telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General of Canada. (Sent 10.30 p.m. 19th September, 1922)

Following for your Prime Minister from Prime Minister. Begins.

The attitude of Canada at this moment is of great importance. We do not ask for any immediate decision to send troops. We should immediately summon parliament here if large reinforcements were to prove necessary and should at once notify you of our decision to do so. Presumably it is not necessary for you to summon parliament till then and we hope it may not be necessary at all. A definite

statement, however, that in the event of the terms of the Armistice being broken Canada will stand by the Empire will do much to ensure that peace is maintained. Ends.

CHURCHILL

(17)

Paraphrase telegram from Commonwealth of Australia dated 20th September (received at the Colonial Office 20th September, at 6.27 a.m.)

Following from my Prime Minister for Prime Minister. Begins.

Your telegram was not received till late in the afternoon on Sunday and after arrival in Australia of press messages giving substantially same information given to press by yourself. This in a matter of such grave importance is most unfortunate as it precludes that full and judicial consideration of the position by Commonwealth which is its clear right as a national Government. It is not right that a Dominion should be stampeded into action by premature statements in the press disclosing a position which even admitting its gravity is not set out in detail and upon which no information had been previously received by the Commonwealth Government suggesting the probability of the Empire being involved in hostilities. Foreign Office despatches many weeks old relating to Greco-Turkish position have no doubt been received from time to time. But no information has come to hand suggesting that the Empire was likely to be involved in hostilities and no telegrams have been communicated to us bearing upon recent developments in the Near East.

Thus your telegram informing us that the British Cabinet had decided to take prompt action against the Kemalists came as a bolt from the blue. And we have not been told even now by what action of the Kemalists this decision has been necessitated. And as it would appear that the press was notified before your telegram reached me of the fact that you contemplated hostilities, and that the Dominions were asked to associate themselves with Britain and send contingent, the Commonwealth Government found itself in most embarrassing position of being asked to decide not between peace and war, for Britain had already determined that issue without consultation with the Commonwealth, but whether after Britain had decided to go to war and had notified the press that she had asked the Dominions whether they wished to join her, it was possible for us in all the circumstances to say that we could not do so. The point the Commonwealth Government desires to emphasise most strongly is that, that consultation with the Dominions ought to take place before any action is taken or irrecoverable decision is made by Britain, as then and then only can our voices be heard and our counsels heeded. Either the Empire is one and indivisible or it is nothing. If it is only another name for Britain, and the Dominions are to be told that things are done after they have been done, and that Britain has decided upon war, and are then to be asked whether they wish to be associated with her and to stand by her side, when they

have in fact no other alternative, then, it is perfectly clear, the relations between the Dominions and Britain being what they are, that all talk about the Dominions having a real share in deciding foreign and imperial policy is empty air.

I feel that I ought to speak quite frankly and say that the unity of the Empire is gravely imperilled by such action.

The Australian people are sick of war. In their view war, except in defence of vital national interests is not only a blunder but a crime. While they fully recognise the importance of the freedom of the Straits and would be grieved and angry if the sanctity of Anzac graves in Gallipoli were violated, they have no sympathy whatever with King Constantine's ambitious projects. They do not understand why the Dominions were not consulted before Britain took action, and before the situation had developed, and they do not understand why the Allies did not restrain the Greeks long ago from such action as it now appears has led up to the present deplorable situation. That situation is the natural and indeed inevitable result of the policy of action or inaction which the Allies have pursued in regard to Greece and Turkey. Australians have seen war raging for many months, great armies arrayed against one another almost within gunshot of Geneva, and they ask themselves what has the League of Nations that was to bring war to an end been doing to bring about peace. Towards the upkeep of the League Australia has paid and is paying very large sums of money. For a very long time war has been raging at its very doors. It now threatens to spread over the whole world. What is the League doing? Apparently it is fiddling with unimportant matters while the world is once more in danger of a general conflagration. Australia must ask that the League of Nations should actively interfere in this struggle; it was established to maintain peace, let it do so; if it cannot or will not, let it acknowledge itself helpless and make way for some more effective means. In order to make it clear to the world the position of Australia stands in this grave matter, her representatives at Assembly now sitting at Geneva have been requested to urge the League to take immediate action.

I hope that I have made it clear that believing in the unity of the Empire as we do, and notwithstanding it has not been consulted until the Empire was by the declaration of the British Government committed to action, Australia will associate itself with Britain in retaining the Gallipoli Peninsula, and in maintaining the freedom of the Straits. But we think that we are clearly entitled to be told precisely what is the policy of Britain and her Allies in the Near East and to have set out in most definite terms just how far Britain desires and intends to go. And we want to know (corrupt group) what is the policy of France and Italy and the other powers who are allied with Britain.

First as to the policy of Britain, or rather of the British Empire, the Commonwealth Government fully recognise the most important bearing of the situation in the Near East upon Mesopotamia, Arabia, Egypt, India and upon the

Empire as a whole. This being so what we desire to know is what is the policy of Britain towards Turkey in Europe and in Asia, and what it proposes to do towards effecting a *modus vivendi*. Mention is made of a Conference: well, what is to be done there? What are you prepared to concede? Anything? nothing? The empire is a world in itself composed of many countries peopled with different races holding widely different religious and other opinions. Is Britain's policy satisfactory to the Moslems in Turkey and throughout the British Empire? If not, is any modification compatible with vital Imperial interest possible and contemplated? We are prepared to back Britain in frustrating the ambitious projects of Kemal, with which we have, of course, no sympathy whatever. On the other hand Australia is not prepared to risk one soldier's life in furthering the schemes of Constantine. Aggression leads to counter aggression: violence to further violence: and unless the cause for which we fight is just and the military objective is laid down in the most precise and definite way we are not prepared to participate actively in a war. We are not for example to be dragged behind the chariot of French intrigues and ambitions in the Near East. Australia will not be a party to treating Turkey unjustly because it is weak. Are we asked for example to associate ourselves in an enterprise whose object is to maintain the *status quo* under the Sèvres Treaty? What we want to know is are we to defend the neutral zone, ensure the inviolability of the Gallipoli Peninsula and the freedom of the Straits, but go no further no matter how much France, Greece or the Balkan States may urge us to take advantage of the superior naval and military strength of the allied forces? Is it the settled and deliberate conviction of the British Government that the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres are fair to Turkey and to the Moslem world and that no further concessions can be or ought to be made? If not, then to what extent and in what direction ought Treaty to be modified in order to meet the legitimate demands of Turkey? The Commonwealth Government, while expressing no opinion on the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres relating to Turkey, strongly urges that if it is possible to make any modifications likely to render it more acceptable to Turkey, they ought to be offered now before hostilities commence. Every effort ought to be made to avoid war. In the unsettled state of the world, war is like going with a lighted torch into a powder magazine. The Empire must set an example to the world. It must not go to war to gain more territory for itself or its allies or do anything incompatible with its solemn declarations during the Great War and since the Armistice. It ought not to go to war unless in defence of its clear rights and unless these are vital to Empire. And the League of Nations must be appealed to and be compelled to shoulder its responsibilities and either prove its worth or confess its futility. Australia wants also a plain and detailed statement on the policy of France in regard to Thrace, Smyrna and the Near East generally. To what extent is the Treaty of Sèvres or its attitude or its policy towards Kemal, Gallipoli and the Straits affected or impaired by the Franklin-Bouillon Treaty? Was the Angora Government financed or supported by France against Constantine? Did

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Britain or any other of her allies support Constantine in his campaign in Thrace and Angora? What is the general policy of France or Italy? What troops if any have they agreed or are they likely to supply?

The Commonwealth Government hopes this frank expression of its views will not be misunderstood by the British Government. Frankness on a matter of such grave importance is imperatively demanded. The Empire ought not to be pushed into a war. The Dominions ought not to be asked whether they will associate themselves with Britain after Britain has in effect committed them. And above all they should not be asked to join in an unnecessary or unjust war. Once the war is begun, no one can say where it will end. We are a peace-loving democracy. We have been through a dreadful ordeal in which we hope that you and the world will agree we played our part worthily. In a good cause we are prepared to venture our all; in a bad one, not a single man. In our own defence and in that of the Empire we are quite ready to fight, but we must know where we are going. Ends.

GOVERNOR GENERAL

(18)

Paraphrase telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors General of Canada, Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, the Officer Administering the Government of Newfoundland and the High Commissioner for Iraq. (Sent 1.45 a.m. 20th September, 1922)

Iraq only. No 540.

I send you at the request of the Prime Minister for your information though not for publication or textual quotation the following review of the position to date.

Begins. The following is the situation: The evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks is now complete and what remains to be settled is the future of the Straits and the disposition of European Turkey and Constantinople. The British Government while they are quite prepared to discuss the settlement with every regard for Turkish as well as other interests, consider the following conditions essential to any lasting arrangement. *First.* The neutrality of Gallipoli and the freedom of the Straits must be guaranteed for all time. *Second.* Any modification of the existing Treaties must be brought about not by force of arms but by conference. *Third.* Mustapha Kemal must in the meantime respect the terms of the Armistice concluded with the Allies by Turkey in 1918. Any breach of the terms of the Armistice which at the moment governs our legal position and any invasion of the Neutral Zone will be resisted if necessary by force. No reply has yet been received to an enquiry addressed to Kemal as to whether he proposes to respect the Armistice pending a Conference or not.

In the meantime we regard it as most important clearly to show the reality of our determination that the Neutral Zone shall be respected and that the solution shall be reached by Conference. From this standpoint two things are specially

important. *First*. It is necessary immediately to reinforce our Naval, Military and Air Forces in the Gallipoli area in order to show that we can stop any sudden breach of the Armistice. We are doing this with good effect. *Second*. We must make it absolutely clear that the position of the Empire if challenged will be maintained firmly against any Turkish forces which can be mobilised against us. From this point of view the moral support of the Dominions and the undertaking to send contingents should the necessity arise is of the utmost value not only in impressing the Turks but in keeping our Allies sound. Although there is a general tendency to loss of morale among the Christian Powers in regard to the Eastern Question a quiet demonstration of firmness on our part supported by the Dominion Governments should be decisive. We are confident that any immediate attack can be resisted by the forces which we now have on the spot with the assistance of the Navy and the Air Force and the Admiralty has declared its ability to prevent the passage of troops from the Asiatic to the European shore whether in the Bosphorus or the Marmora or the Dardanelles.

From the above it will be seen that there is in our opinion no immediate need for the organisation of Dominion contingents except as a means of showing the solidarity of the Empire in safeguarding the results of the War in the Eastern theatre. At present the French attitude is unsatisfactory but in spite of their fear of standing up to the Turks they are unlikely to leave us in sole control of the Gallipoli Peninsula because it is a standing terror with them that Gallipoli may become another Gibraltar in the East of the Mediterranean. Lord Curzon accompanied by Admiral Beatty has just left for Paris to discuss the position with the French Government, and we are not by any means unhopeful of a satisfactory agreement. In this respect the attitude of the Balkan nations who were all signatories to the Treaty of Sévres is important since France has to consider her obligations to them as well as her desire to stand well with the Turks. The Balkan Allies are naturally opposed to the return of the Turk to Europe since this would make inevitable another Balkan war in the near future. Assistance has been promised by Roumania if necessary at once and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, although it has as yet come to no decision, is not likely to adopt a very different attitude. We hope therefore to be able to keep the Allies with us in resisting an appeal to force and in demanding a solution by Conference. By no means are we averse to the League of Nations intervening in the settlement when the time comes, but the first necessity is to ensure that the Turks respect the neutral zone just as we insisted on the Greeks respecting it when they threatened Constantinople last month, and that the Peace Conference should meet in confidence that pending a settlement the Armistice will not be broken.

In taking up this attitude we are putting forward no new claims or fresh obstacles in the way of peace. We are on the contrary standing by our engagements we are absolutely convinced that much trouble will be saved in the future with the

whole Mahomedan world by a quiet but decisive demonstration that the British Empire is not to be threatened or bluffed. To be weak, on the contrary, may lead to widespread disorder amongst Mahommedan populations everywhere. There is no question of our ability to deal with Mustapha Kemal should this become inevitable as he commands only a force of 60,000 rifles but our desire is to prevent hostilities by an immediate show of firmness, and the effect of the promise of Dominion contingents has already been most valuable from this stand point.

CHURCHILL.

F.O. 371/7892/E. 9774

No. 250

War Office to Foreign Office

WAR OFFICE, LONDON, 23rd September, 1922

(Received September 25)

0152/6137 (M.I.2).

Secret

Sir

I am commanded by the Army Council to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter from Lieutenant General Sir Charles Harington No. M.S. /Personal/142, dated the 19th of August 1922, together with a copy of a message received by General Harington from his Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey.

I am, etc.

F.O. 371/7893/E 9859

(Signed)

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 250

Lieutenant-General Sir Charles H. Harington to War Office

August 19th 1922

M. S. /Personal/142.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward for your information a copy of a message received by me from His Imperial Majesty, The Sultan, and for which I have conveyed to him my thanks without any further comment or action.

I have, etc.

(Signed) C. H. HARINGTON

Lieutenant-General,

Commanding-in-Chief,

The Allied Forces of Occupation (Turkey)

F.O. 371/7893/E 9859

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 250

Report of verbal message delivered by Prince SAMI Bey to Colonel GRIBBON at Constantinople on the evening of Monday, 7th August, 1922.

I have been directed by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan to deliver the following message with the request that it be transmitted through you to General Harington, Commander-in-Chief, The Allied Forces of Occupation, Constantinople:—

H.I.M. the Sultan until to-day has never contemplated such a tragic situation as exists at the moment and request that General Harington should not consider that H.I.M. is a fatalist.

Prince SAMI Bey then quoted the following verbatim statement from H.I.M. the Sultan:—

"I am the Sultan and Khalif who must first consider the women and children of this country. As Sultan I am Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Army and it is only natural that I should be with the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces of Occupation should the crisis materialise and I would request that in the event of such a situation arising, General Harington, as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces of Occupation, would inform me where my Headquarters should be".

General Headquarters,
The Allied Forces of
Occupation (Turkey).
August 8th, 1922.

F.O. 371/7893/E. 9859

No. 251

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

WASHINGTON, September 23, 1922
(Received September 23.)

No. 372. Telegraphic R.

My telegram No. 366.

Statement of our aims issued yesterday is producing excellent effect, and sentiment of press is increasingly in our favour, while French propagandist messages are no longer given the same prominence.

"New York World," which has been our chief critic, has leading article to-day on importance of checking Kemal, though it adds a caveat against permanent British occupation of any of territories affected. Even Hearst press to-day is cordial to our case.

General tendency now, especially in editorial columns, is to recognise Britain as bulwark of civilised thought; except in Church circles and organs, there is no readiness to accept any share of responsibility for America. Ground lost in American public opinion as a result of much mistrust of announcement made in London on 16th September appears to be in process of being regained.

F.O. 424/254, p. 308, No. 566

No. 252

Sir R. Graham to Lord Hardinge (Repeated to Foreign Office; Received September 24.)

ROME, September 23, 1922

No. 287 Telegraphic.

FOLLOWING is continuation of my immediately preceding telegram:—

"He declared that France and Italy were deluging Kemal with good advice, and he trusted and believed hostilities would be avoided. Thrace was the danger point, as Greek civil and military administrations there were in full dissolution and Turks had already succeeded in introducing large numbers of disguised officers and emissaries.

"His Excellency promised to do everything possible for Smyrna refugees (your telegram No. 280) and said that Italian naval authorities had already incurred odium for transporting more Greeks than Italians.

"He enquired whether I knew anything of French proposal to send Franklin Bouillon to Angora to negotiate on behalf of all the Allies and strongly deprecated it.

"Finally he begged me to assure you that you could count on his full support in all efforts to secure peaceful solution to present crisis".

F.O. 371/7894/E 9916

F.O. 424/254, p. 315, No. 588

No. 253

Sir H. Hankey to Lord Balfour (Geneva)

24th September, 1922

No. 61

Following for Dominions Delegation.

Most important news today is invitation to Mustapha Kemal published in Press here and no doubt in Geneva also. Great difficulty was experienced in

finding a formula acceptable to the three Powers and final agreement was only reached in Paris late yesterday evening after British Cabinet had been consulted by Lord Curzon. Final form of invitation is in conformity with general policy of British Cabinet. Proposal to support admission of Turkey to League is a new point.

While political outlook is somewhat better it is too soon to forecast Mustapha Kemal's reply and relax precautions for securing freedom of Straits. Military position at Chanak is now more secure and from today onwards British naval, military and air reinforcements will be arriving. Report has just been received that Turkish cavalry are near Chanak but no firing had taken place up to 1 a. m. this morning and officers have orders to avoid it as long as possible.

French and Italians have withdrawn all their forces from Asia and in consequence British troops have been withdrawn from original allied position on Ismid Peninsula to a shorter line covering Scutari.

Position in Constantinople City is not free from anxiety but Rumbold and Harington believe that French will assist in maintenance of order there.

In view of French attitude Roumania continues to delay decision as to sending any force immediately to Constantinople area, Serbia's attitude in this respect is evasive. Greek Government has offered to place all resources at disposal of British Government if their help is desired as an ally. British minister at Athens expressed thanks and added that peaceful solution was desired.

F.O. 371/7893/E. 9872

No. 254

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, September 24, 1922.

(Received September 25.)

No. 479 Telegraphic [By Bag].

PRACTICALLY entire French press welcomes with unfeigned satisfaction decision reached here yesterday to send a joint invitation to Angora Government and stress is laid on its being a triumph for peace in general and not for any particular country or Government. Your Lordship's conciliatory disposition is highly appreciated and is the subject of much eulogy. Regret is expressed in most of the papers that Mr. Lloyd George should, in contrast, have issued a controversial statement at moment when three Powers had just reached agreement.

I am sending by to-night's bag leading article in this evening's "Temps", which reflects general opinion of press. It does not disguise difficulties which still remain, and hints that Kemalists may be reluctant to accept régime proposed for Straits, but its tone is in general optimistic and friendly to Great Britain.

M. Gauvain in the "Journal des Débats", remarks gloomily that the proposed peace will result in a Turkey stronger than before the war. If the Turks show intransigence, it will, he declares, prove that it is impossible to allow their re-establishment in Europe. He concludes with the suggestion that the Soviet Government may prevent Mustapha Kemal from accepting the conditions now offered to him.

F.O. 424/254, p. 333, No. 615

No. 255

General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office

Despatched 2330 24.9.22

Received 1000 25.9.22

Secret

2430 cipher 24/9.

I have seen note communicated to Mustapha Kemal by Allied Governments and which I presume he will accept with certain quibbles. I shall be prepared to proceed at once to Ismid or Mudania as required. Meanwhile, until an answer is received, it would in my opinion be unwise to cancel any arrangements made, as display of force is the only thing Turks understand. 2,500 Greeks are moving to Bulair lines according to reports received. These must be Greeks reported erroneously as going to Chanak. City is quiet though I consider certain amount of trouble will be given by bands being organized in Thrace. Will divert to Iraq "Braemar Castle" arriving Chanak tomorrow, otherwise I think no change should be made. Will you inform Trenchard and Mr. Churchill how grateful I am for their offer of help.

F.O. 371/7825/E. 9991

No. 256

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 25, 1922

(Received September 25.)

No. 451 Telegraphic R

MY telegram No. 456.

General Harington informs me that a force of Turkish cavalry, 2,000 strong, with machine guns has appeared at Eren Keui.

We have arranged to telegraph to admiral at Smyrna to interview Mustapha Kemal if possible, and get him to give order for withdrawal of this force of cavalry on [uc] neutral zone. French High Commissioner, at my request, has undertaken to instruct French admiral at Smyrna to take similar steps and is speaking to Nationalist agent here. We are pointing out that British military authorities at Chanak have shown utmost forbearance in this matter. Turkish force will be summoned to leave within a specified period, which will allow of receipt of orders by commander of force.

Mustapha Kemal and Nationalist agent are to be warned that if Turkish cavalry remain at Eren-Keui after lapse of time limit General Harington will have no alternative but to turn them out.

F.O. 424/254, p. 332, No. 610

No. 257

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, September 25th, 1922, 7.40 p.m.
(Received September 25, 10.30 p.m.)

Unnumbered. Urgent.

Private and Secret.

Mendl has seen Nihad Rechad to-day. Latter expresses conviction that Kemal will accept terms and opportunity of conference. He views Bouillon's sole presence with Kemal as most dangerous to British interests since he will attribute entire success of terms offered and allied solidarity to France's efforts. He considers we should send a trusty English envoy and suggests that he should cross to London to see you. From all that he said I think it important for you to see him. The name suggested by Rechad as an envoy who would be acceptable to Turks who believe in him is Aubrey Herbert.

I would suggest one way of preventing Franklin-Bouillon from prejudicing (? British interests) would be to send someone from Constantinople to see Kemal before Franklin-Bouillon gets there, such as Mr. Henderson, but not Mr. Ryan who is supposed to be (? anti) Turkish.

F.O. 371/7894/E. 9914

F.O. 424/254, p. 334, No. 616

No. 258

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, September 25, 1922

(Received September 26.)

No. 480 Telegraphic.

FOLLOWING announcement appears in this evening's "Temps":

"M. Franklin-Bouillon, who negotiated the Treaty of Angora in 1921, left Paris yesterday evening for Toulon where he embarks to-day on board the battleship 'Metz' en route for the East. He will meet Mustapha Kemal either at Smyrna or at Ismid, and will furnish him with all the necessary details in regard to the letter of invitation to a peace conference sent by MM. Poincaré, Curzon and Sforza; preliminary meeting and determination of a Græco-Turkish armistice line in Thrace, liberty of the Straits, respect of the neutral zone, summoning of a peace conference, promise of the restoration to Turkey of Eastern Thrace, &c".

*F.O. 371/7894/E. 9913**F.O. 424/254, p. 352, No. 628*

No. 259

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1922

(Received September 25.)

No. 375 Telegraphic R.

MY telegram No. 372

This morning's eastern papers regard British participation in joint note sent to Kemal as a diplomatic victory for France due largely to attitude of British labour. Terms offered are regarded as a conspicuous success for Kemal, and, while there is little disposition to criticise them, return of Turkey to Europe is deplored, and it is freely predicted that present settlement even if, as is generally anticipated, it is accepted by Turks, will not result in durable peace in the Near East.

Ability of League of Nations to maintain freedom of the Straits or protect minorities is very generally doubted, though "New York Times" welcomes proposal as natural solution and "highest compliment" yet paid to League.

"World" thinks that in time of war enforcement of League's authority in the Straits will devolve on British navy, and sees in suggestion partial compensation for what it regards as defeat of our policy in other directions.

F.O. 424/254, p. 334, No. 617

No. 26a

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 25, 1922

(Received October 3.)

No. 840

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 23rd instant to speak to him about the situation.

2. I pointed out that, in view of the tension which prevailed here in consequence of the uncertainty of Mustapha Kemal's intentions, it was absolutely necessary that the Central Government should do nothing which could contribute to provoke disorders in the town. I said that the arrests of Armenians and Greeks coming from the southern ports of the Marmora must cease, and I spoke to his Highness in particular about the case of an Ottoman Greek who is under sentence of death and who, I had learnt was to be executed at any moment.

3. İzzet Pasha agreed with me that moderation was necessary in the present circumstances. He promised to take up the case of the Ottoman Greek at once and he appeared to be impressed by what I said with reference to the arrests of Armenians and Greeks. I may mention that the pretext given for these arrests is that the persons in question have been implicated in looting the houses of Mussulman subjects before and during the Greek evacuation of Asia Minor.

4. We then spoke of the possibility of disorders in the town. I said that we knew that there had lately been an influx of bad elements, who would take the first opportunity to create disorders. There were also a fair number of Russian Communists, who would not be slow to fish in troubled waters. I said that it was certain that large numbers of Turks were armed. İzzet Pasha replied that the Turks had no doubt armed themselves for protection against the Greeks, many of whom it was known were armed. I told İzzet Pasha that we had good reason to believe that some 20,000 Turks in this city had arms. In this connection I may mention that the Ecumenical Patriarchate recently stated in writing that it could place 20,000 armed Greeks at the disposal of the British authorities if their services were required. I need hardly say that, whilst I forwarded a copy of this note to General Harington, I do not propose in any circumstances to avail myself of the Patriarchate's offer, for I cannot conceive anything more dangerous than to utilise the Greeks of Constantinople in the manner suggested.

5. İzzet Pasha then read me a note which had been prepared for the Council of Minister on the subject of the capacity of the Turkish police to put down disorders. This note stated that Constantinople was policed by a Turkish force consisting of 300 gendarmes and 300 ordinary police. If the inter-Allied police lent

their assistance the Turkish authorities felt themselves capable of suppressing all disorders. They suggested, however, that the force of gendarmes might be increased. I am informing General Harington of this suggestion, but I do not suppose it will commend itself to him.

6. We then reverted to the position of the Sultan. Izzet Pasha said that His Majesty was resigned to the course of events and was bearing himself with a dignity which commanded respect. Although Izzet Pasha has no particular reason for attachment to the Sultan, he spoke with considerable feeling regarding His Majesty's demeanour and he said that the Sultan was the best member of the House of Osman at the present moment. Nevertheless, His Majesty had many enemies, and I inferred that, in Izzet Pasha's opinion, the Sultan's position was a critical one. His Highness scouted the idea that Mustapha Kemal, whose ambitions are considerable, could put aside the House of Osman and found a new dynasty in his own person.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 424/255, p. 25, No. 31

No. 261

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 892 Secret.

25.9.1922.

The Near Eastern Crisis: The Question of Russian Intervention.

Summary No. 891 contained the text of a telegram from the S.I.S. representative in Constantinople, dated 22nd September, which was to the effect that, in reply to a communication from Angora on the subject of Russian intervention, the Soviet Government had replied that the Red Army in the Caucasus was being strengthened with a view to helping the Turks in Anatolia, but that the Angora Government should apply to the Soviet Ukrainian Government on the subject of Russian action against Rumania. Up to the 18th September, no reply had been received by Angora to a Note which had been sent to the Ukraine; and it was Mustapha Kemal's intention to attack the Straits in the event of a favourable reply being received from the Ukraine.

In this connection, the following telegram, dated 24th September, has been received from the S.I.S. representative:-

According to trustworthy information from Tiflis, the Soviet Government is considering a plan regarding military or diplomatic measures in support of Angora at the present juncture.

Trotsky and Bukharin are advocating military action against Eastern Europe; but Chicherin is opposing this on the grounds of the dangerous internal complications which would ensue, the loss of advantages already secured in Europe, the probability of a blockade of Russian ports, also the difficulties which would be involved in maintaining the numerous resultant fronts.

Under these circumstances, a definite decision has not yet been taken by the Soviet Government, but military preparations are proceeding, and the agent states that reinforcements are being sent to the Rumanian and Caucasian areas.

In the meanwhile, the Kemalist (intend ?) transporting troops by motor lighters from Zungulduk to the Midia district, also via Constantinople to the Silivri area. Russians are to assist in the transporting of troops in the Black Sea area.

F.O. 371/7896

No. 262

British Consul at Sarajevo to Sir C. A. Young (Belgrade)

SARAJEVO, September 25th, 1922

No. 14.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose five extracts from articles recently published in the local press concerning the events in Asia Minor. The riot of invective against Britain which accompanies the jubilant comments on Kemal's triumph and the ominous trend of developments throughout the East is by no means limited to the Moslem press. It is true that the Croatian Opposition papers could only be expected to make common cause to some extent with their Allies of the Moslem majority, and that non-sectarian Government organs, like the "Jugoslavenski List" and the "Vecerna Posta", catering as they do for the commercial and industrial classes, would necessarily discountenance Jugoslavian participation in a British Crusade or in any other warlike undertaking. In some of their articles, however, hostility towards England is so much the predominating note that their attitude, if spontaneous and sincere, would seem to be determined by something deeper than the dictates of ordinary political programmes. An explanation may perhaps be found in the unfortunate differences between the Bosnians and their present rulers, and a disposition, perhaps enhanced by Turkish and Bolshevik propaganda, to regard and depict England, from the standpoint of her Asiatic policy, as a conspicuous adversary of that self-determination to which they themselves aspire. Thus on Sept. 12th the following passage occurred in the "Hrvatska Sloga", an organ of the Croatian Peasant Party.

"In Kemal the World sees the protagonist of a nation struggling for existence. The sufferings of the Turks find sympathy in the hearts of all the Oppressed. We

greet Kemal's victory with joy, not only because many Croats are Moslems, but because it is the triumph of truth over evil, of law over lawlessness, of the national spirit over imperialism and oppression. The Greek defeat proves once again that any nation sinning against the principle of self-determination must pay the penalty".

Whilst the "Nasa Pravda" (Moslem Opposition organ) describes Mr Lloyd-George as "The bloody enemy of the Moslem World", the "Jugoslavenki List" (Government organ) taxes him with gratuitously stirring up a new conflict, which would destroy the last hope of European reconstruction, and the "Vecerna Posta" (Government organ) declares that not only the Little Entente, but all the Allies, should refuse to join England in a new adventure.

I have, etc.

(Signature)

F.O. 371/7898

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 262

Extract from the "Hrvatika Sloga" (anti-Government Organ of the Croatian Peasant Party) of Sept. 15th, 1922

Kemal Pasha's Aims

The Turkish question is now of even greater importance for England than for Greece. For the English the question of the Straits is a vital matter. If they retire from the Dardanelles their prestige will be diminished; if they remain, there will be a new war, which will jeopardise their Asiatic colonies. An understanding with Kemal is their only hope. They have within the past few days had a practical warning of what will happen, if they fail to reach that understanding—an invasion of Mesopotamia. The initial attack compelled them to retire fifty kilometers and Baghdad was in danger. They have pleaded that the forces which attacked them do not belong to the Angora Government, but their statement is obviously false. For how could mere Irregulars have forced back modern troops before them? But it does not matter who the instigators of the incursion were. The significant fact is that the onslaught seems to have been very serious and dangerous.

F.O. 371/7898

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 262

Extract from the "Jugoslavenki List" (pro-Government Organ) of Sept. 15th, 1922

The Failure of European Diplomacy.

European, especially British, diplomacy, has suffered a serious set-back in consequence of the last Turkish victory, which has proved once more that the

future of nations cannot be settled round a green table. A miracle has taken place. The sick man of the Bosphorus is reviving. Once and for all the Turkish question must be dealt with on the basis of law and justice. There is a parallel between the Congress of Antwerp and the Treaty of Sévres. The former was convoked by the Younger Pitt to decide on the measures to be taken by the interested Powers for the purpose of stifling the French Revolution. It discussed the partition of French territory between the States concerned, but failed to reach any definite conclusions, and only succeeded in kindling the national spirit in France, thus paving the way to the defeat of the Coalition and to the Napoleonic supremacy. The recent policy of the Powers in respect of Turkey has much in common with this. It has stirred up the Asiatic wasps' nest, and, instead of helping the Turks out of their difficulties, it was provoked an upheaval of the Moslem world. Since the days of the Crusades Europe has never left Turkey in peace. The Crusades forced the Moslems to draw the sword and led to the Turkish invasions of Europe. Latterly it was the aim of European policy to confine the Turk to Asia. But the national spirit of the apparently expiring Turkish Empire rallied, inspired by the conception of a union of the whole Turanian race. This is a consummation dreaded by England, who sees in it the end of her hegemony in Asia. And time is working for the Turks. Against the Turkish national revival the English backed the Greek, believing that a new Byzantium would protect them against Russia on the one hand and against Turkey on the other.

F.O. 371/7898

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 262

Extract from the "İrİad" (Organ of Dr. Maglajic's pro-Government Turkish Party) of Sept. 14th, 1922

Complete Defeat of the Greeks

The brave Turkish army has inflicted a shameful defeat on the Anglo-Greek expedition in Asia Minor. Its ignominious end is a humiliating blow for Greece and her secret Ally, England. The event has proved that the Greeks of to-day are true scions of those who ran before the Turks in 1898. The huge quantities of war material which has been captured by the Ottoman army certainly did not come from Greece. Four-fifths of it are of British origin.

Congratulatory telegrams have been received by the Angora Government from all Moslem States—Persia, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkestan,—to say nothing of the Soviet Government. The French Ambassador (it is not stated from where) too has sent a gratifying letter. A particularly large number of messages have been sent from Moslem regions under British rule—India, Egypt,

Mesopotamia, Arabia, and Palestine. In some of these messages there is an appeal for deliverance. It is expected that the victorious army will shortly emancipate them.

Jelaleddin Bey, chief of the Angora Mission in Rome, has told the Editor of the "Giornale d'Italia" that the Greeks met with some success last year, because they were opposed by only a few thousands of Volunteers. Since January, 1921, a regular Turkish army, has, he stated, been formed, which now has a strength of 330,000 men.

Ferid Bey, representative of the Angora Government in Paris, has made it known that the atrocities alleged to have been committed by the Turks were inventions of the English, who angrily cast aspersions on them, because they foresee the failure of their Eastern policy in consequence of the Ottoman successes.

F.O. 371/7898

ENCLOSURE 4 IN No. 262

Extract from the "Iriad" (organ of Dr. Maglajic's pro-Government Moslem Party) of Sept. 16th. (1922)

If all the signs mean anything, trouble is brewing for the proud Englishman. The utter rout of the Greeks has baulked the far-reaching designs of the English, who equipped them and sent them to Asia Minor for their own purposes. Everyone will remember the shifty policy followed by England during the negotiations with Turkey. Whilst France and Italy adopted a firm and straightforward attitude, England played a double game. Whilst encouraging a belief that she was well-disposed towards the Turks, she was really doing her utmost to sweep them from the face of the earth. The French and Italians were quite willing to accept all the provisions of the understanding reached at Mudros in 1918, but Mr. Lloyd-George entered into negotiations with Venizelos, weighing the advantages of a "Greater Greece" incorporating part of Asia Minor including Konia. Hence the Greek landing in Asia Minor on May 15th, 1919, was a surprise for the rest of Europe. Indeed, France and Italy were highly incensed at this development and made no secret of their displeasure at the London Conference of February, 1921. France next entered into negotiations with Kemal Pasha and restored Cilicia to Turkey. Italy simultaneously concluded an agreement with Bekir Sami Bey, the representative of the Angora Government, and evacuated Adalia and the Meander Valley. An economic understanding was also established between Turkey and Italy, the latter promising to support the Turkish claim for the restitution of Ismid and Thrace. All this did not deter the English, however, from continuing to uphold the Greeks in the hope of a final Turkish collapse. Consequently the discord between France and England became more and more marked, especially after the Franklin-Bouillon pact of August 20th, (sic) which

was interpreted by the British Government as an infringement of the Treaty of Sèvres. One of the sinister results of this aggressive British policy towards Turkey is to be seen in the fierce struggle now in course in India between the inhabitants and their tormentors. Bloody riots have taken place in Calcutta with heavy casualties. It is a cause of more special anxiety to the English that the Hindus are for the first time making common cause with the Moslem. In Bombay similar disturbances have taken place, and the local Chief of Police has been compelled to resign. A revolt has broken out too in Madras, where the hill tribes are openly defying the British Authorities. In the Province of Madras one of the leaders of the movement, Mehmet Ali, has been arrested and imprisoned. A few days ago his mother addressed a meeting at Lahore in the following terms.

"The English may arrest, torture, or kill you, but they cannot stifle in you the love of your country. Three hundred and thirty millions cannot be destroyed by four-hundred thousand tyrants. You must collect all your forces, throw off the British yoke, and free India."

Much the same thing is happening in other parts of the British Empire. In Mesopotamia the situation has become so critical that the Government has decided to evacuate the country. The situation in the British Dependencies is dangerous from without as well as from within. Clouds are gathering on their outskirts. The ruler of Turkestan, Enver Pasha, is forming against England a coalition of Moslem States including Persia, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Baluchistan, Khiva, and Bokhara. Already an Afghan concentration is reported on the Indian frontier. For the past hundred years England has been digging a grave for Turkey. She is likely to fall into it herself.

F.O. 371/7898

ENCLOSURE 5 IN No. 262

Extract from the "Nâla Prazda" (organ of Dr. Şahin's anti Government Moslem Party) of Sept. 16th (1922)

The great Moslem Victory

Kemal Pasha has solved a question which was too much for all the diplomacy of Europe. He has confronted the Greeks and their secret allies with a "fait accompli" and is now dictating terms of which neither Hellas nor Mr. Lloyd George, the bloody enemy of the Moslem world, ever dreamt. They have to bow their heads before the great liberator of Turkey.

F.O. 371/7898

No. 263

Admiralty to the Foreign Office

ADMIRALTY, 26th September, 1922

(Received September 27)

M. 01285 Immediate

Sir,

I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter of 16th September from the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, enclosing copy of his letter of 14th September to the High Commissioner Constantinople relative to correspondence with Mustapha Kemal Pasha regarding his attitude to Great Britain and the letter (in original) dated 13th September that the Commander-in-Chief received from Mustapha Kemal Pasha. The latter is forwarded herewith in original in view of its diplomatic interest.

I am, etc.

(Signature)

F.O. 371/7895/E. 9978

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 263

Admiral O. de B. Brock to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty

16th September 1922

No. 1991/742.

Grand National Assembly Angora—political relationship with Great Britain

Mediterranean, Telegram No: 315 of 13th September, 1922

Enclosures

Copy of letter No. 742 of 14th September from Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to British High Commissioner, Constantinople.

Letter dated 13. 9. 22. from Mustapha Kemal Pasha to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean (original text).

Forwarded for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

(sd) O. de B. BROCK

*Admiral**Commander-in-Chief*

F.O. 371/7895/E. 9978

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 263

Admiral O. de B. Brock to the British High Commissioner, Constantinople
(See No. 179)

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 263

S. F. Moustapha Kémal Pacha à M. l'Amiral de B. Brock
(See Enclosure in No. 179)

No. 264

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 26th, 1922, 1.15 p. m.

No. 325. *Telegraphic*

Urgent

Private and Secret.

Your telegram Private and Secret of September 25th.

I am quite willing to agree to suggestion made by Nihad Rechad, that he should come to London.

On the other hand I am very doubtful if it is desirable to send anybody either from Constantinople, or from here, to see Mustapha Kemal at the present juncture.

F.O. 371/7894/E. 9914

No. 265

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, 26th September 1922, 2 p.m.
(Received September 26, 5.15 p. m.)

No. 481. *Telegraphic*

Your telegram No. 325.

I have been in touch by telephone with President of the Council who is at his country place till to-morrow night. He promises to send immediate instructions to General Pellé and Admiral Dumesnil to do their utmost with Mustapha Kemal to obtain withdrawal of Turkish troops and to prevent any untoward incident in neutral zone.

He wishes me at the same time to impress upon Your Lordship views which he has already expressed to you recently that maintenance of troops on Asiatic shore was not in reality worth risk and danger that it entails to European peace. So long as troops were there situation was not safe from irresponsible action not on the part of Mustapha Kemal's regular but of his irregular troops and that he hoped that His Majesty's Government would yet take steps to remove this danger.

As an indication of improvement in situation at Constantinople I learned at Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Hamid Bey has informed General Pellé that he has received orders from Mustapha Kemal to prevent any rising or incident in Constantinople.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 481 repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/7894/E. 9965

F.O. 424/254, p. 353, No. 629

D.B.F.P. I. XVIII, p. 100, No. 57

No. 266

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, September 26, 1922

(Received September 26.)

No. 482 Telegraphic

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Now that solidarity has been re-established between us and our allies, I think it permissible to hold a different view from that held the other day at opening of conference as to importance of retaining our troops at Chanak. There is force in Poincaré's argument that peace of Europe is exposed to danger by irresponsible action on the part of Turkish troops, whether regular or irregular, and it seems to me that such danger might be averted by agreement between General Harington and Mustapha Kemal that neutral zone should not be occupied by either British or Turkish troops. If an agreement were come to it would be easy to ascertain whether it was being observed by air reconnaissance.

F.O. 424/254, p. 353, No. 630

D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, pp. 100-101, No. 58

No. 267

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, September 26, 1922

(Received September 26.)

No. 483. *Telegraphic.*

I HAVE just been informed from Quai d'Orsay that, in accordance with M. Poincaré's instructions, General Pellé has seen Hamid Bey and the latter has sent urgent message to Mustapha Kemal to withdraw Turkish troops which had penetrated within neutral zone. He anticipates no difficulties, since he says that Mustapha Kemal is anxious to avoid incidents.

The Angora agent was called this morning to Quai d'Orsay and urged to send a message to Mustapha Kemal in a similar sense. He promised to do so, but remarked that what is preoccupying Turks and causing them to continue their concentration of troops is the news that they received of the stream of British reinforcements going out to the Near East. He was told that it was not likely that this would cease until Mustapha Kemal had accepted the invitation to the conference.

Would it not be possible to give less publicity to such movements? The French papers are full of them.

F.O. 424/254, p. 353, No. 631

No. 268

*General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office**Not Paraphrased**Most Secret**Clear the Line.**Despatched 1530 26/9/22**Received 1530 26/9/22*

2463 cipher 26/9/22.

From Hamid Bey, Constantinople, to Mustapha Kemal, Smyrna, September 25th Begins.

General Pellé was called on to-day by his Adviser to British Embassy, who stated 2000 Turkish cavalry had occupied Erenkeui and that if they were not withdrawn to-morrow Turkish O.C. would be handed an ultimatum and sufficient time to refer to his Chief for a reply. That England did not wish for trouble; but she would be forced to oppose. He asked Pellé to see me and Pellé

begged me as a friend to submit to your Excellency that as British want peace no cause for trouble should be given at this juncture.

F.O. 371/7896

No. 269

G.H.Q., Constantinople, to War Office

Most Secret

Not Paraphrased.

Despatched 1700 26.9.22

Received 1000 27.9.22

2464 cipher 26/9.

Aralov, Angora, to Moscow, September 25th (Begins) (1st 70 groups missed)* informed by Riza Nur Bey of secret decision to occupy neutral zone. In opposition to this are Ali Fuad, Raouf Bey and Yussuf Kemal who is hesitating. These 3 have left for Mustapha Kemal's Headquarters. Our friends have wired Mustapha Kemal not to be influenced by them. During Yussuf's absence Riza is acting for him.

F.O. 371/7896

No. 270

Minutes by Mr. Harold Nicolson, Foreign Office

Mr Breakwell of the Imperial Ottoman Bank came here this evening with a message from his Chief Mr. Barry. The latter had just returned from a meeting of his directors in Paris, and had found all the French directors anxious to furnish Kemal with an immediate loan. Mr. Barry had not committed the British directors one way or the other, but would sooner or later have to come to a decision. He did not wish to offend the Turks since the concession for the Bank as at present constituted expires in 1925, and Mr. Barry fears that strong pressure will be put on the Turks by the French to eliminate all British participation when the concession is renewed. On the other hands he does not wish to be run entirely by his French Directors or to assent to Kemal having an immediate loan, if such a loan would be unwelcome to H.M.G. He asked for some indication of our attitude. I promised to enquire.

I gather that the Treasury are considering some scheme of substituting for the present financial clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres a mutual arrangement under which we are to encourage private loans to Turkey on the condition that our financial claims on Turkey are a first charge on such loans. This scheme is at present only embryonic, but it is obvious that any immediate and unconditional loan to Kemal by the Ottoman Bank would upset the whole scheme.

* Occurs in original.

I submit therefore that Mr. Barry should be told orally, that (from that political aspect of the question we have no objection one way or the other) as the provision of such a loan might seriously weaken us in negotiating a revised financial chapter of the Treaty, it would be as well if he were also to consult the Treasury (Mr. Waley) before reaching a decision.

(Signed) HAROLD NICOLSON

27.9.22

Yes and inform Lord Hardinge, for his own information.

L. Oliphant 27 Sept.

F.O. 371/7943/E. 10139

I agree

R.C.L. Sep. 12 C. 27/9

No. 271

Minutes of a Committee of British Ministers held in Mr Churchill's Room, Colonial Office.

Present.

The Rt. Hon. A. Chamberlain, M. P.,

Lord Privy Seal. (in the Chair)

The Most Hon. The Marquess Curzon of
Kedleston K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Rt. Hon. W. S. Churchill, M. P.,
Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Rt. Hon. Sir L. Worthington-Evans,
Bart., G.B.E., M.P., Secretary of
State for War.

The Rt. Hon. the Lord Lee of
Fareham, G.B.F., K.C.B.,
First Lord of the Admiralty.

The following were also present—

Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty,
G.C.B., G.C.V.O., D.S.O.,
First Sea Lord and Chief of the
Naval Staff.

General the Earl of Cavan, K.P.,
G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B.,
Chief of the Imperial General
Staff.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh M
Trenchard, Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

Air Commodore J. M. Steel, C.B.,
C.I.I.G., Director of Operations
and Intelligence, Air Ministry.

Li-Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankley G.C.B. Secretary, Cabinet.

Li-Col. Sir John Chancellor, K.C.I.I.G., Principal Assistant Secretary, C.I.D.

MILITARY SITUATION IN NEAR EAST

MR. CHAMBERLAIN stated that the meeting had been summoned in order to endeavour to elucidate certain naval and military aspects of the situation before having a full meeting of Ministers at 7 p.m.

MR. CHURCHILL read Telegram No. 466 from the High Commissioner, and SIR LAMING WORTHINGTON EVANS read a Telegram No. 2479 from General Harington in which it is reported that he is now in touch with Kemal Pasha.

MR. CHURCHILL asked the C.I.G.S. what his views were as to the situation which would arise if hostilities began, in particular how long our troops could hold Chanak before the arrival of reinforcements.

THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF read Telegrams Nos. 2469 and 2468 which he had received from General Harington. He was of opinion that the position which was held at Chanak with a perimeter of four miles would not give sufficient room for the landing and deployment of a large force there. He was also doubtful if the transports could reach Chanak if hostilities had begun. As soon as mobilisation was ordered, he was certain that Kemal would at once attack the Chanak position. He did not believe that he could turn our forces out of Chanak which could hold their own without reinforcements for three or four weeks, but there was nothing to prevent Kemal from bringing up guns to positions on the shore of the Dardanelles from which they could fire up and down the Narrows. That fire would prevent transports from disembarking troops in the Dardanelles. The reinforcements would therefore have to be landed on the North Side of the Gallipoli Peninsula and move across to Chanak. This would entail a very difficult operation and heavy losses would probably be incurred in transferring troops across the Dardanelles. An alternative plan was to divert the two divisions of reinforcements and land them at some place which must be kept secret as a counter offensive. He understood that it would be difficult for His Majesty's Government to order the evacuation of the Chanak position, but it was for consideration whether a force of one battalion would not be as effective as the force that we now in Chanak. If, as appeared probable, Kemal was unable to prevent his irregular troops from harassing our troops in Chanak, he could not prevent them from lining the shores of the Dardanelles with guns. It must be realised that if we do withdraw from Constantinople and Chanak that we have not sufficient forces to enable us to go back. If it is considered probable that Kemal would loyally observe an undertaking for the withdrawal of British and Turkish troops alike from the neutral zone, such an agreement would be to our advantage. If it were decided to evacuate Chanak now we might claim that our action was a "beau geste", and explain that our object was to avoid the risk of a collision in view of the fact that Kemal cannot control his irregular troops in that locality.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN observed that the proposals for withdrawal were based on purely military considerations, and he was of the opinion that we could not now withdraw from Chanak with credit to ourselves in order to avoid Kemal's irregulars. He would regard such a withdrawal as an humiliation to the British Empire.

MR. CHURCHILL concurred in Mr. Chamberlain's view, and added that, if it were possible to ensure the immunity of the Neutral Zone by withdrawing from Chanak, we should accept such an arrangement at once, but he considered it to the last degree improbable that Kemal would consent to sacrifice the advantages he now had of access to the shores of the Dardanelles without firing a shot.

LORD CURZON remarked that in Paris last week M. Poincaré had urged that we should consent to withdraw from Chanak and had expressed an opinion that Kemal would come to an agreement on the subject. The situation had changed since then.

LORD CURZON remarked that in Paris last week M. Poincaré had urged that we should consent to withdraw from Chanak and had expressed an opinion that Kemal would come to an agreement on the subject. The situation had changed since then.

In reply to enquiries from Mr. Churchill as to the military position at Chanak, the CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF stated that, if fighting occurred at Chanak within the next 48 hours, Kemal would probably be able to bring artillery against the position in about four days time. There were now 3,500 British troops at Chanak. Reinforcements are due to arrive as follows—

- 2 Pack Batteries from Egypt due on the 28th.
- 6" Howitzer Battery from Gibraltar due on the 30th.
- 1,000 Marines and a Signal Detachment due on the 30th.
- 1 Battalion is due to arrive on the 3rd October.
- 3 Battalions leave on the 28th and are due on 9th October.

The Turks are reported to have 7 Infantry and 4 Cavalry Divisions in that locality, a force of 23,000 rifles and sabres.

MR. CHURCHILL expressed the opinion that General Harington's last telegram was different in tone from his previous ones. Up to now, he had been confident that he could maintain himself at Chanak for four weeks without difficulty.

THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF explained that there was no change in General Harington's view in regard to that matter, but he asked to be assured as to the reinforcements that would be sent if hostilities broke out.

THE FIRST SEA LORD stated that the facts put forward by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff would add to the difficulties of the navy. He was of opinion

that immediate withdrawal should be avoided if possible, as it would involve considerable loss of prestige. He considered that the navy could assist in the debarkation of reinforcements at Chanak with the support of howitzers mounted on the Gallipoli Peninsula. He thought that the guns that might be mounted in the shores near Chanak as suggested by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff could be controlled by the fire of the Navy and the howitzers on the Gallipoli Peninsula. If Chanak fell, the Navy could keep open the passage of the Straits for warships. There need be no anxiety as to the withdrawal of the military forces from Constantinople and Chanak. He had instructed the Naval Commander-in-Chief to take all measures necessary to ensure their safe withdrawal in case of need and he had no doubt carried out his instructions. His observations did not qualify in any way the Chief of the Imperial General Staff's view as to the difficulties of deploying a large force in the small position at Chanak where they would be landed on a beach overlooked by hills commanding the position.

MR. CHURCHILL remarked that it clearly emerged that the forces at Chanak could hold out until reinforcements arrived, and that the Navy could ensure the withdrawal of troops now there or that reinforcements can reach them if necessary, but the difficulties of the operation are greatly increased by the new considerations which had been put forward. It was desirable not to exaggerate the power of Kemal's artillery. It was true that he had some 8" and 6" field guns, but his supply of ammunition was probably limited and the difficulty of transporting the ammunition across broken country to the shores of the Dardanelles must be very great. If necessary, reinforcements could be landed at Bulair, marched along the Gallipoli Peninsula to opposite Chanak and ferried across to Chanak. There should be therefore no difficulty in getting reinforcements to Chanak if it is desirable to do so. He enquired if it is certain that General Harington could not hold the two high hills commanding the Chanak position. He suggested that if General Harington knew that reinforcements would be sent to him that he might be prepared to do so. He suggested that that question should be put to General Harington and that he should be told that he might move troops from Constantinople to Chanak for that purpose if he thought it necessary. He enquired if it would be more humiliating for us to evacuate Chanak now or to repulse the Turkish attack and if need be withdraw pending the arrival of reinforcements. He enquired, assuming a serious collision takes place on 1st October, and orders were given to mobilise, what interval would elapse before the reinforcements began to arrive.

THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF read an appreciation of the situation prepared by the General Staff on the assumption that our troops in the Chanak position are attacked on the 30th September and that the attack was repulsed and that orders for mobilisation were given on the 2nd October. He explained that reinforcements would arrive as follows:—

By the 7th October, 5 more Battalions.

By the 15th October, 2 Pack Batteries and one Battery of 6" Howitzers.

After that there would be a gap until the 23rd October when the mobilised troops would begin to arrive. The whole of the infantry of the 1st Division would have arrived by the 30th October and the whole Division by the 3rd November. The infantry of the 2nd Division would have arrived by the 3rd November and the complete Division by the 7th November. It was proposed to expand the position at Chanak as reinforcements arrived.

MR CHAMBERLAIN requested that the Naval, Military and Air Chiefs would consider the Naval, Military and Air aspects of the situation as now disclosed in readiness for a meeting of the Cabinet at 7 p.m.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff was authorised to consult General Harington as to whether it would not be possible to hold the two high hills commanding the position at Chanak.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,

27th September, 1922.

F.O. 371/7896/E. 10223

No. 272

Minutes of a Conference of the British Ministers held at 10, Downing Street, S. W. 1., on Wednesday, 27th September, 1922, at 7 p. m.

Secret

Present

The Prime Minister (In the Chair)

The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain,
M. P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. The Viscount
Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.

The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne,
G.B.E., K.C., M.P., Chancellor of
the Exchequer.

The Most Hon. The Marquess Curzon
of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I.,
G.C.L.E., Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill,
M. P. Secretary of State for
the Colonies.

The Right Hon. Sir L. Worthington-
Evans, Bart., G.B.E., M.P., Secretary
of State for War.

The Right Hon. The Lord Lee of
Fareham, G.B.E., K.C.B., First
Lord of the Admiralty.

The following were also present—

Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff.	General The Earl of Cavan, K.P., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
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Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh M. Trenchard, Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff.	Sir Edward Grigg, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.
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Lieut. Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B.	Secretary, Cabinet.
Mr. R.B. Howorth	Assistant Secretary, Cabinet.

The Situation in the Near East
The position at Chanak and Constantinople

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL informed the Committee that that afternoon he had been present at a meeting of Ministers at the Colonial Office at which the Lord Chancellor, the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff had also been present. This meeting had had before them General Harington's telegram No. 2468/2469 (C.P. 4334) (his personal telegram to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff) and also telegram 2459 and 2477. In addition there was a telegram from Sir H. Rumbold No. 466 indicating that the reply of Mustapha Kemal was unsatisfactory, and General Harington's telegram No., stating that he was in touch with Mustapha Kemal. Lord Cavan had informed the meeting that the position held at Chanak by the British forces had a perimeter of four miles only and was so situated as to give no elbow room for deploying reinforcements as and when the latter arrived. Moreover, it was uncertain whether it would be safe to land the reinforcements at Chanak in face of Turkish opposition, and it might be found necessary to land the troops on the North shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula, or outside Gallipoli altogether. There was no doubt however that a landing at Chanak itself in force presented very considerable difficulties. The British forces could hold out at Chanak for three or four weeks and it was held by Lord Beatty that the troops could be reinforced, evacuated or relieved at the expiration of that time, but undoubtedly the position was a very cramped one and from the military point of view it would be difficult to hold if the Kemalists forces occupied certain high ground in the immediate neighbourhood of Chanak.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL continuing, said that Lord Beatty would deplore a British withdrawal from Chanak as this would make the Naval work in the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora very much more difficult. The Navy could

assure the landing of reinforcements at Chanak though no doubt some losses would be incurred. Lord Beatty had added that the artillery fire of the Turks on the high ground could be kept down by British artillery reinforced by Naval fire. On hearing this view Lord Cavan had said that the troops at Chanak would be in a hollow commanded by surrounding high ground, and that it would be very difficult to deploy the reinforcements so as to drive the Turks out of the commanding positions. As there appeared to be a divergence of views between the Military and Naval Staffs, the Lord Privy Seal had requested Lord Beatty, Lord Cavan and Sir Hugh Trenchard to consult together and report to the present meeting on the questions at issue. The British troops at Chanak numbered 5,500 sabres and bayonets, two pack batteries would arrive to-morrow (September 28th), one 6" Howitzer Battery and 1,000 Marines would arrive next Saturday; a Battalion would arrive on the 3rd October, and three other Battalions on the 9th October. The Turks were reported to have 23,000 rifles and sabres in the neighbourhood. A telegram had been dispatched to General Harington asking him whether the hills in the neighbourhood of Chanak had been in fact occupied by the British, and if not, whether it would not be possible for him to occupy them now.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY pointed out that effective air reinforcements had arrived. The "Argus" and the "Pegasus" were on the spot and 15 aeroplanes at least were available.

THE PRIME MINISTER did not consider that Mustapha Kemal's telegram was very disconcerting. It seemed to him the complaints in it were mainly directed towards the Greeks. No doubt he was very bitter against the British, and certain of the statements made by him such as, that the British had fired upon Nationalist Forces, were obvious mis-statements. He was not so much disturbed at the idea that the Chanak position was commanded by the neighbouring hills, and in this connection he instanced our experiences in France and Gallipoli where we had often had to hold positions commanded by the enemy on neighbouring high ground.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR assured the Committee that there was abundance of ammunition available on the spot or on the way for the British.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies Alternative Plan.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES said that he was very uncomfortable at the restricted position held at Chanak. It was only on receipt of General Harington's telegram No. 2415 that he had realised for the first time that the perimeter of this position was only four miles. He then read some notes which he had drafted of a purely tentative character as a basis of discussion the general tenor of which was as follows—The British Government had never taken up the

position that Chanak was to be held at all costs. What had been decided upon was that Gallipoli was of prime importance, then Chanak as an outpost of Gallipoli, then Constantinople, and lastly the Ismid Peninsula.

F.O. 371/7896/E. 10224

No. 273

General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office

Despatched 1230 27.9.22

Received 0400 27.9.22

Paraphrase

Clear the line.

2468 cipher 26/9.

Part I. I again interviewed Hamid Bey to-day and got him to wire direct to Mustapha Kemal requesting that Turkish cavalry should be withdrawn from Lapsaki and Erenkeui and I wired personally to Mustapha also. Every effort is being made by me to get them out without force. We cannot allow them to remain or they will bring up guns and be dangerous to fleet. An ultimatum has been issued by Colonel Shuttleworth that he will be obliged to use force at 0700 to-morrow but this I have cancelled. General Marden, who knows my desire to avoid conflict has been sent off to-day to investigate on spot and report. I shall give Mustapha (Kemal) 48 hours to reply and withdraw his troops. It will show that forces are moving up behind if he does not withdraw his troops.

Part II. He can produce 7 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions (total 23,000 sabres and rifles) Balikesri and Giunen-Panderma areas for an attack on Chanak. I can offer a stout resistance, and by evacuating Constantinople which I should have to do, could obtain a reserve brigade. Allies have agreed together to defend the Straits—British in fact, others on paper. I presume policy remains same that I am at all costs to hold Gallipoli and Chanak. If I do this, would other divisions be sent me? Before I become seriously engaged I must know this as I should have to make preparations to hang on some 35 days. I should have to judge moment to evacuate if I am not to be reinforced. I can do whatever you wish. My own personal opinion is that Mustapha will not attack seriously. He is trying to force me into firing the first shot. I am trying to avoid this but he cannot be allowed to put a net round us and put guns on Straits.

F.O. 371/7896/E. 10191

No. 274

General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office

27.9.22

Clear the line

1221 27th September, 1922.

Following is the telegram I sent yesterday to Mustapha Kemal Pasha. Begins. I have asked Hamid to communicate with you immediately to effect withdrawal of your cavalry from Erenkeuy and from west of Bigha. I am most anxious to avoid incidents and request that pending negotiations you will withdraw troops outside neutral zone. Ends. For Mustafa Kemal Pasha's reply please see my immediately following telegram.

F.O. 371/7896/E. 10914

No. 275

General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office

27.9.22

Clear the line

No. 1222 27th September, 1922.

Following is translation of reply received to-day to my telegram of 26th to Mustapha Kemal. Begins. Up to the present I have not been informed of any neutral zone having been established between the Governments concerned and the Government of the Grand National Assembly. The movements of our Cavalry and other units consist in following up the retreat of the hostile Greek Army. Your Excellency is aware that Anatolia has been completely devastated and burnt and that hundreds of thousands of the population have been left homeless by the Greek Army. This Army is on the one hand continuing to perpetrate the same atrocities in Thrace while on the other hand it is profiting by each days delay to reorganize itself. I would further point out (to quote the most recent example of the exemption of the Greek military forces from the conditions of the neutral zone) that Greek aeroplanes at noon on 23rd September carried out warlike operations over Turkish territory in the neighbourhood of Ezine and that even so recently as the 25th September the Greek fleet anchored in the port of Constantinople. Our efforts to avoid the occurrence of incidents have been genuine and sincere. We find great difficulty however in understanding the reasons for such actions as the destruction carried out by the British troops stationed at Chanak on our territory between Chanak and Eren Keuy, the seizure of buildings in the neighbourhood of our town of Chanak, the destruction of arms and stores belonging to us, the firing of guns

and bombs in proximity to our troops and finally the construction of defences by forced Moslem labour on the road separating us from the Greek Army. I take this opportunity of informing you that the observance of the freedom of the Straits has always been admitted by us and I request Your Excellency to take steps to prevent the occurrence of any misunderstanding prior to the assembly of the coming conference which we sincerely hope will lead to permanent results. Signed. Mustapha Kemal. Ends. For my reply please see my immediately following telegram.

F.O. 371/7896/E 10195

No. 276

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 27, 1922

(Received September 27.)

No. 466. Telegraphic. R.

Very urgent

My telegram No. 461.

At a meeting of Allied High Commissioners and generals this morning General Harington communicated reply of Mustapha Kemal to his telegram demanding withdrawal of Turkish cavalry from Erenkeuy. Another Turkish force has meanwhile entered neutral zone from the direction of Bigha. Mustapha Kemal's reply is thoroughly unsatisfactory. He denies any knowledge of neutral zone, and says that the sole object of his troops is the pursuit of beaten Greek army. He alludes to activity of Greek aeroplanes near Ezine and to the presence of Greek men-of-war at Constantinople on 25th September as proofs that Greek forces are not respecting neutrality of any zone. He says that Nationalists are most sincere in their desire to avoid regrettable incidents, but that they have difficulty in understanding certain measures taken by British forces in Chanak area. He says that British artillery has fired upon and dropped bombs in neighbourhood of Nationalist troops. He repeats solemn declaration of Turkish Nationalists with regard to freedom of the Straits, and finally asks General Harington "to contribute to making of such a situation as will permit of no misunderstanding."

My Allied colleagues and Allied generals accepted my proposal that General Harington should reply in detail to Mustapha Kemal refuting all his arguments and stating that Greek men-of-war have left Constantinople. Reply is being drafted now and will be considered at a further meeting of Allied High Commissioners and generals this afternoon.

I am convinced that if General Harington could get into personal touch with Mustapha Kemal much good would result from such a meeting.

F.O. 424/254, p. 365, No. 651

D.B.F.P., I, XVIII, p. 104, No. 62

No. 277

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 27, 1922

(Received September 27.)

No. 468. Confidential.

Telegraphic. D.

Very urgent

FRENCH High Commissioner told me to-day that telegram sent by Allied Governments from Paris had produced a *détente* in the situation. Mustapha Kemal's delay in replying to this note might be due to a telegram sent by Franklin-Bouillon from Paris before his departure advising Mustapha Kemal to do nothing until his arrival at Smyrna. Mustapha Kemal may have interpreted this to mean that he was to await Franklin-Bouillon's arrival before answering Allied note. French High Commissioner sent a strong telegram to his Government, saying that either Franklin-Bouillon was going to Smyrna to assure Mustapha Kemal of the goodwill of the French Government, in which case his mission was superfluous, or else that he was bringing with him promise of further concessions. In that case, French High Commissioner wished to know what these were, and French Government replied that Franklin-Bouillon had no authority to offer any additional concession.

F.O. 424/254, p. 366, No. 653

D.B.E.P., I, XVIII, pp. 105-106, No. 64

No. 278

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 27, 1922

(Received September 27.)

No. 469. Telegraphic.

MEETING was held this morning to discuss question of instructions to be given to Allied generals in connection with their proposed meeting with Mustapha Kemal at Mudania or Ismid, to fix line behind which Greek forces must retire previous to meeting of conference.

In opinion of Allied generals only practical solution would be retirement behind Maritza line, East Thrace thereby becoming special zone in which some Turkish administration would have to be immediately instituted.

Allied High Commissioners concurred in this view and decided to request their Governments to furnish them with instructions as to character of that administration and authority from which it should derive, *i.e.*, Angora or Central Government. It was agreed that administration would, of course, only be provisional for, say, two months, and that order should be maintained if possible by local recruitment of gendarmerie with nucleus of Allied officers.

Allied High Commissioners also decided to request Allied Governments to lay down definitely what powers and terms of reference should be given to Allied generals for purpose of meeting. Would, for instance, generals have full powers to settle nature of that administration at meeting?

French High Commissioner observed that any discussion of cessation of hostilities would necessarily include request to Kemalists to stop further advance of their troops in direction of neutral zone, and pointed out that such a demand would provoke corresponding demand from Mustapha Kemal. Allied High Commissioners would also be glad to know what arrangements have been made for presence of fully authorised Greek military representative at meeting.

(Repeated to Athens. No. 146.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 366, No. 654

No. 279

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, September 27, 1922

(Received September 27.)

No. 496. *Telegraphic, R.*

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 465.

You will have seen from my telegrams of yesterday that Greek Government no longer control movements of transports or men-of-war. I appreciate argument of Sir H. Rumbold, though it would seem that if it suits Kemalists to attack us they will always find or invent excuse. Revolutionary movement has for its main object reinforcement of Thracian front, and I am somewhat uneasy at effect which will be produced on excited population here when it is known that we are preventing that front being reinforced, although Kemal has not yet answered Allied invitation. It must also be remembered that no one here expects Kemal to accept invitation as it stands. Neither he nor Bolsheviks are believed to desire peace either in principle or practice.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 364, No. 649

No. 280

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 28, 1922

*(Received September 28.)**No. 480, Telegraphic. D.**Telegraphic. D.*

THE position of affairs at Chanak is as follows:

General Marden, who has gone down there, reports that situation is impossible, as Turks have entirely disregarded neutral zone round Chanak and are collecting in considerable numbers close to British defences.

Turks are evidently acting under clear orders, and it is evident from Mustapha Kemal's accurate information about demolitions in Chanak area that Turkish force is not out of touch with its general headquarters. British military authorities at Chanak have pushed restraint to the utmost possible limit.

I at once informed French High Commissioner of above. He promised to send a wireless to Franklin-Bouillon who was due at Smyrna this morning, pointing out that danger-point at the moment was Erenkeuy, and that his first care should be to get Mustapha Kemal to give necessary orders to withdraw his troops from proximity of Chanak zone and also to get Mustapha Kemal to meet General Harington at Mudania.

French High Commissioner then read an account by Admiral Dumesnil of latest interview with Mustapha Kemal. Essential part of this account was that Mustapha Kemal had given his sincere assurance that he wished to avoid a conflict at Erenkeuy and that he had, whilst at the moment unable to withdraw his detachments, given formal orders that no aggression should be made against British troops. Mustapha Kemal also asked that, if British force was not withdrawn from Chanak, similar orders should be given to it.

I have informed General Harington of foregoing. Situation evidently contemplated by Mustapha Kemal is that British and Turks should watch each other whilst Turkish forces are piling up until Mustapha Kemal thinks that he is strong enough to attack.

Admiral Brock informs me he has given orders that Turkish craft should be cleared from Asiatic shore of Dardanelles.

*F.O. 424/254, pp. 375, No. 680**D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, pp. 109-110, No. 68*

No. 281

Conclusion of a Conference of British Ministers held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Thursday, 28th September 1922 at 11 a.m.

Present:—

THE PRIME MINISTER (in the Chair)

The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. Lord Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.

The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne, G.B.E., K.C., M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Most Hon. the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W.S. Churchill, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. Sir L. Worthington Evans, Bart., G.B.E., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. the Lord Lee of Foreham, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Following Were Also Present:—

General The Earl of Cavan, K.P., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Beatty, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., First Sea Lord & Chief of the Naval Staff.

Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, Bart., K.C.B., D.S.C., Chief of the Air Staff.

Sir Edward Grigg, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.,

Lieut.-Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B., Secretary, Cabinet.

Lieut.-Col. Sir John Chancellor, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Principal Assistant Secretary, C.I.D.

Refugees at Smyrna

1. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that it was desirable that we should secure the evacuation of the refugees at Smyrna before September 30th. If, as was stated in that morning's newspapers, the number left was only about 15,000, it should be possible to do this. It was important to consider what would happen to these refugees on their arrival in Greece. Mr Lindley had suggested that an Inter-Allied Commission should be set up at Athens to arrange for the relief of the refugees, and that this might be done through the League of Nations.

It was agreed:—

That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should telegraph to Lord Balfour, asking him to invite the League of Nations to set up machinery to deal with the relief of the refugees in Greece.

The Crisis in the Near East. Greek Representation at the Mudania Conference

2. The attention of the Conference was drawn to the fact that the invitation to Mustapha Kemal to the Conference agreed to in Paris on September 24th, provided that the line behind which the Greek troops were to retire should be fixed by the Allied Generals in a accord with the Greek and Turkish Military Authorities. No action, it was pointed out, had yet been taken to invite a Greek General to the Conference. The Allied High Commissioner at Constantinople, however, had asked what action was being taken in this respect.

It was agreed:—

(a) That the War Office should ask General Harington to arrange for the presence of a Greek General.

(b) That the Foreign Office should send a telegram to Athens on the subject. (? Notify Paris and Rome).

The Crisis in the Near East. General Situation.

3. Apart from Conclusion 2 above, no conclusions were reached on the main subject of the crisis in the Near East, but the following represents the trend of the discussion together with certain interim steps decided on with a view to clarifying the situation at a further meeting to be held at 4 p.m.

(a) The primary British interests in the position in the Near East are:

(i) *Peace*:— but our position is one of mediators. We do not propose to use force to establish peace, either against the Turks or against the Greeks. Thus if the Turkish Nationalists decline to make peace, we shall not march an army against them. If the Greeks decline, we shall not use our fleet to coerce them.

(ii) *The Freedom of the Straits*:— for this, as a great maritime Empire primarily interested, we are prepared to use force, if necessary. We are not in a position to send an army to protect the Bosphorus, but we do intend to hold both sides of the Straits.

(iii) *The maintenance of the Alliance with France and Italy*:— But, while anxious that the Allied status should be preserved at Gallipoli, we intend to hold on to the Gallipoli Peninsula, whether the French detachment now there remains or not.

(b) In order to carry out the above policy it is essential that, if serious fighting should occur at Chanak, mobilisation should be decided on and further reinforcements sent out, which involves the immediate summoning of Parliament.

(c) In regard to General Harington's proposal (in his telegram No... viz. that the Turkish Nationalists should be allowed to cross the Sea of Marmora, anywhere outside the zones which were declared by the Allied High Commissioners to be Neutral in May, 1921, it must be borne in mind that:—

(i) We are bound to be absolutely impartial and to give fair play to both sides. Thus if the Turkish Nationalists, a military Power, are to be allowed

to try and move their armies into Thrace, Greece, which is a naval Power, must not be debarred from trying to prevent them. Consequently the proposal in Sir Horace Rumbold's telegram No. 467 that Greek warships should be withdrawn from the Sea of Marmora must not be pressed, and the detention at Chanak of Greek transports bound for the Sea of Marmora, announced in Sir Horace Rumbold's telegram No. 465 of 26th September, must cease, if General Harington's proposal is adopted.

- (ii) The Paris Note of 24th September, 1922, inviting Mustapha Kemal to the Conference, specifically provides that the Government of Angora shall not cross the Straits or the Sea of Marmora.
 - (iii) General Harington's proposal would be contrary to the policy declared in the speech addressed to journalists by the Prime Minister on Saturday, September 23rd in which he mentioned our desire to prevent the conflict from spreading into Europe. This, however, is probably counterbalanced by a new factor, viz: the Greek revolution with the avowed object of defending Thrace.
 - (iv) Primary conditions of any consent to the passage of Mustapha Kemal's forces to the neutral zone are that the Greeks should have refused to withdraw behind the line to be fixed at the Mudania conference and that the Turkish Nationalists should have withdrawn from the neutral zone.
- (d) That, in order to assist the Conference in arriving at a decision, and without prejudice to their decision, the following draft telegrams should be drawn up, to be based on the above, for consideration at a meeting to be held at 4 p.m.
- (i) The War Office to prepare a draft telegram to General Harington informing him that the British Government favour his proposal subject to the considerations set forth above; that in view of the fact that the Allied invitation to Mustapha Kemal specifically provided that the Government of Angora should undertake not to send troops to cross the Straits or the Sea of Marmora the matter could only be settled after obtaining agreement with the Allies; that the Allies were being consulted, and that a further communication would be made to him as to the result; that if his proposal was agreed to by the Allies, it was presumed that his intention was to raise the matter at his proposed conference at Mudania. The draft telegram should conclude by a statement on the lines of a draft read by Mr. Churchill, expressing appreciation of his forbearance at Chanak and promising support and reinforcements if he is compelled to undertake hostilities.
 - (ii) By the Foreign Office informing Sir Horace Rumbold of the above decision.
 - (iii) By The Foreign Office approaching the Allies in regard to the above proposal.

- (iv) By the Admiralty informing Admiral Brock of the situation, and explaining that if General Harington's proposal should eventually be approved by the Allies, he should not in future interfere with the movements of Greek warships in the Sea of Marmora, or with their passage through the Straits, provided that they undertook belligerent operations within the neutral zone.

F.O. 371/7096/E. 10225

No. 282

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

FOREIGN OFFICE, 28th September 1922, 10.15 p.m.

No. 44. Telegraphic.

Cabinet have given prolonged and anxious consideration to proposals made by Harington in his telegram No. 2485. We should have been glad if his views, which he had apparently communicated to you, had been accompanied by an expression of your own opinion, the more so as the proposals made raise political issues of gravest importance, involving some departure from Paris agreement, and therefore necessitating communication with our allies.

Harington's first proposal is for a personal meeting with Mustapha Kemal. War Office has telegraphed to him that an independent meeting is inconsistent with Paris agreement, but that we are entirely in favour of Mudania meeting taking place at once under conditions laid down at Paris and that if personal meeting be proposed it should be converted into Mudania conference.

Harington's second proposal is to fix line to which Greek army are to be invited to retire at Maritsa River. Should the generals concur in this proposal at Mudania, and should the Greeks accept it, no question of a military crossing by Kemalists into Europe will arise, though in that case we shall have to provide for provisional administration in evacuated areas, as contemplated in your telegram No. 469. It seems to us useless to assign this task to Constantinople government, because in the first place we doubt their ability to carry it out, and secondly we doubt if Kemal would agree. He will no doubt express his opinions on the matter at Mudania, and final decision should not be made without reference to High Commissioners and to Allied Powers, since matter is evidently political rather than military.

In the contrary event of the Greeks declining to accept Mudania decision, and refusing to withdraw, a new situation is created, and Harington's plan for meeting it is not strictly in accordance with Paris decisions. He proposes that passage of Marmora should be permitted to Kemal because the waters and coasts of the Marmora are not included in the neutral zones which the latter has been told

to respect. As to this it must be pointed out (1) that the crossing of the Marmora at present state is expressly prohibited in the Paris terms and could only be permitted with allied consent; (2) that it would involve consequences which Harington has not fully foreseen and which must be carefully considered before proposal is made. The liberty accorded to Kemal could not in logic or fairness be unilateral. If he were permitted to cross into Europe to fight the Greeks and anticipate the decision of peace conference by establishing his rule in Eastern Thrace Greek ships could not be prevented from using non-neutral waters of Marmora at same time, in order to resist his passage; and embargo placed on Greek ships and transports would have to be withdrawn.

In this way proposed plan might have consequence of not only re-opening war between Turkey and Greece but of transferring theatre of that war to Europe with consequences that cannot be foreseen.

These are the important considerations to which we invite your attention and upon which we are reluctant to decide until we have heard your views.

Broadly speaking our policy should be to adhere as closely as possible to Paris terms and only to contemplate departure from them where such departure is made subject of allied consultation and can be justified in interests of peace.

F.O. 371/7896/E. 10197

D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, pp. 110-111, No. 69

No. 283

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 28, 1922

No. 442. Telegraphic. R.

YOUR telegram No. 476.

Please make following intimation to Angora representative at Constantinople:

In accordance with spirit of Paris Agreement we have hitherto prevented, and are still preventing, entry of Greek transports and men-of-war into Marmora and Dardanelles.

If, however, Mustapha Kemal does not withdraw from neutral zone, justification for this prohibition will no longer exist, and it will be withdrawn. (End of R.).

(For your information.)

On the other hand, we do not think that neutrality requires us to compel withdrawal of Greek ships at present in Marmora. Please inform Harington and admiral of this decision.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 327; Rome, No. 287; and Athens, No. 269.)

F.O. 424/254, p. 376 A, No. 682-A

D.B.F.P., I, XVIII, pp. 111-112 No. 70

No. 284

Sir Maurice Hankey to Lord Balfour, Geneva

28th September, 1922.

Cypher Telegram

Following for Dominions Delegates.

Constantine's abdication confirmed.

Harington is making every effort to secure withdrawal of Turkish cavalry from Chanak neutral zone without force, but they cannot be allowed to remain or they will bring up guns. He has cancelled ultimatum issued by local Commanding Officer that force would be used at 7 a.m. September 27th and has sent General Marden to investigate and report. He states that Kemal is trying to force him into firing the first shot. Harington is trying to avoid this but adds that Kemal cannot be allowed to put a net round British forces or guns on Straits.

Kemal has sent most unsatisfactory reply to demand for retirement of Turkish Cavalry from Chanak neutral zone. Kemal ignores neutral zone and affirms that troops are following up defeated Greek army. He says that Greek aeroplanes have been operating in neutral zone; alludes to presence of Greek war vessels at Constantinople on September 25th and argues that this shows that Greeks are respecting neutrality of no zone. Nationalists wish to avoid incidents but cannot understand measures alleged to have been taken by our troops in Chanak zone. Kemal affirms that his troops have been fired on by British guns and bombs dropped near them. He reaffirms declarations of his Government about the freedom of Straits and urges Harington to co-operate in securing satisfactory situation.

Harington is replying to Kemal rebutting contentions and stating that Greek warships have left Bosphorus.

French High Commissioner in Constantinople has suggested to Rumbold that delay of Kemal in replying to joint Allied Note may be due to telegram from Franklin-Bouillon now on his way to see Kemal, asking him to do nothing until they have conferred. He added that Bouillon had no further concessions to add on behalf of French Government.

Greek warships have left Constantinople as result of representations to Greek Admiral by British Admiral. Angora agent at Constantinople, who was immediately informed, had on the previous day implied connection between presence of Turkish cavalry in Chanak zone and presence of Greek warships in Bosphorus.

F.O. 371/7896

No. 285

General Harington, G.H.Q., Constantinople, to War Office

Despd. 0950 28.9.22

Recd. 1515 28. 9.22

Telegram

1223 28th September, 1922.

Following is my reply to His Excellency Moustafa Kemal my telegram 27th September. Have received your telegram. This is first intimation I have had of any misunderstanding regarding neutral zone as proclaimed by allied powers. I would draw your attention to fact of your Commander at Ismid last year actually marking neutral frontier at Yarimja in conjunction with my Commander. I realize your objective as being Greek military force. There are none in zone which you are threatening nor have any passed through. To take your points in order.

(a) The Greeks have not had any aeroplanes at Erzine or neighbourhood to my knowledge.

(b) Greek Fleet has been entirely withdrawn from Constantinople this day under the strongest British pressure.

As regards your charge against the British.

(1) Certain demolitions have taken place under orders of the inter-allied sub-commission of disarmament and certain minor ones as a military precaution. Enquiries being made as to the extent of these.

(2) Certain registration of artillery taken place but not one shot has been fired in anger against your troops or will be fired in anger against your troops except by my orders. My one desire is to avoid conflict with your troops. I trust forbearances I am showing will convince you my sincerity. I note with much pleasure your solemn declaration with regard to freedom of the Straits which the Allied powers reciprocate. I share your desire for early negotiations which would lead to peace which the world desires. In view of above, I earnestly ask you again to withdraw any appearance of threat to my forces at Chanak and the Straits so as to avoid any possibility (3 groups omitted). Should there be still points of misunderstanding between us would be prepared to proceed to meet at any place

mutually agreed to between us should you wish to do so. I take opportunity to tell you on behalf of England that the reinforcements which have been sent to me were sent solely in interests of peace as I was careful to state in the communique which I published recently. It is therefore an immense relief to me to hear from you that you have no aggressive intentions against my troops.

F.O. 371/7806/E. 1096

No. 286

General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office

Despatched 0410 28.9.22

Received 1000 28.9.22

Paraphrase. Secret.

2485 cipher 27/9.

Clear the Line.

1st of 3 parts.

My telegram to Mustapha Kemal and his reply together with my last communication which has just gone off and which I showed to Allied High Commissioners, has been communicated to you in my telegrams 1221-1223 September 27th. I do not think Mustapha Kemal wants to attack us and I feel myself that if we go quite straight now we may remove all danger of attacks from our troops. I want to reach a conference with British troops standing unaided at Chanak without losing a life and with British troops in Constantinople having kept order and calmed the Christian population (one group undec.) you could then withdraw with great honour. I think it can be done. The question of transfer of troops to Thrace is the only outstanding trouble now Greek fleet has gone. Legally I think they are right. The northern shore of Sea of Marmora from Bulaire to Biyuk-Chekmeje and southern shore from Karabigha to Yarimje has never been in neutral zone and Greek troops crossing were never interfered with.

Part 2.

They therefore contend if our fleet stops their crossing it is not only illegal but it is covering Greek rearguard with which they are at war. They argue therefore that they have no alternative left but to attack me at Chanak and Constantinople if this attitude is persisted in. My firm conviction is that if Government could find itself able to accept this, Mustapha Kemal would guarantee at once not to violate neutral frontiers. I could guard Chanak and Ismid and the French could guard Chatalja frontier. We could also preserve safety of Constantinople and add to British prestige. I realize I have put forward suggestion outside of my sphere, and there are other considerations, but situation is very delicate and it is only my earnest endeavour to prevent plunging England into another dreadful war which prompts me to put this forward.

Last part.

What the effect of Greek revolution will be I do not know. I am carefully watching Greeks here. I am confident conference here with Mustapha Kemal would be advisable and also that big conference should follow without delay. There is I am afraid some confusion between zone of Straits as proposed in Treaty of Sévres which included the Marmora and the neutral zones for armies of occupation proclaimed in May 1921 by the three Allied High Commissioners.

This telegram is being communicated to Admiral Brock and Sir H. Rumbold.

F.O. 371/7896/E. 10197

No. 287

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, September 28, 1922

(Received September 29)

No. 486. Telegraphic. (By Bag.)

FOLLOWING communiqué has been issued as result of Cabinet meeting at Rambouillet this morning:—

"M. Raymond Poincaré, President of the Council, gave an account of the situation in the East and in Greece. The Council decided that the events which have taken place in Greece cannot modify the resolutions of France, which were taken in agreement with the Allies, and were contained in the proposals communicated to Mustapha Kemal Pasha."

This statement is a reflection of the apprehensions expressed in the press (and, I understand, shared by the Quai d'Orsay) as to the possible results of the abdication of King Constantine. Danger is foreseen in two quarters: (1) That Greece may claim and obtain support of Great Britain, if not of other Allies, now that she has got rid of King Constantine and is free to recall Veniselos; (2) that the Turks may show intransigence and hasten to seize Thrace before a revival of Greek fighting spirit takes place.

The press is unanimous in pointing out that events in Greece can make no difference to decision of Allies of 23rd September, which must remain basis of negotiations, whether M. Veniselos returns to power or not. "Figaro" observes that King Constantine's departure is as inopportune as the rest of his acts; and the general embarrassment of the press at this turn of events bears out the truth of this remark, as far as French opinion is concerned.

F.O. 424/254, pp. 379-380, No. 639

No. 288

Sir A. Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

BELGRADE, September 28, 1922

(Received October 3.)

No. 413.

My Lord,

ON the 24th instant, M. de Lens, the French Chargé d'Affaires, communicated to the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs in the name of Great Britain, France and Italy the text of the note which was being despatched to the Grand National Assembly at Angora. On its terms being made public, the newspapers expressed generally disappointment at the retrocession to the Turks of Adrianople and Thrace to the Maritza frontier and M. Nincic, on his return from Paris late on the night of the 25th, met the reproaches of some reporters at the railway station with the pertinent remark that if the Serbs had been willing to furnish an army of 200,000 men some other solution might have been possible.

Having allowed M. Nincic a day or two to settle himself back in his Ministry, I asked yesterday for an interview, and he received me this morning.

M. Nincic expressed the pleasure he felt at the reception which had been given him in London and at the personal relations which he had now established with so many of His Majesty's Ministers, at Genoa, at Geneva, and now in London and Paris. He is also much satisfied at having served in some degree as a bridge between the conflicting British and French points of view. To this service, I may here mention, and to the respect which M. Nincic says he has found to exist in the west for the capabilities of the Serb-Croat-Slovene army, considerable publicity has been given and the self-esteem of the nation has been raised.

M. Nincic then proceeded to speak of the detachment of 200 soldiers which it appears he promised, subject to ratification by the Council of Ministers, to despatch to the Straits to demonstrate the solidarity of this country in the Near East question. As this demonstration carried with it the potentiality of a recourse to arms, the equipment of the army became a matter of immediate importance. The French Government had recently given this Government a credit for 100,000,000 fr. for purposes of armament. It was feared that the French might take offence at any decision of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to despatch this contingent and might cut off or defer this credit. The question of this detachment would be brought before the Council of Ministers as soon as M. Pašić returned, and M. Nincic was desirous of being in a position to meet the objections of his colleagues as regards the bad condition of the equipment of the Serbian army and the want of funds for its re-equipment by an assurance that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to give the same credit as the French and furnish the equipment, in the

event of the French taking the obstructive line thought possible. M. Nincic added that he thought 100,000,000 fr. was much too little, and he also seemed in his confused way to wish to secure the credit from the British Government, even if the detachments were not furnished. He added the proviso that the charges for the British material should not be at a higher rate than the French were offering.

I may here mention that a few days ago I heard from a fairly good source that the French had offered a credit of 300,000,000 fr., and that General Martic had started for Paris to select the material. It has also been announced that General Martic was to represent the Serbian army at the French manoeuvres.

In my telegram No. 129 of to-day conveying this request, I mentioned, as I have done above, that M. Nincic described the despatch of the contingent as destined to mark the solidarity of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. But I could not elucidate exactly the solidarity with whom: that is to say, with Great Britain, or with joint action of Great Britain and France. Your Lordship will, of course, know what you asked from M. Nincic and what he promised. In reply to my questioning, I gathered that the contingent was only for the European shore of the Straits; and whether the employment of the Serbian army, of which the rearming was desired, was contemplated in contingencies arising from what I understood to be the intention of His Majesty's Government, viz., the defence by force of arms of strategical points on the Asiatic shore, was not at all clear. In default, however, of any instructions from your Lordship I did not press the point.

M. Nincic dwelt on the dangers of the situation. He had heard that the Soviet Government was preparing to take military action. He was sure in that eventuality Germany would also act. He expressed, of course, his usual fear of the Hungarians and the Bulgarians, and repeated his usual reproaches against the Powers for not having more effectively disarmed those peoples. He said that the Bulgarians possessed more rifles than the Serbs.

As some paper had attributed a remark to M. Nincic to the effect that Bulgaria had asked for an autonomous Western Thrace and that some parties in this country were not unfavourable to such a project, I questioned him on this point. He said "No, Thrace must remain Greek." It was true that M. Stamboulisky, whom he had seen at Geneva, had made that proposition to him, at the same time offering, as that statesman usually did, Salonica. I gathered from M. Nincic that he had not turned down M. Stamboulisky's proposition as regards Western Thrace so categorically as he might have done.

I also asked M. Nincic whether he had any fears with regard to the effects of Kemal Pasha's victories on the Mussulman population of this country. He said as regards the Macedonian Mussulmans he had fears of an insurrection, but the Moslems of Bosnia were all of Serbian race.

A propos of this point, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Sarajevo containing a selection of press articles. These articles rather confirm the impression which I have formed that if events in the near East should take an unfortunate turn in respect of which Great Britain may have to look for armed assistance from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom there are considerable factors in the internal situation of this country which may influence its Government towards a course of extreme prudence. These particular articles were of course written before the generous concessions to Kemal Pasha's demands were decided on and made known.

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government have received a long telegram from Moscow, which is doubtless a replica of similar messages sent by the Soviet Government to the other Allies. It protests against any decisions being taken in regard to the future of Constantinople and the Straits without the presence of the representatives of Russia, and would appear to conclude by summoning a conference of its own. This Government have not yet decided what reply to send, but it is likely that, as on previous occasions, no reply will be sent at all.

I have, &c.

ALBAN YOUNG

F.O. 424/255, pp. 28-29, No. 34

No. 289

Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

BELGRADE, September 28, 1922

(Received October 3)

No. 415.

My Lord,

Though the Press of Belgrade has as a whole expressed great disappointment at the decision of the three great Powers to restore Adrianople to the Turks, I do not find that there is expressed any strong feeling that this country should make sacrifices in order to prevent the necessity of such a measure. The independent newspapers reproach M. Nincic for not having made firmer efforts to retain for Christendom the town in front of which the Serbians fought so steadfastly in 1912, but the official organs of the Coalition, the *Samouprava* and the *Democratia* have to trim their sails so as not to compromise their parties, while the development of events is so uncertain, and while M. Pasić is still absent. The *Democratia* of September 23—before the final decisions of the Allies was taken—had an article of which I had prepared the enclosed translation, defending the attitude of England, while the same paper in its issue of yesterday, finds that the solution was

not so dangerous to this country and may be rendered harmless by the decisions to be taken at the Conference respecting the Straits. The "Balkan" of course is severe in its condemnation of the decision of the Allies.

The "Vreme" of to-day has an article which has the appearance of being inspired and which I venture to think reflects accurately the present opinion of this country and its Government, and coincides with the upshot of my own reports to Your Lordship. It will be observed from the enclosed translation that the newspaper echoes the opinion that "the moment was an unfavourable one for a war. Our people has had its fill of fighting and any military action at such a distance from our frontiers would not have been well received". The paper however makes no mention of the important factor that the armament of the forces is not properly reconstituted, so as to enable the army to confirm its reputed efficiency and give fair chance to its admirable soldiers. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government is doing its best to profit by this emergency and enlist the aid of England, or France, for the better equipment of its troops.

I have, etc.

(Signed) ALBAN YOUNG

F.O. 371/7898/E. 10420

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 289

Extract from "Demokratija" of September 23, 1922

THE ALLIES AND THE BALKANS

Last week it was announced that Lloyd George would go to Geneva to speak on "disarmament" at the League of Nations.

Lloyd George really had this intention, but he has not put it into practice: last Saturday, instead of a pacific speech, there was a communiqué from the English Government which has perturbed Europe. This communiqué was taken to be a declaration of war against Turkey, and moreover a war in which, besides England, also France, Italy, our State and Roumania must share, and what is more strange, this communiqué on the part of London was made without a preliminary accord between the Governments of those States which should participate in the new war: they learnt from "Reuter's Agency" that they must raise troops to send to the Dardanelles!

In the same communication from Reuter it was also said that Great Britain was decided, if necessary, to defend alone the liberty of the Straits with her own arms, that is to defend the actual position of England at Constantinople and the Dardanelles. Thus this communication from London presents itself rather as a declaration of independent action on the part of England than as an invitation to a common action.

The Allies, naturally, found themselves in a great difficulty; either they must share the operations of war foreshadowed by London and which are desired neither by Rome or Paris, or they must leave England and her Dominions to decide the Eastern Question, and this is an event that they desire even less than the first.

The way out of such a situation must be found in the actual negotiations at Paris. In these, as in all preceding negotiations, the Allies are divided into two groups. Every time that a crisis has arisen because of Germany, it was England that represented the "pacific" group, while France threatened to take "severe measures" and the Press of Lloyd George showed her as a country intoxicated with victory that wished to avenge herself on her conquered enemy and take even his life. The French policy was condemned as imperialistic and militarist. But now when it is a question of Turkey things are changed: to-day all that was to be read for so many months in the English press against Poincaré is to be found in the French press against Lloyd George: the same arguments, the same reasonings, the same words, etc. even in the titles of the articles:— "France in favour of peace", "England isolated".

England "isolated" in Europe! It is almost the same as saying that the United States are "isolated" in America! Especially when we speak of an important question like that of the Near East, which — and of this nobody doubts — cannot be decided without her and against her.

To leave England "alone" in this territory would mean that we must renounce sharing in the arrangement of relations in the Levant. Since only political babies can in their innocence think that the British Empire will not know how to deal with Kemal Pasha's hordes, which for her are not at all a serious enemy as were once the hordes of the "Mad Mullah" in the Soudan. It would be still greater ingenuity to believe that England, who knows the world better than certain people their own country, should allow lightly, for levity or convenience, that an event such as the defeat of the Greek army should overthrow all her plans in the Mediterranean Sea, in the Near and Middle East, and reduce to chaos all the territories from the Sahara to India.

If England at this moment is not in favour of a "peaceful policy" as are France and Italy this is quite natural, since such "peaceful policy" is not far from neutrality. Both States declare that they will not use arms against Kemal, trusting fully in the promises of the Turkish dictator: that he will respect the liberty of the Straits. How he understands such liberty will be seen later. Then if we accept the point of view of France and Italy it would mean in practice: to withdraw the troops and give Kemal liberty of action, to allow him to pass into Europe, to take Adrianople and Thrace and to establish himself on the Maritza if he liked. And if he did not like? And if, reconstructing the Turkey of 1914 he should forget his

promises and return to the ambitious plans of the Young Turks before the Balkan War? Who would then drive him beyond the Maritza, and who would be in a position to defend the liberty of the Straits with a "pacific policy"?

And therefore it is quite understandable that England should request more real guarantees than the good will and word of Kemal Pasha or any other Pasha. The possibility that the most important route of international communications be under the control or protectorate of Turkey must not be reached.

We must also keep present in our minds that if Kemal fulfills his own programme and returns to the Balkans, the situation in that same peninsular would change fundamentally. A new military power would appear which, by its sole existence, would oblige the Balkan peoples to increase their means of defence.

This would not be good, and therefore England, by working to hinder such an eventuality, still defends our interests.

F.O. 371/7898/E. 10420

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 289

Extract from "Democrat" of September 27, 1922

AFTER THE AGREEMENT

Translation.

As a basis of the Allied agreement the Turks will have Thrace. It will be seen almost immediately after the Conference with what hypotheca a "decisive constitution" must be given to the Near East. And so long as this hypotheca remains unknown, it is impossible to say if the Turks, having once more become masters of Adrianople, will receive in the Balkans any other thing than a paltry concession to their vanity.

This concession:—Thrace with Adrianople as far as the Maritza is said not to be necessary. This is possible, but the policy of the Allies has made it so. France already a year ago was pledged to yield this territory to the Turks, as was also Italy. Against the policy there was only England till the last moment, seeing that England hoped to be able to constitute a large Greece. And when this did not happen then England has joined the other powers.

As for our national point of view, we see nothing wrong in the Turks returning again to Adrianople. Ten years have passed since so many of our sons gave their lives for the liberation of this city, which when freed, was given to the Bulgarians, who after a few months returned it to the Turks. So much for the sentimental side, and as to that which bears on the political side, the position of Turkey as a military power in the Balkans is not determined by her western frontier. In such regard it is quite relative if the frontier be at Ciataldja on the Strandja or on the Maritza. In this respect are of capital importance the bonds between Anatolia and this tiny piece of territory which Turkey will have in the Balkans. And this bond is

composed of the Straits. Then on the decision of the question of the Straits it depends whether the Turks shall or shall not be a serious factor in our peninsula. This question has not been decided in the agreement of Paris, nor has this decision been compromised; it has been left for the next conference which must be shortly summoned, and in which our State will also take part. Public opinion justly expects that the persons summoned will know how to assume an attitude under such circumstances which will correspond to the great interests which will be discussed at the Conference.

F.O. 371/7898/E. 10420

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 289

Extract from the "Balkan" of September 27, 1922

FRANCE BRINGS THE TURKS BACK AGAIN INTO EUROPE

After having spoken of the return of H.M. the King and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the opening of the political season is mentioned. A season which commences with a big political reverse of the policy of the S.H.S., the consequences of which are incalculable.

"Our sweet kind Allies, with or without our consent (they do not very often ask our opinion) have decided that the Turks be permitted to return to Europe, and that they should again obtain not only Constantinople but also Adrianople and Thrace.

"This is a grave blow for us and for the other Balkan States, it is also a grave blow for European civilisation".

F.O. 371/7898/E. 10420

ENCLOSURE 4 IN No. 289

Extract from "Vreme" of September 28, 1922

THE ATTITUDE AND ROLE OF OUR GOVERNMENT IN THE EASTERN QUESTION

Our State on the horns of a dilemma; either to undertake military action against Turkey or to allow her to come into Europe. The reasons which led M. Nincić and M. Pasić. No hostile designs on the part of Kemal against us.

Since M. Nincić presented his report to the Council of Ministers, it appears that in this country a definite stand point is beginning to be formulated with regard to the Eastern question. Our delegates in Paris and London found themselves in a very difficult situation. They had to choose between England and France. There is no doubt that the English point of view approximates much more closely to our vital interests; a fact which was perceived by Messers Pasić and Nincić. But the crux of the matter is whether or not England will be in a position to make good her point of view and prevent the access of the Turks to Europe. Had France and

England come to an agreement on that basis, then the position of our Government would have been much easier. Our Government could have whole heartedly acquiesced in such an agreement since it would have been certain that the united action of these two powers whatever was planned could have been carried through.

But as things turned out England suffered a diplomatic reverse and the French stand point held the field. England remained isolated. Adherence to the English point of view would have entailed considerable risk and great sacrifices. In such a case we should have been obliged to send troops to the Dardanelles in order, together with the English and the Greek troops, to prevent Kemal Pasha from getting into Europe. Such was the proposal of England to our Government.

Messrs Pasić and Nincić were in a dilemma: either they had to agree to armed action against Kemal Pasha, or they had to take upon themselves the role of mediator between France and England and to see to it that the Turks should be allowed as small a pied à terre as possible in Europe. They decided on the second course, and that for various reasons. In their opinion the moment was an unfavourable one for a war. Our people has had its fill of fighting and any military action at such a distance from our frontiers would not have been well received. *The compensations, which were offered to us in the event of such military action proving successful were not commensurate with the sacrifice asked of us. On the other hand however, our delegates received guarantees of a satisfactory nature from Kemal that he intended no hostile measures against our State and that he would undertake nothing either directly or indirectly against us. These declarations of Kemal's representative were of a nature to determine Messrs. Pasić and Nincić's concurrence to the note sent by England and France to Kemal. They were of the opinion that at the present moment it was better to consent even to the Turks return to the Balkans, to Gallipoli and to Adrinople, than to go to war.*

In well informed circles it is thought that we have suffered no great loss at this juncture such as would justify our speaking of it as a reverse. The reverse is England's. As for the situation in the Balkans in the opinion of various politicians the return of the Turks will not greatly modify the situation to our detriment. When the Turks obtain Adrianople they, nevertheless, consider that there is no need to regard with any great misgiving a Turco-Bulgarian frontier, the Bulgarians being irritated by the return of the Turks to Adrianople to an extent which will prevent neighbourly relations from ever developing between the two countries.

Apart from that our Government should be prepared to intervene in the settlement of the Eastern question should circumstances demand it. It is not impossible that, should events turn out in favour of the English policy, our Government would change its attitude. Our Government is not so p'edged to one or the other point of view as to make its abandonment impossible. Our Government has its hands free for any future action.

F.O. 371/7898/E 10420

No. 290

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 29, 1922.

No. 359.

My Lord,

THIS afternoon Dr. Nihad Rechad, the Kemalist representative in London, called upon me at his special request in order to discuss the situation that had arisen between the British and Angora Governments.

He began by thanking me for the friendly attitude that I had shown in Paris, and congratulated me on the agreement that had there been arrived at. He said that he came as a warm friend of good relations between our two peoples and of the early conclusion of peace, and he hoped that I would not desist from my efforts to carry the matter to a successful conclusion.

I said that I proposed to treat him with the utmost frankness, because a situation had arisen in which immediate action alone could prevent the outbreak of hostilities and probably the renewal of war between Great Britain and Turkey. I was at a loss to understand the tactics that had been pursued by Mustapha Kemal since he had received the Paris note. This communication, it could not be denied, contained an immense and unexpected concession to his views. The three Great Powers had found themselves in absolute accord upon the point, and it rested only with Kemal, in his own interests as well as in those of peace, to meet without delay the advance that had been made. Nevertheless, a week all but a day had passed since the Paris note was despatched to him. So far, he had not answered it, and, even if he offered the excuse that he was waiting to consult M. Franklin-Bouillon, who had arrived at Smyrna on Wednesday, there was no reason why a reply should not by now have been sent. On the contrary, Mustapha Kemal had amused himself by returning, captious replies to the British Commander-in-chief, and meanwhile he had authorised the continuous advance of Turkish troops into the Chanak neutral zone up to a point where they were in direct contact with the British forces, and where the situation, as I should presently tell him, was one of a critical description. The sequence of events contemplated in Paris was, firstly, a general acceptance by Mustapha Kemal of the Allied proposals and of the conditions attached to them; secondly, an immediate meeting in Mudania with the Allied generals and the Greek commander, in order to arrange for the retirement of the Greek forces; and, thirdly, such arrangements as might be required pending the holding of the Peace Conference itself. Where, I asked, was Mustapha Kemal at this moment?

Dr. Nihad Rechad explained that he had gone off with M. Franklin-Bouillon to Angora.

I replied that I had nothing to say as to Kemal's desire to consult the Grand National Assembly, although I observed that he had already summoned his Cabinet for consultation in Smyrna; but that he should go off to Angora at this moment, instead of going to Mudania, seemed to me to constitute a tactical error on his part which I found it difficult to explain. Meanwhile, I would tell Dr. Nihad Rechad frankly what had happened, and what was going to happen. Mustapha Kemal having, in spite of the Paris note and in spite of frequent protests, absolutely declined to withdraw his forces from the Chanak neutral zone, and these forces having continued to advance until they were in a position where we were informed that they even made grimaces at the British troops on the other side of the barbed wire, a situation had arisen which could not be tolerated by any army—it would not be tolerated by that of Mustapha Kemal himself. It further constituted a military menace of the most serious description. Warning after warning to the Turkish commander having been ignored, the British Government had decided that this situation, for which they were in no sense responsible, must be terminated. Orders had therefore been given this morning to the British commander to call upon the Kemalist forces to retire, and in the event of their refusing, to compel them to do so. Thus we might, owing to the culpable action of these forces, find ourselves within a few hours on the edge of war.

Dr. Nihad Rechad expressed the utmost alarm at this situation, which had apparently come upon him as a great shock, and he announced his intention of telegraphing at once to Mustapha Kemal on the point. He believed he could reach him by wireless before to-morrow morning.

I suggested that, if there were still time, orders should be given to the Kemalist cavalry—of whom there were now 4,500—to retire; and that, even if these orders came too late and an unfortunate incident occurred, it was still possible for Mustapha Kemal to explain that the incident had been due to an error on the part of his troops, and to order their instant withdrawal from the neutral zone. It might be too late to prevent hostilities, but it might still be possible to avert a war.

Dr. Nihad Rechad then proceeded to give me his own explanation of the Kemalist position. He said that Kemal was in in great alarm lest, owing to the revolution in Athens, we were already arranging with the new Greek Government that they should re-enter the war and join us in the occupation of the Marmora and in the retention of Thrace. Further, in the event of the Greek troops retiring, as was proposed in the Paris note, either to the Maritza or to another line in Eastern Thrace, what guarantee had the Turks as to the nature of the administration to be set up in the evacuated territory? They were desperately afraid that it would not be a Turkish administration, and that some attempt would be made to rob them of the spoils which they appeared to have won. It was these doubts more particularly which had restrained Mustapha Kemal from returning an immediate answer to the Paris proposals—a delay which Dr. Nihad Rechad, for his own part, joined with me in deeply regretting.

I replied that, on the two points which he had mentioned, I would be as explicit with him as I had been in respect of Chanak. It was not true that so far any step whatever had been taken to encourage the Greeks. I was not in communication with the new Government in Athens. I did not even know who they were. I was unaware of the disposition of their troops, and of their military intentions. We had given them no encouragement whatsoever in Thrace. On the contrary, Dr. Nihad Rechad must know quite well that we had obliged the Greek man-of-war to leave Constantinople, and that we had prohibited Greek transports and vessels of war from entering the Dardanelles. We could not possibly have acted in a more strictly neutral manner. But I must warn him frankly that, if the incidents which I had described result in hostilities, this attitude would at once be changed. There would then be no reason whatsoever why we should prevent Greece from doing anything that she pleased in respect of Thrace or the Marmora; and, if Mustapha Kemal chose to fight us, he would have no cause to be surprised at the re-entry of Greece upon the scene. As regards Thrace, I said that I had not the slightest difficulty in rebutting the suspicions of Mustapha Kemal. As a matter of fact, the British Government had already had in contemplation the necessity of instituting a civil administration in those parts of Eastern Thrace which would be evacuated by the Greek army, and although the assistance of Allied officers might be required in reporting upon the situation and setting up an administration, I had always contemplated that it should be in the main Turkish in character, and that certainly no attempt should be made to get behind the terms of the Paris note. But how, I asked, was this to be brought about if Mustapha Kemal refrained from coming to Mudania? Mudania, I repeated, was the first step; the line of evacuation was the second; and the setting up of some form of civil administration was the third. That at such a moment Mustapha Kemal should be in a train going to Angora instead of expediting these issues so favourable to him, was to me quite incomprehensible.

Dr. Nihad Rechad asked my permission to include in his message to his chief the observations which I had just made.

I readily gave him permission, and urged upon him the utmost speed and the most definite presentation of the case if he was to have any chance of avoiding what we both regarded as the disastrous contingency of a new war. No one wanted such a war certainly not Great Britain. But, if it were provoked in the particular circumstances which I had described, I did not think that public opinion would be left in the smallest doubt as to where the responsibility lay.

I am &c.

COURZON OF KIDLESTON

No. 291

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 29, 1922
(Received September 30).

No 484. Telegraphic R.

ADMIRAL DUMESNIL has telegraphed that Franklin-Bouillon attended a long meeting yesterday at Smyrna with Mustapha Kemal and his ministers. Meeting was to be continued in the evening and Franklin-Bouillon promises a full account to-day. Franklin-Bouillon states that matters will be very difficult but that he hopes it will be possible for a meeting to take place very soon at Mudania between Mustapha Kemal and Allied Generals.

F.O. 424/254, p. 379, No. 691

No. 292

Italian Embassy in London to Foreign Office

COMUNICAZIONE VERBALE

D'après les informations reçues par la Consulta les militaires grecs qui se sont soulevés contre le Roi Constantin auraient posé, entre autres conditions, aux Gouvernement grec, celle de l'immédiat renforcement du front grec en Thrace.

M. Schanzer serait d'avis de faire connaître d'urgence à Athènes que, dans le moment actuel, toute opération militaire en Thrace, même l'envoi de renforts, pourrait compromettre la conclusion de la paix. La nouvelle de l'envoi de renforts grecs en Thrace pourrait fournir à Mustapha Kemal le prétexte pour continuer ce mouvement en avant qu'on tâche actuellement, avec tant de difficulté, de contenir et provoquerait aussi des agitations locales en intensifiant l'activité des bandes.

C'est pourquoi Mr. Schanzer croit qu'il serait oppotun d'envoyer aux Ministres Alliés à Athènes des instructions en vue de mettre en garde le Gouvernement Hellénique sur le grave danger auquel il s'exposerait en organisant en Thrace une résistance désormais inutile. En outre, le prestige des Alliés à la prochaine conférence serait sérieusement atteint si les Alliés restaient passifs devant des opérations militaires en Thrace qui pourraient être d'obstacle à la réalisation des engagements qu'ils ont désormais envers la Turquie après que les Alliés lui ont attribué la frontière de la Maritza.

London, le 29 Septembre 1922.

F.O. 371/7897

M. Schanzer a approuvé le point de vue de M. Garroni. C'est-à-dire:

1. *Que les troupes grecques devaient se retirer en arrière de la ligne de la Maritza.*
2. *Que l'administration civile devrait être constituée de notables locaux encadrés de fonctionnaires turcs de Constantinople choisis parmi ceux qui sont moins contraires à Kemal.*
3. *Qu'une administration centrale pourrait être formée à Andrinople pour diriger les administrations locales qui devraient être autonomes.*
4. *Que l'envoi de troupes alliées en Thrace ne semble pas opportun car elles se trouveraient embarrasées entre les bandes turques et grecques, et Kemal refuserait.*
5. *Qu'il semble préférable encadrer des éléments locaux dans le bataillon de la gendarmerie de Tchataldja le maintien de l'ordre local*.*

F.O. 371/7897/E. 10321

No. 293

G.H.Q., Constantinople, to War Office

Despatched 1500 29.9.22

Received 2000 29.9.22

Not paraphrased

Most Secret

2516 cipher 29/9. Two parts. 1st.

Information dated September 24th shows that Raouf, Angora, instructed Ferid, Paris, to contradict some statements he had made hostile to (Jews Jewish home) and he was especially to do so in the case of Kiazim Pasha El Musseini, President of Palestine Délegation. On September 27th Aralov reported that the (2 groups undec) newspaper (s) at Angora was being mobilized against Allied proposals with usual Bolshevik propaganda. The Hara (? Hakimiyet) et Millie had however appeared without leading article (s). This paper? is? usually vitriolic. On same day also was contemplating bribing Turkish Commander with valuable? swords, watches, cigarette cases etc. Aralov intended that Mustapha Kemal, Fevzi Pasha, Chief of the Staff? Kazim, Commissar of Defence, Ismet Pasha and Azim his Chief of the Staff, Nureddin Pasha, G.O.C. 1st Army, Yakoub Shev (ki) Pasha, G.O.C. 2nd Army, Fehreddin Pasha, G.O.C. Caucasus Group, Mursel Bey, G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry Division to have these presents.

Part 2.

Comments. Bolshevik influence appears to be waning amongst Nationalists. Turkish Commanders named are presumably considered more susceptible.

F.O. 371/7897

* Belgenin bu son bölümü elyazması olarak sonradan eklenmiş

No. 294

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ROME, September 29, 1922

(Received September 29)

No. 295 *Telegraphic. R.*

YOUR telegram No. 289.

Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me that report is devoid of all foundation, nor is any such step in contemplation. On the contrary, General [group undecypherable] he has been instructed to place himself in communication with British General Officer Commanding in order to ascertain what is required of him. I asked his Excellency to authorise an assurance to you that no withdrawal would take place without previous consultation with His Majesty's Government, and he consented.

His Excellency urged that Greeks should be induced to withdraw from Eastern Thrace to behind Maritza, as this would remove any pretext for advance by Kemal. But he was uncertain as to how this could be accomplished.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

F.O 424/254, p. 380, No. 696

No 295

Minutes of a Conference of British Ministers held at Lord Curzon's house, No. 1., Carlton House Terrace, London, S. W. 1., on Friday, 29 September, 1922, at 10 p.m.

Secret

PRESENT:—

The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain,

M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

(In the Chair).

The Right Hon. The Viscount
Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.

The Most Hon. The Marquess Curzon
of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. Sir Laming
Worthington-Evans, Bart., G.B.E.,
M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne,
G.B.E., K.C., M.P., Chancellor of
the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. W.S. Churchill,
M.P., Secretary of State for
the Colonies.

The Right Hon. The Lord Lee of
Farham, G.B.E., K.C.B., First
Lord of the Admiralty.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:—

General The Earl of Cavan, K.P., G.C.M.G.,	Rear-Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, K.C.B.,
G.C.V.O., K.C.B., Chief of the Imperial General Staff,	K.C.M.G., C.V.O., Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff

Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh M.
Trenchard, Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

Lieut. Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B. Secretary, Cabinet.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said that Mr Chamberlain had agreed that the matter which he was about to put to the meeting was of sufficient importance to justify summoning the Ministers who normally attended the Conference dealing with the crisis in the Near East.

At 4. p.m. he had seen Nihad Rechad, who was the Kemalist representative in London.

(Lord Birkenhead entered at this point.)

He had previously met Nihat Rechad in the Spring, when the latter had come to London with Yussuf Kemal Bey. Nihad was a gentlemanly, friendly, outspoken man, friendly to this country, the more so as he aspired to be the future Turkish Ambassador in London. Two days ago Nihad had asked if Lord Curzon would see him, and he had replied that he certainly would. Nihad began by remarks in praise of what had been decided in Paris, which he thought was a work in the interest of peace, and he had congratulated Lord Curzon on the useful part he had played in reaching that agreement. Lord Curzon had then thanked Nihad, but took the occasion to tell him frankly that at the moment it hardly looked like peace and that we appeared to be on the brink of hostilities. Nihad replied by asking what on earth Lord Curzon meant? He replied that more than a week had elapsed since the invitation was sent to Mustapha Kemal to a Conference at Venice and Mudania. During this period no reply had been received, and the only communication had been to General Harington, and of a polemical character. If it was said that Mustapha Kemal was waiting for the arrival of M. Franklin-Bouillon, he would point out that the latter had reached Smyrna on Wednesday and that there had been plenty of time for an answer. In the meanwhile, what was happening on the Chanak front? The Turkish forces had continued to advance to a point where they were in close contact with British troops. They had actually reached the barbed wire of our position and were making grimaces across it! This was in the nature of an enveloping movement and would soon involve extreme military danger to our troops.

(Sir L. Worthington-Evens entered at this point.)

Lord Curzon had then described quite frankly what had happened at the Cabinet that morning. The Government had been told by the military authorities

that the position was inconsistent with the security of our forces. It had been tolerated up to the present in the interest of peace, but no-one could tolerate it any longer. He had then told Nihad the steps that were to be taken on the advice of the military authorities. On the following day the General would demand the withdrawal of the Turkish forces, and if this was not complied with they would be fired on. Nihad Rechad had replied, "But that means war." Lord Curzon had pointed out that at any rate it probably involved hostilities. Nihad had then said that he had not known that matter were so serious, and he asked permission to communicate this conversation to his chief. Lord Curzon had replied that he hoped he would not only tell him this but that he would say a good deal more to Mustapha Kemal. He should point out that there had been no reply to the Paris invitation. Why, asked Lord Curzon, was Mustapha Kemal not at Mudania? Where was he at the present moment? Nihad Rechad had then said that Mustapha Kemal was at that moment in the train with M. Franklin-Boullion on the way to Angora to consult the National Assembly. Lord Curzon replied that it was not his business to criticise the propriety of Mustapha Kemal's consulting his National Assembly, but he recalled that the Nationalist Cabinet had met at Smyrna and he had asked why Mustapha Kemal should not have gone to Mudania on his way to Angora? His whole attitude was consistent with a dilatory and evasive procedure. Nihad Rechad had then said that he was in contact with Mustapha Kemal, and that the latter was suffering under two great apprehensions. First, he believed that the British Government was in communication with and in a conspiracy with Athens, and was organising Greek military aggression so as to render nugatory all the promises made at Paris in regard to Thrace. Lord Curzon had met this by stating that we were not in comminations with the new Government, for the reason, if for non other, that no new Government, so far as he knew, existed, and he had asked what authority Nihad had for making such a statement. Nihad had also said that the British were organising the Greeks in the Straits and in Thrace. Lord Curzon had replied by pointing out that we had actually stopped transports going into the Sea of Marmora and had insisted on the Greek warships leaving Constantinople. He had pointed out, however, that if events developed as they were doing at the present moment, this attitude of restraint on the Greeks would certainly not be continued, and the very situation which Mustapha Kemal appeared to apprehend to exist now would be produced. Nihad had replied that he was very glad to know this. His second apprehension had been that the Turkish Nationalists were going to be cheated out of the Paris decisions as regards Eastern Thrace, which would be rendered nugatory. He thought that some sort of Govenment would be set up there which would prevent the Turks coming into their own. Lord Curzon had replied that it was a curious thing that he should mention this today, because the question had only just been discussed at the Cabinet as to the form of interim administration which should be

set up during the Conference in Eastern Thrace, and he had telegraphed to Constantinople that this administration would have to be mainly of a Turkish character. If Mustapha Kemal wanted to settle these questions, why did he not go to Mudania, where everything could be arranged? Nihad Rechad had asked permission to tell this to Mustapha Kemal, and he himself had agreed. Nihad had then said he could get in touch with Mustapha Kemal by the following morning, and asked Lord Curzon what he should say. Lord Curzon had replied that it was not for him to say what account Nihad should give of his conversation, but as regards the position of Chanak he hoped he would advise Mustapha Kemal that it was essential he should order the local Commander to withdraw his forces at once, before firing started. If, on the other hand, he was too late and firing had commenced, he should admit that it was an error and give an undertaking that this was an isolated incident which he regretted and that his troops would be withdrawn from the neutral zone. Nihad had replied that he would do this.

LORD CURZON then said he wished to tell his colleagues the conclusion he had since drawn. On the supposition that there was anything in what Nihad had said and that he did speak the views of his Chief, he had said to himself. Was there not a possibility of escaping from the grave emergency that would arise on the morrow? Even though the position of the Government was irrefutable—and they had an admirable case to make to Parliament—nevertheless they had to remember that a renewal of the war with Turkey would be a most deplorable occurrence and very unpopular. He asked, therefore, if it would be possible to suspend the orders to General Harington for a short period, by one of two methods: either by holding the orders in suspense for 24 hours, or, if that was impossible, whether it would be practicable to tell the Commander to extend the time limit given to the Turks by 24 hours? He felt that the answer to the question mainly rested with the military authorities. Would the delay of 24 hours involve military danger? Would the Turks thereby be enabled to dig themselves in and envelope our force and bring up guns, and so forth, and was the danger of this so great as to make it worth while to neglect this chance of obtaining peace? So many military considerations were involved that he hesitated to express an opinion, but, subject to this, he felt strong that if military considerations permitted the attempt to be made, and, if it was made, that it would immensely strengthen the Government's public position.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL added that just before Lord Curzon had come to see him on this subject at 7.30, his attention had been called to the headlines in the evening newspapers to the effect that Kemal accepted the Mudania Conference. "Better News", and so forth. All this was an ill preparation for the public reception of the decisions taken by the Cabinet that day. Then Lord Curzon had come to him and told him what he had just told the Conference. He had felt that it was too great a responsibility for any two members of the Cabinet to

take, to decide the question raised by Lord Curzon. He had asked Sir Maurice Hankey to obtain the Prime Minister's view upon the subject, and Sir Maurice would no doubt communicate it later. He himself had told Lord Curzon that he appreciated the reasons in support of the suggested delay in taking action, but that after hearing the report of the Naval, Military and Air Staffs that day he had felt very doubtful whether military considerations would not render it impracticable. It might be that the additional time given would enable the enemy to dig himself in and bring up heavy guns and reinforcements. He had also asked Lord Curzon whether he believed Nihad Rechad to be honest, and Lord Curzon had replied that he thought he was. He did not ask if Nihad Rechad carried weight with Mustapha Kemal, but he would ask him that question. He felt the extreme difficulties that any postponement would create for General Harington. It would give the impression of hesitating and of the Government saying at one moment that he was to act, and at the next that he was to delay. Moreover, he recalled that September 30th had several times been mentioned as a critical date. What he did not say, though he felt sure it was principally what was in the Prime Minister's mind, was that any delay would destroy the confidence of our representatives at Constantinople, who, on receiving the fresh instruction, would be much harrassed by the succeeding orders and counter orders.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said that he had no doubt at all that Nihad Rechad was in Mustapha Kemal's confidence, as he had accompanied his representative to London last March and had obviously been in his confidence also. When he had asked Nihad Rechad if he was in touch with Mustapha Kemal he had replied that he was. He could not tell, however, whether he exerted any great influence with Mustapha Kemal. Nihad Rechad had said that he could communicate by wireless, and hoped to be able to reach him at 8 o'clock the next morning. He wished to point out that he had not suggested a telegram of a discouraging character; all he had contemplated was that General Harington should be told to allow an additional 24 hours to elapse before taking action. Moreover, everything he had said was subject to a military opinion, and if the military insisted that an additional 24 hours would jeopardise the position it would greatly influence him.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR agreed that the considerations Lord Curzon had mentioned required careful examination, but even larger considerations were raised. What new fact had arisen, he asked, since the decision taken that afternoon which would justify a modification of the policy then decided? One of the conclusions reached that morning had been that there should be a very short time limit locally at Chanak. The only question tonight was whether they ought to modify that time limit. He had heard nothing which led him to think it ought to be modified in the slightest degree. If the case had been made that Nihad Rechad had swifter access to Mustapha Kemal than General Harington had, or that Mustapha

Kemal had not been in a position to reply to the communications addressed to him, there might be some case for delay. As a matter of fact, however, Mustapha Kemal had the Allied invitation for the last six days; it was known that he had received the invitation, and he had given no answer whatsoever. There was no reason why he should not have replied that he was satisfied on this or that point but must make qualifications on another, and so forth. But he had done nothing at all. He had received several warnings about the violation of the neutral zone, but he had done nothing but to equivocate, procrastinate and defy us.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL interrupted to say that he had been somewhat surprised that afternoon when Lord Beatty had said that Mustapha Kemal had received no ultimatum. The Officer Commanding at Chanak had intended to send him an ultimatum but General Harington had stopped it, and he himself had examined the telegrams and to his surprise they confirmed Lord Beatty's statement. One of the telegrams from General Harington said that Mustapha Kemal would be given 48 hours notice, but there was no evidence that it had ever been sent. He thought, therefore, that Lord Beatty's statement was correct.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR said that if that was the case he was shocked to hear it. This might slightly weaken the presentation of the case, but it did not alter our fundamental position, which rested on the non-violation of the neutral zone. What was the position today? Mustapha Kemal knew perfectly well the conditions of the Paris offer so far as the neutral zones were concerned. What had he done? He had advanced his troops through the neutral zone right up to our lines, completely ignoring the Paris condition that "In return of this intervention the Government of Angora will undertake not to send troops either before or during the Conference into the zones which had provisionally been neutral" etc. After we had committed ourselves to the Paris Note our troops were now being netted in and blanketed, so that when the time came that they ought to be able to make themselves felt they would not be in a position to do so. In 24 hours new troops would be arriving. He was by no means sure that if we delayed 24 hours the spirit of the troops might not be affected by the insolence of the Turks. We would not whittle down the decision which had been taken, and he had no doubt that Parliament and the public would support the Government if they proceeded with their plan. He was deeply desirous of averting war, and would go to great lengths for this purpose, but he did not think that war would be avoided by weaknees of this kind.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said he had arrived at the same opinion. He was impressed by the fact that Mustapha Kemal had received the Paris message and had given no reply to it. The impression he got from the account of Lord Curzon's interview with Nihad Rechad was that Nihad had been sent to "blind " London. All the information we had received was in accord with the secret information received that Ferid Pasha (sic) in Paris had advised

Mustapha Kemal not to mind our threats and to bring his troops close alongside ours, in the certainty that he would not be fired at. All indications of Mustapha Kemal's real attitude were to this effect. As regards Mustapha Kemal's suggestion, for example, that the British Government was in collusion with the Greek Government, he pointed out that there had been no revolution in Greece until two days ago, yet for six days no reply had been received. The Paris Note provided for the non-violation of the neutral zone, yet all the time Mustapha Kemal was pushing up men into it. He regarded Nihad Rechad's statement as probably being for the purpose of blinding us, when Kemal's real object was to get into Thrace. He was inclined to distrust Nihad's suggestions altogether.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said he was convinced that Nihad had not come with any instructions of this kind.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said he might be an unconscious agent. For his part, he thought that if the Government indulged in any further delay Mustapha Kemal would get enough men into the neutral zone to blanket us so that our force would be masked from effective action if and when the time came. He would be very sorry to postpone action.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS asked that the military view might now be heard.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR said that, as he conceived it, the soldiers could only tell them as to the effect of the 24 hours' delay.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY added, "And how far the position and moral of the forces at Chanak would be affected by delay".

THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF said that, as he read the situation, the ultimatum left the War Office at about 4 p.m. On an average of the time taken by these telegrams it should be reaching General Harington at that very moment (about 11 p.m.). The telegram was a definite, straight forward order. General Harington would at once issue orders to General Marden on the spot. He did not know how long communication with General Marden would take, but it would take General Marden three or four hours to communicate the orders to the troops and to the Turkish local Commander. That would bring the situation up to 4 or 5 a.m. In reply to Lord Curzon, he said there was no day or night in carrying out military orders, and undoubtedly the communication would be made to the Turkish Commander the same night. General Marden could be relied upon to take the quickest possible steps, as the whole tone of the telegram was in that order of ideas. However, it might be 5 or 6 o'clock in the morning before he was ready. A counter order issued now could not, in his view, arrive in time to affect the situation. To issue a counter order after definite operation orders had been issued was fatal and most dangerous. As to the situation opposite the wire, he had not been able to determine whether the Turks

were close up to the four miles perimeter of the main position or to the wire of the outpost line, the existence of which had only been learned that morning. It might be that they were grimacing through the wire of this latter line. Every moment's delay meant a larger reinforcement to the enemy, and after tomorrow, when a battalion of Marines was due to arrive, no further reinforcements would arrive before October 3rd: that is to say, British forces were at the maximum immediate strength on the morrow. This was not the case with the Turks, and there might be 5,000 or 6,000 Turks there by this time. The immediate risk, therefore, was that the Turks, whether they were 4,500 or 6,000, would be engaged with 3,500 British Infantry. It was true that General Marden might be able to withdraw the outposts tonight; probably he would endeavour to do so. If there were a further 24 hours delay there was grave danger that the rush of the Turks after the capture of the outpost line might enable the Turks to overwhelm us by force of numbers. In such a situation our own troops and the enemy would be inextricably mixed up, and artillery and machine-gun fire could do very little. The only possible military argument he could think of in favor of delay was the fact that the air fighting squadron, on which a good deal of reliance was placed, could not arrive until tonight or tomorrow. If these aircraft were in action he would feel happier as to the situation. His opinion, however, was that to issue a counter order now would be disastrous.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said he had not suggested a counter order, but merely a delay in giving execution to the order.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL thought that Lord Cavan's opinion was decisive. As Lord Curzon had said, both military and political considerations were involved, and he himself had felt, with Lord Curzon, that it would be right to do everything possible to preserve peace, provided that we did not endanger our troops, but Lord Cavan's statement seemed to leave no doubt of this.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY said he had reserved his opinion deliberately until he had heard Lord Cavan, because he thought that military opinion would be decisive on this point. The Government might not be forgiven if it did not make every effort to preserve peace, but they would be still less forgiven if they put our troops in jeopardy. He had rather expected to hear tonight that there was a new communication from Mustapha Kemal. It transpired, however, that the position was precisely what it had been when the decision was taken that afternoon. In the circumstances, he felt sure the duty of the Government was to adhere to their decision.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR said that though he had urged the opposite view to Lord Curzon, he was very glad that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had given an opportunity for this discussion.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES said he sympathised most deeply with the Foreign Secretary, who was bound to assure

himself, like Sir Edward Grey in 1914, that no stone had been left unturned to preserve peace, and he felt he had the full right to clear his conscience in the matter. After all it was his duty more than anyone else's. He agreed, however, in the opinions expressed that it was not physically possible to defer action without the gravest risk. It might upset the whole situation. It would almost certainly make General Harington feel he did not know where he was. He would probably say to himself that the Government had "cold feet". Moreover, a counter order issued at the last moment might prove only partially effective. Consequently the Cabinet could not undo what had been done after very careful consideration. He himself, however, did not take a tragic view of the situation, and by no means lost hope that there might still be a peaceful settlement. He did not think the action to be taken on the morrow would exclude conversations being reopened in a few days' time. The Turks might scurry off with some loss. He thought it quite possible, however, that this might not result in war. It must be borne in mind that Mustapha Kemal was at war with the Greeks, and his aim was to pursue them into Thrace. So far as he was concerned, the British force at Chanak was an irrelevance. He could hardly believe that Mustapha Kemal wished to embroil himself with us. What Mustapha Kemal thought and what had been dinned into him was that the British could be trampled on and ignored. He might get over that idea if a lesson were given him locally at Chanak. He recalled what had happened in similar circumstances some two and a half years ago, when there had been an operation of this kind. The decision had then had to be taken without consulting the Cabinet. The Nationalists had lost about 100 and we about 15 men, and the incident had closed. He thought, therefore, there was a danger of exaggerating the situation. After all, the Nationalists only had about 80,000 sabres and bayonets in all, and they did not want to lose them fighting us. Moreover, they did not want to waste ammunition. When Mustapha Kemal found he was up against people who would stand up to him he might change his attitude, and Lord Curzon could then again take up the threads of the peace settlement.

The LORD PRIVY SEAL agreed that was quite possible this might be the way to avoid trouble, but it was impossible to let off guns without having in mind that greater events might come out of it.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR asked Lord Curzon if he differed from the General view?

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said he hoped that the decision would prove a right one. He was glad of the reception that had been given to his action in taking what was, he thought, an obvious duty. He still had his apprehensions but he thought the question was decided first by the physical impossibility of communicating, and second, by Lord Cavan's strong belief that

24 hours, while adding little to our strength, might add considerably to that of the enemy. The course he had proposed, therefore, appeared impracticable, and they could only hope for the best.

F.O 371/7898/E. 10 399

No. 296

*Minutes by Sir William Tyrrell, Foreign Office, on his Conversation
with the French Ambassador at London*

The French Ambassador called to-day to say that his Government took a very serious view of the state of affairs in Thrace, as reports were reaching them from their consular representatives to the effect that the Greek Administration was breaking up, that the Greek soldiers were more or less in a mutinous condition and that there were all the elements for creating a state of disorder possibly leading to indiscriminate massacre. The French Government also realized that the first demand Mustapha Kemal would be likely to put forward would be that the Allies should insist upon the immediate and total evacuation of Thrace up to the line of the Maritza prior to his entry into the Conference, since he would be in a position to make out a very plausible plea that he would not be justified in allowing the Greek forces to recover and eventually refuse to obey the directions of the Allies with regard to evacuation.

To meet this situation the French Government think that military representatives who are to meet Mustapha Kemal at Mudania should be furnished with instructions on the subject, and should be authorized to inform the Kemalists that the Allies would agree to handing over eastern Thrace to the Turkish Civil Administration of Angora and to the creation of a Turkish gendarmerie under foreign officers pending the Angora Government eventually entering into possession of that territory.

The French Government entirely share Lord Curzon's opinion that the first essential is that the meeting contemplated in the Allied note should take place at Mudania, but they are equally anxious that the allied representatives should be furnished with the above instructions.

29/9/1922

F.O 371/7897

No. 297

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ROME, September 29, 1922

(Received October 3.)

No. 882

My Lord,

ON receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 22nd September I called at once upon the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and pointed out to him that the allegation of the Italian press that there had been an attempt on your part to exclude Italy from the deliberations at Paris was a gross misrepresentation of the facts of the case. I gave his Excellency the explanations contained in your telegram, and requested him to issue an immediate *démenti*.

Signor Schanzer replied that to his great regret he was unable to do anything of the kind. He would give your Lordship every credit for not having desired to wound Italian susceptibilities. But it was perfectly obvious that any such meeting as you had in Paris with M. Poincaré at the present juncture could only be in reference to affairs in which Italy was vitally interested. He could not accept any analogy between such a visit and those which he might himself have paid to the French Foreign Minister on other occasions. Your Lordship's action was bound to be regarded throughout Italy, and indeed throughout the world, as an attempt to reach a settlement of the Near Eastern question in conjunction with France without Italian participation. He had fully expressed his own views on the subject in the correspondence which had passed between Count Sforza and Lord Hardinge. In the circumstances the animadversions in the Italian press were entirely justified, and he could not possibly issue a *démenti*. He added that the Italians were a susceptible race and that their feelings were easily wounded. With this remark I could cordially agree. I said that in view of his Excellency's refusal I proposed to issue a *démenti* myself. He answered that I was of course at liberty to do so, but that he would strongly advise me not to, as it would serve no useful purpose and would only aggravate feeling.

I had taken the opportunity at the same time calling Signor Schanzer's attention to the abominable tone recently adopted by the Italian press in its references to Great Britain, and the abuse which it was showering upon His Majesty's Government, and more especially upon the Prime Minister. Little attention had hitherto been paid in the British press to these slanders, but if they continued Anglo-Italian relations must inevitably suffer. With this his Excellency entirely agreed. He promised to send that afternoon for the representatives in Rome of the Italian press and to speak to them very strongly on the subject, insisting that they should modify their tone. I consider this more important than the issue of a

démenti; for the explanations contained in your telegram of the 22nd September have already been discounted in the Italian newspapers and were unlikely to produce any useful effect. I have referred to the above subject in a separate despatch.

With reference to an allusion to Anglo-Italian friendship, Signor Schanzer declared that it had always been his personal policy to favour a close understanding and co-operation with His Majesty's Government, and he had done everything that lay in his power towards this object. But the fulfilment of any such policy was now out of the question. Italian public feeling, after the conference at Genoa had, as I was aware, been strong pro-British and anti-French, but he regretted to record that there had been a complete reversal of opinion. This was due to the attitude adopted towards Italy since the conference by His Majesty's Government, from which Italy had suffered a series of failures, slights and humiliations. He had, with great reluctance arrived at the conclusion that His Majesty's Government attributed little if any importance to Italian friendship. I protested strongly against such an idea, and requested his Excellency to furnish me with further explanations. He quoted the recent incident with Count Sforza in Paris, the British refusal to accept the Italian proposal for an immediate conference at Venice, the ill-success that had attended his own visit to London, and Lord Balfour's attitude on the League of Nations at Geneva, especially in regard to Italy and Austria.

The discussion then turned to the situation in the Near East. I asked Signor Schanzer what the Italian Government had meant in their note of the 13th September (see my telegram No. 278), when they had stated their agreement with His Majesty's Government on the question of the Straits, and had declared that the necessary instruction had been issued to the Italian civil and military representatives in Constantinople. If, as appeared to be the case, this assurance signified that Italian naval and military co-operation was at once to be withdrawn I could only say that its terms were singularly misleading. His Excellency showed considerable discomfort, and could only maintain that Italian public opinion would not for a moment tolerate that the life of one Italian sailor or soldier should be sacrificed in conflict with the Turks. He feared that the British attitude would be regarded as provocative by the Turks, and might precipitate a collision. I said that if the Allied Governments were free to quote the plea of public feeling as a reason for evading their obligations, the precedent was one of extreme danger. There had, in the past, been a divergency of opinion between the British and Italian Governments in the Turco-Greek conflict, although we were in no sense hostile to the Turks, but in the present situation there was surely only one possible attitude. The Allied Powers must defend the Straits at all costs, and not trust to Turkish promises. Orientals were excellent at bargaining and would always present a maximum demand. If they saw that there would be no effective opposition to this

demand they would obviously insist upon obtaining it in full. I could not see what use there would be in a conference if Constantinople and the Straits lay at the mercy of the Turk. I had some experience of the East, and knew that while the policy of firmness paid, that of propitiation and scuttle never produced satisfactory results. In any case, whatever France or Italy might do, the policy of His Majesty's Government was perfectly clear; it was in the best interests of a permanent peace, it would not only safeguard the result of the war, but also prevent the spread of the conflict to Europe. This policy would be supported by adequate force, and had the approval of the British Empire. In this connection I begged his Excellency not to believe a word of what appeared in the "Daily Mail" and other papers, which were, for personal reasons, hostile to His Majesty's Government. The "Daily Mail" was widely read, but had no influence upon instructed opinion and very little even upon that of the mass of its readers. Nor could Moslem feeling in India or elsewhere, however strong, be allowed to carry undue weight in matters of vital imperial interest. Great Britain meant to see the matter through, and the moment a shot was fired national feeling would sweep every trace of internal opposition away. But I begged his Excellency to consider whether, if we were left to face the Turk alone, the death knell of existing alliances would not have been rung. Signor Schanzer replied that he had no doubt that all I told him was perfectly true. The British Empire was a mighty Power with vital interests to defend. But in the present instance there were no similar Italian interests, and he could only repeat that any Italian Government which attempted to fight the Turks would be swept from office at once. However, he trusted that the situation which I had depicted would never arise. Both the French and Italian Governments were pouring good advice upon Mustapha Kemal, and were imploring him to take no aggressive action. In his opinion Thrace was the danger point. According to all the information at his disposal the Greek civil and military administrations there were in full dissolution, and the Turks had already succeeded in introducing large numbers of disguised officers and emissaries.

I spoke to his Excellency in the sense of your Lordship's telegram No. 280, and he promised that the Italian Government would do everything that lay in their power to help the Smyrna refugees. The Italian naval authorities had already saved over 5,000 Greeks as against a far smaller number of Italians and had incurred considerable criticism and even odium on this account.

He enquired whether I knew anything of a French proposal that M. Franklin-Bouillon should be sent on a mission to Kemal on behalf of the three Powers. He strongly deprecated any such idea. He had no confidence in M. Franklin-Bouillon, and in so far as Italy was concerned could not entrust her interests to him. I had at that time no information on the subject.

Finally, Signor Schanzer begged me to assure your Lordship that his own friendly feelings towards His Majesty's Government had suffered no change, and

that you could count on his full support in every effort to secure a peaceful solution of the present crisis.

I have, &c.

R. GRAHAM

F.O 424/255, pp. 30-31, No. 36

No. 298

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at
Paris (No. 330, Telegraphic) and Rome (No. 293, Telegraphic)*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 30, 1922

Telegraphic. D.

HIS Majesty's Minister at Athens enquires whether Greek retirement in Thrace contemplated in ante-penultimate and penultimate paragraphs of Allied invitation to Angora of 23rd September is actually to take place prior to Kemal's acceptance of invitation to peace conference.

In our view, which we cannot doubt will be shared by French (Italian) Government, the answer is in the negative, and Kemal cannot accept the note in fractions.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 451, and Athens, No 272.)

F.O 424/254, p. 388, No. 714

D.B.F.P.I. XVIII, pp. 115-116, No. 76

No. 299

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 30th September 1922, 5.45 p.m.
(Received September 30, 10.5 p.m.)

No. 487. Telegraphic

Your telegram No. 441 has crossed my telegram No. 479 containing my comments on General Harington's telegram No. 2485. I sent these comments immediately after I had received communication of General Harington's above mentioned telegram. My present telegram supplements those comments and deals with specific points you have raised.

1. I entirely agree that it is inadvisable that General Harington should meet Mustapha Kemal alone. If and when Mustapha Kemal says he is ready for a meeting at Mudania the three allied generals should proceed there. In view of

F. 39

Kemalist invasion of neutral zone at Chanak it is obvious that General Harington will have more to discuss with Mustapha Kemal than the two allied generals.

2. I agree that in the event of Maritza being fixed and Greeks accepting it, it would be useless to assign administration of evacuated area to Constantinople government. Mustapha Kemal would never agree to such a procedure. We must rely on allied generals to submit proposals for administration of this area after their meeting with Kemal at Mudania.

3. In the event of Greeks declining to withdraw from Eastern Thrace it appears to me that allies will be confronted with alternative of bringing pressure on Greece to withdraw or of standing aside and allowing Kemal to transport his troops to European shore of Marmora. But allies would not be justified in putting pressure on Greece unless Kemal observed his share of the bargain by respecting neutral zones. If allies stood aside advantages offered to Kemal under Paris proposals would presumably lapse, at all events for the moment. In that event we could not deny Greeks right of entering non-neutral waters of Marmora and attempting to prevent passage of Kemalist troops from Asia to Europe. In practice Kemal would not be able to cross either Dardanelles or Sea of Marmora and he would be limited to trying to cross Bosphorus. This means that he would regardless of consequences try to invade neutral zone opposite Constantinople. The British force would be exposed to weight of bulk of Kemalist army and would inevitably have to withdraw. If Greeks tried to dispute passage of Bosphorus there would be fighting at Constantinople results of which would probably be disastrous to the town.

My telegram No. 479 will have shown you that I am fully alive to consequences of transfer of (grp. undec.) war to Europe. I consider we should do everything possible to avoid such a disastrous eventuality and I entirely agree that our policy should be to adhere as closely as possible to Paris agreement.

Unfortunately it looks at present as if both Kemal and Greeks will make it difficult to adhere closely to Paris agreement. Kemal's delay in replying to allied telegram from Paris coupled with his invasion of neutral zone at Chanak may at any moment lead to an incident which may mark beginning of hostilities and compromise whole position. It is reported that Kemal is having great difficulty in restraining his generals who are certain to be egged on by Bolsheviks but I believe he is playing for time. On the other hand it would seem that watchword of new Greek régime is to be, reorganize Greek troops for defence of Eastern Thrace. There seems little doubt that Greeks in Eastern Thrace are acting in a manner calculated to exasperate Kemalists.

In view of foregoing considerations our energies locally must be directed to getting Kemal to meet allied generals at Mudania as soon as possible. If we can secure this His Majesty's Government will no doubt consider in good time what form of pressure will have to be applied to Greece to get her to evacuate Eastern Thrace.

I entirely agree with last sentence of your telegram under reply.

I have shown this telegram before despatch to Admiral Brock and General Harington both of whom concur in its terms.

F.O. 371/7897/E. 10263

F.O. 424/254, pp. 385-386, No. 707

D.B.F.P.J. XVIII, pp. 116-117, No. 77

No. 300

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 30, 1922

(Received September 30.)

No. 489 *Telegraphic, R.*

YOUR telegram No. 443

I have just made communication to Angora representative.

I took this opportunity of telling him in strongest possible terms that procrastination on the part of Angora Government must cease and that there must be no further vague talk of meeting at Mudania. I said that this meeting must come off without further loss of time, and I spoke in the sense of sentence of your telegram No. 447, beginning: "If, therefore, Mustapha Kemal desires," &c. I said that action of Kemal in entering neutral zone at Chanak was provocative and that there was a limit to the patience of His Majesty's Government.

I also took exception to tone of Mustapha Kemal's last communication to General Harington, which I said was [group or groups omitted] General Harington, I told him that he had better realise that His Majesty's Government would vigorously support their local representatives here.

This shook Hamid up considerably, and he hastened to say that, whilst he could only speak privately, he had reason to believe that meeting at Mudania would take place within two or three days' time. He said he would attend it, and he asked that one of the vessels of Serai-Sefain fleet, name of which he gave, should be fitted with a wireless apparatus so as to enable him to communicate with Constantinople.

I think this means that details of meeting at Mudania have been arranged at Smyrna.

Hamid then handed me a protest, substance of which I am telegraphing separately, against proceedings of Greeks in Thrace. I said that if facts mentioned in this protest were true it was an additional reason why Angora Government should not, by their delays, prolong present unsatisfactory state of affairs.

(Repeated to Athens. No. 155)

F.O. 424/254, p. 386, No. 708

No. 301

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 30, 1922

(Received September 30.)

No. 490 Telegraphic.

GENERAL HARRINGTON has shown me his telegram No. 2538 to War Office. I am in agreement with it. General Marden reports a distinct improvement in situation at Chanak. The Angora Government is now discussing its reply to Allied telegram, and you will have seen from my immediately preceding telegram that there is now a good chance of meeting at Mudania. If General Harrington were to carry out his instructions at once we might compromise the situation irremediably. I do not think we lose anything by delaying action for two or three days to see whether meeting at Mudania materialises. I do not think Kemalists mean business at Chanak. Mustapha Kemal probably means to strengthen his military position at Ismid as much as possible before coming to meeting at Mudania.

F.O. 424/254, pp. 386-387, No. 709

D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, pp. 118-119, No. 79

No. 302

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, September 30, 1922

(Received September 30.)

No. 492 Telegraphic. (by Telephone)

I CALLED this morning on the President of the Council to ask him what news he had received from Franklin-Bouillon of his interview with Mustapha Kemal.

M. Poincaré read to me a long telegram, of which I have copy *in extenso*, which will send to your Lordship to-night, reporting his conversation with Mustapha Kemal, and the proposals which he has made to him. It struck me as very moderate, requiring alteration as suggested by M. Poincaré in only one important detail, upon which he has already taken action. The conversation seemed promising, and at the end Franklin-Bouillon announced his intention of going to Angora and of addressing the Assembly. He added that Mustapha Kemal anticipates considerable difficulties with the Assembly.

M. Poincaré, however, read to me a telegram, which he had received from the French Ambassador in London, reporting the conversation which he had had with

Sir William Tyrrell, and expressed his satisfaction with the views expounded by the latter, which seemed to him to meet the situation in every respect.

M. Poincaré then stated that he had been greatly disturbed to read in the French papers—he mentioned particularly "Figaro" and "Matin"—a statement to the effect that General Harington had been authorised to issue an ultimatum to the Turks, which he interpreted as meaning that, if the Turks refused to agree to the general's demands, there would be war between Turkey and England. He expressed to me his astonishment that, after solidarity between the Allies achieved at the conference here last week, action of such nature should have been taken without consulting either the French or Italian Governments, especially as it would be impossible to see what the eventual result of such action might be throughout Europe. He quoted the case of the Ruhr, stating that, although there would have been no question of war with Germany, he had resisted the desire of a large section of public opinion in France for an incursion into the Ruhr, in view of the attitude of France's allies, and particularly of England, towards that question. He expected to have been consulted in this case before any definite action had been taken, and he stated definitely that the French Government would not consider themselves bound by or responsible for any developments that might result from the action that General Harington had been authorised to take.

I presume that the statements of the French press are inexact, in view of the fact that I can find no corroboration in the Foreign Office and military telegrams sent to me by bag last night, and it would be useful if I could contradict them here.

F.O. 424/7869/E. 102g

F.O. 424/254, pp. 387-388, No. 712

No. 303

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

BUCHAREST, September 30, 1922

(Received October 1.)

No. 128 Telegraphic

My immediately preceding telegram.

It would appear that telegram of Soviet Government is designed to embarrass Rumanian Government at the moment and render impossible any resistance to Allies or action against Turkey.

This is also view of Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have seen to-day. He asked me to call attention to this further threat of Soviet Government, who seem to wish to quarrel with Roumania. He is most anxious that His Majesty's Government should understand that he is in entire sympathy with their policy at

Constantinople, but that it is of vital importance for Roumania to watch her [? Bessarabian] frontier and be prepared for all eventualities there.

Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed personal apprehension at attitude of Mustapha Kemal at present moment, which was not reassuring. He is of opinion that Soviet influence on Angora Parliament is responsible for non-recognition of neutral zone.

I found M. Duca on the whole somewhat nervous, as is also public opinion in the press, which fears general conflagration. I secretly reassured him by quoting privately our General Staff view that Russian forces are not apparently meditating any movements of troops against Roumania at present. He was most grateful for this indication.

(Secret.)

Minister for Foreign Affairs' private opinion of French policy at Constantinople past and present is not favourable. He said that it is incomprehensible.

F.O. 424/255, p. 9, No. 8

No. 304

Count de Saint-Aulaire, French Ambassador at London, to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

(Received October 1.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de France a l'honneur de communiquer, ci-joint, à sa Seigneurie le Marquis Curzon of Kedleston le compte rendu de la première conversation entre M. Franklin-Bouillon et Mustapha Kemal.

M. Poincaré a répondu à M. Franklin-Bouillon en lui signalant la nécessité de l'évacuation de la zone neutre par les Turcs.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,

le 30 Septembre 1922.

F.O. 424/255, p. 7, No. 3

ENCLOSURE IN No. 304

M. Franklin-Bouillon to M. Poincaré

SMYRNA, le 29 Septembre 1922

Télégraphique.

DES mon arrivée, j'ai vu Mustapha Kemal. Son accueil, ainsi que celui des Ministres et commandants particuliers, a été émouvant. Une conversation de quatre heures, continuée le soir et toute la nuit, parce qu'il me demande instamment de partir avec lui à Angora pour lutter contre l'intransigeance du Parlement, où prendrai la parole à ses côtés.

Situation pour lui très difficile. Armée exaspérée en présence destruction absolue du pays presque totalement incendié par Grecs. Renforts britanniques et présence troupes anglaises Tchanağ cause irritation à *(ux)* militaires victorieux.

Conversation commencée par cette déclaration de Mustapha Kémal: "Si je n'avais pas reçu votre dépêche, je n'aurais pas pu arrêter même une minute mes troupes. Aujourd'hui encore, elles croient que j'ai compromis l'intérêt du pays. Il faut agir immédiatement. Mais à quoi bon nous rendre la Thrace si c'est un désert comme l'Anatolie? Je ne puis arrêter mes 300,000 hommes que si vous me garantissez contre les incendiaires."

Mustapha Kémal appuyait ces déclarations en refusant de prendre la responsabilité du délai. J'ai suggéré, en mon nom personnel, occupation immédiate interalliée de la Thrace. Il voulait la France seule. J'ai refusé, pour éviter tout froissement entre Alliés. Voici les chiffres que je crois suffisants: 1,000 hommes à Andrinople; des détachements de trois sous-officiers et de vingt hommes à Tcherkeskeuy, Babaeski, Rodosto, Kirk-Kilissé, Ipsala, Enos, Gallipoli, Midia, Kechan. Ils prendraient administration et assureraient évacuation des Grecs. Commission serait accompagnée par gendarmerie de grande Assemblée et remettrait dans un délai maximum de trente jours administration aux Turcs. C'est le système qui nous a réussi en Cilicie. Troupes turques rentreraient seulement après mise en vigueur du traité définitif. Simultanément, Turcs s'engageraient à rester sur positions actuelles à Tchanağ. Il faudrait agir nécessairement quarante-huit heures en raison des destructions et cruautés que faciliteront encore révoltes troupes se trouvant désormais sans chef. Si nous obtenons par télégraphe solution immédiate, arriverons, je crois, à gagner temps nécessaire pour discussion des conditions transitoires de la paix.

Arrangements sur ces deux points seraient conclus à Moudania, où généraux se borneraient, après avoir reçu instructions expresses des Gouvernements, télégraphiées de Paris, à signer accord sans perdre temps à discuter. Cela montrerait à l'Europe que sommes véritablement entrés dans période négociation paix. La Turquie serait représentée par Ismet Pacha, Généralissime. J'aurai grosses difficultés à faire accepter participation petite Entente et Japon, et exclusion Russie. Je ne puis compter que sur action personnel de Mustapha Kémal. Mais il faut d'abord arrêter les soldats et sauver la Thrace. J'ai conscience de toutes mes responsabilités.

Soyez assuré que les Alliés n'auront qu'à vous remercier de mon effort. En ce qui concerne lieu réunion conférence, les nécessités militaires et politiques empêchent Turcs accepter Europe ou environs Constantinople. Ils demandent Smyrne.

Les questions de Thrace et Tchanaq étant immédiatement réglées, conférence pourrait se réunir vers 15 octobre, et je pense que je serai auparavant à Paris.

FRANKLIN-BOUILLOX.

F.O. 424/255, pp. 7-8, No. 3/1

No. 305

*Count de Saint-Aulaire, Ambassadeur de France à Londres,
au Marquis Curzon of Kedleston*

Le Gouvernement français vient de faire savoir au Comte de Saint-Aulaire que Mustapha Kemal avait télégraphié au Général Pellé pour proposer un retrait simultané des troupes turques et des troupes anglaises de la partie de la zone neutre attenante aux Dardanelles sur la rive d'Asie. On n'autoriserait dans cette zone que la présence de quelques éléments turcs indispensables au maintien de l'ordre.

Le Gouvernement britannique a certainement eu connaissance de cette proposition que l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres est chargé d'appuyer très instamment auprès de Sa Seigneurie le Marquis Curzon de Kedleston.

Le Gouvernement français estime en effet qu'une pareille décision écarterait un danger réel et ménagerait la susceptibilité que soulève toute éventualité d'évacuation. Le Général Pellé a l'impression que les autorités britanniques de Constantinople redoutent de voir les Turcs ne pas observer une convention de ce genre et prendre des dispositions pour menacer la liberté de Détroits. Le Haut Commissaire français à Constantinople pense qu'il serait aisé d'exercer un contrôle par avions ou autrement sur la zone neutre évacuée. M. Poincaré attache une grande valeur aux considérations énoncées par le Général Pellé et estime que la proposition de Mustapha Kemal mérite le plus sérieux examen de la part du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à Sa Seigneurie le Marquis Curzon de Kedleston les assurances de sa très haute considération.

Albert Gate House

Le 30 Septembre 1922

F.O. 371/7897

No. 306

*M. Poincaré, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de France,
à Lord Hardinge, Ambassadeur Britannique à Paris*

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Par une lettre en date du 23 septembre, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire savoir que Mustapha Kemal avait répondu à une démarche collective des amiraux et des consuls par un refus de permettre aux réfugiés grecs du sexe masculin âgés de 18 à 36 ans, de quitter Smyrne et aux autres réfugiés de quitter Smyrne après le 30 septembre. Votre Excellence ajoutait que le Commandant des forces navales anglaises à Smyrne avait l'instruction de protester contre cette décision et d'insister pour que les réfugiés obtinssent la permission de s'embarquer. Le Gouvernement Britannique souhaitait qu'il fût prescrit à l'Amiral Dumesnil d'agir dans le même sens.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence qu'en ce qui concerne le premier point, il ne m'apparaît pas qu'il puisse donner lieu à une protestation. Le refus d'autoriser des sujets grecs mobilisés ou mobilisables à quitter Smyrne est, en effet, conforme aux lois de la guerre.

En ce qui concerne le deuxième point, l'Amiral Dumesnil vient de me télégraphier qu'après avoir réuni hier les commandants supérieurs alliés et américains et leur consuls, il a demandé, au nom de tous, à Nourredin Pacha d'accorder aux réfugiés un délai d'évacuation de quinze jours. Le général Nourreddin en a fait la promesse, sauf événements politiques ou militaires éventuels. Le Commandant de nos forces navales ayant demandé au général si les hommes entre 18 et 45 ans qui ont été arrêtés recevaient une nourriture suffisante, a obtenu de lui sur ce point une affirmation formelle.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Paris, le 30 septembre 1922.

(Signé) POINCARÉ

F.O 371/7897

No. 307

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

FOREIGN OFFICE, 1st October, 1922, 7-30 p.m.

No. 455. *Telegraphic*

His Majesty's Government are glad to hear that Mudania meeting is to take place without delay, and have considered very carefully form of instructions to be sent to Military commanders who will take part in it. Under Paris agreement sole

object of this meeting is to fix line of retirement of Greek forces in Eastern Thrace, in accord with Greek and Turkish military authorities, the Angora government in return for this intervention to undertake not to send troops either before or during final peace conference into neutral zones and not to cross Straits of Marmora.

These conditions must be borne strictly in mind. In accordance with them General Harington, as allied Commander-in-Chief, was instructed by War Office on September 28th to communicate with Allied Generals and the representative of Greek forces, and to arrange for their presence. It is presumed that this has been done.

When Mudania meeting takes place, on October 3rd, the Commanders should proceed with the duty assigned to them at Paris; and should discuss and fix the line in Eastern Thrace. At the same time they should inform Mustapha Kemal that the allied governments cannot exercise pressure upon the Greeks to withdraw behind the line determined, until

- (1) The Kemalist forces have, in accordance with the Paris terms, withdrawn entirely from the neutral zones and
- (2) Until satisfactory arrangements have been made for the preservation of order, and the protection of minorities of whatever nationality, in the evacuated areas.

This will raise at once the question of the provisional administration of Eastern Thrace pending the meeting of the peace conference. The Generals at Mudania will obviously have no authority to settle this question, which is one for the allied governments acting on the advice of their High Commissioners.

It is necessary therefore that the latter should at once proceed to draw up a scheme and should forward it to their several governments with as little delay as possible. We have duly considered the opinions on this subject put forward in your telegrams Nos. 469, 474 and 487 and have further received representations from the French and Italian governments on the subject. There seems to be a general agreement:

- (1) that the administration should be controlled by allied officers;
- (2) that local gendarmerie should as far as possible be employed to maintain order, and should, if the necessity arises, be reinforced by allied troops;
- (3) that it will be useless to hand over the civil administration to the Constantinople government which is powerless to exercise it.

The French Ambassador has communicated to us a proposal of M. Franklin Bouillon for the employment of allied detachments at selected places which M. Bouillon will doubtless communicate to you on his arrival in Constantinople to-day. He admits that Turkish troops could not be admitted until treaty of peace has been concluded and put into operation; and this is obvious, seeing that the

admission of Kemalist forces now would not only provoke a violent conflict but would render peace conference superfluous by anticipating its decisions. Upon the principle of inter-allied occupation there is therefore complete agreement.

We are informing French and Italian governments of these proposals and are asking them to instruct their High Commissioners in above sense. We hope that you will proceed with latter to immediate elaboration of scheme in order that there may be no unnecessary delay. We cannot contemplate Mudania meeting being spun out from day to day, in order to enable Mustapha Kemal to strengthen his position at Ismid with a view to invading Europe. We recognize immense danger of such an invasion in its effect not merely on the general situation but on the population of Constantinople.

In the meantime we are glad to hear from your telegram No. 483 that three or four inter-allied commissions are starting at once or have already started for Eastern Thrace, to calm apprehensions both of Greeks and Turks. Their advice should be of value in drawing up scheme of provisional administration.

Object of above instructions which are I trust clear, is:

(1) to confine Mudania decisions of Commanders to purely military role assigned to them at Paris;

(2) to require of Kemal loyal acceptance of Paris terms, as condition of allied influence to secure evacuation of Thrace;

(3) to refer to High Commissioners all questions of a political character upon which they are not themselves competent to decide.

For your own information. General Harington is at the same time authorised to inform Mustapha Kemal that Great Britain cannot participate in above measures, which are designed to bring about peaceful settlement while Kemalist forces are taking hostile action against Kurdistan and Iraq and that these must be suspended. Kemal cannot go on making war in Asia while we are endeavouring to make peace in Europe.

II. In the course of Mudania meeting Mustapha Kemal may raise several points upon which you should instruct Harington, who has been duly advised, in following sense:

It is extremely undesirable that we should be drawn into any agreement about the stopping of British reinforcements to the Turkish theatre. Such an agreement would be bound to lead to disputes and to allegations of breach of faith in view of our complicated troop movements which may be necessary from one point to another and to the general service of the Empire. Moreover the stipulation which we should have to exact against the forward movement of Kemalist troops and guns towards the neutral zones would certainly not be accepted by him, or observed by him if accepted. Harington should therefore leave it to him to raise the question, and confine him in the first instance to showing all the objections and difficulties.

It, however, an arrangement of this kind is indispensable to the achievement of an otherwise satisfactory settlement we should be willing to agree to the following:

That no reinforcements of fighting units for the army of Royal Air Force shall be embarked from any territory under the control of the British Government for the purpose of reinforcing the British forces in your command, over and above what has actually embarked before the date of this agreement, and the British Government will ask the Dominions not to despatch any forces after that date. But we must retain liberty to add such medical and administrative personnel as may be necessary, and to replace sick wastage.

It must be clearly understood however

a) That the above undertaking only refers to the fighting units of the army and Royal Air Force and not to the supplies and stores required to maintain the said forces in an efficient condition.

b) That the transport of drafts to and from India and other British territory, through the Mediterranean, is not restricted.

The whole of the above must be subject to such reasonable undertaking by Mustapha Kemal as Harington may deem necessary and will hold good so long as Kemal observes his undertakings.

We must retain the right to carry out air reconnaissance over the neutral zones in the Dardanelles and the Ismid Peninsula.

These instructions are for the general guidance of Harington who will report if other subjects are raised.

Repeated to Paris (by bag) No. 334.

First part only up to "For your information", repeated to Rome No. 296 and Athens No. 276.

F.O. 371/7898 E. 10377

F.O. 424/255, pp. 11-13, No. 14

D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, pp. 120-123, No. 81

No. 308

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, 1st October 1922

(Received 1st October, 1922, 3 p.m.)

No. 494

Telegram (by Telephone)

My despatch No. 2285 of yesterday.

Monsieur Poincaré has communicated to me text of further telegram received from Monsieur Franklin-Bouillon, who states that after two days discussion, and with extreme difficulty, he has been able to persuade Mustapha Kemal to order the immediate and total halt of his troops on the positions occupied by them on the day of Monsieur Franklin-Bouillon's arrival, on condition of cessation of British disembarkation of troops and organisation of intrenchments.

He states that this result is due solely to personal authority of Mustapha Kemal, whose desire for peace is absolutely sincere. He adds that the conflict is inevitable if British Government does not accept compromise at present possible without discussing limits of neutral zone or evacuation of villages occupied by Kemalists. Mustapha Kemal accepts this date of October 3rd for meeting at Mudania, of Conference of Generals which will settle arrangement for inter-allied occupation of Greek evacuation of Thrace. He presses for Allies acceptance of this plan which alone can ensure peace.

Mustapha Kemal is telegraphing to Allied Governments to propose October 15th for meeting of Conference at Smyrna. Monsier Franklin-Bouillon promises details of a scheme which he hopes will prevent question of presence of Little Entente or of Russia being raised.

Copy of this telegram by messenger tonight.

F.O. 371/7897/E. 10276

No. 309

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, 1st October 1922

(Received 1st October, 1922, 3 p.m.)

No. 495

Telegram (by Telephone)

My immediately preceding telegram.

In communicating to me Monsieur Franklin-Bouillon's telegram, Monsieur Poincaré informs me that he has, in reply, urged the necessity of not allowing

Turkish troops to approach the immediate neighbourhood of Chanak, in order to avoid even involuntary incident.

Monsieur Poincaré firmly trusts that His Majesty's Government will agree with French government in accepting October 3rd as date for the Mudania meeting; which is, he is convinced, the best means of rapidly settling present situation.

I request that I may be informed of any instructions sent to His Majesty's High Commissioner or General Harington in the above sense.

End of message.

F.O. 371/7897/E. 10277

No. 310

Commander-in-Chief (Mediterranean) to the Admiralty

1st October 1922

(Received 1st October, 1922, 5.28 p.m.)

No. 436

Telegraphic

Following has been received from R.A.C. Second Light Cruiser Squadron, Smyrna. Begins:—

Monsieur Bouillon, personally, has (? been) given me this message, the result of 27 hours conference with Kemal and Cabinet. (Begins)

Paragraph A. I have succeeded in obtaining immediate and complete halt of Turkish troops. Entirely due to personal authority of Kemal that halt was ordered. Advance on Chanak and Constantinople had begun.

Paragraph B. Word of honour has been given that no advance (? will) be made, each side remaining in present positions occupied today 30th September, without movement, reinforcement or entrenchments on either side.

Paragraph C. As against this immediate interallied occupation of Thrace demanded to be carried out on lines already communicated to President Interallied Conference.

Paragraph D. It has been decided Generals will meet at Mudania on 3rd October definitely settle question of stoppage of troop movements and occupation of Thrace. Ismet Pasah will represent Kemal who left for Angora evening of 29th September. (Ends).

Sailed for Constantinople in French "Edgar Quinnet". (Ends).

F.O. 371/7897/E. 10292

No. 311

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 1st, 1922, 1.10. p.m.

(Received October 1st, 7 p.m.)

No. 494. (D).

Telegraphic

Your telegram No. 448.

I asked French and Italian High Commissioners yesterday whether their ships would in case of necessity co-operate with Admiral Brock in preventing transfer of Kemalist forces from Asia to Europe.

French High Commissioner replied that the only instructions he had on the subject were that if British ships attacked Kemal's, French were to take no action. If Kemal accepted (?) invitation, omit.) to attend conference on conditions laid down in allied telegram to him, question of preventing passage of Nationalist troops to Europe would presumably not arise. If Kemal violated his undertaking a different situation would arise and French High Commissioner said he had no instructions on the subject but would ask for them.

I then asked my colleagues whether their troops would remain in Constantinople in the event of Kemal advancing on this town and reaching it. French High Commissioner said this question was difficult to answer but that French troops would no doubt defend themselves if attacked. Italian High Commissioner said that Italian troops would remain here for preservation of order and protection of Italian subjects.

F.O. 371/7897/E. 10282

No. 312

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 1st, 1922, 8 p.m.

(Received October 1st, 9.45 p.m.)

No. 498 and 499

Urgent.

My telegram No. 489 and my telegram No. 493.

At meeting with General Harington and Admiral Brock this morning former stated that Kemal was making dispositions which would enable him to attack neutral zone in Ismid peninsula with force of 30,000 rifles. We agreed that he must not be allowed to play for time indefinitely and decided to bring question of Mudania meeting to a head. I sent Mr. Ryan to Hamid Bey this afternoon with verbal (gr. omit.) on following lines:—

R. begins. "British High Commissioner confirms what he said yesterday about growing impatience of His Majesty's Government in presence of situation which silence of Nationalist authorities and continuous presence of their troops in neutral zone tends to prolong indefinitely in spite of His Majesty's Government's efforts to bring about peaceful solution.

In view of uncertainty in which he is left regarding Nationalist intentions General Harington declares his readiness to proceed to Mudania on October 3rd at 11 a. m. in accordance with proposal of allied governments for preliminary meeting. He expects Nationalist Commander to meet him. If Nationalist authorities do not comply British High Commissioner and General Harington will draw their own conclusions".

Mr. Ryan explained that General Harington would be accompanied by allied Generals and that object of meeting would be as defined in allied note of September 23rd. He added that we had reason to believe that Nationalists themselves contemplated meeting on October 3rd.

Hamid confirmed this. He said that he had received communication from Smyrna which he had been unable to act on as text was corrupt. He was expecting repetition at any moment. Sense however was that Ismet Pasha, Commander of western army, would come to Mudania on October 3rd to discuss delimitation and evacuation of Thrace. Question of neutral zone was not mentioned but message added for his information that orders had been given to arrest all forward movement in direction of Constantinople, Chanak, and even against Greeks. It also stated that meeting would take place in hope of preparing the way for conference. He himself was instructed to attend Mudania meeting.

Mr. Ryan said that Admiral could not see his way to allow installation of wireless on Turkish vessel but would give all facilities for transmission of messages in cypher or otherwise from Mudania if meeting took place. *R. ends.*

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 498, repeated to Athens No. 138.

F.O. 3711 7897; E. 10296

F.O. 4241/255, pp. 9-10, No. 9

D.B.F.P. LXVII, pp. 124-125, No. 83

No. 313

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

(Received October 2.)

No. 2291.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to

transmit herewith copy of a note from M. Poincaré dated the 1st October, enclosing a message from M. Franklin-Bouillon in regard to the Mudania meeting.
Paris, October 1, 1922.

F.O. 424/255, p. 13, No. 15

Enclosure 1 in No. 313

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge

PARIS, le 1^{er} Octobre 1922

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

JE vous communique ci-joint un nouveau télégramme que je viens de recevoir de M. Franklin-Bouillon.

En lui accusant réception, j'insiste auprès de lui sur la nécessité de ne pas laisser les troupes turques dans le voisinage immédiat de Tchanak, afin d'éviter des incidents même involontaires.

J'ai le ferme espoir que le Gouvernement britannique sera d'accord avec nous pour accepter la date du 3 octobre pour la réunion de Moudania. Cette entrevue est, j'en suis convaincu, le meilleur moyen de régler rapidement la situation actuelle.

Croyez, &c.

POINCARE

F.O. 424/255, p. 14, No. 15/2

Enclosure 2 in No. 313

M. Franklin-Bouillon to M. Poincaré

Télégraphique.

SMYRNE, le 29 Septembre 1922

JE suis parvenu, après deux jours de discussion, à décider Moustapha Kémal à ordonner l'arrêt immédiat et total de ses troupes sur les positions qu'elles occupaient le jour de mon arrivée, à condition que, de leur côté, les Anglais cesseraient leurs débarquements et l'organisation de retranchements.

Les forces turques avaient déjà commencé leur marche sur Tchanak et Constantinople. J'ai dû, pour faire revenir les généraux sur cette décision, me livrer à une lutte épuisante.

La raison n'a pu triompher que grâce à l'autorité personnelle de Moustapha Kémal, dont la volonté de paix est absolue. Nous allons à un conflit certain et

F. 40

rapide si le Gouvernement anglais n'accepte pas la transaction actuellement possible sans revenir sur la discussion des limites de la zone neutre, ni insister sur l'évacuation des villages qui pourraient avoir été occupés par les nationalistes. La date du 3 octobre est acceptée par Moustapha Kémal pour la conférence des généraux à Moudania, qui enregistrera les modalités convenues entre les Gouvernements pour l'occupation interalliée et l'évacuation grecque de la Thrace. Je vous demande instamment d'obtenir que les Alliés, sans revenir sur le passé, se rallient immédiatement à ce plan, qui sauvegarde tous les amours-propres. Sinon, il faudrait renoncer à tout espoir de paix.

Ce soir, Moustapha Kémal adresse aux Gouvernements une dépêche en ce sens [deux groupes faux] relative à l'organisation de la conférence de Smyrne, qui demeurerait fixée du 15 octobre. Je préciserai demain une solution que je crois avoir trouvée avec Moustapha Kémal pour permettre à l'Assemblée d'Angora de ne plus soulever la question de la présence de la petite Entente ou de la Russie. En raison de l'action bolchevique, à laquelle Sadoul se livre désespérément à Angora, nous avons décidé de renoncer à me faire entendre par l'Assemblée, mettant notre confiance dans l'action des groupes amis. J'attends pour demain votre réponse au sujet de Moudania.

Le Ministère nationaliste s'associe entièrement à Moustapha Kémal, à la suite de notre entente, pour me demander de rentrer vous mettre au courant de la situation en vue de la conférence, quand les résultats attendus de la conférence de Moudania auront pu être obtenus.

Obligés d'aller charbonner, je partirai pour Constantinople après réception de votre réponse au sujet de Moudania.

F.O. 424/255, p. 14, No. 15/2

No. 314

*Conversation between the Prime Minister and M. Diamandy, October 1, 1922
(Received in Foreign Office, October 4.)*

Present:

British Prime Minister,
Sir Edward Grigg.

M. Diamandy.

M. DIAMANDY began by saying that he was very glad to have an opportunity of meeting the Prime Minister, as he had been specially deputed to come to England for that purpose by M. Bratiano. He would like to state the views of Roumania briefly.

In her opinion the menace caused by the present Kemalist advance was very dangerous. The entry of the Kemalist army into Europe might have reactions

which would disturb the whole of the territorial *status quo* in Eastern Europe. It would inevitably involve both Russia and Bulgaria, and Roumania feared a very grave situation. Her view, therefore, was that Kemal should be kept out of Europe. In this matter she agreed entirely with Great Britain, and deplored the French point of view. In particular, she deplored the French idea that the relations of Europe with Turkey could be settled by colonial considerations.

Roumania was threatened on three frontiers by restless Powers—Russia, Hungary and Bulgaria. He remembered that at Genoa M. Chicherin had expressly stated that, in the event of war with Turkey, Russia would not be bound by the pact of non-aggression.

Roumania had been surprised—if he might speak frankly, disagreeably surprised—by the fact that she had not been consulted regarding the terms of the Paris Allied note to Mustapha Kemal. She was so deeply interested in the question, and had, as she believed, stood so faithfully by the Allies in the war that she thought she had a reason to be invited to give her opinions before the decision was taken, and to be trusted fully by the great Allies.

Roumania held two views strongly regarding the Eastern question:

1. That there should be no common frontier between Turkey and Bulgaria, and that, if such a frontier were permitted, there should at least be a neutral zone guaranteed by the Allies.
2. That the freedom of the Straits should be safeguarded by the demilitarisation of both the European and Asiatic shores under the control of an Allied commission. In this respect Roumania was not quite satisfied with the guarantee of the League of Nations, as she feared that her very vital interests might be overruled by States with very limited interests, such as Salvador and Guatemala.

He ended by handing the Prime Minister a note which contained the views of the Roumanian Government.

(He also remarked that the non-settlement of Eastern Galicia was causing considerable embarrassment to Roumania. Unrest among the Ruthenians reacted on Roumania, and they hoped that a settlement might soon be possible.)

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was glad that the Roumanian Government had decided to send M. Diamandy over to take the British Government into its confidence, and he would talk quite freely. Lord Curzon had approached the representatives of both Roumania and Serbia before he went to Paris, and did his best to see that their views were taken thoroughly into account. There was, however, a good deal of hesitancy shown. We made no complaint of that, but the crisis at that moment required prompt decisions and an arrangement had to be made at once. There had, however, been no idea of leaving Roumania out of the conference which would settle the peace.

We did not know at present what Kemal Pasha would do. He was very elated, although, in point of fact, he had won not a military but only a political victory. He

was, however, undoubtedly in an intractable frame of mind, and therefore very dangerous. Our military authorities informed us that he was massing eighteen divisions behind the Ismid Peninsula ready to cross into Europe, and there was no telling what the Turkish leaders would do in these circumstances. We had heard that a meeting was probably to be held next Tuesday at Mudania between the allied generals and the two combatants. Kemal might demand the right to occupy Eastern Thrace immediately. That we could not allow. He might also demand that we should evacuate Chanak. To that also we would not consent. Chanak was an essential feature in the rights which we demanded. It was an emblem of the freedom of the Straits, and we would refuse absolutely to evacuate it. On the other hand, if Kemal proved reasonable the next stage would be a full peace conference.

We were pledged in the event of the conference taking place to invite the Greeks to retire west of the Maritza and to cede Eastern Thrace to Turkey. He could not see that in such circumstances Greece would refuse. Bulgaria would then become the heir to the troubles of Thrace, and he had no doubt that the troubles of Thrace under Turkish misgovernment would be very terrible. If Greece was out of those troubles Bulgaria would inevitably be in. She would take steps in her own time and become the most formidable Power in the Balkans. He quite understood, therefore, that the Roumanian position between Bulgaria, the Magyars and the Russians was a serious one, and he also recognised that Roumania's most formidable immediate danger was Soviet Russia.

He thought, however, that Soviet Russia was still anxious for friendly relations with Great Britain. Great Britain was the only Power, except the United States, able to help Russia to her feet. The Urquhart Agreement was a practical step in that direction. When one capitalist started others followed, and he did not think that the Soviet Government would wish to interrupt this process. For that reason he thought that we might be able to exercise a restraining influence upon Russia and to persuade her to remain neutral. He did not wish to exaggerate our influence, which was uncertain, but he thought we might succeed in preventing Russia from making any attack on our Roumanian ally.

With regard to equipment, he said that he would ask the Secretary of State for War to go into the matter. He could make no promises, but he was ready to say that if other conditions were satisfactory we would do our best to help. Certainly if Roumania found herself fighting on our side she could count on our supplying her necessities.

With regard to the despatch of a Roumanian contingent there were two eventualities to be considered.

If peace were preserved, Roumania would certainly be asked to provide one of the contingents necessary for the international guarantee of the freedom of the Straits.

If war unfortunately broke out, we should like to know exactly where Roumania would stand. The British Empire would, as it seemed, almost inevitably be involved. Its forces would come rather slowly into play. Some of them would be sent from Australia and New Zealand. The presence, therefore, of immediate contingents on the spot in the first stage of operations would be very valuable. We wished, therefore, to know whether Roumania in such circumstances would assist in preventing Kemal from establishing himself in Europe.

With regard to the sea, we should probably need Constanza, and arrangements would have to be made with Roumania for that purpose.

In any case we were prepared to see that Roumania should be guaranteed participation in the peace conference and that she should be invited to participate in the international guarantee of the Straits. The discussion was at present in the air, and he would not ask for an immediate reply as to Roumania's intentions. We should probably have no news of how things were going to develop before Thursday, and he would like to see M. Diamandy again later in the week.

M. DIAMANDY said that Roumania was perfectly convinced that French policy in the Near East was mistaken, but, nevertheless, she would always regret a division between Great Britain and France.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that we desired also to act in close co-operation with France, but that we could not sacrifice the primary interests of the British Empire for France's sake. He was quite sure that, even if France found herself unable to act with us, she would remain the spectator of events. There could be no question, of course, of her intervention upon the other side.

M. DIAMANDI said he was sure of that.

F.O. 424/255, pp. 43-44 No. 55

No. 315

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Count de Saint-Aulaire

Your Excellency,

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 2, 1922

WITH reference to your conversation with Sir W. Tyrrell on the 29th September regarding the situation in Thrace, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Italian Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, suggested on the 30th September that the three Allied Ministers at Athens should collectively press for a Greek withdrawal behind the Maritza, and for the immediate establishment of a Turkish administration and Turkish gendarmerie in the evacuated territory, prior to the meeting of the Allied generals at Mudania.

2. I am informing M. de Martino in reply that, having received an enquiry from His Majesty's Minister at Athens as to when the Greek retirement in Thrace

could take place, I have already telegraphed to the British representatives at Paris, Rome, Athens and Constantinople that in the view of His Majesty's Government, which they confidently assume will be shared by the French and Italian Governments, a decision regarding the line to which the Greek troops should withdraw in Thrace must be taken by the Allied generals at the Mudania meeting proposed for this specific purpose in the antepenultimate and penultimate paragraphs of the Allied note of the 23rd September. The actual Greek withdrawal, however, cannot precede Kemal's acceptance of the Allied note of the 23rd September as a whole, and therefore of the invitation to the peace conference as well as to the meeting of the generals at Mudania. Should they pronounce in favour of the Maritza as the line behind which the Greek forces are to withdraw, His Majesty's Government will accept the decision.

3. With regard to the provisional administration of Thrace after the Greek withdrawal, separate instructions have already been issued to Lord Hardinge for communication to M. Poincaré.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

F.O. 424/255, p. 20, No. 28

No. 316

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

PARIS, October 2, 1922

(Received October 2.)

No. 499

Telegraphic. D

YOUR telegram No. 337.

I saw President of the Council this morning, and he agreed as to importance of securing presence of a Greek general at Mudania to-morrow, and he will send instructions to Athens in that sense.

He remarked that it was quite possible that Mustapha Kemal's representative would object to meeting Greek general, in which case difficulty could be bridged by Allied generals holding two meetings at Mudania, one with Mustapha Kemal's representative, the other with the Greek general.

(Sent to Constantinople and Athens.)

F.O. 424/255, p. 19, No. 27

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 2, 1922

(Received October 2.)

No. 503

Telegraphic. D

AT suggestion of French High Commissioner, Franklin-Bouillon, who arrived here yesterday evening, gave last night to Allied High Commissioners and generals account of his negotiations at Smyrna, and of his views in general.

Following are chief points of this account, which was of an excessively partisan character:

Out of thirty-six hours spent at Smyrna twenty-seven had been taken up in conference with Mustapha Kemal, Fethi Bey [? Reo] ul, Yussuf Kemal, Ismet and Fevzi Pashas.

In the whole of his parliamentary career he had never had a more difficult task or met with such determination and resistance.

On his arrival at Smyrna he found 150,000 Turkish troops who wanted to advance were being set in motion against Constantinople and Chanak with absolute intention of occupying former and attacking latter.

Though Mustapha Kemal himself was sincerely anxious for peaceful solution, no victorious army had ever stopped and waited before its own capital.

Turks were, incapable of understanding why British troops had occupied Chanak, or why they were being refused permission to at once occupy Thrace, which had been promised to them by the Allies.

One brutal fact had to be borne in mind. Turkish army had just advanced through 400 kilom. of country utterly and completely devastated by the Greeks. It was feared lest same fate would befall Thrace if Greeks were allowed to remain there one day longer.

Though they knew dangers and difficulties, Turks had reached state of mind which made them regardless of risks, losses or consequences.

Principal fault of Allied policy in East had always been that they had been too late. This fault must be avoided now if a catastrophe were to be averted.

By dint of argument and persuasion he had at last minute induced Turks to suspend all movements of their troops, in hope that British would take similar action, and not permit further fortifications to be constructed or reinforcements brought out, and provided that Allies gave proof of their good faith by themselves ejecting Greeks from Thrace and preserving that province from the ruin which had befallen Anatolia.

Franklin-Bouillon then read letter addressed to President of the Council by Yussuf Kemal, promising that an answer would be given to conference proposal in a few days, acknowledging assurances of Allied Governments respecting just peace, stating that, trusting in Franklin-Bouillon's assurances, all movements of troops would be suspended, pointing out impossibility of allowing Greeks to stop even a day longer in Thrace, and notifying acceptance of Mudania Conference at which Ismet Pasha would [? omitted: represent] Government of Angora.

Franklin-Bouillon then read proposed instructions for Allied generals at Mudania, which he has apparently also submitted to Paris. Instructions were doubtless drawn up in agreement with Kemalist leaders. In support of point contained therein that British and Turkish troops should remain in positions actually occupied, Franklin-Bouillon urged with great warmth that British should not insist on withdrawal of Turkish troops from positions now held by them in Chanak zone. He said that Turks would never agree to withdraw and could never impose withdrawal on their troops.

(Repeated to Athens.)

F.O. 371/7897/E. 10366

F.O. 424/255, p. 16, No. 21

No. 318

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, 2nd October 1922, 7.0. p.m.

(Received October 2, 9.20 p. m.)

No. 504. (D).

Telegraphic.

Very Urgent.

At meeting this morning, to discuss attitude of generals at Mudania meeting, French High Commissioner endeavoured to assert that reply addressed to President of the Council by Angora Minister for Foreign Affairs, promising, within a few days, reply of his government to conference proposal and accepting Mudania meeting, constituted an actual expression of readiness of Angora government to attend that conference and could be accepted as such by generals who could therefore proceed at once with arrangements for evacuation of Thrace by Greece and organization of temporary administration there.

I told French High Commissioner that I could not admit such an interpretation. In this I was supported by my Italian colleague. I informed High Commissioners that I could not agree to any definite engagements as regards pressure on Greeks etc. being undertaken until formal acceptance by Kemal of

peace conference had been received and held to be satisfactory by allied governments. In this connection I notified High Commissioners of terms of your telegram No. 430 to Paris.

It was eventually agreed that there was no objection to generals explaining fully measures which allied governments would be prepared to take in the event of, and in anticipation of, satisfactory reply from Kemal.

It will be practically impossible owing to conflicting views (? of our) governments to ensure that all three allied generals shall have (? received) identic instructions before meeting. General Harington however fully appreciates that our hands cannot be bound and those of Angora left free. French High Commissioner also raised this morning question of exact line in Thrace behind which Greeks should be requested to retire.

He drew attention to inconvenience, throughout its whole course, of line of Maritza River since railway line from Kuleli Bourgas to Karagatch runs for thirty-eight kilometres west of that river.

French High Commissioner argued that it would be preferable and more practical from point of view of railway communication if line selected between those places were railway line which should be left to Turks rather than line of river. Continuity of railway would thus remain unbroken.

I said that without instructions from you I could not agree to any modification of Maritza frontier which was in fact frontier accepted by Turks themselves.

Italian High Commissioner suggested that this complication was capable of adjustment later by means of arrangement regulating travelling facilities and prohibiting customs barriers on this part of railway.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 504.

Repeated to Athens No. 164.

F.O. 371/7897/E. 10367

F.O. 424/255, p. 17, No. 22

D.B.F.P. I. XVIII, pp. 133-134, No. 87

No. 319

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, October 2nd 1922, 2.0. p.m.

(Received October 3rd, 6.30 a. m.)

No. 533. (R)

Telegraphic

My telegram No. 532.

Colonel Plasteras who is real head of the military movement called on me this morning and asked if it was true that allied Generals were to meet Kemal at Mudania tomorrow. I said that was the desire of allied Generals to have the meeting but I was not yet sure that the other side would come.

Colonel Plasteras then informed me that he was going to Thrace tonight to try to reform the army there.

Number of officers had already been sent. He asked me what was to be the future of the province. I told him that His Majesty's Government were most anxious for peace and that if Kemal accepted allied invitation to conference it would be madness for Greeks to refuse. Greece would have need of the Powers after the long war and would have a fine country left to her. She could not hope for assistance in putting her house in order unless she accepted the decisions of the Powers.

Colonel Plasteras objected that if Greece refused she would be face to face with an enemy also weakened by war and that the Greeks might well hold their own and even take Constantinople. I replied that whole lesson of the last two years was that Greece could do nothing in the long run if isolated. Should she act as proposed she would be just as isolated as she had been during these two years and result would be a real catastrophe for her.

Colonel Plasteras admitted the force of these arguments and said that after all he was not a political man. Monsieur Veniselos understood foreign situation and was best judge. He would do what Monsieur Veniselos advised in this matter but he must lose no time in getting army of Thrace into shape.

I said that I thought a disciplined force was very necessary in Greece because one never knew how far successes of Kemal might have turned his head. An army might be required on Maritza and discipline was absolutely necessary in Thrace itself in order to put an end to massacres and excesses of which I had already spoken to him and which would do incalculable harm to the Greek cause. Colonel Plasteras said that his first efforts would be directed to stopping this kind of thing which he hated as much as I.

Impression left by visit was that Colonel Plasteras is a real soldier who will do all he can to put down disorder and will take political advice from those in whom

he has confidence. His personal courage is a by-word in the army and I would sooner deal with him than any other Greek I have met.

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/7898/E. 10400

F.O. 424/255, pp. 14-15, No. 16

D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, pp. 131-133, No. 86

No. 320

Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

(Received October 4.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de France a l'honneur de communiquer ci-joint à son Excellence le principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires étrangères le texte de la réponse du Gouvernement d'Angora adressée à M. Poincaré en sa qualité de président de la Conférence de Paris, en réponse à la communication des Gouvernements alliés du 23 septembre dernier.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire a été chargé de demander à sa Seigneurie le Marquis Curzon de Kedleston de vouloir bien lui faire connaître le plus tôt possible la réponse officielle du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté à cette communication, afin que la conférence de Moudania puisse se réunir le 3 octobre. Il saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,

le 2 octobre 1922.

F.O. 424/255, p. 42, No. 54

Enclosure in No. 320

*Texte de la Réponse du Gouvernement d'Angora à la Note des Gouvernements alliés
du 23 Septembre 1922*

A son Excellence M. Poincaré, Président de la Conférence de Paris.

M. le Président,

SMYRNE, le 29 Septembre 1922

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que la réponse à la note adressée en date du 23 septembre 1922 par les trois Puissances alliées au Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie sera donnée dans quelques jours par mon Gouvernement, confiant dans les assurances que M. Franklin-Bouillon, qui vient d'arriver chez le commandant en chef des armées turques, a données d'accord avec les représentants des Puissances de l'Entente réunis à Paris et persuadé qu'on procédera tout de suite aux négociations afin d'établir une paix juste. L'ordre est donné d'arrêter immédiatement nos opérations militaires, qui se développent sans arrêt dans la direction de Constantinople et de Tchanaq à la

poursuite des armées helléniques. Les assurances données par M. Franklin-Bouillon ont établi les sentiments de justice dont sont inspirées en réalité les propositions de l'Entente en vue d'assurer les droits de la Turquie. Cependant, le maintien de la Thrace, ne fût-ce qu'un seul jour de plus, sous l'administration et l'occupation de l'armée hellénique, étant la cause des dangers de toutes sortes ainsi que la douleur des populations de Turquie, il est indispensable d'évacuer immédiatement et de restituer d'urgence au Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie la Thrace jusqu'à l'ouest de la Maritza, y compris Andrinople. La convocation à Moudania d'une conférence des généraux alliés, afin de fixer des questions urgentes répondent aux désirs et aux propositions des Puissances de l'Entente. La réunion de cette conférence est proposée pour le 3 octobre 1922.

Le Général Ismet Pacha, commandant les armées du front de l'ouest, est personnellement désigné pour nous représenter à la conférence de Moudania. Dans le cas où la date précitée conviendrait, je vous prie de vouloir bien faire désigner les généraux devant se rendre à cette conférence et de nous en faire connaître les noms.

YOUSSEUF KEMAL

*Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement
de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie.*

F.O. 424/255, p. 42 No. 54/1

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T I P K I B A S I M L A R

SECRET.

C.P. 3434.

THE CABINET.

10169
SEEN BY
25 OCT 1921
SPYRE CROWE

THE SITUATION IN ANATOLIA, 1st OCTOBER, 1921.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR

I circulate herewith a memorandum by the General Staff on the position in Anatolia following upon the recent retirement of the Greek Army.

171
1
1182

THE WAR OFFICE,

L. W.-E.

21st October, 1921.

1. Occasion for this paper.

The withdrawal of the Greek Army, at the end of September, 1921, to their old lines east of Eskişehir, marks the completion of a definite phase in the Turco-Greek operations. The occasion thus arises for a fresh appreciation of the situation in Anatolia.

2. Course of recent operations.

The map attached to this paper indicates—

- (a.) The Greek positions at the commencement of the operations in July;
- (b.) The furthest point reached in the Greek advance on Angora;
- (c.) The position on 1st October.

3. Greek objectives in recent operations.

In these operations, which began on 9th July, 1921, the Greek objectives were as follows:—

- 1st Objective.—To compel the Turkish Nationalist Army to fight, and to destroy it.
- 2nd Objective.—To occupy the Nationalist Capital, Angora.
 - (a.) With the political object of bringing the Turks to terms.
 - (b.) With the military object of gaining possession of the Nationalist workshops and depôts at Angora, and of denying to the Turks the use of the Angora—Eskişehir railway, the main line of approach to Smyrna, from the heart of Anatolia.
- 3rd Objective.—To obtain the power of rapidly concentrating their army, either on the Bursa or Üsküdar front, by gaining possession of the Anatolian railway, through Eskişehir and Ağın Kara Hisar.

4. Results of the operations.

The extent to which the Greeks obtained their objectives is as follows:—

1st Objective.

In the early stages, the Greeks failed to bring about a decisive battle, although they succeeded in surprising the Turks and turning the Kutaya position. At Eskişehir, on 21st July, the Turks seized the initiative and carried out a very strong counter-attack in hold up the Greek advance. It is to be noted that this counter-attack coincided with the refusal of the Angora Government to accept the offered assistance of the Bolshevik Army of the Caucasus. This counter-attack was defeated by the Greeks who, however, were unable to reap the fruits of victory owing to the fatigue of the troops and the necessity for reorganising the Greek supply and transport arrangements after their long and rapid advance over difficult country. Following this battle the Turks withdrew a further 70 miles east, refusing battle west of the Sakarya river. They thus compelled the Greeks to follow them through an inhospitable country, and to extend their lines of communication to such a degree that supply became a matter of the greatest difficulty. This difficulty was intensified by the successful raiding activities of small Turkish forces which hovered on the flanks of the Greek advance. The Turks accepted battle at the Sakarya and won a signal victory; and the Greeks have therefore failed in their primary objective.

Tipkhasım :

Sakarya Muharebeleri Sonrasında, 1 Ekim 1921'de Anadolu'da askerî durum hakkında İngiliz Genelkurmayının raporu (Belge 9'un tipkhasımı)

2nd Objective.

The Greeks have failed to gain their second objective, but they report that they have done much damage to the Angan-Ekiskheh railway.

3rd Objective.

The Greeks have attained this objective at a cost greatly exceeding their estimate. It, however, remains to be seen whether they will be able to hold what they have gained. Their front from Afium Kara Hisar through Alpi Heni to Bişik measures 180 miles, without making any allowance for covering the open flank at each end of this line. It is supplied by two lines of communication situated in the rear of the extreme flanks, and neither of them adequately protected by the position of the field army. Furthermore, the northern line of communication through Beaa, which was 70 miles in length prior to these operations, now measures 125 miles to Ekiskheh; whilst the southern line, which formerly measured 185 miles to Tendu Pinar, now measures 225 miles to Afium Kara Hisar. These extended lines of communication are very vulnerable and invite attack.

The Greeks have thus gained only the least important of their three objectives; but it is probable that even this partial success is more than counter-balanced by the moral effect produced, both in the opposing armies, and also among the inhabitants of Anatolia, by the Turkish victory at the Sakaria.

3. Causes of Greek failure.

The causes which appear to have led to the failure of the Greek Army may be summarized as follows:—

- (a) The over-weening confidence of the Higher Command in the power of their army.
- (b) An indifferent intelligence service, which appears to have given very incomplete information concerning the enemy.
- (c) The plan of operations for the battle of the Sakaria was exceedingly complicated, thus leading to many unforeseen situations with which the Greek command was not sufficiently good to deal.
- (d) Faulty means of inter-communication.
- (e) Inadequate means of transport and faulty supply arrangements.
- (f) Faulty ammunition supply.
- (g) Bad subordinate Staff work generally.
- (h) Their failure to cripple the Turkish Army in the early stages of the operations. This compelled them to employ at the Sakaria forces larger than they were able to maintain there.

4. Distribution of opposing armies, 23rd September, 1921.

From the latest information at our disposal, the distribution of the opposing armies appears to have been as follows:—

Greek Army—						Rifle and sabre strength.
Bişik area—						
1 Division	3,700
1 Regiment	1,500
Ekiskheh area, General Headquarters—						
12 Divisions	37,000
Cavalry Brigade	400
Afium Kara Hisar area—						
1 Division	3,700
2 Regiments	3,000
Reserve—6 Regiments	7,300
Total						54,900
Nationalist Army—						
Bişik area—2 Divisions						3,200
Ekiskheh area—12 ½ Divisions						36,500
Afium Kara Hisar area—10 Divisions						13,750
Reserve—6 Divisions						14,000
Total						67,450

Tipkibasiu s'in arkast

7. Present condition of the Turkish Nationalist Army

(a) *The Higher Command*.—Doubt no longer exists as to the sincerity of Nationalist General Headquarters, and of the Commanders of formations. Their reading of the statement, over 100 miles in length, in the face of a resolute enemy, and without any serious mishap, indicates the skill of command and higher staffs, while their handling of the difficult tactical situation in the battle of the Sakaria appears to have been efficient.

(b) *The troops*.—All the information at our disposal indicates that the Turkish soldier is good. The cavalry have shown enterprise and dash. The infantry have fought stubbornly and well, and their marching has been in no way inferior to that of the Greeks. The artillery, though numerically weaker than that of the Greeks, has been skillfully handled.

(c) *Casualties*.—It is reported that the Turkish casualties from the commencement of operations have amounted to about 30,000, and that in addition there have been some 10,000 deserters. It is also reported that 25,000 reinforcements had been sent to the Army before the end of the operations. It may, therefore, be assumed that the Army will soon be up to its original strength.

(d) *War material*.—There is no evidence to show that the Turks are dangerously deficient in guns, rifles, ammunition, or other war material; but it is known that their reserves are small. As, however, from secret information at our disposal, it is believed that they are now arranging for large supplies of this nature from France and other European countries, it seems probable that by next spring they will be better armed and equipped than they have hitherto been. We have no definite information as yet that contracts are complete, although arrangements are far advanced. When these arrangements are complete, the Turks will no longer be dependent upon Bolshevik Russia for the supply of such material.

(e) *Morale*.—The morale of the Turkish Nationalist Army must be considered high. The effect of the victory at the Sakaria, and the subsequent 60 miles advance, will have spread, not only to the Army, but throughout the length and breadth of Anatolia. It will assuredly have kindled Nationalist enthusiasm among those who were wavering in their allegiance to Mustafa Kemal, and is likely to redouble the difficulties of the Greeks in the occupied area.

(f) *Position of Mustafa Kemal*.—There is no doubt that the prestige of Mustafa Kemal himself has been greatly enhanced as a result of these operations. Formerly in the position of a Prime Minister answerable to a Government, he now appears to be almost in the position of a Dictator. We may, therefore, assume that the Moderate Party in the Angora Government is, for the time being, firmly in power, and this assumption, if correct, would seem to remove any immediate danger of the return of Enver Pasha, or of a military alliance between the Nationalists and Bolshevik Russia, especially as the Nationalists will shortly be no longer wholly dependent upon Russia for the supply of war material. At the same time, Mustafa Kemal is in such a strong military position, that there appears to be no reason why he should moderate his political demands, in the event of peace negotiations being re-opened.

8. Present condition of the Greek Army

(a) *The Higher Command*.—Full credit must be given to the Greek Higher Command for their excellent conduct in the earlier phases of these operations. With the exception of one misreading of orders, while the Greeks were advancing through Eskişehir, by which an opportunity was lost of intercepting a considerable Turkish force, the operations were carried through according to plan. Even in the battle of the Sakaria the Greeks appeared at one time to be within reach of victory, but at the close of the battle they allowed themselves to be outgeneralled by the Turks, and thus they failed.

(b) *The troops*.—All evidence in our possession goes to prove that the Greek troops marched and fought ably, in spite of great privations. Their defeat at the Sakaria, and subsequent retirement to Eskişehir, must inevitably have adversely affected their morale, which, previous to these events, was very high. They must also, to some extent, have lost confidence in their leaders, and this will no doubt lead to the usual political bickering, so prevalent in the Greek Army even in better times, which tends so unfortunately upon its efficiency.

(c) *Casualties*.—It is reported that the Greek casualties have amounted to about 24,000. Most of these casualties have no doubt been replaced already, and the balance can be replaced in the near future.

(Contd.)

Tipkhasim i'in arkau

(d) *War material*.—It was evident that at the Sakaria there was a shortage of ammunition, but this is accounted for by the failure of transportation arrangements, and did not represent an actual shortage in the country. As the Greeks are now at liberty to purchase their requirements from civilian firms of any nationality, there appears to be no reason why they should not in future obtain all their needs, up to the limit of their financial resources.

B. Courses open to the Turkish Nationalists.

It is evident from recent information that the Greeks do not intend to resume the offensive before next spring. The initiative in the campaign may therefore be considered as having definitely passed to the Turks. The courses open to Mustafa Kemal are as follows:—

- (a) To continue operations on a large scale and engage the Greek Army with a view to defeating it, and driving it out of Anatolia.

Such operations would be difficult at any time, owing to the lack of railway facilities and accommodation for troops, but the difficulties in winter will be multiplied many times. This course is therefore very improbable, if similar results can be obtained by other means.

- (b) To avoid a general engagement, but to harass the Greeks by guerrilla operations, directed against their lines of communications, with a view to compelling them to withdraw from their present line.

Such operations present comparatively little difficulty. Mustafa Kemal would be able to count on receiving assistance from the Turkish elements of the population in the occupied area. Climatic conditions, and the difficult nature of the country, would render such operations even more difficult to cope with than the similar tactics adopted by the Boers in the later stages of the South African War. If the Turks successfully develop guerrilla tactics they would stand a good chance of compelling the Greeks to abandon Eskişehir.

- (c) To avoid all active operations against the Greeks and devote the winter to training and re-organization, hoping that political and financial troubles will force the Greek Government to demobilize the bulk of their army during the winter.

Time is undoubtedly in favour of the Turks in this connection, as the Greeks cannot afford to maintain a large army in the field for an indefinite period. From a military point of view, however, the complete cessation of offensive operations is unusual.

- (d) Concurrently with (a), (b) or (c) the Ankara Government may develop operations against either Constantinople or Mesopotamia, with a view to bringing pressure on the Allies to induce them to modify the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres.

An early advance on Constantinople, with the Greek Army situated on the flank as it is at present, would be a very dangerous military operation. It would also bring the Nationalists into direct conflict with France and Italy, as well as with Great Britain, thus creating a situation which would appear to be at present out of harmony with the political programme of the Ankara Government.

An operation of any magnitude against Mesopotamia appears to be equally improbable unless the French Government conclude a separate peace in Cilicia. It is considered that Mustafa Kemal will be disinclined to reduce his forces on the western front by sending any considerable detachments to the Tigris front so long as the Greek Army remains in Asia Minor. Even if political considerations demanded such a course the difficulties of transportation would probably prevent its adoption. The central section of the Baghdad Railway is in French hands, so that the Turks would have the assistance of the railway for only a portion of the distance.

An operation undertaken by a small detachment against the Mosul vilayet is *theoretically* always possible, until such time as peace is restored in Anatolia. It is an *actual* possibility at Ankara that even a small operation in this area would suffice to cause much disappointment and anxiety in Great Britain, and we must therefore be prepared for the possibility. The enemy forces, to be expected, would consist of local tribesmen.

Topkibasım r'in arkası

supported by such Turkish regulars as still remain in the Diarbekr area. The numbers of Turkish regulars in this area are believed to be small, but there are enough to cause us trouble. On the other hand, if the French conclude a separate peace in Cilicia, ample Turkish forces would become available to cause us serious anxiety.

10. Courses open to the Greek Army.

The arrival of winter precludes the possibility of offensive operations on a large scale. Any minor offensive operations, which might be undertaken, would merely tend to increase the supply and transport difficulties, which are already considerable. The courses open to the Greek Army would therefore appear to be as follows —

- (a.) To maintain their present positions, with a view to resuming the offensive in the Spring.

It seems probable that, by the Spring, they may find the Turkish Army a more formidable and efficient machine than it has been hitherto. There would therefore seem to be no better prospect of gaining a definite decision next year than in 1921.

- (b.) To select a suitable frontier line and make preparations for the permanent occupation of the territory they propose to annex.

With an unbent Turkish Army still in the field, the Greeks will be compelled, if they adopt this course, to maintain an army in Anatolia of sufficient size to deal with the Nationalist Army. Financial and political considerations would appear to forbid this course.

- (c.) To retire to the boundary of the Smyrna and Brusa enclaves, or possibly to that of Smyrna only, with a view to reducing the size of their army.

By this means they would be able to make great reductions in the size of the army but such a retirement would be regarded as an admission of defeat, an admission to which the Greek Government would probably be unwilling to subscribe. Even if such a course were adopted, there is no guarantee that it would bring peace to Anatolia. Mustapha Kemal has repeatedly declared that he will continue the war so long as the Greeks remain in Smyrna, and there is little doubt that he intends to carry out his word.

11. Conclusions.

In view of the factors enumerated above, it is the opinion of the General Staff that the Greek Army is not capable of enforcing a decision upon the Turkish Nationalists.

In a former paper they gave as their considered opinion that although it appeared possible that the Greek Army, fighting alone and unsupported, might obtain some initial success in the operations which were then about to commence, they saw no prospect of any decisive victory being gained which would bring peace to Anatolia. C.P. 3124,
dated
11.7.21,
para. 2.

The course of recent events has confirmed this opinion. Furthermore, recent decisions of the Supreme Council with regard to neutrality have tended to make the future still darker for the Greeks. The Turks will no longer be restricted to Russian Bolshevik sources and the contraband traffic for the supply of their needs in war material, as they are known to be in negotiation for large supplies of war materiel from European countries. The General Staff are of opinion that, as time goes on, the relative efficiency of the Turks as compared with that of the Greeks is likely to increase.

The General Staff are, therefore, of opinion that the Greeks have nothing to gain by continuing military operations, and that the best course open to them is to commence peace negotiations with Mustapha Kemal immediately, using such territory as they hold to bargain with, before its loss is risked.

Tipkihasım 1'in sonu

SECRET.

My Lord,

The Grand Vizier called on me yesterday.

2. His Highness began by referring to a conversation he had had with Your Lordship at the time of the Conference in London in March of last year. On that occasion he had stated that the Sultan was anxious to conclude a separate agreement with England. The Grand Vizier had recognized that such a solution was not practicable at that moment and Your Lordship had agreed that it was not possible for His Majesty's Government to take separate action from their Allies at that juncture. The conversation in question is recorded in Your Lordship's despatch No.340 of March 15, 1921.

3. The Grand Vizier then informed me that the Sultan had sent for him yesterday and that he had proceeded to the Palace after the Cabinet Council. The Sultan had then unfolded to him the following proposal which His Majesty had instructed him to communicate to me, with the request that I would lay it before Your Lordship. The proposal is to the following effect : - That an agreement should be concluded between England and Turkey under which

the /

The Right Honourable,

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, F.R.S., F.C.S.,
etc., etc., etc.

Tıpkıbasım 2

Padişahan, Boğazlar Bölgesinin yönetimini İngiltere'ye bırakmak şartıyla İngiltere ile ayrı bir anlaşma yapmak istediğini bildiren İngiliz Yüksek Komiserinin gizli yazısı. (Belge 94'un tıpkıbasımı)

The latter would entrust to England the maintenance of the liberty of the Straits in the interest impartially of all nations. England could either use her own troops for the purpose or Turkish Gendarmerie, which would be put at her disposal by the Turkish Government and would be under her orders. In fact the administration of the strip of territory necessary to ensure the maintenance of the freedom of the Straits would be vested in British hands.

4. The Sultan thought that such an agreement would remove the objection to the return to Turkey of Eastern Thrace and Adrianople, since England being invested with the guardianship of the Straits on behalf of all nations, would have nothing to fear in the future. Such an agreement would once and for all destroy the idea prevailing in India and elsewhere that England is hostile to the Caliphate and wishes to destroy Turkey. The agreement would be a striking proof of the contrary and would proclaim to the Moslem world the fact that England was the associate or the protector of the Caliphate.

5. The Grand Vizier went on to say that he quite realized that the Allies had bound themselves not to conclude separate agreements with Turkey. To meet this objection the Sultan had recalled the fact that at the time of the Congress of Berlin, Great Britain had been given Cyprus in return for a guarantee of the protection of Asia Minor against Russian interference.

This/

Tipkihasım 2'nin arkası

This arrangement had been negotiated directly between England and Turkey without the cognizance of the other Powers and had, he thought, been communicated to the Conference whilst it was sitting. The Sultan had also referred to the policy of England in Egypt. The basis of this policy had been and would continue to be the determination to keep open British communications with the East through the Suez Canal. This object had been achieved and the Egyptians had at the same time secured their complete independence. His Majesty did not see why the same results should not be obtained in the case of the Straits. The freedom of the Straits was of the utmost importance to British interests. England, therefore, could be entrusted with the maintenance of that freedom which need not interfere with the full independence of Turkey. The Sultan considered that of all the Powers, England was the most far-seeing.

6. The Grand Vizier said that he was in agreement with the proposal which His Majesty had put forward. He had reflected over this proposal all night and had come to me to-day to ask me to transmit it to Your Lordship. The Sultan had impressed on him the necessity of secrecy in this matter and had even asked him not to mention this proposal to the other Turkish Ministers not excepting Izzet Pasha. He hoped, therefore, that Your Lordship would treat this matter equally confidentially and not communicate the proposal to the French or Italians. Finally His Majesty had declared that if an agreement on the lines indicated could/

Tipkibasım a'nın arkası

could be reached with England he would sign and ratify it at once.

7. I listened to the Grand Vizier's statement with great attention and at the end of it I thanked him for it as well as for the confidence which the Sultan seemed willing to repose in my country. But I thought it only right to remind His Highness of the criticism which the action of France in concluding the Franco-Kemalist agreement behind the backs of her Allies had aroused on the part of British public opinion. Was not the Sultan asking us to contemplate an action similar to that for which we had blamed the French? The Grand Vizier replied that the circumstances were not quite similar. The Franco-Kemalist agreement had done great harm; it had made the Kemalists arrogant and intractable. An agreement with England such as the Sultan had suggested would on the contrary be to the benefit of the whole world. I replied that I thought that it would tend to rouse jealousy on the part of the Allies. I also asked the Grand Vizier how the Nationalists would view such an agreement. He replied that they could not possibly object to it, especially if it resulted in the return to Turkey of Eastern Thrace with Adrianople.

8. In speaking as he did of the Franco-Kemalist agreement, it is clear that the Grand Vizier was largely animated by the resentment felt by the Sultan and possibly himself, at having been side-tracked in this matter. Whilst I see the obvious objections to the proposal made by the Sultan, I think it would be a

mistake /

Tipikbasım z'nin arkası

mistake to look upon it merely as a device in accordance with Turkish policy to separate the Allies. I believe the Sultan to be sincerely imbued with the desire for close relations with England. He has never made any secret of this desire. He notes the close relations at present existing between France and Angora and he is afraid of the extent to which Mustafa Kemal has committed himself to the Soviet Government. He foresees the moment when the Nationalists will be free to come to Constantinople bringing with them perhaps their commitments both to France and to Soviet Russia. He looks about for a protector and he instinctively turns to England. I, therefore, hope that whatever reply Your Lordship may see fit to return to the Sultan's proposal, and the Sultan will expect a reply, it will if it is a refusal, be made as palatable as possible to the Sultan and his Government.

9. Before he left, the Grand Vizier told me that the Sultan had often felt the irksomeness of having to converse with me through an interpreter. If he could talk English or French, His Majesty would open his mind much more freely to me.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

With the highest respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient,

Humble Servant,

Horace Rumbold

HIGH COMMISSIONER

Tipkhasını 2'nin Sonu ve Yüksek Komiser Sir Horace Rumbold'un imzası

No. 799,
(5312/4850/1922).

British High Commission,
Constantinople.

12th September, 1922.

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to
Your Lordship herewith copy of a letter which
I have addressed to General Harington in reply
to his letter to me of the 7th September regarding
the protection to be afforded to the Sultan.

Enclosure.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

With the highest respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient,
humble Servant,

Herma Rumbold

HIGH COMMISSIONER.

The Most Honourable,
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., F.C.,
etc., etc., etc.

Tıpkıbasım 3

Buyuk Zafer üzerine Padişahın koynması ve İstanbul'dan kaçırılması konusunda
İngiliz Makamları arasında yazışmalar. (Belge 166'nın tıpkıbasımı)

(Copy)

S E C R E T.

C.R.A.F. /1525/3.

Subject: Protection of H.I.M.
The Sultan in case of
emergency.

Date September 7th 1922.

FROM:- Lieutenant General Sir Charles H. Harington, K.C.B., D.S.O.,
Commanding-in-Chief,
The Allied Forces of Occupation (Turkey),
Constantinople.

TO :- His Excellency,
The British High Commissioner,
British Embassy, Constantinople.

The Senior Naval Officer, (CONSTANTINOPLE),
H.M.S. " AJAX".

Your Excellency,

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith for your
information copy of War Office letter No. 0182/6134
(D.M.O. & I) dated August 22nd, 1922.

I beg to draw Your Excellency's /your attention
to paragraph 3 of the War Office letter regarding the
measures to be taken for the protection of His Imperial
Majesty the Sultan.

Will Your Excellency please inform the Senior
Naval Officer, (CONSTANTINOPLE), what accommodation will
be required and will the Senior Naval Officer please inform
me in what ship the accommodation will be reserved, so that
I may arrange any escort that may be necessary on shore to
enable His Imperial Majesty to reach the ship.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,

(Signed) C.H. Harington.

Lieutenant General,
Commanding-in-Chief,
THE ALLIED FORCES OF OCCUPATION (TURKEY).

Tıpkıbasım 3'ün 1. eki
Padişahın korunması ve kaçırılması konusunda General Sir Charles
Harington'un 7 Eylül 1922 günlü gizli yazısı

(Copy)

34

SECRET.

0152/6134/ (D.M.O. & I.)

War Office,
London, S.W.1.

22nd August, 1922.

Sir,

I am commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter C.R.A.F. No. 3222/L of the 5th inst., in which you ask for certain advice and instructions in view of the situation which has arisen owing to the concentration of Greek troops on the Frontiers of Thrace, and the threat of a similar concentration of Kemalist forces in the Ismid Peninsula.

I am to say that the telegrams and letters sent to you personally by the Secretary of State and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff since the despatch of your letter under reply, as well as the official communications from the War Office, will no doubt have given you the advice and information you require on most of the points raised in your letter.

As regard the person of the Sultan himself, the Council consider that you should take all precautions for his safety, and that preparatory arrangements should be made with the Navy to provide accommodation for him in one of His Majesty's Ships, should it become unsafe for him to remain in Constantinople.

I am to add that the Council concur in your appreciation of the situation from the point of view of International Law.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) B.B. CUBITT.

The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
The Allied Forces of Occupation,
Constantinople.

Tıpkıbasım g'ün v. eki.

Padışahın güvenliğinin sağlanması için İngiliz Savaş Bakanlığından General
Harinton'a salımlar

No. 6012/4830/1922.

British High Commission,
Constantinople.

11th September, 1922.

FROM :- The British High Commissioner,
Constantinople.

TO :- The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Allied Forces of Occupation,
Constantinople.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant forwarding me copy of a letter from the War Office, dated the 22nd ultimo, and drawing my attention to paragraph 3 thereof, regarding the measures to be taken for the protection of the Sultan.

2. The Senior Naval Officer at Constantinople, to whom a copy of your letter under reply was likewise sent, informs me that, having referred the matter to the Commander-in-Chief for instructions, Admiral Webb has now received a reply directing him that "he should be guided by the instructions of the High Commissioner".

3. If and when I hear that there is serious likelihood of the Sultan requiring protection in Constantinople itself or desiring to leave the City, I will consult immediately with yourself and the Senior Naval Officer.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient,
humble servant,

(Signed) Horace RUMBOLD.

HIGH COMMISSIONER.

Tıpkıbasım 3'ün 3. eki.
Padışahın korunması ve kaçırılması konusunda Yüksek Komiser H. Rumbold'dan
General Harington'a yazı

Printed for the Cabinet. September 1922.

SECRET.

C.P. 4135.

CABINET.

I circulate the following telegram which has been received from India, as I think that my colleagues will be interested to see the view of the situation taken by the Government of India.

PEEL.

15th September 1922.

*From Viceroy, Foreign and Political Department, to Secretary of State for India,
11th September 1922.*

1124—S. Greco-Turkish crisis must be expected to cause violent repercussion throughout the Islamic world, and may add considerably to our difficulties in India, on North-West Frontier and Afghanistan. We therefore earnestly beg that His Majesty's Government will give every possible weight to India's interest before reaching their decision. We recognise the immensity and complexity of the problem and the limited area of our own knowledge of the international situation, but India's interests, internally and externally, are so deeply involved that we dare not let this deter us from pressing our views. From India's standpoint, the essential thing is the restoration of the old cordial relations between Great Britain and Turkey, and fact that Greek débacle was preceded by Greek demand for Allies' evacuation of Constantinople seems to us to afford an opportunity. Whether our own proposals last February would still suffice seems very doubtful, they are at all events absolute minimum. In any case we earnestly beg that His Majesty's Government, whilst taking steps for adequate protection of minorities, will assume the leading rôle amongst Allies with which she is credited throughout the East, and will not suffer France and Italy to reap credit of taking the initiative in recognising fundamental change in . . . position. Restoration of our old relations with Turkey would mean:—

- (1) Immediate reconciliation with Moslem India as a whole, and crippling, if not extinguishing, of non-co-operation movement.
- (2) Material strengthening of our position in Afghanistan and consequent easing of our frontier difficulties.
- (3) Detachment of Turkey from Russia, and consequent set-back of Bolshevism.

Even if it should involve readjustment in our general Arabian policy, this would be compensated for by increased stability, the cutting down of our own commitments and eventual restoration of our general prestige and influence throughout the East. On the other hand, any attempt to rob the Turks of the legitimate fruits of their victory would awaken a storm much greater than before throughout Islam, and might, probably would, involve serious consequences to India.

Tıpkıbaşı 4

Türk zaferinin İslâm dünyasında şiddetli yankılar yapacağı ve İngiltere'nin güçlüklerini artıracağı hakkında Hindistan Kral Naibliğinden alınan ve İngiliz Kabinesine sunulan telgraf. (Belge 169'nun tıpkıbaşı)

Drift.

Sir H. Humbold,
Constantinople.
Telegram

No.

Very Urgent

copies will
No distribution.

Return done

L.O

F.O.,

September

1922.

Despatched

M.

Private and Secret

Re

Your No. 415.

I think I should send for your personal guidance confidential indication of lines upon which our policy is proceeding. Cabinet yesterday was gravely impressed with danger of position in which victorious Kemalist army may, either now, or even while a Conference is sitting, ignore Allied unity, and attempt a military move either upon Straits or Constantinople, or even seek to interfere in Thrace. They felt that if we are to maintain our position in a Conference, it must be supported by adequate force. Accordingly two more battalions and two squadrons of aeroplanes are being sent to Harington. Arrangements are also being made for further reinforcements by a division if required later on; and Dominions Governments are being approached. Meanwhile I am addressing Roumania and Yugo-Slav Governments, pointing out to them menace to their own interests of a Kemalist descent upon Europe, and a Kemalist solution of Straits question, and am offering to support their admission to...

Tıpkıbasım 5

İngiltere Dışleri Bakanlıgından İstanbul Yüksek Komiserine tel. Muzaffer Türk ordusu karşısında İngiltere Boğazlar Bölgesinde kuvvet yoluyla tutunmak kararındadır. (Belge 189'un tıpkıbasımı).

to European Conference to construct new Treaty, if they will give an earnest of their sincerity by providing troops without delay for defence of Constantinople and the Straits.

I propose to go to Paris next week for a private conversation with Poincaré, being convinced that only by Franco-British understanding can a solution be reached. If I have obtained or can promise military reinforcements above referred to, I shall be in a position to exert strong pressure upon him and to claim similar military support from France. As regards Conference I agree with you that early meeting of such a gathering is indispensable. My idea has been to propose at Paris, that it shall be summoned without delay, that it shall be Peace Conference with power to make new Treaty, that it shall consist of the Great Powers, and, upon understanding already referred to, of States locally concerned, viz. Roumania and Jugo Slavia, that Greece and Turkey shall of course be present, and that any Power, possessing local interests e.g. Bulgaria shall if thought necessary be heard. As to locale of such a conference Italy is pressing hard for conversion of Venice meeting as originally planned into a full European Treaty Conference. Choice lies between Venice and Paris, since for reasons....

Tipkubasam 5th in arkam

reasons of expediency we do not propose to press for selection of London. Between France and Italy, there is not in respect of loyalty, much to choose; but we are rather afraid of an Italian chairman, playing off France against England and always coming down on the side of former. Drawback of either Paris or Venice is that Kemal would not attend, and that his representative might either not have full powers or be liable to be thrown over on his return.

I am not clear however whether the conference that you suggest is satisfied by above conception, or whether you still have in mind a local meeting, devoted as you say, to bringing about formal cessation of hostilities and to examine larger points at issue. I am sceptical about desirability of two conferences but await your views on this point, and also your own idea of best manner and place in which conference whether major or minor should be held.

Alleged Turkish atrocities at Smyrna, if confirmed, strengthen our position and will secure popular support to strong action which I have foreshadowed.

Greatest confidence is felt in judgment both of Harington and yourself, and the more freely you communicate with me, if necessary confidentially, the better will it be.

Tipsibaam 5'in sonu

TURKEY.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Sir H. Rambold (Constantinople).
21st September 1922.

D. 1.10 a.m. 22nd September 1922.

R. 8.30 a.m. 22nd September 1922.

No. 445. (D).

VERY URGENT.

Addressed to Paris No.23 for Lord Curzon.

French High Commissioner who returned from Smyrna this morning has given me a full account of his interview with Kemal. French High Commissioner stated that he received no telegram from his government whilst he was at Smyrna and that he was unaware of withdrawal of the French detachments from Asiatic shore of both Straits. French High Commissioner saw Kemal twice. He described him as talking more like a victorious general than as a politician. He began by urging him not to violate neutral zones as such action would bring him up against three most powerful countries in Europe. Kemal replied that his troops were already in motion and that he intended to march on Constantinople as soon as possible. Whilst French High Commissioner believes Kemal's statements regarding rapidity of his army's movements were partly bluff he is convinced that he does mean to march on Constantinople. He will probably march on Chanak simultaneously. Kemal said that he must have Eastern Thrace up to Maritza line. He made no mention of
Western

Tıpkıbasım 6

Franız Yuksek Komiserinin İzmir'de Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile yaptığı görüşme hakkında İngiliz Yuksek komiserinin telgrafı. (Belge 227'nin tıpkıbasımı)

Western Thrace. He said he did not propose to transport a large army to Thrace but that he must send a certain number of troops there to maintain order. He said that as he was convinced that England would not agree to modification to any considerable extent of her policy in Thrace he must settle matter by military means. His army had accomplished one part of its task and must accomplish the rest. He must either go on or demobilize and he must finish the business before the winter set in.

French High Commissioner had pointed out that Mustapha Kemal must surely be reluctant to destroy Constantinople but this argument did not seem to weigh much with the Turks.

Mustapha Kemal said that he would come to a conference but would not arrest movements of his troops. He suggested conference might be at Soutari.

French High Commissioner derived impression that Nationalists only care about territorial question at present moment. Mustapha Kemal and his staff were suffering badly from swelled head. Mustapha Kemal had summoned his ministers to meet at Smyrna. This meeting will probably take place tomorrow and French High Commissioner thinks it will decide line of policy to be followed.

Mustapha Kemal is in great fear of being assassinated.

French High Commissioner implored Mustapha Kemal not to prejudice meeting of conference by committing any rash act. He also warned him of tenacity of England when once she was engaged in a struggle.

I told French High Commissioner that you were

Tipkhasan G'nin sonu

Telegram No. 472.

Paris

En clair

September 22nd 1912.

By bag

TELEGRAM FROM LORD HARDINGE.

Following from Lord Curzon.

Have just returned from meeting of quite unprecedented description. Our object was, I understood, to discuss terms of possible general agreement between ourselves as to bases of future conference, and indications that might be given in issuing invitation to Kemal. Accordingly I began by expounding main propositions concerning Constantinople, Thrace and Straits, for which I sought and received approval of Cabinet yesterday.

invitation ~~invitation~~ As regards Thrace, I was particularly anxious that any ~~invitation~~ given to Kemal should not wholly prejudice question, or leave him to think that Turkey would regain entire pre-war frontiers and authority. I had in mind possible erection of a buffer State under League of Nations in Eastern Thrace. Poincaré commenced by reading out accounts of military position of most menacing description, declared that the sole chance of peace was to make overtures to Kemal at Ihdania, since he would absolutely decline to come to Europe, and that indispensable condition was immediate promise of Maritza frontier and Adrianople. He wanted this declaration to be made to-morrow without any reserve or qualification. I contested Poincaré's account of military situation, and remarked incidentally that if it was as he said, and if Harington were forced to evacuate, which I did not believe, the reproach would not be his, but that of those who had abandoned him.

Poincaré then commenced a second speech by a bitter attack on Harington whom he accused of having deliberately misrepresented to his colleagues the attitude of the French and Italian Governments. I instantly and indignantly repudiated this charge; whereupon Poincaré lost all command of his ^{temper}

Tıpkıbasım 7

Lord Curzon'un Paris'te Poincaré ile yaptığı kavga hakkında raporu.
(Belge 243'un tıpkıbasımı)

temper, and for a quarter of an hour shouted and raved at the top of his voice, putting words into my mouth which I had never uttered, refusing to permit the slightest interruption or correction, saying that he would make public the insult to France, quoting a telegram from Athens to the effect that the British Minister had asked the Greek Government to furnish 60,000 men for the defence of Thrace and the Straits, and behaving like a demented school-master screaming at a guilty school-boy. I have never seen so deplorable or undignified a scene. After enduring this for some time I could stand it no longer and rising, broke up the sitting and left the room. Monsieur Poincaré ultimately came out and made an apology, explaining that he had been exasperated at the charge that France had abandoned her Ally - a word which for my part I declared my willingness to withdraw - although I suspect that the sting lay in its incontestable truth. I only report this scene as illustrating the peculiar character and un governable emotions of the man with whom I am dealing. I should not have thought it possible for anyone in such a position, the Chairman and host of the proceedings, to make such a display, and it needed more than ordinary self-restraint not to terminate the conference abruptly and announce my intention to return to England.

After half an hour I reentered the room and the discussion was resumed. Monsieur Poincaré once more insisted on his formula for submission to Kemal, and defined it as meaning the full restoration of Turkish sovereignty up to the old frontiers, subject to the demilitarisation of a strip on the Turkish side of the future boundary and a corresponding strip on the Greek side of the same boundary in Eastern Thrace.

All/

Tipkbaum 7'nin arkası

All other questions were ignored, Kemal being left to interpret the silence in his own way. I asked whether Monsieur Poincaré was really prepared to restore the pre-war conditions, and whether Serbia and Roumania would accept such a solution. In reply he categorically declared that the Serbian King and Ministers had yesterday given him assurances in a sense absolutely opposed to their conversations with me and that Roumania was of the same opinion.

Seeing that we were rapidly approaching another impasse, I said at once that I must decline to make the statement which he proposed, which involved an absolute surrender to Kemal on the most important point of the Pact, while leaving everything else unsettled. But I then produced a formula which I had prepared in advance as indicating in general terms the limits to which I was prepared to go. Text of this has been telephoned. It closes with ^{the} proposal that Harrington should go to Iudania to meet Mustapha Kemal and endeavour to arrange the recognition of lines behind which the Turks and Greeks are respectively to stand in Asia and Europe pending final conference. Poincaré said that he could not accept any formula without submitting it to his ministers, and he suggested that if we could not agree we might send the invitation in our own terms, and the French and Italians theirs. He even asked if he might assure Kemal that though holding back now, there was a good chance of our falling into line later on. I declined all these suggestions and said that I was willing to stay in Paris, and resume discussion of British text to-morrow afternoon, after Monsieur Poincaré had consulted his colleagues in the morning. This was agreed to and a meeting is fixed for 2 p.m. I shall do my best to secure a

Tipsbasım y'nin arkası

collective invitation, if that be possible, and, even if the French choose to add a private gloss of their own. If not, we must each address Kemal in our own way.

The British Cabinet will I trust appreciate that by these steps we have gained another day both here and at the other end, and that Mudania will mean several days more. Before the end of this time our preparations should be complete and in any case the prospect of an attack upon ^{Chenak} ~~Chana~~ or Ismid seems now to be receding.

I grieve to have to report to my colleagues an experience so painful as that which I ^{just} passed through this afternoon and which I hope never to be compelled to repeat.

I intimated to Poincaré that at conference we should have to raise question of future military position on ~~Chenak~~ ^{Chenak} side of Straits, ^{at which} ~~an~~ which he taunted me with the departure from terms of March last. I replied that military situation was now wholly changed, as had been admitted by his own generals and admirals. Indeed he has always declined himself to be bound by anything that was settled in March.

Tupkabasın 7'nin arkası

Since writing above I have received a request from Count Sforza to consider whether in lieu of general phrases about Thrace I cannot accept to-morrow^a/definite reference to the Maritza and Adrianople in the draft formula suggested. He will of course support Poincaré; and he points out undesirability of several Notes to Turks, and certainty that if concession has ultimately to be made, French will get the entire credit. This afternoon I argued that this might produce violent explosion among Greek army and Greek population in Thrace, and would involve complete surrender to Turkish demands. I am reluctant therefore to make concession, and cannot do it without Cabinet authority. I will await your decision.

Tipikbasım 7'nin sonu

PARAPHRASE

Clear the line.

Despatched 0830 27. 9.22.
Received 0400 27. 9.22.

From: General Harrington.

To: War Office.

2468 cipher 15/9.

Part I. I again interviewed Kemal Bey to-day and got him to wire direct to Mustafa requesting that Turkish cavalry should be withdrawn from Laprak and Krenksal and I wired personally to Mustafa also. Every effort is being made by me to get them out without force. We cannot allow them to remain or they will bring up guns and be dangerous to fleet. An ultimatum has been issued by Colonel Shuttleworth that he will be obliged to use force at 0700 to-morrow but this I have cancelled. General Harbord, who knows my desire to avoid conflict has been sent off to-day to investigate on spot and report. I shall give Mustafa 48 hours to reply and withdraw his troops. It will show that forces are moving up behind if he does not withdraw his troops.

Part II. He can produce 7 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions (total 23,000 sabres and rifles) 10,000 men and German Pandurians areas for an attack on Chanak. I can offer a stout resistance, and by evacuating Constantinople which I should have to do, would obtain a reserve brigade. Allies have agreed together to defend the Straits - British in fact, others on paper. I presume policy remains same that I am at all costs to hold Gallipoli and Chanak. If I do this, would other divisions be sent? Before I become seriously engaged I must know this as I should have to make preparations to hang on some 30 days. I should have to judge moment to evacuate if I am not to be reinforced. I can do whatever you wish. My own personal opinion is that Mustafa will not attack seriously. He is trying to force me into firing the first shot. I am trying to avoid this but he cannot be allowed to put a nat round us and put guns on Straits.

Tıpkıbasım 8

General Harrington'un, Türk askerinin Çanakkale bölgesinden geri çekilmesini istediğini ve Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya bu yolda bir telgraf çektiğini bildiren telgrafı. (Belge 273'ün tıpkıbasımı)

C O D E.

From: G.H.Q. Constantinople.

To: War Office.

27.9.22.

CLEAR THE LINE

1221 27th September, 1922.

Following is the telegram I sent yesterday to Mustapha Kemal Pasha. Begins. I have asked Hamid to communicate with you immediately to effect withdrawal of your cavalry from Erenkeuy and from west of Biga. I am most anxious to avoid incidents and request that pending negotiations you will withdraw troops outside neutral zone. Ends. For Mustafa Kemal Pasha's reply please see my immediately following telegram.

.....

G.4.(Ciphers) Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL
D.M.O. & I. D.D.M.O. & I.
M.O.1.1a.2,3,3a.
M.I.1.2.2b,3.
D.S.D. D.M.T. D.Q.M.G.
Paris. Ad.(D.N.I.). Ad.(D.O.D.).
Marquis Curzon. Sir Eyre Crowe.
P.O.(Mr.Oliphant). P.O.(Mr.Osborne).
C.O.(Col.Moynertzhagen).
S.of S. for India. I.O.(Col.Moens).
Mr.Chamberlain. Mr.Churchill.
Sir E.Grigg (for P.M.). Lord Lee.

Tıpkıbasım 9

Türk süvarisinin Erenköy ve Biga yöresinden geri çekilmesi hakkında General Harington'dan Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya çekilen telgraf (Belge 274'un tıpkıbasımı)

CO D E.

From: General Harrington, Constantinople.

To: War Office.

27.9.22.

CLEAR THE LINE

No. 1222 27th September, 1922.

Following is translation of reply received to-day to my telegram of 26th to Mustapha Kemal. Begins. Up to the present I have not been informed of any neutral zone having been established between the Governments concerned and the Government of the Grand National Assembly. The movements of our Cavalry and other units consist in following up the retreat of the hostile Greek Army. Your Excellency is aware that Anatolia has been completely devastated and burnt and that hundreds of thousands of the population have been left homeless by the Greek Army. This Army is on the one hand continuing to perpetrate the same atrocities in Thrace while on the other hand it is profiting by each days delay to reorganise itself. I would further point out (to quote the most recent example of the exemption of the Greek military forces from the conditions of the neutral zone) that Greek aeroplanes at noon on 23rd September carried out warlike operations over Turkish territory in the neighbourhood of Esmirna and that even so recently as the 25th September the Greek fleet anchored in the port of Constantinople. Our efforts to avoid the occurrence of incidents have been genuine and sincere. We find great difficulty however in understanding the reasons for such actions as the destruction carried out by the British troops stationed at Chanak on our territory between Chanak and Eren Keuy the

signature

Tipkibasim is

Mustafa Kemal Pasa'nin General Harrington'a cevabi (Belge 275'in tipkibasimi)

seizure of buildings in the neighbourhood of our town of
 Chanak the destruction of arms and stores belonging to us the
 firing of guns and bombs in proximity to our troops and
 finally the construction of defences by forced Moslem
 labour on the road separating us from the Greek Army. I
 take this opportunity of informing you that the observance
 of the freedom of the Straits has always been admitted by
 us and I request Your Excellency to take steps to prevent the
 occurrence of any misunderstanding prior to the assembly
 of the coming conference which we sincerely hope will
 lead to permanent results. Signed. Mustapha Kemal.
 Ends. For my reply please see my immediately following
 telegram,

.....

G.4. (Ciphers) -Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL
 D.M.O. & I. D.D.M.O. & I.
 M.O.1.1a.2,3,3a.
 M.I.1.2.2b.3.
 D.S.D. D.M.T. D.Q.M.G.
 Paris. Ad.(D.W.I.). Ad.(D.O.D.).
 Marquis Curzon. Sir Eyre Crowe.
 F.O.(Mr.Oliphant). F.O.(Mr.Osborne).
 C.O.(Col.Meinertzhagen).
 S.of S. for India. I.O.(Col.Moens).
 Mr.Chamberlain. Mr.Churchill.
 Sir E.Grigg (for F.M.). Lord Lee.

Tipkhasim to'un sonu

C O N F.

From : General Harington, G.H.Q., Constantinople.

To : War Office.

Recd. 22.9.22
Recd. 20.9.22.

1223 28th September, 1922.

Following is my reply to His Excellency Mustafa Kemal my telegram 27th September. Have received your telegram. This is first intimation I have had of any misunderstanding regarding neutral zone as proclaimed by allied powers. I would draw your attention to fact of your Commander at Izmid last year actually marking neutral frontier at Yarinje in conjunction with my Commander. I realize your objective as being Greek military force. There are none in zone which you are threatening nor have any passed through. To take your points in order

(a) The Greeks have not had any aeroplanes at Ekinli or neighbourhood to my knowledge.

(b) Greek Fleet has been entirely withdrawn from Constantinople this day under the strictest British pressure.

As regards your charge against the British

(1) Certain demolitions have taken place under orders of the inter-allied sub-commission of disarmament and certain minor case as a military precaution. Enquiries being made as to the extent of these.

(2) Certain registration of artillery taken place but not one shot has been fired in anger against your troops nor will be fired in anger against your troops except by my orders. My one desire is to avoid conflict with your troops. I trust forbearance I am showing will convince you my sincerity. I note with much pleasure your solemn declaration with regard to frontier of the Straits which the

Allied

Tipkhasim :

General Harington'un Mustafa Kemal Papa'ya ikinci telgrafi. (Belge 285'in tipkhasimi)

Allied powers reciprocate. I share your desire for early negotiations which would lead to peace which the world desires. In view of above, I earnestly ask you again to withdraw any appearance of threat to my forces at Chanak and the Straits so as to avoid any possibility (3 groups omitted). Should there be still points of misunderstanding between us would be prepared to proceed to meet at any place mutually agreed to between us should you wish to do so. I take opportunity to tell you on behalf of England that the reinforcements which have been sent to me were sent solely in interests of peace as I was careful to state in the communique which I published recently. It is therefore an immense relief to me to hear from you that you have no aggressive intentions against my troops.

C.4. (Cipher). Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL.

D.M.O. & I. & D.D.M.O. & I.
H.O. 1.1a.2.3.3a.
M.I. 1.2.2b.3.
D.S.D. D.M.T. D.Q.M.G.
Paris. Ad. (D.N.I.) Ad. (D.O.D.).
Marquis Curzon.
Sir Eyre Crowe.
P.O. (Mr. Oliphant).
P.O. (Mr. Osborne).
C.O. (Col. Mairsitzhagen).
S. of S. for India.
I.O. (Col. Meane).
Mr. Chamberlain.
Mr. Churchill.
Sir E. Grigg (for P.M.)
Lord Lee.

Tipkhasum 11'in sonu

TURKEY.

POLITICAL.

Copy of Cypher telegram from Commander-in-Chief, 96

(Mediterranean), to the Admiralty.

D. 1st October, 1922.

N. 1st October, 1922, 5.28 p.m.

No. 436.

Following has been received from W.A.C. Second Light Cruiser Squadron, Smyrna. Begins:-

Monsieur Bouillon, personally, has (been) given me this message, the result of 27 hours conference with Kemal and Cabinet. (begins)

Paragraph A. I have succeeded in obtaining immediate and complete halt of Turkish troops. Entirely due to personal authority of Kemal that halt was ordered. Advance on Chanak and Constantinople had begun.

Paragraph B. Word of honour has been given that no advance (will) be made, each side remaining in present positions occupied today 30th September, without movement, reinforcement or entrenchments on either side.

Paragraph C. As against this immediate inter-allied occupation of Thrace demanded to be carried out on lines already communicated to President Interallied Conference.


Paragraph D. It has been decided Generals will meet at Mudania on 3rd October definitely settle question of stoppage of troop movements and occupation of Thrace. Ismet Pasah will represent Kemal who left for Angora evening of 29th September. (Ends).

Sailed for Constantinople in French "Edgar Quinnet". (Ends).

97

Tipkiyasim 12

M. Franklin-Bouillon'un İzmir'de Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile yaptığı görüşmelerinin sonuçları hakkında İngiltere'nin Akdeniz Başkomutanının telgrafı (Belge 310'un tipkiyasımı)



Resim 1

Sakarya uchrî kıyasında toplanmış bir Yunan askerî konvoyu (*L'illustration*,
9. 9. 1922, No. 4149)



TINOPOLIS.

TINO. "MY CITY, I THINK."

BRITISH TROOP. "WELL, THINK AGAIN."

Resim 2

Istanbul'u işgal etme emeline kapılan Yunanlıyı canlandıran bir İngiliz karikatürü. Yunanlı, İstanbul'a "Benim şehrim" diye bakmakta, İngiliz, "bir kez daha düşün" demektedir. (Punch, 9. 8. 1922)

L'ILLUSTRATION

PARIS, 10 SEPTEMBRE 1922

SAMEDI 9 SEPTEMBRE 1922

100 FRANCS



Le général Ismet Paşa, commandant en chef des armées turques en Asie Mineure,
au milieu de son état-major à Ankara (haut et à droite Mustafa Kemal).

(Dessiné par le peintre turc Mustafa Kemal Paşa, d'après une photographie prise par le général Ismet Paşa.)

Resim 3

Batı Cephesi Komutanı İsmet Paşa (İnönü) kurmay heyetiyle birlikte ünlü
L'Illustration dergisine kapak olmuştur. [9 Eylül 1922]

LE JOURNAL ILLUSTRÉ
15, rue de Valenciennes, PARIS
F. A.
L'ILLUSTRATION

NUMÉRO 16 SEPTEMBRE 1922

RENÉ BAUCHE, directeur

10 francs N° 415

Abonné: M. BERNARD, rue de la Chapelle




M. BERNARD, Paris

De gauche à droite : Mustafa Kemal Paşa, et le commandant en chef des armées nationales, le général Ismet Paşa.


Photographie prise à Constantinople par le 107^e Régiment d'Artillerie, le 10 septembre 1922.

Resim 4

Muzaffer Baykomutan Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa (Atatürk) ile Batı Cephesi Komutanı İsmet Paşa (İnönü) L'Illustration dergisine kapak olmuştur.
(16 Eylül 1922)



Resim 3
Türk suvarisinin henir'e gışı (L'Illustration, 23. 9. 1922)



Resim 6
İzmir'in kurtuluşu üzerine İstanbul'da, Fatih Camii avlusunda zafer şenliği
(*L'Illustration*, 23. 9. 1922)



Resim 7

Büyük Zafer üzerine İstanbul'da yapılan zafer şenliklerinde Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın resmi otomobilde taşınıyor (*L'Illustration*, 23. 9. 1922, No. 4151)



Resim II

Türk zaferi üzerine İngiliz kolonisinin bir bölümü Londra bandralı "Elpiniki" adlı Yunan gemisiyle İzmir'i terk ediyor. (*L'Illustration*, 23. 9. 1922, No. 4131)



Resim 9
İzmir'deki İtalyan kolonisi "Scrivia" vapuruna yükleniyor. (*L'Illustration*,
30. 9. 1922, No. 4152)



Resim 10

Türk zaferi üzerine İzmir limanında gemilere doluşmağa çalışan Rum göçmenleri (*L'Illustration*, 30. 9. 1922, No. 4152)



Resim 17

Türk zaferi üzerine Mudanya limanının sığınan XI. Venedik tımarını kaçıran
zafıçı içinde. [L'Illustration, no. 9, 1922, No. 4152]



FALLEN IDOLS.

YISİ. "CHEER UP, CAPT. AFTER ALL, YOU'VE ONLY BEEN KNOCKED OUT. I'VE BEEN KICKED OUT."

Resim 12

Yunan yenilgisini canlandıran bir İngiliz karikatürü. Yunan kralı Yunan askerine, "Nişaneyi sen nakavt oldun, ben ise tekmeleli oldum" diyor. (Punch, 4. 10. 1922)




NINE YEARS AFTER.

KEMALIST. "WHAT DID SIR EDWARD GREY SAY IN 1913? 'THE TURK MUST CONSOLIDATE HIMSELF IN ASIA MINOR.' WELL, I'M DOING IT."

Resim 13

Türk zaferini canlandıran bir İngiliz karikatürü. Yunanlığı altına almış olan kemalist Türk, "eski İngiliz Dışişleri Bakanı Sir Edward Grey, 1913'te, 'Türkleri artık Anadolu'da güçlensin', dememişmiydi? Öyleyse işte onu yapıyorum" demektedir. (Punch, 13. 9. 1922)



Resim 14
İngiltere Başbakanı
D. LLOYD GEORGE



Resim 13
İngiltere'nin İstanbul Yüksek Komiseri
SIR HORACE RUMBOLD



Resim 16

İstanbul'da İtilâf Devletleri Komutanları. Soldan sağa : İtalyan Generali Montebelli, İngiliz Generali Sir Charles Harington ve Fransız Generali Charpy.

(*L'Illustration*, 30 Eylül 1942, No. 4152)

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